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HEADQUARTERS

2d Battalion, 9th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

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3 March 1968
S&C 2/9 00125-68

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: Commanding General, Third Marine Division

Subj: Command Chronology for Period 1 Feb 1968 to 29 Feb 1968

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8

Encl: ✓(1) 2d Battalion, 9th Marines Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. Downgraded to unclassified when Sections I, II, III, IV, V, VII and VIII are removed from enclosure (1).


W. M. CRYAN

Copy to:
CO, 4th Marines
CO, 9th Marines

2ND BN/9TH MAR

CMD CHRON

FEB 1968

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 2d Battalion, 9th Marines
 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY1 February 1968 to 29 February 1968INDEX

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✓ ENCLOSURE (1)
 ✓ " (2)

- Personnel Daily/Weekly Summary
 - A/Rpt (OPN LANCASTER)

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Section I - Organizational Data

1. Designation/Location. 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, 29 February 1968, Camp Carroll.
2. Period Covered by Report. 1-29 February 1968.
3. Name/Rank of Commanding Officer and Staff including T/O Billet Assignments:

Commanding Officer	LtCol W. M. CRYAN	1-29 Feb
Executive Officer	Maj C. H. JOHNSON	1-29 Feb
S-1	1stLt R. A. GRANT 1stLt R. E. HENSEL	1-20 Feb 21-29 Feb
S-2	1stLt J. P. C. FLOYD	1-29 Feb
S-3	Maj R. M. LOSEE	1-29 Feb
S-4	Capt M. E. RICH	1-29 Feb
S-5	1stLt J. P. C. FLOYD 2dLt J. L. BURGOINE	1-27 Feb 28-29 Feb
Comm Officer	Capt J. M. HARTNETT	1-29 Feb
MT Officer	2dLt J. N. G. MITCHELL	1-29 Feb
Supply Officer	1stLt S. K. CUTHBERT	1-29 Feb
Medical Officer	Lt R. D. MCARTOR	1-29 Feb
Chaplain	LtCdr J. F. SIEBERT	1-29 Feb
H&S Company	Capt J. M. HARTNETT	1-29 Feb
Company "E"	Capt D. M. SAMS	1-29 Feb
Company "F"	Capt R. W. KNIGHT	1-29 Feb
Company "G"	Capt W. S. MACK	1-29 Feb
Company "H"	Capt R. W. ELLISON	1-29 Feb

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Section II - S-1 Chronology

1. General. During the reporting period, the officer strength has decreased and a shortage exists primarily in occupational field 03. Four officers were joined and five were lost to this organization. The enlisted strength continues to decrease, having joined 131 enlisted and dropped 160, and a shortage still exists in staff non-commissioned officers ranks, primarily in the occupational field 03. There are only 23 on the rolls and an expected loss of one during the month of March. Only 22 staff non-commissioned officers in occupational field 03 will remain in the battalion at the end of March 1968 out of a T/O of 34, if replacements are not forthcoming. The non-effectives at the end of the reporting period total five officers (one WIA) and 143 enlisted. Losses for the forthcoming month are expected to be 57 enlisted by rotation to CONUS.

a. Strength. The average monthly strength for the period ending 29 February 1968 was as follows:

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
36	1123	2	60

Note: Percentage of T/O was about 97%.

b. Losses.

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
Hostile	2	60	0	1
Non-hostile	0	3	0	0
Admin	3	97	0	1

Note: The above figures include only those personnel dropped from the rolls. For total casualties see the medical chronology.

(1) Of the battle casualties, 12 were KIA, 1 DOW, and 47 were WIA. The 47 were transferred by service record to Camp S. D. Butler. Of the non-hostile casualties, 1 was killed with a grenade by friendly forces, 2 were DAI when a CH-53A helicopter crashed.

(2) Of the administrative losses, 2 officers were transferred by service record to Camp S. D. Butler, 2 rotated to CONUS, and 1 was transferred intra-division. Thirty-five enlisted were transferred intra-division and 62 rotated to CONUS.

c. Administration.

(1) State of Morale. Excellent.

(2) Significant Activities of Personal Service. None.

(3) Promotions. Two Corporals were promoted to Sergeant meritoriously, 46 Lance Corporals were promoted to Corporal, 63 Privates First Class were promoted to Lance Corporal, and 11 Privates were promoted to Private First Class.

(4) Discipline, Law and Order. Two Special Court-martials were completed, 4 persons were awarded NJP by the battalion commander.

(5) Mail. Service has been satisfactory.

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Section III - S-2 Chronology

1. General. During the reporting period from 1 February to 29 February 1968, the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines participated in two offensive operations under OPCON of the 4th Marines and 9th Marines.

a. Operation LANCASTER II. Companies "E", "H", and "H&S" (-) spent the entire reporting period under OPCON of the 4th Marines participating in Operation LANCASTER II. Their primary mission for the month of February was to provide security for Route #9 between Camp J. J. Carroll at vic (YD 063543) and its intersection with the eastern boundary of the 4th Marines TAOR vic (YD 114581). Company "G", 2d Battalion, 4th Marines has been operating with this battalion to aid in the execution of this mission.

b. Operation KENTUCKY V. From 1 to 18 February 1968, Command Group "B", and Companies "F", "G", and "H&S" (-) were under OPCON of the 9th Marines with the mission of providing security for the Cam Lo Artillery Base vic (YD 140614) and the Cam Lo Bridge vic (YD 148604). On 18 February 1968, these elements rejoined the battalion and assumed the mission of perimeter defense at Camp J. J. Carroll.

2. Area.

a. General. The area of operation while under OPCON of the 4th Marines was generally the vicinity of Camp J. J. Carroll. This operating area is bounded on the north by the southern boundary of the DMZ, on the east generally by the 09 north-south grid line, on the south by the ridge line containing OP 250 vic (YD 068558), generally coinciding with the 56 east-west grid line as far east as Route #558, where the boundary follows a northeast direction to Route #9. The western boundary is generally the 04 north-south grid line. On 18 February 1968 when the battalion was rejoined, the Camp J. J. Carroll operating area was increased to include the area south of Camp J. J. Carroll, to be bounded on the east by the northern tributary of the Song Vinh Phung, on the west generally by a line arbitrarily drawn from Camp J. J. Carroll southwest to Nui Ba Ho vic (YD 015512). The southern boundary is comprised generally by the northern boundary of the Ba Long Valley.

Prominent terrain features in this area include Dong Ha Mountain at vic (YD 017594), which affords observation over the entire area. Also of significance is Nui Kiem (OP 250, vic (YD 068555), which provides good observation over the southern portion of the operating area. Cutting the TAOR into two segments is the Cam Lo River, running east from vic (YD 040561) to vic (YD 090595). During periods of heavy precipitation, this river will be difficult to cross and will isolate the northern portion of the AO. In both portions, most of the operating area is rugged and mountainous; a 20' to 50' canopy exists in the higher regions. On the low rolling foothills, thick brush makes movement difficult. Also worthy of note in the operating area is the Cua Valley which contains over 90% of the civilians living in the area.

The Cam Lo area of operation is bounded on the north by the 63 grid line, to the east by the 17 grid line, to the west generally by the 09 grid line, and to the south by the Cam Lo River.

The Cam Lo Valley is part of a narrow piedmont west of Route #1 consisting of undulating hills which are bisected by numerous river valleys. These waterways extend like fingers from the northern highlands through piedmont into the coastal plains. In this transitional piedmont the hills range from 30 to 70 meters in elevation and slopes are between 10 and 20 degrees.

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Sec III - S-2 Chronology
2.4. (Continued)

In the Cam Lo area, trafficability in the rice paddy area is excellent in the dry season and difficult in the wet season. Paddy dikes are from two to four feet high and usable in any season. Hamlets in the paddy-land will canalize troops, as will the large amounts of wire used by civilians near hamlets and around land holdings. There are three streams which flow from foothills in the north down into the paddy area to the Cam Lo River. These streams are fordable, but even in the summer the water is nearly waist deep. These streams are not fordable in the wet season. The stream which flows from vic (YD 127615) down into the Cam Lo River at vic (YD 134607) has three crossing areas: at the culverts on the road to Hill #46 vic (YD 187615), at a small bridge at vic (YD 127613), and at a low spot at vic (YD 107603). The stream to the east is fairly deep and has only one bridge at vic (YD 148599). The streams to the west of Hill #46 at vic (YD 187603) are wide but slow flowing and should offer no problem to foot troops. As all of these streams begin their flow from the foothills in the north, they cut deep draws that hinder movement not only by the drop but also by dense vegetation growing along side. As these streams flow south into the piedmont they also become more wandering, wider, and slower. There is one prominent road in the area of operations, the Main Supply Route, which extends from the Cam Lo Bridge north, around to the west of the Cam Lo artillery position generally superimposed on the old Route #561. The MSR becomes the prominent terrain feature in the area when it reaches the ridge at vic (YD 135623), because it has been defoliated and bulldozed 200 meters on either side. There are two other significant roads, neither of which appear on maps: the road which is cut in a similar manner to the MSR west to Hill #46, and the short bypass from the Bridge curving west to the Cam Lo artillery position. The road to Hill #46 begins on the MSR at vic (YD 134624) and follows the high ground to Hill #46 at vic (YD 107603). It crosses a stream at a depression at vic (YD 125615). The high ridge at vic (YD 134624) at the junction of these two roads is important because the terrain is defoliated along the ridge for approximately 300 meters and enemy and friendly troops will be canalized around that high ground which in fact is the skyline of observation for anyone of the Cam Lo Hill or anywhere in the immediate vicinity. There are no roads in the paddy system west of the Cam Lo Bridge, but many trails follow the dikes. East of the bridge, a secondary road in poor condition runs to Highway #1. Many of the old bridges along this road are in poor condition, but with some emergency attention the road could be passable for 6x6 trucks in 24 hours. Of the many trails in the highly populated flatland, only three major trails run further north into the foothills. These are ~~former~~ well-beaten cattle trails and they are in constant use by woodcutters and civilians.

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Terrain in the Cam Lo area of operation can be divided into two distinct segments: the rich, low farmland fed by the Cam Lo River and the hilly brush country rising generally 1500 meters north of the river. From the line of the Cam Lo River to where the rice paddies and meadowland meet the foothills the terrain is typically flat and fertile, well populated with hamlets. Visibility is excellent across the rice paddies but poor near the hamlets because of the hedgerows and bamboo which screens the houses. There is some pastureland generally where the rice paddies meet the foothills. The hilly brush country north of the river valley is characterized by gently rolling hills covered with low vegetation from 2' to 5' high. The hills are drained by small streams which are fordable and which create deep draws. Generally, the low areas and streambeds are thick while the higher ground is low scrub and grass. Visibility is good, but opportunity for camouflage and concealment is excellent.

b. Trafficability. In the area around Camp J. J. Carroll, trafficability is afforded by Route #9 and a vast network of lesser roads and numerous trails. Movement here is directly influenced by the weather. Prolonged heavy rains will swell streams hampering foot and vehicular traffic on secondary roads and occasionally on Route #9.

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c. Weather. The weather conditions for the reporting period follows the expected seasonal trend coinciding with the presence of the northeast monsoon. Typically cold and moist air hung over the area constantly. A summary of weather statistics for the reporting period is as follows:

Maximum Temperature	78 Degrees
Minimum Temperature	57 Degrees
Total Rainfall (Inches)	3.48
Number of Days with Rain	6
Visibility (Miles)	5 (Average)
Winds (Knots)	7 NNE (Average)
Humidity	86% (Average)

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3. Enemy Situation.

a. General. Of primary significance is the movement of large NVA units throughout the area. At the beginning of the reporting period, it was believed that the 48th, 52nd, and 64th Regiments of the 320 NVA Division were deployed in the northern portion of the TAOR. The division headquarters was thought to be positioned further north in the DMZ south of the Ben Hai River. The 54th Artillery Regiment of the same division was also believed to be south of the Ben Hai. These units were accompanied by remnants of the 803rd Regiment and possible elements of the 90th Regiment both of the 324B NVA Division. Fluctuations in the positions of these units were noted throughout the period. The 64th Regiment is believed to have moved south along the boundary limits of the Fourth Marines and Ninth Marines TAOR to a position that is just north of the Cam Lo River and presently has minor units engaged in probable rest and rehabilitation activities in the wooded area south of Cam Lo. The 48th Regiment moved east into the Ninth Marines TAOR to the area generally east of C-2 vic (YD 134645).

Characteristic of these NVA units are well equipped and supplied troops having a mission of interdiction of major supply routes, notably Route #9, and possible ground assaults on friendly positions in the western portion of the Ninth Marines TAOR and in the Fourth Marines TAOR, possibly Camp J. J. Carroll.

The presence of these NVA units is complemented by the development of several less regimented enemy units in the area. At the beginning of the reporting period, the 27th Independent Battalion was located in the Ninth Marines TAOR north east of the Cam Lo Artillery Base. Their movement has been noted throughout the period over to a position southwest of Cam Lo. The possibility exists that elements of the 64th Regiment mentioned previously. It is also believed that local force companies are working in the vicinity of the Cam Lo resettlement village vic (YD 1258) and also in the D-5 vic (YD 0951) area of the Gue Valley. The mission of these local force units is primarily conducting terrorist activities and assistance to transient NVA units.

b. Significant Enemy Activity. Enemy activity continued at a significant rate throughout the reporting period. Of significance was the heavy contact on 2 February between Company "E" and an estimated company (-) of heavily entrenched NVA at vic (YD 089579). This encounter resulted in eleven NVA KIA confirmed and one POW. Also of significance was the ground assault on the Cam Lo District Headquarters on 1 February requiring a reactionary force from Company "F" of this battalion to deploy as a blocking force on suspected enemy routes of escape. These major incidents were set in a background of mining incidents along Route #9, sporadic and intense incoming rocket, mortar, and artillery attacks on major friendly installations, plus several minor small arms exchanges and several successful ambushes in the Cam Lo area. A breakdown of these incidents is presented in section 6.

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4. VC/NVA Casualties and Personnel Losses.

VC/NVA KIA (C)	65
VC/NVA POW	14

5. Enemy Equipment Destroyed or Captured.

AK-47	25
AT Mines	10
AK-50	1
NVA Binoculars	1
Satchel Charges	7
Brush Knives	2
NVA Entrenching Tools	6
NVA Picks	3
1/4 Lb. Block TNT	3
Blasting Caps	2
1944 Carbine	1
Type 56 Light Machinegun	4
NVA Packs	3
NVA Gas Masks	8
ChiCom Grenades	33
82mm ChiCom Mortar Tubes	3
82mm Rds	18
82mm Fuses	31
82mm Bipods	4
82mm Base Plate	1
RPG-7	2
RPG Boosters	3
B-40 Rocket Cannisters	4
AK-47 Magazines	9
Trenches	3
Fighting Holes	103
Detainees	9
RPG-2	4
RPG-7 Rds	3
RPG-2 Rds	6
Russian Grenade	1
60mm Mortar Base Plate	1
60mm Rds	5
LAAW	2
NVA 7.62 Ammo Can	1
NVA Blanket Roll	1
NVA Flashlight	1
Documents	3
USMC Packs	2
NVA Helmets	2
NVA Ammo Pouch	7
Rice (Pounds)	751
Type 56 Ammo Drum	1
7.62mm Short Ammo	270
Type 53 Tripods	1
Type 53 Heavy Machinegun	1
AK-47 Recoil Pad	1
NVA Trousers	1
Mortar Increment Cans	12
82mm Mortar Increments	6
AK-47 Grenade Adapter	1
40mm Rds	8
French 20 lb Anti-tank Mine	1
NVA Boots	1
Bunkers	8
NVA First Aid Kit	1
Miscellaneous Medical Gear	

6. VC/NVA Initiated Incidents. During the reporting period, VC/NVA initiated a total of 100 incidents in the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines area of operation. These incidents are broken down as follows:

Mortars	50
Artillery/Rockets	24
Contacts	15
Sniping	8
Mining/Boobytraps	4

7. Sources of Intelligence. Intelligence information was gathered from the following sources: S-2, Ninth Marines, S-2 Fourth Marines, Third Force Recon Company, Company "G", Third Recon Battalion, Kit Carson Scouts, Battalion S-2 Scouts, 7th ITT, and ground forces working in the area.

8. Surveillance Devices. Ten small Starlight scopes were employed extensively during the reporting period on ambushes, LPs, and perimeter defense. The battalion is allocated thirteen such scopes, three of which are Code X; the remaining ten are in good working order. In addition to this, one NOD was employed in the OP tower at Cam Lo, another at Cam Lo Bridge, and four CIDs were utilized on the perimeter at Camp J. J. Carroll. PPSGs, NODs and PISDs were also in use at Camp J. J. Carroll.

9. Comments and Conclusions. While many of the NVA units are believed to have moved out of the immediate area, NVA strength in the vicinity of Camp J. J. Carroll remains high. Weather conditions throughout the reporting period have been advantageous to the enemy's resupply effort and his capability with both ground forces and rocket, mortar, and artillery remains high. Because of this, artillery attacks on friendly positions can be expected to continue and future enemy ground assaults cannot be put out of the realm of possibility.

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Section IV - S-3 Chronology

1. General. 2d Battalion (-), 9th Marines participated in Operation LANCASTER II under OPCON of the 4th Marines from 1 Feb 1968 to 18 Feb 1968. Bravo Command Group, Company "F", and Company "G" participated in Operation KENTUCKY under OPCON of the 9th Marines from 1 Feb to 18 Feb 1968. From 18 Feb 1968 to 29 Feb 1968 the entire 2d Battalion, 9th Marines participated in Operation LANCASTER II, OPCON to the 4th Marines.

2. Company "E". 2d Battalion, 9th Marines. From 1 Feb 1968 to 2 Feb 1968, E/2/9 was responsible for a portion of the perimeter defense of Camp J. J. Carroll providing local listening posts. From 2 Feb 1968 to 29 Feb 1968, E/2/9 occupied hill #37 vic (YD 089579) and bridges at vic (YD 098575) and (YD 103576). From 2 Feb 1968 to 29 Feb 1968, E/2/9 was responsible for security of Route #9 within its area of operation and provided close-in security by conducting squad size patrols and ambushes and providing road sweeps.

3. Company "F". 2d Battalion, 9th Marines. F/2/9 was OPCON to the 9th Marines from 1 Feb 1968 to 17 Feb 1968. Its mission was to defend the perimeter of Cam Lo artillery position (C-3). It was also responsible for improving the defensive position there in accordance with the "Dye-Marker" project and to provide close-in security by conducting squad size patrols and ambushes and providing road sweep security. The 2d platoon of G/2/9 was attached to F/2/9 as F-4/2/9 from 1 Feb 1968 to 17 Feb 1968. From 18 Feb 1968 to 29 Feb 1968, F/2/9 participated in Operation LANCASTER II under OPCON of the 4th Marines. During this period, F/2/9 was responsible for a portion of the perimeter defense of Camp J. J. Carroll providing local listening posts, ambushes, and patrols.

4. Company "G". 2d Battalion, 9th Marines. G/2/9 was OPCON to the 9th Marines from 1 Feb 1968 to 17 Feb 1968. G(-)/2/9 was responsible for the defense of the Cam Lo Bridge at vic (YD 148604). It also had the responsibility of improving the position in accordance with the "Dye-Marker" project and conducting close-in security with patrols and ambushes. G-2/2/9 was attached to F/2/9 from 1 Feb 1968 to 17 Feb 1968. From 18 Feb 1968 to 29 Feb 1968, G/2/9 participated in Operation LANCASTER II under OPCON of the 4th Marines. During this period G/2/9 was responsible for a portion of the perimeter defense of Camp J. J. Carroll providing local listening posts.

5. Company "H". 2d Battalion, 9th Marines. From 1 Feb 1968 to 29 Feb 1968, H/2/9 was responsible for "Mike's Hill" at vic (YD 074575) and the position at vic (YD 073564). From 1 Feb 1968 to 29 Feb 1968, H/2/9 was responsible for security of Route #9 within its area of operation and provided close-in security by conducting squad size patrols, ambushes, and local listening posts. H/2/9 also provided road sweeps.

6. H&S Company. 2d Battalion, 9th Marines. H&S Company was divided under two separate command groups from 1 Feb 1968 to 17 Feb 1968: one command group at Camp J. J. Carroll supporting Company "F" and Company "H" and the other at Cam Lo artillery position to support Company "F" and Company "G". From 1 Feb 1968 to 17 Feb 1968 it provided normal services in support of the battalion from these two locations. On 18 Feb 1968, F/2/9 and G/2/9 along with "Bravo" Command Group became OPCON to the 4th Marines participating in Operation LANCASTER II.

7. Close Combat. During the month of Feb 1968, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines conducted 2 company, 1 company (-), 1 platoon (+), 51 platoon, 19 platoon (-), and 137 squad patrols; 126 squad ambushes; and 548 squad or fire team listening posts and 20 combat outposts.

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Section V - S-4 Chronology

1. General. Although there has been improvement in some areas, particularly maintenance, the overall situation continued to deteriorate during this period.

a. Supply. Significant shortages are, (600) air mattresses, (650) protective masks, M-17, (600) first aid kits, (600) body armor, upper torso, and (100) compasses, M-2, and (80) watches.

b. Ordnance.

(1) Currently the following item is on 3d echelon deadline: (1) M-79 grenade launcher. The following items are on 2d echelon deadline: (1) 106mm recoilless rifle, (4) flamethrower, portable, (1) 81mm mortar and (1) 60mm mortar. The situation on 3d echelon maintenance of ordnance items has improved considerably. All repair parts required for 2d echelon deadline items have been nominated for "Red Ball". The following items are on order: (1) 12 gauge shotgun, (1) 60mm mortar, and (3) M-60 machineguns.

(2) The situation in obtaining class V has deteriorated seriously. The following items are either not available or in such limited amounts as to be insignificant: Mine, AP M18A1; signal, illumination ground; M-26 hand grenade; time fuse; M-49 trip flares, 7.62 link; 81mm illumination; M-79, 40mm grenade. The only improvement in this area is the present availability of 81mm HE (C255), however, this ammunition, as of late February is under suspension.

c. Comm/Elect.

(1) There has been an improvement in this area. 3d echelon deadline items have decreased appreciably with respect to radio set AN/PRC-25s.

(2) Currently the battalion has the following items on 3d echelon: (1) radar set AN/TPS-21, (1) battery charger, PP3240 A/U, and (3) radio sets, AN/PRC-25.

(3) The following items are on 2d echelon deadline: (2) radio set, AN/PRC-47, (5) radio set, AN/GRC-125, (2) speech security device, KY-8. All repair parts required to take the above items off deadline have been nominated for "Red Ball".

(4) The following items are on order: (1) teletype, AN/GGC-3, (1) receiving set radio, AN/URR-23, (1) teletypewriter set, AN/TGC-144, (8) radio set, AN/PRC-25 and (1) radio set (AN/MRC-109). All items on order have been "Red Balled".

d. Motor Transport.

(1) The situation in this area remained fairly stable. The lack of repair parts for the M422A1 presents difficulties in keeping these vehicles up. Replacement of this item by the M151 still has not been initiated. Presently (1) AN/MRC-87 is deadline for replacement of a gas tank.

e. Supporting Units.

(1) FBSG-B provides the bulk of the logistical support.

(2) Engineer support is provided by 11th Engineers.

(3) Truck support is provided by 4th Marines with trucks attached from 9th Motor Transport Battalion.

(4) Helicopter support is provided by MAG-16 and coordinated through 4th Marines.

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2. Camp Development.

a. Three GP tents were destroyed by incoming rockets and/or artillery fire. Two hardbacks were partially destroyed by the same means.

b. Construction of positions on the line and barbed wire obstacles was intensified during this period.

3. Operations. Companies "F" and "G" participated in Operation KENTUCKY V up until 18 February 1968. Commencing on 19 February 1968, they joined Companies "E" and "H" which were participating in Operation LANCASTER II. See S-3 Chronology for details.

4. Troop Movement. During this period (30) trucks with trailers moved 380 men in (2) lifts.

5. Logistical Lifts. During this period 88,922 pounds of supplies were moved utilizing UH-34 and UH-46 helicopters in (36) lifts. Trucks moved 125,000 pounds in (101) lifts.

6. Ammunition Expenditure for the Month of February 1968.

<u>Nomenclature</u>	<u>Expended</u>
5.56 Ball	141,820
7.62 Link	39,200
50 Cal Link	6,200
45 Cal Ball	800
40mm M-79	1,440
60mm HE	1,607
60mm Illum	1,747
60mm WP	360
M-26 Frag	1,000
LAAW	295
3.5 HE	59
3.5 WP	21
Claymores	50
(Green Star Para) Signal Illum Ground	576
(Red Star Para) Signal Illum Ground	756
(White Star Para) Signal Illum Ground	360
81mm HE	6,295
81mm WP	121
81mm Illum	270

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On 2 Feb 1968, a company (-) reaction force consisting of two platoons of Company "F", two tanks and two twin 40mm tracked vehicles was dispatched to the aid of Cam Lo District Headquarters from Cam Lo Hill. This unit swept between District Headquarters and the Cam Lo River, routing enemy soldiers attempting to break contact. Completing this sweep the unit moved east and swept an area south east of the Cam Lo Bridge making contact with a small enemy element.

During the NVA assault on Cam Lo District Headquarters, three enemy frogmen attempted to blow the Cam Lo Bridge using 250 pounds of waterproof explosives. Two of these were killed by bridge sentries. The third was captured while attempting to escape.

On 2 Feb 1968, E/2/9, while approaching Hill #37, was taken under fire by approximately two squads of NVA. E/2/9 called in air and artillery and then assaulted Hill #37 and took possession of it with 11 NVA KIA confirmed.

On 1 Feb 1968, a convoy moving to Dong Ha hit a mine at vic (YD 075573). When the convoy stopped it began receiving incoming 82mm mortars and small arms fire. One 6x6 was partially destroyed and two jeeps received minor damages. H-3/2/9, riding security on the convoy, suffered no casualties.

8. Training. Due to operational commitments and the split of the battalion, very little formal training was conducted. 131 replacement personnel received training in accordance with DivO 1510.3B.

9. Fire Support and Fire Support Coordination.

a. 2d Battalion, 9th Marines was provided direct artillery support from 1 Feb to 29 Feb 1968 in the 4th Marines area by "A" and "C" Batteries of 1st Battalion, 12th Marines. Also, "W" Battery 3d Battalion, 12th Marines provided direct artillery support. Tactical and technical fire direction was provided by H&S, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines.

2d Battalion, 9th Marines was provided direct artillery support in the 9th Marines area from 1 Feb 1968 to 17 Feb 1968 by "D", "E", and "F" Batteries of 2d Battalion, 12th Marines. Tactical and technical fire direction was provided by Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines. The 12th Marines provided general support from 1 Feb to 29 Feb 1968.

b. Employment of artillery during the period of 1 Feb to 29 Feb 1968 in the 4th Marines area consisted of 11,329 HE, 140 WP, and 179 illumination rounds fired. Employment of artillery during the period of 1 Feb to 17 Feb 1968 in the 9th Marines area consisted of 4,742 HE, 88 WP, and 38 illumination rounds fired. Fire missions consisted of targets of opportunity, counter mortar, counter artillery, counter rocket, preparation, and covering fire for convoys and road sweeps.

c. From 1 Feb to 29 Feb 1968 in the 4th Marines area, 81mm mortars provided organizational support of the battalion firing 2,129 HE, 26 WP, and 226 illumination rounds. From 1 Feb to 17 Feb 1968 in the 9th Marines area, 81mm mortars provided organizational support to the battalion firing 1,553 HE, 33 WP, and 232 illumination rounds.

d. Artillery support from all supporting batteries was considered satisfactory.

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10. Air Support:

a. Medevacs. During this month, 75 WIA and 15 KIA were evacuated by air from battalion positions in the field. Reaction time was good, although on occasion hampered by inclement weather and darkness.

b. Command and Control. 2d Battalion, 9th Marines did not make use of rotary wing air for command and control this month.

c. Resupply. 2d Battalion, 9th Marines was supported by 36 resupply flights flown on emergency and routine basis by UH-34Ds and CH-46As, delivering a total of 88,922 pounds to battalion positions at Camp J. J. Carroll and along Route #9.

d. Troop Lifts. No troop lifts were conducted in February 1968.

e. Fixed Wing. On 2 Feb 1968, a close air support mission was flown for Company "E" at vic (YD 089579) under direct control of an aerial observer with the ground assistance of the Company "E" forward air controller. The flight contributed materially to the subsequent successful action, but a positive BDA is not possible due to participation of other supporting arms. During the remainder of the month, low ceilings and visibility along with a total lack of aircraft availability in the OA precluded the use of fixed wing.

UNCLASSIFIED

Section VI - S-5 Chronology1. Civil Affairs.

a. General. Due to the inflamed tactical situation in Quang Tri Province during the month of February, there was little emphasis on civil affairs. Plans have been made for the resumption of pacification activities as soon as the situation permits.

b. Solatium. Two solatium payments were made during the month of February, one at Cam Lo vic (YD 148602) and one in Cam Thain at vic (YD 146598).

2. Psychological Warfare. There were no efforts made in psychological warfare during the month of February.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Section VII - Communications Chronology

1. General. The communications platoon furnished radio, wire, message center service, repair and maintenance support for the battalion during the month of February. The battalion CP located in Camp J. J. Carroll provided communications between battalion elements located at Cam Lo, D-5, and elements stationed at the bridge along main service road Route #9.

2. Support. The communications platoon supported 2d Battalion, 12th Marines with one (1) AN/PRC-25 and one (1) RC-292 and one (1) remote control unit AN/GRA-39 and second echelon repair. The message center supported the 4th Marine Regiment with one (1) AN/TGC-14 and supported Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines with one (1) TH-5. Also, courier service of shackles sheets was provided to battalion and CP groups. During the month, the communication center handled 600 incoming and 50 outgoing messages.

3. Wire Communications. The wire section within the battalion operated a total of six (6) SB-22s switchboards. A stack of three SB-22s for administrative phone service to all staff sections, line companies, and support of Company "H" in the field; two (2) SB-22s are used for perimeter command bunkers, and one (1) SB-22 located in COC to all Camp J. J. Carroll commands. Also, trunk lines to all other units located at Camp J. J. Carroll and three (3) hot lines from 2d Battalion, 9th Marines COC bunker to 4th Marines COC, 81s FSCC, and 4th Marines FSCC. In addition, wire section supports radio section with remote lines and 81s with gun loop lines.

4. Training. Formal instruction was given on radio procedure, use of shackles, communications security, and preventative maintenance to all communications section personnel. Comm center and electronic repair personnel were crosstrained on the SB-22 wire switchboard.

5. Difficulties. A critical shortage of repair parts and accessories for the AN/PRC-25 radio continues.

UNCLASSIFIED

Section VIII - Medical Chronology

1. General. During the month of February 1968, the battalion maintained aid stations at Cam Lo and Camp J. J. Carroll where 74 and 263 Marine Corps personnel were treated respectively. MEDCAP was limited to treatment of 161 Montagnards due to the military situation.

2. Sanitation. Routine sanitation inspections of the battalion area were made on a weekly basis. Spraying of the heads and the mess hall on a weekly basis along with the cold weather has contained the fly problem.

3. Disease, Injuries, and Treatment in General. The BAS continues to maintain a ten bed ward for minor injuries. This ward enables the BAS to render more efficient treatment. Personnel requiring more extensive treatment are referred to the 3d Medical Battalion for evaluation, treatment, and for further evacuation. Most of the patients treated at the BAS during the month of February were of a routine basis. One serious rabies incident occurred when twenty-three men who had significant exposure to a rabid pet puppy required rabies inoculation. Numerous sprained shoulders, ankles, knees, and backs resulted from seeking rapid cover from incoming enemy ordnance. These, along with the battle casualties accounted for the majority of non-effectives during the month. Although diarrhea has been a problem for Company "E", it has not decreased the effectiveness of the members of that company. There is no evidence of this being secondary to parasites.

4. Casualties and Hospitalization. Eleven personnel from the battalion were hospitalized at the BAS during the month of February. There were 12 KIAs, 1 DOW, 1 death from encephalitis, 1 accidental death, and 86 WIAs. Outpatient treatment consisted of 44 shrapnel wounds, 76 miscellaneous sprains, 34 colds, 24 diarrhea, 1 FUO, 24 cellulitis, and 3 anxiety reactions.

5. Training. Orientation lectures were given to newly joined personnel. The subject matter included personal hygiene, self aid and buddy aid, venereal disease, care and protection of the feet, cellulitis, and the snake problem in Vietnam.

6. Complement of BAS. At the close of the month, the BAS had a complement of 1 medical officer and 60 hospital corpsmen. Five new personnel were joined during the month. There were 8 non-effectives during this period. There are 3 SNCOs attached to the BAS at this time.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Section IX - Chaplain's Chronology

During the month of February, Roman Catholic and Protestant services were held at Camp J. J. Carroll and Cam Lo for the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines by the battalion chaplain and supporting chaplains from 1st Battalion, 12th Marines and the 9th Marine Regiment. General prayer for all hands was held for Companies "E" and "H" out in the field near Camp J. J. Carroll along Route #9. The chaplain's orientation lecture on religion and customs of Vietnam was also given to newly arrived Marines.

HEADQUARTERS
2d Battalion, 9th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

1/HES/hdn
1080

1Feb68

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF (Attn: SC-1)
Subj: Personnel *Daily* ~~Weekly~~ Summary

1. The below information is correct for the period ending 2400, 31Jan68

	ON HAND STRENGTH				NON-EFFECTIVES			
	USMC		USN		USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
R&S	16	291	2	59	0	15	2	5
E	6	215	0	0	1	25	0	0
F	5	211	0	0	0	13	0	0
G	6	210	0	0	0	24	0	0
H	6	221	0	0	0	42	0	0
TOTAL	39	1148	2	59	1	119	2	5

ATTACHMENTS:

TOTAL ATTACHMENTS:

DETACHMENTS:

TOTAL DETACHMENTS:

By direction

FMF INSTRUCTIONS

HEADQUARTERS
2d Battalion, 9th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FME
APO San Francisco 96602

1/HES/ndn
1080

8 Feb 1968

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FME (Attn: SC-1)
Subj: Personnel ^{Daily} Weekly Summary

1. The below information is correct for the period ending 2400, 7 Feb 1968

	ON HAND STRENGTH				NON-EFFECTIVES			
	USMC		USN		USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
H&S	17	291	2	59	0	19	1	5
E	6	232	0	0	2	61	0	0
F	4	201	0	0	0	26	0	0
G	6	196	0	0	0	26	0	0
H	6	216	0	0	3	42	0	0
TOTAL	29	1136	2	59	5	174	1	5

ATTACHMENTS:

TOTAL ATTACHMENTS:

DETACHMENTS:

TOTAL DETACHMENTS:

By direction

HEADQUARTERS
2d Battalion, 9th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

/LMB/han
1680

15 Feb 1968

From: Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF (Attn: SC-1)

Subj: Personnel Daily Summary

Ref: (a) DivO 1080.3A
(b) RegO 1080.3A

1. The below information is correct for period ending 240014 Feb 1968

	TOTAL ASSIGNED STRENGTH				NON-EFFECTIVES			
	USMC		USN		USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
H&S	17	291	2	61	1	11	0	4
E	4	217	0	0	0	57	0	0
F	4	210	0	0	0	28	0	0
G	6	210	0	0	0	26	0	0
H	5	211	0	0	1	38	0	0
TOTAL	36	1139	2	61	2	160	0	4

ATTACHMENTS:

TOTAL ATTACHMENTS:

DETACHMENTS:

TOTAL DETACHMENTS:

By direction

HEADQUARTERS
 2d Battalion, 9th Marines
 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMP
 FPO San Francisco 96602

1/LMB/hdn
 1080

22 Feb 1968

From: Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines
 To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMP (Attn: SC-1)
 Subj: Personnel Daily Summary
 Ref: (a) DivO 1080.3A
 (b) RegtO 1080.3A

1. The below information is correct for the period ending 2400, 21 Feb 1968

	TOTAL ASSIGNED STRENGTH				NON-EFFECTIVES			
	USMC		USN		USMC		USN	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
H&S	17	290	2	60	0	14	0	4
E	4	218	0	0	0	65	0	0
F	4	209	0	0	0	31	0	0
G	6	208	0	0	0	36	0	0
H	5	207	0	0	1	44	0	0
TOTAL	36	1132	2	60	1	190	0	4

ATTACHMENTS:

TOTAL ATTACHMENTS:

DETACHMENTS:

TOTAL DETACHMENTS:

By direction

HEADQUARTERS
 2d Battalion, 9th Marines
 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 FPO San Francisco 96602

1/IMB/hdn
 1080

29 Feb 1968

From: Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines
 To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF (Attn: SC-1)

Subj: Personnel Daily Summary

Ref: (a) DivO 1080.3A
 (b) RegO 1080.3A

1. The below information is correct for the period ending 2400, 28 Feb 68

	TOTAL ASSIGNED STRENGTH				NON-EFFECTIVES			
	USMC		USN		USMC		USN	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
H&S	18	296	2	60	2	22	0	3
E	3	214	0	0	0	54	0	0
F	4	201	0	0	0	26	0	0
G	6	202	0	0	0	36	0	0
H	5	208	0	0	1	45	0	0
TOTAL	36	1121	2	60	3	183	0	3

ATTACHMENTS:

TOTAL ATTACHMENTS:

DETACHMENTS:

TOTAL DETACHMENTS:

By direction

HEADQUARTERS

2d Battalion, 9th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMT
FPO San Francisco 96602

1/IMB/hdn
1080

1 Mar 1968

From: Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMT (Attn: SC-1)

Subj: Personnel Daily Summary

Ref: (a) DivO 1080.3A
(b) RegtO 1080.3A

1. The below information is correct for the period ending 2400, 29 Feb 1968.

	TOTAL ASSIGNED STRENGTH				NON-EFFECTIVES			
	USMC		USN		USMC		USN	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
H&S	18	297	2	60	3	22	0	5
E	4	214	0	0	1	60	0	0
F	4	195	0	0	0	20	0	0
G	6	201	0	0	0	32	0	0
H	5	207	0	0	2	36	0	0
TOTAL	37	1114	2	60	6	170	0	5

ATTACHMENTS:

TOTAL ATTACHMENTS:

DETACHMENTS:

TOTAL DETACHMENTS:

By direction

SECRET

S & C FILES
30 MARINES

HEADQUARTERS

00111-68 2d Battalion, 9th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

only 30 of 13

3:RML:mmf
3480
10 Feb 1968
S&C 2/9 00108-68

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding Officer, 3d Marine Regiment
 Subj: Operation LANCASTER After Action Report
 Ref: (a) 3d Marines FragO #1 (Opn LANCASTER)

1. Code Name. Operation LANCASTER

2. Dates of Operation. 2d Battalion, 9th Marines participated in Operation LANCASTER under OPCON of the 3d Marine Regiment from 010001H Nov to 100600H Nov 1967, from 121430H Nov to 270800H Nov 1967 and from 241515H Dec to 291315H Dec 1967. From 291315H Dec 1967 to 201525H Jan 1968, 2d Battalion (-), 9th Marines was OPCON to 3d Marines on Operation LANCASTER. From 201525H Jan to 202400H Jan 1968, 2d Battalion (-), 9th Marines was OPCON to 4th Marines on Operation LANCASTER.

3. Location. Cam Lo and Gio Linh Districts, Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam.

4. Task Organization.

2d Battalion, 9th Marines

Company "E"

Company "F"

1 Nov - 10 Nov, 12 Nov - 27 Nov 1967, and 24 Dec - 29 Dec 1967

Company "G"

1 Nov - 10 Nov 1967, 12 Nov - 27 Nov 1967, and 24 Dec - 29 Dec 1967

Company "H"

H&S Company

Det, "C" Co, 3d Engr Bn

4 Nov - 10 Nov 1967

HST, 3d Shore Party Bn

4 Nov - 10 Nov 1967

CAP-5

1 Nov - 3 Nov 1967, 13 Nov - 26 Nov 1967, and 28 Dec 1967 - 20 Jan 1968

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5. Supporting Forces.

a. Artillery and Armor.

(1) From 1 Nov to 4 Nov 1967, 1st Bn, 12th Marines was in direct support of the battalion.

(2) From 4 Nov to 10 Nov 1967, Battery "I", 1st Bn, 12th Marines was in direct support and the 12th Marines were in general support.

(3) From 12 Nov to 27 Nov 1967, and from 24 Dec to 31 Dec 1967, 1st Bn, 12th Marines was in direct support and the 12th Marines were in general support.

(4) Tactical and technical fire direction was provided by Headquarters, 2d Bn, 12th Marines.

ENCLOSURE (2)

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(5) Rounds expended in support of 2d Bn, 9th Marines on Operation LANCASTER on targets of opportunity, counter-mortar fires and H&Is totaled 8,638 HE rounds (81mm), 346 WP (81mm), 4 illum (81mm), 3,953 HE (artillery), 336 WP (artillery) and 265 illum (artillery).

(6) Artillery support during Operation LANCASTER was satisfactory.

b. Air Support.

(1) Medevac. Medevac helicopters evacuated ten Marines during Operation LANCASTER. There were three emergency, five priority, and two routine medevacs.

(2) Command and Control. Key battalion personnel flew seven visual reconnaissance missions in the operation area.

(3) Resupply. UH-34 helicopters flew 33 missions carrying 39,915 pounds of cargo in support of the battalion. There were several emergency resupply missions flown to replace consumed ammunition and food.

(4) Troop Lifts. No troops were carried by helicopters. Fifty-four and fifty-eight troops were helo-lifted on two different occasions (Sparrow Hawk). In the first instance (54 Marines), two CH-46s were used. In the second, there were two UH-34s and four CH-46s.

(5) Fixed Wing. During the operation there was one ground controlled air strike, one AO controlled air strike, and one smoke screen mission flown in support of the battalion.

6. Intelligence.

a. General Description of the Area. The area surrounding Camp J. J. Carroll comprised the operating area of Second Battalion, Ninth Marines for Operation LANCASTER. This area is bounded on the north by the southern boundary of the DMZ, on the east generally by the 09 north-south grid line, and on the west generally by the 00 north-south grid line as far south as Nui Ba Ho vic (YD 014510) where the boundary cuts east and south to the Dong Ngan area vic (YD 096449). The area generally south of Ba Long vic (YD 150400) serves as the southern boundary of the operating area. Terrain throughout this area is rugged, being comprised of mountains in the northern portion and heavily vegetated rolling hills in the southern portion.

b. Terrain Features. Prominent terrain features in the area include Dong Ha Mountain vic (YD 017594) which affords observation over the entire operating area. Cutting the TAOR into a northern and southern portion is the Cam Lo River, running east from vic (YD 000561) to vic (YD 090595). Also prominent is the Cua Valley, primarily an agricultural region, which contains over 90% of the civilians in the area.

c. Trafficability. Trafficability throughout the operating area is afforded by Route #9 and a network of lesser roads and well used trails. Inclement weather will greatly limit any vehicular traffic, even on Route #9. Movement on foot throughout the area will also be hampered due to swollen streams and flooded area.

d. Avenues of Approach. Route #9 is the predominant friendly avenue of approach into the area. It is supplemented by Route #558 and another secondary road running south from Camp J. J. Carroll both of which offer limited vehicular access to the Delta-5 area vic (YD 093514). Friendly vehicular avenues of approach are limited to the southern portion of the operating area as no predominant route exists that bridges the Cam Lo River affording access to the northern portion of the operating area.

Enemy avenues of approach are comprised of a network of well used trails running south from the southern boundary of the DMZ. Movement here is hampered by the rugged mountainous aspect of the terrain. In the southern portion of the TAOR access is afforded by a network of trails leading into the Cua Valley from all directions.

e. Stream Forcing Points. With the exception of the extreme northern and southern boundaries of the operating area, the entire area falls into the Cam Lo River water shed. The numerous streams that flow into this river can be forded on foot at almost all points. Noteworthy is the fact that these streams for the most part have steep and high banks preventing the crossing of vehicles of any type. The portion of the Cam Lo River flowing through the operating area averages from 20' to 50' in width and from 2' to 5' in depth; a swift current will be encountered for most of its length. Forcing by foot will be hazardous in all areas and impossible in others. Vehicular crossings are all but impossible. It should be noted that in prolonged periods of inclement weather forcing of even the tributary streams will be hampered.

f. Vegetation. With the exception of the agricultural regions of the Cua Valley, heavy vegetation will be encountered throughout the operating area. In the mountainous areas, a 20' to 50' canopy type vegetation with accompanying dense undergrowth will be encountered. The rolling hills south of the Cam Lo River are covered with low but dense vegetation making movement difficult.

g. Road and Trail Conditions. Route #9 is the only road of sufficient size in the operating area to afford heavy and varied vehicular traffic. Its width approaches a double lane the entire distance through the operating area. For the most part, routes leading into the Cua Valley are narrow affording a single lane of traffic at best. Due to flooded portions of these routes, traffic is limited to tracked vehicles. Trails encountered in and leading into the Cua Valley average 3' to 4' in width and are generally in good condition due to heavy use by civilians in the area. Elsewhere in the operating area narrower and less used trails will be encountered.

h. HLZs. Helicopter landing zones are numerous in the southern portion of the operating area and generally available in the northern portion. In the northern portion, "Arc Light" bombing has aided in clearing vegetation increasing the number of LZs. This was particularly noted in the area around Nui Ho Kho vic (YD 103642).

i. Enemy Situation. Enemy units operating in the Third Marines TAOR during Operation LANCASTER were primarily small local force units. There was evidence of NVA units in the northern portion of the operating area just south of the DMZ. Elements of the 803rd, 812th, and 90th Regiments of the 324B NVA Division moved in and out of the operating area maintaining forward positions in either the Third or Ninth Marines operating areas. There was also evidence of elements of the 27 Independent Battalion operating along Route #9 and in the Delta-5 area. Local force units include a suspected local force company in and around the Delta-5 area vic (YD 1052) and a local force company in the Cam Lo area vic (YD 1358).

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Characteristic of the NVA units in the operating area are well armed and supplied troops with a mission of general support for units working farther east in the Ninth Marines TAOR. Also worthy of note is the infiltration efforts by small NVA units into the Ba Long Valley utilizing routes through the Cua Valley. The mission of the local for units include terrorist activities, mining, and aid to transient NVA units.

j. Enemy Fortifications. Enemy bunker and fighting hole complexes were encountered throughout the area. Characteristic of the former were well constructed bunkers having average dimensions of 4'x6'x4' deep, covered by an average two feet of dirt reinforced with logs, good camouflage, and located on commanding terrain. For the most part these bunkers were of the living type but adjoining trenches and adjacent fighting holes were noted in the larger complexes. The most significant of these complexes was discovered in the early part of the operation in the vicinity of YD 104641.

k. Cumulative Enemy Losses.

VC/NVA KIA (C)	1
Detainees	2
Bunkers (Destroyed)	71
Fighting Holes (Destroyed)	53
AK-47	2
AK-47 Magazines	9
ChiCom 60mm Mortar Rds	33
ChiCom 82mm Mortar Rds	1
ChiCom Grenades	5
M-26 Grenades	4
ChiCom Claymore Type Mine	1
RPG Cannister	4
ChiCom Bayonets	1
ChiCom 60mm Base Plate	1
AK-47 Rds	45
NVA Entrenching Tools	3
NVA Helmets	3
NVA Canteens	2
NVA Machetes	1
Gas Masks (US Old Type)	1
PRC-25 Handset	1
Medicine Bottles	3
US M-1 Carbines	2
US M-1 Carbine Magazines	2
US 60mm Mortar Rds	1
Type 50 SMG Magazines	2
Booby Traps	6

1. Psychological/Civic Affairs Operations.

(1) General. Concern was directed primarily to the twin villages of Cam Chinh and Cam Nghia (pop approx 4,000 in vic (YD 097525) which contain the resettled civilians in the operating area of this battalion. Approximately one quarter of these people are children. Security is provided by one Combined Action Platoon, CAP-5 vic (YD 097523), and a reaction force of Marines at Delta-5 vic (YD 094514). Education and health facilities are unsatisfactory. Water and food supply is excellent. Rice and other agricultural foodstuffs are abundant in the fertile valley surrounding the village. VC activity in and around the village is high, with an unknown portion of the population actual sympathizers.

(2) Construction Projects. Work was begun and continues to progress on the rebuilding of a school house for all the children in the area vic (YD 093518). Timbers have been cut and trimmed by hand

and cement has been made available for masonry work. A gift of ten (10) masonry kits and ten (10) carpentry kits has been made for this purpose. Tin for the roof has also been promised, to follow sufficient progress on the frame. Interest and dedication to this project on the part of the villagers is considered good and progress satisfactory. Supplies for the school are available in abundance and will be provided at its completion. Other projects include the rebuilding of the village market-place and improvement of the village midwifery, possibly into a local dispensary.

(3) MEDCAP. MEDCAPs are run in the village every Thursday, and the Marine Corpsman at CAP-5 sees from sixty (60) to seventy (70) persons every morning. General health of the civilians is considered excellent. A village corpsman attends all MEDCAPs and is being trained to cope with simple ills. Plans for vaccination of the villagers, at least children, are now being considered. Leaflets for a Health Leaflet Handout have been ordered and will be scheduled for a MEDCAP.

(4) Solatium. Solatium payment of 1,000 piasters was made for the accidental destruction of three (3) cows.

(5) A rice thresher was obtained from S-5, 3d Marines and loaned to the civilians of Cam Chinh and Cam Nghia to expedite their rice harvest.

m. Miscellaneous Remarks.

(1) Weather. Weather for the reporting period (1 Nov - 10 Nov 12 Nov - 27 Nov, 24 Dec - 20 Jan) followed the expected trend coinciding with the presence of northeast monsoon. A summary of weather conditions is as follows:

Maximum Temperature	92 Degrees
Minimum Temperature	47 Degrees
Number of Days with Rain	42
Total Rainfall (Inches)	52.76 (1 Nov 1967 to 20 Jan 1968)
Average Winds	5 Knots, NNE
Visibility (Average)	5 Miles
Humidity (Average)	87 Percent

(2) VC/NVA Initiated Incidents. Nine incidents were initiated by the enemy against this unit for the reporting period. They break down as follows:

Sniping, Small Arms	4
Boobytraps, Mining	3
Rocket, Mortar, Artillery	2

(3) Intelligence Information. Intelligence information during the operation was obtained through the following sources: S-2, Third Marines, Third Force Recon Company, Company "G", Third Recon Battalion, Kit Carson Scouts and ground forces working in the area.

(4) Special Equipment. Special equipment used during the operation included ten (10) small starlight scopes which proved a great asset on LPs, ambushes, and perimeter defense. Four CIDs were also utilized for perimeter defense at Camp J. J. Carroll.

7. Mission. 2d Battalion, 9th Marines was OPCON to 3d Marine Regiment on Operation LANCASTER during the periods indicated. During the periods 1-4 Nov 1967 and 13-27 Nov 1967, the battalion's mission was to provide units to defend portions of the Camp J. J. Carroll perimeter, man three perimeter outposts, occupy and defend the Khe Ghia Bridge

vic (YD 026561) and D-5 vic (YD 095514), provide a Sparrow Hawk Reaction Force, provide a reinforced squad daily for road mine sweeps from Camp J. J. Carroll to Highway #9 and D-5, on order provide convoy security and conduct patrols and ambushes in the 3d Marine AO. From 4-10 Nov 1967, the mission of the battalion was to conduct a search and destroy operation in accordance with 3d Marine FragO #1 (Opn LANCASTER) in an area between the Cam Lo River and Con Thien in the 3d Marines AO. From 121430H Nov to 270800H Nov 1967, the battalion's mission was to provide units to defend portions of the Camp J. J. Carroll perimeter, man three perimeter outposts, occupy and defend the Khe Ghia Bridge and D-5, provide a daily road sweep security, provide convoy security on order and conduct patrols and ambushes in the 3d Marines AO. From the 24th of Dec 1967 through 20 Jan 1968, the battalion's mission was again to provide units to defend portions of the Camp J. J. Carroll perimeter, man three perimeter outposts, occupy and defend the Khe Ghia Bridge and D-5, provide a daily road sweep security, provide convoy security on order, and conduct patrols and ambushes in the 3d Marines AO.

8. Concept of Operation. From 1-4 Nov 1967, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines performed defensive duties in the vicinity of Camp J. J. Carroll, Khe Ghia Bridge and D-5, and conducted ambushes and patrols. On 4 and 5 Nov 1967, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines moved to vic (YD 125615) and thence to an assembly area at vic (YD 094597) in accordance with 3d Marines FragO #1 (Opn LANCASTER). From 5-9 Nov 1967, the battalion conducted a search and destroy operation to the north through Nui Ho Khe vic (YD 103642) to the YD 1067 grid square where it was transferred to OPCON of 9th Marines on 10 Nov 1967. On 12 Nov 1967, OPCON of 2d Battalion, 9th Marines was returned to 3d Marines and the battalion returned to Camp J. J. Carroll. From 13 Nov to 27 Nov 1967, the battalion performed its defensive mission in the Camp J. J. Carroll, Khe Ghia Bridge, and D-5 areas, conducting continuous patrolling during this period. On 27 Nov 1967, OPCON of 2d Battalion, 9th Marines was given to 9th Marines, and on 24 Dec 1967, OPCON of the battalion was returned to the 3d Marines and the battalion assumed its defensive mission at Camp J. J. Carroll on 25 Dec 1967. On 28 Dec 1967 the battalion assumed its defensive mission at the Khe Ghia Bridge and at D-5, with these duties until 20 Jan 1968. On 29 Dec 1967, Co "G", Co "F" and the "B" Command Group were CHOPCON to the 9th Marines and remained such for the duration of Operation LANCASTER.

9. Execution.

a. 1 November 1967.

(1) Disposition of Forces. 2d Battalion, 9th Marines was located at Camp J. J. Carroll at the commencement of Op LANCASTER.

E/2/9 - Manned sector of Camp J. J. Carroll perimeter and conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

F/2/9 - Conducted one plt patrol and two sqd ambushes.

G/2/9 - Manned sector of Camp J. J. Carroll perimeter, provided mine sweep security and Sparrow Hawk Reaction Force and conducted one plt patrol and one plt ambush.

H/2/9 - Occupied Khe Ghia Bridge with one plt and D-5 with a company(-), provided one sqd patrol and two sqd ambushes.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.

b. 2 November 1967.

(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

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F/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and two sqd ambushes.

G/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one plt patrol and one plt ambush.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted two sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events.

020015H - F/2/9 sqd moving into ambush site vic (YD 06850) received small arms fire. Returned fire, negative assessment. Results were one Fr WIA.

021431H - F/2/9 while on live fire problem suffered (1) Fr KIA NBC.

c. 3 November 1967.

(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

F/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol.

G/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one plt patrol and one plt ambush.

H/2/9 - Was relieved at Khe Ghia Bridge and D-5 and returned to Camp J. J. Carroll.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.

d. 4 November 1967.

(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission.

F/2/9 - Moved to vic (YD 137616) in accordance with 3d Marines FragO #1 (Opn LANCASTER).

G/2/9 - Moved to vic (YD 137616) in accordance with 3d Marines FragO #1 (Opn LANCASTER).

H/2/9 - Manned sector of Camp J. J. Carroll defensive perimeter.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.

(2)

e. 5 November 1967.(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Moved to vic (YD 092598) in accordance with 3d Marines FragO #1 (Opn LANCASTER). Conducted one sqd ambush.

F/2/9 - Moved to vic (YD 092598). Conducted one sqd ambush.

~~G/2/9 - Moved to vic (YD 092598). Conducted one sqd ambush.~~

H/2/9 - Moved to vic (YD 092598) in accordance with 3d Marines FragO #1 (Opn LANCASTER). Conducted one sqd ambush.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.f. 6 November 1967.(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Moved to vic (YD 079621). Conducted one sqd ambush.

F/2/9 - Moved to vic (YD 079621). Conducted one sqd ambush.

G/2/9 - Moved to vic (YD 082619). Conducted one sqd ambush.

H/2/9 - Moved to vic (YD 082619). Conducted one sqd ambush.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events.

060704H - G/2/9 point man tripped booby-trapped 60mm mortar round at vic (YD 096602). Results were two Fr WIA.

060800H - G/2/9 discovered 60mm mortar round rigged as a booby-trap at vic (YD 090604). Round was blown in place.

060900H - F/2/9 discovered two M-26 grenade booby-traps at vic (YD 102603). Booby-traps were blown in place.

061000H - G/2/9 found four fighting holes at vic (YD 092612).

061700H - H/2/9 discovered two old and badly burned AK-47s, one bayonet and scabbard and six AK-47 magazines.

g. 7 November 1967.(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Moved to vic (YD 085645). Conducted one plt patrol

F/2/9 - Moved to vic (YD 087640).

G/2/9 - Moved to vic (YD 085645).

H/2/9 - Moved to vic (YD 087640).

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events.

071000H - E/2/9 discovered 11 bunkers, one NVA corpse and one AK-47 magazine at vic (YD 079623).

071145H - E/2/9 found six fighting holes at vic (YD 083627)

071330H - H/2/9 found nine bunkers, 11 fighting holes and one hut at vic (YD 085626).

h. 8 November 1967.(1) Disposition of Forces.

F/2/9 - Moved to vic (YD 105643). Conducted one sqd ambush.

G/2/9 - Moved to vic (YD 105643). Conducted one sqd ambush.

H/2/9 - Moved to vic (YD 105643). Conducted one sqd ambush.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events.

081145H - G/2/9 found six fighting holes estimated to be three to six months old at vic (YD 105643).

081745H - F/2/9 discovered six 4-man bunkers, 30 fighting holes, one ChiCom claymore mine, four M-26 grenades, 9 ChiCom grenades, 31 ChiCom 60mm mortar rounds and 4 RPG canisters at vic (YD 105643). All gear was destroyed.

081750H - H/2/9 discovered four fighting holes, 45 AK-47 rounds and three ChiCom grenades at vic (YD 104641).

i. 9 November 1967.(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Moved to vic (YD 098675). Conducted one sqd ambush.

F/2/9 - Moved to vic (YD 098675). Conducted one sqd ambush.

G/2/9 - Moved to vic (YD 098675). Conducted one sqd ambush.

H/2/9 - Moved to vic (YD 098675). Conducted one sqd ambush.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events.

090830H - G/2/9 discovered five old bunkers at vic (YD 093650).

091415H - H/2/9 discovered three bunkers and ten fighting holes containing 3 helmets, one 60mm mortar base plate, 3 entrenching tools, and one AK-47 magazine at vic (YD 089653).

091636H - E/2/9 found three old bunkers at vic (YD 096673).

j. 10 November 1967.

(1) Disposition of Forces. 2d Battalion, 9th Marines was made OPCON to 9th Marines at 0600H Nov 1967.

k. 12 November 1967.

(1) Disposition of Forces. 2d Battalion, 9th Marines returned OPCON to 3d Marines at 1430H Nov 1967.

E/2/9 - Moved to Camp J. J. Carroll. Conducted three sqd ambushes.

F/2/9 - Moved to Camp J. J. Carroll. Conducted one sqd ambush.

G/2/9 - Moved to Camp J. J. Carroll. Conducted one sqd ambush.

H/2/9 - Moved to Camp J. J. Carroll. Conducted one sqd ambush.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.

1. 13 November 1967.(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Remained at Camp J. J. Carroll, provided reaction force in accordance with 3d Marines FragO #2 (Opn LANCASTER).

F/2/9 - Assumed defense of Khe Ghia Bridge with one plt and D-5 with a company (-). Conducted four sqd patrols and three sqd ambushes.

G/2/9 - Assumed sector of Camp J. J. Carroll defensive perimeter. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

H/2/9 - Assumed sector of Camp J. J. Carroll defensive perimeter, daily mine sweep security and Sparrow Hawk Reaction Force.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.m. 14 November 1967.(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission.

F/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted four sqd patrols and three sqd ambushes.

G/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.n. 15 November 1967.(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission.

F/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted four sqd patrols and three sqd ambushes.

G/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events.

150930H - F/2/9 patrol detonated ChiCom grenade booby-trap at vic (YD 077512). Results were 3 Fr WIA.

o. 16 November 1967.(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission.

F/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted four sqd patrols and three sqd ambushes.

G/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.p. 17 November 1967.(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission.

F/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted four sqd patrols and three sqd ambushes.

G/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.q. 18 November 1967.(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one plt patrol and one plt ambush.

F/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted four sqd patrols and three sqd ambushes.

G/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted seven sqd patrols and one sqd ambush.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted seven sqd patrols and one sqd ambush.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.

r. 19 November 1967.

(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol.

F/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted four sqd patrols.

G/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted seven sqd patrols and one sqd ambush.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.

s. 20 November 1967.

(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted two sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

F/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted three sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

G/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events.

202230H - F/2/9 plt at vic (YD 028563) observed what appeared to be a SAM launched on 60 degree azimuth, distance unknown.

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t. 21 November 1967.(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

F/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted three sqd patrols and three sqd ambushes.

G/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Provided one reinforced plt to F/2/9 as reaction force at D-5.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events.

211146H - F/2/9 received report from ARVN at D-5 that VC plt would meet at vic (YD 120540) at approx 211300H Nov. H/2/9 plt dispatched to F/2/9 by tracked vehicles; F/2/9 elements swept through area accompanied by RFs. Negative results.

211250H - F/2/9 patrol at vic (YD 078490) received six to eight M-79 rds or rifle grenades. Believed to be from friendly elements in the area.

u. 22 November 1967.(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission.

F/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted three sqd patrols and three sqd ambushes.

G/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.v. 23 November 1967.(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission.

F/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted three sqd patrols and three sqd ambushes.

G/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.

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w. 24 November 1967.

(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission.

F/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted two sqd ambushes.

G/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Assumed H/2/9 sector of Camp J. J. Carroll perimeter, daily mine sweep security, and Sparrow Hawk Reaction Force. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

H/2/9 - Conducted four sqd patrols and three ambushes.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.

x. 25 November 1967.

(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission.

F/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted three sqd patrols and three sqd ambushes.

G/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

H/2/9 - Resumed responsibility for manning a portion of the Camp J. J. Carroll perimeter and providing daily mine sweep security.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events.

250830H - F/2/9 patrol at vic (YD 121512) tripped ChiCom booby-trap. Results were four Fr WIA.

y. 26 November 1967.

(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission.

F/2/9 - Relieved of defensive mission at the Khe Ghia Bridge and D-5 and returned to Camp J. J. Carroll.

G/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.

z. 27 November 1967.

(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - CHOPCON to 9th Marines at 270800H Nov 1967.

F/2/9 - CHOPCON to 9th Marines at 270800H Nov 1967.

G/2/9 - CHOPCON to 9th Marines at 270800H Nov 1967. Continued assigned mission at Camp J. J. Carroll.

H/2/9 - CHOPCON to 9th Marines at 270800H Nov 1967.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.

aa. 24 December 1967.

(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Returned OPCON 3d Marines.

F/2/9 - Returned to Camp J. J. Carroll and continued assigned mission.

G/2/9 - Returned to Camp J. J. Carroll and continued assigned mission.

H/2/9 - Returned to Camp J. J. Carroll and continued assigned mission.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.

bb. 25 December 1967.

(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission.

F/2/9 - Continued assigned mission.

G/2/9 - Continued assigned mission.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events.

251100H - Assumed defense of Bravo and Delta sectors of 3d Marines lines.

cc. 26 December 1967.

(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission.

F/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

G/2/9 - Continued assigned mission.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted two sqd patrols and one sqd ambush.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.

dd. 27 December 1967.

(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission.

F/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

G/2/9 - Continued assigned mission.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted two sqd patrols and one sqd ambush.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.

ee. 28 December 1967.

(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Conducted one sqd patrol. At 281700H, Co "E" (-) moved to vic (YD 094574) and assumed defense of D-5. At 281700H, Co "E" (-) moved to vic (YD 025561) and assumed defense of the Khe Ghia Bridge.

F/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

G/2/9 - Continued assigned mission.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted two sqd patrols and one sqd ambush.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events.

282250H - H/2/9 reported a six round burst of automatic weapons fire in front of bunker #19. Investigation did not reveal the source.

ff. 29 December 1967.(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted two sqd patrols and three sqd ambushes.

F/2/9 - Transferred OPCON to 9th Marines at 291315H.

G/2/9 - Transferred OPCON to 9th Marines at 291315H.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted three sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes. 2/9 Command Group "B" transferred OPCON to 9th Marines.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.gg. 30 December 1967.(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted three sqd patrols and one sqd ambush.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.hh. 31 December 1967.(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted two sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted three sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.ii. 1 January 1968.(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted two sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted three sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.

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jj. 2 January 1968.(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one plt patrol and one sqd patrol and two sqd ambushes.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted three sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.kk. 3 January 1968.(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and two sqd ambushes.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted three sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events.

031003H - E/2/9 at vic (YD 069533). Patrol found one reinforced bunker approx two months old. Blown in place.

ll. 4 January 1968.(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted two sqd patrols and one sqd ambush.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted two sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

P5A - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events.

041045H - E/2/9 at vic (YD 098514). A twelve year old boy cut his foot on some glass in dump at D-5 when RF at D-5 tried to chase him from dump. Tendon damage suspected so boy and father sent to Dong Ha. Medevac completed at 041125H.

041300H - CAP-5 at vic (YD 105527). Patrol found 105mm round at above grid. Blown in place.

041600H - 2/9 reaction plt alerted and lifted out at 041650H. Returned at 041810H.

mm. 5 January 1968.

(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and two sqd ambushes.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted three sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

P5A - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.

nn. 6 January 1968.

(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted two sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one plt patrol, one sqd patrol and two sqd ambushes.

P5A - Continued assigned mission.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events.

060830H - H-1/2/9 at vic (YD 030563) met RF sqd at given grid where they found the remains of a CH-34. Transmissions and rotor blade were about 200 meters from engines and fuselage. Because of extremely heavy vegetation it would have been unlikely for pieces to spread that far after the chopper hit the deck. Holes believed to be .30 caliber found in transmission mounts, tail rotor shaft and main rotor shafts only slightly damaged and could be used again. Parts of body armor found but no evidence of bodies.

061700H - E-1/2/9 at vic (YD 029563). Enemy at vic (YD 029568). E-1 OP received about six rounds from directions of 6320 mils at distances of approx 500 meters. Returned small arms fire and called in an artillery mission. Mission denied. Sqd checked area with negative results.

062030H - CAP-5 at vic (YD 096523). Ambush going out found two boys age fourteen without lights. Returned boys to village where village chief determined them friendly. Boys were released in morning. Two detainees.

oo. 7 January 1968.

(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one company (-) patrol, one sqd patrol and two sqd ambushes.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one plt patrol, one sqd patrol and two sqd ambushes.

P5A - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.

pp. 8 January 1968.

(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted two sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd and one plt patrol and one sqd ambush.

P5A - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events.

080030H - H/2/9 at vic (YD 061550) suspected enemy movement in vic forward of bunker 12. Three hand illum thrown. Bunkers #11, 12, and 14 fired general burst of small arms. Three 81mm illum were fired. Negative results.

qq. 9 January 1968.

(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted two sqd patrols and one sqd ambush.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted three sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

P5A - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.

rr. 10 January 1968.

(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted two sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted three sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

P5A - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.

ss. 11 January 1968.

(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted two sqd patrols and one sqd ambush.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted three sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

P5A - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.

tt. 12 January 1968.

(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted two sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted three sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

P5A - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.

uu. 13 January 1968.

(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted two sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

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H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted three sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

P5A - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events.

131700H - E/2/9 at vic (YD 026562). En at vic (YD 030555). E-1 OP spotted one man moving at above coordinate. No friendly units in area. Fired two 106mm RR rounds on suspected position. Movement ceased.

137800H - P-5 at vic (YD 099525). Two boys were playing with pop-ups they had found when one exploded. Both received shrapnel wounds. One fractured a leg. Both treated at P-5. Boy with fractured leg was medevaced.

vv. 14 January 1968.

(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted two sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted three sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

P5A - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.

ww. 15 January 1968.

(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted two sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted three sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

P5A - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events. None.

xx. 16 January 1968.

(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted two sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted three sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

P5A - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events.

160830H - 161345H - Fr at vic (YD 056587). En at vic (YD 054587). Reaction plt alerted at 0830H, lifted out at Camp J. J.

Carroll at 0920H and landed at vic (YD 063588) and proceeded to recon position at vic (YD 056587). On landing, four NVA took plt under fire from vic (YD 053588) with automatic weapons and small arms weapons. Plt returned fire with small arms, artillery, and fixed wing. Extraction completed at 161315H. One friendly WIA.

yy. 17 January 1968.

(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Conducted two plt patrols and three sqd ambushes

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted three sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

P5A - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events.

170245H - E/2/9 at vic (YD 106494) sprung ambush on fifteen NVA/VC at what was thought to be a rally point at the junction of three trails. Moved to an alternate ambush site. Swept area at 170900H revealing following: Two M-1 carbines, four loaded carbine magazines, two ChiCom grenades, one medical kit with hand written documents, and blood trails in area. All gear sent to S-2.

171000H - H/2/9 at vic (YD 063558). En at vic (YD 065565). HP11 saw convoy on road take sniper fire. Patrol thought it had spotted sniper position and moved toward it. Seemed to be two snipers. With another patrol standing by as security, HP11 checked out the area. Negative results.

170830H - 171530H - E/2/9 at vic (YD 095515). When Co "E" patrol checked out area of 16 Jan 1968 ambushes, they found an unusually large number of young men mixed in with farmers and villagers. They seemed messy and avoided Marines. Some wore utility jackets. Echo-6 gave PFs order to question civilians. Plt from Co "E" went to D-5 as reserve. Co "E" conducted a company minus patrol in the area. Negative results. Reaction force returned to Camp J. J. Carroll.

171705H - 2/9 at vic (YD 068555). En at vic (YD 068558). OP 250 spotted one NVA carrying rifle 300 meters north of wire. Sqd went after him. Negative results.

172200 - 172300 - 2/9, friendly at Camp J. J. Carroll, enemy at vic (YD 051549). OP at waterpoint heard movement to their front and requested 81mm illumination. Movement ceased when illum popped, then started again when illum burned out. Numerous water buffalo and (2) two NVA/VC with weapons spotted 150 meters from wire. Fired (13) thirteen 81mm WP rounds with good target coverage.

zz. 18 January 1968.

(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted two sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted three sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

P5A - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd ambush and one sqd patrol.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events.

180240 - 2/9 at Camp J. J. Carroll spotted enemy movement at waterpoint OP, vic (YD 051549). Request for illum was denied. OP fired three M-79 rounds. No more movement reported.

181410H - P-5 at vic (YD 098523). En at vic (YD 111552) PFs heard in village that VC had ambushed one man at above coord. Went to pick up man. A village official came to P-5 and said that two VC were near the outskirts of village and had killed a village official from Mai Loc. Patrol was sent to investigate and found the village official was killed. He had been shot twice in chest.

aaa. 19 January 1968.

(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted two sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted three sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

P5A - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol and one sqd ambush.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events.

190930H - 2/9 at Camp J. J. Carroll. Two Marines were injured when a "water buffalo" (water tank) fell on them. One had a possible fracture of the left foot and the other a possible fracture of the left thigh. Both were sent to Dong Ha to "D" Med.

192155H - H/2/9 at vic (YD 058553). En at vic (YD 052556). Heard movement and saw flashlight about 100 meters in front of their position. Fired two 81mm illum rounds. Light moved farther back. Adjusted 81mm with WP and fired 6 rounds light HE in effect. Results unknown.

192305 - H/2/9 at vic (YD 058553). Saw light and movement about 50 meters from position. Fired five 81mm illum rounds and twelve HE light rounds for effect. Also fired 30 small arms rounds.

bbb. 20 January 1968.

(1) Disposition of Forces.

E/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted two sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

H/2/9 - Continued assigned mission. Conducted three sqd patrols and two sqd ambushes.

P5A - Continued assigned mission. Conducted one sqd patrol.

2(-)/9 - Changed OPCON to 4th Marines from 3d Marines.

(2) Enemy Contacts and Significant Events.

201030 - 201700 - 2/9 at Camp J. J. Carroll received 12 to 15 rounds of 140mm rocket incoming. Resulted in seven USMC WIA medevacs.

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202010H - E/2/9 at vic (YD 068555). En at vic (YD 065555). OP 250 spotted what appeared to be a man squatting in the road near their position at above grid. Fired M-79 and small arms at figure but it remained stationary. Later it moved slightly. Kept under observation until it disappeared.

202200H - E/2/9 at vic (YD 094514). En at vic (YD 096572). Movement heard 25 meters in front of LP at vic (YD 096572). Men on lines saw eight VC/NVA across paddy.

202145H - LP saw three men look through hedge row at their position. They activated claymore and pulled back to lines. Fired 60mm illum at vic (YD 096572). Small arms and M-79 also. Negative results.

202400H - Termination of Operation LANCASTER.

10. Results.

a. Friendly Personnel Losses. During this operation, 2d Bn, 9th Marines had 21 WIAs and 2 MIAs. There were no KIAs.

b. Enemy Losses. (See Intelligence portion of this report).

11. Administrative Matters.

a. Supply and Resupply. Resupply of all units attached to the battalion was accomplished in the following manner from 1-10 Nov 1967:

(1) 44,455 lbs of ammunition, water and rations were flown in 34 lifts utilizing H-34s.

(2) The battalion experienced difficulty in obtaining ration resupply during this period. On one occasion they went four days without food. The difficulty was attributed to the shortage of helicopters, cancelling of routine missions in favor of priority or emergency missions, and lack of coordination with fixed wing and artillery missions in the area.

(3) Weather was not a factor in resupply during this period.

b. 12-27 November 1967. Daily resupply convoys were run to support one rifle company operating out of Delta-5 outpost. Tracked vehicles were required due to monsoon conditions.

c. 24 Dec - 20 Jan 1968. Daily resupply convoys were run to support one rifle company operating out of Delta-5 outpost. Difficulties were encountered due to unseasonably dry weather which adversely effected the operation of "otters" which were the only available transportation.

d. General.

(1) The following items were unobtainable during the entire period: Claymores, trip flares, and white star clusters.

(2) The employment of the 81mm mortar was seriously limited during the latter part of the operation due to the restriction on the firing of HE (med) and illum rounds which were packaged in plastic containers. Other types of HE and illum were in short supply or NIS.

(3) Occasional difficulty was encountered in obtaining 106mm HEPT and 60mm HE.

e. Maintenance. No unusual or serious maintenance problems were encountered during this operation.

f. Treatment of Casualties Evacuated and Hospitalized.

(1) The evacuation chain for 2d Battalion, 9th Marines during Operation LANCASTER was by motor convoy and, in emergencies, helicopter directly through "D" Medical Company, 3d Medical Battalion at Dong Ha.

(2) The Battalion Aid Station served as a holding facility with a capacity of fourteen (14) beds for minor illnesses and wounds and this prevented some prolonged loss of personnel who would otherwise have been evacuated south by "D" Med.

(3) There was one death during a live fire problem on 2 November 1967.

(4) On 20 January 1968, after a rocket attack, six casualties were evacuated to "D" Med. One of these was returned to full duty. Three minor casualties were treated and returned to full duty.

g. Medical Evaluation.

(1) Sanitation measures included the use of tube urinals and burn-out latrines. Trash and garbage collection was a problem due to the lack of trucks. This problem was corrected. There was a rodent problem which has been rectified through the use of poisoned baits and traps. Spraying of the heads and mess halls on a weekly basis alleviated the fly problem.

(2) Due to heavy rains, the majority of cases treated were skin and fungal infections.

(3) Diarrheal diseases were prevalent due to individual negligence in the use of halazone tablets.

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12. Special Equipment and Techniques.

a. Special Equipment.

(1) Starlight scopes were used extensively in ambushes, on LPs and OPs, and all scopes functioned effectively.

(2) Seismic intrusion devices (SIDs) were used on the two permanent OPs in the perimeter at Camp J. J. Carroll.

b. Techniques. No special techniques were initiated during this operation by 2d Battalion, 9th Marines.

13. Commander's Analysis. Operation LANCASTER presented no new or unusual operational techniques. There were two areas, however, which bear some discussion, namely helicopter resupply and artillery support. In the area of resupply the battalion experienced difficulty in receiving normal resupplies of rations and ammunition. At one period, resupply of rations was delayed for a four day period. This delay was attributable to several factors; (a) dictates of the mission assigned at times precluded any receipt of supplies due to the battalion being on the move, and (b) unavailability of helicopters for resupply when the battalion was in a position to receive the supplies. In the area of artillery support, several instances of check fires were caused by air, fixed and/or rotary wing, being in the general area. These check fires effectively eliminated planned prep fires and/or on call fires during these periods. The normal restricted fire plan, if employed, would have provided the capability for air and artillery to conduct their operations without mutual interference.

14. Recommendations.

a. It is recommended that helicopters be placed in direct support of the regiments on operations, and in that way be responsive to the needs of the regiment be it command and control flights, resupply, troop lift or medevac missions. The allocation of the helicopter assets available would then be the responsibility of the controlling regiment.

b. It is recommended that the normal restrictive fire plan be employed in the conduct of air and fire support operations and thus avoid the unnecessary check fire procedure now employed when any air is in an area.

W. M. CRYAN
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