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HEADQUARTERS
1st Battalion, 9th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

3/AF/ec
005750
18 May 1968

From: Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO 3D)

Via: (1) Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
(2) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
(3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 April - 30 April 1968

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8
(c) DivO 5750.1A

Encl: ✓(1) 1st Battalion, 9th Marines Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a) and (b), enclosure (1), is submitted.

W. W. Dinegar
W. W. DINEGAR
By direction

Copy To:
(2) Copies 9th Marines
(1) Copy 26th Marines

1st BN. 9th MAR
COPY 1 OF 15 COPIES
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COMMAND CHRONOLOG

1 April - 30 April 1968

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A/A Rpt, Opn PEGASUS

ENCLOSURE (1)

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2. During this reporting period the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines were located at a strongpoint northwest of the Khe Sanh Combat Base as part of Operation SCOTLAND. On 4 April while in Operation PEGASUS, the Battalion was situated at Hill 471 (XD847394) and Hill 552 (XD823403).

During Operation SCOTLAND II the Battalion was located at Hill 689 (XD803409) until the 20 April. During the latter part of this reporting period while in Operation KENTUCKY, the Battalion was located at C-3 and C-2.

3. STAFF OFFICERS

Executive Officer

Major J. A. DONNELLY
1 April - 30 April 1968

S-1

1stLt. P. A. WOOB
1 April - 30 April 1968

S-2

1stLt. R. J. ARBOLEDA
1 April - 30 April 1968

S-3

Major T. R. HENDERSON
1 April - 4 April 1968
Capt. C. B. HARTZELL
5 April - 22 April 1968
Major. A. FERNANDEZ
23 April - 30 April 1968

S-4

1stLt. J. M. GEORGI
1 April - 30 April 1968

S-5.

1stLt. R. J. ARBOLEDA
1 April - 30 April 1968

4. Average Monthly Strength.

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL.</u>
43	1040	2	54

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ORGANIZATIONAL DATAPART I1. DESIGNATIONCOMMANDERS

1st Battalion, 9th Marines

LTCOL. JOHN H. CAHILL
1 April - 30 April 1968

"RAS" Company

Capt. E. R. MILLER JR.
1 April - 30 April 1968

Company "A"

Capt. E. D. BANKS
1 April - 30 April 1968

Company "B"

Capt. J. P. WILLIAMS
1 April - 30 April 1968

Company "C"

Capt. R. H. FLAGLER
1 April - 30 April 1968

Company "D"

Capt. J. W. CARGILE
1 April - 30 April 1968

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PART IINARRATIVE SUMMARY

On 1 April 1968, marked the beginning of Operation PEGASUS, which was to relieve the pressure on the Khe Sanh Combat Base by reopening Route #9 for vehicular traffic and seizing the tactical high ground around the Base. Participating in PEGASUS, 1/9 was the first unit to move out of the Khe Sanh Combat Base seizing Hill 471, Hill 552 and Hill 689 between 4 and 8 April 1968. On 15 April, while 1/9 was on Hill 552 and Hill 689, PEGASUS was terminated and SCOTLAND II began on 16 April 1968.

On 21 April 1968, 1/9 was relieved on Hills 552 and 689 by the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines, and relieved the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines in positions in the KENTUCKY II AO. At the close of April 1/9 was still in the KENTUCKY II area of operation under the operational control of the 9th Marine Regiment.

At 0100H on the 1st of April 1968, "D" Company detected movement on a SID at XD830412, 6 rounds of 81mm mortar, 13 rounds of 60mm mortars and 20 rounds of M-79 fire was fired on the suspected enemy movement, after which the movement ceased. At 1050H a patrol from "D" Company found 2 Chinese Communist grenades, 2 magazines for an AK-47 rifle a magazine pouch at XD831413; the gear was turned into the Battalion S-2.

The artillery FO from "B" Company at 1625H spotted an active enemy mortar position at grid XD821413. The FO adjusted an artillery mission on the position and reported good coverage of target.

Total incoming rounds received by 1/9 on 1 April were 4 rounds of 60mm, 8 rounds 82mm and three rounds 120mm mortars. The Battalion sustained 1 WIA as a result of the incoming, and 1 NBC, both evacuated.

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At 0735H 2 April 1968, elements of "D" Company spotted 2 NVA in the open at grid XD822413. "B" Company fired 9 rounds of 60mm mortar fire on the enemy position with unknown results. Company "C" personnel on "Drop Zone" security, spotted 2 automatic weapons positions with enemy firing at C-130 aircraft making air drops. The enemy positions were located at XD826424 and XD827424. M-79 fire was initiated on the enemy positions, after which enemy fire ceased from the area. At 1900H, the 2d Platoon "C" Company observed an enemy position at XD822413 firing RPG's at the Battalion position. Ten rounds of 106mm recoilless rifle were fired on the enemy position with unknown results.

Total incoming received on 2 April were one 60mm and 6 82mm mortar rounds and 3 RPG's. The Battalion sustained one casualty, WIA (Non-serious).

At 030310H April, a Marine from "B" Company checking lines, observed a NVA sapper inside the perimeter crouching near a trenchline. He was challenged and killed as he attempted to escape. A search of the immediate area was then conducted revealing a second enemy sapper hiding behind bushes inside the perimeter. He attempted to throw a hand grenade and was killed. Both enemy personnel were dressed in loin clothes and covered with black camouflage paint. Equipment taken from the bodies consisted of 3 grenades, a knife, a Russian wrist watch, a soft cover and several safety pins apparently used to disarm trip flares and mines.

At 0404H, another enemy was spotted when he tripped a trip flare forward of "B" Company positions. He was killed with M-16 and M-79 fire.

At 0655H, members of Company "D" heard digging sounds forward of their defensive wire at XD826411 and fired 15 rounds of 60mm mortar fire. The digging ceased. Total incoming rounds received by 1/9 on 3 April were seven 60mm mortar rounds, resulting in a total of four WIA's.

1/9 had been assigned the mission of securing Hill #471 on 4 April 1968, the Battalion (-), "B" Company, commenced movement to the line of departure at 0230H for 0600H jump off.

1/9 crossed the EOD with "D" Company and "C" Company moving abreast with "A" Company and "H&S" Company (-) in trace. At 1140H while moving to Objective E (Hill #471) elements of "C" Company found 11 enemy bunkers, 8 chi-com grenades, and miscellaneous enemy equipment. All was destroyed. At 1200H 1/9 was in position on high ground overlooking Obj. E (Hill #471). 1/9 began receiving 122mm rocket fire, 8 rounds from enemy rocket positions several thousand meters to the Southwest. Preparations were made for the attack of Hill #471 with "A" Company to attack and take Hill #471. An A.O. assigned to 1/9 at 1215 reported sighting 20-30 enemy troops and 15-20 enemy bunkers in a fortified position complex on the top of Hill #471. Heavy artillery preparations from the Khe Sanh Combat Base was called in by 1/9 on Hill #471 between 1230H and 1400H. Close air support was run by 1/9 on Hill #471 between 1400 and 1500H. During this reporting period "D" Company secured Objective D, Hill immediately adjacent to Hill #471, and "A" Company moved to an attack position from which they would assault Hill #471. During the entire period 1/9 received enemy artillery and rocket fire from the Southwest. In addition, mortars and small arms fire were received from vicinity of Hill #471.

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At approximately 1300H following airstrikes, "A" Company initiated its assault on Hill #471 across a narrow approach with "B" Company providing heavy base of fire from its position on Objective D. "A" Company assaulted Hill #471 with two of its platoons in the lead and the 3d Platoon in force prepared to take the right half of #471 with the 1st Platoon was in reserve. The assaulting elements slowed down near the top of Hill #471 due to heavy enemy small arms fire and grenades. A-1 was sent to pass through A-2 and continue the assault. At approximately 1530H A-1 secured the east half of Hill #471 and provided fire support for A-2 and A-3 to secure the remaining portion of Hill #471. Hill #471 was secured at approximately 1600H. "C" Company had been ordered to reinforce "A" Company on Hill #471 and completed movement to the Hill by 1800H. "C" Company was responsible for the western half and "B" Company the eastern half of the Hill. The attack resulted in 16 NVA KIA's. Total incoming rounds received by 1/9 on 5 April 1968, were 12 artillery, 72 rockets, and 104 mortar rounds. Total casualties sustained by the Battalion were 10 KIA's and 22 WIA's destroyed.

On 5 April, 1/9, "A" Company and "C" Company were situated at Hill #471, "B" Company with "C" on adjacent Hill and in a defensive position.

At 0130H "A" Company on Hill #471 came under a heavy enemy counter-attack by an estimated 200 NVA elements. Fighting was intense, with the enemy as close as twenty meters to friendly lines. The NVA employed small arms, automatic weapons and heavy machine guns, grenades, and RPG's in their assault. The enemy was well disciplined. It was observed that the NVA were uniformly dressed in green utilities and steel helmets and well equipped. The enemy broke off their assault at approximately 0630H and retreated to a Hill Southwest of Hill #471. From this position they continued sporadic small arms, mortars and RPG fire on Hill #471. The fire was returned by 1/9 elements who maintained fire superiority over the enemy. As a result of the attack on "C" Company the following enemy equipment was captured: 1 (60MM) mortar with ammo, 13 machineguns, 4 RPG's, 28 AK-47's 30 AK-47 magazines, 3 SKS's, 12 60mm type magazines for automatic weapons and other miscellaneous gear. 1/9 killed 100 NVA (Confirmed) and captured 5 prisoners. By 0800H the enemy had ceased their small arms fire on 1/9's positions. At various times between 0800 and 2000H on 5 April 1968 elements of 1/9 observed small groups of enemy moving South of Hill #471 and initiated small arms, mortar and artillery fire on the enemy. Total incoming rounds received by 1/9 on 5 April were 20 rounds of 122mm rocket fire. Total friendly casualties sustained by 1/9 on 5 April were one KIA, 21 WIA's serious and 7 non-serious WIA's.

From 5-6 April no changes were made on 1/9 positions. At 1000H, S-3 Officer from 2/12, 1st Air Cavalry, U.S. Army arrived at 1/9's position to effect liaison with 1/9's CO and S-3.

At 1030H, 1/9 in accordance with orders from higher headquarters commenced departure from its positions on Hill #471, being relieved in place by 2/12 1st Air Cavalry, U.S. Army who were helilifted into position between 1030 and 1230. By 1230H all of 1/9 had departed Hill #471. By 1400H 1/9 had completed its move to the Northwest to an area approximately 1000 meters from Hill #471. By 2000 1/9 had established its night defensive positions. There were no further significant events on 6 April with no casualties or incoming rounds received into 1/9's position.

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At 0200H on 7 April 1/9 received orders to attack and secure Hill #552. Orders were issued and units commenced movement in order to cross the line of departure at 0700. Between 0715 and 0820H 1/9 controlled close air support and artillery fire against Hill #552 in preparation for the assault. At 0820H Delta Company and "C" Company plus 1/9 Command Group, started their assault on Hill #552, meeting no resistance and securing the hill by 0845H. By 1700H all elements of 1/9 involved in the operation were in position on Hill #552. At 1810H 1/9 on Hill #552 received 12 rounds of incoming rockets. Five non-battle casualties were sustained by 1/9 on 7 April.

At 0800H on 8 April 1968, 1/9 (-) "B" Company were in defensive positions on Hill #552. 1/9 received orders to assault and hold Hill #689.

At 0600 with "C" Company in the lead, 1/9 crossed the line of departure and began movement toward the objective. At 0720H 1/9 had secured Hill #689 making no enemy contact. Between approximately 1500 and 1630H 1/9 on Hill #689 received 38 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, which inflicted serious casualties on the Battalion. An artillery mission was fired on the suspected enemy position with unknown results.

On Hills #552 and #689 1/9 found numerous enemy positions consisting of bunkers, trenchlines, fighting holes, mortar pits and anti-aircraft positions. Some miscellaneous enemy ordnance and gear was found, but in general it was apparent that the enemy units previously occupying these areas had made an orderly withdrawal.

On 8 April 1/9 received a total of 38 rounds of 82mm enemy mortar fire. Casualties sustained by 1/9 were 9 KIA's, 27 serious WIA's and 1 non-battle casualty.

At 0001H on 9 April 1/9 was in a defensive position on Hill #552 and 689. Orders were received that the Battalion would spend an unspecified period of time in present position. In view of this 1/9 spent the majority of 9 April further preparing defensive positions on Hills #552 and #689. At 0720H 1/9 on Hill #689 received 18 rounds of enemy 82mm mortars resulting in 2 KIA's and 4 WIA's. An artillery mission was fired on the enemy mortar position and no further rounds were received from that location. Total incoming rounds received by 1/9 on 9 April were 18 (82mm mortar rounds and 2 unidentified recoilless rifle rounds. Total casualties sustained by 1/9 were 2 KIA's 3 serious WIA's and 1 minor WIA.

At 0001H on 10 April, 1/9 was in positions on Hills #552 and #689. An area of responsibility was assigned to 1/9 from the 26th Marine Regiment.

During the day 1/9 conducted patrols relatively close-in to the Battalion's perimeter to familiarize personnel with the area and provide security. There were no notable occurrences resulting from these patrols. The Battalion continued improving its positions through 10 April.

1/9 received no incoming rounds and sustained no casualties on 10 April. 1/9 employed five small unit security patrols within its AO on 11 April. At 0930H a patrol from "B" Company discovered an enemy bunker complex of approximately 100 bunkers. The condition of which indicated it had been recently used by an NVA Battalion.

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Approximately 25 of the 100 bunkers had been destroyed by artillery missions and airstrikes. In addition, there were 7 mortar pits found in the area. A "D" Company patrol at 1000H also found an enemy bunker system. At the site "D" Company's patrol found food containers and bloody clothing which were turned into the S-2. On 11 April 1/9 received no incoming rounds and sustained no casualties.

On 12 April, 1/9 conducted three patrols in its AO. At 1000H "C" Company from its defensive position sighted an active enemy rocket sight then firing on Khe Sanh Combat Base. An artillery mission was fired on the enemy, giving excellent coverage of target. At 1150H, a platoon patrolling from "C" Company found an abandoned enemy anti-aircraft position. In this area they found 4 cans 50 caliber anti-aircraft ammo, NVA entrenching tools, gas masks, ponchos, knives and boxes of accessories for anti-aircraft weapons.

At 1300H, the patrol from "D" Company found a total of 42 enemy bunkers in two positions. Weapons and equipment found were: 1 AK-47, 6 magazines, 7.62 ammunition, 1 NVA radio with 2 batteries, 4 chi-com grenades, TNT explosives, first aid kit, rice and assorted documents.

In a third position "D" Company found 3 pallets of 155MM artillery rounds evidently part of a faulty air drop. The pallets showed evidence of tampering by NVA. 1/9 requested an EOD Team to destroy the ammunition.

At 1420H a platoon patrol from "C" Company discovered an enemy anti-aircraft position and a 12.7mm anti-aircraft gun. The weapon was set up on tripods with mounts, sights pivot and shoulder bar. The weapons were loaded and had a round in the chamber. The 12.7mm anti-aircraft gun was in excellent condition. Additional gear found was several hundred rounds 12.7 anti-aircraft and armor piercing ammunition, complete sets of tools, cleaning gear, spare parts and other accessories for the weapons. The weapon and accessory equipment were turned into the Battalion S-2.

1/9 received no incoming rounds on 12 April and sustained 1 non-battle casualties which required a medevac.

At 1500H, "A" Company on 13 April patrolling to the south of 1/9 position received a total of 14 enemy 60mm and 82mm mortar rounds causing 10 friendly WIA's of which all but 1 required medical evacuation.

"A" Company coordinated artillery and 81mm mortar fire on the enemy position after which the patrol commenced to sweep through the area. The patrol came under grenade and small arms fire from 5 NVA. "A" Company returned small arms fire against the enemy, resulting in 3 NVA KIA's and 2 NVA POW's and the capture of 5 AK-47's, 47 grenades, 97 (82mm) mortar rounds and other miscellaneous NVA equipment. There were no significant activities or incidents on that day.

At 1015H on 14 April a platoon from "B" Company while on patrol discovered an unoccupied enemy position. In this position, the patrol found 100 (82MM) mortar rounds, 14 AK-47 magazines, fuzes and increments for mortar rounds, NVA helmets, clothing and various other NVA gear.

At 1115H a platoon patrol from "A" Company found 8 pallets of 155mm artillery ammunition from a misplaced air drop. Details and location were reported to 26th Marine Regiment for future disposition.

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At 1110H on 15 April, "D" Company while patrolling discovered 2 Russian made helmets and 1 Chinese Communist grenade. "B" Company at 1100H departed on a Company size patrol. At 1500H one squad from the Company was moving to checkout and secure an area on the Company's patrol route when one NVA hidden in a spider hole exposed himself, fired an automatic burst of 15 rounds at the squad, killing one man and seriously wounding two others. The squad immediately returned fire and killed the enemy. The squad captured one AK-47, 2 AK-47 magazines, documents and personal gear, all of which were turned into the Battalion S-2.

Subsequently at 1630H, the "B" Company patrol discovered an unoccupied enemy mortar position. In addition, to the mortar pit they found five bunkers, numerous ammunition canisters, spools of communication wire, fifty pounds of rice, various NVA gear and documents. The documents were turned into the Battalion S-2 and the remainder of the gear and the positions were destroyed. 15 April ended without further incident.

On 16 April, all Battalion units were still positioned in their previously located positions. Night activities of the 15th of April returned to their respective positions without incidents and the scheduled day activities of 16 April departed.

At approximately 1800, "A" Company (-) was approaching the area of its earlier enemy contact of 13 April. "A" Company dispatched two squads to move up a ridge, observe the opposite side and secure the area for the remainder of the Company. Nearing the top of the hill, one squad began receiving sniper fire which pinned the squad down. The other squad attempted to lay down a base of fire, when it, too, came under enemy small arms, grenade and mortar fire from other enemy positions, resulting in 2 friendly KIA's. The squads then drew back to consolidate with the remainder of "A" Company, at which time they employed small arms, machinegun, grenade, M-79 and 60mm mortar fire to suppress the enemy positions. As one platoon set up a base of fire, a second platoon moved to a position to flank the enemy position and sweep through it. The sweeping element began its movement but was slowed and eventually stopped due to heavy enemy small arms, mortars, grenades and extremely accurate sniper fire.

The enemy was estimated at this time to be of Company size and observed to be in well prepared, well camouflaged, heavy fortified, mutually supporting bunkers. Friendly casualties at this time were estimated to be 10 KIA's and 20 WIA's. Supporting mortars and artillery were called in on enemy mortar positions which had been constantly firing on "A" Company during the contact; the result of the mission were a temporary silencing of the enemy tubes. Supporting arms and air support could not be employed against the enemy positions with which Company "A" was in contact, because of close proximity of friendly troops to the enemy.

1/9 deployed "C" Company (-) and Company "D" (-) at approximately 1435 to reinforce "A" Company, continue in the attack on the enemy allowing for extraction of casualties and to assist "A" Company in breaking contact. At this time the 1/9 perimeter on Hill 689 came under enemy rockets, receiving 15 120mm rockets. A counter battery mission was fired on the rocket site with unobserved results.

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Company "D" had arrived at the area of "A" Company's contact and positioned itself to the east of the ridge line. "C" Company had positioned itself to the South of the ridge, and with one platoon on line and another intrace began its assault. Due to heavy small arms, grenades and mortar fire, and resulting casualties, the assault did not progress across the entire objective but was stopped after a distance of approximately 300 meters. At this time Company "D" swept up to and over the ridge line and on to the reverse side accounting for numerous enemy KIA's although continually receiving enemy fire from adjacent enemy positions. It was noted that the enemy was also employing machineguns and M-79 fire against the units.

During the time of "C" Company's and "D" Company's assault "A" Company had withdrawn from the area and established a landing zone for the evacuation of casualties. At this time casualties estimated at 19 KIA's and 36 serious WIA's, an unknown number of minor WIA's, 16 MIA's and four non-battle casualties.

Companies "C" and "D" then began withdrawing from the area at approximately 2115 H. The first medevacs arrived at approximately 1805H, "C" Company had set up another LZ and was effecting the evacuation of some of its casualties. At 2400H Companies "A", "C" and "D" were enroute back to Hill 689's perimeter.

Companies "A", "C" and "D" were returning to the Battalion perimeter on Hill 689 at 0230 17 April 1968. "C" Company was able to medevac one serious WIA whom they had been carrying back to the perimeter, because they were unable to evacuate prior to that time. Another extremely serious WIA who had deliriously walked back to the perimeter earlier, was also medevaced by the same medevac helicopter.

By 0310 all remaining members of "A", "C" and "D" Companies were returned to their respective position on Hill 689. The total casualties of the contact were estimated at this time to be 20 KIA's (bodies not recovered), 4 KIA's evacuated, 46 evacuated WIA's, 23 MIA's and 5 non-battle casualties.

At 0900H on 17 April, an AO controlled by 1/9 was dispatched to check out the area of the contact the previous day. Observing the area, the AO reported sighting 1 Marine casualty at the scene, who was still alive.

1/9 conferred with higher headquarters and requested that helicopters be dispatched to make a recon type extraction.

At 1200 H two CH-46 Helicopters arrived at 1/9's position, 1 rifle squad was assigned to escort the helicopter and 4 Marines were assigned to effect the actual pick-up from the other helicopter.

The helicopters departed Hill 689 and flew to the position of the wounded Marine. As the rescue chopper landed and the hydraulic tailgate was being lowered 3 NVA exposed themselves from spider holes less than 10 meters from the rear of the craft and fired on the chopper. The 4 Marines running out of the helicopter returned fire killing two of the NVA and causing the third to drop back into his spider hole. The Marines departed the craft to the left and as 3 Marines and the helicopter gunners provided covering fire, the 4 Marines proceed to check 5 bodies, to the immediate left of the craft.

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Upon finding all 5 of the bodies dead the team returned to the craft, still maintaining covering fire and the helicopter took off. The craft was seriously damaged by the enemy fire but was able to fly only as far as Hill #689, where it made an emergency landing. The AO who had been observing the operation reported that the wounded Marine had been to the right of the position where the craft had landed and not in the area searched.

The Marine who had searched the bodies, reported upon returning that of the 5 bodies he had searched, 3 had been mutilated, two being decapitated and one being disemboweled.

At 2015H, a U. S. Army unit using the call sign of Birth Control 3 which had kept abreast of the situation by monitoring radio traffic offered its assistance in rescuing the Marine.

At 1840, Birth Control 3 dispatched Blue Max, a flight of 9 Huey gunships to the area. While 8 of the helicopters circled in two orbits saturating the area with continuous rocket and machinegun close suppressive fire, the 9th helicopter alighted to the wounded Marine's position and landed. The crew chief of the helicopter departed the craft found the Marine and carried him back to the helicopter. It then took off and evacuated the Marine back to the medical aid station at Khe Sanh Combat Base.

At 0900 on 18 April an A.O. controlled by 1/9 ascertained that again he could observe another Marine, alive at the position of the contact of the 16th.

At 1400H on 18 April, U. S. Army Birth Control 3 dispatched Huey aircraft to the area. Employing the same tactics used the previous day, Blue Max successfully effected the rescue and evacuation of this Marine.

On 19 April 1/9 conducted limited patrols in its local area. All patrols were completed without incurring any significant incidents. Routine night activities were commenced between the hours of 1900 and 2000H.

Routine patrols were again conducted by 1/9 on 20 April. At approximately 1030H, 1 Company 3/4 and its Command Group arrived at the 1/9 position on Hill 689. Liaison between the units was established and arrangements were made for 1/9's departure of Hill 689 and Hill 552 and for 2/4's assumption of responsibilities of that area.

"I" Company 3/4 and 3/4's Command Group remained in 1/9's position for the night of 20 April 1968.

By 0700H 21 April 1968, 1/9's night activities had returned to the perimeter. At 0800H the Battalion began its preparations for departure of its present positions. Landing zones had been established, all troops were packed up and arrangements had been made for the troop helilift.

At 1600 1/9 was informed by higher headquarters that it would release operational control of Companies "A" and "E" 2/3. Company "A" to be assigned to the operational control of 2/1 and Company "B" to 2/3.

At approximately 1400H the first helilift of 3/4 arrived at Hill 689, dropped off its troops and began the movement of 1/9's Command Group, Companies "C" and "D", elements of "H&C" Company to its newly assigned TACR, the defense of the Cam-Loc area, Operation KENTUCKY. The helilift was completed at approximately 1730H on 21 April 1968.

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At the time of assumption of responsibility of the Cam Lo area, 1/9 also assumed operational control of "K" Company, "M" Company 3/4 and Company "K" 3/3, units previously in residence in that area.

At 1100H on 22 April 1968, Companies "A" (-) and "B" (-) plus "K" 3/4, "M" 3/4, one platoon of "K" 3/3, Company "C" 3d Engineer Battalion, 1st Searchlight Battery and "A" Company, 3d Tank Battalion assumed responsibility for its newly assigned area of operation including the defense of C-2, C-3, Cam Lo District Headquarters and CAP 3.

At 1145 Civic Action Platoon #3, operating in conjunction with 1/9 had one (1) Viet Cong surrender of his own accord to them, under the "Open Arms Program". CAP #3 had been informed on the night of 21 April by a local civilian Police Chief of the possibility of this happening, therefore, CAP 3 was prepared to except the Viet Cong. He (the Viet Cong) arrived at the CAP #3 position accompanied by the Police Chief, and turned himself in. ITT personnel were notified of this and sent representatives to CAP #3 to assume custody of the Viet Cong defector. Night activities were commenced between the hours of 1930 and 2000H without incidents.

At 0640H on 23 April 1968, a Marine from "M" Company 3/4 had an accidental discharge and shot himself in the foot. The Marine was treated at 1/9 BAS, and was later evacuated to D Med in Dong Ha. The incident was then put under investigation. At 2130H, the observation tower in C-3 observed 20 NVA with NOD (Night Observation Device). An artillery mission was initiated on the enemy position resulting in 6 NVA KIA's (Conf). At 2300 "K" 3/3 at their C-2 position received one round of incoming which landed in "K" Company 3/3's perimeter defensive minefield, resulting in the detonation of one mine. The round was believed to be an 82mm mortar round. The remainder of 23 April passed without incident.

At 1030, 24 April, "K" Company 3/3 at their C-2 position received 15 to 20 rounds of incoming 152mm artillery. A counter artillery mission was fired on the suspected enemy position with reported good coverage of target. At 1500, "K" Company 3/3 again came under enemy artillery fire receiving a total of 10 rounds, also suspected 152mm artillery. The extent of casualties resulting from the incoming amounted to 1 minor WIA.

At 1500H, the 2d Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment ended its operational control of Company "A" and the 2d Battalion, 3d Marine Regiment ended its operational control of Company "E". Company "A" and Company "E" were then helilifted to the 1/9 area of operations. The lift was completed at 1700 on 24 April.

At 1700 on the 24th of April, 1/9 was deployed as follows:

Company "A" YD148603
 Company "E" YD134646
 Company "C" (-) YD123552
 Company "C" 1st Platoon YD178586
 Company "C" 1st Squad YD121592
 Company "C" 2nd Platoon YD 243585

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1/9 officially ended its operational control of Companies "K" and "M" 3/4 at 1700H on 24 April 1968. The remainder of 24 April passed without further incidents.

On 25 April, at 1600H Company "E" at their C-2 position, received 2 rounds of 82mm enemy mortar fire, there was no counter mortar fire initiated by Company "B", as the enemy position was unknown. No casualties were sustained as a result of the incoming. With the exception of the aforementioned incident, there was no further significant incidents on 25 April 1968. 1/9's activities for that day consisted mostly of consolidation and organization of its newly acquired positions.

On 26 April at 1248, Company "B" received 2 rounds of enemy recoilless rifle fire which hit their minefield. Company "E" was unable to get a fix on the enemy position. No casualties resulted from the incident.

At 1730, 1/9 received orders from 9th Marines to instruct "K" 3/3 to relieve and move to Yankee Station, then engaged with NVA forces. "K" 3/3 arrived and made liaison with 1/4 at 1750. 1/4 released "K" 3/3 at 1832 and the Company was back in its positions at 1930. No further incidents of significant events occurred on 26 April 1968.

On 27 April, at 0745, approximately 25 enemy 60mm mortar rounds impacted Southwest of the C-2 position. The position of the enemy was found to be at coordinates YD112641. An artillery mission was planned but negative clearance was given by higher headquarters.

At noon, a patrolling platoon from "E" Company 3/3 found a large enemy bunker complex at grid coordinates YD154655. The complex consisted of 40-50 living type bunkers, and numerous fighting holes. The area appeared to be last occupied two weeks prior to its discovery. The body of one dead NVA was found in the position. It was estimated that the corpse was 7 to 10 days old.

The platoon destroyed the position as well as conditions permitted. At 1830, 1/9's units in the C-2 position received 4 rounds of enemy 122mm rocket fire. A counter battery mission was fired on the suspected enemy position (YD107614) with unknown results. The 4 rounds of incoming resulted in three (3) friendly WIA's all requiring medical evacuation.

The remainder of 27 April 1968, progressed without further incidents.

In the early morning hours of 28 April, at approximately 0115, a member of "E" Company, using a starlight scope observed an NVA only 35 meters away from his position. The Marine fired one round of M-16 fire and the NVA disappeared. A check of the area that morning at first light revealed a negative result. At 1215, a platoon patrolling from Company "B" found a 60mm mortar pit and 3 (60MM) mortar round containers, both estimated at 1 month old. The cans and pit were destroyed later, the same patrol, at 1255, found an unoccupied enemy bunker at grid coordinates YD124657, which they destroyed by hand. At 1330, a platoon patrol from "K" Company at grid YD146640, found an abandoned bunker complex consisting of 22 separate positions, all of which were destroyed with entrenching tools and explosives. A document which was found at this position was turned into the Battalion S-2. No further significant events occurred for the duration of 28 April 1968.

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At 1030, a point man for a patrol from "K" Company spotted one NVA carrying some sort of pack which was possibly a radio. The point man initiated small arms fire on the enemy who withdrew to the northwest. An A.O. controlled by 1/9 observed the area but failed to spot any signs of enemy activity. At approximately 1100H a unit from CAP 3 became heavily engaged with an estimated Company of NVA.

At 1500, Task Force Robbie, a mechanized unit within the Cam Lo area was ordered to detach a segment of its force to proceed to the area of CAP 3's contact. 1/9 was ordered to give operational control of Company "D" to Task Force Robbie creating a combined Tank/Infantry Reaction Force. At 1515, "D" Company received a 15 minute notice to prepare to move with Task Force Robbie. The force moved out at approximately 1530. At 1615 the lead tank hit a mine in the road, knocking it out of action. At this time, the troops dismounted and proceeded on foot with tank and armor vehicles accompaniment. While closing near the area of contact. The column made a left turn. Due to the darkness the platoon on the right flank spread far to the right. At the time, the platoon came under enemy fire from a fixed position in a hedgerow. As the volume of enemy fire increased, the vehicles and remaining troops came under heavy mortar, RPG and small arms fire from several other enemy positions.

The one platoon on the right flank assaulted through the enemy emplacements, resulting in numerous enemy KIA's and somewhat relieving the pressure on the units. This allowed for the extraction of some wounded.

Enemy reinforcements were observed by the friendly forces and by an A.O. controlled by the force, observing by the light of the flares.

Armor vehicles fire and artillery missions were fired on the reinforcing enemy unit, and the friendly began its withdrawal and continued evacuation of wounded. 1/9 resumed operational control of Company "D" at 2300H 29 April 1968, at which time all remaining units of Company "D" were back in the perimeter. "D" Company sustained as a result of the contact, 4 KIA's, 6 MIA's and 15 WIA's.

At 2135, a night activity from "K" Company 3/3 observed 20 to 30 indigenous personnel at grid YD136633 moving in an easterly direction. 81mm mortars at the C-2 position, fired a mission on the enemy location, giving good coverage of target. The results of the mission was unknown.

Between 2245 and 2310, 1/9's units at the C-2 position received a total of 4 (82mm) mortars, resulting in 3 friendly WIA's serious.

At 1000, on 30 April 1968, a patrol from "K" Company was at YD136633 and areas immediately around that grid which was the location of the previous night sighting of the 20 to 30 indigenous personnel. The patrol found numerous, recently used trails and other indications of movement in the area. At 1725, the C-2 position received 6 rounds of unknown size artillery. One non serious medevac was sustained as a result of the incoming. Operations of the Battalion continued throughout the remainder of 30 April without further incident.

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PART IIISEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

A. PMF Organizations committed to combat and the SLF.

1. Combat Missions Assigned. During this reporting period the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines had various missions during the following operations.

(1) Operation PEGASUS. From 010001H April to 152400H April 1968, the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines mission was to relieve the pressure on the Khe Sanh Combat Base by reopening Route #9 for vehicular traffic and seizing the high ground around the base.

(2) Operation SCOTLAND II. From 160001H April to 211830H 1968 the mission of this Battalion was to occupy and defend the tactical high ground around Khe Sanh and to defend Hills 552 and 689.

(3) Operation KENTUCKY. On 221200H April to 302400H April 1968 the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines mission was to defend the Cam Lo area, including Cam Lo District Headquarters, C-3, C-2, C-3 Bridge, CAP 3 and to interdict enemy movement on Route #561 and Route #9.

B. Significant Operations Conducted. On 4 April 1968, during Operation PEGASUS, the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines assaulted Hill 471, Company "D" secured Objective D, a hill adjacent to Hill #471 while elements of Company "A" assaulted and secured Objective E (Hill 471) along with elements of Company "C".

C. Casualties Inflicted on the Enemy.

(1) Operation PEGASUS.

VC/NVA KIA: 371
VC/NVA POW: 7

(2) Operation SCOTLAND II.

VC/NVA KIA: 23
VC/NVA POW: 0

(3) Operation KENTUCKY.

VC NVA KIA: 20
VC NVA WIA: 1

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D. CASUALTIES SUSTAINED:(1) Operation PEGASUS:

USMC KIA: 21
 USMC WIA: 126
 USMC MIA: 0

USN KIA: 2
 USN WIA: 7
 USN MIA: 0

(2) Operation SCOTLAND II

USMC KIA: 22✓
 USMC WIA: 50✓
 USMC MIA: 20✓

USN KIA: 2
 USN WIA: 6
 USN MIA: 3

(3) Operation KENTUCKY.

USMC KIA: 5
 USMC WIA: 10
 USMC MIA: 7

USN KIA: 0
 USN WIA: 6
 USN MIA: 0

E. New Techniques Employed. None

F. Command Relations. From 0900G to 211830H April 1968, the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines were under the operational control of the 26th Marine Regiment throughout Operation PEGASUS, and Operation SCOTLAND II. During the latter part of this reporting period the Battalion was under the operational control of the 9th Marine Regiment, serving in Operation KENTUCKY.

G. Equipment. During this reporting period organic motor transport was engaged in resupply, household and administration runs for the Battalion.

Due to enemy action around the Khe Sanh Combat Base we have had a total of three vehicles damaged, M170, M107A1 and M122A1. The M107A1 is the only one that was repairable.

H. Logistics. Logistical support activities for the month of April were centered around resupply functions for the Battalion as it operated in the Khe Sanh and Cam Lo areas. Problems were encountered in maintaining enough water for operating units in the field. As the 5 gallon expeditionary cans were scarce, we resorted to the plastic bag within 105 powder canisters. Although this procedure works, it again does not provide enough water in relation to space taken and manpower used in preparation. The answer to resupply of a large quantity of water with minimum waste of space appears to lie within use of the collapsible bladder bag.

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I. Civic Action. Due to the location of this Battalion during the first half of April, and the familiarization of the new operating area in the latter part of this month, no civic action program was undertaken.

J. Administration. No problems were encountered during this reporting period.

K. Personnel. The following Personnel were transferred from this Command.

USMC OFF: 7
USMC ENL: 250

USN OFF: 1
USN ENL: 12

Personnel who were Joined to this Command.

USMC OFF: 3
USMC ENL: 217

USN OFF: 1
USN ENL: 10

L. Intelligence. In the month of April, elements of the 304th and 325C Division still remained in the Khe Sanh area. A few of the artillery and rocket positions were still active but the major portion had been pulled back into Laos. The 320th Division continued to operate in the Mutters Ridge/Helicopter Valley area where it could still intradict Route #9 and serve in a support role for any enemy effort in the Khe Sanh area. From 211200H April to the end of this reporting period, elements of the 27th Independent Regiment were operating in the Battalion's AO during this month. The main enemy operating in or in close proximity to the 9th Marines TAOR was the 64th Regiment, 320th Division, which was generally located in the vicinity of Quang Xa. Infantry units were supported by the 54th and 64th Artillery Regiment deployed from Helicopter Valley to positions along the DMZ.

On 4 April 1968, the Battalion ran into a reinforced platoon from the 8th Battalion, 66th Regiment on Hill 471. After securing the hill, the enemy counter-attacked with elements of the 8th and 9th Battalions, 66th Regiment. The enemy lost 153 NVA KIA's (Conf), 5 POW's 16 crew-served weapons, 1 PRC-10 Chinese Communist Radio, and 31 individual weapons. After the action on the 4th and 5th of April, the battalion remained in an offensive posture and continued to sweep along the Dong Dang Ridge to Hill 689. The enemy appeared to have left in haste. There were many unoccupied positions, numerous ammunition caches, and some weapons abandoned of which one weapon, 12.7mm AA gun is the most noteworthy.

On 20 April 1968, the battalion was relocated at C-3. Enemy attacks by fire increased in northeastern Quang Tri. Agent reports continue to indicate infiltration of troops into the south through the DMZ. The increase in attacks by fire may have been designed to direct attention from troop or supply movement to the DMZ and

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Information gathered from agents and POW interrogations ranging in reliability from F to B continues to indicate that the enemy will capitalize on the propaganda holidays during May by coordinating large scale attacks to coincide with one or all of these holidays. The probability of a coordinated 2d offensive during the coming weeks is not considered likely, but rather, widespread attacks by fire and terrorist activity and possibly a ground attack against one or more populated centers in I Corps.

M. Weather. Sky conditions were generally good during the day. Low ceilings and fog were predominant at night in the mountain and valleys. From 24-30 April, sky conditions were mostly cloudy with rain. Visibility was restricted from one to three miles during rain. High and low temperatures average at 82° and 68° respectively at the Khe Sanh area; and 81° and 71° respectively at Dong Ha. Rainfall for month was trace for both areas. Winds were mostly northwesterly at 5 knots at both locations with visibility averaging 6 miles throughout I Corps.

N. Communications. Combined equipment failures and combat losses require the most detailed planning and allocation of equipment. An aggressive program of follow-up action is necessary to insure timely replacement/repair of this equipment.

Personnel shortages continue to be a problem within the Communication Platoon. These shortages resulted in delays in completing the installation of the CP and Company areas with communication capabilities.

Security on the land lines continues to be a serious problem. During the past month a distinct wire tap was discovered on our line between the two CP's. The cable is buried three (3) feet, so being buried does not guarantee there will be no tapping. Switchboard operators must inform subscribers that line is unobserved. Battalion personnel must realize that phone lines are not secure. Use of the radio, with appropriate coding becomes mandatory for the passing of secure traffic.

O. Artillery. During this reporting period, fifty-four missions were fired by Forward Observers attached to 1st Battalion, 9th Marines. These targets included active artillery, mortars, and rockets; troops in the open, and prep fires.

During Operation PEGASUS, fires were planned for the entire operation. Concentration was plotted on known targets. These were consolidated into series and group fires. These were used very effectively as cover fires during the attack and defense of Hill 471. In this area, an Aerial Observer confirmed over 50 killed as a direct result of supporting artillery.

From 29-30 April, over 62 artillery missions were fired by our Forward Observers, and a total expenditure of over four thousand, two hundred rounds. The targets were mainly troops in the open or dug in; also counter artillery, rocket and mortar.

Throughout this reporting period there has been a growing coordination between air and artillery. As a result there has been a better efficient use of both supporting elements.

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P. Air. During the month of April 1968, air support, both fixed wing and helicopters, was used extensively. Close airstrikes were used to attack and destroy bunker complexes, mortar and rocket positions, staging areas and resupply areas, and troop concentrations. While in an offensive posture, the Battalion made use of airstrikes, to prep objectives ahead of friendly troop advancements. A total of 65 flights of fixed wing were conducted dropping 151000 pounds of napalm and 172000 pounds of bombs. 2 Flights of CBV-24 were used with the ordnance being laid along trails used by the enemy.

Aerial Observers were made maximum use of and during the month 97 AO's employed. They were used for visual reconnaissance, airstrikes control, artillery control, and coordination of medical evacuation.

Helicopter support, although far from adequate, was used extensively for resupply, visual reconnaissance and medical evacuation. While involved in Operation PEGASUS, the Battalion was resupplied almost daily by helicopters. Although somewhat lacking in coordination, these resupplies for the most part went smoothly.

Medical evacuation facilities were the sole means of transporting casualties from the field and for the most part these facilities were grossly inadequate. While occasionally prompt, many unacceptable and extreme delays were suffered. In particular, on 16 April, with 40 casualties staged in the landing zone awaiting evacuation, as much as three hours lapsed between the departure of one flight of helos and the arrival of the next. On the same day, an emergency ammunition resupply request was submitted through appropriate channels. However, this request was not filled until 24 hours later. Many difficulties on the Air Wing level can occur which the Battalion Air Officer may not have cognizance of. However, guide lines in effect, particularly, weather minimums, are too restrictive and prohibit the latitude required to fill emergency requests.

On 17 April, a CH-46A was shot down at coordinates YB793398, while attempting to extract a wounded Marine. The CH-46A was escorted by 2 UH-1E Gunships. Because only a minimal amount of suppressive fire was delivered by the gunships, the enemy was permitted to bring fire to bear upon the CH-46A. Later in the day the extract was successfully completed by elements of the 1st Air Cavalry U.S. Army. The fire support technique and the large amount of ordnance expended by the escort aircraft, also UH-1E's, was directly responsible for this success. On the 17 of April a second Marine was extracted by elements of the 1st Air Cavalry with the same success as the previous day.

On 21 April Company "C", "D", and the Battalion Command Group were helilifted from the Bue Sanh area to the 9th Marine Regiment's TAOR. Companies "A" and "B" followed on 24 April 1968.

Other statistics for the month of April include 40 emergency, 40 priority and 93 routine casualties evacuated by helicopters. There were 38 TPQ's run in the Battalion area of operation and C-47 flare and gun ships were employed on three occasions.

Q. Activation/Deactivation/Redesignation. None

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KHE SANH (OPN PEGASUS)

012400H APRIL 1968

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NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

022400H APRIL 1968

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NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

UNIT OR SECTION	
S-2/S-3 JOURNAL	
PLACE	
KHE SANH (OPN PEGASUS)	
FROM (Date and hour)	TO (Date and hour)
030001H APRIL 1968	032400H PERIL 1968

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NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

UNIT OR SECTION	
S-2/S-3 JOURNAL	
PLACE	
KHE SANH (OPN PEGASUS)	
FROM (Date and hour)	TO (Date and hour)
040001 APRIL 1968	042400 APRIL 1968

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NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

UNIT OR SECTION S-2/S-3 JOURNAL	
PLACE HILL 471 & 552 (OPN PEGASUS)	
FROM (Date and hour) 050001 APRIL 1968	TO (Date and hour) 052400H APRIL 1968

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UNIT OR SECTION	
S-2/S-3 JOURNAL	
PLACE	
HILL 471 & 552 (OPN PEGASUS)	
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060001H APRIL 1968	062400H APRIL 1968

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SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

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SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

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SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

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UNIT OR SECTION	
S-2/S-3 JOURNAL	
PLACE	
HILL 471 & 552 (OPN PEGASUS)	
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100000H APRIL 1968	102400H APRIL 1968

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112400H APRIL 1968

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122400H APRIL 1968

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SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

132400H APRIL 1968

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SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

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NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

150001H APRIL 1968 152400H APRIL 1968

	0530	1	150600	GV/26thMar	SitRep#273		SF
1115		7	151030	GV/26thMar	SpotRep#1	Final	SF
	1132	9	151200	GV/26thMar	SitRep#274		SF
1310		13	151320	GV/26thMar	SpotRep#2	Final	SF
1310		14	151320	GV/26thMar	SpotRep#3	Final	SF
1410		18	151430	GV/26thMar	SpotRep#4	Final	SF
1530		23	151330	GV/26thMar	SpotRep#5	Final	SF
	1650	26	151530	GV/26thMar	SpotRep#6	Final	SF
	1750	29	151800	GV/26thMar	SitRep#275		SF
1928		34	151850	GV/26thMar	SpotRep#7	Final	SF
	2305	37	152400	GV/26thMar	SitRep#276	Final	SF
	2310	38	151930	GV/26thMar	SpotRep#8	Final	SF

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HILL 689 (OPN SCOTLAND II)

TO (Date and hour)

160001 APRIL 1968	162100H APRIL 1968
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NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

170001 APRIL 1968 172400 APRIL 1968

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SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

S-2/S-3 JOURNAL

PLACE
HILL 689 (OPN SCOTLAND II)

TO (Date and hour)

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SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

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HILL 689 (OPN SCOTLAND II)

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200001 APRIL 1968 202400 APRIL 1968

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NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

S-2/S-3 JOURNAL

HILL 689 (OPN SCOTLAND II)

10 (Date and hour)

210001 APRIL 1968 212400 APRIL 1968

TIME		SERIAL NO.	DATE TIME GROUP	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN	
IN	OUT				M-Maps S-Staff	T-Troops F-File
	0530	1	210600	GV/26thMar SitRep#21		SF
0933		2	210933	GV/26thMar SpotRep#1	Final	SF
1115		6	211111	GV/26thMar SpotRep#2	Initial	SF
	1130	8	211200	GV/26thMar SitRep#22		SF
1205		10	211200	GV/26thMar SpotRep#3	Final	SF
1125		12	211210	GV/26thMar SpotRep#4	Final	SF
1230		13	211230	GV/26thMar SpotRep#5	Final	SF
	1307	14	211250	GV/26thMar SpotRep#6	Final	SF
1340		17	211333	GV/26thMar SpotRep#7	Final	SF
		19	211355	GV/26thMar SpotRep#8	Final	SF
1740	1740	25	211800	GV/26thMar SitRep#23		SF
1730		26	211645	GV/26thMar SpotRep#9	Final	SF
1850		3	211830	GV/26thMar SpotRep#10	Final	SF
	1130	31	212400	GV/26thMar SitRep#24		SF

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NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

UNIT OR SECTION

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FROM (Date and hour)

TO (Date and hour)

220001H APRIL 1968

222400H APRIL 1968

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NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

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UNIT OR SECTION	
S-2/S-3 JOURNAL	
PLACE	
C-3 (OPN KENTUCKY)	
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230001H APRIL 1968	232400H APRIL 1968

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NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

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UNIT OR SECTION		1/9
S-2/S-3 JOURNAL		
PLACE		
C-3 (OPN KENTUCKY)		
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240000H APRIL 1968	242400H APRIL 1968	

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NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

S-2/S-3 JOURNAL

C-3 (OPN KENTUCKY)

250001H APRIL 1968

252400H APRIL 1968

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262400H APRIL 1968

NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

S-2/S-3 JOURNAL

C-3 (OPN KENTUCKY)

270001H APRIL 1968

272400H APRIL 1968

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NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

UNIT OR SECTION	
S-2/S-3 JOURNAL	
PLACE	
C-3 (OPN KENTUCKY)	
FROM (Date and hour)	TO (Date and hour)
280001H APRIL 1968	282400H APRIL 1968

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SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

S-2/S-3 JOURNAL

C-3 (OPN KENTUCKY)

TO (Date and hour)

290001H APRIL 1968

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C-3 (OPN KENTUCKY)

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Battalion, 9th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMP
APO San Francisco 96602

3/AF/ec
003480
22 May 1968

From: Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMP
Via: Commanding Officer, 9th Marines

Subj: Combat After Action Report

Ref: (a) DivG 3100-1D
(b) Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000 AMS Series I7014, Sheets 6342 II and 6342 III

1. CODE NAME: PEGASUS
2. DATE OF OPERATION: 010001 April 1968 to 152400H April 1968
3. LOCATION: HUONG HOA DISTRICT, QUANG TRI PROVINCE.
4. TASK ORGANIZATION:

1st Battalion, 9th Marines

LtCol. JOHN H. CAHILL
1 April - 15 April 1968

"H&S" Company (Rein)
"H&S" Company

Capt. E. R. MILLER JR.
1 April - 15 April 1968

Company "A" (Rein)
Company "A"
FO Tm, "D" Btry 2/12
DET, "H&S" Company
FAC Team
FO Team, 81MM
Det, Med Plat.
Det, Comm Plat.

Capt. H. D. BANKS
1 April - 15 April 1968

Company "B" (Rein)
Company "B"
FO Tm, "D" Btry 2/12
DET, "H&S" Company
FAC Team
FO Team, 81MM
Det, Med Plat.
Det, Comm Plat.

Capt. J. P. WILLIAMS
1 April - 15 April 1968

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Company "C" (Rein)
 Company "C"
 FO Tm, "D" Btry 2/12
 DET, "H&S" Company
 FAC Tm,
 FO Tm, 81MM
 Det, Med Plat.
 Det, Comm Plat.

Capt. R. H. FLAGLER
 1 April - 15 April 1968

Company "D" (Rein)
 Company "D"
 FO Tm, "D" Btry 2/12
 DET, "H&S" Company
 FAC Tm
 FO Tm, 81MM
 Det, Med Plat.
 Det, Comm Plat.

Capt. J. W. CARGILE
 1 April - 15 April 1968

5. SUPPORTING FORCES.

a. Artillery. During this reporting period the Forward Observers attached to the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines fired forty-two missions. The targets fired upon included active artillery, rockets, mortars, troops in the open, and preparation fires in support of offensive moves.

The fires in support of Operation PEGASUS were separated into groups and series according to the known target and the concentration number assigned each target. This method of grouping fires proved highly effective in the assault upon Hill #471. Aerial Observers sighted over 50 confirmed enemy KIA's resulting from the successful employment of artillery during this single engagement.

b. Air. During this period of Operation PEGASUS both fixed wing and rotary wing air support was used extensively. Close air strikes were used to attack and destroy enemy bunkers, mortar and rocket positions, staging and resupply areas and troop concentrations. While in an offensive posture the Battalion made use of air strikes to prep objectives ahead of friendly troop advancement. A total of 40 flights of fixed wing were conducted. Aerial Observers were used to a maximum for visual reconnaissance, airstrike control and coordination of medical evacuation. A total of 55 aerial observers were employed.

Helicopter support was constantly in demand, however, there were not enough aircraft to handle the load. The Battalion was resupplied almost daily by helicopters. Delays in medevacs and resupply were common. During the operation a total of 28 TPQ's were run in support of the Battalion to hit suspected troop movement, bunker complexes and weapons positions.

c. Armor. None

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6. INTELLIGENCE. As Operation PEGASUS began, elements of the 304th and 325th Divisions still remained in the Khe Sanh area. A few of the artillery and rocket positions along the 75 Grid Line were still active, but the major portions had been pulled back into Laos.

On the 4th of April, the Battalion moved from Hill #584 to secure Hill #471. On Hill #471, the Battalion ran into a reinforced platoon from the 8th Battalion, 66th NVA Regiment. The initial action resulted in 16 NVA KIA'S (Conf). After securing the Hill, the enemy counterattacked with elements of the 8th and 9th Battalions, 66th Regiment. The enemy lost 137 KIA's confirmed and the Battalion captured 5 POW's, 16 crew-served weapons, 1 PRC-10 Chinese Communist radio and 31 individual weapons. After the action on the 4th and 5th of April 1968, the Battalion remained in an offensive posture and continued to sweep along the Dong Dang Ridge to Hill #689. The enemy appeared to have left in haste and there were many unoccupied positions, numerous ammunition caches and some weapons abandoned, of which; one weapon, a 12.7MM AA gun, is the most noteworthy.

On the 13th of April 1968, "A" Co. was conducting a Company size; Search and Destroy mission along Dong Dang Ridge encountered an enemy squad from the 101st NVA Regiment in bunker position. The action resulted in three NVA KIA's (Conf), the capture of 2 POW's, 5 AK-47's and 97 (82mm) mortar rounds.

On 15 April, "B" Company on a sweep to the Southwest, encountered one NVA in a spider hole who was killed by Company "B" and his AK-47 captured.

On the final day of the Operation "A" Company became engaged with elements of the 2d Battalion, 101st Regiment. The NVA were dug in a reverse slope defense and were supported by rockets, artillery and mortars. Because of the high elephant grass and the nature of the situation and accurate determination of enemy casualties was not obtained.

7. MISSION. The 1st Battalion, 9th Marines mission was to conduct limited offensive activity as directed in support of the Operation.

8. CONCEPT OF OPERATION. The concept of operation was to make maximum use of supporting arms in seizing and occupying the tactical high ground surrounding the Khe Sanh Combat Base in order to relieve pressure on that base.

9. EXECUTION. At 0100H on the 1st of April 1968, D Company detected movements on a SID at XD830412; 6 rounds of 81mm mortar, 13 rounds of 60mm mortars and 20 rounds of M-79 fire was fired on the suspected enemy movement, after which movement ceased. At 1050H a patrol from "D" Company found 2 Chinese Communist grenades, 2 magazines for an AK-47 and a magazine pouch at XD831413; the gear was turned into S-2. The artillery FO from "B" Company at 1625H spotted an active enemy mortar position at grid XD821413. The FO adjusted an artillery mission on the position and reported good coverage of target.

Total incoming rounds received by 1/9 on 1 April were 4 rounds of 60MM, 8 rounds 82MM and three (3) rounds 120MM Mortar. The Battalion sustained 1 WIA as a result of the incoming, and 1 NBC both evacuated.

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At 0735H 2 April 1968, elements of "D" Company spotted 2 NVA in the open at grid XD822413. "D" Company fired 9 rounds of 60mm mortar fire on the enemy position with unknown results. Company "C" personnel on "Drop Zone" security, spotted 2 automatic weapons positions with enemy firing at C-130 aircraft making air drops. The enemy positions were located at XD826424 and XD827424. M-79 fire was initiated on the enemy positions, after which enemy fire ceased from the area. At 1900H, the 2d Platoon "C" Company observed an enemy position at XD822413 firing RPG's at the Battalion position. Ten rounds of 106mm recoilless rifle were fired on the enemy position with unknown results.

Total incoming received on 2 April were one 60mm and 6 82mm mortar rounds and 3 RPG's. The Battalion sustained one casualty, 1 WIA (Non-serious).

At 030310H April, a Marine from "B" Company checking lines, observed a NVA sapper inside the perimeter crouching near a trenchline. He was challenged and killed as he attempted to escape. A search of the immediate area was then conducted revealing a second enemy sapper hiding behind bushes inside the perimeter. He attempted to throw a hand grenade and was killed. Both enemy personnel were dressed in loin cloths and covered with black camouflage paint. Equipment taken from the bodies consisted of 3 grenades, a knife, a Russian wrist watch, a soft cover and several safety pins apparently used to disarm trip flares and mines.

At 0400H, another enemy was spotted when he tripped a trip flare forward of "D" Company positions. He was killed with M-16 and M-79 fire.

At 0655H, members of Company "D" heard digging sounds forward of their defensive wire at XD826414 and fired 15 rounds of 60mm mortar fire. The digging ceased. Total incoming rounds received by 1/9 on 3 April were seven 82mm mortar rounds, resulting in a total of four WIA's.

1/9 had been assigned the mission of securing Hill #471 on 4 April 1968, the Battalion (-), "B" Company, commenced movement to the line of departure at 0230H for 0600H jump off.

1/9 crossed the LDB with "D" Company and "C" Company moving abreast with "A" Company and "485" Company (-) in trace. At 1140H while moving to Objective E (Hill #471) elements of "C" Company found 11 enemy bunkers, 8 chi-com grenades, and miscellaneous enemy equipment. All was destroyed. At 1200H 1/9 was in position on high ground overlooking Obj. E (Hill #471). 1/9 began receiving 122mm rocket fire, 3 rounds from enemy rocket positions several thousand meters to the Southwest. Preparations were made for the attack of Hill #471 with "A" Company to attack and take Hill #471. An A.O. assigned to 1/9 at 1215 reported sighting 20-30 enemy troops and 18-20 enemy bunkers in a fortified position complex on the top of Hill #471. Heavy artillery preparations from the Khe Sanh Combat Base was called in by 1/9 on Hill #471 between 1230H and 1400H. Close air support was run by 1/9 on Hill #471 between 1400 and 1500H. During this reporting period "D" Company secured Objective D, Hill immediately adjacent to Hill #471, and "A" Company moved to an attack position from which they would assault Hill #471. During the entire period 1/9 received enemy artillery and rocket fire from the Southwest. In addition, mortars and small arms fire were received from vicinity of Hill #471.

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At approximately 1500H following airstrikes, "A" Company initiated its assault on Hill #471 across a narrow approach with "D" Company providing heavy base of fire from its position on Objective D. "A" Company assaulted Hill #471 with the 2d Platoon in the lead and the 3d Platoon in trace prepared to take the right half of #471 with the 1st Platoon was in reserve. The assaulting elements slowed down near the top of Hill #471 due to heavy enemy small arms fire and grenades. A-1 was sent to pass through A-3 and continue the assault. At approximately 1530H A-3 secured the east half of Hill #471 and provided fire support for A-1 and A-2 to secure the remaining portion of Hill #471. Hill #471 was secured at approximately 1600H. "C" Company had been ordered to reinforce "A" Company on Hill #471 and completed movement to the Hill by 1830H. "A" Company was responsible for the western half and "C" Company the eastern half of the Hill. The attack resulted in 16 NVA KIA's. Total incoming rounds received by 1/9 on 4 April 1968, were 12 artillery, 72 rockets, and 103 mortar rounds. Total casualties sustained by the Battalion were 10 KIA's and 56 WIA's medevaced.

On 5 April, 1/9 "A" Company and "C" Company were situated at Hill #471. "B" Company with CP on adjacent Hill and in a defensive position.

At 0430H "C" Company on Hill #471 came under a heavy enemy counter-attack by an estimated two NVA Companies. Fighting was intense, with the enemy as close as twenty meters to friendly lines. The NVA employed small arms, automatic weapons and heavy machine guns, grenades, and RPG's in their assault. The enemy was well disciplined. It was observed that the NVA were uniformly dressed in green utilities and steel helmets and well equipped. The enemy broke off their assault at approximately 0630H and retreated to a Hill Southeast of Hill #471. From this position they continued sporadic small arms, mortars and RPG fire on Hill #471. The fire was returned by 1/9 elements who maintained fire superiority over the enemy. As a result of the attack on "C" Company the following enemy equipment was captured: 1 (60MM) mortar with ammo, 13 machineguns, 4 RPG's, 28 AK-47's 30 AK-47 magazines, 3 SKS's, 13 down type magazines for automatic weapons and other miscellaneous gear. 1/9 killed 149 NVA (Confirmed) and captured 5 prisoners. By 0800H the enemy had ceased their small arms fire on 1/9's positions. At various times between 0800 and 2000H on 5 April 1968 elements of 1/9 observed small groups of enemy moving South of Hill #471 and initiated small arms, mortar and artillery fire on the enemy. Total incoming rounds received by 1/9 on 5 April were 20 rounds of 122mm rocket fire. Total friendly casualties sustained by 1/9 on 5 April were one KIA, 21 WIA's serious and 7 non-serious WIA's.

From 5-6 April no changes were made on 1/9 positions. At 1000H, S-3 Officer from 2/10, 1st Air Cavalry, U.S. Army arrived at 1/9's position to effect liaison with 1/9's CO and S-3.

At 1030H, 1/9 in accordance with orders from higher headquarters commenced departure from its positions on Hill #471, being relieved in place by 2/12 1st Air Cavalry, U.S. Army who were helilifted into position between 1030 and 1230. By 1230H all of 1/9 had departed Hill #471. By 1400H 1/9 had completed its move to the Northwest to an area approximately 1000 meters from Hill #471. By 2000 1/9 had established its night defensive positions. There were no further significant events on 6 April with no casualties or incoming rounds received into 1/9's position.

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At 0200H on 7 April 1/9 received orders to attack and secure Hill #552. Orders were issued and units commenced movement in order to cross the line of departure at 0700. Between 0715 and 0820H 1/9 controlled close air support and artillery fire against Hill #552 in preparation for the assault. At 0820H Delta Company and "C" Company plus 1/9 Command Group, started their assault on Hill #552, meeting no resistance and securing the hill by 0845H. By 1700H all elements of 1/9 involved in the operation were in position on Hill #552. At 1810H 1/9 on Hill #552 received 12 rounds of incoming rockets. Five non-battle casualties were sustained by 1/9 on 7 April.

At 0800H on 8 April 1968, 1/9 (-) "B" Company were in defensive positions on Hill #552. 1/9 received orders to assault and hold Hill #689.

At 0600 with "C" Company in the lead, 1/9 crossed the line of departure and began movement toward the objective. At 0720H 1/9 had secured Hill #689 making no enemy contact. Between approximately 1500 and 1630H 1/9 on Hill #689 received 38 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, which inflicted serious casualties on the Battalion. An artillery mission was fired on the suspected enemy position with unknown results.

On Hills #552 and #689 1/9 found numerous enemy positions consisting of bunkers, trenchlines, fighting holes, mortar pits and anti-aircraft positions. Some miscellaneous enemy ordnance and gear was found, but in general it was apparent that the enemy units previously occupying these areas had made an orderly withdrawal.

On 8 April 1/9 received a total of 38 rounds of 82mm enemy mortar fire. Casualties sustained by 1/9 were 9 KIA's, 27 serious WIA's and 1 non-battle casualty.

At 0001H on 9 April 1/9 was in a defensive position on Hill #552 and 689. Orders were received that the Battalion would spend an unspecified period of time in present position. In view of this 1/9 spent the majority of 9 April further preparing defensive positions on Hills #552 and #689. At 0720H 1/9 on Hill #689 received 18 rounds of enemy 82mm mortars resulting in 2 KIA's and 4 WIA's. An artillery mission was fired on the enemy mortar position and no further rounds were received from that location. Total incoming rounds received by 1/9 on 9 April were 18 (82mm) mortar rounds and 2 unidentified recoilless rifle rounds. Total casualties sustained by 1/9 were 2 KIA's 3 serious WIA's and 1 minor WIA.

At 0001H on 10 April, 1/9 was in positions on Hills #552 and #689. An area of responsibility was assigned to 1/9 from the 26th Marine Regiment.

During the day 1/9 conducted patrols relatively close-in to the Battalion's perimeter to familiarize personnel with the area and provide security. There were no notable occurrences resulting from these patrols. The Battalion continued improving its positions through 10 April.

1/9 received no incoming rounds and sustained no casualties on 10 April. 1/9 employed five small unit security patrols within its AO on 11 April. At 0930H a patrol from "B" Company discovered an enemy bunker complex of approximately 100 bunkers. The condition of which indicated it had been recently used by an NVA Battalion.

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Approximately 25 of the 100 bunkers had been destroyed by artillery missions and airstrikes. In addition, there were 7 mortar pits found in the area. A "D" Company patrol at 1000H also found an enemy bunker system. At the site "D" Company's patrol found food containers and bloody clothing which were turned into the S-2. On 11 April 1/9 received no incoming rounds and sustained no casualties.

On 12 April, 1/9 conducted three patrols in its AO. At 1000H "C" Company from its defensive position sighted an active enemy rocket sight then firing on Khe Sanh Combat Base. An artillery mission was fired on the enemy, giving excellent coverage of target. At 1150H, a platoon patrolling from "C" Company found an abandoned enemy anti-aircraft position. In this area they found 4 cans 50 caliber anti-aircraft ammo, NVA entrenching tools, gas masks, ponchos, knives and boxes of accessories for anti-aircraft weapons.

At 1300H, the patrol from "D" Company found a total of 42 enemy bunkers in two positions. Weapons and equipment found were: 1 AK-47, 6 magazines, 7.62 ammunition, 1 NVA radio with 2 batteries, 4 chi-com grenades, TNT explosives, first aid kit, rice and assorted documents.

In a third position "D" Company found 3 pallets of 155MM artillery rounds evidently part of a faulty air drop. The pallets showed evidence of tampering by NVA. 1/9 requested an EOD Team to destroy the ammunition.

At 1420H a platoon patrol from "C" Company discovered an enemy anti-aircraft position and a 12.7mm anti-aircraft gun. The weapon was set up on tripods with mounts, sights pivot and shoulder bar. The weapons were loaded and had a round in the chamber. The 12.7mm anti-aircraft gun was in excellent condition. Additional gear found was several hundred rounds 12.7 anti-aircraft and armor piercing ammunition, complete sets of tools, cleaning gear, spare parts and other accessories for the weapons. The weapon and accessory equipment were turned into the Battalion S-2.

1/9 received no incoming rounds on 12 April and sustained 1 non-battle casualties which required a medevac.

At 1500H, "A" Company on 13 April patrolling to the south of 1/9 position received a total of 14 enemy 60mm and 82mm mortar rounds causing 10 friendly WIA's of which all but 1 required medical evacuation.

"A" Company coordinated artillery and 81mm mortar fire on the enemy position after which the patrol commenced to sweep through the area. The patrol came under grenade and small arms fire from 5 NVA. "A" Company returned small arms fire against the enemy, resulting in 3 NVA KIA's and 2 NVA POW's and the capture of 5 AK-47's, 47 grenades, 97 (82mm) mortar rounds and other miscellaneous NVA equipment. There were no significant activities or incidents on that day.

At 1015H on 14 April a platoon from "B" Company while on patrol discovered an unoccupied enemy position. In this position, the patrol found 100 (82MM) mortar rounds, 14 AK-47 magazines, fuzes and increments for mortar rounds, NVA helmets, clothing and various other NVA gear.

At 1115H a platoon patrol from "A" Company found 8 pallets of 155mm artillery ammunition from a misplaced air drop. Details and location were reported to 26th Marine Regiment for future disposition.

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On 15 April at 1100H, "D" Company while patrolling discovered 2 Russian made helmets and 1 Chinese Communist grenade. "B" Company at 1100H departed on a Company size patrol. At 1500H one squad from the Company was moving to checkout and secure an area on the Company's patrol route when one NVA hidden in a spider hole exposed himself, fired an automatic burst of 15 rounds at the squad, killing one man and seriously wounding two others. The squad immediately returned fire and killed the enemy. The squad captured 1 AK-47, 2 AK-47 magazines, documents and personnel gear, all of which were turned into the Battalion S-2.

Subsequently at 1630H, the "B" Company patrol discovered an unoccupied enemy mortar position. In addition, to the mortar pit they found five bunkers, numerous ammunition canisters, spools of communication wire, fifty pounds of rice, various NVA gear and a document. The documents were turned into the Battalion S-2 and the remainder of the gear and the positions were destroyed. 15 April ended without further incident.

10. RESULTS.

a. Casualties Sustained:

USMC KIA: 2
USMC WIA: 131
USMC MIA: 0

b. Casualties Inflicted:

VC/NVA KIA: 171
VC/NVA POW: 7

c. Captured Materials: During Operation PEGASUS the following enemy material was captured by this Battalion: 18 crew-served weapons, 38 individual weapons and numerous miscellaneous gear which included documents, 50 caliber ammunition for 12.7 anti-aircraft gun and various Russian helmets.

11. ADMINISTRATION.

A. Supply. Logistical support activities for Operation PEGASUS were centered around resupply functions for the Battalion as it operated in the Khe Sanh area.

Problems were encountered in maintaining enough water for operating units in the field. As the 5 gallon expeditionary cans were scarce, we resorted to the plastic water bag within 105 powder canisters. Although this procedure worked, it again does not provide enough water in relation to space taken and manpower used in preparation. The answer to resupply of a large quantity of water with minimum waste of space appears to lie within use of the collapsible bladder. No significant problems were encountered during the remainder of the Operation.

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b. Maintenance. The overall maintenance situation is extremely poor. The problem is a lack of spark plugs, tubes and tires for the M274A2 (Mule). Spare parts for the mule are in general difficult to obtain such as carburetors, starter cables, spark plugs, tires and tubes.

c. Treatment of Casualties, Evacuation and Hospitalization. The medical report of Operation PEGASUS can be divided into several categories:

(a) Patient Care. There was no forward BAS set up during Operation PEGASUS. The medical officer was at C-Med at Khe Sanh. Sick call was handled by the senior corpsman and pt's were referred to C-Med if further medical care was required. Battle casualties were medevaced by helicopter to C-Med or D-Med. The medevacuation system was generally excellent; however, on 4 April 68 and 8 April 68, there was difficulty in obtaining helicopters. About 200 battle casualties and 20 non-battle casualties were handled during this period.

(b) Epidemiological Problems. There were no epidemiological problems during this period.

(c) The food supply of Operation PEGASUS was C- Rations.

(d) Medical supplies for 1/9 during Operation PEGASUS was from C- Med through helicopters. There were adequate medical supplies available.

(e) Trash disposal was inadequate.

(f) Rat bites were not uncommon. These were treated by a series of 14 rabies vaccination shots.

(g) All water consumed was chlorinated at Khe Sanh. In summary, the medical aspect of Operation PEGASUS was adequate.

d. Transportation. During this Operation, organic motor transport was engaged in resupply, household and administration runs for the Battalion.

Due to enemy action around the Khe Sanh Combat Base we have had a total of three vehicles damaged. M-170, M107A1 and M422A1. The M107A1 is the only one that was repairable.

e. Communications. During Operation PEGASUS, combined equipment failures and combat losses required the most detailed planning and allocation of equipment. An aggressive program of follow up action is necessary to insure timely replacements/repair of this equipment.

Personnel shortages continue to be a problem within the communication platoon. These shortages resulted in delays in completing the installation of the CP and Company areas with communication capabilities.

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
f. Medical Evaluation. See paragraph C.

12. Special Equipment and Techniques Employed. None

13. Commanders Analysis. This period consisted of offensive operations out of the Khe Sanh Combat Base perimeter spearheaded by 1/9's attack on Hill #471. Early movement towards the objective was assisted by periods of limited visibility which provided security/secretcy to the attacking elements. Although defensible terrain existed between the LD and Objective, the enemy chose only to defend on the Objective. However, once the ground haze/fog lifted, the enemy was able to place accurate and heavy fire (mortar, rockets, artillery) on advancing elements. Within the immediate objective area, his mortars appeared to be pre-registered and fired into these designated areas without adjustments. This was in contrast to enemy indirect type fire elsewhere, on targets of opportunity which were obviously FO controlled. In addition, he employed the techniques of using the noise of jet aircraft (CAS) to fire his weapons. The actual assault and seizure of Hill #471 was successful due to superiority of men and firepower.

The heavy enemy losses on Hill #471 on the morning of 5 April are attributed to a well established defense by friendly forces which integrated illumination and firepower to attack/defend against a massed enemy. Subsequent operations developed patterns that indicated that the enemy had chosen to vacate the immediate area within 3000 to 4000 meters of the Khe Sanh Combat Base perimeter proper (Airfield). Bunker complexes uncovered, if occupied, would have delayed attacking forces considerably as they were positioned to take maximum advantage of terrain. Numerous and sizeable quantities of ammunition caches uncovered indicated a hasty withdrawal. Although the enemy did not physically occupy the area in strength, he did not hesitate to periodically use indirect fire means to inflict casualties on friendly forces. It appeared almost as if he had drawn an imaginary line, that, if he chose to cross you suffered the consequences. Except for isolated instances it appeared he was selecting the time and place of engagement. His tactics implied a desire on his part to draw out our forces and over extend the LOC. As friendly forces established patrol bases and conducted close-in patrols, the situation, as this period ended, appeared to be a stalemate.

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W. A. DINGMAN
By Direction



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11. ADMINISTRATION MATTERS.

a. Supply. During this operation the bulk of logistical effort had been directed towards the support of the Battalion. The majority of Classes I, III, and V items have been furnished by the 26th Marines leaving Classes II and IV in our hands.

b. Maintenance. The overall maintenance situation as regards to the M774R (Mule) is extremely poor due to the lack of spare parts, such as carburetors, starter cables, spark plugs, tires and tubes.

c. Treatment of Casualties, Evacuation and Hospitalizations. Medical treatment of casualties was the primary job of the medical department during Operation SCOTLAND. Casualties are first seen by corpsman in the individual companies and then they are brought to the forward BAC. From there they are either treated, medevaced out to "C" Med for further referral, or sent to 1/26 or the Special Forces FOB-3 to recuperate. Medevacs to C-MED were transported by Otters and Mules. Medevacs to D-MED were transported by helicopters.

d. Transportation. During Operation SCOTLAND, motor transport was primarily used in administrative runs for the Battalion in Dong Ha. The Battalion's Forward units employed 2 "Mighty Mites", 10 "Mules", 1 PC, 1 Trailer M416 and 4 Trailers M107 at the Ahe Sanh Combat Base. Most of these vehicles were severely damaged by fragmentation from incoming rounds.

e. Communications. The laying of alternate land lines was used to offset wire communications outages due to incoming enemy fires, with excellent results. Subsequent policies and burying of lines would possibly remove the need of these alternate line which then can be reclaimed for future use. The installation of a five pair cable (buried) to Regiment greatly enhanced the communications posture of this unit. The use of cable laying equipment made a fast and efficient installation. However, some casualties were taken when the cover of fog lifted. It is recommended that the replacement of hasty installations by permanent lines or cable be done during the cover of fog or darkness. This is especially true when using large equipment and large numbers of personnel.

The establishment of a HF Net with this Battalion's rear on a twice daily basis has insured timely reports from forward positions. It also provided timely status reports on equipment under repair in the rear areas. Two circuit has also been the means of conducting administrative matters. It is recommended that in static or semi-permanent positions, KI-8 Keys be issued down to Battalion level. This precludes daily trips to senior elements to get this equipment. The extensive use of SID's required the expenditure of more wire (WD-I/TT) than was initially planned on. Plans for operations should include the number of SID's to be used and the total wire requirements.

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f. Medical Evaluation. The forward BAS received 353 wounded and 72 KIA's during this operation period. Of the 353 wounded, 170 were medevaced. The men treated at the BAS were debrided, dressed and placed on prophylactic antibiotics for three days. The men are followed daily with dressing changes to observe function, cleanliness and presents of infections. Fly control has been fought with malithione. Rodent control (minimal) has been treated with Zone Phosphide. Cholera and Plague vaccines have been given in the field during this operation for prophylaxis.

12. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT & TECHNIQUES. During Operation SCOTLAND the Battalion began employing a number of intrusion detectors. These were the Night Observation Devices, Seismic Intrusion Devices, PPS-5 and PPS-6 radar. Use of the starlight was continued and increased due to additions of eleven more starlight scopes. Thus far, our findings have indicated that the NOD is outstanding when there is no fog or heavy rain. However, almost every night during the month of February it was foggy. The starlight scope is similar to the NOD in that is not useful in the fog. The Battalion has not yet gotten a confirmed kill with the starlight scope. The SID's seem to work well regardless of terrain, fog, etc. The units picked-up movement nearly every night and this has been born out by recent events. The PPS-5 and PPS-6 radar has not been used with any degree of effectiveness because the hilly terrain and heavy vegetation of Khe Sanh severely limit the radar. In recent weeks, during February little use has been made of the radar, because of power supply difficulties and part-replacement problem. Radar personnel feel that even if the optimum battery life of the radar is obtained, the battery is still inadequate. A power supply lasting up to five days needs to be developed.

W. W. Dinegar
W. W. DINEGAR
By direction

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1/9 May 68

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