

## DECLASSIFIED

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ENDORSEMENT on CO, 5th Marines ltr 3/BJH/1cc, 3100, Ser  
57 of 14 August 1967

From: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation CIMARRON)

Ref: (a) COMUSMACV Inst 335-9 of 2 April 1967

I addressed and forwarded ~~accompanying~~ with the basic report.

*J. R. Stockman*  
J. R. STOCKMAN  
By direction

9TH/MAR

A/A Rpt (Opn CIMARRON)

1 June - 25 July 1967

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9th Mar Regt  
Control No 00686-67  
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## HEADQUARTERS

9th Marines

3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
c/o FPO San Francisco 96602

30 SEP 67

3/BM/loc

3100

14 Aug 1967

SER# 35-63-67

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
Subj: Combat After Action Report

- Ref. (a) Maps Vietnam 1:50,000 to Series L7014, Sheets 6442 IV, 6342 I, 6342 II, 6442 I, 6442 II, 6441 I, 6542 IV, 6542 III, and 6441 IV.  
 (b) 3d MarDiv Ltr 1-67  
 (c) 3d MarDiv Op Order 2-67 (Sparrow Hawk)  
 (d) 3d MarDiv Op Order 30-67 (OG, Third MarDiv 201640Z May67)  
 (e) 3d MarDiv O PO2000 2E (COI)  
 (f) CG, 3d MarDiv 211415Z Jun67  
 (g) 3d MarDiv Frag O 35-67  
 (h) 9th Mar Op O 7-67  
 (i) 9th Mar Frag O 1-67 for Op CINCPAC  
 (j) 9th Mar Frag O 2-67 for Op CINCPAC  
 (k) 9th Mar Frag O 3-67 for Op CINCPAC  
 (l) 9th Mar Frag O 4-67 for Op CINCPAC  
 (m) 9th Mar Frag O 5-67 for Op CINCPAC  
 (n) 9th Mar Frag O 6-67 for Op CINCPAC  
 (o) 9th Mar Frag O 7-67 for Op CINCPAC  
 (p) 9th Mar Frag O 8-67 for Op CINCPAC  
 (q) 9th Mar Frag O 9-67 for Op CINCPAC

Encl (1) Operation CINCPAC Overlay I.  
 (2) Unit after action reports 1/9, 2/9, 3/9, 2/3 Filed Apr

1. Code Name. Operation CINCPAC.

2. Date of Operation 010000H Jun67 to 021000H Jul67.

3. Location. JAG TRI Province (C.M LO and GIO LINH District).

4. Command Headquarters. 9th Marines (Rein)

5. Task Organization

9th Marines (Rein)

HqCo, (-) (Rein)

LTCOL KILLY 01 Jun67 to 03 Jun67  
COL JIRUE 04 Jun67 to 02 Jul67

Det, Comm Co, HqBn  
Downgraded in three (3) year intervals  
Declassified after twelve (12) years.

1st Bn, 9th Marines

MAJOR FULLAM

Co A, 1st Bn, 9th Marines  
 Co B, 1st Bn, 9th Marines  
 Co C, 1st Bn, 9th Marines  
 Co D, 1st Bn, 9th Marines

2d Bn, 9th Marines

LTCOL PEELER

Co E, 2d Bn, 9th Marines  
 Co F, 2d Bn, 9th Marines  
 Co G, 2d Bn, 9th Marines  
 Co H, 2d Bn, 9th Marines

3d Bn, 9th Marines

MAJOR WOODRING

Co I, 3d Bn, 9th Marines  
 Co K, 3d Bn, 9th Marines  
 Co L, 3d Bn, 9th Marines  
 Co M, 3d Bn, 9th Marines

2d Bn, 3d Marines

MAJOR BEARD

Co E, 2d Bn, 3d Marines  
 Co F, 2d Bn, 3d Marines  
 Co G, 2d Bn, 3d Marines  
 Co H, 2d Bn, 3d Marines

6. Supporting Forcesa. Direct Support and General Support Units

12th Marines - Direct Support and General Support as required.  
 3d Recon Bn (-) (Rein) - General Support.  
 2d Bn, 12th Marines - Direct Support.  
 Co. C, 3d Engr Bn - Direct Support.  
 Co C, 3d AT Bn - Direct Support.  
 Co A, (Rein), 3d Tank Bn - Direct Support.  
 Co C, (Rein), 3d SP Bn - Direct Support.  
 1st Bn (Rein), (AW) (SP), 44th ADA, USA - Direct Support.  
 G Btry, 29th Arty, USA - Direct Support.

b. Artillery

(1) Artillery support for the 9th Marine Regiment during Operation CIMARRON was provided by the 2d Battalion, 12th Marines operating in a direct support role. Reinforcing fires were provided by the 12th Marine Regiment. During operation, D/2/12 displaced from DONG HA (YD 2159) to (YD 2265).

(2) Direct support artillery fired 30,614 rounds, broken down as follows:

Targets	Round
Observed Missions 539	105mm 18,075
Unobserved Missions 253	107mm 7,230
H&I Targets 5,380	155mm 5,309
Total 6,172	Total 30,614

(3) Significant surveillances were as follows:

- 34 KIA (Conf)
- 20 KIA (Prob)
- 1 Bridge Destroyed
- 2 Bunkers Destroyed
- 1 Truck Destroyed
- 1 Gun Position Partially Destroyed
- 13 Secondary Explosions

c. Air Support

(1) Helicopter Support

(a) During this operation there was one battalion (-) troop lift, inserting two companies and a Battalion Command Group. The lift commenced at 290730H and was completed at 290850H. The lift was completed without incident or casualties.

(b) Resupply and medevac aircraft supported the operation from DONG HAI. There was frequent helicopter resupply totaling 348,526 pounds helilifted to ground units. There were 85 medevac missions, lifting 156 casualties to DONG HAI from units in the field. There were 108 WIA, 25 NBC, 11 KIA's, 10 civilians and 2 NVA WIA.

(c) Helicopters were utilized in a variety of missions including the helilift of captured rice, and rapid helilift of captured enemy equipment of intelligence value from the field to Regimental Headquarters.

(2) Fixed Wing Support

(a) Fixed wing were used as escort for the helicopter troop lift under control of a tactical air coordinator (airborne).

(b) Fixed wing and CI aircraft were on station or on call throughout the operation. During this operation, within the 9th Marines OAs, fixed wing aircraft flew 482 CAS and 656 TPQ missions, dropping 4,903,000 pounds of ordnance.

(c) A flare equipped aircraft was either on station or on call throughout the operation.

7. Intelligence

a. Estimate of Enemy Strength in Operating Area. During the course of the operation, there was a change in the composition of enemy forces in the operating area. The area will be divided into two areas for purposes of this paragraph.

(1) South of Route #9 and CUA VIET River, the enemy strength stayed relatively stable.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>
808 Bn	YD 3757	190
814 Bn	HAI LANG District	350
C.10 Co	YD 3338	120
TRIEU PHONG Co	YD 2245	80
H.99 Co	YD 4251	80

(2) North of Route #9 and CUA VIET River, it was a changing situation. The 812th Regiment withdrew and was replaced by the 90th Regiment near the end of the operation. A battalion of the 803d Regiment moved into the area. Near the end of the operation, two battalions of the 29th Regiment moved to the western fringes of the operating area. During the course of the operation, the 31st Regiment moved into the old operating area of the 32d Regiment east of GIO LINH along the coast. Strength of these units at start of operation were as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
31st Regt	Moved from KIM MON area to the coastal plains east of Route #1	2,285
803d Regt	Northern IMZ. Moved one Bn into southern IMZ (YD 1175) near end of operation.	2,400
812th Regt	Moved out of SVN to NVN	1,740
90th Regt	Moved out of NVN into area north of CON THIEN	2,400
29th Regt (-)	Moved east into NUI TOT MON area (YD 1162) during operation	1,500

b. Estimate of Enemy Capability of Reinforcing

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EST STRENGTH</u>
803d Regt	IMZ	2,400
32d Regt	Eastern IMZ	2,625
33d Regt	Eastern IMZ	2,625

c. Specific Information on enemy in areas

(1) Intelligence gained during this operation indicated that the enemy was using the month of June to reorganize and regroup. An extensive effort was made by the NVA/VC to collect rice from the QUANG TRI province. Some evidence of this was the almost nightly harassment of CAP P-2, with the mission of occupying this unit while other forces carried rice from the coastal plains across Highway #1 into the piedmont area. There were also frequent reports of the enemy harvesting rice at night in the area east of GIO LINH.

(2) In addition to the rice gathering mission the enemy was building his forces for an offensive move. The following was evidence of this action:

- (a) Increased sightings in the DMZ area by A0's.
  - (b) Increased contacts by patrols around CON THIEN.
  - (c) Build up of enemy artillery and anti-aircraft weapons in area north of BEN HAI.
  - (d) S-2, 2d ARVN Regiment, indicated that enemy had a five year history of conducting those types of operations during this period of the year.
  - (e) An increase of SPAR activity in the eastern DMZ region.
  - (f) The "dark of the moon" coincided with other indications of offensive action.
- (3) Outstanding cooperation with Division and 12th Marine Aerial Observers obtained during this operation. Close contact between observers and S-2, 9th Marines, proved to be a prime source of accurate information on enemy movements and build-up.
- (4) Extensive use of AN/TPS-21 radars at CON THIEN and on Hill 30 (YD 139613) provided valuable assistance for perimeter defenses.

d. Enemy Capabilities

(1) Enemy was capable of massing up to four regiments in the area North of Route #9 and CUA VIET River and attacking friendly positions at a time of his choosing.

(2) Enemy was capable of massing up to two battalions and two local force companies in area South of Route #9 and CUA VIET River and attacking positions at a time of his choosing.

(3) Enemy was capable of conducting small unit attacks against friendly forces throughout 9th Marine OA.

(4) Enemy was capable of withdrawing but would do so only under heavy pressure.

(5) Enemy was capable of defending in areas of his choice

(6) Enemy could reinforce with units from North Vietnam.

e. Adequacy of Pre-D-Day Intelligence. Information provided by division and obtained from intelligence gathering units in the OA provided adequate intelligence prior to commencement of operation.

f. Enemy Casualties

KIA 152 (Conf)

KIA 196 (Prob)

g. Fortifications. Extensive enemy bunkers and trenches were found throughout the northern portion of the 9th Marines OA. Bunkers were found in no specific pattern nor of a specific design. Some were fighting bunkers but the majority were strictly for shelter.

h. Terrain Analysis. No specific analysis was made for this operation. See 9th Marines Intelligence Estimate for June 1967.

i. Weapons Captured

34 Individual Weapons

11 Crew-Served Weapons

45 Total Weapons

j. Enemy Tactics. The enemy employed classical guerrilla tactics. In the southern portion of the area he harassed and distracted the CAP unit in that area so that he could move rice in another area. In the northern portion of the 9th Marines OA he employed scouting and patrolling techniques. In this method he was able to observe actions by FMMF and prepare for offensive action at a time and place advantageous to him.

k. Intelligence gained from interrogation. No tactically significant intelligence was gained from PW's or DETAINERS.

1. CIVIL AFFAIRS

(1) On 6 June, coordination was made with CM LO officials concerning curfew.

(2) On 8 June, conference was held with all OPCON units to review the Kit Carson Scout program, availability of civil affairs commodities, and reports.

(3) On 13 June, refugees in HA THANH (YD 220698) were granted permission to return to VAN AN (YD 155685) for ten days to harvest rice.

(4) On 17 June, conference was held by Division Civil Affairs Officer. Area coordinators were appointed and units, for coordination were assigned. 9th Marines were assigned villages of CAN HAI, CAM LO, HIEU, TRIEU LUONG, TRIEU LE, GIO HAI, and TRIEU VAN. District and village headquarters were visited and statistics compiled on all villages.

(5) On 18 June, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines held a medcap and talent show in CAM LO.

(6) On 24 June, K Company, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines evacuated 8000 lbs of rice from (YD 268700). Delivered to 2d ARVN Regiment.

(7) On 27 June, regimental order was issued assigning units areas of responsibility for civil affairs.

(8) During July 1226 Vietnamese were treated at medcap.

m. Psychological Warfare.

(1) During operation CIMARRON the operating area was saturated with leaflets. On each day of the operation leaflet drops and broadcasts were conducted.

(2) The themes utilized during the operation were

- (a) NVA Chieu noi
- (b) NVA surrender
- (c) Exploitation of VC misery
- (d) A variety of Chieu noi appeals

(3) A total of 6,914,000 leaflets were dropped in support of the operation.

(4) A total of 26 hours and 25 minutes of aerial speaker broadcasts also supported the operation.

8. Mission. Ninth Marines (Rein) provide security and defense of DONG HA Combat Base and CAI LO Bridge site. Be prepared to provide reinforcements, counterattack and relief forces for GIO LINH artillery outpost and CUA VIET facility. Maintain an active ground surveillance program and conduct spoiling attacks throughout assigned OA to detect and destroy infiltrating NVA personnel. Provide security for Routes #9, #561 and #1 in assigned OA and AOR. Assume OCON of Marine elements of C.C's within assigned OA and AOR. Support GVN RD program within assigned OA and AOR. Occupy and defend CON THIEN complex. Provide one rifle company (Rein) OCON GIO LINH artillery QMDR for defense and security of that position. Assist units located at mouth of CUA VIET River in regard to defense and security measures and fire support. Augment security forces of CUA VIET facility as required. Conduct operations in coordination with 1st Amtrac BN to detect/deter waterborne infiltration and discover/destroy enemy weapons and ammunition caches in designated areas. Conduct operations as directed in assigned AOR. Coordinate use of areas with RVN, as required.

9. Concept of Operations. Ninth Marines (-)(Rein) provides security and defense of DONG HA Combat Base by utilizing forces of ten ~~to~~ commands with infantry forces providing coordination and the reserve force. Security and defense of CAI LO bridge site is provided by one rifle platoon (Rein). Provides reinforcements, counterattack and relief forces for GIO LINH artillery outpost and CUA VIET facility from assigned forces as required. Maintains an active ground surveillance program and conducts spoiling attacks throughout assigned OA with assigned forces to detect and destroy infiltrating NVA personnel.

Provide security for Route #9, Route #61 and Route #1 in assigned O4 by aggressive patrolling along flanks utilizing Combined Action Platoons and other assigned forces. Occupies and defends CON THIEN Complex with a command group and a battalion (-). Provides one rifle Company (Rein) CPCON GIO LINH artillery commander for defense and security of that position. Assists units at mouth of CU A VIET River with regard to defense and security measures and fire support as required. Augments these forces as required. Conducts operations in coordination with 1st Antrac Battalion to detect/deter waterborne infiltration and discover/destroy enemy weapons and ammunition caches in designated areas. Conducts operations as directed in designated AOR, coordinates use of area with ARVN, as required in carrying out these missions. General and direct support artillery will be employed as feasible. In addition fixed wing and helicopters will be used as feasible and commensurate with availability.

01 June 1967

At 010825H a patrol from E/2/3 discovered/destroyed a 60mm mortar round explosive device, vicinity (YD 120610). At 011130H vicinity (YD 121672) E/2/3 discovered 2 EN KIA (Conf). At 011500H vicinity (YD 275575) C.P-P2 administered first aid to and medevaced 2 VN children who had been playing with an M-79 round.

02 June 1967

At 020125H vicinity (YD 137665) E/2/3 received 4 rounds of incoming mortar fire. There was no damage or casualties. At 021200H vicinity (YD 154704) D/1/9 made small arms contact with 3 VC, swept area with negative results. At 021445H vicinity (YD 106123) B/1/9 captured 3 enemy rifles. At 021545H vicinity (YD 135666) E/2/3 detonated a chicom grenade resulting in 1 USMC KIA, and 1 USMC WIA, from an explosive device. At 021650 vicinity (YD 150115) a patrol from D/1/9 made small arms contact with unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 021700H vicinity (YD 122593) 1 Marine from 15th CBT was killed and 1 PF WIA by M-26 frag grenade explosion. At 022145H vicinity (YD 283570) C.P-P2 ambushed 5 VC, resulting in 1 PF KIA and 1 PF WIA. At 02140H 2 Marines from Hq Co, 9th Mar were wounded by accidental discharge of M-16 rifle.

03 June 1967

At 031000H vicinity (YD 155714) A/1/9 received small arms fire. Resulting sweep of the area revealed 1 M-16 AF mine, 1 3.5" rocket launcher serial number 175214, and assorted small arms ammunition and equipment. Also suffered 2 USMC WIA. At 031000H vicinity Company area A/1/9 destroyed enemy emplaced M-16 AF mine.

At 031155H vicinity of (YD 253599) a C-130 aircraft received small arms fire while taking off from DONG HA. Area swept with negative results. At 1100H E/2/3 vicinity (YD 136683) destroyed 2 chicom grenades. At 031300H June 1967 Colonel JERJE assumed command of 9th Marines (Rein) vice Lt. Col. KELLY. At 031300H B/1/9 discovered 1 gas mask and 2 kshki shirts vicinity (YD 201678). At 031350H vicinity (YD 106675) B/1/9 discovered/destroyed an enemy bunker complex with assorted small arms and ammunition. At 031600H vicinity (YD 122600) A/2/3 apprenended 1 VN male 16 years old with a USMC dog tag in his possession.

04 June 1967

At 041130H vicinity (YD 173670) A/2/3 detonated explosive device resulting in 2 USMC WIA. At 041130H vicinity (YD 215736) 2/9 received 3 incoming unknown caliber artillery rounds resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 041330H vicinity of (YD 150700) A/2/3 discovered/destroyed 50 enemy bunkers. At 041515H vicinity (YD 154718) E/2/3 discovered multiple explosive devices consisting of 32 chicom grenades and 10 pounds of TNT complete with electrical and non-electric blasting caps. At 041845H vicinity (YD 145141) E/2/3 discovered VC base camp area. Destroyed base camp with explosives. At 042145H vicinity (YD 144674) E/2/3 had two friendly ambush units exchange grenades resulting in 2 USMC injured NBC.

05 June 1967

At 040230H perimeter at DONG HA Combat Base received small arms fire and 3 incoming hand grenades. Returned fire and swept area with negative results. At 050745 vicinity (YD 156727) A/1/9 destroyed 1 AP mine consisting of TNT and 8 chicom grenades. At 050815H vicinity (YD 159697) A/1/9 discovered/destroyed a tunnel complex. At 050845H A/1/9 received 5 to 10 rounds of small arms fire vicinity (YD 158728) resulting in 2 USMC WIA. At 051015H vicinity (YD 163702) A/1/9 discovered/destroyed a deserted defensive position of approximately 1 NVA company. At 051230H vicinity (YD 155655) E/2/3 evacuated 110 villagers. At 051235H vicinity (YD 115701) CON-21EN an O1-C aircraft made a forced landing. At 051300H vicinity (YD 158713) A/1/9 destroyed a triangular shaped enemy position consisting of 33 bunkers and 17 fighting holes complete with covered trenches. At 052140H vicinity (YD 130581) CAR-F3 fired an artillery mission on 1 VC squad with negative results. 2/9 (-) commenced search and destroy operations vicinity (YD GS 2668) and Northeast of DONG HA in the area used by the enemy to fire rockets. E, 2/9 commenced search and destroy operations East of GIO LINH to 050215H.

06 June 1967

At 060745H vicinity (YD 274550) CAP P-2 exchanged small arms fire with unknown size VC force resulting in 2 USMC WIA and 1 EN KIA (Prob) and captured several enemy documents. At 060910H vicinity (YD 114721) A/1/9 received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire with negative results. At 060930H vicinity (YD 164727) A/1/9 destroyed an enemy defensive position composed of 13 bunkers and 42 fighting holes. At 061025H vicinity (YD 128718) 1/9 called an airstrike on an enemy bunkered position resulting in two secondary explosions. At 061200H E/2/9 exchanged small arms fire with unknown size NVA force resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 061200H vicinity (YD 270718) E/2/9 called an artillery mission on an enemy force fleeing a village resulting in 4 EN KIA (Prob). At 061350H vicinity (YD 166726) A/1/9 received 2 rounds of 82mm fire resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 061430H vicinity (YD 143724) B/1/9 discovered 4 NVA KIA (Conf) and captured military equipment and three explosive devices. At 061440H vicinity (YD 133624) F/2/3 had 1 TD-18 bulldozer damaged by an AT mine and resulted in 1 USMC WIA. 2/3 (-) conducted screening mission vicinity CAM LO for Premier KY's visit.

07 June 1967

At 0730H vicinity (YD 115702) 1/9 detained 3 VN civilians who claimed to have escaped from NVA prison camp. At 070800H vicinity (YD 159748) a 9th Marines AD called airstrike resulting in 1 EN KIA (Conf) and 3 EN KIA (Prob). At 070845H vicinity of (YD 183710) A/1/9 exchanged small arms fire with 2 VC resulting in 2 EN KIA (Prob). At 071040H vicinity (YD 130724) to (YD 134726) B/1/9 made contact with an estimated NVA platoon resulting in 1 USMC KIA, 13 USMC WIA, and 5 EN KIA (Conf) and captured 1 AK-47 rifle and assorted NVA equipment and ammunition. At 071600H vicinity (YD 152728) A/1/9 discovered 10 EN KIA (Conf). At 071945H vicinity (YD 163724) A/1/9 exchanged small arms fire with 1 NVA squad resulting in 2 EN KIA (Prob).

08 June 1967

At 081000H vicinity (YD 151711) A/1/9 destroyed an enemy fortified mortar position and 5 rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition. At 081030H vicinity (YD 173669) E/2/3 detonated an explosive device resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 081130H vicinity (YD 157726) B/1/9 exchanged small arms fire with an unknown size enemy force resulting in 2 USMC WIA and 2 EN KIA (Prob). 2/9(-) completed operations vicinity of (YD 2668) Northwest of DONG HA and returned to DONG HA at 081725H.

09 June 1967

9th Marines AO ran an airstrike Northeast of CON THIEN resulting in 3 EN KIA (Conf). 3/9 chopped OPGON to 9th Marines at 090800H. At 091320H vicinity (YD 153715) a truck from 11th Engineers detonated an AT mine resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 091520H vicinity (YD 271566) CAP-P2 exchanged small arms fire with an estimated enemy platoon resulting in 2 USMC WIA. At 092300H vicinity (YD 115701), 1/9 received 50-75 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in negative damage. 2/3 moved to DONG HA to commence preparation for backloading as HLT 2/3 at 090845H.

10 June 1967

At 100940H vicinity (YD 167725) 1/9 discovered 1 NVA KIA (Conf) and captured 1 AK-47 rifle. At 101200H vicinity (YD 274554) CAP-P2 exchanged small arms fire with unknown size enemy force resulting in 4 USMC WIA. 1/3/9 relieved G/2/9 at GIO LINH at 101400H. G/2/9 moved by convoy to DONG HA at 101817H. At 101505H vicinity (YD 185735) B/1/9 attacked an enemy ambush resulting in 2 USMC WIA, 1 EN KIA (Conf) and 1 EN POW, captured assorted explosive device and 2 SKS rifles. At 101615H vicinity (YD 127675) E/2/9 discovered 2 NVA KIA (Conf). At 101940H 1/9 vicinity (YD 185735) received 60 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 102400H 2/3 chopped OPGON to CG, Third Lar Div.

11 June 1967

At 110700H G/2/9 commenced search and destroy mission in area bounded by (YD 160550; YD 200650, YD 160990, YD 200690). At 110945H 2/3 commenced backloading as SLF. At 112130H vicinity (YD 183673) G/2/9 received 7 rounds of friendly artillery fire resulting in 1 USMC WIA.

12 June 1967

At 120130H vicinity (YD 276576) CAP-P2 was attacked by unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 EN KIA (Conf), 10 EN KIA (Prob), 20 USMC WIA, 7 PF WIA and 10 civilians injured. At 120300H vicinity (YD 159713) C/1/9 received 1 round of enemy artillery resulting in 5 USMC WIA. At 120745H vicinity (YD 124658) E/2/9 detonated an enemy explosive device resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 121030H to 121730H 1/9 vicinity (YD 180727) received 40 rounds of 60mm mortar fire with negative damage. At 121630H vicinity (YD 110683) B/1/9 discovered 15 EN KIA (Conf). Late AO reports 15 EN KIA (Conf) and 18 EN KIA (Prob). 9th Marines AO called air strike on enemy positions vicinity of (YD 161779) resulting in 2 EN KIA (Conf).

13 June 1967

B/1/9 Chopped OPOON to Composite Arty Bn at 131200H. 3/9 moved to vicinity of CON THIEN to begin search and destroy operation. At 131020H vicinity (YD 103709) D/1/9 detonated an enemy explosive device resulting in 1 USMC WIA. 3/9 commenced search and destroy operations vicinity CON THIEN. G/2/9 continuing operations IAW 3d MarDiv Frag Order 35-67 to insert recon team west of CON THIEN. Platoon of L/3/9 moved to vicinity of CAP-P2 to screen CAP-P2 in the event of an enemy attack.

14 June 1967

At 140500H vicinity (YD 276577) the highway bridge was destroyed by enemy explosives. At 140610H vicinity (YD 096707) K/3/9 ambushed 2 NVA resulting in 1 NVA KIA (Conf). Captured 1 rifle. At 140915H vicinity (YD 128683) E/2/9 destroyed an enemy bunker complex and assorted explosive equipment and captured 1, M-79 grenade launcher ser no. 10482. G/2/9 completed operations West of CON THIEN IAW Div Frag O 35-67. At 140850H vicinity (YD 095709) L/3/9 received 1 short round from friendly 4.2" mortar resulting in 8 USMC WIA. At 140915H vicinity (YD 128683) E/2/9 discovered and destroyed an enemy bunker complex and assorted small arms, and mortar ammunition. At 140915H vicinity (YD 190740) C/1/9 was hit with several command detonated enemy AP mines resulting in 3 USMC KIA and 8 USMC WIA. At 141430H vicinity (YD 188722) B/1/9 received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 5 USMC WIA.

15 June 1967

At 150830H vicinity (YD 155655) E/2/9 detonated an enemy explosive device resulting in 2 USMC WIA. At 151015H vicinity (YD 172672) G/2/9 captured 1 wounded VC, 1 AK-47 rifle, 2 chicom grenades and small arms ammunition. At 151215H vicinity (YD 174663) G/2/9 detonated an enemy explosive device resulting in 2 USMC WIA. At 151255H vicinity (YD 193733) a bulldozer working with B/1/9 detonated an anti-personnel explosive device resulting in hydraulic line damage and 1 USMC WIA. At 151410H vicinity (YD 119668) E/2/9 discovered and destroyed a bunker complex and captured 1 chicom light machine gun. At 151415H vicinity (YD 173664) G/2/9 detonated an enemy directional type anti-personnel mine resulting in 7 USMC WIA. 9th Marines AD reported 9 EN KIA (Conf), 25 EN KIA (Prob), and 1 machine gun destroyed. At 152030H vicinity (YD 282567) CAP-P2 exchanged small arms fire with an estimated VC squad resulting in 2 USMC WIA and 1 EN KIA (Prob). At 140610H vicinity (YD 096707) K/3/9 ambushed 2 NVA resulting in 1 EN KIA (Prob), and captured 1 SKS rifle. At 151320H B/1/9 had one LVT detonate an enemy mine resulting in 2 USMC WIA.

16 June 1967

At 161200H vicinity (YD 172664) G/2/9 captured 1 60mm mortar destroyed bunker complex and 11 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition. One Marine from G/2/9 detonated an enemy explosive device resulting in 2 USMC WIA. At 161445H vicinity of (YD 200734) a bulldozer working with B/1/9 detonated 1 AT mine resulting in extensive damage to vehicle. At 161415H vicinity (YD 180655) G/2/9 detonated an explosive device resulting in 2 USMC WIA. At 161600H vicinity (YD 129722) B/3/9 received 2 rounds of heavy caliber flat trajectory (estimated) artillery fire resulting in 1 USMC KIA. At 161815H C-A-F-2 exchanged small arms fire with an estimated VC platoon resulting in 2 USMC WIA.

17 June 1967

At 170830H vicinity (YD 177661) G/2/9 captured 1 enemy carbine and assorted ammunition and grenades. One Marine from G/2/9 vicinity of (YD 178661) detonated an explosive device resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 170845H vicinity (YD 177655) G/2/9 detonated an explosive device resulting in 3 USMC WIA, also exchanged fire with an unknown size NVA force resulting in 1 NVA officer KIA, captured 1 M-47 rifle, maps and assorted documents and equipment. At 170920H vicinity (YD 202553) C-A-F-2 exchanged small arms fire resulting in 3 USMC WIA. At 171100H vicinity (YD 177661) G/2/9 destroyed one enemy bunker complex and captured 1 M-14 modified rifle, 1 M-47 rifle, 2 chicom sub machine guns and 2 signaling devices, 1 EN KIA (Prob).

18 June 1967

At 180130H vicinity (YD 159650) G/2/9 received 40 rounds of 60mm mortar fire resulting in negative damage. At 180830H vicinity (YD 131718) B/1/9 discovered 8 NVA bodies in a bunker complex. Results: 8 EN KIA (Conf). At 181145H vicinity (YD 125725) B/3/9 discovered 2 NVA KIA (Conf) also destroyed a bunker complex. At 181640H vicinity (YD 177660) G/2/9 discovered 1 NVA KIA (Conf). At 181530H to 181757H vicinity (YD 140738) B/3/9 destroyed a bunker complex, captured 1 light machine gun destroyed assorted small arms ammunition and mortar ammunition and discovered 2 NVA KIA (Conf) and 30 EN KIA (Prob) based on intense dead body smell.

19 June 1967

At 190600H vicinity (YD 148605) B/2/9 received 1 incoming hand grenade resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 190845H vicinity (YD 166732) C/1/9 received 5 rounds of mortar fire with no damage. At 191040H vicinity (YD 125615) B/3/9 received unknown number of mortar rounds resulting in 8 USMC WIA, returned fire and swept area resulting in 3 EN KIA (Conf), 3 EN KIA (Prob) and captured 3 M-47 rifles and assorted military equipment. At 191100H vicinity (YD 130627) a tank with F/2/9 detonated an AT mine resulting in track damage and 1 USMC WIA.

20 June 1967

At 200100H vicinity (YD 102617) H/2/9 exchanged small arms fire and grenades with an unknown size enemy force, resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 200135H vicinity (YD 223730) B/1/9 received 50 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in negative damage. At 200710H vicinity of (YD 145716) K/3/9 captured 1 AK-47 rifle. At 201000H vicinity (YD 186744) B/1/9 detained 4 Vietnamese civilians. At 201130H vicinity (YD 276546) a CAP-P2 patrol was ambushed by estimated VC platoon resulting in 2 USMC WIA. At 201425H vicinity (YD 226743) B/1/9 received 37 rounds of artillery fire resulting in 2 USMC KIA, and 4 USMC WIA. At 201635H vicinity (YD 217743) B/1/9 received 8 rounds of artillery fire, with no damage. At 201425H vicinity (YD 216743) B/1/9 received 37 rounds of artillery resulting in 2 USMC KIA and 8 USMC WIA. From 200800H to 201730H 9th Marines AO reported 3 enemy artillery pieces destroyed vicinity (YD 235800), 2 anti-aircraft weapons destroyed and 11 EN KIA (Conf) and 25 EN KIA (Prob). At 202200H the perimeter at DONG HA Combat Base received 1 hand grenade resulting in 1 USMC WIA. C/1/9 replaced D/1/9 at CON THIEN at 201320H. D/1/9 returned to DONG HA Combat base.

21 June 1967

At 211840H vicinity (YD 244594) L/3/9 had an explosion for unknown reason in their ammunition bunker resulting in injury to 2 USMC. L/3/9 chopped OPCON to 4th Marines at 210700H.

22 June 1967

At 220850H vicinity (YD 155655) E/2/9 detonated an enemy explosive device resulting in 6 USMC WIA. K/3/9 commenced search and destroy operations in area of (YD 2466, YD 2469, YD 2970, and YD 2866) at 220910H.

23 June 1967

At 030030H vicinity (YD 149607) CAP-P3 patrol exchanged small arms fire with VC squad resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 230645H vicinity (YD 266699) K/3/9 detained 1 VC female. At 230815H vicinity (YD 254546) L/3/9 exchanged small arms fire with 2 VC resulting in 1 EN KIA (Conf) and captured 1 AK-47 rifle. At 231200H vicinity (YD 268700) K/3/9 detained 7 Vietnamese civilians and captured 3 tons of rice.

24 June 1967

At 040000H-241800H AO reported 4 EN KIA (Conf) and 11 EN KIA (Prob) vicinity (YD 164715) as the result of airstrikes. At 242210H vicinity (YD 169614) F/2/9 ambushed 3 NVA resulting in 1 EN KIA (Conf).

25 June 1967

At 250700H vicinity (YD 164708) C/1/9 exchanged s/a fire with 3 NVA resulting in 1 EN KIA (Conf), 1 EN KIA (Prob), captured 1 AK-47 rifle and 15 82mm mortar rounds. At 250830H vicinity (YD 280666) K/3/9 detained 2 Vietnamese civilians. At 251210H vicinity (YD 164709) C/1/9 captured 1 enemy light machine gun, machine gun ammunition and 4 chicom grenades. From 250600H to 251800H AOs reported 2 EN KIA (Conf) and 4 EN WIA (Prob) from airstrikes Northeast of CON THIEN. F/2/9 commenced operations vicinity (YD 1762, YD 1767, YD 2062, YD 2067) at 250000H.

26 June 1967

At 260600H vicinity (YD 131715) C/1/9 fired small arms at 2 NVA resulting in 2 EN KIA (Prob) and 1 AK-47 rifle captured. At 260725H to 260800H vicinity (YD 187758) AO reported 21 EN KIA (Prob), 5 EN KIA (Conf) from airstrikes Northeast of DONG HA. At 261200H vicinity (YD 119667) E/2/9 killed 1 VC and captured 4 others. At 261145H vicinity (YD 155646) F/2/9 exchanged small arms fire and received 4 USMC WIA from an enemy command detonated explosive device. At 261000H M/3/9 chopped OPCON to 12th Marines and I/3/9 chopped OPCON to 9th Marines and returned to DONG HA.

27 June 1967

At 270700H vicinity of (YD 123706) B/1/9 discovered 2 EN KIA (Conf). At 271005H vicinity (YD 102662) F/2/9 detonated an explosive device resulting in 3 USMC WIA. At 271650H vicinity (YD 104658) E/2/9 had 2 USMC KIA and 6 USMC WIA resulting from detonation of 4 enemy claymore mines. At 271730H vicinity (YD 115721) D/1/9 discovered 1 EN KIA (Conf). At 271745H vicinity (YD 164655) F/2/9 detonated an enemy explosive device resulting in 1 USMC WIA.

28 June 1967

At 280500H vicinity (YD 153723) C/1/9 detonated 2 enemy explosive devices resulting in 8 USMC WIA. At 281100H vicinity (YD 097668) E/2/9 destroyed an enemy bunker complex, a 50 foot tower, and 50 rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition. At 281205H vicinity (YD 122723) D/1/9 exchanged small arms fire with 3 NVA resulting in 2 EN KIA (Conf) and captured 17 grenades and assorted enemy military equipment. At 281520H vicinity (YD 116701) 1/9 received 8 rounds of 82mm artillery fire. At 281630H vicinity (YD 124724) D/1/9 exchanged small arms fire with an estimated NVA squad resulting in 3 USMC WIA, 3 EN KIA (Conf) and 2 EN KIA (Prob). At 282045H vicinity (YD 137674) E/2/9 detonated an enemy explosive device resulting in 1 USMC WIA.

29 June 1967

At 290010H vicinity (YD 135670) E/2/9 had 1 Marine WIA by enemy hand grenade. At 290605H vicinity (YD 128722) D/1/9 patrol received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 290610H vicinity (YD 125716) D/1/9 exchanged small arms fire with an estimated NVA platoon sized force and called artillery mission resulting in 3 USMC KIA, 15 USMC WIA, 13 EN KIA (Conf) and 18 EN KIA (Prob) captured one light machine gun, 1 AK-47 rifle, and miscellaneous equipment. At 291020H vicinity (YD 265539) L/3/9 detained 20 Vietnamese civilians. At 291127H vicinity (YD 273513) K/3/9 detained 7 Vietnamese civilians. At 291128H vicinity (YD 162691) E/2/9 detained 1 Vietnamese civilian. From 291340H to 291610H vicinity (YD 133724) AD's ran airstrikes resulting in 3 EN KIA (Conf) and 7 EN KIA (Prob) North of CON THIEN. At 291455H vicinity (YD 292528) K/3/9 detonated an enemy explosive device resulting in 2 USMC WIA. 3/9 (-) commenced operations IAW 9th Marines Frag Order 7-67. 2/9 (-) commenced operations IAW 9th Marines Frag Order 8-67.

30 June 1967

At 300715H vicinity (YD 053685) E/2/9 and G/2/9 made small arms contact with unknown size NVA force resulting in 4 USMC KIA, 9 USMC WIA, 1 EN KIA (Conf) and 19 EN KIA (Prob), captured 1 SKS rifle. At 300900H vicinity (YD 053685) E/2/9 discovered 4 EN KIA (Conf). At 301045H vicinity (YD 117702) 1/9 CP received 4 rounds of 82mm artillery fire. Called air strike on suspected position with unknown results. At 301230H G/2/9 and 3d Recon element IAW 3d MAI Div Frag Order 35-67 discovered the area of helicopter crash. The area was completely burned and no bodies or equipment were recovered. At 301300H vicinity of (YD 130695) B/1/9 detained 2 Vietnamese civilians as VC. At 301440H vicinity of (YD 292535) I/3/9 exchanged small arms fire with an unknown size enemy force resulting in 2 USMC WIA, 1 EN KIA (Prob) and 2 Detainees. At 301545H vicinity (YD 055683) E/2/9 had 3 USMC WIA from friendly debris by friendly air strike. At 301800H vicinity (YD 115703) 1/9 received 4 rounds of 82mm artillery fire, fired counter battery fire and caused 2 secondary explosions. At 301830H G/2/9 vicinity (YD 055683) discovered 3 EN KIA (Conf).

31 June 1967

At 010900 vicinity (YD 295543) I/3/9 exchanged small arms fire with a VC squad resulting in 3 USMC WIA, and captured 1 US Carbine. At 011110H vicinity (YD 204545) L/3/9 exchanged fire with 5 VC/NVA carrying weapons resulting in 1 USMC WIA, 1 EN KIA (Prob). At 011715H vicinity (YD 114701) 1/9 CP received 11 rounds of artillery and recoilless rifle fire resulting in 4 USMC WIA. At 011715H vicinity (YD 294546) I/3/9 exchanged small arms fire with unknown size enemy force resulting in 4 USMC WIA. At 011930H vicinity (YD 204545) exchanged small arms fire with 2 VC resulting in 1 EN KIA (Prob) and 3 USMC WIA. At 012025H vicinity (YD 114701) 1/9 received 9 rounds of 82mm artillery resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 012210H vicinity (YD 122591) CAP-P1 received 50 rounds of enemy mortar fire resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 012235H vicinity (YD 148616) H/2/9 exchanged small arms fire with an unknown size NVA force resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 012240H vicinity (YD 204574) CAP-P2 exchanged small arms fire with

2 VC resulting in 3 USMC WIA. AD fired artillery mission on hut containing an enemy vehicle vicinity (YD 198817) resulting in 1 EN KIA (Prob) and 1 EN KIA (Conf). AD ran air strikes resulting in 1 EN WIA (Conf) and 4 EN KIA (Prob) North of CON THIEN.

02 July 1967

At 020910H vicinity (YD 142726) B/1/9 exchanged small arms fire with an estimated NVN squad. At 020745H vicinity (YD 106719) 1/9 received 8 rounds of artillery fire resulting in 3 USMC WIA. At 020840H vicinity (YD 114717) 1/9 detonated an explosive device resulting in 2 USMC WIA. Operation CIMA RON terminated at 02000H Jul67.

### 11. Results

#### Personnel

Friendly:	19 KIA 242 WIA	Enemy weapons captured or destroyed	45
Enemy:	152 KIA (Conf) 196 KIA (Prob) 74 Detainees	Individual Weapons Crew-served	34 11

### 12. Administrative Matters

#### a. Supply

Discussion All resupply was provided through FLSU-1 and the using unit's own organic stock. The method of resupply was via the LSA and road. AD was utilized correctly to order all helicopter resupply with the exception of those emergency requests which went through the AD and HST.

Problem Areas Units tend to go immediately to emergency resupply whenever it appears they won't be getting rations or water when requested on routine request.

Solution. Unit Commanders should be aware of the limited availability of helicopters and limit emergency requests to those of a definite emergency nature. The LSA is currently publishing a SOP explaining the functioning of the AD and the LSA. This should greatly assist in solving this problem in the future.

Communications. Upon commencement of Operation CIMA RON normal operational communications within the 9th Marine Regiment had been established and continued to function throughout the operation without incident. No unusual communication problems occurred during Operation CIMA RON for this regiment.

During this operation, additional radio circuits and radio relay circuits for command and control were not necessary. Command and control was maintained during Operation CINNARON from the 9th Marines CP at DONG HA.

13. Commander's analysis.

a. Operation CINNARON can best be described as a normal operating period. It was characterized by day-to-day patrolling and nightly ambushes. It was not a spectacular operation with headline type results, however the mission assigned was accomplished.

b. In view of the above, the one concise lesson learned was the need to constantly remind units to emphasize the basic principles of scouting and patrolling and of land combat. The tendency exists to become lax as operations become routine. It calls for increased command attention to re-emphasize previous lessons learned.

c. This period also lent itself to an increased civic action program. Units were more stable and could establish a good rapport with villages in their immediate vicinity and accomplished "grassroots" civic action.

14. Recommendations. It is recommended that a unit, during a period such as Operation CINNARON, take the opportunity to re-establish and re-emphasize basic training subjects and also concentrate on maintenance of unit and individual equipment.

*G. E. JONES*  
G. E. JONES

3979 67

HEADQUARTERS  
 9th Marines  
 3d Marine Div (Rein), FMF  
 /o FWD San Francisco 96601

7/BJd/1-1  
 Ser 28 64-67  
 15 Aug 67

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commandant of 1, 2, 3, the Corps (7, 8, 9, 10)  
 Via: (1) C. S. C. General, San Francisco  
 (2) Commandant General, FMF  
 (3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Correspondence for period 1 July to 30 July 1967

Ref: (a) 100 5750.24  
 (b) 3d M. Div C 5750.24  
 (c) FMF 60 5750.3

Enclosure (1) 9th Marines Command Correspondence

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a), (b) and (c),  
 enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. The security classification of this document is downgraded at three  
 (3) year intervals and declassified after twelve (12) years.

*John F. Clark*  
 G-2 JWD B

DEGRADED AT 3 YEAR  
 INTERVALS' DECLASSIFIED AFTER  
 12 YEARS DOD DIR 5200 10

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS

21 22 23  
24 May 1971 25 26 (Per) DDF  
27 28 29 30

CHARTS, TIDE DATA

RAILROAD SCHEDULE

CALENDAR, LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

TIME & DATES

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

## PART I

## ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. North Marines  
3d Marine BN 1967 Col C. E. JERUE

1-3 July 1967 Capt J. E. NICHOL

4-7 July 1967 LtCol J. A. CONWAY

8-11 July 1967 LtCol D. J. L. LEE

12-15 July 1967 LtCol R. J. HUMPHREY

16-19 July 1967 LtCol L.N. VEST  
20-23 July 1967 LtCol L.R. KURTZ

24-27 July 1967 Maj R. C. BELL

28-31 July 1967 Maj J. J. OODPING

1-3 August 1967 LtCol J. J. PEELER  
4-7 August 1967 LtCol W. D. KENT

2. 1-31 July 1967 Doss T. RVI.

3. Executive Officer 1-4 July 1967 LtCol J. J. KELLY

5-8 July 1967 Capt J. F. ANGIL

9-12 July 1967 Maj J. P. SWEENEY

13-16 July 1967 Maj P. B. RATCLIFF

17-31 July 1967 Maj B. J. HILL

1-4 August 1967 Maj J. S. VOGT

5-8 August 1967 Maj J. G. METAS

9-12 August 1967 LtCdr N. L. RICARD

13-31 August 1967 LtCdr D. P. CO, RTY

4. 1967 USN  
20-24 1967 DNE  
25-29 1967 OTH

1967  
1967  
1967

UNCLASSIFIED

P R I T

## I. I. D. R. O. C. O. M. Y.

## 1. Personnel

follows is based on the information available the  
of July 1967.

Barber 37 201  
Brd 11 100  
Non Battle

## 2. Total Personnel

MC OFF	MC INF	NAV OP	NAV INF
3	22		0

## 3. Replacement rates per

MC OFF	MC INF	NAV OP	NAV INF
3	20		1

2. Informational Services. No other news releases were sent out or received by phone.

3. Special Services. 3 ice chests, 2 game kits, 40 general purpose kits (including 200 stationary kits, 130 packages of coke, 3 tennis sets, 2 horseshoe sets, 4 baseball sets, 1 baseball, 1 volleyball and 2 footballs and 50 bags of feed and 2 cases of soda were distributed to the 200 men of Headquarters Company.

## 4. Dispensary

a. Dispensing Problems

b. Dispensing Record

DISPENSING RECORD FOR JULY

CG	0	CG	0
CG	0	CG	0
0	0	0	0

c. Regimental Dispensed Service Hours - 0

d. Many C. and T. to C. I. - 2

T.D.

REDACTED

- Morale, P.X., Postal Affairs and R&R

b. Morale. Morale in Headquarters Company remains excellent.

c. Postal Affairs. Mail losses are continuing.

d. R&R. The following are the latest figures:

Up to 1000 hours 2000 men have been processed due to lack of facilities.

e. Returnees:

- Roughly 3

- 1

- 1

- 1

- 2

- 3

- 1

- 1

Returnees from R&R reported no problems and expressed satisfaction with the program.

c. Administrative. No problems. The Regimental Command post move to location of HQ Bn. HQ Bn to be on 13 July 1967.

7. Transport. - 1000 men, 1000 horses, 1000 trucks and the T-Or

T-2

RECORDED

## 1. AREA CT OPERATIONS

a. Line 1 - The 1<sup>st</sup> line is to be on the east coast of South Vietnam in the 10<sup>th</sup> dist. (51° 11' 30" E to 102° 45' 30" E) border of the OA is the southern boundary. The 2<sup>nd</sup> line is to be the northern border of the OA in the 10<sup>th</sup> dist. (51° 11' 30" E to 102° 45' 30" E) border of the OA and the northern boundary of the OA in the 11<sup>th</sup> dist. (51° 11' 30" E to 102° 45' 30" E) border of the OA. The eastern boundary of the OA will follow the following line (line 1) going to the coast of the South China Sea and then line 2 to the south of the coast along the following line (D 14° 51' 00"), (YD 10° 45' 00") to (YD 10° 46' 00") then the 3<sup>rd</sup> line is the northern boundary of the OA, the eastern boundary following coordinates (YD 10° 46' 00"), (YD 09° 51' 00"), (YD 37° 04' 00") to (YD 06' 00") then follows the QUANG TRI/THUA THIEN Provincial border, any east of the Gulf of THIEN. The eastern boundary follows the coastline not - southern boundary of the OA to the QUANG TRI/THUA THIEN Province boundary.

b. Demographic of the Area

(\*) The CA encompasses an area of approximately 388 square miles. There are two distinct hydrographic regions represented.

(a) Coastal Lowland. The coastal lowland consists primarily of poorly drained flat areas of rice cultivation. Rice cultivation extends inland for approximately 20 km but may extend further along river valleys. A narrow strip of swamp, approximately 4 km wide along the coast consists of well graded sand dunes and sand beaches. Elevations in this area rarely exceed 5 meters. Large areas of open grassland and sand dunes occur on the gently rolling plains between the coast and paved larl and National Route 1. The elevation of these rolling plains is less than 5 meters.

(c) ~~near~~ <sup>across</sup> the ~~coastal~~ <sup>coastal</sup> plains ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> rolling plains and hills. The elevations range from 10 meters to more than 300 meters, the ground slopes range from 10 to 70 percent, but may increase to 50 percent. The topography is more or less irregular "no st. " and generally 3 to 4 km apart so that in the rolling plains and hills, the topography affords large areas for dispersion. The hills become increasingly rugged toward the west and the ~~coastal~~ <sup>coastal</sup> plains, ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> the oil, natural gas, and is generally followed by ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~coastal~~ <sup>coastal</sup> plains.

c. Cultural Features. Cultural features with important tactical significance are

[REDACTED]

(2) DONG HA Combat/Air base . . . . . YD 24590  
 (3) C10 L1N Facility . . . . . YD 27732  
 (4) C10 T1N Facility . . . . . YD 17911  
 (5) CJA 1st Fac . . . . . YD 40098  
 (6) C10 T1N Facility . . . . . YD 145540  
 (7) [REDACTED] runs north and south through the OA  
 (8) [REDACTED] runs along the western boundary of the OA  
 to the T20 Line.

Population. The OA includes a population of approximately 240,000 people concentrated around the major population centers of CUI/NG TRI, CUA HUNG, DONG HA and CTO HENG. Statistical data reflecting the ethnic and religious make-up of the population is limited, but available sources indicate that ethnic Vietnamese make up approximately 90% of the population, 9% are Montagnards and 1% a mixture of Cambodians, Chinese and others. Roughly 60% of the population is Buddhist, 15% Catholic and a smaller number are of the CAO DAI and CONFUCIUS sects. Approximately 75% of the population are subsistence farmers, 20% are employed in some type of family industry, 5% work for the Government of Vietnam.

e. Waterways and LOC's. The OA has numerous waterways. Most of the large rivers, used as LOC's and supply routes, flow into the CJA VIET FOI, which empties into the Gulf of TONKIN. The waterways have great tactical significance, emphasized by the fact that they reach into all sections of the OA. National Route #1 runs from the DMZ on the north, south through the major population centers of the OA. Route #9 from DONG HA westward to the Lao/Thai border is used as a main east-west LOC for the OA.

f. Weather. The weather in July was characterized by monsoon associated winds beginning in the mornings and carrying on throughout the day and into the early evening. Winds were from 10 to 15 miles per hour from the southwest causing dust and sandstorms. Later in the month rain clouds moved in, generally from the west. Humidity during the month averaged about 65%. There were small spurts of rain, usually in the evenings, from the 22d until the end of the month.

## 2. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS.

a. Operation BUFFALO. Operation BUFFALO commenced at 1000H on 2 July 1967, when Company A, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines made contact with an estimated two battalion force of the 90th NVA Regiment in grid squares (YD 1272) and (YD 1372). Companies A and B, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, were on company-sized-sweeps north of CON THIEN on the morning of 2 July. Company B on their advance began receiving small arms fire from their right front, from a large number of NVA. As Company B advanced on the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The volume of small arms increased and they began receiving a heavy mortar barrage. As the contact grew, Company A was called to join and reinforce Company B. At this time, as pinned down by small arms and mortar fire, A, B, C, D and E from the west, they came under small arms fire and were hit. The NVA Company B until late on the evening of the 2d of July. Company C was initially on the south. Company B began to move. As upon advanced, they received supporting and harassing fire from their flanks and as they were closing they came under a heavy artillery and rocket attack. Relief forces from 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, were inserted into the area on the evening of the 2d of July. On the morning of the 3d, 3d Battalion 9th Marines, elements swept north to end the battle field firing numerous NVA bodies and gear including an RPG 7 and 2 rounds of armor. On 4 July, 1st Battalion 3d Marines, joined the operation. Termination of Operation BATTLE was 1500 on 12 July 1967. The operation accounted for 901 NVA KIA (Confirmed), 297 NVA KIA (Probable), 11 Detainees including 2 NVA PW's, 76 individual and 20 crew served weapons captured or destroyed.

b. Operation HICKORY II Operation HICKORY II commenced at 1200H on 12 July, with a force of 5 battalions 2/3, 3/9, 1/3, 1/4 and 3/4. Forces swept from the "trace" on the north to Highway #1 on the south. There was no contact. NVA/VC casualties were attributed to air. Total enemy casualties for the operation were 5 NVA KIA (Confirmed), 0 NVA KIA (Probable), 2 individual and 1 crew served weapons captured. Operation HICKORY II ended on 16 July 1967.

c. Operation KINGFISHER. Commencing at 1600H on 16 July, Operation KINGFISHER opened with little or no contact through 29 July, when 2d Battalion, 9th Marines entered the DMZ in what was to be a spoiling attack. 2d Battalion, 9th Marines advanced into the DMZ following generally the road starting in grid square (YD 0970) and terminating north in the village of CALI SON (YD 0975). The battalion met no resistance until the morning of the 29th, when they commenced to move out of the DMZ. The front of the battalion column or the rear started the initial contact by detonating a mine which was followed by mortar barrages and heavy AW fire from their flanks and rear. The NVA had an estimated battalion-sized unit well entrenched along the road and on the high ground to the battalion's right flank. Contact was maintained during the day and only subsided when dark came. Contact was broken on the 30th and the battalion returned to the area of CON THIEN. Totals as of 31 July were 101 NVA KIA (Confirmed), 273 NVA KIA (Probable), 7 Detainees including 1 NVA Returnee, 8 individual and 1 crew served weapons captured.

3. NVA/VC TACTICS. NVA/VC tactics did not vary during the month. The enemy continued to use his supporting arms, artillery, rockets and mortars, against PAVN bases in this area. The enemy continued to use mines and booby

traps with a slight increase during the month. Tactics employed by the NVA in the contacts made by 2d Battalion, 9th Marines and 1d Battalion, 9th Marines were L shaped approaches. The similarity of both attacks made that the NVA had to use his supporting arms to their greatest advantage. During the month of July the 1d Battalion, 9th Marines, the 1d Battalion, 9th Marines with their supporting arms were in contact with the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. Following this supporting arms pre-occupied on a strong point along the road of their advance. The enemy continued to fight until supported by their supporting arms and forces. Throughout the period the NVA continued his sniping/harassing type actions.

4. NVA/VC COB

a. 341st Division

Strength 15,000  
 Weapons Unk  
 Commander Col LUONG TINH  
 Location DMZ

b. 31st Regiment, 341st Division

Strength 2,360  
 Weapons Unk  
 Commander Col NGUYEN NGOC HUNG  
 Location YD 1677

c. 32d Regiment, 341st Division

Strength 2,600  
 Weapons Unk  
 Commander Maj TINH  
 Location DMZ

d. 324B Division

Strength 9,600  
 Weapons Unk  
 Commander Gen TRAN DO  
 Location DMZ

e. 803d Regiment, 324B Division

Strength 2,600  
 Weapons 82mm morts, 75mm RR, 60mm morts, 12.7mm AA MG, MG's.  
 Commander Maj VO THIET  
 Location DMZ

f. 812th Regiment, 324B Division

Strength 200  
Weapons 82mm morts, 75mm RP, 60mm morts, 57mm RR, 12.7mm AAMG,  
MG's  
Commander 7<sup>th</sup> Col NGUYEN MU NH HE  
Location DMZ

g. 903<sup>rd</sup> Regiment, 324B Division

Strength 1240  
Weapons 82mm morts, 75mm RP, 60mm morts, 57mm RR, 12.7mm AAMG,  
MG's  
Commander TFIEP  
Location DMZ

h. 808th Battalion, MF

Strength 90  
Weapons 4 82mm morts, 2 75mm RR's, 8 60mm morts, 3 57mm RR's,  
3 MG's  
Commander VAN KIEN  
Location YD 3757

i. 814th Battalion, MF

Strength 280  
Weapons 2 82mm morts, 2 60mm morts, 1 B-40, 2 57mm RR's, 2 MG's  
Commander THANH  
Location HAI LANG

j. H-99 Company, LF

Strength 80  
Weapons 1 MG  
Commander VO BA  
Location YD 4251

k. TRIEN PHONG Company, LF

Strength 80  
Weapons Unk  
Commander NGUYEN XUAN LAM  
Location YD 2245

1. C-10 Company, LF

Strength 120  
Weapons Pistols, AK-47's  
Command C40 Reg  
Location YD 3338

2. CAM 10 Company, LF

Strength 60  
Weapons Unk  
Commander N/AIA  
Location YD 1058

3. K-10 Company, LF

Strength 120  
Weapons 3 60mm morts, 2 D-40's 6 BAR's  
Commander 1st Lt DAW  
Location GIC 111MH District

~~SECRET~~S-3 CHRONOLOGY

1. General. In July 1967, the 9th Marines conducted search and destroy operations throughout the O.A. In addition, the Regimental commander ~~had~~ visit to dugout areas the most notable being Major General HOCHMUTH.

2. Operation CLAWHORN. Operation CLAWHORN commenced at 01000H June 1967 and terminated at 02000H July 1967. Units under operational control of the 9th Marines in this period were First Battalion, Ninth Marines; Second Battalion, Ninth Marines and Third Battalion, Ninth Marines. There were no major engagements. The results of Operation CLAWHORN during July were 1 USMC KIA, 25 USMC WIA, 2 EN KIA (Conf), and 7 EN KIA (Prob). Total results for Operation CLAWHORN were 19 USMC KIA, 242 USMC WIA, 152 EN KIA (Conf), 106 EN KIA (Prob), 74 detainees, and 45 (34 individual - 11 crew-served) weapons captured or destroyed.

3. Operation BUFFALO. Operation BUFFALO commenced at 02100H July 1967 and terminated at 140900H July 1967. Units under operational control of the 9th Marines in this period were First Battalion, Ninth Marines, Second Battalion, Ninth Marines, Third Battalion, Ninth Marines, First Battalion, Third Marines; First Battalion, Fourth Marines and Third Battalion, Fourth Marines. There was one major engagement fought primarily by First Battalion, Ninth Marines and Third Battalion, Ninth Marines and involving possibly one Regiment of NVA. The results of Operation BUFFALO were 129 USMC KIA, 576 USMC WIA, 991 NVA KIA (Conf), 297 NVA KIA (Prob), 11 Detainees, 2 POW's and 96 (76 individual - 20 crew-served) weapons captured or destroyed.

4. Operation HICKORY II. Operation HICKORY II commenced at 140900H July 1967 and terminated at 161600H July 1967. Units under operational control of the 9th Marines in this period were Second Battalion, Ninth Marines, Third Battalion, Ninth Marines, First Battalion, Third Marines, First Battalion, Fourth Marines, and Third Battalion, Fourth Marines. There were no major engagements. The results of Operation HICKORY II were 1 USMC KIA, 9 USMC WIA (Medevac), 8 USMC WIA (Nonevac), 3 NVA KIA (Conf), 8 NVA KIA (Prob) and 3 (2 individual - 1 crew-served) weapons captured or destroyed.

5. Operation KINGFISHER. Operation KINGFISHER commenced at 161600H July 1967. Units under operational control of 9th Marines during this period of July were Second Battalion, Ninth Marines, Third Battalion, Ninth Marines, First Battalion, Third Marines and Third Battalion, Fourth Marines. There was one major engagement on 29 July 1967 in which Second Battalion, Ninth Marines engaged approximately two NVA Battalions. Results of Operation KINGFISHER during this July were 26 USMC KIA, 169 USMC WIA (Medevac), 73 USMC WIA (Nonevac), 101 NVA KIA (Conf), 273 NVA KIA (Prob), 7 Detainees and 19 (6 individual and 1 crew-served) weapons captured and/or destroyed.

FIRE SUPPORT CHRONOLOGY1. Artillery support.

a. During July 1967, artillery support for the 9th Marine Regiment was provided by 2d Bn, 12th Marines operating in direct support with general support/reinforcing fires from the 12th Marine Regiment. At the landing of the 2d during Operation BIFFALO, batteries in direct support reached a maximum of 4-105mm, 1-155mm, and 2-107mm batteries. When the SLF re-embarked on 11 July after completing nick Pt II, artillery support for the 9th Marine, reverted to the norm of 1-155mm, 1-107mm, and 3-105mm batteries. On 22 July, 2/12 displayed forward to OAI, TAHEN to better support operations to the north.

b. Significant events. During July, artillery support was concentrated in two periods: Operation BIFFALO from 1000, 2 July to 0900, 14 July and the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines operation in the DIZ CO Lencing 0600-23 July. During BIFFALO, 2/12 fired 25,386 rounds resulting in 229 KIA confirmed. Over 9,000 artillery rounds were fired in support of the 2/9 operation in the DIZ.

c. Total missions Fired

Observed	444
Unobserved	616
H & I	<u>8,802</u>
Total	9,862

d. Rounds expended.

105mm	42,914
107mm	12,067
155mm	<u>3,300</u>
Total	59,181

e. Significant surveillance

255 KIA (Conf)  
 108 KIA (Prob)  
 13 Secondary Explosions  
 5 C4 Pcs  
 1 Artillery Piece Destroyed  
 1 Bunker Destroyed  
 1 Naval Complex Destroyed  
 1 Automatic Weapon Destroyed

2. Naval Gunfire. No Naval gunfire operated in direct support during July. General support/reinforcing fires were provided throughout the month.

AIR SUPPORT ORDNANCEI. Operational Highlightsa. Operation CLAWFISH

(1) Operation CLAWFISH concluded at 021000H Jul 67. Helicopter and fixed wing aircraft were utilized extensively throughout this operation.

b. Operation BUFFALO

(1) Inclusive dates BUFFALO commenced at 021000H July67 and concluded at 140900H July67. Aircraft were utilized extensively throughout the operation.

(2) Helicopter Support

Helicopters performed a variety of missions including reconnaissance, resupply, liaison troop-lift, medevac, helicopter escort and CAS (strafing) missions. Uh 1C gunships were utilized in a CAS role during the initial contact of this operation, until relieved by fixed wing aircraft. There was a 640 man troop-lift on the opening day of the operation. Helicopters Medevaced 322 troops and relieved 267,861 pounds of resupply during this operation.

(3) Fixed Wing Support

Fixed wing aircraft were utilized on close air support, deep air support, TQ, aerial reconnaissance, F4C (airborne) and helicopter escort missions. Fixed wing flew 523 CAS and 472 TQ missions, expending 4,297,500 pounds of ordnance.

c. Operation HAWK II(1) Inclusive Dates

Operation HAWK II commenced at 140900H July67 and concluded at 161600H July67.

(2) Helicopter Support

Helicopters lifted 29 medevacs and 30,096 pounds of resupply during this operation.

(3) Fixed Wing Support

Fixed wing flew 71 CAS and 42 TQ missions expending 446,500 pounds of ordnance.

2. Helicopter Support

- a. Helicopters were utilized on all assigned missions except the spread of riot control agents. They were loaded on 30 minutes standby, but were not utilized in this mission.
- b. There were two large troop lifts this month. A battalion (.) and a company sized troplift totaling 800 troops helilifted.
- c. There was over 105 pounds of resupply flown for 9th Marine units this month.
- d. Medevac missions evacuated 503 troops.

3. Fixed Wing Support

- a. Fixed wing aircraft were utilized on close air support, deep air support, Iro, aerial reconnaissance, aerial observation, FAC (UnForce) and screen and helicopter escort missions.
- b. There was 1,053 close air support and 913 FRO missions expending 8,305,500 pounds of ordnance this month.

4. Personnel and Equipment.

- a. All battalions are up to strength in AFM & FAC's. The UnF capability remains unsatisfactory with the FAC's, no one field technician equipped with U.F. radio available.

S-4 CHRONOLOGY1. Supply and Distribution

a. During the reporting period HSS 1 was the primary source of supply and maintenance for organizations of the 9th Marines.

b. Supply point distribution was in effect during the reporting period.

2. Transportation

a. The primary method of transportation was vehicular. Units utilized organic vehicles and primarily 9th Hs or Transport Bn for troop lifts, resupply runs, and "household" type runs.

b. HAG 16 was the primary source of helicopter support, and was utilized for resupply, med evacs and troop lifts.

3. Engineer Support. Co C, 3rd Bn was in direct support during the reporting period. The BNG Hs Combat Base Coordinator controlled all support of a general camp maintenance nature. Route 9 and 561 have been open during the reporting period and have been utilized as the MSR for units at Camp CARROLL, CO 1 Lt. and CO 2 TIN.

4. Medical. Casualties requiring treatment beyond the capabilities of the organic B S were evacuated to CO 1 Lt, 3rd Med Bn for treatment or further evacuation to 1st Med Bn., MS BATT, the USNS SINKTUY, USS RIBBLE, or further evacuation out of country.

5. General

a. The LS, using the Hs concept of helicopter resupply coordinated all helicopter resupply during the reporting period.

b. Support by all support units was considered excellent.

S-5 CHRONOLOGY1. General

- a. Activities during the month of July included making liaison with District Officials, local officials and members of our OPCON units, to coordinate the Civil Affairs and Psy-War program and reporting on same.
- b. Three new Civil Affairs Officers were appointed during this reporting period. 3/4 now has 3 CA Officers. The new CA Officer for the 1/9 is Lt GRIFFIN and the 3/4 CA Officer is Lt GRIFFIN. The new CA Officer for 2/9 is Lt HERNANDEZ, and the new CA Officer for 3/9 is Lt PENDLAND. S-5, 9th Marines made liaison with the new CA Officers.
- c. SSgt VIOLETTE, of the 244th Psy-Ops Co, replaced Lt MARTIN USA, and is now supporting the 9th Marine Regiment psychological operations.

2. Civil Affairs

- a. On 1 July a Regimental S-5 staff visit was made to the CAM RIC and QUANG TRI District headquarters. Future CA projects were discussed with the District officials. Local village chiefs have agreed to provide guides and Popular Force personnel as security for S-5 representatives of OPCON units when traveling to less secure hamlets within the ~~district~~ respective villages.
- b. On 4 July, 3/9 found a rice cache and brought the rice to the 3/9 rear. Regimental S-5 made arrangements to have the rice trucked to the CAM RIC District Chief for distribution in his area. The cache totaled 60 bags of rice.
- c. On 8 July, Regimental S-5 made a staff visit to all OPCON units to discuss S-5 requisitions and future CA projects.
- d. On 11 July, S-5 met with the Subsector Advisor of TRIEU PHONG District at QUANG TRI to obtain information concerning the pacification progress report on the village of TRIEU VILLAGE. While in QUANG TRI City a staff visit was made to the CHIEN LUU center. The problem of absent Kit Carson Scouts was discussed and partially solved.
- e. On 14 July, Regimental S-5 attended a Civil Affairs conference at CAM RIC meeting with the Division CA Officer. CA operations in the 9th Marine's TAF were reviewed.
- f. On 20 July, 300 lbs of Bulgar and 8 gallons of cooking oil was issued to 3/9 from supplies on hand at Regimental S-5 in support of a food for work project for the Vietnamese people in the 3/9 area.
- g. On 21 July, 150 school kits and medical supplies were issued to 1st MERRIC BN from supplies on hand at Regimental S-5.

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h. On 22 July the S-5 of "A" Co Shore Party Bn was issued 70 school kits, 150 bars of soap and 70 lbs of clothing in support of their CA projects.

i. On 23 July, 60 lbs of medical supplies was issued to 1st ALTRAC Bn in support of their CA projects.

j. On 24 July, "A" Co Shore Party Bn held a MedCap in the Hamlet of MOC DOC (YD 191594). This was the first MedCap held in this area.

k. On 27-28 July, Regimental S-5 assistant made a staff visit to QUANG TRI, meeting with Sgt LIVIS to coordinate acquisition of CA commodities.

l. On 29 July, S-5 transported 90 sheets of roofing tin and 45 bags of cement from the OCO warehouse in QUANG TRI City to C.C-P in support of their CA projects.

m. On 30 July, Regimental S-5 made staff visits to all OREGON units to review future CA projects and reporting.

n. The following is additional data relative to the Regiment's Civic Action program.

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
MedCap totals	1,634 persons treated
Food distributed	3,920 lbs
Soap distributed	150 bars
School kits distributed	220
Tin sheets distributed	70
Bags of cement distributed	45
Number of projects in progress	20

### 3. Psychological Warfare

a. Three Kit Carson Scouts were utilized during this period. One scout assigned to Regiment was wounded at the beginning of this month and is still in the hospital. One scout was on leave at the beginning of this month, one had for about two days and went UA. He has been found. Preliminary reports indicate that the remaining three scouts performance is outstanding.

b. On 4 July, Maj G HILL, Psy-War Officer for 3d ILF made a staff visit to Regimental S-5. The Kit Carson Scout program, leaflet drops, aerial broadcasts and hand distribution of leaflets by troops in the field was reviewed.

c. On 26 July, the Regimental S-5 Officer attended the Psy-War conference at 3d ILF.

d. Leaflets dropped during the month of July, including Operation HICKORY II, totaled 5,725,000.

e. Broadcasts for the month of July totaled 11 hours. Due to faulty equipment the Regiment was not able to comply with all OPCON units' requests for IRB term support.

f. A total of 200,000 leaflets and 6,000 To Do newspapers were hand distributed by OPCON units while on patrol and at ~~not~~ <sup>not</sup>

COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS COMMAND ORGANIZATION

1. During the month of July, operations ~~CHARLIE~~ BUFFALO, HICKORY II and KINGFISHER were conducted within the 7th Marines TACR,

2. Communication Center

a. Comm Spt Co., 7th Co. Bn assumed communication guard for all tenant activities within the DONG HUA Combat Base.

b. During Operations ~~CHARLIE~~, BUFFALO, and HICKORY II, the 9th Marines established a forward CP at C.M. L., at which time a half a Duplex covered teletype circuit was established to the DONG HUA Combat Base Comm Center.

c. During this period the 9th Marines CI (Pear) moved to a new area within the DONG HUA Combat Base and a messenger service was established from the new CP to DONG HUA Combat Base Comm Center.

d. 3947 messages were processed by Comm Center during the month of July.

3. Radio

a. During Operations ~~CHARLIE~~, BUFFALO, HICKORY II and KINGFISHER, a radio tag was dispatched to Q.M. THIN to relay all traffic on Regimental Tac to OpCon units because of the difficulty of voice radio comm to units northeast of Q.M. THIN.

b. During the month of July, an experimental method of remote the  $\Delta/\text{PRC}-25$  over long distance was tried. Utilizing a voice channel of the  $\Delta/\text{PRC}-27B$ , the remote capabilities of the  $\Delta/\text{PRC}-25$  were extended in that we were able to remote an  $\Delta/\text{PRC}-25$  from the DONG HUA Combat Base to Q.M. THIN. This system of remote our Regimental Tac Net from Q.M. THIN to DONG HUA CP, gave us direct communications to our units operating north, northwest and northeast of Q.M. THIN.

4. Wire

a. During the month of July, Comm Spt Co., 7th Co. Bn, installed new telephone cables and a new switching central to relieve the wire section, 9th Marines of the wire system of the DONG HUA Combat Base.

b. During operations conducted during the month of July, wire section established a Senator Forward telephone system and also installed a new Senator Pear telephone system at DONG HUA Combat Base due to the translocation of our rear CP.

5. Radio Relay

a. During the stated period, a 4 channel radio relay circuit was established between our forward CP to the DONG HUA Combat Base.

b. Also an experimental method of extending the remote capabilities was conducted as described in Paragraph 3a of this report.

#### 6. Personnel

a. Personnel strength is nearly up to manning level with the exception of a teletype technician (MOS 201) and 2 K-7 Technicians (MOS 2015) which limits our immediate teletype and crypto repair capabilities.

#### 7. Equipment

a. 9th Marines is in fairly good shape equipment wise with the exception of the below listed items

	<u>On Hand</u>	<u>Dead Lined</u>
AV-8	6	4
N/4xG-110	2	1

Some parts required to move above items from deadlined are on request list at this time.

MEDICAL CHRONOLOGY1. Significant Events.

a. Headquarters Company 9th Marines has changed its geographical location, but is still situated in DONG HU. The regimental Aid Station is located within the company area. The treatment and disposition of all regimental personnel is made by the company corpsmen of this facility. A dental unit is available at Co. A, 3d Med Bn, and gives dental service to all personnel in this area.

2. New Developments

a. H/C Harold H. JOENSON reported to regiment on 13 July 1967, as relief for H/C R. J. BAKER, who was transferred to 3d Med Bn, PHU BAI.

3. Problem Areas:

a. A sanitary inspection of Regiment by PMU-2 was held on 20 July 1967 and several discrepancies were noted at that time, and as of this writing most discrepancies have been corrected or are being worked on.

4. Patient Statistical Data

a. The number of patients seen this month was approximately comparable to those seen last month. All 9th Marine personnel are being seen by the company corpsmen and any referrals are being seen by M. O. Dr. FERRERA at Co. A, 3d Med Bn.

b. Breakdown of patient statistical data number of patients 210, referrals 5, admission 1, dental 8.

c. The majority of treatment consisted of diarrhea, lacerations, and minor infections. Emergency treatment consisted of contusions and burns. No impairment of functional capacity of the unit.

5. Innoculations and Prophylactic Medicine Administered

a. Total immunizations for the month of July were 300, and malarial prophylactic 1,000.

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## PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF  
SITREP COPIES

- 1 Jul 67 - Continued Operation CLEMIRON as provided for in 9th Marines Op O 7-67 (See "ab C").
- 2 Jul 67 - 1/9 became heavily engaged with NVA forces. See SitReps number 1 and 2. At 021000H Jul 67 Operation CLEMIRON terminated and Operation BUFF, I/O commenced, initiated as provided for in 9th Marines Frag Order 9-67. See Tab D.
- 3 Jul 67 - At 030500H to 070545H DONG HUA Combat Base received 120 rounds of heavy artillery/rocket fire resulting in 30 WIA (7 Medevac) and minor damage to 9th Marines area (See Sitreps #3 and #4).
- 4 Jul 67 - At 041645H 9th Marines CP at DONG HUA Combat Base received approximately 7 rounds of heavy caliber artillery fire resulting in 5 USMC WIA (3 Medevac) (See SitRep #9). Assumed OPCON CTG 79.4 effective 040328Z from 3d Marine Division.
- 5 Jul 67 - At 050330H DONG HUA Combat Base received approximately 12 rounds of heavy artillery fire resulting in 2 USMC WIA and 3 USMC WIA (See SitRep #1). At 051745H 9th Marines CP, DONG HUA Combat Base, received four rounds of heavy artillery fire resulting in 16 USMC WIA (3 Medevac) (See SitRep #13).
- 6 Jul 67 - At 061800H to 062215H 9th Marines CP at DONG HUA Combat Base received approximately 25 rounds of heavy artillery. Fired counter-battery fires. Results were 7 USMC WIA (6 Medevac). At 061430H to 062205H personnel of 9th Marines CP observed a suspected surface-to-air (SAM) missiles from launch to destruction. One missile destroyed itself approximately 1000 meters south of DONG HUA Combat Base at an altitude of 1500 feet (See SitRep #17).
- 7 Jul 67 - Chopped OPCON CTG 79.4 (minus H.T 1/3) to 3d Marine Division effective 071450Z, 9th Marines CP at DONG HUA closed 071245H and opened via C.M. I/O effective 071245H Jul 67.
- 9 Jul 67 - 2/9 completed relief of 3/9 in place. See 9th Marines Frag Order 10-67, Tab E and SitRep #26.
- 10 Jul 67 - 2/9 completed relief of 3/9 whereupon Co A and C/1/9 were chopped OPCON from 3/9 to 1/9. See Tab E and SitRep #31.
- 13 Jul 67 - Chopped OPCON of 1/9 to 3d Marines effective 131600H. Assumed OPCON 3/4 from 3d Marines effective 131200H (3/4 relieved 1/9 and assumed mission of defense of CON THIEN). Assumed OPCON 1/4 effective 131200H. All units commenced preparations for execution of 9th Marines Op O 11-67 (HICKORY II). See Tab F and SitRep #43.

III-1

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- 14 Jul 67 - At 140900H Operation BUFFALO terminated and Operation HICKORY II commenced. All units commenced operations in accordance with 9th Marines Op O 11-67. See Tab F and SitRep #46 for Operation BUFFALO and SitRep #47 for Operation HICKORY II.
- 15 Jul 67 - The DC on two occasions, made his helicopter available to the 9th Marine Regimental and the Battalion Commanders for reconnaissance. This greatly facilitated OPCON units in planning future days' operations.
- 16 Jul 67 - Chopped OPCON 1, to 4th Marines effective 161915H. See SitRep #2. Operation HICKORY II terminated at 161600H and Operation KINGFISHER commenced. See SitRep #3 for Operation KINGFISHER.
- 17 Jul 67 - 1/2 moved to DONG HUA at 171615H. Commenced backloading to resupply mission as SLF. See SitRep #4 and #6. Assumed OPCON of Co I, 3d Bn, 4th Marines effective 171733H and passed OPCON to 3/4 effective 171833H.
- 18 Jul 67 - Chopped OPCON MLT 1/3 to CTG 79.4 effective 181300H. See SitRep #9.
- 19 Jul 67 - Issued 9th Marines Op O 12-67 (KINGFISHER). See Tab G. At 192200H vic ID 143613 9th Marines CP received two rounds of arty/rocket fire approx 1000 meters outside perimeter. See SitRep #14.
- 20 Jul 67 - H/2/9 commenced combined search and destroy operation vic of V.N KIM village and adjacent villages. See 9th Marines Frag Order No. 1 (In support of ARVN Operation LAM SON 88), Tab H and SitRep #16.
- 21 Jul 67 - H/2/9 completed operation. See SitRep #21.
- 22 Jul 67 - 9th Marines CP at (YD 139615) closed at 221300H Jul 67 and opened at DONG HUA Combat Base (ID 239536) at 221300H Jul 67.
- 25 Jul 67 - Assumed OPCON M/3/9 from 12th Marines and passed OPCON to 3/9. Chopped OPCON M/3/9 to 12th Marines. All effective 251615H. See SitRep #37. Issued 9th Marines Frag Order No. 2 for Operation KINGFISHER. See Tab G.
- 27 Jul 67 - Set Red Alert at 9th Marines CP at 270337H because of incoming arty at DONG HUA Combat Base. Secured Red Alert at 270430H. See SitRep #43. At 271103H DONG HUA Combat Base received three rounds of artillery.
- 28-30 Jul 67 - At 200530H 2/9 commenced execution of 9th Marines Frag Order No. 2 for Operation KINGFISHER. See Tab I and SitRep #48. On 29 Jul 2/9 became heavily engaged with an estimated two IV A battalions. On 30 Jul contact broken and all units out of DMZ at 391150H. See SitRep #49.

## DECLASSIFIED

NAVAL MESSAGE  
OPNAV FORM 110-28 (REV. 3-61)

SECRET

RELEASED BY

G. E. JERUE COLONEL

DRAFTED BY

P. D. RATCLIFF MAJOR

PHONE EXT NR

PAGE

PAGES

TOP/TOD

22 JUNE 1967

ROUTED BY

CHECKED BY

1 OF 2

MESSAGE NR	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	DEFERRED
	22 JUN 67	ACTION			XXXXXX			
		INFO			XXXXXX			

FROM: NINTH MARINES

TO: FIRST BN, NINTH MARINES  
SECOND BN, NINTH MARINES  
THIRD BN, (-), NINTH MARINESINFO CG, THIRD MARDIV  
TWELFTH MARINES  
THIRD MARINES  
THIRD TANK BN  
THIRD AT BN  
NINTH MT BN  
THIRD MED BN  
THIRD ENGR BN  
THIRD SP BN  
FIRST AMTRAC BN

Change of mode

22 June 67

4PM

SECRET

OPERATION ORDER 7-67 (OPN CIMARRON) CHANGE NO. 1

A. 9TH MARINES 311331Z MAY67

1. THE FOLLOWING CHANGES WILL BE MADE TO REFERENCE (A):

A. UNDER PARAGRAPH 2 DELETE THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE: "BE PREPARED TO REINFORCE OR PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO CON THIEN CIDG CAMP IN THE EVENT OF ENEMY ATTACK". INSERT THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE: "OCCUPY AND DEFEND CON THIEN COMPLEX".

B. UNDER SUBPARA 3A DELETE THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE "PROVIDES FORCES AS REQUIRED TO REINFORCE OR PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO CON THIEN CIDG CAMP IN THE EVENT OF ENEMY ATTACK". INSERT THE

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UNCLASSIFIED

DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)

TAB C

DECLASSIFIED

## DECLASSIFIED

MESSAGE  
F057211028 (REV. 3-61)~~SECRET~~

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MESSAGE NR	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	DEFERRED
		ACTION						
		INFO						

FOLLOWING SENTENCE: " OCCUPIES AND DEFENDS CON THIEN COMPLEX  
WITH A CMD GRP AND A BATTALION (-)."

C. UNDER SUBPARA 3B (2) DELETE THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE:

" COORDINATE AND PROVIDE SECURITY FOR CON THIEN CIDG CAMP  
AND ARTY UNITS AT CON THIEN WITH A CMD GRP AND A BATTALION  
(-)". INSERT THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE: " OCCUPY AND DEFEND  
CON THIEN COMPLEX WITH A CMD GRP AND A BATTALION (-)".

D. DELETE THE FOLLOWING PHRASE FROM SUBPARAS 3B (3) AND  
3C (8): " AND CON THIEN CIDG CAMP".

E. UNDER REFERENCES ADD: " F. CG THIRD MARDIV  
211415Z JUN 67. "

GP-4

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DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)

(C)

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MESSAGE  
NAVM 2110-28 (REV 3-61)

P. B. Ratcliff

SEN BY KELLY, LTCOL	ROUTED BY P. B. RATCLIFF, MAJOR	PHONE EXT NR	PAGE 1	PAGES 12
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MAY 1967				

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	311331Z	ACTION			XXXXXX			
		INFO			XXXXXX			

FROM: NINTH MARINES

Cpl P. F. Kelly  
312108HTO: FIRST BN, NINTH MARINES  
SECOND BN, NINTH MARINES  
SECOND BN, THIRD MARINESINFO: CG, THIRD MARDIV  
TWELFTH MARINES  
THIRD MARINES  
THIRD TANK BN  
THIRD AT BN  
NINTH MT BN  
THIRD MED BN  
THIRD ENGR BN  
THIRD SP BN  
FIRST AMTRAC BN

SECRET

## OPERATION ORDER 7-67 (OPERATION CIMAARON)

A. MAPS VIETNAM 1:50,000 SERIES L7014 SHEETS 6342 I, 6342 II, AND  
6442 IV, 6442 III, 6442 I, 6442 II, 6441 I, 6541 IV, AND 6542 III, 6441 IV

B. THIRD MARDIV OP ORDER 30-67 (CG, 3RD MARDIV 281640Z MAY67)

C. THIRD MARDIV LOI 1-67

D. THIRD MARDIV OP ORDER 2-67 (SPARROW HAWK)

E. THIRD MARDIV O P02000.2E (001)

F. CG THIRD MARDIV 211715Z JUN 67  
BLACK ORGANIZATION

NINTH MARINES (-) (REIN)

LTCOL KELLY

DISTRIBUTION: 400, 9TH MARINES

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NAVAL MESSAGE  
OPNAV FORM 2110-28 (REV. 3-61)

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		ACTION						
		INFO						

BET, COMM CO, HQEN

FIRST BN, NINTH MARINES MAJOR FULHAM

(-)

SECOND BN, NINTH MARINES LTCOL PEALER

SECOND BN, THIRD MARINES MAJOR BEARD

TIME ZONE: H

1. SITUATIONA. ENEMY FORCES. CURRENT INTSUMS, PERINTREPS AND SIGR'SB. FRIENDLY FORCES

(1) THIRD MARDIV CONDUCTS OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE COMMENCING 1 JUN 67 WITH MULTI-REGIMENTAL FORCE TO COUNTER NVA INFILTRATION AND VC ACTIVITIES AND TO SUPPORT <sup>RD</sup> ACTIVITIES IN THAT AREA.

(2) FIRST MAW PROVIDES AIR CONTROL AND AIR FIELD OPS FACILITIES AND FIXED AND ROTARY WING, ALL-WEATHER AIR SUPPORT.

(3) U. S. NAVAL FORCES PROVIDE NAVAL SUPPORT IN COASTAL AND CONTIGUOUS WATERS.

(4) FIRST ARVN DIVISION CONDUCTS OPNS AND SUPPORTS THE RD PROGRAM IN 11TH DTA.

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(5) QUANG TRI PROVINCE HQS PROVIDES RF SUPPORT AND DEFENDS CVR VITAL AREAS.

(6) THIRD MARINES CONDUCTS OPERATIONS IN WESTERN SECTION OF CIMAVERON-0A TO COUNTER NVA INFILTRATION AND VC ACTIVITIES AND TO SUPPORT RD ACTIVITIES IN THAT AREA.

(7) TWELFTH MARINES (-) (REIN) - MAINTAINS FSCC, MAINTAINS FSCC AT DONG DA, SUBORDINATE TO DIVISION FSCC, FOR COORDINATION OF FIRE SUPPORT IN OPI CIMAVERON AND FOR MAINTAIN WITH DASC. CONTINUOUS CURRENT MISSION OF GIO LINE: ARTILLERY OUTPOST IN AREA ASSIGNED. PROVIDES BS, GS AND GS REINF FIRES TO INFANTRY REGTS AS REQUIRED.

(8) FIRST BATTALION, ADA AV (REIN), 44TH ARTY - PROVIDES TWO BTRY'S (-) REINFORCED WITH THREE ADA MG SECTIONS IN DIRECT SUPPORT NINTH MARINES.

(9) THIRD TANK BN - PROVIDES ONE COMPANY (REIN) WITH PLATE SECTION - DIRECT SUPPORT NINTH MARINES.

(10) THIRD AR BATTALION - PROVIDES ONE COMPANY (REIN) IN DIRECT SUPPORT NINTH MARINES.

(11) FIRST AMTRAC BATTALION (-) - GENERAL SUPPORT -

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RE	TOR/TOD	ROUTED BY		CHECKED BY					
MESSAGE NR	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)		PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	DEFERRED
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AS INSTALLATION COORD, CUA VI LT FACILITY, COORDINATES SECURITY AND LOCAL DEFENSE MEASURES IN OP RATING AREA AS LIGNEB. CONDUCTS C.H. CUASLES OA IN COORD WITH CO NINETH MARINES.

(12) NINETH MT BN - GENERAL SUPPORT OF OPN GEM-1 AND FORCLS.

(13) CO D (-) (REIN), THIRD MED BN - GENERAL SUPPORT OF OPN GEM-1 AND FORCLS.

(14) CO C (-) (REIN), THIRD ENGR BN - GENERAL SUPPORT - PRIORITY OF EFFORT TO THE NINETH MARINES.

(15) BET, TEL D SP BN - GENERAL SUPPORT OF OPN GEM-1 AND FORCLS. PROVIDE RST AS REQUIRED.

C. ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS

(1) MLT 2/3 DETACH FROM 9TH MARINES TO CTS 79.5 ON OR ABOUT 10 JUN 67.

(2) 3RD BN, 9TH MARINES DETACH 3RD BN TO 9TH MARINES ON OR ABOUT 10 JUN 67.

2. MISSION. NINETH MARINES (-) (REIN) PROVIDE SECURITY AND DEFENSE OF LONG RA COMBAT BASE AND CAM LO BRIDGE SITE. BE PREPARED TO DISTRIBUTION

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MESSAGE NR.	DATE/TIME GROUP (IGCT)		PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	DEFERRED
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PROVIDE REINFORCEMENTS, COUNTERATTACK AND RELIEF FOR GIO LINH  
 CUA  
 ARTILLERY OUTPOST AND GIO VIET FACILITY. MAINTAIN AN ACTIVE GROUND  
 SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND CONDUCT SPOILING ATTACKS THROUGHOUT ASSIGNED  
 OA TO DETECT AND DESTROY INFILTRATING NVA PERSONNEL. PROVIDE SECURITY  
 FOR ROUTES #9, #561 AND #1 IN ASSIGNED OA. ASSUME OPCON OF MARINE  
 ELEMENTS OF CAD'S WITHIN ASSIGNED OA AND AOR. SUPPORT CVN RD PROGRAM  
 WITHIN ASSIGNED OA AND AOR. ~~BE PREPARED TO REINFORCE OR PROVIDE  
 COMPLEX. CUA~~  
~~ASSISTANCE TO GIO LINH AND GIO VIET IN THE EVENT OF ENEMY ATTACK.~~

COORDINATE AND PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ENGINEER CLEARING OF 600 METERS  
 GIO  
 WIDE STRIP BETWEEN GIO LINH AND GIO VIET. PROVIDE ONE RIFLE

COMPANY (REIN) OPCON GIO LINH ARTY COMB FOR DEFENSE AND SECURITY  
 OF THAT POSITION. ASSIST UNITS LOCATED AT MOUTH OF CUA VIET RIVER  
 IN REGARD TO DEFENSE AND SECURITY MEASURES AND FIRE SUPPORT.

AUGMENT SECURITY FORCES OF CUA VIET FACILITY AS REQUIRED.

CONDUCT OPS IN COORD WITH FIRST AMTRAC BN TO DETECT/DETER NVA.

FORCE INFILTRATION AND DISCOVER/DESTROY NVA WPS AND AMMO

CACHES IN DESIGNATED AREAS. CONDUCT OPS AS DIRECTED IN DESIGNATED AOR;  
 COORDINATE USE OF AREAS WITH ARVN, AS REQUIRED.

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		ACTION					
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3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. NINTH MARINES (-) (REIN) PROVIDES SECURITY AND DEFENSE OF DONG HA COMBAT BASE BY UTILIZING FORCES OF TENANT COMMANDS WITH INFANTRY FORCES PROVIDING COORDINATION AND THE RESERVE FORCE. SECURITY AND DEFENSE OF CAM LO BRIDGE SITE IS PROVIDED BY ONE RIFLE PLT (REIN). PROVIDES REINFORCEMENTS, COUNTERATTACK AND RELIEF FORCES FOR ~~510~~ LINE-ARTILLERY-OUTPOST AND CUA VIET FACILITY FROM ASSIGNED FORCES AS REQUIRED. MAINTAINS AN ACTIVE GROUND SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND CONDUCTS SPOILING ATTACKS THROUGHOUT ASSIGNED OA WITH ASSIGNED FORCES TO DETECT AND DESTROY INFILTRATING NVA PERSONNEL. PROVIDES SECURITY FOR ROUTE #9, ROUTE 561 AND ROUTE # 1 IN ASSIGNED OA UTILIZING COMBINED ACTION PLATOONS AND OTHER ASSIGNED FORCES BY AGGRESSIVE PATROLLING ALONG FLANKS. ~~PROVIDES FORCES TO OCCUPY AND DEFEND CON THICH COMPLEX WITH A CMDO GRP AND REQUIRED TO REINFORCE OR PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO CON THICH AND CAM, A BNC (-)~~ <sup>G10</sup> <sup>CH1</sup> IN THE EVENT OF ENEMY ATTACK. ASSIGNS ONE INFANTRY BN TO COORDINATE AND PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ENGINEERS CLEARING ~~an~~ 600-METER WIRE-STRIP <sup>G10</sup> BETWEEN ~~the~~ LINE AND CON THICH. PROVIDES ONE RIFLE CO (REIN) OPOON G10 LINE ARMY COMDR FOR DEFENSE AND SECURITY OF THAT POSITION. ASSISTS UNITS AT MOUTH OF CUA VIET RIVER WITH REGARD TO DEFENSE AND SECURITY

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DATE	TOR/TOD	ROUTED BY	CHECKED BY		7	OF 12	
MESSAGE NR	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE
		ACTION					
		INFO					

MEASURES AND FIRE SUPPORT AS REQUIRED. AUGMENTS THESE FORCES AS REQUIRED. CONDUCTS OPNS ~~TO~~ IN COORD WITH FIRST ANTRAC BN TO DETECT/DETER WATERBORNE INFILTRATION AND DISCOVER/ AND DESTROY ENEMY WPNS AND AMMO CACHES IN DESIGNATED AREAS. CONDUCTS OPNS AS DIRECTED IN DESIGNATED AOR; COORDINATES USE OF AREA WITH ARVN, AS REQUIRED, IN CARRYING OUT THESE MISSIONS. GENERAL AND DIRECT SUPPORT ARTY WILL BE EMPLOYED AS FEASIBLE. IN ADDITION FIXED WING AND HELICOPTERS WILL BE USED AS FEASIBLE AND COMMENSURATE WITH AVAILABILITY.

B. 1ST BN, 9TH MARINES CHI

(1) COORDINATE AND PROVIDE SECURITY FOR 11TH ENGINEER PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT CLEARING 600 METER STRIP BETWEEN CON THIEN AND GIO LINE WITH A CMB GRP AND BN (-).

(2) COORDINATE AND PROVIDE SECURITY FOR CON THIEN OCCUPY AND DEFEND CON THIEN COMPLEX ~~AND CON THIEN~~ AND ARTY UNITS AT CON THIEN WITH A CMB GRP AND BN (-). CHI

(3) BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO PROVIDE RELIEF/REINFORCEMENT ~~AND CON THIEN~~ CON THIEN CMB OF GIO LINE ARTY OUTPOST, ~~AND~~ CUA VIET FACILITY IN THE EVENT OF AN ENEMY ATTACK.

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DATE	TOR/TOD	ROUTED BY	CHECKED BY		8 OF	12		
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		ACTION						
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## (4) CONDUCT GROUND SURVEILLANCE AND SPOILING ATTACKS

THROUGHOUT ASSIGNED OA, USE ASSIGNED FORCES TO DETECT AND DESTROY  
INfiltration of NVA FORCES. (OPN OVERLAY TO BE PUBLISHED SEPARATELY)

## (5) MAINTAIN SECURITY ON ROUTE 561 IN ZOA BY

AGGRESSIVE PATROLLING ALONG FLANKS.

## (6) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR MINE SWEEP TEAMS IN ZOA.

C. 267TH, 3RD MARINES.

## (1) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ARTY POSITIONS LOCATED

VIC YD 147617.

(2) POSITION FORCES ALONG ROUTE 561 IN ZOA TO PROVIDE  
SECURITY FOR MSR AND PULL-SHEP VIC YD 136666 BY AGGRESSIVE  
PATROLLING ALONG FLANKS.

(3) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR MINE SWEEP TEAMS ALONG  
ROUTE 561 (MSR) IN ZOA.

## (4) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR CAM LO BRIDGE SITE.

(5) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR TRUCK CONVOYS BETWEEN VIC  
YD 145615 AND CON THIEN.

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MESSAGE NR.	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE
		ACTION					
		INFO					

(6) CONTROL TRAFFIC ON MSR BETWEEN CON THIEN AND VIC

YD 145615. EACH TRUCK CONVOY WILL HAVE A MINIMUM OF ONE PLT (REIN) AS SECURITY. NO VEHICLES WILL PROCEED WITHOUT THIS SECURITY ELEMENT.

(7) PROVIDED SECURITY FOR ENGINEER PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT WHILE UPGRADING MSR.

(8) BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO PROVIDE RELIEF/REINFORCEMENT OF GIO LINH ARTY OUTPOST, GUA VIET FACILITY AND CON THIEN OICG CAMP IN THE EVENT OF AN ENEMY ATTACK.

(9) CONDUCT GROUND SURVEILLANCE AND SPOILING ATTACKS THROUGHOUT ASSIGNED OA WITH ASSIGNED FORCES TO DETECT AND DESTROY INFILTRATING NVA FORCES. (OPN OVERLAY TO BE PUBLISHED SEPARATELY).

(10) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE A PLT/ (REIN) REACTION FORCE IN THE EVENT CAN LO RESETTLEMENT VILLAGE COMES UNDER ENEMY ATTACK.

3. 28 SEP - 05-07-1972

(1) PROVIDE ONE RIFLE CO (REIN) UPON 12TH MARINES FOR DEFENSE AND SECURITY OF GIO LINH ARTY OUTPOST.

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DATE	TOR/TOD	ROUTED BY		CHECKED BY		10 OF 12	
MESSAGE NR	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE
		ACTION					
		INFO					

(2) PROVIDE ONE RIFLE CO (REIN) AS COUNTERATTACK  
FORCE FOR DONG XA COMBAT BASE DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS.

(3) PROVIDE ONE PLT (REIN) AS SPARROW HAWK ON 10  
MINUTE ALERT DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS. THIS PLT MAY BE PART OF  
COUNTERATTACK FORCE DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS.

(4) ASSUME OPCON OF MARINE ELEMENTS OF COMBINED  
ACTION COMPANY AT CAI LO INCLUDING CAP-P1, P-2, P-3 AND P-4.

(5) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ROUTE #9 IN ZOA USING CAC  
UNITS AND OTHER ASSIGNED FORCES.

(6) BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO PROVIDE RELIEF/REIN-  
FORCEMENTS OF GIO LINH ARMY OUTPOST, CUA VIET FACILITY AND CON THIEN  
CIZG CAP IN THE EVENT OF ATTACK.

(7) CONDUCT GROUND SURVEILLANCE AND SPOILING ATTACKS  
THROUGHOUT ASSIGNED FORCES TO DETECT AND DESTROY INFILTRATING  
NVA FORCES.

(8) ORGANIZE BN CP AS ALTERNATE 9TH MARINES CP. BE  
PREPARED ON ORDER TO ACTIVATE NECESSARY RADIO NETS TO INCLUDE  
PECC, DIRECT TAC, AIR, AND BASE DEFENSE NET.

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				ACTION						
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E. REGIMENTAL RESERVE.(1) ~~2ND BN, 9TH MARINES~~

(a) BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO PROVIDE ONE RIFLE CO (REIN) TO BE EMPLOYED EITHER IN 9TH MARINES OA OR ADR ON TWO HOURS NOTICE.

F. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) THIS ORDER EFFECTIVE FOR PLANNING ON RECEIPT AND FOR OPERATIONS 010001H JUNE 67.

(2) OPERATOR CALL NAME: CIGARRON

(3) BIRLAUGH ALCOM.

(4) FIRE SUPPORT - SEE REFERENCE (C).

(5) AIR SUPPORT - SEE REFERENCE (C).

(6) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT - SEE REFERENCE (C).

(7) THIS OPERATION ORDER SUPERSEDES 9TH MARINES OP O 3-67 AND 6-67

(8) THRUST POINTS:

(a) FISH 1374

(b) BIRDS 1469

(c) EGGS 1571

(d) FLOWERS 1673

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DATE	TOR/TOD	ROUTED BY		CHECKED BY			
MESSAGE NR	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE
		ACTION					
		INFO					

(e) CARS 1767  
 (f) GIRLS 1859  
 (g) BOYS 2260  
 (h) VEGETABLES 1459

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. SEE REFERENCES (B).5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

## A. COMMUNICATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF (E).

B. COMMAND-OCT

(4) 1ST BN, 9TH MARINES YD-115701 / -  
 (1) (2) NINTH MARINES YB 242597 B / -  
 (3) 2ND BN, 9TH MARINES YD-249594 D / -  
 (4) 2ND BN, 9TH MARINES YD-145015 T / -

GP-4

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MESSAGE NR	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	DEFERRED
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FROM NINTH MARINES

TO FIRST BN (-), NINTH MARINES  
SECOND BN, NINTH MARINES  
THIRD BN (-), NINTH MARINES  
BLT FIRST BN, THIRD MARINESINFO CG, THIRD MARDIV  
TWELFTH MARINES  
THIRD MARINES  
THIRD TANK BN  
THIRD AT BN  
NINTH LT BN  
THIRD MED BN  
THIRD ENGR BN  
THIRD SP BN  
FIRST ATTRAC BN

## OPERATION CIMARRON FR/G ORDER 9-67

## A. NINTH MARINES OP O 7-67 (OPERATION CIMARRON)

TASK ORGANIZATION. SEE REF A

TIME ZONE HOTEL

1. SITUATION

A. ENEMY FORCES. CURRENT INT SIMS, PERINTREPS AND SIGR'S

B. FRIENDLY FORCES. SEE REF A

C. ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS. BLT 1/3 OPCON 9TH MARINES

EFFECTIVE        JULY 67.2. MISSION. 9TH MARINES (-) (REIN) CONDUCTS SEARCH AND DESTROY

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DATE	TOR/TOD	ROUTED BY		CHECKED BY		2	OF 4	
MESSAGE NR	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	DEFERRED
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OPERATIONS IN ASSIGNED OBJECTIVE AREA WITH TWO BATTALIONS TO LOCATE, CAPTURE OR DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT.  
(SEE OPN OVERLAY) (PASEP)

3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. COMMENCING AT H-HOUR ON D-DAY 9TH MARINES CONDUCTS SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS WITH TWO BATTALIONS ATTACKING NORTH ALONG THE AXIS SHOWN ON OPN OVERLAY (PASEP) TO EXPLOIT CONTACT DEVELOPED BY 1ST BN, 9TH MARINES 2 JUL 67. BLT 1/3 LANDS BY HELO IN LZ HAWK COMMENCING AT L-HOUR ON D-DAY. MOVES NORTH UNTIL ABREAST OF 3D BN, 9TH MARINES. ON ORDER BOTH BNS ATTACK NORTH IN ASSIGNED MISSION.

B. 1ST BN, 9TH MARINES. CONDUCT ASSIGNED MISSION.

C. 2D BN, 9TH MARINES

- (1) CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION
- (2) SHIFT ROAD SECURITY TO NEW POSITION OF ROUTE 561.
- (3) CONDUCT SCREENING PATROLS WITH ONE COMPANY ORIENTED TO NW PORTION OF ASSIGNED ZONE.
- (4) ASSUME SPARROW HAWK MISSION EFFECTIVE 030600H JUL67.

D. 3D BN, 9TH MARINES. ON ORDER, ATTACK IN ASSIGNED ZONE

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DATE	TOR/TOD	ROUTED BY		CHECKED BY		3 OF	4
MESSAGE NR	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE
		ACTION					
		INFO					

SUPPORTED BY SIX (6) TANKS TO LOCATE AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT. (SEE OPN OVERLAY) (PASEP)

E. BLT 1/3

- (1) ON ORDER OF CG, THIRD MARDIV CHOP OPOON TO 9TH MARINES.
- (2) LAND BY H10 IN LZ HAWK.
- (3) MOVE NORTH UNTIL ABREAST 3/9.
- (4) ON ORDER, ATTACK NORTH IN ASSIGNED ZONE TO LOCATE AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES, SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT. (SEE OPN OVERLAY) (PASEP).

F. CO A 3D TK BN

- (1) ASSIGN SIX (6) TANKS DS 3/9
- (2) REDEPLOY REMAINING ASBEST LAW VERBAL INSTRUCTIONS.

G. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

- (1) THIS ORDER EFFECTIVE FOR PLANNING ON RECEIPT AND FOR EXECUTION ON 3 JUL 67.
- (2) D-DAY - 3 JUL 67
- (3) H-HOUR - 1400H
- (4) L-HOUR -
- (5) CONTACT LEFT TO RIGHT

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DATE	TO/R/TOD	ROUTED BY	CHECKED BY		4 OF 4			
MESSAGE NR	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)	PRECEDENCE	RASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	DEFERRED
		ACTION						
		INFO						

(6) ALL PERSONNEL WILL CARRY PROTECTIVE MASKS.

(7) THRUST POINTS

- (A) CITIES 1375
- (B) STATES 1674
- (C) COUNTRIES 1470
- (D) TREES 1572
- (E) BOOZE 1768
- (F) FLOWERS 1859
- (G) FISH 1459
- (H) DOGS 2260

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. REF A

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

A. THIRD HARDIV 0 P02000.2E (OOI)

B. REPORT UNIT LOCATIONS AND CP'S IN FIRST SIX HOUR SITREP  
AFTER EXECUTION OF THIS ORDER. THEREAFTER REPORT ONLY CHANGES.

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MESSAGE NR	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	DEFERRED
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BN'S UPON COMPLETION OF RELIEF.

2. ~~MISSION~~ <sup>CONDUCTS DAYLIGHT</sup> 9TH MARINES ~~CONDUCTS DAYLIGHT~~ RELIEF IN PLACE OF 3D BN (-) (REIN) 9TH MARINES WITH 2D BN, 9TH MARINES.

## 3. EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. ON ORDER 9 JUL 1967, 9TH MARINES CONDUCTS A DAYLIGHT RELIEF IN PLACE. 2D BN, 9TH MARINES RELIEVES 3D BN (-) (REIN), ONE COMPANY AT A TIME, IN PRESENT POSITION. CONDUCT RELIEF OVER A TWO DAY PERIOD TO BE COMPLETED PRIOR TO 101400 JUL 67.

B. 1ST BN (-) 9TH MARINES

- (1) CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION
- (2) ASSUME OPCON OF CO A AND CO C AT A TIME MUTUALLY AGREEABLE BETWEEN COMMANDERS.

C. 2D BN, 9TH MARINES

- (1) CONDUCT RELIEF IN PLACE WITH 3D BN (-) (REIN) 9TH MARINES.
- (2) ASSUME MISSION OF 3D BN (-) (REIN) UPON PASSING OF CONTROL DURING RELIEF.

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			ACTION						
			INFO						

(3) ASSUME OPCON OF CO H AT TIME MUTUALLY AGREEABLE  
BETWEEN COMMANDERS.

D. 3D BN (-) (REIN) 9TH MARINES

- (1) CONDUCT RELIEF IN PLACE WITH 2D BN, 9TH MARINES.
- (2) ASSUME MISSION OF 2D BN, 9TH MARINES UPON  
PASSING OF CONTROL DURING RELIEF.

(3) PASS OPCON OF CO A, C, AND H TO PARENT BN'S AT A  
TIME MUTUALLY AGREEABLE BETWEEN COMMANDERS.

E. BLT 1/3. NO CHANGE

F. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

- (1) THIS ORDER EFFECTIVE FOR PLANNING ON RECEIPT AND  
FOR EXECUTION ON ORDER 9 JUL 67.
- (2) DIRLAUTHALCON
- (3) DISMOUNT POINT, (YD 144689)
- (4) THIS HQ WILL BE NOTIFIED OF THE ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE  
TIME OF EACH CO SIZE UNIT AND COMMAND GROUP AT DEPARTURE POINT,  
DISMOUNT POINT, AND DESTINATION.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. REF (A)

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		ACTION						
		INFO						

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS. NO CHANGE FROM REF

(A), EXCEPT:

A. UPON COMMENCEMENT OF RELIEF, 2/9 WILL COME UPON M 982  
AND CONTACT PIED PIPER ECHO FOR FIRE SUPPORT.

B. UPON COMPLETION OF RELIEF, 3/9 WILL COME UPON M 492  
AND CONTACT PIED PIPER FOXTROT FOR FIRE SUPPORT.

GP-4

REAPPOINT REAR	M-972 NESTOR
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107. EXCISE IN THE MARKETS  
OF DURGAPUR MARKET  
TODAY IN, DINE A YEN  
TODAY IN DURGAPUR MARKET  
TODAY IN DURGAPUR MARKET  
TODAY IN DURGAPUR MARKET

100-4 66, 1000 HARRY  
EXPO MASTERS  
THE 77 11-1968  
2, 77, 7 ART. DIV  
P-52-A

Col. C. (14) (15) (16) THAT POSITION AND THAT

3003

CONTINUED. REFERRED ORDER 11-47 (HICKORY 11)

4. CP 7 224M, 110,000, ACI 37375 17014  
5. 31 1741 1 2-67  
6. DATA 3100.10  
7. C3 173 14 224 12 912 74067 37375  
8. DATA 02443.17  
9. 31 1740 15

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		ACTION					DEFERRED
		INFO					

## C. INFO PARADE AC

TIME 0000, 1000 1000Z

TIME ORGANIZATION

9TH MARINE

COL JAMES

80 CO (100)

CAPT STICKLE

1ST BN, 9TH MARINE (SLE PHRAG 3B)

LTC L. GOWARD

2D BN, 9TH MARINE

LTC L. FETT

3D BN, 9TH MARINE

MAJ RYAN

4TH BN, 9TH MARINE

LTC L. GOWARD

3D BN, 9TH MARINE

LTC L. FETT

4TH BN, 9TH MARINE

MAJ RYAN

5TH BN, 9TH MARINE

LTC L. GOWARD

## 1. EQUIPMENT

## A. AIRCRAFT

## (1) DISSEMINATION AND ACTIVITIES

	PROBABLE LOCATION	DISSEMINATED
SAFARIA DIV		
2000 T-33/2000 DIV	10 OF CON DIVS TO 1000	2,000
SAFARIA T-33/2000 DIV	10 1000	1,700
3000 T-33/2000 DIV	10 2000	1,600
-----	-----	-----
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MESSAGE NR	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE
		ACTION					
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320 3102/3102 017 TD 1600 1,200

320 3102 (4) TD 0800 1,200

NOTE: PREDICER LOCATION DENOTES CENTRAL OPERATING AREA FOR SPECIFIED

LOCATION. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT UP TO THIRTY TWO OF THE 3102

017 MAY BE ARMED OR NOT YET ARMED; PROBABLY ONE IS, SINCE THIS

ONE OF THREE IS AND PROBABLY TWO ARE 3102/320 NOT ARMED OR

ARMED.

(2) ARMED ATTACKERS. FOLLOWING 3102/017 GROUP OF TAKING THE  
BEGUN LAST DAY OF MAY, 1702 FORCES REINFORCED INTO 3102 AND PRESENT  
SIXTY EIGHT OF THE 3102 017 GROUP IN THE VICINITY OF GUN 0100 AND  
3102 0170 IS INDICATED TO BE RECENTLY ARMED AND FORT NINETEEN 171 FORCES  
SIXTY EIGHT OF THESE GROUPS HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN THE VICINITY  
TO THE SOUTH OF THE 3102 017 GROUP. THE GROUP SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED  
THEIR ARTILLERY, ROCKETS AND ANTIAIRCRAFT CAPABILITY DURING RECENT WEEKS  
AND HAS STARTED UP THE DEPLOYMENT OF DAYLIGHT BOMBING FLIGHTS AGAINST  
PEASANT HOMESTEADS. RECENT CAPTURED CONTACTS INDICATE THAT THE GROUP  
IS PROBABLY FOR TAKING THE SOUTHERN GROUPS UNDER LEADERSHIP OF  
GENERAL AND M. FOR ARRESTED. IN ADDITION, SEE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
REPORTS.

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DATE	TOR/TOD	ROUTED BY		CHECKED BY				
MESSAGE NR	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	DEFERRED
		ACTION						
		INFO						

B. ~~EMERGENCY~~

- (1) THE NAVY IS TO MESSAGES THE 100000, WHICH IS CONSIDERED JEWISH AND IS NOT RECORDED IN LOGS OR PRACTICALLY POSSIBLE.
- (2) THE NAVY DIVISION IS ADVISED AND ADVISED TO CARRY THE JEWISH COMMUNIQUE ON THE AIRPORT AND AIRPORT LINE, ALL JEWISH AIRPORTS SUPPORT.
- (3) THE NAVY DIVISION IS ADVISED TO BEARER AND USE THE OPERATIONS ON OR AFTER 140000/30L 67 IS AS FOLLOWS IN CONNECTION WITH THE 30 JEWISH DIVISION OPERATIONS.
- (4) THE NAVY DIVISION IS ADVISED AGAINST BOMBING THE 30 JEWISH DIVISION CONCERNING 140000 JULY 1967 IN CONNECTION WITH THE 30 JEWISH DIVISION OPERATIONS.
- (5) PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT THE NAVY DIVISION IS ADVISED TO BEARER IN TORONTO.
- (6) THE NAVY DIVISION IS ADVISED TO BEARER IN TORONTO.
- (7) THE NAVY DIVISION IS ADVISED OF THE 30 JEWISH DIVISION OPERATIONS ON THE 30 JEWISH DIVISION.
- (8) THE NAVY DIVISION IS ADVISED TO BEARER IN TORONTO.
- (9) THE NAVY DIVISION IS ADVISED OF THE 30 JEWISH DIVISION OPERATIONS ON THE 30 JEWISH DIVISION.

AS SUBJECT.

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			ACTION						
			INFO						

## 6. STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS

- (1) 30 BATTALION, 4TH INFANTRY ATTACHED 9TH INFANTRY 131204Z JUL 67.  
(2) 100 BATTALION, 9TH INFANTRY ATTACHED 37TH INFANTRY 131000Z JUL 67.  
(3) 112 BATTALION, 4TH INFANTRY ATTACHED 903 131200Z JUL 67.  
~~(4) 30 BATTALION, 4TH INFANTRY ATTACHED 903 131200Z JUL 67.~~  
(4) ONE PLATOON, 903 4TH INFANTRY AS 1200 0900Z 07 JUL 67,  
FOR USE IN ATTACHING 37TH INFANTRY 131000Z JUL 67 TO 100 BATTALION 67.

(6) ALL APPROPRIATE TACTICS OF THE UNITS TO BE APPLIED  
REF 131000JULY 57.

2. WILSON. COMMENCING AT 8:00 A.M. EACH SUNDAY DURING 1940  
1. NOT OPERATIONAL IN FURT OF ACT 3.

3. 二十二

**453) SECRET OF OVERCOMING**

- (1) **SEARCHING AT ANOTHER'S HOME OF ACTIVITY, OFFICE, OR PLACE OF WORK.**

- (2) COMMENCING AT 0600H ON 10 JULY, EIGHT DIVISIONS OF THE  
U.S. ARMY AND DIVISIONS OF THE ARMY OF THE PHILIPPINES WILL  
DESTITUTE OF TROOPS & EQUIPMENT TO DESTROY ALL MILITARY AND  
INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES WHICH ARE OF USE TO THE ENEMY.

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OPNAV FORM 2110-28 (REV. 3-61)

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DATE	TOR/TOD	ROUTED BY	CHECKED BY				
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		ACTION					
		INFO					

BE EMPLOYED TO PREPARE FOR THE ATTACK, TO MARCH HOME POSITIONS IN AND OUT OF THE AREA AND TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED.

**B. 1ST DE. 600 MARTINS**

- (1) WHEN ADVISED IN PRESENT POSITION BY 2D DE (-) 400 MARTINS AND 1000 DE 131500Z JUL 67 GIVE ORDER TO 3D MARTINS,
- (2) UTILIZING TRANSPORTATION USED TO MOVE 3D DE (-), 400 MARTINS TO 600 MARTINS, MOVE TO VIC CAMP GAMBOL AS DIRECTED BY 3D MARTINS.

**C. 2D DE. 600 MARTINS**

- (1) ESTABLISH BLOCKING POSITIONS VIA TRACE (600 OVER LAD)

**D. 3D DE. (-), 600 MARTINS**

- (1) CONTINUE PRESENT PRACTICE OF DEFENSE OF CAMP 1D.
- (2) ESTABLISH BLOCKS WITH MINIMUM OF TWO CONCENTRIC (600 OVERLAD).

**E. 1ST DE. 10 MARTINS**

- (1) COMMENCING AT 1000Z ON D-DAY CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN 601 (600 OVERLAD).
- (2) BE PREPARED TO DROP CHARGE FROM ONE MARTIN ON OR AROUND 16 JULY 67.

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DATE	TOR/TOD	ROUTED BY		CHECKED BY		OF 13		
MESSAGE NR	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	DEFERRED
		ACTION						
		INFO						

2. ~~13 JUL 67~~ (b) (1)

- (1) MAINTAIN 13 JUL 67 CTF 8000 TO 9000 HOURS.
- (2) PRIOR TO 13 JUL 67 0000 TO POSITION ASIDE OF OPERATION CTF 8000.
- (3) COMMENCING AT 0000 OF 13 JUL 67 CONDUCT SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS IN VOL. (NOT VOL. 1)
- (4) BE PREPARED TO CROP FROM VOL. 1 HOURS OR ABOVE.

16 JUL 67.

3. ~~13 JUL 67~~ (b) (1)

- (1) MAINTAIN 13 JUL 67 0000 ONWARD TO 9000 HOURS.
- (2) CONDUCT VOL. 1 IN PLACE OF VOL. 1, VOL. 1 HOURS OR ABOVE ON 13 JUL 67.
- (3) PRIOR TO 13 JUL 67 MAINTAIN SEARCH POSITION TIC TRADE (OPERATION CTF 8000).

4. ~~13 JUL 67~~ (b) (1)(b)(2)

- (1) REQUEST REPORT AND DAY RE. SUPPORT AS NECESSARY.
- (2) REQUEST/HEAVY ARMY FOR PREPARATION VINES IN AND AHEAD OF VOL. 1 CONDUCT 13 JUL 67.

5. ~~13 JUL 67~~ (b) (1)

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MESSAGE NR	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	DEFERRED
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		INFO						

- (1) IMMEDIATE SUPPORT OF THE PARTIES.
  - (2) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE ALL SUPPORT AS REQUESTED.

L. S. L. 3374

- (1) **NEVER SUPPORT ONE SIDE**
  - (2) **BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE ~~THE~~ SUPPORT AS REQUESTED.**

卷之三

- (1) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE DAY TIME TO INSTRUCT JUNIOR'S DAD  
DAD DUTIES.

- (1) PENSION FUND IN EACH STATE ACTUARILY ASSESSED BASED UPON THE  
ESTIMATED LIFE EXPECTANCY OF THE  
PENSION FUND PARTICIPANTS.

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- 9TH  
~~12TH~~

(1) ~~THE 12TH~~

(2) IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING ONE <sup>GK</sup> REGIMENT FOR  
THEIR OWN DEFENSE IN VIEWS OF ACTION.

## ② COMMERCIAL TENDERING

- (b) THE CRIMINAL OFFENSES FOR PLANNING OR DIRECTING AND FOR  
EXECUTION OF CRIME.

- (2) ასეთ გარე გერმანიულ კულტურას.

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MESSAGE NR	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCTI)		PRECEDENCE	FLASH	MERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	DEFERRED
			ACTION						
			INFO						

- (3) OPERATIONS AREA NAME BOSTON 12.  
*ALL*
- (4) ATTACKS ON THE ENEMY WILL COMMENCE EIGHT OR LESS.
- (5) MEANS OF COMMUNICATIION IN ACKNOWLEDGED NAME (N) *AHO (D)*.
- (6) STATEMENT OF HIGH CONTROL AREA (HCA) AUTHORIZED.
- DEFINITION (D) APPROVED.
- (7) PHYSIOLOGICAL SUPPORT AS WILL BE EMPLOYED TO MAXIMIZE FEASIBLE EFFORT. AREA 3, DEFINITION (D) APPROVED.
- (8) REPORTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH RAY (1), AND (2), FOR WARFARE WILL COMMENCE AT APPROXIMATELY JAPAN TIME EIGHT ZERO ZERO APPROXIMATE TIME 0800.
- (9) DEFENSE LEADERSHIP AND COMMANDERS APPROVED.
- (10) CIVIL DEFENSE: DEF (D) APPROVED.
- (11) WAR SUPPORT ORGANIZATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH AREA 3 AND DEF (D). IN VIEW OF COMPLEXES OF OPERATIONS INVOLVED AND NATURE OF AIR, ARTILLERY AND NAVAL SERVICES TO BE EMPLOYED, CARE MUST BE EXERCISED AT ALL TIMES AND ALL SERVICES INVOLVED TO ISSUE EXPLANATION OF INFORMATION AND THOROUGH COMMUNICATIION OF APPROVING OPS AND NAVAL PLANS PROVIDED.
- (12) BOSTON AREA IS APPROXIMATELY 131000 JUN 67.
- (13) APPROVALS FOR USE AND HIGH AUTHORITY FOR APPROVALS

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		ACTION						
		INFO						

OF PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEANS WILL BE RELEASED.

- (14) INDEPENDENT INFORMING ESTIMATE ISSUES OF OTHER TYPE  
MOVES AND MOVES TRANS IN THIS OPERATIONAL AREA. WHICH ARE CANCELLED  
IN THIS REGION.
- (15) PLUS ESTIMATE SET OF DIRECTIONS FOR THE PREDOMINANT  
OF MOVES AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS ESTIMATED.
- (16) THE FOLLOWING THREE PAGES ARE APPENDIX 13-14-000  
JUL 67. AND THIS IS THE THIRD NUMBER IN THE SET OF THREE PAGES AND IN THE  
SUPPORT OF 900 MILE AS INDICATED.

- |              |         |
|--------------|---------|
| (A) ARRIVED  | 10 1000 |
| (B) DESTINED | 10 1400 |
| (C) DATES    | 10 0845 |
| (D) DATES    | 10 1400 |
| (E) DATES    | 10 1400 |
| (F) DATES    | 10 1400 |
| (G) DATES    | 10 1330 |
| (H) DATES    | 10 1400 |

4. ~~CONFIRMATION AND VERIFICATION~~5. ~~TYPE~~ (a)

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OPNAV FORM 2 10-26 (REV. 3-61)

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DATE	TO/R/TOD	ROUTED BY		CHECKED BY		11	OF 13
MESSAGE NR	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE
		ACTION					
		INFO					

**SUPPLY**

- (1) SUPPLY SOURCE FLSU #1 DONG HA
- (2) PRESCRIBED LOADS. IAW REF (B).
- (3) LEVELS OF SUPPLY
  - (A) UNITS. IAW REF (B).
  - (B) FLSU # 1 AS PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED.
- (4) WATER. UTILIZE WATER CANS WHERE POSSIBLE. THROW AWAY 6 GAL CONTAINERS. MAY BE USED UNDER EMERGENCY CONDITIONS.
- (5) CONTROL AND DISTRIBUTION.
  - (A) SUPPLY POINT DISTRIBUTION (FLSU #1) FOR UNITS EXCEPT INFANTRY UNITS. INFANTRY UNITS - UNIT DISTRIBUTION.
  - (B) INFANTRY UNITS SUBMIT REQUESTS TO SHORE PARTY DSA ESTABLISHED VIC DONG HA AIRFIELD.
- (6) AERIAL DELIVERY. EMERGENCY ONLY WITH APPROVAL OF CG, THIRD MAR DIV.

**C. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION**

- (1) EVACUATION TO D MED 3D MED BN.

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## NAVAL MESSAGE

Z02 FORM 21028 (REV. 3-61)

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MESSAGE NR	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	DEFERRED
		ACTION						
		INFO						

(2) SPECIAL COLLECTING UNITS ARE DEDICATED TO SUPPORT  
AS DIRECTED. UNITS ARE NOT USED. THESE UNITS  
WILL BE ASSOCIATED TO UNITS WHERE AVAILABLE AS NEEDED.

(3) INFORMATIVE UNITS WILL NOT BE EMPLOYED AS CASUALTY  
HANDLING UNITS.

(4) MEDICAL PATIENTS WILL BE AUGMENTED BY ONLY MEDICAL  
AND CLEANING UNITS.

4. ANALYSIS

(1) DO NOT DO (-).

(A) PROVIDE GENERAL UNARMED SUPPORT AS DIRECTED.

(2) DO NOT PARTY IN

(3) OPERATE AND INSTRUCTED VTC TONE IN ALL CASES.

(4) ATTACH LOGO TO INDIVIDUAL UNITS AS INDICATED.

(5) ~~DO NOT DO (-)~~

(A) GENERAL SUPPORT

5. DISPOSITION AND SUPPORT UNITS

A. COMMUNICATIONS LINE DO (-) AND (B).

B. ASSISTANT RADIO-TRANSMITTER COMMUNICATIONS LINE DO (-)

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OPNAV FORM 2110-28 (REV 3-61)

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DATE	TO/R/TOD	ROUTED BY	CHECKED BY	OF				
MESSAGE/NR	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT)	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	DEFERRED
		ACTION						
		INFO						

SHOWS IN SECTION BELOW THE 2/2C-2 LINE. CLASSIFIED

IN PAGES.

OR 1 - COMINT MSG

OR 2 - COMINT MSG

OR 3 - COMINT MSG (CINCPAC)

OR 4 - COMINT MSG

a. INCLUSE THIS MSG EXCS.

b. DIRECT GROUPS IN OR 3/2C-2

GP-4

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OPNAV FORM 2110-74 REV 3 63

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MESSAGE NR	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT) <b>201250Z</b>	PRECEDENCE <b>ACTION</b>	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	DEFERRED
		<b>INFO</b>			<b>XXXX</b>	<b>XXXX</b>		

TANAH, TANAH, TANAH

20 MM, 9TH MARCH 1968  
20 MM (-), 9TH MARCH 1968  
20 MM, 10TH MARCH 1968

INFO: CD 3D MARCHY  
1929 = MARCHY (-) (REIS)  
30 MARCHY  
30 TX 300 (-)  
926 M7 300  
30 TX 300  
30 MARCHY  
30 MARCHY  
1930 MARCHY (-)  
30 SP 30  
1931 MARCHY (-)  
30 MARCHY (-) (REIS)  
30 45 30 (-)  
1932 30 (-) (REIS) (PA)  
20 30 1933 M MARCHY (-)

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### CHINESE GRAMMAR (TEACHING)

- A. 30000 VOLUME 1400/100, 2000 EDITIONS 179814, ISSUES 64411, 694311, 644211, 644212, 644213, 65411X, 6542111, AND 654211Y
  - B. 30 EDITIONS 1-67
  - C. 30 EDITIONS OF 0 42-67 (30 EDITIONS OF 1902402 JUL 67)
  - D. 30 EDITIONS OF 0 2-67 (GARDEN NAME)
  - E. 30 EDITIONS OF 1902402/67 (CONT)

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NAVAL MESSAGE  
OPNAV FORM 2110-28 (REV. 3-61)

SECRET

RELEASED BY		DRAFTED BY		PHONE EXT. NR		PAGE	PAGES
DATE	TOR/TOD	ROUTED BY		CHECKED BY		2	OF 11
MESSAGE NR	DATE/TIME GROUP (IGCT)	PRECEDENCE	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PRIORITY	ROUTINE
		ACTION					
		INFO					

TASK ORGANIZATION

9TH MARINES (-) (MAIN)

COL JONES

3D BN 9TH MARINES

DET 66244 CO HQ BN

DET MP CO HQ BN

2D BN 9TH MARINES

LT COL KURT

2D BN (-), 9TH MARINES

MAJ WOODRING

3D BN 4TH MARINES

LT COL VEST

1. SITUATION

A. ENEMY FORCES. SEE CURRENT INTELL, PRIORITY, AND SIR'S.

B. FRIENDLY FORCES.

(1) III MAR, IN COORDINATION WITH I ARVN COMB, CONDUCTS SUSTAINED COORDINATED, BILATERAL OR COMBINED GROUND AND AIR OPERATIONS TO DESTROY VC/ARVN MAIN AND SUBVERSIVE FORCES LOCATED IN ICPIA.

(2) 1ST MAW PROVIDES AIR CONTROL AND AIRFIELD OPERATIONS FACILITIES AND FIXED AND ROTARY WING ALL WEATHER AIRCRAFT SUPPORT.

(3) U.S. SEVENTH FLT PROVIDES SHOTGUN BOMBARDMENT AND CHIEFTAIN SUPPORT AND DEPLOYS THE ARD/ADF AS DIRECTED.

(4) U. S. NAVAL FORCES, IV AND VMS, PROVIDE NAVAL SUPPORT IN COASTAL AND

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CONTIGUOUS WATERS.

- (5) 7TH AF AND VNAF PROVIDE AIR SUPPORT FOR GROUND OPERATIONS AND AIR DEFENSE OF RVN.
- (6) FIRST DIVISION, ARVN, CONDUCTS OPERATIONS AND SUPPORTS THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IN 11TH PTA.
- (7) QUANG TRI PROVINCE HQ PROVIDES RF SUPPORT AND DEFENDS VITAL AREAS.
- (8) 11TH PTA HQ (C) IN O/S, MAINTAINS AND UPGRADES ROUTE 561 CAM LO TO CON THIEN.
- (9) 3D MARINE (-)(REIN) UNITS IN KINGFISHER OPERATING AREA CONDUCT MULTI-REGIMENTAL SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS; DEFEND COMBAT BASE AREA, AIRFIELD AND ANCILLARY FACILITIES AT DONG HA AND OTHER VITAL INSTALLATIONS IN OA; MAINTAIN COMBAT BASES IN CONJUNCTION WITH RF UNITS AT DESIGNATED LOCATIONS; OPEN AND SECURE LINES OF COMMUNICATION IN THE OA; MAINTAIN ACTIVE GROUND SURVEILLANCE AND SCRIMMING OPERATIONS AND SPOILING ATTACKS AGAINST NVA/VC FORCES; AND SUPPORT GVN REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (RD) CAMPAIGN PLAN 1967.
- (10) 3D MARINES (-)(REIN) PROVIDE FOR THE DEFENSE AND SECURITY OF VITAL INSTALLATIONS IN OA; MAINTAIN COMBAT BASES CA LU AND BA LONG; MAINTAINS AN ACTIVE GROUND SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND CONDUCTS SPOILING ATTACKS.

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THROUGHOUT ASSIGNED OA TO DETECT AND DESTROY INfiltrating NVA PERSONNEL, MAINTAINS SECURITY OF ROUTE 9 IN ASSIGNED OA, INCLUDING ENGR CONSTRUCTION AND UPGRADING EFFORT, AND ASSUMES OPCON OF MARINE ELEMENTS OF CAC's WITHIN ASSIGNED OA;

(11) 12TH MARINES (-) (REIN) PROVIDES D/S ARTILLERY TO INFANTRY REGIMENTS AS REQUIRED; PROVIDES C/S AND C/I REINFORCING FIRES AS REQUIRED; MAINTAINS PSOC AT DONG HA, SUBORDINATE TO DIV PSOC, FOR COORDINATION OF FIRE SUPPORT AND FOR LIAISON WITH DABG; CONTINUE CURRENT MISSION OF GIO LIMI ARTILLERY OUTPOST IN AREA ASSIGNED; PROVIDES ARTILLERY SUPPORT TO 3D RECON BY PATROLS, DISPLACING ARTILLERY AS NECESSARY; AND PROVIDES SEARCHLIGHT SUPPORT IAW 12TH MAR 031100Z JUL 67 AS MODIFIED BY 12TH MAR 160630Z JUL 67.

(12) 3D RECON BY (-) (REIN) C/S; PROVIDES LIAISON PARTY WITH EACH INFANTRY REGIMENT; COORDINATES ALL RECON INSERTIONS/EXTRATIONS; FIRE SUPPORT AND USE OF REACTION FORCES WITH APPROPRIATE INFANTRY COMMANDERS.

(13) 1ST BN ADA AW (REIN) 44TH ARTY PROVIDES ONE ADA AW BATTERY REINFORCED WITH ONE ADA HQ SEC D/S 3D MAR; PROVIDES TWO BATTERIES (-) REINFORCED WITH THREE ADA HQ SEC D/S 3D MAR; AND ONE ADA

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SEC D/S CIO LINH ARTILLERY OUTPOST.

(14) 3D T/4 B/3 PROVIDES ONE COMPANY REINFORCED WITH ONE PLATOON AND ONE FLAME SEC D/S 9TH MAR, AND PROVIDES ONE COMPANY (-) REINFORCED WITH ONE FLAME SEC D/S 3D MAR.

(15) 3D AT B/3 PROVIDES PLT (RMN) D/S 3D MAR, AND PROVIDES ONE COMPANY (RMN) D/S 9TH MARINES.

(16) 1ST ANTRAC BN (-) C/S, AS INSTALLATION COORDINATOR, CUA VIET FACILITY, COORDINATES SECURITY AND LOCAL DEFENSE MEASURES IN OA ASSIGNED, AND CONDUCTS OPERATIONS OUTSIDE OA IN COORDINATION WITH 9TH MARINES.

2. MISSION. 9TH MARINES (-) (RMN) ON ORDER PROVIDE SECURITY AND DEFENSE OF DONO HA COMBAT BASE; BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE REINFORCEMENTS, COUNTER ATTACK AND RELIEF FORCES FOR CIO LINH ARTILLERY OUTPOST AND CUA VIET FACILITY; MAINTAIN AN ACTIVE GROUND SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND CONDUCT SPOILING ATTACKS THROUGHOUT ASSIGNED OA TO DETECT AND DESTROY INFILTRATING IVA PERSONNEL; PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ROUTE 9, ROUTE 561, AND ROUTE 1 IN ASSIGNED OA; ASSURE OPCON OF MARINE ELEMENTS OF CAGS WITHIN ASSIGNED OA AND AOR; SUPPORT CVN 70 PROGRAM WITHIN OA AND AOR; MAINTAIN COMBAT BASE AT GOM THIEN AND

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PROVIDE SECURITY FOR CAM LO BRIDGE SITE; COORDINATE AND PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ENTRANT BOMBARDED OPERATIONS BETWEEN GIO LINH AND GIAI THIEN; PROVIDE ONE RIFLE COMPANY (REIN) OPCON GIO LINH ARTILLERY COMMANDER FOR DEFENSE AND SECURITY OF THAT POSITION; ASSIST UNITS LOCATED AT MOUTH OF GIA VIET RIVER WITH DEFENSE; SECURITY MEASURES, AND FIRE SUPPORT - AUGMENT SECURITY FORCES AS REQUIRED; AND CONDUCT OPERATIONS AS DIRECTED IN DESIGNATED AOR; COORDINATE USE OF AIRCRAFT WITH ARVN, AS REQUIRED.

**3. EXECUTION.**

**A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.** ON ORDER 9TH MARINES (-) (REIN) PROVIDES SECURITY AND DEFENSE OF DONG HA COMBAT BASE BY UTILIZING FORCES OF TERRITORY COMMANDS WITH INFANTRY FORCES PROVIDING COORDINATION AND REINFORCE BORDERS; PROVIDES SECURITY OF CAM LO BRIDGE SITE BY ONE RIFLE PLT (REIN). PROVIDES REINFORCEMENTS, COUNTERATTACK AND RELIEF FORCES FOR GIO LINH ARTILLERY OUTPOST AND GIA VIET FACILITY FROM ASSIGNED FORCES AS REQUIRED. MAINTAIN AN ACTIVE GROUND SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND CONDUCTS SPOILING ATTACKS THROUGHOUT ASSIGNED OA WITH ASSIGNED FORCES TO DETECT AND DESTROY INFILTRATING NVA

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PERSONNEL. PROVIDES SECURITY FOR ROUTE 9, ROUTE 561, AND ROUTE 1 IN ASSIGNED OA BY AGGRESSIVE PATROLDNG ALONG PLANKS, UTILIZING COMBINED ACTION PLATOONS AND OTHER ASSIGNED FORCES, OCCUPIES AND DEFENDS COM THIEN COMPLEX. PROVIDES ONE RIFLE CO (RIFC) GROUNDS GIO LINH ARMY CMBR FOR DEFENSE AND SECURITY OF THAT POSITION. ASSISTS UNITS AT MOUTH OF CUA VINE RIVER WITH REGARD TO DEFENSE, SECURITY MEASURES, AND FIRE SUPPORT, AS REQUIRED, AUGMENTING THESE FORCES AS REQUIRED. COORDINATES AND PROVIDES SECURE SITE FOR MAJOR FORTIFICATION OPERATIONS BETWEEN GIO LINH AND COM THIEN. CONDUCTS OPS AS DIRECTED IN DESIGNATED MR, COORDINATING USE OF AREA WITH ARVN, AS REQUIRED, IN CARRYING OUT THESE MISSIONS. GENERAL AND DIRECT SUPPORT ARMY WILL BE EMPLOYED AS FEASIBLE. IN ADDITION, FIXED WING AND HELICOPTERS WILL BE USED AS FEASIBLE AND COMMENSURATE WITH AVAILABILITY.

**B. 3D BN ATH MAINTEN.**

- (1) OCCUPY AND DEFEND COM THIEN COMPLEX.
- (2) BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO PROVIDE RELIEF/REINFORCEMENTS OF GIO LINH ARMY OUTPOST AND CUA VINE FACILITY IN THE EVENT OF ENEMY ATTACK.

- (3) CONDUCT GROUND SURVEILLANCE AND SPECIFIC ATTACKS THROUGHOUT

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ASSIGNED OA (OAI) WITH ASSISTED FORCES TO DETECT AND DESTROY  
DETERIORATING IVA FORCES (OPER OVERLAY - PAPER).

- (4) MAINTAIN SECURITY ON ROUTE 561 IN OA BY AGGRESSIVE PATROLLING ALONG BLANKS.
- (5) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR MINE SWEEP TEAMS IN OA.
- (6) ED BM (-), OAI MANNERS
  - (1) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ANY POSITIONS LOCATED BY OAI TO POSITIONS
  - (2) PROVIDE SECURITY ALONG ROUTE 561 IN OA BY AGGRESSIVE PATROLLING ALONG BLANKS.
  - (3) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR MINE SWEEP TEAMS ALONG ROUTE 561 IN OA.
  - (4) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR OAI TO BRIDGE SITE.
  - (5) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR TRUCK CONVOYS BETWEEN OAI TO POSITIONS AND GOM TOWN.
  - (6) CONTROL TRAFFIC ON MSR BETWEEN OAI TO POSITION AND OAI TOWN.
  - (7) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR 14TH MECH PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT WHILE URGENTING MSR.
  - (8) BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO PROVIDE RELIEF/REINFORCEMENT/ OF OAI HIGH OUTPOST AND GOM VIST FACILITY IN THE EVENT OF ENEMY ATTACK.

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(9) CONDUCT GROUND SURVEILLANCE AND SPOILING ATTACKS THROUGHOUT ASSIGNED (OA II) OA WITH ASSIGNED FORCES TO DETECT AND DESTROY INFILTRATING NVA FORCES. (OPP OVERLAY- PAGE 5).

(10) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE A PLATOON (REIN) REACTION FORCE IN THE EVENT CAN LO RESETTLEMENT VILLAGE COMES UNDER ENEMY ATTACK.

D. 2D BY CEF-MARINES.

(1) ON ORDER PROVIDE ONE RIFLE COMPANY (REIN) AS COUNTERATTACK FORCE FOR DONG HA COMBAT BASE DURING THE HOURS OF DARKNESS.

(2) PROVIDE ONE PLATOON (REIN) AS SPARROW HAWK ON THIRTY MINUTES ALERT DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS. (SEE REF D).

(3) ASSUME OPOON OF MARINE ELEMENTS OF COMBINED ACTION COMPANY AT CAN LO TO INCLUDE CAP-1, CAP-2, CAP-3, AND CAP-4.

(4) PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ROUTE 9 IN OA USING CAC UNITS AND OTHER ASSIGNED FORCES.

(5) BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO PROVIDE RELIEF/REINFORCEMENTS OF GIO LINH ARMY OUTPOST AND GIA VIET FACILITY.

(6) CONDUCT GROUND SURVEILLANCE AND SPOILING ATTACKS THROUGHOUT ASSIGNED OA (OA III) WITH ASSIGNED FORCES TO DETECT AND DESTROY INFILTRATING NVA FORCES.

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(7) ORGANIZE BN CP AS ALTERNATE REGIMENTAL CP. BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO ACTIVATE NECESSARY RADIO NETS TO INCLUDE FSOC, RNDT TAG, AIR, AND BASE DEFENSE NET.

(8) PROVIDE ONE RIFLE COMPANY (REIN) OPCON 12TH MAR FOR DEFENSE AND SECURITY OF GIO LINE ARMY OUTPOST.

E. EXTRADITAL RESERVE.

(1) 2D BN 9TH MARINES

(2) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE ONE RIFLE COMPANY (REIN) TO BE EMPLOYED EITHER IN REGIMENTAL OA OR AOR ON TWO HOURS NOTICE.

F. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) THIS ORDER EFFECTIVE FOR PLANNING OR RECEIPT AND FOR OPERATIONS 161601N JUL 67.

(2) OPERATION CODE NAME - KINGFISHER.

(3) DIRECTORATE ALONE

(4) COORDINATE OPERATIONS WITH RVNAF UNITS AND DISTRICT LEVEL OFFICIALS IN OA AND AOR.

(5) THIS HQ WILL COORDINATE OPERATING AREAS WITH RVNAF AND OTHER FMF AS APPROPRIATE.

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		INFO						

(6) THIS HQ WILL COORDINATE RECON INSURANCES/EXTRactions AND FIRE SUPPORT, AND PROVIDE REACTION FORCES TO RECON EXTRactions AND/OR EXPLOITATION OF RANDOM CONTACTS.

(7) FIRE SUPPORT - SEE REF (B).

(8) AIR SUPPORT - SEE REF (B).

(9) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT - SEE REF (B).

(10) THIS OP CANCELS 9TH MAR OP 0 7-67.

(11) BRIEFING POINTS - TO BE PUBLISHED SEPARATELY.

(12) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. REF (C) AND CURRENT DIRECTIVES.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS.

A. COMMUNICATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF (B).

B. COMMAND POSTS.

(1) 9TH MAR DIVES - COM LO.

(2) 3D BN 4TH MAR - COM THIN

(3) 2D BN 9TH MAR - DONG HA

(4) 3D (-), 9TH MAR - COM LO

(5) REPORT ALL CHANGED OF CP LOCATIONS TO THIS HQ.

ANNEX A - OPN OVERLAY - PAGE

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MAIL MESSAGE  
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FROM: NINTH MARINES

TO      SECOND BN, NINTH MARINES  
         THIRD BN (-) NINTH MARINES  
         11TH ENGR BN  
         CO C 3D ENGR BN  
         CO A 3D TK BN    *9<sup>th</sup> UT BN*  
         2D ARVN REGT

INFO     CG, THIRD MAR DIV  
         THIRD BN, FOURTH MARINES  
         ADC THIRD MAR DIV (FWD)  
         1ST ARVN DIV  
         THIRD MARINES

SECRET

FRAG ORDER NO. ONE (IN SUPPORT OF ARVN OPN LAM SON 88)

1. SITUATION VAN KIM VILLAGE AND SURROUNDING AREA HAS LONG BEEN KNOWN AS A VC HARBOR SITE. ALL CIVILIANS HAVE LEFT THE AREA AND HAVE EXTRACTED PERSONAL BELONGINGS AND ITEMS OF CULTURAL INTEREST. SEE CURRENT SITREPS AND ISUMS
2. MISSION 2D ARVN REGT SUPPORTED BY NINTH MARINES CONDUCTS SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION IN VIC OF VAN KIM VILLAGE AND ADJACENT VILLAGES.
3. EXECUTION

A CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS ONE COMPANY, 1ST BN, 2D ARVN REGT SUPPORTED BY ONE RIFLE COMPANY (USMC) AND OTHER COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS, CONDUCTS A SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION IN ASSIGNED ZOA.

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## NAVAL MESSAGE

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(SEE OPN OVERLAY). THE USMC RIFLE COMPANY WILL BE USED PRIMARILY AS SECURITY FOR THE COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS AND TO SUPPORT THE ARVN COMPANY IN THEIR MISSION.

B. 2D, BN 9TH MARINES

- (1) PROVIDE ONE RIFLE COMPANY WITH ARTY FO TEAM<sup>S</sup> AND EAC TEAM.
- (2) DIRECT RIFLE COMPANY TO RENDEZVOUS WITH COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS AND ASSUME CONTROL OF ALL USMC FORCES.
- (3) DIRECT RIFLE COMPANY TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS AND TO SUPPORT THE 2D ARVN REGT OPERATION.

C. 11TH ENGR BN

- (1) REQUESTED TO PROVIDE TWO (2) BULLDOZERS TO SUPPORT OPERATION.
- (2) RENDEZVOUS WITH 2/9 RIFLE COMPANY VIC YD 130659.

D. CO C, 3D ENGR BN

- (1) PROVIDE ONE (1) ENGR SQD WITH SIEP AND DEMOLITION CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT OPERATION.

- (2) RENDEZVOUS WITH 2/9 RIFLE COMPANY VIC YD 130659.

E CO A, 3D TK BN

- (1) PROVIDE ONE (1) TANK PLATOON (2 GUN TANKS AND 2 FLAME TANKS) TO SUPPORT OPERATION.

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(2) INSURE REFUELING CAPABILITY FOR FLAME TANKS AT  
CAM LO POSITION.

(3) RENDEZVOUS WITH 2/9 RIFLE COMPANY VIC YD 130659

F. 9TH MT BN

(1) PROVIDE FOUR (4) TRUCKS TO TRANSPORT ARVN FORCES  
FROM DONG HA TO VIC YD 130659.

(2) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL MT SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

G. 3D (-), 9TH MARINES

(1) PROVIDE FOR CONVOY SECURITY OF ARVN CONVOY FROM CAM LO  
POSITION TO VIC YD 130659 AND RETURN.

H. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) D-DAY 20 JUL 1967

(2) H-HOUR 1000H

(3) RENDEZVOUS POINT YD 130659.

(4) RENDEZVOUS TIME - 200900H JULY 1967

(5) ANTICIPATED DURATION OF OPERATION - TWO (2) DAYS.

(6) COMMANDER OF USMC FORCES - CO, CO H, 2D BN, 9TH MARINES

COORDINATE WITH ARVN COMMANDER.

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4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. IAW CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

- A. IAW CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS
- B. CO H, 2D BN, 9TH MARINES MAINTAIN COMMUNICATIONS ON REGT TAC
- C. SUBMIT SITREP AND SPOT REWS DIRECT TO THIS HQ.
- D. SITREP DUE 1100, 1700, 2300, AND 0500. SPOT PEP'S ON OCCURRANCE REPORTS TO INCLUDE ALL SUPPORTING UNITS.
- E. REPORT CP LOCATIONS WHEN ESTABLISHED.

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
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9th Marines  
Jul 1967

DPN Overlay to Accuracy  
FRAG O. 1-67 (on KINGFISHER)



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*Frag 0*  
*SB*  
*J*  
*DS*  
*JWS*

ZNY SSSSS  
 G 251300Z JUL 67  
 1- NINTH MARINES  
 TO ZEN/SECOND BN NINTH MARINES  
 ZEN, TH RD BN FOURTH MARINES  
 ZEN/CO A TH RD TANK BN  
 ZEN/CO C TH RD AT BN  
 ZEN/CO C TH RD ENGR BN  
 HQ CO CG TH RD MARDIV  
 ZEN, ADC TH RD MARDIV DHCB  
 ZEN, TWELFTH MARINES  
 THIRD MARINES  
 SECOND BN TWELFTH MARINES  
 ZEN/FIRST AMTRAC BN  
 ZEN/TH RD BN NINTH MARINES  
 ZEN, NINTH MT BN  
 TWENTY SIXTH MARINES  
 BT

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FRAG ORDER NUMBER TWO FOR OPERATION KINGFISHER  
 A- NINTH MARINE 04 0 12-67

PAGE TWO DHCB **SECRET**

B- NINTH MARINES MSG 230659Z JUL 67 (NOTAL)

1- SITUATION

A- ENEMY. SEE CURRENT SITREPS AND INSUMS

B- FRIENDLY

(1) 7TH AIR FORCE WILL PROVIDE TAC (A)S AND AIR SUPPORT NORTH OF THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE DMZ.

(2) 3D MARDIV WILL PROVIDE AO'S ON STATION DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE TO 2D BN, 9TH MARINES.

(3) 1ST MAW WILL PROVIDE FIXED-WING AIR SUPPORT ON STATION AS REQUIRED IN ADDITION TO ON CALL AIRCRAFT DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE TO 2D BN, 9TH MARINES. IN ADDITION, MELOS WILL BE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE, ON CALL, TO 2D BN, 9TH MARINES FOR THE RAPID REPOSITIONING OF FORCES UP TO PLT SIZE.

(4) 12TH MARINES WILL PROVIDE LONG RANGE GENERAL SUPPORT TIRES TO COUNTER ENEMY ARTILLERY/MORTAR CAPABILITIES IN AND NORTH OF THE DMZ.

(5) 2D BN ( ) (REIN). 12TH MARINES WILL PROVIDE CLOSE, DIRECT SUPPORT. A MINIMUM OF TWO DS 105MM HOWITZER BATTERIES WILL BE (REIN) TO BE IMMEDIATELY LOCATED AT THE FIRE POSITION OF 2D BN

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

PAGE THREE D4CB S E C R E T

(6) 1ST AMTRAC BN PROVIDES LVT AND LVTP SUPPORT FOR ENGRD OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF 2D BN, 9TH MARINES.

2. MISSION. 9TH MARINES CONDUCT SPOILING ATTACK WITH ONE REINFORCED BATTALION INTO SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE DMZ IN THE AREA NW OF CON THIEN.

## 3. EXECUTION

A. CONCERN OF OPERATIONS. 9TH MARINES CONDUCT SPOILING ATTACK INTO THE DMZ ALONG AX'S OF ADVANCE BLUE. (SEE JPN OVERLAY-(<sup>4</sup>ASE)). THIS ATTACK WILL BE PRECEDED BY AT LEAST TWO DAYS OF INTENSIVE ARTY AND AIR SUPPORT. ARTY AND AIR WILL ALSO BE UTILIZED EXTENSIVELY FOR SUPPRESSIVE FIRES ON THE FLANKS AND TO THE NORTH AS THE BN MOVES ALONG THE AX'S OF ADVANCE. ARC LIGHTS WILL BE RUN IN DESIGNATED AREAS TO THE NORTH OF THE AXIS ON THE TWO NIGHTS PRECEDING THE ATTACK. THE ATTACK WILL BE COMPLETED WITHIN A TWENTY-FOUR TO THIRTY-SIX HOUR PERIOD (NOT RESTRICTIVE).

B. 2D BN (REIN), 9TH MARINES

(1) CONDUCT SPOILING ATTACK ALONG AXIS OF ADVANCE BLUE. (SEE JPN OVERLAY-(<sup>4</sup>ASE)).

(2) DESTROY ENEMY FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS ENCOUNTERED IN AREA.

(3) UTILIZE SUPPORTING ARMS TO THEIR MAXIMUM CAPABILITY TO COVER

PAGE FOUR D4CB S E C R E T

FLANKS AND TO RECON BY FIRE.

(4) REPORT UNIT LOCATIONS AT LEAST EVERY TWO HOURS WHILE MOVING.

C. CO A (-) (REIN). 3D TKE BN

(1) PROVIDE ONE COMPANY, REINFORCED WITH ONE SECTION FLAME

FLANKS. DIRECT SUPPORT 2D BN, 9TH MARINES.

(2) MAINTAIN ONE PLT OF THE COMPANY PROVIDED AT CON THIEN AS STANDBY TO REINFORCE IF NECESSARY.

D. CO C. 3D AT BN

(1) PROVIDE ONE PLATOON ON TO DIRECT SUPPORT 2D BN, 9TH MARINES.

E. CO C. 3D ENGR BN

(1) PROVIDE ONE PLATOON ENGR'S DIRECT SUPPORT 2D BN, 9TH MARINES.

(2) PROVIDE DEMOLITION AND SAWM CAPABILITY WITH PLATOON.

F. RESERVE

(1) 3D BN, 4TH MARINES

A. BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT OR EXPLOIT OPERATIONS WITH GMU GRP AND THREE RIFLE COMPANIES.

B. SCREEN ADVANCE OF 2D BN, 9TH MARINES IN 3D BN, 4TH MARINES OA UNTIL CLEAR OF SOUTHERN ENDURANCE OF DMZ.

C. MAINTAIN UNITS IN POSITION TO COVER 2D BN, 9TH MARINES REAR WHILE MOVING ALONG AXIS IN THE DMZ.

D. SCREEN EXIT AREA FROM DMZ IN ADVANCE OF 2D BN, 9TH MARINES.

G. COORDINATION INSTRUCTIONS

(1) THIS ORDER EFFECTIVE FOR PLANNING ON RECENT AND EXECUTION ON ORDER.

TAB-J

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

PAGE FIVE DRAFT SECRET

- (3) H-HOUR = TBA
- (4) AXIS OF ADVANCE BLUE = 301 00N 89E LAY = PHASED
- (5) POINT OF DEPARTURE = 1100Z 117
- (6) ALL UNITS WILL IMMEDIATELY REPORT TIME OF 1100Z  
ENTRY NT DMZ AND TIME LAST ELEMENT HAS CLEARED DMZ TO THIS, O.
- (7) ALL UNITS WILL FORM LINE OF SILENT ARTILLS  
AVAILABLE ASSETS TO RELIEVE FIGHTING ELEMENTS OF THIS PHASE IN 1100Z
- (8) ENEMY USE OF AIR WARFARE TO MARK CRINT LOCATIONS.
- (9) KEEP THIS HQ INFORMED OF NEAREST AVAILABLE LZ
- (10) ANTICIPATED DURATION OF PHASED, THIRTY FOUR TO  
48 HRS TO 72 HRS (NOT EXACTLY).
- A. ADMIN'S PART AND LOC STICKS, LAW RET (A) AND CURRENT DIRECT LTC  
IN COMMAND AND COMINT CALLINGS - ELEPHTR INFO
- B. LAW RET (A) AND SURREIN DIRECTIVES.
- C. REGIMENTAL RELAY STAFF IN WILL BE ESTABLISHED AT COMIN 1100Z  
TO COMMENCEMENT OF OPERAT CN.
- D. ALL UNITS REPORT OP LOCATIONS WHEN ESTABLISHED.

**SECRET**

TAB J


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9th Marines, July 67.

~~SECRET~~

9th Marines  
3d Marine Division SHF (Rein)

14  
+ 76



OPEN  
THIS OVERLAY TO ACCOMPANY  
FRAG ORDER NUMBER TWO FOR  
OPERATION KINGFISHER

~~SECRET~~

66 +  
07

TAB 2

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SECRET

1433Z  
21 October 1967

529867

5-ML-EMEN on CR 9th Marines ltr CMNS/PR, 3106, Serial  
5-67 o 21 August 1967To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), RIF  
Commanding General, I Marine Amphibious Force

C: After Action Report (Operation BUFFALO)

I: I wanted concurring in the analysis and recommendations  
in the reporting commander.

J. R. Stockman

J. R. STOCKMAN  
By directionCopy No. 10 of 10 copies  
SECRET

SECRET

TPRM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~More on the monsoon  
planning.

GR

HOUVARA 0  
OF RIAR AND H/W NR 11...11...11...11...11

G-3D

Plans

ACTION

G-3

POC

00000  
0 000515Z JUL 67  
FM NINH MARINES  
TO CG THIRD MARDIV

PT

CONFIDENTIAL

PLANNING CONFERENCE

A. CG, 3D MARDIV MSG 021123Z JUL 67

1. IAW THE RPF AND ASSUMING THIS REGIMENT WILL BE IN THIS  
NEPAL OPERATING AREA WITH BASICALLY THE SAME ASSETS AVAILABLE,  
THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE SUBMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION.

2. UNITS OF THIS REGIMENT WILL BE GENERALLY DISPOSED AS AT PRESENT WITHIN THE CURRENT OPERATING AREA. CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN HOWEVER TO EXTENDING THE OPERATING AREA TO INCLUDE HIGHWAY NR 1 TO THE EAST. THIS BECOMES MORE NECESSARY WITH THE ADVENT OF THE MONSOON SEASON IN ORDER TO IMPROVE CONTROL OF THIS VITAL LINK AND ENSURE ADEQUACY OF AN ISR.
3. CONSIDERATION SHOULD ALSO BE GIVEN TO UP-GRADING THE POSITION AT CON THIEN AND GIO LINH TO MAKE THEM TENABLE DURING THE MONSOON SEASON. THE SAME APPLIES TO RI 561 INTO CON THIEN.
4. DUE TO THE RESTRICTED AVAILABILITY OF HELICOPTERS DURING

PAGE TWO RIAR CONFIDENTIAL

THE MONSOON SEASON, CONSIDERATION IS BEING GIVEN TO OPERATING COMPANY AND PLATOON PARADE BASES TO COVER THE AREA. IN THIS SAME CONNECTION, OTHERS AND FOLLOW-ON TYPE VEHICLES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR MOVEMENT AND RESUPPLY DURING THE MONSOON SEASON.

5. THE BASIC CONCEPT FOR THIS OPERATING AREA DURING THE MONSOON SEASON WILL BE LIMITED OBJECTIVE TYPE OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OF CAC UNITS. IT IS BELIEVED THAT OPERATIONS OF THIS SORT IN SUPPORT OF THE ADVISOR EFF

T ARE THE KEY TO PREVENTING THE  
TYPE INTERFERENCE MENTIONED  
IN UVARA, I.P. OF THE REF.

CP-A

PT

FOR 090925Z JUN 67 04 JUL 1967

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TAB-N

HEADQUARTERS  
9th Marines  
3d Marine Division (Reinf), FMF  
FPO San Francisco, 96602

9th Mar Regt  
Control No 00706 67  
Copy No 12 of 12

3/MWS/pz  
3100  
SER P 35-67-67  
AUG 21 1967

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Reinf), FMF

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report

Ref: (a) Maps Vietnam, 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014, Sheets 6342 I,  
6342 II  
(b) 3d MarDiv LOI 1-67  
(c) 3d MarDivO P02000.2E  
(d) 3d MarDivO 3100.1C

Encl (1) Operation BUFFALO Overlay  
(2) After Action Reports; 1/9, 2/9, 3/9, 1/3, 1/4 and 3/4

1. Code Name. BUFFALO

2. Date of Operation. 021000H Jul67-140900H Jul67.

3. Location. QUANG TRI Province (CAM LO and GIO LINH District)

4. Command Headquarters. 9th Marines (-) (Reinf)

Task Organization

9th Marines

COL JERDE

Hq Co (-) (Rein)

1st Bn, 9th Marines

LTCOL SCHENING

Co A 1st Bn, 9th Marines  
Co B 1st Bn, 9th Marines  
Co C 1st Bn, 9th Marines  
Co D 1st Bn, 9th Marines

2d Bn, 9th Marines

LTCOL PELLER - 021000H - 051200H Jul67  
LTCOL KENT - 051200H - 140900H Jul67

Co E 2d Bn, 9th Marines  
Co F 2d Bn, 9th Marines  
Co G 2d Bn, 9th Marines  
Co H 2d Bn, 9th Marines

Downgraded in three (3) year intervals  
Declassified after twelve (12) years.

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9TH MAR

AIR RPT  
OPN BUFFALO

2-14 JULY 1967

TAB-M

3d Bn, 9th Marines

Major WOODRING

Co A, 3d Bn, 9th Marines  
 Co B, 3d Bn, 9th Marines  
 Co C, 3d Bn, 9th Marines  
 Co D, 3d Bn, 9th Marines

1st Bn, 3d Marines

LtCol NICKEL

Co A, 1st Bn, 3d Marines  
 Co B, 1st Bn, 3d Marines  
 Co C, 1st Bn, 3d Marines  
 Co D, 1st Bn, 3d Marines

1st Bn (-), 4th Marines

Major BELL

Co A, 1st Bn (-), 4th Marines  
 Co B, 1st Bn (-), 4th Marines  
 Co C, 1st Bn (-), 4th Marines

3d Bn (-), 4th Marines

LtCol WEST

Co K, 3d Bn (-), 4th Marines  
 Co L, 3d Bn (-), 4th Marines  
 Co M, 3d Bn (-), 4th Marines

## 5. Supporting Forces

### a. Direct Support and General Support Units

12th Marines - Direct Support and General Support as required.  
 3d Recon Bn (-) (Rein) - General Support  
 2nd Bn, 12th Marines - Direct Support  
 Co A, 3d Ldr Bn - Direct Support  
 Co C, 3d Ldr Bn - Direct Support  
 Co A (Rein), 3d Tk Bn - Direct Support  
 Co C (Rein), 3d Tk Bn - Direct Support  
 Hwy "A" and "B", 1st Bn (-) (Rein) 4th Arty, USA - Direct Support

### b. Air Support

#### (1) Helicopter Support

(a) During the afternoon of the first day of the operation one battalion (-) (three companies and a command group of Third Battalion, Ninth Marines) and Company C of the First Battalion, Ninth Marines were helilifted into the area just east of Cu Lien. This troop lift of 640 men was expeditiously and professionally executed with a minimum of advance notice.

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(b) Medevac and resupply missions were flown extensively throughout the operation. Medevac missions evacuated 322 casualties. Resupply missions carried a total of 267,661 pounds of supplies to the field units.

(c) AH-1W gunships gave excellent fire support to Companies A and B of the First Battalion, Ninth Marines during the initial engagement on 2 July.

(2) Fixed Wing Support

(a) Fixed wing aircraft were utilized as T.C(A)'s, A's, flare-ships, CAS, and on TRQ missions.

(b) The prompt and professional response by fixed wing, close air support aircraft and their airborne controller (TRAIL 64) was instrumental in the relief of Bravo Company, First Battalion, Ninth Marines in their initial contact on 2 July.

(c) Fixed wing aircraft flew 523 CAS and 472 TRQ missions, expending 4,297,500 pounds of ordnance during the operation.

• Artillery Support

(1) Artillery support for the Ninth Marine Regiment during Operation BUFFALO was provided by the Second Battalion, Twelfth Marines operating in a direct support role. Reinforcing fires were provided by the Twelfth Marine Regiment. On 7 July, 1/12 landed from the Special Landing Force and assumed a direct support mission for QM HILL. The same day, 2/12 landed and was placed in support of the A.G.H. Combat Base. On 12 July, 4/2/12 displaced to Cu Lc in order to better support the Ninth Marine Regiment.

(2) Direct support artillery fired 25,306 rounds broken down as follows

<u>Targets</u>		<u>Rounds</u>	
Observed	147	105MM	17,940
Unobserved	257	107MM	5,612
Total	3269	155MM	1,834
Total	3673	Total	25,306

(3) Significant surveillances were as follows

225 AL (Conf)  
 101 AL (Prob)  
 7 Secondary explosions  
 1 automatic weapon destroyed  
 1 artillery piece destroyed  
 1 funnel complex destroyed

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6. Intelligencea. Estimate of enemy strength in Operating area

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Strength</u>
90th Regt.	North of Cai LIN centered in Go (YD 1372)	2,400
1 Bn of the 803d Regt.	W of Cai LIN in south- ern DMZ	700
29th Regt. (-)	Along western boundary of the operating area	1,500
Elements of 312th Regt.	Throughout operating area (Recon elements)	Est. 200-300
31st Regt.	est of Highway #1 and South- ern DMZ centered on Go (YD 1676)	2,285

b. Estimate of enemy Capability of Reinforcing

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Strength</u>
32d Regt.	Eastern DMZ	2,625
803d Regt. (-)	North of Cai LIN in DMZ	1,700
312th Regt. (-)	North of Cai LIN in DMZ	Est. 1200-1500

c. Specific Information on enemy in area

(1) There had been a build up of intelligence information indicating that the enemy would undertake offensive action during the period 3-14 July, 1967. The indication is that the act was based on the following evidence:

- (a) Increased sightings in the DMZ area by A's.
- (b) Increased contacts by patrols around Cai LIN.
- (c) Build up of enemy artillery and anti-aircraft weapons in area north of the ~~the~~ DMZ River.
- (d) S-2, 2d ARVN Regiment, indicated that enemy had a five year history of conducting offensive operations during this period of the year.

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(e) The "Mark of the moon" coincided with other indications of offensive action.

(f) An increase of SPAR activity in the eastern DMZ region.

(2) An inspection of the bodies of the enemy that had been killed in the GIANG BINH area 2, 3, and 4 days before the commencement of this operation revealed that a new regiment, the 90th Regiment, had moved into the area around CON THIEN. The enemy was dressed in new uniforms and had new equipment. All enemy bodies that were recovered during this period had homemade gas masks included in their equipment.

(3) During the initial phases of the operation a very close liaison was maintained with division serial observers. This close contact was invaluable in keeping track of enemy movements; however, heavy shelling of the DONG HA airfield necessitated moving the planes to PHU BAI and the benefits of close personal liaison were greatly diminished.

**d. Enemy Capabilities**

(1) Enemy was capable of massing up to three regiments (90th, 29th (-), and 31st) in the area around CON THIEN at the beginning of the operation.

(2) Enemy was capable of conducting small unit attacks against friendly forces throughout the area of operation.

(3) Enemy was capable of defending in the DMZ area.

(4) Enemy could reinforce with units from North Vietnam.

(5) Enemy was capable of withdrawing but would do so only under heavy pressure.

e. Adequacy of Pre-D-Day Intelligence. Information provided by division and obtained from intelligence gathering units in the OA provided adequate intelligence prior to commencement of operation.

**f. Enemy Casualties**

991 (Confirmed)  
297 (Probable)

g. Positions. Extensive enemy bunkers and trenchlines were known to exist throughout the area surrounding CON THIEN. In the opening contact of the operation the enemy fought from prepared positions. The positions were nothing more than improved drainage ditches utilizing hedgerows and bushes for concealment.

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**h. Terrain Analysis.** No specific terrain analysis was made for this operation. 9th Marine's intelligence estimate for July, 1967 includes a terrain analysis.

**1. Weapons Captured.**

76 Individual weapons  
20 Crew-served  
96 Total weapons

**4. Enemy Tactics.** The enemy employed no new tactics but at the onset were in a position which initially offered some measure of success. With the opening of the operation, the enemy fired two command detonated claymore mines at "A" Company, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines. "A" Company was delayed due to evacuation of casualties. This resulted in "A" Company not meeting up with "B" Company as expected. "B" Company became engaged with what was estimated initially to be a large sized unit in a position, previously prepared on terrain favorable to their forces. The enemy opened fire on "B" Company from the right flank and front. The enemy utilized captured Marine uniforms, flak jackets and helmets to confuse friendly troops. During the initial phase of the operation, "A" Company and "C" Company became heavily engaged. There were reports that the enemy used tear gas on the first two days of the operation, but an investigation could produce no positive evidence that tear gas was used by the enemy. During the ensuing battle, the enemy displayed effective use of both artillery and mortars. Pre-registered targets were scattered throughout the GIA BINH area and the enemy, on a number of occasions, opened fire with a "fire for effect". On two separate occasions, enemy troops assaulted friendly positions during their own mortar barrage. The enemy fiercely defended his positions and could not be ousted by infantry assault alone. Massive use of air support and artillery fires were used to blast the enemy out of position. The enemy withdrew only after tremendous amounts of heavy ordnance were delivered on his positions.

**5. Intelligence Gained from Interrogation.** No tactically significant intelligence was gained from PWs or Detainees.

**7. Mission.** 9th Marines (-(Rein) conduct search and destroy operations in assigned objective area with two battalions to locate, capture or destroy enemy forces, supplies and equipment.

**8. Concept of Operation.** Commencing at H-Hour on D-Day 9th Marines conducts search and destroy operations with two battalions attacking north along the axis shown on operation overlay to exploit contact developed by 1st Bn, 9th Marines on 2 July. ELT 1/3 lands by helicopter in LZ Hawk commencing at L-Hour on D-Day. On order, both battalions attack north in assigned area.

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~9. Executiona. Significant Events02Jul67

At 021000H Operation BUFFALO commenced when B/1/9 encountered an estimated two battalions of well entrenched NVA ~~vic (YD 133712)~~ heavy fighting continued throughout most of the day resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. A/1/9 tried to relieve the pressure on the western flank while C/1/9 was helilifted from ~~BLG~~ ~~to~~ to an L4 ~~vic (YD 133712)~~ to reinforce Bravo Company. Shortly after arriving in the L4 C/1/9 received 150 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. A platoon of tanks and a platoon from D/1/9 were dispatched from ~~BLN~~ ~~BLN~~ to help retrieve the casualties which were mounting at this time. At 021500H reinforcing units were requested from the Ninth Marines. While evacuating the casualties two tanks hit mines and were hit with RPG rockets. Between 021600H and 021700H A, B, and C Co panics care under heavy artillery fire. At 021715H 3/9 (-) landed by helicopter in the vicinity of ~~BLN~~ ~~BLN~~ and assumed OPO's of A/1/9, B/1/9 and C/1/9. A/1/9 and B/1/9 moved their casualties to ~~BLN~~ ~~BLN~~. Throughout the day artillery and air support were used extensively in support of 1/9. Units of 1/9 received an estimated 500 rounds of 82mm mortar fire throughout the day. Friendly casualties resulting from the day's activities were 51 KIA, 170 WIA, and 34 MIA. Later bodies of 33 Marines were recovered and identified, decreasing the total to 1 MIA. 3's flying in support of 1/9 reported 65M KIA (Conf) and 55 M KIA (Prob) as a result of airstrikes. B/1/9 reported 31 M KIA (Conf) from 020930H-021930H (from initial contact). At 021030H 1/9 CP vicinity (YD 115702) received 3 rounds of artillery with no damage or casualties. At 021420H 1/3/9 vicinity (YD 294539) received small arms fire. 1/3/9 returned fire and searched area with negative results. At 021515H 1/9 CP vicinity (YD 115701) received 50 rounds of incoming artillery from several enemy positions. At 021745H K/3/9 located east of ~~BLN~~ ~~BLN~~ received 10 rounds of artillery. Counter battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy positions. At 021800H A/3/9 vicinity (YD 1372) captured and destroyed 1 heavy machine gun, 1 light machine gun, 4 AK-47's and 8 AK-47 rifles. At the same time the 3/9 command group picked up 1 NV, wounded prisoner vicinity (YD 115718). At 021830H, 3/9 located east of ~~BLN~~ ~~BLN~~ received approximately 24 rounds of artillery fire. Counter battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy position. At 021910H 1/3/9 vicinity (YD 132722) discovered and destroyed 2 light machine guns, 9 SKS rifles, and 7 AK-47 rifles. At 022000H K/3/9 ~~vic~~ (YD 125714) captured 1 RPG-7. At 022125H 1/9 CP vicinity (YD 11701) received rounds of incoming artillery. Counter battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy positions.

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Action on 3 July started at 0500H when DONG HA Combat Base received 120 rounds of artillery resutin, in 30 USMC wIA and minor damage to the DONG HA area. Simultaneous with the attack on DONG HA, 1/9 CP vic(YD 11570) received 30 rounds of artillery. Counter battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy positions. One secondary explosion was observed vic(YD 083788). At 030830H 10 working for 3/9 reported 5 En KIA (Conf) vic(YD 145718) as the result of an airstrike. At 031030H CCR T-111 received 4 82mm artillery rounds with no damage or casualties. At 031314 K/3/9 vic(YD 124714) found 2 En KIA (Conf). At 031330H scout snipers attached to H/2/9 vic(YD 123677) fired on one NV<sub>4</sub> resulting in 1 En KIA (Prob). The enemy also fired resulting in 2 USMC WIA. At 031600H B/1/3 completed lift into LZ Hawk. At 031715H 3/9 CP vic(YD 131708) received two volleys of 82mm artillery fire. Counter battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy positions vic(YD 097783) and (YD 125725). At 031730H 1/9 CP vic(YD 11570) received incoming artillery fire. There was no damage. At 031915H B/1/3 captured 1 NV<sub>4</sub> vic(YD 152703). At 032000H B/1/3 vic(YD 132703) exchanged small arms fire with 1 NV<sub>4</sub> resulting in 1 En KIA (Conf) and 2 USMC WIA. At 032130H K/1/9 vic(YD 122708) received 2 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. 10's reported 8 En KIA (Conf) and 19 En KIA (Prob) on 3 July.

04Jul67

040115H-040200H F and H/2/9 received three probing attacks from an estimated squad size unit. The attacks were beaten off. Results of the action were 7 USMC WIA (5 medevac). At 040645H F/2/9 vic(YD 126677) received approx 82 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 7 USMC WIA. Counter battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy positions. At 040720H B/1/3 vic(YD 146717) found 1 En KIA (Conf), 1 7.62 rifle and assorted amo. At 040800H K and L/3/9 vic(YD 127718 and YD 132719, respectively, received an unknown number of 60mm mortar rounds from vic(YD 125718). Counter mortar fire was delivered on the suspected enemy position. There were a total of 7 USMC WIA for the action. At 040800H K/1/3 vic(YD 138722) found 1 flamethrower and a rocket launcher. They were returned to En S-2. At 040830H K/3/9 and L/3/9 vic(YD 126711 and YD 132719), respectively, received an unknown number of 60mm mortar rounds resulting in an additional 6 USMC WIA. At 040930H 1/9 CP vic(YD 114701) received 6 rounds of 82mm artillery fire. Counter battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy position vic(YD 095715). At 040935H K/B/C/1/3 vic(YD 142720) received approximately 40 rounds of 107mm rocket fire resulting in 4 USMC WIA. From 040910H until 041010H K/3/9 vic(YD 127719) while moving north received heavy automatic weapons fire resulting in 11 USMC WIA. 1 tank was disabled by an RPG round. It was noted in this action that the NV<sub>4</sub> were mining the tops of ditches. K/3/9 pulled back and called artillery on NV<sub>4</sub> to the north. At 041030H 3/9 CP vic(YD 131708) received approximately 12 rounds of rocket fire. Counter battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy position vic(YD 042700). There were 11 USMC WIA. At 041035H F/2/9 vic(YD 126667) received 3 82mm mortar rounds resulting in 1 USMC WIA. Counter battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy position vic(YD 116685). At 041030H 1/3 CP vic(YD 152700) received 30-40 rounds of incoming

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rocket fire resulting in 8 USMC WIA. At 041120H MLT 1/3 cho ped OPGON 9th Marines. At 041130H 3/9 CP vic (YD 133714) received 128 rounds of unknown caliber artillery fire. Counter battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy position. At 041145H 3/9 command group observed secondary explosions from airstrike vic (YD 133720.) At 041300H F/2/9 vic (YD 133654) detained 1 Vietna ese without I. D. card. At 04115H 4/1/9 vic (YD 136717) had 9 USMC WIA from a friendly airstrike. At 041645H 1/9 CP vic (YD 114701) received unknown number of 82mm artillery rounds resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 041915H E/2/9 vic (YD 149621) received 3 rounds of small arms fire resulting in 3 USMC WIA. 60mm and 82mm mortar fire was delivered on suspected enemy position. At 041750H DONG HUA Combat Base received approximately 7 rounds of heavy artillery resulting in 5 USMC WIA. At 041755H vic (YD 129717) CO of 1/3/9 was killed by sniper fire. 10's reported 7 EN KIA (Conf) and 17 EN KIA (Prob) on 4 July.

5 July 1967

At 050330H DONG HUA Combat Base received approximately 12 rounds of heavy artillery resulting in 2 USMC KIA, and 3 USMC WIA. At 050450H A/1/3 vicinity (YD 136718) received 130-150 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. At 050500H F/2/9 vicinity (YD 124664) received approximately 80 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 3 USMC KIA and 35 USMC WIA. Counter battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy position. At 050630H 1/9 CP vicinity (YD 116701) received 5 rounds of enemy mortar fire. Counter battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy position. At 050730H B/1/3 vicinity (YD 143713) found 1 EN KIA (Conf). At 050920H L/3/9 vicinity (YD 131720) found and destroyed an enemy minefield. At 050940H C/1/3 vicinity (YD 145717) found 1 EN KIA (Conf). At 051030H L/3/9 vicinity (YD 131723) found and destroyed an 82mm mortar position and 43 rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition. At 051000 F/2/9 called artillery mission on suspected enemy. Rounds landed short resulting in 4 USMC WIA and 1 damaged bulldozer. A second bulldozer was damaged by an AT mine when it tried to retrieve the bulldozer hit by artillery. At 051130H L/3/9 vicinity (YD 131774) discovered a bunker 4x4 ft and captured 1-82mm and 3-60m (US Type) mortar rounds. Bunkers and ammunition were destroyed. At the same time L/3/9 vicinity (YD 130726) captured a 60mm mortar tube and accessories. At 051150H 3/9 CP vicinity (YD 131709) received 4 rounds of recoilless rifle fire. There was no damage. At 051225H I/3/9 vicinity (YD 132725) discovered 5 EN KIA (Conf) and captured 1 light machine gun. At 051340H 4/1/3 vicinity (YD 137724) had 1 tank damaged from an AT mine, resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 051445H 4/1/9 vicinity (YD 132713) discovered 3 EN KIA (Conf). At 051500H F/2/9 vicinity (YD 119667) discovered 8 bunkers, 12 fighting holes and 3 mortars. They also discovered safety clips and shipping plugs with Russian and Chinese writing on them. At 051630H H/2/9 vicinity (YD 154694) exchanged small arms fire with 1 NVA resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 051745H 9th Marines CP at 1-3/9 received 4 rounds of heavy artillery resulting in 16 USMC WIA. At 051855H 1/9 CP vicinity (YD 115701) received 4 rounds of 82mm artillery. Counter battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy positions. At 052140H 4/1/3 vicinity (YD 137724) made contact with an estimated 35-40 NVA. Results of the encounter were 1 USMC WIA, 8 EN KIA (Conf) and 15 EN KIA (Prob). At 051600H 4/1/3 vic (YD 136721) discovered 1 EN KIA (Conf).

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At 060600H 1/9 CP vic (YD 115701) received 4 incoming rounds of artillery. Counter-battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy position. At 060845H 3/9 CP vic (YD 133709) received 8 rounds of artillery fire, resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 060915H OP at CON THIEN observed 1 vehicle at (YD 110840.) Vehicle fired twice. 175mm fire mission was fired at target with unknown results. At 061030H C/1/3 vic (YD 154713) received AW fire resulting in 2 USMC KIA and 3 USMC WIA. At 061100H 1/9 OP at CON THIEN observed muzzle flashes from (YD 083842) and (YD 093820.) Counter battery fire was delivered, resulting in 3 secondary explosions and 2 fires. At 061140H 1/3 vic (YD 140732) received 75 rds of 82mm arty fire resulting in 5 USMC WIA. At 061145H L/3/9 vic (YD 138724) received 30 rds of arty fire resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 061205H H/2/9 vic (YD 12694) apprehended 5 detainees. At 061325H 1/9 CP at CON THIEN received 30 rds of arty resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 061530H B/1/3 vic (YD 138722) received 15 rds of arty resulting in 6 USMC WIA. At 061800 DONG HUA Combat Base received approximately 25 rounds of heavy artillery resulting in 7 USMC WIA. From 061900H-062100H 1/9 CP at CON THIEN received 30 rounds of rocket fire, 200 rounds of mortar fire and 100 rounds of artillery resulting in 4 USMC KIA and 17 USMC WIA. At 062200H F/2/9 vicinity (YD 135645) received 1 enemy frag grenade resulting in 1 USMC WIA. Throughout the day 1/3 was in heavy contact resulting in 7 USMC KIA, 75 USMC WIA, 22 EN KIA (Conf) and 73 EN KIA (Prob). The following weapons were captured 1 50 caliber Machine Gun, 3 AK-47's, 3 M-44's and 1 30 caliber machine gun.

07Jul67

At 070745-1/9 CP vicinity (YD 115701) received 11 rounds of 82mm artillery resulting in 5 USMC KIA and 4 USMC WIA. At 070750H vicinity (YD 123725) A/1/9 counted 150 NV AL (Conf) killed the previous night. At 070750H A/1/9 sweep at (YD 123725) found 1 NV KIA (Conf). At 070830H K/3/9 vicinity (YD 125715) found 2 EN WIA (Conf). At 070827H 1/3 elements at (YD 137724) received 50 rounds of mortar fire from (YD 176724). Observed 35 NV at (YD 137724) during fire. Resulting in 1 NV KIA (Conf), and 3 EN KIA (Prob). 3/9 CP reported that its units were in contact throughout the night on 6 July until 070800 in GS (YD 1471) with an estimated 400 NV. The results of that action were 155 NV KIA (Conf), 100 EN KIA (Prob), 3 USMC KIA, 21 USMC WIA, 1 60mm mortar destroyed, 3 light machineguns destroyed and 3 AK-47's destroyed. These are separate from A/1/9 action on 070750H. At 071245H I/3/9 vicinity (YD 124715) had small fire's contact resulting in 4 EN KIA (Conf). At 071320H K/3/9 vicinity (YD 128716) killed on F-10 NV in woodland resulting in 3 EN KIA (Conf).

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At 070720H 4/1/9 vicinity (YD 125724) discovered and destroyed 2 60mm mortars, 40 60mm rounds, 11 SKS rifles, 16 AK-47's and 1 light machine gun. At 071250H L/3/9 vicinity (YD 133720) fired 90mm and small arms at 6-8 NVA in open, resulting in 5 ENEMY KIA (Conf). At 071330H B/1/3 sweep at (YD 142717) captured 3 AK-47 rifles, 5 SK-44 rifles, 1 .30 caliber machinegun, 2 60mm mortars, 500 rounds 7.62 ammunition, 60 rounds .30 caliber ammunition, 4 rounds B-40 ammunition, 1 homemade gas mask and 5 NVA KIA (Conf). At 071345H 1/9 CCC received a direct hit resulting in 9 USMC KIA and 21 USMC WIA. At 071400H L/3/9 vicinity (YD 132724) called in UH-1E gunships on enemy resulting in 3 EN KIA (Conf). At 071630H L/3/9 vicinity (YD 126713) captured 1 AK-47, 2 SK-50's and 1 unknown type barrel and receiver group. At 071615H vicinity (YD 125727) to (YD 134726) 3/9 40 reported 200 NVA KIA (Conf) as a result of artillery and air strikes.

08Jul67

At 080800H 1/3 vicinity (YD 145719) ran airstrike resulting in 3 EN KIA (Conf). At 080955H 1/3/9 discovered and destroyed 2 bunkers, 1/3/9 also found a gas mask carrier filled with 7.62 ammunition and a booby trapped gas can. At 081010H 1/9 CP at CON THIEN received 5 rounds of heavy artillery resulting in 2 USMC KIA and 3 USMC WIA. From 081000H until 081800H 1/9 CP at CON THIEN received approximately 30 rounds of heavy artillery resulting in 1 USMC KIA and 14 USMC WIA. At 081100H L/3/9 vicinity (YD 129723) found 3 enemy tunnels and bunkers with assorted gear and ordnance. At 081100H C/1/3 vicinity (YD 141718) discovered 50 EN KIA (Conf) wearing Khaki and green uniforms. Some of the NVA were wearing flak jackets. 3 EN KIA (Prob) were estimated due to gear in the area. At 081120H L/3/9 found assorted NVA gear and ordnance. At 081145H 1/9 vicinity (YD 126725) captured 2 AK-47's. At 081210H 1/3/9 vicinity (YD 123723) discovered and captured 1 SKS rifle and 9 60mm mortar rounds. At 081530H 1/9 CP at CON THIEN received 1 round of heavy artillery resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 081600H, C/1/3 sweep from (YD 145719) to (YD 145720) found an NV base camp containing 250 bodies, 63 of which had been previously reported, and 1 crew-served rifle destroyed. At 082230H F/2/9 spotted 7 NVA vicinity (YD 129647). A small fire fight ensued. Area was searched with negative results. On 8 July 40's reported 6 EN KIA (Conf) vicinity (YD 147727). At 082250H CO Ninth Marines issued Frag Order directing Second Battalion, 9th Marines to relieve Third Battalion (-), 9th Marines one company at a time. Time of completion, prior to 101400H.

09Jul67

From 091000-091950H 1/9 Cp at CON THIEN received 7 rounds of heavy artillery. No damage. For 091420-091500H 1/9 Cp at CON THIEN received 3 rounds of artillery resulting in 3 USMC WIA. From 091700-091830H 1/9 CP at CON THIEN received 8 rounds of heavy artillery. 40 called airstrikes on suspected enemy positions. At 091255H G/2/9 vicinity (YD 128698) discovered a hut with a letter, pamphlet and flag in it. Material was turned over to the Bn S-2.

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10Jul67

At 101800H 1/9 CP at CON THIEN received 5 rounds of artillery with delayed fuse. Counter battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy positions. At 102320H F/2/9 vicinity (YD 133603) fired on 5 NVA resulting in 2 EN KIA (Prob). Prior to 101400H Second Battalion, 9th Marines completed relief of Third Battalion (-), 9th Marines. Third Battalion (-), 9th Marines assumed the defense of CAM LO and the CAM LO bridge site and security for Route 561.

11Jul67

At 111210H B/1/3 vicinity (YD 116721) located an enemy base camp and 1 60mm round and 21 82mm rounds. They also found a large amount of equipment. The ammunition was destroyed. At 111330H E/2/9 vicinity (YD 138697) discovered assorted documents. The documents were sent to Bn 2-2. At 111245H 2/9 reported that friendly aircraft made a bombing run to the rear of their positions. There were no casualties. At 112250H F/2/9 vicinity (YD 133703) spotted enemy movement. Subsequent action resulted in 1 USMC WIA.

12Jul67

At 120724H 1/9 CP at CON THIEN received 3 rounds of artillery resulting in 3 USMC WIA. Counter battery fire was delivered on suspected enemy positions vic YD 102838. At 120900H D/1/9 found 1 En KIA (Conf) vic (YD 121701). At 121340H B/1/3 vic (YD 146701) had a patrol that detonated a mine resulting in 1 USMC WIA. At 121440H an airstrike for 1/3 was run vic (YD 152730) resulting in 6 En KIA (Prob). A total of 4.9 hours of visual reconnaissance, was flown by two AD's, over eastern QUANG TRI Province on 12Jul67. Airstrike conducted on fortified positions accounted for 2 NVA KIA (Conf) and 1 NVA KIA (Prob).

13Jul67

At 131200H 1/4 and 3/4 (-) chopped OPCON to Ninth Marines. At 131640H K/3/4 vic (YD 122703) received 3 rounds of unknown caliber artillery fire resulting in 1 USMC WIA. Counter battery fire was called on suspected enemy positions. At 131030H H/2/9 vic (YD 130696) picked up 3 female detainees and forwarded them to DONG HU Combat Base. On 13Jul67 3/4 (-) relieved 1/9 and assumed the defense of CON THIEN. At 131600H Ninth Marines chopped OPCON of 1/9 to Third Marines. AD's debriefed on 13Jul67, accounted 2 EN KIA (Prob) from airstrike at (YD 16726) and 2 NVA KIA (Conf) from airstrike at (YD 090707).

14Jul

At 140900H Operation BUFFALO terminated. No significant events on this date.

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b. Civil Affairs

(1) On 4Jul67 3d Bn, 9th Marines found a rice cache consisting of 66 - 77 1b bags. The rice was transported to the 3/9 rear at DONG HA.

(2) On 10Jul67, S-5, 9th Marines, transported 3d Bn, 9th Marines rice cache from the 3/9 rear to the CAM LO District Headquarters for distribution by the District Chief.

c. Psychological Warfare

(1) During the operation the operating area was saturated with leaflets, and on each day of the operation leaflet drops and broadcasts were conducted.

(2) The themes utilized during the operation were:

- (a) NVA Chieu Hoi
- (b) NVA surrender
- (c) Exploitation of VC misery
- (d) A variety of Chieu Hoi appeals

(3) A total of 2,770,000 leaflets were dropped in support of the operation.

(4) A total of 10 hours and 5 minutes of aerial speaker broadcasts also supported the operation.

10. Cumulative Losses

a. Friendly: 129 KIA ]  
576 WIA ]

b. Enemy      991 KIA (Conf)  
297 KIA (Prob)  
11 Detainees  
2 POW

c. Weapons Captured or Destroyed.

96 Weapons  
76 Individual Weapons  
20 Crew-Served Weapons

d. In addition there was numerous miscellaneous material captured or destroyed.

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(m)

1. Administrative Mattersa. Supply

(1) Discussion: The high density of units, and the swift moving tactical situation involved considerable coordination between the using units, FLSU-1, H-2, and LSA. As the operation developed and contact with the enemy increased, nearly all resupply was by helicopter. Emergency resupply, in nearly all cases, was based on requirements for water. The landing of the SLF also increased the need for coordination and supervision at the Regimental level. This was caused primarily by a lack of familiarity with logistical procedures in this area. The urgency with which they landed contributed to some misunderstandings, however, cooperation was excellent in all areas and from a logistical point of view, the operation was successful.

(2) Problem areas: The requirement for water cans became critical and their availability was inadequate at this base. The SLF was unfamiliar with the method of resupply in this area and relied completely on helicopters as their method of resupply. Also, the SLF required transportation ashore which they didn't have on landing.

(3) Solution: An adequate back up of water cans should be available at FLSU-1 for immediate issue should the situation require. The SLF should make every effort to effect early liaison in order to become familiar with the resupply procedures in this area. The SLF should land at least two mites and trailers for use by their S-4. Also, one 6x6 should be landed for moving supplies from FLSU-1 to the LSA.

b. Casualties: All casualties requiring medical evacuation were taken to Co. D, 3d Medical Bn, DONG HAI or to the USS OKINAWA.

c. Transportation: Other than as listed in paragraph 11a(2) above there were no transportation difficulties encountered.

d. Communications

(1) At the commencement of Operation BUFFALO normal command and control communications for the units within the 9th Marine Regiment were maintained from our CP located within the DONG HAI Combat Base.

(2) Upon assuming OPOON of two additional infantry battalions, a manual radio (M) relay station was activated on 3 July at CON THIEN to assure continuous communications with all units. At the same time, a secondary FM radio net was activated within the regiment to better control the units OPOON to the 9th Marines.

(3) On 7 July the 9th Marines command group displaced from DONG HAI to CM LO.

(a) Message Center: A 60 WPM covered simplex teletype circuit established from the 9th Marines forward CP to the DONG HAI Combat Base message center.

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(b) Wire

1 Two SB-22 switchboards were activated at the forward CP to provide internal local & telephone communications and external trunk lines to the Shove switchboard at PHU BAI and the Shove switchboard at DONG HA.

2 Hot lines from the 9th Marines COC were provided to the COCs at the 3d Marine Division Headquarters and the 3d Marines, and from 9th Marines FSCC to the 12th Marines FSCC in DONG HA.

(c) Radio

1 Both the regimental tactical nets and the division tactical nets were displaced to the forward CP at CM LO. Both maintained a covered voice (Nestor) capability.

2 Direct communications to the 3d Marine Division CP at PHU BAI from the 9th Marines CP at CM LO on the division tactical net #2 was not feasible due to the distance involved. Direct contact was maintained with the ADC at DONG HA, 3d Marines at CM CARROLL and the 4th Marines at CM EVANS. In order to pass traffic to the 3d Marine Division Headquarters at PHU BAI it was necessary to relay messages via one of these stations.

(d) Radio Relay

1 Two radio relay circuits were established at the 9th Marines CP.

a An AN/MRC-62, four channel radio relay circuit was established from the 9th Marines CP at CM LO to the 3d Marine Division Headquarters at PHU BAI.

b An AN/TRC-27B, eight channel radio relay circuit was established from the 9th Marines CP at CM LO to the communication facilities at DONG HA Combat Base.

12. Special Equipment and Techniques. None

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13. Commander's Analysis

- a. This operation could best be termed a meeting engagement. This regiment was operating with the mission and guidance set forth for operation CIMARRON at the time of commencement of Operation BUFFALO.
- b. Intelligence had indicated a build-up in the area north of the eventual battlefield. To investigate this intelligence a battalion, minus, swept the area north and east of COM THIEN to the Market area a week prior to the operation. This battalion encountered only small reconnaissance units. A few days later, two companies from 1/9 again swept a portion of the area and found indications that a stronger force than previously encountered was sliding into the area. As a result, "A" and "B" Companies were reinserted the day following their withdrawal at which time Operation BUFFALO was triggered.
- c. It is believed that an NVA force was moving into the area for a possible attack on COM THIEN. Further, it is believed that subsequent action between 2-4 July by units of this regiment disrupted this intended attack and severely reduced the capability of the enemy force to conduct offensive operations in the immediate future.
- d. There were indications during the early stages of this operation that the enemy was dressed in Marine Jungle utilities and boots, flak jackets and helmets in an attempt to confuse our forces. While there is some indisputable evidence that this occurred, it is not believed that this was a widespread tactic of the enemy forces. There were also two reports of the enemy's use of tear gas. However, this has not been substantiated.
- e. By the use of hindsight it is believed that an excellent opportunity was lost on 4 July when the initial action was not exploited since additional assets were not available with a rapid enough reaction time to turn this action into an operation similar to that of HICKORY I.

14. Recommendations

- a. That attempts be made from all sources to gather evidence of the use of gas, and the use of USMC clothing and equipment by NVA units.
- b. That every effort be made to increase USMC assets in sufficient strength to increase our fast reaction means in order to enhance our exploitation capabilities.

*G. E. JERUE*  
G. E. JERUE

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(n)

**SECRET**Advanced  
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NY 55555  
 O P 160300Z JUL 67  
 FM 3RD MARINES  
 TO CG THIRD MARDIV  
 INFO THIRD MARINES  
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G-3

COC

- SECRET  
 TERMINATION OF OPERATION HICKORY 1  
 1. 3D MAR DIV OP O 39-67  
 1. OBJECTIVES ASSIGNED BY REF(A) WIL. BE ACCOMPLISHED BY  
 160000Z JUL 67.
2. THOROUGH SEARCH OF ASSIGNED ZONE WAS NOT POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF  
 TERRAIN AND TIME LIMITATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN THE EASTERN PORTION  
 OF THE ZONE. HOWEVER, BY-PASSED AREAS WERE SATURATED WITH AIR  
 STRIKES AND ARTILLERY FIRE. BY-PASSED AREAS IN THE EASTERN ZONE  
 WILL BE PATROLLED BY ORGANIC UNITS OF THIS REGIMENT IN THE NEXT  
 FEW DAYS.
3. RECOMMEND OPERATION HICKORY 1 BE TERMINATED A 160000Z JUL 67

GP-4  
 FT

TO R / 16 / 0300 / JUL 67 / S-3 / 3-2-5-4-6  
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A - G3/COC: Standard (WWT) 683002Z

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