

HEADQUARTERS
 2d Battalion, 9th Marines
 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 FPO San Francisco 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 March 1968 to 31 March 1968

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HEADQUARTERS

2d Battalion, 9th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
APO San Francisco 96602

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5750
1 April 1968

DD 169-68

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: Commanding General, Third Marine Division

Subj: Command Chronology for Period 1 Mar 1968 to 31 Mar 1968

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8

Encl: (1) 2d Battalion, 9th Marines Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. Downgraded to unclassified when Sections I, II, III, IV, V, VII and VIII are removed from enclosure (1).


W. M. CREAN

Copy to:
CO, 4th Marines
CO, 9th Marines

2008/1974 MAR

CMD CHRON

MAR 1968

Section I - Organizational Data

1. Designation/Location. 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, 31 March 1968, Camp Carroll.
2. Period Covered by Report. 1-31 March 1968.
3. Name/Rank of Commanding Officer and Staff including T/O Billet Assignments:

| | | |
|--------------------|------------------------|----------|
| Commanding Officer | LtCol W. M. CRYAN | 1-31 Mar |
| Executive Officer | Maj C. H. JOHNSON | 1-31 Mar |
| S-1 | 1stLt R. E. HENSEL | 1-31 Mar |
| S-2 | 1stLt J. P. C. FLOYD | 1-31 Mar |
| S-3 | Maj R. M. LOSEE | 1-31 Mar |
| S-4 | Capt M. E. RICH | 1-31 Mar |
| S-5 | 2dLt J. L. BURGOYNE | 1-31 Mar |
| Comm Officer | Capt J. M. HARTNETT | 1-31 Mar |
| MT Officer | 2dLt J. M. G. MITCHELL | 1-31 Mar |
| Supply Officer | 1stLt S. K. CUTHBERT | 1-31 Mar |
| Medical Officer | Lt R. D. MCARTOR | 1-31 Mar |
| Chaplain | LtCol J. F. SELBERT | 1-31 Mar |
| H&S Company | Capt J. M. HARTNETT | 1-31 Mar |
| Company "E" | Capt D. M. SAMS | 1-31 Mar |
| Company "F" | Capt R. W. KNIGHT | 1-31 Mar |
| Company "G" | Capt W. S. MACK | 1-31 Mar |
| Company "H" | Capt R. W. ELLISON | 1-31 Mar |

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Section II - S-1 Chronology

1. General. During the reporting period, this Battalion has joined 3 officers. According to T/O the Battalion is presently lacking 4 officers. The SNCO and enlisted strength remained fairly consistent having dropped 106 and gained 98. The unit is lacking seven SNCOs. The non-effectives at the end of the reporting period total four officers and 15 enlisted. Losses for the forthcoming month are expected to be five officers and 61 enlisted by rotation to CONUS.

a. Strength. The average monthly strength for the period ending 31 March 1968 was as follows:

| <u>USMC</u> | | <u>USN</u> | |
|-------------|------------|------------|------------|
| <u>OFF</u> | <u>ENL</u> | <u>OFF</u> | <u>ENL</u> |
| 38 | 1109 | 2 | 58 |

Note: Percentage of T/O was about 96%.

b. Losses.

| | <u>USMC</u> | | <u>USN</u> | |
|-------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|
| | <u>OFF</u> | <u>ENL</u> | <u>OFF</u> | <u>ENL</u> |
| Hostile | 0 | 22 | 0 | 0 |
| Non-hostile | 0 | 23 | 0 | 0 |
| Admin | 0 | 61 | 0 | 1 |

Note: The figures shown above include only those personnel dropped from the rolls. For total casualties see the medical chronology.

(1) Of the battle casualties, two were KIA and 20 were WIA. 23 were NBC. Those 43 were transferred by SR to Camp S. D. Butler.

(2) Of the administrative losses, five were transferred intra-division and 56 rotated to CONUS.

(3) Promotions. 60 PFCs were promoted to LCPL and 8 PVTs were promoted to PFC.

(4) Discipline, Law and Order. One Special Court-Martial and four Summary Court-Martials were completed. Nine persons were awarded NJP by the Battalion Commander and two NJPs were awarded by Company Commanders.

(5) Morale. Service has been satisfactory.

Section VI S-5 Chronology

1. General. Activities for the reporting period were primarily centered on the 3,000 Montagnards collected at the Cam Lo Resettlement Village. These people are primarily refugees from the Khe Sanh and Ca Lu areas. The situation in this resettlement village is one of abject poverty, in part due to the unfortunate fact that these people were required to leave the majority of their worldly possessions in the Khe Sanh/Ca Lu areas when they were resettled. Promised support from GVN sources, such as foodstuffs, adequate housing, medical care, and employment has not been provided in the required measure. Malnutrition is evident throughout this village; epidemic diseases and ulcerated sores prevail. Housing facilities are extremely limited and in many cases tents supplied by this facility provide shelter for several families. Aside from the lack of privacy, this situation drastically augments problems caused by lack of sanitation controls. The tactical situation in this area severely constricts the gathering of natural materials to improve this situation.

As an additional comment, it is apparent to S-5 personnel participating in the program that the ethnic differences between the Vietnamese and the Montagnards are quite obvious in the relationships between these people. In effect there is a lack of concern on the part of the Vietnamese toward the plight of the Montagnards.

2. Civil Affairs. Civic action activities for the period were directed at the specific goals of improving the health, sanitation, housing, and financial status of these refugees.

a. Medcaps. On 8 March 1968, a daily Medcap was established and has been conducted for the remainder of the period. This activity is attended daily by the Battalion Surgeon, Second Battalion, Ninth Marines under whose direction medical treatment has been extended to 1554 persons during the reporting period. It should also be noted that over 2,500 inoculations for the control of epidemic diseases have been administered. These Medcaps are accompanied by periodic broadcasts of health and sanitation education and the distribution of bath soap.

b. Financial Aid. A project to clear the dense vegetation along Route #9 was also initiated during the reporting period. This project employs 100 Montagnards a day and is regulated by a rotation system to insure a fair distribution of wealth among the refugees. Pay has been established at the rate of 100 \$VN per day; in addition to this, 1000 pounds of bulgur, 500 pounds of flour and 500 pounds of cornmeal are equally distributed among the workers daily. This project has obvious benefits to both the Montagnards and friendly forces. While supplying the former with a small income, the possibility of future enemy ambushes in this portion of Route #9 is averted.

c. Housing Aid. Ten general purpose tents have been loaned to the refugees by the Fourth Marine Regiment for temporary relief of the housing shortage. Negotiations are in progress for the acquisition of lumber from ammunition boxes to be used in the construction of a more permanent type of housing.

3. Psychological Operations. Psychological operations have taken two distinct courses during the reporting period.

a. In the Cam Lo Resettlement Village, the social environment resists an openly aggressive program. Obvious utilization of civil aid as a support for pre-GVN propaganda is clearly avoided. However, individual and group discussions of political subjects are deliberately initiated by S-5 personnel at the Medcap station. In this manner, the convictions of Medcap personnel are made known, and Medcap services provide support for the sincerity of these convictions. Progress indicators in this area have been encouraging.

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Section III - S-2 Chronology

1. General. During the reporting period from 1 March to 31 March 1968, the Second Battalion, Ninth Marines participated in Operation LANCASTER II under OPCON of the Fourth Marine Regiment. The primary mission of this unit for that period was provision of security along Route #9 between Camp J.J. CARROLL and the eastern boundary of the Fourth Marines TAOR (vic YD 114581), plus perimeter defense at Camp J.J. CARROLL. Incident to this mission was saturation patrolling of the area immediately surrounding Camp J.J. CARROLL and south into the Cua Valley.

2. Area.

a. General. The area of operation during the reporting period was generally the vicinity of Camp J.J. CARROLL. This operating area is bounded on the north by the southern boundary of the DMZ, on the east by the 09 grid line and the northern tributary of the Song Vinh Phuong, on the south by the northern edge of the Ba Long Valley, and on the west by the 04 grid line and an arbitrarily drawn line from Camp J.J. CARROLL southwest to Nui Ba Ho (vic YD 015512). For purposes of analysis, the operating area is conveniently divided into two dissimilar portions by the centrally located Camp J.J. CARROLL plateau. The northern portion including Camp J.J. CARROLL, Route #9, the Cam Lo River, and the foothills north to the DMZ will be referred to as "Alpha." The southern portion of the area of operations, extending from Camp J.J. CARROLL south to the Ba Long Mountains, an area known traditionally as the Cua Valley, will be referred to as "Bravo".

b. AO Alpha.

1. Weather. Weather in Alpha was predominantly transitional from monsoon to summer, characterized by intermittent rain, clouds, and fog. A daily mist covered the mountains to the north of Camp J.J. CARROLL for most of March. There were occasional electric storms throughout the month, but little steady precipitation. Climatic conditions for the period followed the expected trend for this transitional phase. A summary of pertinent weather statistics is as follows:

| | |
|--------------------------|---------|
| Maximum Temperature | 81 |
| Minimum Temperature | 61 |
| Humidity (Average) | 88% |
| Number of Days with Rain | 17 |
| Total Rainfall (Inches) | 5.2 |
| Visibility (Average) | 6 Miles |
| Winds (Average) | 7 W |

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2. Relief. The eastern portion of Alpha is gently rolling hills increasing in relief over the western portion of the area, which is predominantly mountains, deep valleys, and ridges. One such ridge runs east to west directly north of Camp J.J. CARROLL and merges its western portion into Dong Ha Mountain vic (YD 025954). This ridgeline masks the rest of Alpha from direct observation by Camp J.J. CARROLL, which sits on a plateau on the south side of the Cam Lo River.

3. Drainage. There are two catchment basins or stream systems in Alpha. The topographical divide separating these two systems is Mitters Ridge, which extends east from Nui Cay Tri (484 meters, YD 9661). Many perennial, intermittent, and ephemeral streams drain north and south from the high ground into one of two east-west rivers, the Ben Hai in the north and the Cam Lo in the south. In the center portion of Alpha, where the ground is generally high, the streams are narrow and fast, whereas in the lower portion, the down cutting

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potential has decreased and side cutting has begun, thus allowing the streams and larger rivers to widen their beds and develop a meander.

4. Vegetation. In the western portion of Alpha the vegetation is predominantly trees with double or triple canopy. In the eastern portion, covering the gently rolling hills, the vegetation varies according to elevation and gradient, with trees and thicker vegetation in the draws, and scrub grass, and elephant grass on the high ground. In the southern portion of the area, including the Cam Lo River Valley and the Camp J.J. CARROLL plateau, vegetation is primarily grass and elephant grass.

5. Surface Materials. The Camp J.J. CARROLL area and the area north of the Cam Lo River are predominantly clay type soil with occasional gravel and bedrock. The soil along the Cam Lo River is sand and gravel.

6. Man Made Features. Man made features in Alpha include road complexes, tank trails, and foot paths. Route #9 is the predominant road, running east to west along the southern portion of the Alpha AO, generally parallel to the Cam Lo River. It is predominantly paved and covered with silt. Most of the footpaths in the area follow high ground for purposes of seasonal trafficability. Occasional tank trails are found close to Camp J.J. CARROLL; it should be noted that they follow no predictable pattern.

c. Military Aspects of Terrain (Alpha)

1. Observation. Observation in Alpha is good due to many excellent vantage points. Friendly examples of this are OP 250 and OP North on the Camp J. J. CARROLL plateau. Many far better opportunities are afforded the enemy for observation of Camp J.J. CARROLL and other friendly activity, such as the Dong Ha Ridgeline north of the Cam Lo River. Friendly observation of enemy activity north of the Dong Ha Ridgeline is restricted by the height of that piece of terrain. Weather conditions of reduced visibility in March restricted ground and air observation.

2. Fields of Fire. The terrain north of the Cam Lo River limits fields of fire for flat trajectory weapons except within the ridge masses themselves. However, flat trajectory weapons situated on these ridges can command their lowland approaches very effectively.

3. Concealment. The high canopy in the western portion of the area gives excellent concealment from both air and ground observation all year round. The grassy crests of gently rising hills in the eastern sector offer only fair concealment. Elephant grass along the Cam Lo River and on the Camp J.J. CARROLL plateau also offers fair concealment. The mountains and valleys north of the Cam Lo River provide good long range concealment for the enemy and his weapons.

4. Cover. Principal cover is afforded by the ridge lines themselves and by the low ground which the enemy will seek cover in. Caves and man made tunnels on the northern slopes of hill masses will be used by the enemy as well as extensive bunker and living complexes.

5. Obstacles. The Cam Lo River under normal conditions will offer only minor problems to an ~~assault~~ crossing. During seasonal flooding, a crossing will be impossible. The ridgeline to the north of the river will be an obstacle to troop movement in all seasons. The smaller streams can also ~~present~~ present obstacles to movement.

6. Trafficability. Trafficability will range from good to fair in the eastern portion of the AO and from fair to poor in the western portion. Heavy seasonal rains will greatly hamper movement on the steep slopes of the western portion of Alpha, while they will have little effect in the east.

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7. Key Terrain. The Camp J.J. CARROLL plateau with its Observation Posts dominates the southern side of the Cam Lo River Valley. Dong Ha Mountain vic (YD 0259) and the prominent ridgeline upon which it stands are also key features. There are many smaller hills along Route #9 which are in a commanding position.

8. Avenues of Approach. The principal all-weather avenue of approach in the area is Route #9. The Cam Lo River is a seasonal riverine avenue of approach. Other roads and footpaths will be more or less trafficable depending on the season. One such road is the access road to Camp J.J. CARROLL extending from Route #9 in a south east direction to Camp J.J. CARROLL.

d. AO Bravo.

1. Weather. Weather in Bravo was transitional from monsoon to summer with intermittent rain, clouds and fog. A morning mist generally covered the floor of the Cua Valley which usually burned off by midday, particularly towards the end of March. There was occasional electrical storms throughout the month, but little steady precipitation.

2. Relief. The Cua Valley can be divided into two distinct topographical portions: to the west an agriculturally rich alluvial plain, and to the east a piedmont area typified by gently rolling hills.

3. Drainage. In the alluvial plain west of Route #558, drainage is afforded by slow streams that drain water from the wet flat lands and paddied lowlands which cut into the floor of the Cua Valley from the south. These streams flow generally southeast into the Quang Tri River deep in the southern Ba Long Valley. In the eastern piedmont portion of the Cua Valley, drainage is affected by faster and deeper streams with banks up to fifteen feet high and seventy degrees in elevation. These streams run both north to south and east to west.

4. Vegetation. Vegetation in the Cua Valley varies from grassy pastureland to double canopy jungle. The area directly south of Camp J.J. CARROLL is primarily agricultural, typified by pastureland, tilled fields, hedgerows, and extensive network of irregularly terraced rice paddies.

There are several deserted villages in this area, characterized by bamboo thickets, and increased presence of paths and hedgerows. Two such hamlets, traditionally the most prosperous in the area, have become resettlement hamlets for all the civilians presently living in the area. This large village complex, known as the Doc Kinh Resettlement Village, lies abreast of Route #558 vic (YD 097523); the area is typified by many high stands of trees. The "Delta-5" Fort, presently occupied by ARVN forces, is surrounded by a grassy flatland which at one time was utilized by the French as an airfield. Bordering this flat land to the south and east are large rice paddies with occasional clumps of trees marking deserted religious structures and domiciles. Further to the east the vegetation is typically piedmont. The hills are as a rule covered with elephant grass, and the draws between them often are strangled with extremely thick vegetation ranging in height from three feet to a full double canopy. In the lower areas of this piedmont, particularly along the stream beds, vegetation grows luxuriously.

5. Surface Materials. The surface materials in the Cua Valley is agriculturally rich clay and silt.

6. Man Made Features. Man made features in the Cua Valley include roads, dwellings, footpaths, tank trails, fences, villages, fortresses, bunkers, and enemy base camps. The road from Camp J.J. CARROLL to the Doc Kinh Resettlement Village has been made prominent by the use of tracked vehicles. Route #558 is the prominent road in the area, being hard packed silt and rock, though seldom used by vehicles. Footpaths

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are numerous and generally follow high ground. There are a total of three old French forts in the Cua Valley, one at vic (YD 074525), one at vic (YD 095520), and "Delta-5" at vic (YD 093513). "Delta-5" is the only fortress presently occupied by friendly forces. Tank trails are found throughout the area and they follow no predictable pattern.

e. Military Aspects of Terrain (Bravo)

1. Observation. Observation is good to excellent throughout the Cua Valley. Camp J.J. CARROLL, particularly the OP at vic (YD 0754), commands outstanding observation of the entire area. The daily monsoon mist subsided in March so that by midday visibility was generally good. The sporadic vegetation on the valley floor allowed good observation of civilians and enemy activities there. Many excellent opportunities for observation are afforded within the valley itself by numerous pieces of high ground.

2. Fields of Fire. Fields of fire for flat trajectory weapons on the Camp J.J. CARROLL plateau are outstanding. The outpost at vic (YD 0754), which offers observation over the entire Cua Valley, would be an excellent location for long range flat trajectory weapons. The piedmont east of Route #558 also offers good fields of fire from the military crests of the high ground, however, dense vegetation in the lower areas will hamper fields of fire in that area.

3. Concealment. Concealment opportunities are good in the Valley. The hedgerows and increased vegetation around the village areas offer concealment from the air as well as from the ground observation. Air observation is more effective however since the sporadic treelines mask horizontal lines of sight. Furthermore, it will be possible to conceal large amounts of troops and machinery in vegetation throughout the valley, especially in the piedmont area with its alternately thick and thin areas of foliage.

4. Cover. There is a paucity of cover in the Cua Valley due in part to the features of the valley floor and to the high angle line of sight from Camp J.J. CARROLL. Principal cover is afforded by the deep stream beds and terraced banks of the rice paddies cutting into the valley floor from the south. There are numerous dwellings, bunkers, and fighting holes in the valley offering cover, and the rolling hills of the piedmont to the east provides good cover in the draws.

5. Obstacles. The primary natural obstacles to vehicular and troop movement are the many streams throughout the area. South of Camp J.J. CARROLL, the streams drain large draws which have been cultivated into finger like rice paddies that reach up into the Cua Valley from the Ba Long Valley. Vehicular movement over these paddies will be impossible. Troop movement will be canalized unless care is taken to sweep on line against the unfavorable terrain. During the seasonal rains, other natural obstacles impede movement considerably, notably large muddy areas on the access road into the village and the cultivated terrain. In the piedmont area the thick vegetation along stream beds and draws greatly hampers friendly movement. The streams themselves are obstacles in this area throughout the year, due to the steep banks and lack of vehicular fording areas. Man made obstacles abound in the populated valley. Notable among these is wire, both single strands and concertina, which the civilians have erected around their land holdings. Wire cutters will be necessary for the friendly patrols not wishing to become canalized onto well-used paths. Thick treelines and hedgerows around villages, populated and deserted, are also obstacles. The deserted French forts at vic (YD 073524) and vic (YD 094520) are not only obstacles to movement but could at any time be occupied by the enemy.

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6. Trafficability. Trafficability is generally excellent all year in the Cua Valley. The clay-silt soil is rich and hard in the summer and it remains fairly trafficable all year round. The only exception would be the dirt road from Camp J.J. CARROLL which is churned into a muddy soup by friendly tracked vehicles during the rainy season. A particularly bad part of the road during the monsoon in October was at vic (YD 084520).

7. Key Terrain. The Camp J.J. CARROLL plateau and its observation posts vic (YD 072540) dominate the Cua Valley. Other key terrain features are located at the following grids: Hill 142 vic (YD 059524), "Delta-5" vic (YD 093513), Hill 92 vic (YD 107535), un-named piccos of ground at vic (YD 103554) and vic (YD 080533), the abandoned ARNV outpost which has a commanding view of the entire valley from the south at vic (YD 073507), Hill 94 vic (YD 123515) and the high ground of the abandoned village of Thon Son Nam vic (YD 125537).

8. Avenues of Approach. The principal avenue of approach for vehicles and troops from Camp J.J. CARROLL is the well used road which runs south and then east along the high ground between the finger like streams and rice paddies mentioned earlier. Most roads and trails in this area are built on high ground or ridgelines because of the threat of seasonal rains. It is possible to follow roads or trails with vehicles on high ground all the way from the Camp J.J. CARROLL plateau to the high plateau of Thon Son Nam, which provides excellent observation over the entire eastern sector of the AO. Although no streams are encountered along this route, which follows the east to west road to Doc Kinh and then picks up the trail through Mai Loc out to Thon Son Nam, the avenue follows, and at times precarious path between large wet rice paddies. Another avenue of approach of lesser tactical significance is along the high ground directly east of Camp J.J. CARROLL and down into the Cua Valley from Doc Kinh.

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3. Enemy Situations.

a. General. Enemy strength, primarily in Alpha, remained at a significant and stationary level throughout the reporting period. Elements of the 320 NVA Division are still believed to be harboured in Alpha with the Division CP in the southern portion of the DMZ and the 64th Regiment located approximately in the middle of Alpha. The 7th and 8th Battalions of this regiment are believed to occupy the terrain immediately north of the Cam Lo River. Elements and equipment of the 54th Artillery Regiment, 320 NVA Division are also scattered through Alpha, with the 164th Battalion of that regiment imposing the greatest threat to Camp J.J. CARROLL. In addition to this, these units are supported by the C-20 Engineering Company, C-22 Transportation Company, possible anti-aircraft, chemical, and sapper companies that are deployed in the northeastern portion of Alpha bordering on the Ninth Marines TAOR. While these NVA units have operated extensively in this area since the middle of January, all indications are that they are still well supplied and equipped.

The predominant resident enemy unit south of Camp J.J. CARROLL is the 27th Independent Battalion. Primarily a non-combatant unit, its mission is to resupply and guide transient NVA units passing through the area. This unit operates primarily in the piedmont east of the Doc Kinh Resettlement Village. Until recently, it was believed that this village harboured a local force company, however indications now point to the fact that this local force unit and the 27th Independent Battalion are one and the same. Also worthy of note is the increase in NVA units moving through the southern portion of the operating area in an easterly and northeasterly direction.

b. Significant Enemy Activity. Although an impressive number of enemy forces are harboured in the TAOR, activity remained light.

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throughout the reporting period. In conjunction with their continuing mission of interdiction of Route #9, NVA units north of the Cam Lo River fired repeated mortar missions against friendly activity on and near Route #9. These offensives were typified by sporadic, two to four round bombardments designed more to harass than to destroy; it should be noted however that the intensity of these attacks increased during the last few days of the month as did size of the weapons from the common 82mm mortar up to the heavier 107mm and 120mm mortars. In the same vein, Camp J.J. CARROLL has received several artillery and rocket attacks. These attacks were notably less intense than those of the previous month.

Also of significance are the two sweeps made by Company "B", Second Battalion, Ninth Marines in the eastern portion of the Cua Valley. The objective of both sweeps was the headquarters company of the 27th Independent Battalion. The first sweep resulted in an incomplete contact with a sizable enemy force in the 1353 grid square. Three groups of enemy were noticed: VC wearing typically paramilitary gray uniforms and armed with carbines, NVA laden with packs and carrying AK-47's, and an unusual group of enemy wearing brown uniforms with crossed leather straps over their chests and backs. The second sweep resulted in the discovery of a remarkable base camp complex at vic (YD 146537). The living area was in a covered draw and contained twenty-two large bunkers, a CP bunker, a messing area, a washing area, and a sophisticated smoke dissemination system. The high ground surrounding the draw contained fighting holes and observation towers which provided an outstanding view of the entire surrounding area. It is suspected that the enemy has countless such base camps along the 14 grid line south into the Ba Long Valley.

4. VC/NVA Casualties and Personnel Losses.

| | |
|----------------|----|
| VC/NVA KIA (C) | 11 |
| Detainees | 1 |

5. Enemy Equipment Destroyed or Captured.

| | |
|------------------|-----|
| ChiCom Grenades | 13 |
| NVA Packs | 2 |
| AP Mines | 11 |
| AK-47 Ammo | 120 |
| NVA Medical Kits | 2 |
| TNT Blocks | 2 |
| Detonator Cord | 2 |
| AK-47 Mag | 2 |
| NVA Helmets | 1 |
| NVA Gas Masks | 3 |
| Rifle Gren. Kit | 1 |
| NVA Poncho | 1 |
| 60mm rd | 3 |
| 82mm rd | 3 |
| NVA Canteen | 1 |
| Misc. 782 Gear | 2 |

6. Enemy Initiated Incidents. During the reporting period, VC/NVA initiated a total of (134) incidents against or in the Second Battalion, Ninth Marines area of operation. These incidents are broken down as follows:

| | |
|----------------------------|----|
| Sniping | 23 |
| Mortar, Artillery, Rockets | 98 |
| Contacts | 3 |
| Mines/Boobytraps | 10 |

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7. Sources of Intelligence. Intelligence information was gathered from the following sources: S-2, Fourth Marines, Third Force Recon Company, Company "B", Third Recon Battalion, Kit Carson Scouts, Battalion S-2 Scouts, 7th ITT, and ground forces working in the area.

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8. Surveillance Devices. Twenty-two Small Starlight Scopes were employed during the reporting period. Eighteen of these scopes belong to the Second Battalion, Ninth Marines and four were loaned to this unit by the Fourth Marine Regiment. In addition to this, one NOD was employed in the OP tower on Hill 250 and four CID's were utilized on the perimeter at Camp J.J. CARROLL.

9. Comments and Conclusions. NVA strength in the area north of the Cam Lo River is high. Indications are that these well trained and well equipped units may have been reinforced by several other units of unknown size and capability. Also of significance in this area is the enemy's use of supporting arms to a degree that clearly demonstrates their sophistication and flexibility; this capability should be considered in the planning of future operations. The mission of these units is probably twofold: an attack on friendly installations along Route #9 and interdiction of friendly convoys and security positions on Route #9. The enemy has significantly increased interdiction of US convoys by daily mortar barrages of up to forty rounds indicating an impressive stockpile of ammunition and supplies in close proximity. Indications are that the enemy will continue and possibly increase this activity in conjunction with a coordinated countrywide offensive.

To the south, the headquarters company of the 27th Independent Battalion has been deprived of the use of its base camp adjacent to the Doc Kinh Resettlement Village, thereby placing that unit in a possible emergency status for supplies from the villagers. Continued search and destroy operations in this area east of the village will serve to successfully upset the enemy's established routines and possibly halt the rapid infiltration of large NVA units through this area.

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Section IV - 3-3 Chronology

1. General. 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines participated in Operation LANCASTER II under OPCON of the 4th Marines from 1 March to 31 March 1968. During the following periods of time the following units were OPCON to 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines:

"K" Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines. 051135H Mar68 to 110930H Mar68.
 "M" Company, 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines. 081100H Mar68 to 100900H Mar68.
 "L" Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines. 110930H Mar68 to 161500H Mar68.
 "I" Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines. 231800H Mar68 to 312400H Mar68.
 "K" Company, 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines. 261700H Mar68 to 281700H Mar68.

2. Company "E". 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines. From 1 March until 4 March 1968 E/2/9 occupied hill #37 vic (YD 089579) and bridges at vic (YD 097575) and (YD 103576). During this time E/2/9 was responsible for securing of Route #9 within its area of operation and provided close-in security by conducting squad size patrols, ambushes and daily road sweeps. From 4 March until 9 March 1968, from 11 March until 26 March 1968 and from 29 March until 31 March 1968, E/2/9 was responsible for a portion of the perimeter defense of Camp J.J. CARROLL, manning two outposts and providing local security, road sweeps and convoy security. On 10 March and 27 March 1968 E/2/9 was in the field on search and destroy operations.

3. Company "F". 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines. On 1 March 1968 F/2/9 was responsible for a portion of the perimeter defense at Camp J.J. CARROLL providing local security. From 2 March until 31 March 1968 F/2/9 was responsible for "Mikes Hill" at vic (YD 074574) and the position at vic (YD 073563). From 4 March until 31 March 1968 F/2/9 was also responsible for the positions along Route #9 at vic (YD 072571) and vic (YD 072573). H-1/2/9 was OPCON to F/2/9 as F-4/2/9 from 4 March to 18 March 1968, and from 18 March to 31 March H-2/2/9 was OPCON to F/2/9 as F-4/2/9. From 2 March until 31 March 1968 F/2/9 was responsible for security of Route #9 within its area of operation and provided close-in security by conducting squad size patrols, ambushes and daily road sweeps along Route #9.

4. Company "G". 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines. From 1 March until 4 March 1968 G/2/9 was responsible for a portion of the perimeter defense of Camp J.J. CARROLL providing local security. From 4 March until 31 March 1968 G/2/9 occupied Hill #37 vic (YD 089578) and bridges at vic (YD 097575). From 4 March until 31 March 1968 G/2/9 was responsible for security of Route #9 within its area of operation and provided close-in security by conducting squad size patrols, ambushes and daily road sweeps.

5. Company "H". 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines. From 1 March until 2 March 1968 H/2/9 was responsible for "Mikes Hill" at vic (YD 074574) and the position at vic (YD 073563). During this time H/2/9 was responsible for security of Route #9 within its area of operation and provided close-in security by conducting squad size patrols, ambushes and daily road sweeps. H 1 2/9 was OPCON to F/2/9 as F 4/2/9 from 4 March to 18 March 1968. Hotel 2/2/9 was OPCON to F/2/9 as F 4/2/9 from 18 March to 31 March 1968. From 2 March until 31 March 1968 H/2/9 was responsible for a portion of the perimeter defense of Camp J.J. CARROLL providing local security, road sweeps and convoy security in addition to maintaining a combat outpost at vic (YD 067542). From 20 March until 31 March 1968 H/2/9 manned a daylight combat outpost at vic (YD 074537).

6. H & S Company. 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines. From 1 March 1968 until 31 March 1968 H&S 2/9 provided normal services in support of the Battalion operating out of Camp J.J. CARROLL.

7. Company "K", 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines. K/3/1 was OPCON to 2/9 from 051135H Mar 68 until 110930H Mar 68. During this time K/3/1 was responsible for a portion of the perimeter defense of Camp J. J. CARROLL providing local security.
8. Company "M", 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines. M/3/4 was OPCON to 2/9 from 081100H Mar 68 until 100900H Mar 68. During this time M/3/4 was a blocking force for E/2/9 on a two company operation under 2/9 ALPHA command group.
9. Company "L", 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines. L/3/1 was OPCON to 2/9 from 110930H Mar 68 until 161500H Mar 68. During this time L/3/1 was responsible for a portion of the perimeter defense at Camp J. J. CARROLL providing local security.
0. Company "I", 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines. I/3/1 was OPCON to 2/9 from 231800H Mar 68 until 312400H Mar 68. During this time I/3/1 was responsible for a portion of the perimeter defense of Camp J. J. CARROLL, providing local security.
1. Company "K", 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines. K/3/9 was OPCON to 2/9 from 261700H Mar 68 until 261700H Mar 68. During this time K/3/9 took part in a two company search and destroy operation, with E/2/9, under the 2/9 BRAVO command group.

b. On a more direct nature, broadcasts in conjunction with the Chieu Hoi Program were regularly conducted against elements in the vicinity of Camp J. J. CARROLL. At the time of this report, no positive results have been attained from that activity.

M680 Ignition Cyl. flames
M746 Demo C-4
M17 Fuze VT

5
30
260

7. Close Combat. During the month of March 1968, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines conducted four company, 45 Platoon, and 119 Squad size patrol. It also conducted 48 squad size ambushes, 34 fire team observation posts and 427 fire team size listening posts.

8. Training. Due to operational commitments very little formal training was conducted. Battalion held a ten day PPS-6 ground surveillance radar operator school, training five PPS-6 operators. 96 replacement personnel received training in accordance with DIVO 1510.3B.

9. Fire Support and Fire Support Coordination.

a. Second Battalion, 9th Marines was provided direct artillery support from 1 March to 31 March 1968 by "A" and "C" Batteries; 1st Battalion, 12th Marines, "W" Battery, 3d Battalion, 12th Marines, and "K" Battery, 4th Battalion, 12th Marines. Tactical and technical fire direction was provided by H&S, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines.

b. During the period 1 March to 31 March 1968 a total of 4,493 HE, 265 WP and 70 Illumination rounds were expended in support of operations. The following is a breakdown of the total round expenditure:

| <u>TARGET</u> | <u>RDS. EXPENDED</u> |
|-------------------------|----------------------|
| Counter-Mortar Fires | 1,392 |
| Counter-Artillery Fires | 250 |
| Live Targets | 466 |
| Suspected Activities | 480 |
| Prep. Fires | 310 |
| Illum. | 70 |
| H & I's | 1,860 |
| | <u>4,828</u> Total |

c. During said period of time 81mm mortars provided organizational support of the battalion firing 1,612 HE, 102 WP and 215 Illumination rounds.

d. Artillery support for the period 1 March 1968 to 31 March 1968 was considered satisfactory.

10. Air Support.

a. Medevacs. 46 Emergency and Priority cases were medevaced this month, including two civilians. Reaction time was excellent.

b. Command and Control. On 28 March 1968 CO 2/9 used 4th Marines working helicopters for airborne surveillance of company positions vic (YD 150530).

c. Resupply. During March H-34's and CH-46's lifted 22,962 pounds in 16 lifts to 2/9 units in the field.

d. Troop Lifts. On 25 March 1968 three CH-46's lifted E/2/9 (+) to vic (YD 185545) in four waves. On 28 March 11 CH-46's returned E/2/9 (+) to Camp J.J. CARROLL in one wave.

e. Fixed Wing. During March 11 fixed wing and Huey gunships flew in direct support of 2/9. On 20 March 1968 a flight was controlled by the Air Liaison Officer, the remainder were controlled by various AO's. Total confirmed bomb damage assessment was seven KIA, 10 rocket sites destroyed, three mortar pits and weapons destroyed, two mortar positions damaged and five bunkers destroyed.

2. Camp Development.

(1) Two strongbacks were constructed to replace those destroyed by incoming enemy rockets.

(2) Construction was begun on new bunkers for FDC, BAS, and COC by MCB-5.

(3) A new chapel is presently under construction.

(4) Work on the perimeter continued with the rebuilding of positions and addition of more barbed obstacles during this period.

3. Operation. Companies G and F continued to provide security for route #9 as part of Operation LANCASTER II. Companies E and H manned the perimeter in addition to going on small operations of limited duration. See S-3 Chronology for details.

4. Troop Movement. During this period (63) trucks and (39) trailers moved 213 men in (3) lifts.

5. Logistical Lifts. During this period (20,263) lbs. of supplies were moved utilizing H-34 helicopters in 15 lifts.

6. Ammunition Expenditure for the Month of March 1968.

| <u>NOMENCLATURE</u> | <u>EXPENDED</u> |
|------------------------------|-----------------|
| A071 Ball 5.56 | 25,200 |
| A066 Ball 5.56 | 54,720 |
| A127 7.62 linked | 11,200 |
| A574 50, Cal. Tracer | 50 |
| B568 40mm EE M406 | 576 |
| B569 40mm HE | 72 |
| B626 60mm HE | 992 |
| B627 60mm Illum | 225 |
| B630 60mm W.P. | 324 |
| C255 81mm HE | 1,237 |
| C226 81mm Illum | 197 |
| C232 81mm HE 362A | 252 |
| C234 81mm W.P. | 103 |
| C651 106mm Heat | 24 |
| G890 Gren. Hand Frag. M-26 | 100 |
| G895 Gren. Hand Illum | 120 |
| G900 Gren. Hand Inced. | 9 |
| G930 Gren. Hand Smk H.C. | 32 |
| G935 Gren. Hand WP | 50 |
| G888 Gren. Hand Frag. M-33 | 552 |
| G940 Gren. Hand Smk 9mm M18 | 48 |
| G945 Gren. Hand Smk Vel M18 | 80 |
| G950 Gren. Hand Smk. Red M18 | 16 |
| H555 Rkt. 66mm Heat M72 | 240 |
| H600 Rkt. 3.5 Heat M28 | 115 |
| H602 Rkt. 3.5 wp | 45 |
| L310 Sig Illum Grn Starpara | 36 |
| L311 Sig Illum Red Starpara | 103 |
| L312 Sig Illum White Para | 72 |
| L314 Sig Grn Star Clust | 105 |
| L315 Sig Red Star Clust | 36 |
| L316 Sig White Star Clust | 72 |
| M495 Flare Surface trip | 96 |
| M026 Bangalore Torpedo | 70 |
| M130 Cap blasting elec | 200 |
| M131 Cap blasting non-elec | 300 |
| M420 Chg shape 15 lb | 48 |
| M455 Cord Det FT | 2,000 |

Section V - S-4 Chronology

1. General. The overall supply situation improved somewhat during this period however Motor Transport and Comm-Elect developed critical shortages of some component parts, directly affecting their combat readiness.

a. Supply. Significant shortages are (800) air mattresses, (500) protective masks M-17, (600) first aid kits, (100) compasses M-2, and (80) wrist watches.

b. Ordnance.

(1) Currently the following items are on third echelon deadline: (1) M-79 Grenade Launcher. Items on second echelon deadline include: (2) Flamethrowers, Portable.

(2) The Class V situation has improved slightly however there is still room for improvement. Some 75 cases of 7.62 link ammo were received during this period and the resupply of M-26 fragmentation grenades also improved considerably. Despite this, the following items are still available in limited amounts: 106 HEPT, 81 Illum, M18A1 Claymore, Signal Ground Illum, M79-40mm.

c. Comm/Elect.

(1) Due to shortages of second echelon repair parts the situation declined in this area. Difficulty in obtaining A-6, A-9 and A-10 modules has rendered (10) PRC-25's unserviceable at this time. All above items have been nominated for red ball.

(2) The Battalion presently has on 3rd echelon deadline the following items: (1) Radar Set AN/TPS-21, (1) Radio Set AN/PRC-41, (4) Battery charger PP3240 A/U and (3) Radio Set AN/PRC-25.

(3) The following items are on second echelon deadline: (2) AN/PRC-47, (5) Radio Set AN/GRC-125, (10) Radio Set AN/PRC-25 and (2) Speech Security Device KY-8.

(4) The following items are on order: (1) Battery Charger PP3240A/U, (3) Radio Set AN/PRC-25, (1) Radio Set AN/MRC-109.

d. Motor Transport.

(1) The situation in this area deteriorated considerably due to the non-availability of spark plugs and starters for truck, platform M-274. Presently (18) of these vehicles are unserviceable due to a shortage of spark plugs while (3) are deadlined due to starter trouble. In addition to this, a truck utility M-422 was deadlined as a result of an accident, worsening an already critical situation in this item. No M-151A1 vehicles have yet begun to replace this item.

e. Supporting Units.

(1) FLSG-B provides the bulk of the logistical support.

(2) Engineer support is provided by 11th Engineers.

(3) Truck support is provided by 4th Marines with trucks attached from 9th Motor Transport Battalion.

2/9 6803

Section VIII - Medical Chronology

1. General. During the month of March 1968, the BAS held sick call for 1494 Marine Corps Personnel. The medical action program rendered 1554 treatments to Montagnard refugees in Cam Lo.

2. Sanitation. Routine daily sanitation inspections were made of the Battalion area. Spraying of latrines and messing areas was limited owing to unavailability of spraying apparatus from battalion supply.

3. Disease, Injuries, and Treatment in General. The BAS continues to maintain a ten bed ward as well as a hospital bunker for minor illnesses and emergency treatment during hostile enemy acts. Personnel requiring more extensive treatment are referred to the 3rd Medical Battalion for evaluation, treatment, and further evacuation. Most patients treated were of a routine nature. Accidents were the most serious medical problems seen during the month. They included accidental discharges with rifles and pistols as well as improper use of grenades and a grenade blasting cap. The results varied from loss of life to permanent disability of a foot to possible loss of an eye to merely lost time from full duty. Shrapnel wounds from hostile enemy acts accounted for most of the time lost from the field this past month. Another problem which has become more serious as the Battalion stays in a semi stationary position where Marines have more time to sit and worry is that of anxiety reaction manifesting in numerous forms such as hyperventilation, asthma, migraine headaches, etc.

4. Casualties and Hospitalization. Eighteen personnel from the Battalion were hospitalized at the BAS during the month. Outpatient treatment consisted of 54 shrapnel wounds, 72 miscellaneous injuries, 15 FUO, 50 upper respiratory infections, 42 cellulitis, 8 psychiatric disorders, and 22 urology infections.

5. Training. Orientation lectures were given to newly joined personnel. The subject matter included personal hygiene, self aid and buddy aid, venereal disease, care and protection of the feet, cellulitis, and the snake problem in Vietnam. Considerable on the job training was given in suturing under close supervision for corpsmen as well as medical lectures for their training.

6. Complement of BAS. At the close of the month, the BAS had a complement of 1 Medical Officer and 59 Hospital Corpsmen. There are 4 Hospital Corpsmen 1st class attached to the BAS at this time.

There were 12 non-effectives during this period.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

Section IX - Chaplains Chronology

Religious services, Protestant and Catholic, were conducted regularly during the month of March for 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines by the Battalion Chaplain (Protestant) and the Chaplain of the 1st Battalion, 12th Marines (Catholic). Additionally visits were made by the Chaplain for Battalion units deployed in the field.

The Battalion Chaplain participated in the orientation program for newly arrived personnel by advising them of his role within the Battalion and of his availability for personal counsel, as well as in presenting an explanation of the religions and customs of Vietnam.

Of significance during the month was the conduct of a Protestant Folk Singing presentation by the Chaplain, assisted by musically talented personnel of the Battalion, and the beginning of construction of the new Battalion Chapel. Religious material, (Catholic rosaries, and Protestant and Catholic meditational literature.)

HEADQUARTERS

2d Battalion, 9th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

1/IMB/hdn
1080

2 March 1968

From: Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF (Attn: SC-1)

Subj: Personnel Daily Summary

Ref: (a) DivO 1080.3A
(b) RegtO 1080.3A

1. The below information is correct for the period ending 2400, 1 March 1968

| | TOTAL ASSIGNED STRENGTH | | | | NON-EFFECTIVES | | | |
|-------|-------------------------|------|-----|-----|----------------|-----|-----|-----|
| | USMC | | USN | | USMC | | USN | |
| | OFF | ENL | OFF | ENL | OFF | ENL | OFF | ENL |
| H&S | 18 | 297 | 2 | 60 | 3 | 20 | 0 | 4 |
| E | 5 | 213 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 54 | 0 | 0 |
| F | 4 | 194 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 24 | 0 | 0 |
| G | 6 | 201 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 23 | 0 | 0 |
| H | 6 | 205 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 35 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 39 | 1110 | 2 | 60 | 6 | 156 | 0 | 4 |

ATTACHMENTS:

TOTAL ATTACHMENTS:

DETACHMENTS:

TOTAL DETACHMENTS:

By direction

HEADQUARTERS
2d Battalion, 9th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

1/LMB/kgp
1080

8 March 1968

From: Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF (Attn: SC-1)

Subj: Personnel Daily Summary

Ref: (a) DivO 1080.3A
(b) RegtO D80.3A

1. The below information is correct for the period ending 2400, 7 March 1968

| | TOTAL ASSIGNED STRENGTH | | | | NON-EFFECTIVES | | | |
|-------|-------------------------|------|-----|-----|----------------|-----|-----|-----|
| | USMC | | USN | | USMC | | USN | |
| | OFF | ENL | OFF | ENL | OFF | ENL | OFF | ENL |
| H&S | 18 | 302 | 2 | 58 | 3 | 12 | 0 | 4 |
| E | 5 | 208 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 47 | 0 | 0 |
| F | 5 | 198 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 | 0 | 0 |
| G | 6 | 204 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 31 | 0 | 0 |
| H | 5 | 204 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 33 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 39 | 1116 | 2 | 58 | 5 | 145 | 0 | 4 |

ATTACHMENTS:

TOTAL ATTACHMENTS:

DETACHMENTS:

TOTAL DETACHMENTS:

By direction

HEADQUARTERS
 2d Battalion, 9th Marines
 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 FPO San Francisco 96602

1/LMB/kgp
 1080

15 March 1968

From: Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines
 To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF (Attn: SC-1)

Subj: Personnel Daily Summary

Ref: (a) DivO 1080.3A
 (b) RegO D80.3A

1. The below information is correct for the period ending 2400, 14 March 1968

| | TOTAL ASSIGNED STRENGTH | | | | NON-EFFECTIVES | | | |
|-------|-------------------------|------|-----|-----|----------------|-----|-----|-----|
| | USMC | | USN | | USMC | | USN | |
| | OFF | ENL | OFF | ENL | OFF | ENL | OFF | ENL |
| H&S | 18 | 300 | 2 | 58 | 2 | 14 | 0 | 4 |
| E | 5 | 208 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 42 | 0 | 0 |
| F | 5 | 202 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 32 | 0 | 0 |
| G | 6 | 202 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 28 | 0 | 0 |
| H | 5 | 203 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 39 | 1115 | 2 | 58 | 3 | 145 | 0 | 4 |

ATTACHMENTS:

TOTAL ATTACHMENTS:

DETACHMENTS:

TOTAL DETACHMENTS:

By direction

HEADQUARTERS
2d Battalion, 9th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

1/TMB/kgp
1080

22 March 1968

From: Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF (Attn: SC-1)

Subj: Personnel Daily Summary

Ref: (a) DivO 1080.3A
(b) Regto D80.3A

1. The below information is correct for the period ending 2400, 21 March 68

| | TOTAL ASSIGNED STRENGTH | | | | NON-EFFECTIVES | | | |
|-------|-------------------------|------|-----|-----|----------------|--------------------------------|-----|-----|
| | USMC | | USN | | USMC | | USN | |
| | OFF | ENL | OFF | ENL | OFF | ENL | OFF | ENL |
| H&S | 18 | 303 | 2 | 58 | 1 | ¹⁷ 18 | 0 | 2 |
| E | 5 | 211 | 0 | 0 | 1 | ²⁵ 27 | 0 | 0 |
| F | 5 | 208 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ²⁹ 30 | 0 | 0 |
| G | 6 | 197 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ²⁰ 29 | 0 | 0 |
| H | 5 | 202 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ²³ 21 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 39 | 1121 | 2 | 58 | 2 | 1213 114 | 0 | 2 |

ATTACHMENTS:

TOTAL ATTACHMENTS:

DETACHMENTS:

TOTAL DETACHMENTS:

By direction

HEADQUARTERS
2d Battalion, 9th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

1/IMB/3A1
1080
29 March 1968

From: Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF (Attn:SC-1)

Subj: Personnel Daily Summary

Ref: (a) DivO 1080.3A
(b) Regto 1080.3A

1. The below information is correct for the period ending 2400, 28 March 1968

| | TOTAL ASSIGNED STRENGTH | | | | NON-EFFECTIVES | | | |
|-------|-------------------------|------------|------------|------------|----------------|------------|------------|------------|
| | USMC | | USN | | USMC | | USN | |
| | <u>OFF</u> | <u>ENL</u> | <u>OFF</u> | <u>ENL</u> | <u>OFF</u> | <u>ENL</u> | <u>OFF</u> | <u>ENL</u> |
| H&S | 18 | 306 | 2 | 59 | 2 | 22 | 0 | 3 |
| E | 5 | 209 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 31 | 0 | 0 |
| F | 5 | 206 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 | 0 | 0 |
| G | 6 | 194 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 0 | 0 |
| H | 5 | 201 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 39 | 1116 | 2 | 59 | 3 | 120 | 0 | 3 |

ATTACHMENTS:

TOTAL ATTACHMENTS:

DETACHMENTS:

TOTAL DETACHMENTS:

By direction

HEADQUARTERS
2d Battalion, 9th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), MAF
FPO San Francisco 96602

1/LMB/j11
1080
31 March 1968

From: Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), MAF (Attn:SC-1)

Subj: Personnel Daily Summary

Ref: (a) DivO 1080.3A
(b) Regto 1080.3A

1. The below information is correct for the period ending 2400, 30 March 1968

| | TOTAL ASSIGNED STRENGTH | | | | NON-EFFECTIVES | | | |
|-------|-------------------------|------------|------------|------------|----------------|------------|------------|------------|
| | USMC | | USN | | USMC | | USN | |
| | <u>OFF</u> | <u>ENL</u> | <u>OFF</u> | <u>ENL</u> | <u>OFF</u> | <u>ENL</u> | <u>OFF</u> | <u>ENL</u> |
| H&S | 18 | 309 | 2 | 59 | 2 | 19 | 0 | 2 |
| E | 5 | 208 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 26 | 0 | 0 |
| F | 5 | 206 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 23 | 0 | 0 |
| G | 6 | 194 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 18 | 0 | 0 |
| H | 5 | 201 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 28 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 39 | 1118 | 2 | 59 | 3 | 114 | 0 | 2 |

ATTACHMENTS:

TOTAL ATTACHMENTS:

DETACHMENTS:

TOTAL DETACHMENTS:

By direction