

HEADQUARTERS  
2d Battalion, 9th Marines  
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
FPO San Francisco 96602

**UNCLASSIFIED**

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 January 1968 to 31 January 1968

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## HEADQUARTERS

2d Battalion, 9th Marines  
 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 FPO San Francisco 96602

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 5750  
 10 Feb 1968  
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From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)  
 Via: (1) Commanding Officer, Third Marine Regiment  
 (2) Commanding Officer, Fourth Marine Regiment  
 (3) Commanding General, Third Marine Division

Subj: Command Chronology For Period 1 Jan 1968 to 31 Jan 1968

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2  
 (b) FMFPacO 5750.8

Encl:  (1) 2d Battalion, Ninth Marines Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. Downgraded to unclassified when Sections I, II, III, IV, V, VII and VIII are removed from enclosure (1).



W. M. O'BRYAN

Copy to:  
 9th Marine Regiment

2 MARCH 1968

R. M. O'Bryan

R. M. O'Bryan

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## SECTION I - Organizational Data

1. Designation/Location. 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, 31 January 1968.  
Camp Carroll.

2. Period Covered by Report. 1-31 January 1968.

3. Name/Rank of Commanding Officer and Staff including T/O Billet Assignments.

Commanding Officer	LtCol W. M. CRYAN	1-31 Jan
Executive Officer	Maj D. J. MURPHY Maj C. H. JOHNSON	1-21 Jan 22-31 Jan
S-1	1stLt R. A. GRANT	1-31 Jan
S-2	1stLt D. J. HERNANDEZ 2dLt J. P. C. FLOYD	1-27 Jan 28-31 Jan
S-3	Maj J. R. SWEENEY Maj D. M. LOSEE	1-3 Jan 4-31 Jan
S-4	Capt M. E. RICH	1-31 Jan
S-5	2dLt J. P. C. FLOYD	1-31 Jan
Comm Officer	Capt J. M. HARTNETT	1-31 Jan
MT Officer	1stLt E. M. MYERS 2dLt J. M. G. MITCHELL	1-27 Jan 28-31 Jan
Supply Officer	1stLt S. K. CUTBERT	1-31 Jan
Medical Officer	Lt L. D. MCARTOR	1-31 Jan
Chaplain	LtCol J. F. SIEBERT	1-31 Jan
H&S Company	Capt J. M. HARTNETT	1-31 Jan
Company "E"	Capt D. M. SMITH	1-31 Jan
Company "F"	Capt R. W. KNIGHT	1-31 Jan
Company "G"	Capt P. V. BARRA Capt W. S. MACK	1-13 Jan 14-31 Jan
Company "H"	Capt R. W. ELLISON	1-31 Jan

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Section II - S-1 Chronology

1. General. During this reporting period, the officer strength has remained almost constant. Seven officers were joined and eight officers were lost to the organization, one of which died of wounds. The enlisted strength has decreased slightly, having joined 118 enlisted and dropped 133, but a critical shortage still exists in staff non-commissioned officers, primarily in occupational field 03. There are only 22 on the rolls and an expected loss of six is expected during the month of February. Only 15 staff non-commissioned officers in occupational field 03 will remain in the battalion at the end of February 1968 out of a T/O of 34 if replacements are not forthcoming. The non-effectives at the end of the reporting period total two officers (WIA) and 91 enlisted. Losses for the forthcoming month are expected to be three officers and 50 enlisted by rotation to CONUS.

a. Strength. The average monthly strength for the period ending 31 January 1968 was as follows:

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
41	1150	2	60

Note: Percentage of T/O was just over 100%.

b. Losses.

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
Hostile	2	20	0	0
Non-hostile	0	1	0	0
Admin	6	112	0	4

Note: The above figures include only those personnel dropped from the rolls. For total casualties see the medical chronology.

(1) Of the battle casualties, four were KIA, one DOW, and 17 were WIA. The 17 were transferred by service record to Camp S.D. Butler, as was the non-hostile casualty listed above.

(2) Of the administrative losses, two officers were transferred intra-division and four rotated to CONUS. 32 enlisted were transferred intra-division, four enlisted were transferred to Camp S. D. Butler (three because of brother in country and one for humanitarian reasons), also 76 rotated to CONUS.

(3) Not listed in the losses above, as they have not been dropped from the rolls, are two enlisted missing and believed to be aboard a CH-53A helicopter that crashed into a mountain approximately 12 miles south of Dong Ha and 32 miles northwest of Hue RVN on a line between Khe Sanh and Phu Bai.

c. Administration.

(1) State of Morale. Morale is excellent.

(2) Significant Activities of Personal Service. None.

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(3) Promotions. Two Corporals were promoted to Sergeant meritcously, 45 Lance Corporals were promoted to Corporal, 54 Privates First Class were promoted to Lance Corporal and 25 Privates were promoted to Private First Class.

(4) Discipline, Law and Order. One Summary Court-Martial was completed. One person was awarded NJP by the battalion commander.

(5) Mail. Mail service has been satisfactory, even though for periods of time the mail cannot be moved by truck from Dong Ha.

Section III - S-2 Chronology

1. General. During the reporting period 1 Jan to 31 Jan 1968, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines elements were divided between 3d and 9th Marines TAORs.

Companies "E", "H", and "H&S" (-) plus Command Group Alpha were under OPCON of 3d Marine Regiment from 1 Jan to 20 Jan and OPCON of 4th Marines from 20 Jan to 31 Jan 1968. 2d Battalion, 9th Marines was assigned a mission of providing security on a portion of the perimeter at Camp J. J. Carroll vic (YD 063552), security of Doltn-5 at vic (YD 093513) and the Khe Ghia Bridge at vic (YD 026582). Organic to the mission was intense security patrols in all three areas.

During the reporting period from 1 Jan to 31 Jan 1968, the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines (-), consisting of Command Group Bravo, Company "F", Company "G", and "H&S" Company (-), participated in the defense of the Cam Lo Artillery Base at vic (YD 138613) and the Cam Lo Bridge at vic (YD 148604), including daytime patrolling and nighttime activities to provide security to both positions and the MSR along route #561, security elements for the north and south sweep teams, and the provision of a platoon (rein) reaction force for other units in the area.

2. Area.

a. General. The area of operation from 1 Jan to 31 Jan 1968 centered in the vicinity of Camp J. J. Carroll vic (YD 063574). This operating area is bounded on the north by the southern boundary of the DMZ, on the east generally by the 09 north-south grid line, and on the west by the 00 north-south grid line, as far south as Nui Ba Ho vic (YD 014510) where the boundary cuts east and south to the Dong Nzon area vic (YD 096449). The area generally north of Ba Long vic (YD 150400) serves as the southern boundary of the operating area.

Prominent terrain features in the area include Dong Ha Mountain at vic (YD 017594), which affords observation over the entire area. Cutting the operating area into two segments is the Cam Lo River, running east from vic (YD 000561) to vic (YD 090595). During periods of heavy precipitation, this river will be difficult to cross and will isolate the northern portion of the AO. In both segments, most of the operating area is rugged and mountainous; a 20' to 50' canopy exists in the higher regions. In the low rolling foothills, thick brush makes movement difficult. Also worthy of note in the operating area is the Cua Valley which contains over 90% of the civilians living in the area.

The Cam Lo area of operation is bounded on the north by the 63 grid line, to the east by the 17 grid line, to the west by generally the 09 grid line, and to the south by the Cam Lo River.

The Cam Lo Valley is part of a narrow piedmont west of Route #1 consisting of undulating hills which are bisected by numerous river valleys. These waterways extend like fingers from the northern highlands through piedmont into the coastal plains. In this transitional piedmont the hills range from 30 to 70 meters in elevation and slopes are between 10 and 20 degrees.

Terrain in the two Cam Lo area of operations can be divided into two distinct segments: the rich, low farmland fed by the Cam Lo River and the hilly brush country rising generally 1500 meters north of the river. From the line of the Cam Lo River to where the rice paddies and meadowland meet the foothills the terrain is typically flat and fertile, well populated with hamlets. Visibility is excellent across the rice paddies but poor near the hamlets because of the hedgerows and bamboo which screens the houses. There is some pastureland generally where the rice paddies meet the foothills. The hilly brush country north of the river valley is characterized by gently rolling

c. Weather. Weather during the reporting period was predominantly mild with a noted absence of precipitation. This pattern varied from the general inclement weather expected to coincide with the northeast monsoon. A summary of weather statistics for the reporting period is as follows:

Maximum Temperature	75
Minimum Temperature	52
Total Rainfall (Inches)	2.62
Number of Days With Rain	4
Visibility (Average)	6 Miles
Winds (Average)	6 Knots NNE
Humidity (Average)	87%

### 3. Enemy Situation.

a. General. Enemy units operating in the 3d Marines/4th Marines TAOR during the reporting period were primarily local force units. During the first half of the period there was evidence of NVA units in the northern portion of the operating area just south of the southern boundary of the DMZ. Elements of the 803rd and 90th Regiments of the 324B NVA Division were noted moving through the northern portion of the TAOR. The second half of the reporting period was marked by intense NVA activity in this northern sector of the TAOR. Notably, elements of the 43rd, 52d and 64th Regiments of the 320th NVA Division moved into the northern portion of the TAOR stretching into the 9th Marines TAOR. Characteristics of these NVA are well equipped and supplied ground forces with well coordinated fire support most probably provided by elements of the 54th Artillery Regiment, 320th NVA Division. Their mission appeared to be interdiction of Route #9, thus cutting vehicular resupply to Camp J. J. Carroll and the "Rockpile" with a possible ground assault on Camp J. J. Carroll itself. Local force units in the area included a suspected local force company in the Cam Lo area and another in the Delta-5 area. There was also evidence of elements of the 27th Independent Battalion operating area along Route #9 and in the Delta-5 area.

The NVA and VC operate closely together in the Cam Lo area. The VC generally operate in support of the NVA troops, by providing them with food and information about the area. The streambeds west of the MSR are base camp areas. The stream running NW from Hill 46 at vic (YD 104608) is a base camp area for at least two platoons of VC/NVA which have the mission of mining and interdiction of supply routes. There is one company operating in and out of the Cam Vu village at vic (YD 180617) with a base camp in the Tien Chanh area at vic (YD 1664). The mission of these troops is political, recruiting and gathering food. This unit may be affiliated with the 27th Independent Battalion, which operates generally along Route #9 and in the Cam Lo area. Towards the second half of January, there was a significant rise in the contacts with new NVA troops, notably from the 320 Division, 230 Division and the 303 Division in conjunction with the heavy enemy activity during Tet.

There are two main North-South infiltration routes, one east of the MSR and one west. To the west the enemy moved south from the DMZ probably in the area of Hill 174 at vic (YD 0568) along good trail and stream complexes to Nui Da Bac at vic (YD 100628) and down to the Hill 46 base camp area. Infiltration south across the Cam Lo River and Route #9 is easily accomplished. Resupply is a simple matter in the villages along the Cam Lo River. Infiltration continues south in a SE direction, generally parallel to Route #558 and into the Ba Long Valley. East of the MSR the infiltration routes follow well used trails from the area of the "Trace" between Con Thien and Gio Linh south into the Tien Chanh complex at vic (YD 1664). From there, resupply and orientation by the VC in the area is available, and the

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support Co "F" and Co "G". From 1 Jan 1968 to 31 Jan 1968 they provided normal services in support of the battalion from these two locations.

7. Close Combat. During the month of Jan 1968, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines conducted 2 company, 17 platoon, and 203 squad patrols; 183 squad ambushes; and 317 squad or fire team listening posts and combat outposts.

8. Training. Due to operational commitments and the split of the battalion, very little formal training was conducted. 118 replacement personnel received training in accordance with DivO 1510.3B.

9. Fire Support and Fire Support Coordination.

a. 2d Battalion, 9th Marines was provided direct artillery support from batteries "A" and "C" (4.2" Mortars) of 1st Battalion, 12th Marines and Battery "K" of 4th Battalion, 12th Marines during operations of this reporting period. The 12th Marines provided general support. Tactical and technical fire direction were provided and supervised by Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines.

b. Employment of artillery during the period of 1 Jan to 31 Jan 1968 consisted of 8,335 HE, 127 WP, and 162 illumination fired on targets of opportunity, counter mortar, counter rocket, and preparation fire.

c. From 1-31 Jan, 81mm Mortars provided organizational support of the battalion firing 637 HE, 283 WP and 594 illumination rounds.

d. Artillery support from all supporting batteries was considered satisfactory.

10. Air Support.

a. Medevac. A total of 34 medevacs were lifted from 2/9 installations during Jan 1968. Reaction time on the whole was prompt.

b. Command and Control. 2d Battalion, 9th Marines did not make use of rotary wing air for command and control this month.

c. Resupply. 2d Battalion, 9th Marines was supported by 24 resupplies flown on an emergency basis by UH-34Ds, delivering a total of 28,890 pounds to E(-)/2/9 at Delta-5, vic (YD 094514).

d. Troop Lifts. A rifle platoon was lifted by two CH-46As on two different occasions; once in relief of reconnaissance teams pinned down by superior forces and once to provide security for a downed aircraft.

e. Fixed Wing. Fixed wing was not utilized by 2d Battalion, 9th Marines during the month of Jan 1968.

Section V - S-4 Chronology

1. General. The logistical situation is slowly becoming critical in the areas of Supply, Ordnance and Comm-Elect. Motor transport is adequate, however there is room for improvement.

a. Supply. Significant shortages are, (680) protective masks, M-17, (800) air mattresses, (600) first aid kits and (650) body armor upper torso. The air mattresses and first aid kits have been ordered as shortages were shown by the using units. The protective masks, M-17 have become unserviceable and lost as a result of field use. The body armor upper torso is needed for in-kind survey. Due to the apparent lack of these items in the higher echelons, these figures have gradually grown to the present level.

b. Ordnance. Currently the following ordnance items are on third echelon deadline: (1) 106mm recoilless rifle, (5) portable flamethrowers, (1) 81mm mortar, (3) 60mm mortars, (1) grenade launcher, M-79 and (4) M-60 machineguns. The following ordnance items are on order on priority 02: (1) 106mm recoilless rifle, complete; (3) M-60 machineguns and (1) 12 gauge shotgun.

Difficulties have been experienced in obtaining the following items of munitions: Mine, AP M18A1; Signal illumination, ground; 81mm HE; Hand grenade, M-26; Fuse, blasting time; Blasting caps, non-electric; Trip flares, M-49. There have been intermittent difficulties obtaining 7.62 link.

c. Motor Transport. No vehicles are deadlined for second or third echelon maintenance. Eleven truck, utility M122A1 are operational, (9) are Code X; (18) trailer, ton M1631; (30) truck, platform M274A2; (4) truck, cargo M37B1 and (1) ambulance, M-170 are all operational. There is still a short supply of bearings and spark-plugs for the M122A1 and tires for M37B1s.

d. Comm-Elect. The following items of Comm-Elect equipment are on order on priority 02: (1) Teletype set AN/GGC-3; (1) Receiving set radio, AN/UR-23A; (1) Teletypewriter set AN/TGC-14A; (19) Radio set PRC-25 of which (13) have been nominated for "Red-ball".

The following items of Comm-Elect equipment are on second echelon deadline; (2) Radio Set AN/PRC-47, both need battery adapters; (1) has been nominated for "Red-ball"; (5) Radio set AN/GRC-125, all of which need MX-2799/VRS units; (2) Speech security device KY-8, which need power switches.

The following items are on third echelon deadline: (1) Radar set AN/TPS-21; (1) Battery charger PF3240A; (6) Radio set PRC-25.

There is a short supply of BA-30s and BA-386s.

e. Supporting Units.

(1) FLSU-1 provides the bulk of the logistical support.  
 (2) EOD support is provided by the 11th Engineers.  
 (3) Engineer support is provided by 11th Engineers.  
 (4) Truck support is provided by the 9th Motor Transport Battalion.

(5) Helicopter support is received from MAG-16 and was co-ordinated through 4th Marines during this reporting period.

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Section IV - S-3 Chronology

1. General. 2d Battalion(-), 9th Marines participated in Operation LANCASTER under OPCON of the 3d Marines from 1 Jan 1968 to 29 Jan 1968. From 20 Jan 1968 through 31 Jan 1968, 2d Battalion(-), 9th Marines participated in Operation LANCASTER II under OPCON of the 4th Marines. From 1 Jan 1968 to 31 Jan 1968, 2d Battalion(-), 9th Marines was located at Camp J. J. Carroll. During both operations, its mission was to assume responsibility for a portion of the perimeter at Camp J. J. Carroll. It was also responsible for the defense of the Khe Ghia Bridge at vic (YD 026561). From 1 Jan 1968 to 29 Jan 1968, 2d Battalion(-), 9th Marines was responsible for Delta-5 at vic (YD 094514) and OPCON of CAP-5 at vic (YD 098523). 2d Battalion(-), 9th Marines Command Group "Bravo" was OPCON to the 9th Marines from 1 Jan 1968 to 31 Jan 1968. It was assigned the mission of the defense and improvement of Cam Lo artillery position (C-3) and the Cam Lo Bridge in accordance with the "Dye-Marker" project.
2. Company "E", 2d Battalion, 9th Marines. On 1 Jan 1968, Co "E" occupied the Khe Ghia Bridge at vic (YD 206561) and Delta-5 at vic (YD 094514) and conducted squad size patrols and ambushes from both positions and platoon size patrols from Delta-5. It was relieved of its responsibility for Delta-5 on 29 Jan 1968 at which time Co "E"(-) returned to Camp J. J. Carroll and assumed responsibility for part of the perimeter defense until 31 Jan 1968. The 1st platoon of E/2/9 remained at the Khe Ghia Bridge for the entire month.
3. Company "F", 2d Battalion, 9th Marines. F/2/9 was OPCON to the 9th Marines during the entire month of Jan 1968. Their mission was to defend the perimeter of Cam Lo artillery position (C-3). It was also responsible for improving the defensive position there in accordance with the "Dye-Marker" project and to provide close-in security by conducting squad size patrols and ambushes and providing road sweep security. G/2/9 was attached to F/2/9 as F-1/2/9 during the entire month of Jan 1968.
4. Company "G", 2d Battalion, 9th Marines. G/2/9 was OPCON to the 9th Marines during the entire month of Jan 1968. G(-)/2/9 was responsible for the defense of the Cam Lo Bridge at vic (YD 148604). It also had the responsibility of improving the position in accordance with the "Dye-Marker" project and conducted close-in security with squad size patrols and ambushes. G-2/2/9 was attached to F/2/9 for the entire month of Jan 1968.
5. Company "H", 2d Battalion, 9th Marines. From 1 Jan 1968 until 30 Jan 1968, H/2/9 was responsible for a portion of the perimeter defense for Camp J. J. Carroll. It conducted squad size patrols and ambushes, road sweeps and platoon size patrols. H/2/9 also had the responsibility for a Sparrow Hawk Reaction Force during the month of Jan 1968. On 30 Jan 1968, H/2/9 departed Camp J. J. Carroll to provide security along Route #9 in the vic (YD 074574) and (YD 072563). It remained at these locations through 31 Jan 1968. The Sparrow Hawk Reaction Force from Co "H" was committed four times. It was holo-lifted out twice; once for security of a downed aircraft in the Ba Long Valley and once to assist in a recon extraction. Twice it was committed to reinforce a convoy which was ambushed on Route #9; the first time was near Ca Lu and the second near Camp J. J. Carroll.
6. H&S Company, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines. H&S Company was divided under two separate command groups; one at Camp J. J. Carroll supporting Co "E" and Co "H" and the other at Cam Lo artillery position to

a squad of NVA employing RPGs and rifle grenades. On 28 January, a 2d Battalion, 9th Marines ambush was set off, yielding two NVA confirmed KIA. In every incident and sighting on the MSR, either day or night, the enemy moved from the west to the east. During the last week of January, the enemy activity around the Cam Lo positions picked up significantly and took on a more tactical posture. Sightings and probes all around both the bridge and hill perimeter increased in conjunction with the coming of Tet.

4. VC/NVA Casualties.

VC/NVA KIA	3
Detainees	2
POW	1

5. Enemy Equipment Destroyed or Captured.

ChiCom anti-tank mines	3
USMC Jungle Boots	1 pair
US 60mm Mortar Round	1
M-1 Carbine	2
M-1 Carbine Magazines	2
Type 50 Submachinegun Magazines	3
ChiCom Grenades	7
NVA Medical Kits	3
M26 Grenades	1
Miscellaneous Documents	5
NVA Money (Piasters)	12,000
Tunnels	8
Poncho	1
NVA Helmets	2
NVA Canteens	1
Sandbags	200
AK-47 Rifles	17
AK-47 Grenade Launchers	1
RPG Launchers	3
Electrical Detonator Box	1
AK-47 Magazines	20
RPG Rounds	1
ChiCom 60mm Mortar	2
Type 53 Machinegun Tripod	1
Rifle Grenades	2
7.62 Ammo Containers	1
.45 Cal. U.S. Submachinegun	1
Type 56 Machinegun	1
Type 53 Machinegun Tripod	1
SKS Rifle	7
AK-50 Submachinegun	1

6. VC/NVA Initiated Incidents. During the reporting period, VC/NVA initiated a total of (37) incidents in the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines area of operation. These incidents are broken down as follows:

Sniping	6
Small Arms Contacts	9
Mortar, Rocket, Artillery	6
Perimeter Probes	15
Incoming Rifle Grenades	1

7. Sources of Intelligence. Intelligence information for the reporting period was gathered from the following sources: S-2, 9th Marines, S-2, 3d Marines, S-2, 4th Marines, 3d Force Recon Company, Company "G", 3d Recon Battalion, ground forces working in the area and Kit Carson Scouts.

2. Camp Development. Construction was completed on the mess hall and the staff and officers club. Two (2) strong back tents were damaged by incoming artillery rounds. The strong backs were rebuilt by the Mobile Construction Battalion. Companies "F" and "G" participated in the "Dye-Marker" project at Cam Lo during the entire period.

3. Operations. Companies "F" and "G" participated in Operation KENTUCKY and Companies "E" and "H" participated in Operations LANCASTER and LANCASTER II during the reporting period. S-3 chronology for details.

4. Troop Movement. During this period, (12) trucks moved (128) troops in one lift.

5. Logistical Lifts. During the reporting period, 37,100 pounds of supplies were moved by helicopter in (30) lifts, (62) trucks moved (181,500) pounds of supplies in (62) lifts and (81) tracked vehicles moved (58,900) pounds of supplies in (28) lifts.

6. Ammo Expenditure for the Month of January.

<u>Nomenclature</u>	<u>Expended</u>
5.56 Ball	141,820
7.62 Link	39,200
.50 Cal Link	5,000
.45 Cal	8,200
M-79 40mm HE	776
M-79 40mm CS	48
LAAW	179
Rocket 3.5 HEAT	27
12 Gauge Shotgun	80
60mm HE	930
60mm Illum	1,470
81mm Illum	799
81mm HE	300
81mm WP	20
106mm Beehive	15
106mm HEAT	56
Grenade, Hand M-26	1,812
Demolition Kit, C-4	54
Mine, AP M18A1	30
Grenade, Hand Illum MK-1	85
Flares, Surface Trip	32
Fuse, Blasting Time	250 feet
Blasting Cap, Electric	30
Blasting Cap, Non-electric	400
Signal, Illum Ground (Red)	130
Signal, Illum Ground (Green)	250
Signal, Illum Ground (White Star)	100
Signal, Illum Ground (White Para)	218
Grenade, Hand Smoke (Yellow)	20

Section VI - S-5 Chronology1. Civil Affairs.

a. General. During the reporting period, the civic affairs program of 2d Battalion, 9th Marines was directed to two completely different locations. The first was the twin village of Cam Chinh/Cam Nghia at vic (YD 1053) and the second toward the civilian population in the vicinity of the Cam Lo Artillery Base.

b. Civic Action Projects. In the Cam Chinh/Cam Nghia area work continued on the reconstruction of the village schoolhouse. This has been a joint effort of the population of both villages with the USMC supplying material otherwise not available. These materials included cement, gravel and corrugated steel sheeting for the roof. At last report the project is more than two thirds completed.

In the Cam Lo area, effort was directed towards improving the village market place at vic (YD 140596). USMC supplied gravel and villagers the majority of the work. Efforts were made to oil the road and to keep down dust caused by heavy USMC traffic.

c. MEDCAPs. MEDCAPs were held by the corpsman from Delta-5 at vic (YD 092513) in the Cam Chinh/Cam Nghia area daily. Commitments at Cam Lo on the battalion surgeon's time prevented him from holding MEDCAPs in this area, however, weekly MEDCAPs with a doctor present were held in Cam Lo at least once a week.

d. Solatium. Solatium payment was made once in the Cam Chinh area to a villager who lost a cow through an incident involving Company "E", 2d Battalion, 9th Marines.

e. Psychological Operations. Psychological operations were limited to preparing and posting signs advertising monetary rewards as set down by the civilian rewards project. These signs were put in both areas and at the end of the reporting period have achieved negative results.

Section VII - Communications Chronology

1. General. The communications platoon furnished radio, wire, message center, repair, and maintenance support for the battalion during the month of January. The battalion CP located at Camp J. J. Carroll provided communications between battalion elements located at Cam Lo, D-5, and elements stationed at the Khe Ghia Bridge along main service road Route #9. Electric power for the battalion CP at Camp J. J. Carroll was provided by the 11th Engineer Battalion.
2. Support. The communications platoon supported 2d Battalion, 12th Marines with one RC-292, one AN/PRC -25 and one remote control unit AN/GRA-39. Along with second echelon repair, the message center supported the 4th Marine Regiment with one AN/TGC-14. Support was given to battalion and company CP groups by providing courier service of shackle sheets.
3. Wire Communications. The wire sections supported the battalion with wire communications in the field and in the rear. This section maintained a switchboard with phones to each of the companies, 4th Marines CP, 81s, COC, and FSCC. Also, the section provided wire lines to all command bunkers on the perimeter and to the battalion COC.
4. Training. Formal instruction was given on radio procedure, use of shackles, communications security, and preventative maintenance. Comm center and electronic repair personnel were cross trained on the wire switchboard.
5. Difficulties. A critical shortage of repair parts for the AN/PRC-25 continues.

Section VIII - Medical Chronology

1. General. During the month of January 1968, the BAS held military sick call for 493 Marine Corps personnel. MEDCAP was held on a daily basis in the Cam Lo area. Three companies were absent from Camp J. J. Carroll for the entire month.
2. Sanitation. Routine sanitation inspections of the battalion area were made on a daily basis. There was a rat problem which has been rectified through the use of poisons and traps. Spraying the heads and the mess hall on a weekly basis has alleviated the fly problem.
3. Disease, Injuries and Treatment in General. The BAS continues to maintain a ten bed ward for minor injuries. This ward enables the BAS to render more effective treatment. Personnel requiring more extensive treatment are referred to 3d Medical Battalion for hospitalization, treatment, and for possible further evacuation. Most of the patients treated at the BAS for the month of January were of a routine basis. There was one case of malaria within the battalion. One member of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines was evacuated from the field through this facility with a diagnosis of malaria. The battalion remains on a weekly Primaquine-Chloroquine tablet as a preventive against malaria, plus utilization of insect repellent. Most diseases treated were fungal infections and colds. The BAS triage bunker and supplies were placed in immediate use during the last eleven days of January due to the fact that Camp J. J. Carroll was under enemy mortar, rocket, and artillery fire.
4. Casualties and Hospitalization. There were 16 personnel from the battalion hospitalized at the BAS during January. There were 4 KIAs, 1 DOW, and 18 WIAs during the month. Outpatient treatment consisted of 217 fungal infections, 50 miscellaneous injuries, 40 colds, 4 diarrhea, 3 FUO, 3 cellulitis, 1 hyperventilation, 1 allergic reaction to rabies vaccine, and 1 poisoning.
5. Training. Orientation lectures were given to newly joined personnel. The subject matter included personal hygiene, self aid and buddy aid, venereal disease prevention, and care and the protection of the feet. Seven hours of in-service training was given to Hospital Corps personnel during the month. Subjects included lab procedures, medical records, immunizations, and patient treatment.
6. Complement of BAS. At the close of the month, the BAS had a complement of one medical officer and 57 hospital corpsmen. There are three SNCOs attached to the BAS at this time. The BAS rear was maintained during the month with two SNCOs and 14 hospital corpsmen. There were six hospital corpsmen transferred and one hospital corpsman joined during the month.

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Section IX - Chaplain Chronology

During the month of January, Protestant and Roman Catholic services were held at Camp J. J. Carroll and Cam Lo for the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines by the battalion chaplain and supporting chaplains from 1/12 and the 9th Marine Regiment. Private confession and counseling was offered to the 2/9 Marines on a weekly basis.

hills covered with low vegetation from knee to chest high. The hills are drained by small streams which are fordable and which create deep draws. Generally, the low areas and streambeds are thick while the higher ground is low scrub and grass. Visibility is good, but opportunity for camouflage and concealment is excellent.

b. Trafficability. In the area around Camp J. J. Carroll, trafficability is afforded by Route #9 and a vast network of lesser roads and numerous trails. Movement here is directly influenced by the weather. Prolonged heavy rains will swell streams hampering foot and vehicular traffic on secondary roads and occasionally on Route #9.

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2. Trafficability

In the Cam Lo area, trafficability in the rice paddy area is excellent in the dry season and difficult in the wet season. Paddy dikes are from two to four feet high and usable in any season. Hamlets in the paddy-land will channelize troops, as will the large amount of wire used by the civilians near hamlets and around land holdings. There are three streams which flow from the foothills in the north down through the paddy-land into the Cam Lo River. These streams are fordable, but even in the summer the water is nearly waist high. In the wet season the streams are not fordable. The stream which flows from vic (YD 124630) down into the Cam Lo River at vic (YD 134607) has three crossing areas: at the culverts on the road to Hill 46 at vic (YD 125615), at a small bridge at vic (YD 127613), and at a low spot at vic (YD 127609). The stream to the east is fairly deep and has only one bridge, at vic (YD 148599). The streams to the west of Hill 46 at vic (YD 107603) are wide but slow flowing and should offer no problem to foot troops. As all of these streams begin their flow from the foothills in the north, they cut deep drawn, which hinders movement not only by the drop but also by the heavy vegetation growing alongside. As the rivers flow from the foothills in the north through the gentle pastureland into the flat paddy-land in the south, the streams become more wandering, wider, and slower. There is one prominent road in the area of operations, the Main Supply Route, which extends from the Cam Lo Bridge north, around to the west of the Cam Lo Artillery position generally superimposed on the old Route #561. The MSR becomes the prominent terrain feature in the area when it reaches the ridge at vic (YD 135623), because it has been defoliated and bulldozed 100 meters on either side. There are two other significant roads, neither of which appear on maps: the road which is cut in a similar manner to the MSR west to Hill 46, and the short bypass from the bridge around west to the Cam Lo Artillery position. The road to Hill 26 begins on the MSR at vic (YD 134624) and follows the high ground to Hill 46 at vic (YD 107603). It crosses a stream at a depression at vic (YD 1256150). The high ridge, at vic (YD 134624) at the junction of these two roads is important because the terrain is defoliated along the ridge for approx 300 meters and enemy and friendly troops will be channalized around that high ground, which is in fact the skyline of observation for anyone on the Cam Lo hill or anywhere in the immediate vicinity. There are no roads in the paddy system west of the Cam Lo Bridge, but many trails follow the dikes. East of the bridge, a secondary road in poor condition runs to Highway #1. Many of the old bridges along this road are in poor repair, but with some emergency attention the road could be passable for 6x6 trucks in 24 hours. Of the many trails in the highly populated flatland, only three major trails run further north into the foothills. These are former well-beaten cattle trails and they are in constant use by wood cutters and civilians.

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southern movement continues through Cam Vu, across the Cam Lo River to either side of CAP-3 at vic (YD 178584) and further south into the Ba Long and Hai Lang Forest. The high ridgeline layed bare along the MSR north of Cam Lo channelizes enemy infiltration to one side or another, except on the darkest nights. In the event of enemy movement across the MSR in an east-west direction, he will be unavoidably exposed on the skyline. On moonless nights he may follow the Hill 46 road as a guide and cross at a slight dip in the MSR at vic (YD 132628). Generally speaking, enemy movement and troop concentrations coincide with the north-south boundaries on either side of our area of operations.

b. Significant Enemy Activity. The presence of the 320 NVA Division elements was demonstrated by numerous significant incidents. Worthy of note is the NVA contact on a recon posit at vic (YD 056578) on 16 Jan 1968 requiring an emergency extraction of the involved recon unit with support by a reactionary force from Company "H", 2d Battalion, 9th Marines. On 20 Jan 1968, a 140mm rocket attack was launched on Camp J. J. Carroll coordinated with artillery of a lighter caliber. On 24 Jan 1968, an estimated battalion of NVA ambushed a convoy enroute to Camp J. J. Carroll requiring 1/H/2/9 to be deployed as a reactionary force followed by elements of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines. These incidents were supplemented by numerous other enemy encounters including sporadic artillery attacks on Camp J. J. Carroll.

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Enemy activity in the Cam Lo area underwent a significant transition during the month of January, due to the coming of the Tet offensive, which broke during the first days of February. For the first three weeks of January, enemy activity was primarily politically oriented with the exception of one mining incident on the MSR on 2 Jan 1968. There were many reports of VC/NVA infiltration into the hamlets in the Cam Lo area on a nightly basis. The purpose of these visits was recruiting, kidnaping, and resupply. There were some incidents of large unit infiltration through the Cam Lo area and further south. The most energetic activity occurred in the hamlets within the six grid squares bounded on the upper left by (YD 1662) and on the lower right by (YD 1960). The hamlet of Cam Vu, at vic (YD 180615) was a center of this activity. The Cam Lo River is fordable all through this populated area and does not hinder infiltration. There was at least one incident of VC/NVA initiated printed propaganda evidenced at these villages, and leaflets were found throughout the area. The subject of the leaflets was a recent incident between PFs and Marines at CAP-3 at vic (YD 178584). Another center of VC/NVA political activities is the hamlet complex north of the Cam Lo River and west of the Cam Lo Bridge, notably An My at vic (YD 135609). Popular Force ambushes had success in the area west of An My three times during the first two weeks of January, netting three confirmed and eight probable NVA KIA. By the third week in January, it was clear that there was a large amount of movement in and out of these villages, particularly to the east. It was reported that one local force company was operating from base camps south of Route #9 at Hill 52 at vic (YD 162565) and north of Cam Vu at Tien Chanh at vic (YD 1664), with the mission of extensive recruiting and possible interdiction of Route #9 and CAP-3 activities. The villagers reported in the first days of the fourth week in January that a large force of NVA had made its way into the hamlets north of the river in the vicinity of Cam Vu, and that the enemy planned to put fire on the Cam Lo artillery base from positions within the village and at the same time blow up the Cam Lo Bridge under cover of mortar fire. At approximately this time it also became clear that there was a large number of enemy troops massed in base camp areas to the northeast and northwest of the Cam Lo Artillery position. These troops were apparently NVA, operating closely with VC in the area, who supplied and oriented them. The mission of these troops was to interdict the MSR and possibly stage an attack on a Cam Lo position. On 26 January a convoy was ambushed by

8. Surveillance Devices. Nine Starlight Scopes were employed extensively during the reporting period on night ambushes, LPs and perimeter defense. Also, four SIDs were employed around the defensive perimeter at Camp J. J. Carroll with two being used at the Cam Lo Artillery Base.

9. Comments and Conclusions. Enemy activity in the Cam Lo area increased to an unprecedented level. There was a significant transition in the nature of the enemy's activity from political to tactical. The enemy massed new troops in the area, while continuing to move large numbers of troops south. The VC local force units showed a significant increase in the number of NVA in their ranks, and the enemy's capabilities were shown to include mortars, RPGs, rifle grenades, small arms, and other significant non-tactical capabilities such as the printing of psy-war leaflets locally. The large troop buildup in the Cam Lo area, it must be concluded, must be aimed at some tactical mission, possibly against the Cam Lo Bridge, District Headquarters, or one of the many CAP compounds along Route #9.

HEADQUARTERS  
 2d Battalion, 9th Marines  
 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 FPO San Francisco 96602

1/HES/hdn  
 1080-

2 Jan 68

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF (Attn: SC-1)  
 Subj: Personnel Weekly Summary

1. The below information is correct for the period ending 2400, 1 Jan 68

	ON HAND STRENGTH				NON-EFFECTIVES			
	USMC		USN		USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
H&S	17	289	2	63	1	23	0	4
"E"	6	221	0	0	1	42	0	0
"F"	6	222	0	0	0	29	0	0
"G"	6	224	0	0	1	31	0	0
"H"	6	216	0	0	1	30	0	0
TOTAL	41	1172	2	63	4	155	0	4

ATTACHMENTS:

TOTAL ATTACHMENTS:

DETACHMENTS:

TOTAL DETACHMENTS:

By direction

Enclosure (1)

HEADQUARTERS  
 2d Battalion, 9th Marines  
 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 FPO San Francisco 96602

1/HES/hdn  
 1080

8 Jan 1968

From: Commanding Officer.  
 To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF (Attn: SC-1)  
 Subj: Personnel <sup>DAILY</sup> Summary

1. The below information is correct for the period ending 2400, 7 Jan 1968

	ON HAND STRENGTH				NON-EFFECTIVES			
	USMC		USN		USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
H&S	18	293	2	63	1	16	0	4
E	7	212	0	0	1	43	0	0
F	6	215	0	0	0	26	0	0
G	7	213	0	0	0	27	0	0
H	6	213	0	0	0	25	0	0
TOTAL	44	1146	2	63	2	137	0	4

ATTACHMENTS:

TOTAL ATTACHMENTS:

DETACHMENTS:

TOTAL DETACHMENTS:

By direction

(1)

HEADQUARTERS  
 2d Battalion, 9th Marines  
 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 FPO San Francisco 96602

1/HES/hdn

1080

15 Jan 1968

From: Commanding Officer.  
 To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF (Attn: SC-1)  
 Subj: Personnel Weekly Summary

1. The below information is correct for the period ending 2400, 14 Jan 1968

	ON HAND STRENGTH				NON-EFFECTIVES			
	USMC		USN		USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
H&S	18	291	2	62	1	22	0	4
E	6	215	0	0	0	36	0	0
F	6	217	0	0	0	40	0	0
G	7	215	0	0	2	33	0	0
H	7	215	0	0	0	32	0	0
TOTAL	44	1153	2	62	3	163	0	4

ATTACHMENTS:

TOTAL ATTACHMENTS:

DETACHMENTS:

TOTAL DETACHMENTS:

By direction

(1)

HEADQUARTERS  
 2d Battalion, 9th Marines  
 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 FPO San Francisco 96602

1/HES/hdn

1080

22 Jan 1968

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF (Attn: SC-1)  
 Subj: Personnel <sup>DAILY</sup> Weekly Summary

1. The below information is correct for the period ending 2400, 21 Jan 1968

	ON HAND STRENGTH				NON-EFFECTIVES			
	USMC		USN		USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
H&S	18	301	2	61	0	18	1	6
E	6	217	0	0	1	28	0	0
F	6	217	0	0	0	23	0	0
G	7	215	0	0	0	32	0	0
H	7	211	0	0	3	26	0	0
TOTAL	44	1161	2	61	4	127	1	6

ATTACHMENTS:

TOTAL ATTACHMENTS:

DETACHMENTS:

TOTAL DETACHMENTS:

By direction

(1)

HEADQUARTERS  
 2d Battalion, 9th Marines  
 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 FPO San Francisco 96602

1/HES/hdn  
 1080

29 Jan 1968

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF (Attn: SC-1)  
 Subj: Personnel ~~DAILY~~ Weekly Summary

1. The below information is correct for the period ending 2400, 28 Jan 1968

	ON HAND STRENGTH				NON-EFFECTIVES			
	USMC		USN		USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
H&S	15	287	2	60	0	15	2	7
E	6	217	0	0	1	31	0	0
F	5	213	0	0	0	16	0	0
G	6	212	0	0	0	26	0	0
H	6	226	0	0	2	61	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>1155</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>149</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>7</b>

ATTACHMENTS:

TOTAL ATTACHMENTS:

DETACHMENTS:

TOTAL DETACHMENTS:

By direction

(1)

## DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS  
 2d Battalion, 9th Marines  
 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF  
 FPO San Francisco 96602

1/HES/hdn  
 1080  
31 Jan 1968

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF (Attn: SC-1)  
 Subj: Personnel ~~DAILY~~ Weekly Summary

1. The below information is correct for the period ending 2400, 30 Jan 1968

	ON HAND STRENGTH				NON-EFFECTIVES			
	USMC		USN		USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
H&S	16	287	2	59	0	14	2	5
M	6	216	0	0	1	24	0	0
F	5	212	0	0	0	17	0	0
G	6	211	0	0	0	25	0	0
H	6	224	0	0	2	40	0	0
TOTAL	39	1150	2	59	3	120	2	5

ATTACHMENTS:

TOTAL ATTACHMENTS:

DETACHMENTS:

TOTAL DETACHMENTS:

By direction

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DECLASSIFIED