# Drangery

ALADQUARTERS
3d Battalion, 9th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

3/LCJ/elc 005750 1 August 1966

CECIO

From: Commanding Officer

To: Commanding Officer, 9th Marines

Subj: Command Chronology


(19) FragO 51**-**66 (20) FragO 52**-**66

Ref: (a) Div0 5750.1

(1) Command Chromology 1-31 July 1966 S-2 Journal S-3 Journal 4) Lessons Learned dtd 1 August 1966 Frag0 37-66 Frag0 38-66 Frag0 39-66 (8) Frag**O** 40-66 9) Frag0 41-66 **10)** Frag0 42-66 11) Frag0 43-66 12) Frago 44-66 .**1**3) Frag0 45**-**66 14) Frago 46-66 15) Frag0 47-66 16) Frag0 48-66 17) Frag0 49-66 (18) FragO 50-66

ADDED TAB-A: A/A Report, Operation MACON, 4-14 Jul 1966
1. In accordance with reference (a) enclosures (1) through (20) are submitted.

F.D. MACLEAN, JR.



UNCLASSIFIED

The service of the service COMMAND CHRONOLOGY, 1-31 JULY 1966 the first of the second of the second of the

# 1. Organization Data: with the training of the training of the state of the sta

# a. Designation Location:

- (1) 3d Battalion, 9th Marines
- (2) 1-31 July occupied Battalian CP vic (AT 875473) (An Hoa)

# b. Period Covered + 1+31 July 1966 ... c. Commanding Officer, (Staff and Frincipal Subordinates:

- (1) Commanding Officer 1-31 July Major G. H. GRIMES
- (2) Executive Officer 1-31 July Major W.D. HUBBARD
  (3) S-3 1-27 July Capt. R.P. BROOKS
  28-31 July Capt. G.E. YARBROUGH
  (4) S-2 1-34 July 1st Lt. J.L. BAZIS
  (5) S-4 1-31 July 1st Lt. T.H. FITZPATH
  (6) S-1 1-31 July 1st Lt. H.T. MACKIN (5) S-4. July 1st Lt. T.H. FITZPATRICK
  (6) S-1 1-31 July 1st Lt. H.T. MACKIN
  (7) Co. Cmdr., Co. "I" 1-31 July 1st Lt. T.A. MC GOWAN
  (8) Co. Cmdr., Co. "K" 1-4 July Capt. V.V. "PAVLOVSKIS

  - - 6-31 July 1st Lt. R.F. STALEY
  - (9) Co. Cmdr., Co."L" 1-31 July Capt. C.J. PYLE

  - (10) Co. Cmdr., Co. M" 1-31 July Capt. J.C. GOOP ER
    (11) Co. Cmdr., L&S Co. 1-27 July 1st Lt. J.A. RANK III
    28-31 July 1st Lt. T.H. FITZPATRICK

# d. Average Monthly Strength:

- (1) Marine Officers 30 (2) Marine Enlisted 925 (3) Navy Officers 3
- (4) Mavy inlisted

- (1) Wounded In Action 109 (Med Evac., 56)
- (2) Killed in Action (3) Died of Wounds

Enclosure (1)

# Declarated

# b. <u>Intelligence</u>

# (1) Situation:

(a) Enemy activity during the month of July was highlighted by a general increase in enemy contact and sightings. On 4 July, contact was made with an estimated two companies from a main force battalion believed to be operating in the area. In mid July a series of sightings of VC in grey and green uniforms were noted. The Duc Duc District headquarters located (AT 867477) was mortared on 15 July. Sniper and harrassing fire type incidents were prevalent with some enemy harrassment occuring every day, however, mining and booby trap activity has decreased significantly. An unusual number of intelligence reports were also received during July. Reports from local sources generally indicated the proximity of three battalion sized units, one or more of which was reported to be a North Vietnamese regular unit. Intelligence reports continually indicated an attempt would be made to mortar USMC units in and around the an Hoa area.

(b) Recon sightings in the mountains to the south of An Roa were highlighted by an observed massing of approximately 300 VC, 11 kilometers southeast of An Roa (AT 986496). VC activity in the moutains continues at a moderate rate. The majority of sightings being groups of 2 to 8 men with packs and weapons.

# (2) Enemy Losses:

# (a) Personnel:

	i.	alon 1
(1) VC KIA (CONF)	179	my
, (2) VC KIA (PROB) -	385- g ra	Vit at . [18
+(3) VG WIA (PROB) 0	156 🛬 👯	, 7 ° 152
(4) VCS	-4 , 61 ,	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
(5) VCC	,6, ; ]	Far 60 1,07,772
j		· 722, 3 5
Destroyed Enemy Mate	rlal:+ -n :	g 70 g g
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(1) Trenchline		.2918 meters
(2) Covered trenchli	ue	.300 meters
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attales in		2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2



# (c) Destroyed/Captured Auspment:

- (1) Booby Traps ---- 15 Grenades 1 Canteen 1 Shoe Box Mine (2) Mines ----1 Shotgun Shell Mine 1 AT Mine 5 M-16 Mines
- (d) <u>Ammo</u>:
  - (1) 2-105MM Duds
  - (2) 1-155MM Dud
  - (3) 9-60MM Duds
  - (4) 2-82MM Duds
  - (5) 2-81MM Duds

  - (6) 1-COMI Dud (7) 3-57MM Duds (8) 1 Rifle Grenade
  - (9) 1 Ampo Dump (Destroyed)
  - (10) 480rds 30cal. Ammo
  - (11) Cannister C-4

# (e) Equipment:

- (1) 2-55gal. Drums of Korosene
- (2) 1 Cartridge Belt
- (3) Assorted Packs and Documents
- (4) Medical Gear and Clothing
- (5) 2 Gas Masks


# (f) Weapons:

- (1) 1-7.65MM German Pistol
- (2) 1-.38 cal. Smith and Wesson Pistol

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Enclosure (1)







- (3) 2 U,S. H→1 Rifles (4) 1 K-50 MG.
- c. Training: Training during this period was directed toward maintaining a high degree of proficiency in combat skills. Special training was conducted for all replacement personnel prior to assignments to company units. Ref: 3d Battalion, 9th Marines msg 230910Z.
- d. Communication/Electronics: During the month of July, the communications platoon provided communications for operations within the An Hoa TAOR. Supported joint USIC/ARVN operations by providing radios and operators to support U.S. Army advisors to the 2nd Battalion, 51st ARVI Regiment.

# -. "Close Combat:

1-3 July: During this period the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines engaged in search and clear operations designed to gain control of an LCC from An Hoa to the south bank of the Song Thu Bon in GS (AT 92-53).

#### Uperation Macon:

4 July: Phase I of Operation Macon began at 041500H when Co."K" conducting search and clear operations in GS (AT 91-50) with LVTP-5 leading the company was imbushed in the vic (AT 914507), two antracs were disabled by lirect hits from RPG-2. An AO reported sighting 250 300 armed VC in the vic of (AT 904512). Co."K" came under heavy fire from 60MM mortars and numerous small arms both automatic and seminutomatic, including a 50cal. MG. At about 1720 Co."I" approached the battle area from the southwest to support Co."K". Both companies had continued contact with the enemy during the night of 4 July. On 5 July this command received 9th Marines Frago (186-66) directing the initiation of Operation Macon. On 5 July Phase I of the operation continued with 3d Battalion, 9th Marines attacking with three companies abreast from an LOD generally formed along a line described by coordinates (AT 903518) (AT 907504), and (AT 910497) in a northeasterly direction.

Phase II: Phase II of Operation Macon commenced with the insert on of friendly blocking positions generally along the railroad bed to the south and east and along the north bank of the



Enclosure (1)



Song Thu Bon, and Song Ky Lam. During this phase 3d Battalion, 9th Marines continued the attack in a northeasterly and easterly direction until establishing contact with 1st Battalion, 3d Marines at 101515H in the vicinity of (AT 000535). thus termination of Phase II. Phase II was characterized by light contact with the enemy.

Phase III: Phase III of Macon was initiated on 11 July and cosisted of search and destroy operations in the vic of (GS 9852,9853,9753,9754,9654,9554 and 9453).

11 through 31 July: Operation Macon has continued as a search and clear operation in the rea of the proposed road from An Hoa operating base to the Song Thu Bon including providing the security for Vietnamese workman engaged in the construction of the road.

#### f. Fire Support and Fire Support Coordination:

- (1) During the month of July, Battery F, 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines, fired in excess of 150 missions, approximately one third of those were in support of Recommassance OP. Artillery killed 34 VC by body count and another 188 probable.
- (2) On the night of 6 July, Battery F, expended 1500rds. of ammunition in one continuous fire mission.
- (3) Artillery was employed on one mission during July to clear a suspected mine field, resulting in several secondary explosions. The unit being supported then moved through the area without any mine casualities.
- (4) The time necessary to process an average a fire mission was four minutes which is not satisfactory. When control extends beyond the battalion and the respective supporting batteries, the time necessary to process a mission increases greatly. Therefore, it is highly desirable that control of supporting arms remain with the lowest echelon of command possible.


# g. Medical and Dental Support:


(1) The battalion and station treated 93 casulities during Operation Macon. There was no lack of material needed for medical support and the functioning of the battalion aid station was satisfactory.

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- (3) The Med Cap program for the month was curtailed due to operational commitments of battalion aid personnel. However, a total of 1,640 civilians were treated.
  - (A) Approximately 500 immunizations were given this month.
- (5) The dental detachment treated 249 Marine patients and performed 723 procedures. During this same period, 30 Vietnamese were treated for a total of 44 procedures.

#### h. Cha wan Sup out:

- (1) Divino Services:
  - (a) Protestant:
    - 1. No. Services: 1
    - 2. Total Attendance: 248
  - (b) Ca c sc
    - 1. No. Services:
    - 2. Total Attendance: 189
- (2) Menorial Services:
- (3) Civil Affairs: The Battalion Chaplain accompanied a Mike Co. civil affairs patrol in My Loc hamlet at 281700.
  - (4) Significant Events:
- (a) A chapel and Chaplain's office has been provided in one of the new tropical huts.
- (b) The tactical situation now permits the Chaplain to resume holding divine worship services in the field.

Enclosure (1)
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### i. Civil Affairs:

- (1) Public Health: Medical treatment was given to 410 women, 277 men and 619 children. 65 Vietnamese were nedically evacuated. Surgical and diagnostic cases were accepted by BAS when referred by local medical personnel.
- (2) Public Welfare: The following items were distributed to refugees and needy persons. 564 lbs. of food and several hundred cans of unopened C rations, 275 lbs. of clothing, 902 bars of soap, 171 boxes of candy and 2 textile kits.

## (3) Food and Agriculture:

- (a) The first Duc Duc District Farmers Seminar sponsored by 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, was held 27 July. Officials from Vietnamese Ministry of Agriculture, 29 C/A Co., and local officials attended this seminar. The farmers expressed a desire to form a cooperative for the purchase of fertilizer and other needed materials.
- (b) It was agreed that the second Duc Duc District Farmers Seminar will be held 14 August 1966. During this seminar a team will be present to form the farmers into a cooperative. A representative from National Agriculture Credit Organization will be present to arrange credit for the cooperative.
- (4) This command has provided security for civilian construction workers involved in building about 8 kilometers of road from coord. (AT 888465 to 931524), the road will serve as an MSR for civilian and military activity in the An Hoa area.

### (5) Psychological Warfare:

- (a) Primary Themes:
  - 1. Inevitability of VC defeat
  - 2. USMC is in Vietnam to help GVN in its fight

against the VC.

- (b) Means of Dissemination:
  - 1. Land Broadcast
  - 2. Helo-Drops of 50,000 Leaflets
  - 3. Manual Distribution 330 Magazines
  - 4. Motion Pictures

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Enclosure (1)











LEADQUARTERS 3d Battalion, 9th Marines 3d Marine Division (Rein) Fif c/o PPO, San Francisco, California

> 3/GEY/elc 3100.1 4 August 1966

From: Commanding Officer

Commanding Officer, 9th lerines

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report

Rei: (2) DivO 3:00.1B

(b) 3d Marine Division Frago 408-66

(c) 9th Marine Frago 189-66

Encl: (7) Arealicry

(2) Air (3) Arnox

(4) Angineers

- 1. Code Name: Operation Macon, Search and Destroy
- 2. Dates of Operation: 041500H July 140800H July 1966. Operation continues in area outside of 3d Marine Division TACR.
- 3. Location: Quang Nam Province (Duy Xuyen and Duc Duc District)
- 4. Command EQ:
  70 Bartalion, 9th Marines

Maj. G.H. GRIMAS

5. Task Organization:

CounKr

Co. "L"

Co. 'M'

Amphabian Howitzer Plt.

900 B" (-) 30 Tk. Ba.

30 Fit., Co. 11 3- Ing. Br.

Lt. MC GOWAN

Lt. STILEY

Capt. PYLE

Capt. COOPER

Capt. SCAFATI


Capt. These

Lt. WAILLS

6. Supporting Forces: (See enclosures 1 through 4).

7. Intolligenous

a. Mely forces estimated to se in the objective area prior to connected of the operation were the R-20 Br. (-) and the C-13 13/Convaly: with a combiner strungth of 500 men, plus an indevermine. himser of guerilles in each of the himless.



Vill Accient



to Other union considered to be within reinforcing distance of the area of operation were the V-25 Dm., Q-14 IP Company, Q-15 DF Company and the H-25 Dm Company, with a combined strength of 700 men, plus an undetermined number of local guerilles.

- c. Energy courses of action were considered to be as follows:
- (1) Conduct small scale attacks, ambushes and harrassing action win up to one battalion plus one company, augmented by local guardless.

(2) Defend with up to one battalion and one company augmented by local guarillas.

- (3) Reinforce the above units within the objective area with an additional bettalion and ince companies.
  - (4) Vithdraw or exfiltrate out of the area of operation.
- d. The energy employed capability (i) and (4). Large concentrations of energy were observed only twice during the operation (200-300 : men, 4 July), (20) men on 7 July). On 14 July another estimated 300 energy troops were observed massing in the mountains southeast of An Hos obtained of the area of operation. In the latter case it appeared that the energy was intending to move north into the operating area.
- e. Pre P-Rey intelligence was timely and accurate. Requests for acrual inotography were filled expeditiously. (Four days)
- f. The area, particularly the hardets, contained elaborate systems of trenches and fighting holes, along with niscellaneous tunnels.

#### g. Terrain Analysis:

- '(1) Critical Terrain: The critical terrain in the area of operations were the individual hardets, the Ba Ren and Cay kne Vinn Trinh rivers.
- (2) Obscription and Fields of Fire: Observation in rice paddy areas was good. Witherous harlets and dense vegetation restricted observation and reduced fields of fire. high grass, malberry by socs, corn and cane fields hampered observation in the area between the Song Ba Ren and the Song Thu Bon/Song Ky Lam.
- (3) Cover and Concealment: Cover and concealment was provided by turnels, trunches, caves, grass buts, hedgerows and banboo fances in the hamlets. Dikes offered limited cover and concealment in the rice paddies. Geneteries consisting of large mounds along the Song Inu Bon/Song Ky ham afforded good cover and concealment.
- (4) Obstacle: Natural obstacles were limited to the rivers. Man hade obstacles were the handers and barroom feates. Large counds in the cemeteries proved to be obstacles to LVT traffic.





covered by fire, with rany of them augmented with fighting holes are trenches.

(A) Delicater Landing Zones: Most of the rice paddies in the area of operation were suitable for helicopter landing zones (paddies erudin), noticial, the close preximity to hamlets offere the continuous probability of susper and/or harrassing fire. Ruse paddies in the vicinity of AI 957536 contained anti-relicanter paddies in the vicinity of AI 957536 contained anti-relicanter paddies.

# h. Cartured Mater al. Weapons on Pocuments:

()) deputed intermal: Capture instorial included, rifle and nand gravite. [7] to 1 115, 5/1. Fortar rounds, various them type on later 985 105. There are a considerable amount of medical supplies. (Indianae in west were destroyed).

(2) Intring Maryon; "its city we agon that was captured

was one wall it pastol

(5) upt reforments: Of the many documents that were recovered one revealed anyting of inheliate tactical value. All documents teld forwarded so migner headquarters for further evaluations


# . VC Tactics:

- (1, The VC employed only harrassing tactics with the exception of the action with Co. "K", on the 4 July, and the ineffective mortaring of the cattalion command post on 12 July. During the rortar attack, an estimated 100rds. of small arms were also fired.
- (2) Mines and Booby Traps: There was limited use of mines and bobby traps pringhout the entire operation.

# j. Intol. gence Gainer from Interogation and Ralliers:

(.) Of the AL persons apprehended during Operation Macon, 39 tere delivered to Date Due District Headquarters and 5 were forwarded to 34 Interogration Translation Team, Da Nang for futnet interogration. Most of the captives belonged to some VC association. (VC Farmors ham., Old Min's Assn., etc.). The people claimed they did not belong to these associations by choice but were forced to join. This area was under complete VC domination prior to the operation and as long as the area is not permanently occupied by USMC or government forces, the VC will soon regain some degree of control.





(4) Telecopter Landing Zones: Most of the rice paddles in the area of operation were suitable for helicopter landing zones (paddles ero dit), however, the close preximity to hamlets offere the continuous probability of surper and/or harrassing fire. Rice paddles in the vicinity of Al 937536 contains antiphelicopter projects or education of the barbod wire.

# h. Cartures linterral: Weapons and Documents:

(1) (Appropriately 1: Captured external included, rifle and named granufact 1: 1 1 10 15. 6011 mortan rounds, various chery Type on finds, gus los is racks an a considerable amount of medical supplies. (Crairman's fuence were desire, ed).

(2) Command Margons: None half we agon that was captured

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() Continer Licements: Of the many documents that were recovered fone revealed anything of innerhate tactical value. All documents were forwarded to anguer headquarters for further evaluation.


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- (2) Lines and Booby Traps: There was limited use of mines and Jobly Traps Promynous the entire operation.

# j. Intelligence Gained from Interogation and Ralliers:

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- (i) There was a reinforced VC battalion in the area of operation prior to and on D-Day.
- (2) The VC will, when possible, withdraw/exfiltrate from an area rather than face USMC units when they believe the time and place is not to their advantage. Small groups of guerillas will narrass USMC forces to allow the VC the time to exfiltrate.
- (3) There are still fortified areas within the area of operation as well as an undetermined number of guerillas.
- (4) Main force VC units can and do reenter the area by infiltration anytime USMC units are not physically in the area.

#### 8. Mission:

3d Battalion, 9th Marines acts as movement force in elimination operation conducted by 9th Marines to destroy enony forces and influence in the objective area.

#### 9. Concept of Operation:


Operation Majon was a three phase operation. Phase I commenced at about 041520 July when Co. "K" engaged enemy forces in GS (AT 9054). Phase II was instrated on 6 July with the insertion of two battalions (-) as blocking forces, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines in the foothills to the south (AT 937486-BT 003518). 1st Battalion, 3d Marines along the railroad bed on the east (BT 003518-AF 998546), and with elements of the 1st and 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, already in place, forming blocking positions along the northern bank of the Song Thu Bon. 3d Battalion, 9th Marines attacked northeast from the LOD which generally followed a line described by (AT 903518), (AT 907504), and (AT 910497), toward the railroad to the east. Phase II was terminated on order at the time that elements of jd Battalion, 9th Marines made contact with 1st Dattalion, 3d Marines in the vicinity of (AT 995530). Phase III consisted of 3d Barralion, 9th Marines conducting deliberate search and destroy operations from east to west through the operating area to the vicinity of that position of the proposed Alberty Road south of the Song Thu Bon and is being continued as a clear and hold operation in that area.

#### 10. Executions

A July - At about 041520E leaf elements of Co. "K" in the vicinity of (AT 914504) were engaged by VC forces located at (LT 918510), (AT 918503) and (AT 910500). One LVTP-5 received



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


hits from what was first believed to be a 57MM recoiless rifle, but later learner to be an APG-2 resulting in 1 USMC KI.. and 2 USIC VIA. Co. "A" assumer the offensive, taking action to physically pursue the energy, requesting artillery and air support. Co."I" directed to move from Ai 889503 south to AT 892499 in order to approach the battle area from the northwest and relieve pressure on Co, 'K". Co. "A" havar, by this time received 8 KIA'S and 15 WIM'S. Between 1700 and 1730 Co. "I" consolidated positions in the vicinity of (AT 900505 - AT 905505). At about 1800 an AO sighted 250-300 armed VC in the vicinity of (49 904512) and directed an air strike resulting in 50 VC HIA (CONF) and 25 KIA (FROB). At 1805 Co. "L" departed the An Hoa operating base for a position in the vicinity of (AF 924473) in preparation to enter the battle area on order. After mark Co. "K" directed actillary russions on VC noving out of the battle area in the vicinity of (AT 914508) and (AT 914491). Routes of egross were saturated with northr and artillery, and continuous illumination was provided by arroraft flares. Co. "A" was returned to operational control of this battalion upon the completion of Helo-lift to the in Hoa operating base at 200) and assimed defense of the base.

5 July - Phase I of the operation continued as a search and destroy operation into sporadic energi contact through the day. On one norming of that day VC noving in the vicinities of Companies "I" and "I" were engaged with artillery and fixed wing aircraft. Received Regimental Frago (186-66) directing the contendencht of Operation Macon.

6 July - At 061100H Co."I", "M" and "L" crossed the LOD and began an attack to the northeast. At about 1115 Co. "L" in the vicinity of (Am 920511) received approximately 15rds. of 60MM mortar and observed 30 VC in the vacanity of (AT 927506), Co."L" directed artillary fire. Target coverage good. 2 VC KIA(CONF), 90 VC HIA (PROB), 92 VC WIA (PROB). 1900 Co."L" (AT 920512) observed 35-50 VC in the vicinity of (AT 939507), directed artillery mission, estimated 15 VC KL, (PRCB) and 15 VC WIA (PROB).

7 July - Inird platoon of Co. "I" at (AT 914525 observed 150-200 VC in the vicinity of (AT 918528). An artillery mission of approximately 1500rds of 105MM and 155MM, WP and HE was fired. Fifty percent desialities was estimated. The area was searched at first light, three bodies were discovered, blocky stretchers, bits of blocky clothing and blocky candages led to an estimation that the enary custained 50 KIA's. The 3d Battalion, 9th Marines assumed operational control of a plation of tinks and a section of LvTn-6's and LVTP-5's, continuer the attack within the ZOA6



#### **DECLASSIFIED**

8-10 July - The 3d Battallon, 5th Marines continued to attack in the 20% with light enemy contact. Phase TY of Operation Macon was terminated on order at 101515m after this battalion had made contact with the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines. At 102015m chopped OPCON of Co."K" to 1st Battalion, 3d Marines.

11-14 July - Phase III of Operation Macon began on 11 July with two companies moving east to vest in ZOA conducting deliberate search and destroy operations, continuing the task of reducing VC earthworks. At about 120250II the Battalion Command Group (AT 978530) was the object of an ineffective norter attack. On 14 July the forward command group displaced to An Hoa operating base, and Companies "II" and "I" assumed zones of action in the vicinity of liberty road, south of the Song Thu Bon. Phase III Operation Macon is continuing as a search and clear operation in the Liberty Road area.

#### 11. Results:

a. Friendly Casualities:

(1)	KIA		40		MEDEVAC)
(2)	WIA	aprillar, salering data	81	(38	MEDEVAC)
(3)	MILL!	Ribello uni ma una	0		·

b. Amery Casualities:

(1)	KIA	(Confirmed)	130
(2)	KIA	(Probable)	319
(3)	ACC	التركيسية التركية التركيسية	6
(4)	VCS		58

c. Weapons/Equipment Captured:

* - Pistol	Medical supplies RPG-2 60/M morter round
	Documents Gas Mask
	Uniforms, gray and green


d. Fortifications Destroyed:

550 Seet of tannel 47 covered bunkers

2 baildings identified as VC hospitals

9 trenches





a. Sign: Regipoly to three forward companies and the forward CP value on placked by nelicopter on a daily basis.
Logistic support the provided from FLoG by fixed wing almoralt (C-183, whiteh to we had in accordance with previously established procedures

Je. Con mications:

(1) Communications were excellent throughout. PRC/25 radius insuced continuous contact with battalion rear which mentioned of copied all medic tradius. This practice reduced paper rock by the to well Cts SRT/4, reduced was available for pack up but was disliked only one.

(2) Berey ton Commerciation by utilized a LVP-C-1 from 8-11 July. Tempor AS 390 ULF at some was replaced which ennanced


arraground computation via Am /27.


#### 13. Ochpander's Malyers:

a. The rescinon to the initial enemy contact of 4 July was obtaining. Insirtion by 1st Battalion, 3d Marines and 3d Battalion, 3d Marines and 3d Battalion, 3d Marines are 3d Battalion, 3d Marines are 3d Battalion by 2nd Battalion 51st ARVN acgiment was requested at noon on 6 July and shortly thereafter they occupied blocking positions on the south tying in with 3d Battalion, 4d Marines and Co."M" 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. Their location at that time and place filled a sizeable gap in the corton.

p. It is accepted that a sizeable force broke through the sparsely condened area near (AT 9152) on 6-7 July. It is likely that the VC, in shall groups, exhibitrated to the south where effective llocking by two commanes was impossible. Beavy cantalities were inflicted by a full my during their break out of 6-7 July. Recon initiated shouldery and air mission caused radiatous casualizates 14 July 11 the mountain assembly area.

c. Population and refugee cortrol support was requested from 9th Merines. Prompt action by C/A officer produced the desired results when helicopter broadcasts directed civilians to a refugee control point near (37 OU)1). Thus 38 Bottallon, 9th Marine units were not required to cope with large numbers of civilians.







- d. VC units can and will infiltrate back into areas recently searched and cleared. The VC continually harrass and snipe at USMC units from previously cleared areas. It is evident that unless a area is physically occupied, the VC will return or come out of their hiding places to continue their harrassing activities.
- c. Although the results of Operation Macon were largely negative, the impact upon the VC can be considered damaging.

#### 14. Recommendations:

- as Division units maintain continuous preparedness for committeent as blocking forces in an area where sizeable VC elements have been detected.
- b. Future operations in a cordoned area include, to the extent possible, a centralized refugee collection point where civilians are directed by airborne broadcasts.
- c. Occupation by ARVN or US forces should follow operation to conduct pacification and psychological variare operations and conance CVN control of the area.

W.D. AUBBARD By direction





#### ARTILLERY

1. General: Artillery support was provided by the 105MM nowitzer bastery reinforced by two 155MM nowitzers, located at An Ioa. Two batteries of 105's, one battery of 155 (SP) and a platoon of 8" nowitzers supported the operation from hill 55. Artillery support during Operation Macon was excellent. There was a minimum of delay in obtaining clearance or with getting data to the guns. All requests for supporting fires were filled with speed and accuracy. Existing supply of Class V in the LSA dump at An Hoa was sufficient to support the operation throughout. Even when large volumes of artillery were delivered in a short time, as on the 4th and 6th of July, the ammo level never became crivical.

2. If end I Fire: If and I fires were planned each night during the operation. When possible If and I's were fired from one of the reinforcing batteries to conserve the annumition supply at An Hoa. All II and I fires were closely coordinated with the movement of friendly units.


## 3. Operations:

a. Forward Observors: Forward observors generally performed in an excellent manner; the most opportune targets were engaged during Phase I of the operation.

b. Net Discipline: There were several instances where FO's cut into the middle of a transmission occurring in the early stages of the operation, it is attributed to inexperience of new operators. Action taken by the FSCC precluded repetition beyond the third day.

c. <u>Fuzes</u>: Variety of fuzes were stressed for fire missions. Fuze delay, in particular, was employed when it was known the enemy was sileltered by trenches and fortifications.

d. Aerial Observation: Aerial observation was employed to provide surrectiance of artillery missions. On occasions the AC could not observe as well as the ground observer. On 6 July, when Co."I" engaged a VC company, the AO was requested to control the artillery. Though a fare ship was on station, the AO could not enserve the target que to the heavy she've from artillery impact. On occasions such as this, control best remained with the ground enserver. However AO's were effectively employed in coordinating air strikes together with artillery. The use of the AO in controlling the air and artillery, allowed the maximum coordination of artillery and air support. Artillery





ceased fire when air was prepared to take their strikes and recards fire when the air strike was completed. The chill of communication between FDC. FSCC, air and ground observors enhanced the effectiveness of the supporting arms.

# 1. PSCC:

a. On 9 July, the FSCC was split. There was a mobile FSCC unth the forward command group. The PRC/9 used by the ambile FSCC, was inalequate. Reliable communications were established by a PRC/25 to all fire control units. The mobile FSCC became, in many instances the only link of communication between the observor and the FDC.


o. The problems occurred with a split FSCC, obtaining rapid of extract and imposite assignment of contentration numbers. Our minor was delayed for on call firs because three stations were clearing the missions. Due to the measures of friendly units, final electrone could not be given by the robile FECC.


## 5. Recommed alions:

a. Continue employment of 10 or tactical air controler airborne for coordinated aur-actillary missions. Insure, as far as possible, the communication chain from FIC, to FSCC, agrial observor.

b. To expedite clearance of missions, establish bomb lines to describe the area where movile FSCC can grant final clearance to supporting fires.


c. When mobile FSCC is employed, FJC assign a block of concentration numbers for their use during the operation.






#### AIR

- 1. Central: Air support for Operation Macon was provided for in the fold of a split Air Librar Officer section. One element with the forward CP group; the second element remained with the rear CP at An Ioa. From OT-12 nellhopters were on station between 0700 1700, two word on station between 1800-0700. The helicipans word employed for medical evapuation, resupply and tactious operations.
- 2. Air support for Operation Macon was, with minor exceptions, excellent. The captor'ity of resumply by helicopter enabled combat through to smooth lighter and faster. In puticular, this ly remotive of datulations provided maximum destruction fortifications and minimized the amount of explosives carried by the troops.
- 3. Compate Helicopter requests from units in the field.
  Northly relicopter requests are sent by battalion tactical
  not to the radio operators who in turn submit the request
  to the All blaces Officer section for action. This system
  generally produces satisficately regults with a minimum of
  confusion. To over then the all blace Officer (Actual)
  is then the restained to ward Gr, Company Commanders sent
  their helicopter requests to him over the battalion tactical
  net. The limit officer forward, had no direct communications
  with the Air blacen Officer rear due to the immifficient
  number of radios. Consequently, the Air blacen Officer
  forward, upon receipt of a helicopter request, out of
  necessity had to use the pattalion tactical not to contact
  the rear radio operators, who in turn submitted the request
  to the Air blacen Officer rear.
- 4. Recornectations: That regardless of the establishment of an inclusion of theer forward unit, Company Commanders continue to read their helicopter requests directly to the read over the petitalion tectical net. This system will allow attentie need of sending the came messages twice over the pattalion tectical net, as well as eliminating one link in the request chain, preducing faster helicopter service.





#### ARMOR

#### 1. Carcial:

a. Amphibious howitzers, tanks and amtracs were employed by 3d Battalion, 9th Marines during Operation Macon. On 7 July, the armored vehicles joined the battalion after crossing the Thu Bon River.

b. Vchicles were distributed in the following manner:

(1) Gun tanks, flame tanks and H-6's were assigned ciract support of rifle companies.

(2) One gun tank, (The Company Commanders vehicle), one gun tank, equipped with a dozer blade, an LVT C-1 and M-51 recovery vehicle were in general support, and remained with the battalion comman group.

#### 2. Tactical Proleyment:

a. Gun tanks ranged ahead of foot troops, although in foliated areas, close infantry support was provided. 90MM guns were fired into suspected mined areas, and the tanks were used to breach entry routes through tangled treelines. Tanks in direct support entered the rifle company net and close coordination was effectively maintained.

b. Terrain was excellent for armor: Some difficulty was experienced passing through thick treelines and large grave mounds were avoided; somewhat channelizing armor: Only two incidents of tanks bogging down in paddies were reported:

c. During the period 12-14 July tanks, H-6's and the LVT C-1 ware in general support. It was intended to employ the heavy tank section as a quick reaction unit to support either rifle company had an encounter with a sizeable VC eliment occured.

3. Coordination: A liason officer was assigned to the battalior command group. Employing a PRC/8 radio, he insured continuous contact with all tank units. Communication and control was enhanced by this technique.

#### 4. Pronter Arcas:

a. Transportation of supplies by P=5's added to the number of immored venicles without adding to tactical capabilities.

DICLISSIFIED




b. Antracs and Amphitian howitzers were refueled by air-delivered drum fuel on 11 July. The H-6's and P-5's were thus delayed four hours while refusing took place.

# 5. Recommendations:

a. When airlor units are in support of an Infantry Battall m, continue to provide a liason officer with a radio that will not with armor units.

b. when possible establish logistic support areas from which timely refueling vehicles, air or surface, can be dispatched to rendezvous with armor units.





#### INGINIERS

# 1. General:

a. 3a rlatoen, Company "A", 3d Engineer Battalion was instable dayadat into two teams, one assigned to support Co.'M" the seame to support Co."I".

b. a turno bern, provider by 31 Engineer Dattalion, equipped with agany mise blowers, resour equipment. protective masks and riot control agents, were in general support samuarcus the operation.

c Ing following VI fortifications were destroyed by supporting engineers.

- (1) 97 bunkers (2) 47 fighting holes
- (3) 14 punjii traps
- (4) 4 gates
- (5) 240 meters of trencaline
- (6) 5 neters of tunnel
- (7) 4 caves
- (8) 1 90MM rd. dud
- (9) 2 green star clusters signal fieres
- d. The inerrs and tunnel team were detached from 3d Bactalien, 9th Merines on 11 July.

#### 2. Testical Imployment:

- a. The speed of novement denied full utilization of engineers support. The tunnel team remained with the command group and was deployed on call of the rifle company. No extensive timnel networks were discovered, although suspected areas were reported and investigated by the tunnel team.
- o. Derolition teams followed in the traces of each anvencing sifts company with security elements provided by the rifle company. Bunkers and mannels marked by forward clements were destroyed by demolition teams. Rapid movement reduced the effectiveness of searches. It is accepted that many hiding places were bypassid.

#### 3. Recommendations:

That in future operations, engineer support be were closely allied with rapidity of the attack. Increased engineer support is required where speed of neviment is essential or nesired.

