

NAVAL MESSAGE

ORNAV FORM 2110-28A (REV. 3-61)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(when filled in)

RELEASED BY J. B. HENDRICKS		DRAFTED BY J. B. HENDRICKS		PHONE EXT. NR.	PAGE 1	PAGES 2
DATE 20 MAY 1975	TOR/TOD	ROUTED BY		CHECKED BY		
MESSAGE NR 9401	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT) 300712Z	PRECEDENCE ACTION	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE XXX	PRIORITY
		INFO			XXX	ROUTINE DEFERRED

INFO SECOND BN NINTH MARINES

FM: NINTH MARINES

TO: CG THIRD MARDIV **BT**~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ //NO3000//

USMAYAGUEZ KOH TANG ISLAND OPS LESSONS LEARNED (U)

A. CG-3D MARDIV 200820Z MAY 75 (C)

1. THE FOLLOWING LESSONS LEARNED ARE SUBMITTED AS REQUESTED BY REFERENCE A

A. COMMAND AND CONTROL

(1) THE COMMANDER OF FORCES ASHORE MUST BE ABLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH HIGHER HEADQUARTERS [IN THIS CASE GSF]. WITHOUT DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS, OUTSIDE DECISIONS AND OCCURRENCES AND/OR LOCAL TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS CANNOT INFLUENCE THE CONDUCT OF THE ACTION ASHORE.

(2) THE COMMANDER OF FORCES ASHORE MUST BE ABLE TO COMMUNICATE (PERHAPS INDIRECTLY BUT IN A TIMELY FASHION) WITH HIS REAR ECHELON. THIS REAR ECHELON MUST PERFORM THE DUTIES OF PERSONNEL ACCOUNTING, RESUPPLY, AND ADJUSTMENT OF THE COMPOSITION OF REINFORCEMENTS OR SUBSEQUENT SCHEDULED WAVES.

(3) AN ABCCC, WHEN EMPLOYED, SHOULD EITHER PERFORM AS A COMMAND CENTER OR AS A COMMUNICATIONS RELAY CENTER. SHOULD THE AIRBORNE CENTER BE EMPLOYED AS A COMMAND CENTER, THE OVERALL COMMANDER OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE ^{and tactical} LOGISTICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF DEBATED UNITS SHOULD BE ABOARD. PRESENCE OF SUCH WOULD ENSURE FAMILIARITY WITH ASSAULT FORCE TACTICAL PLANS, COMM PROCEDURES, TERMINOLOGY, REPORTING PROCEDURES, AND ORGANIZATION. *Multiple ABCCC should be identically staffed.*

(4) IN PLANNING, SHOULD THE PROBABILITY OF COMBAT BE EVEN A REMOTE CONSIDERATION, THEREIT SHOULD BE THE ^{major planning principle} CONSIDERATION, WITHIN DIPLOMATIC CONSTRAINTS.

B. INTELLIGENCE. ON OPERATIONS SUCH AS THE ONE PROMPTING THIS REPORT, LOW LEVEL ON SCENE INFORMATION IS OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE. IN ANY TASK ORGANIZED HEADQUARTERS A FUNCTIONING STAFF OR UNIT FOR THE RECEPTION, PROCESSING AND DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE IS IMPERATIVE. SUCH STAFF OR (UNIT) MUST HAVE JOINT ACCESS AND CAPABILITIES WHERE JOINT EFFORTS ARE CONCERNED. FOR EXAMPLE, ~~20~~ AFTER THE OPERATION AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT WITH DTG TWO DAYS BEFORE THE OPERATION STATING AN ALMOST EXACT DESCRIPTION OF THE ENEMY FORCE ACTUALLY ENCOUNTERED (7 TO 10 TIMES THE FORCE ESTIMATED BY INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE DURING PLANNING). ~~22/15~~ IS GROSSLY UNSATISFACTORY.

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RELEASED BY J. B. HENDRICKS		DRAFTED BY J. B. HENDRICKS		PHONE EXT. NR.	PAGE 2	PAGES 2		
DATE 30 MAY 1975	TOR/TOD	ROUTED BY		CHECKED BY				
MESSAGE NR. 9441 9442	DATE/TIME GROUP (GCT) 300712Z	PRECEDENCE ACTION INFO	FLASH	EMERGENCY	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE XXX	PRIORITY	ROUTINE	DEFERRED

C. LOGISTICS

(1) TROOP MOVEMENTS, EVEN WHEN BASICALLY ~~RELIABLE~~, ~~DEPEND~~ ON CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE COMMANDER'S GENERAL PLAN OF SEQUENTIAL EMPLOYMENT (IN THIS CASE, AMMUNITION ARRIVED WELL AFTER THE TROOPS AND WAS NOT AVAILABLE FOR ISSUE UNTIL MIDNIGHT.)

(2) THE COMMANDER ASHORE MUST BE CAPABLE OF DIRECTLY INFLUENCING HIS RESUPPLY AND OF INFLUENCING THE METHOD OF DELIVERY.

D. COMMUNICATIONS

(1) THE CONCEPT OF UTILIZING THE BATTALION TACTICAL NET AS A GENERAL PURPOSE SUPPORTING ARMS REQUEST/NET ON THIS OPERATION PROVED TOTALLY UNSATISFACTORY. THE COMMANDER'S TACTICAL NET MUST BE RESERVED FOR HIS TACTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL PURPOSES. (2) THE APPROPRIATE SUPPORTING ARMS REQUEST/DIRECTION NETS ~~SHOULD~~ BE USED TO CONTROL THE SUPPORTING ARMS. THE ABCOC CHOSE TO COMBINE ALL NETS AND TO USE THE BATTALION TACTICAL AS THE SOLE NET FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE GROUND PHASE OF THE OPERATION, AN ACTION WHICH WAS DETRIMENTAL TO BOTH THE TACTICAL GROUND COMMUNICATIONS AND SUPPORTING ARMS.

E. SUPPORTING ARMS

(1) ~~AMMUNITION~~ ~~DELIVERED~~ INTO THE AREA OF OPERATIONS MUST BE UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE COMMANDER ASHORE. EXCEPTIONS MUST BE AGREED UPON PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT OF OPERATIONS. (E.G. THE 15,000 POUND SURPRISE).

F. HELICOPTER UTILIZATION AND TACTICS

(1) LARGE HELICOPTERS SUCH AS CH-53'S CAN NOT BE USED TO INSERT TROOPS INTO UNSECURE LZ'S WITHOUT PREP FIRES AND ESCORT ATTACK HELO'S (AH-1'S)

(2) A FOUR HOUR ROUND TRIP TO OBJECTIVE AREA WITH ALL HELICOPTERS AVAILABLE IN THE AIR AT ONCE REMOVES ALL FLEXIBILITY FROM THE PLAN. CONSEQUENTLY, WHEN IT BECAME NECESSARY IN THIS CASE TO EFFECT A RAPID BUILD-UP OF FORCES ASHORE AND TO EXTRACT MEDEVACS THE TIME/DISTANCE AND ASSETS AVAILABLE FACTORS COMPLETELY PRECLUDED THE REQUIRED TACTICAL ADJUSTMENTS.

(3) DIRECT COMMUNICATION BETWEEN GROUND FORCES AND HELICOPTERS IS REQUIRED TO PLAN ALTERNATE LZ'S, DISCUSS EXTRACTION TACTICS, ETC.

ADS 30 MAY 1976

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