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HEADQUARTERS
3d Battalion, 9th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

3/LCJ/elc
005750
4 September 1966

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 9th Marines

Subj: Command Chronology

Ref: (a) DivO 5750.1

Encl: (1) Command Chronology 1-31 August 1966
 (2) S-2 Journal
 (3) S-3 Journal
 (4) Lessons Learned dtd 1 September 1966
 (5) FragO 53-66
 (6) After Action Report (Swanee)

1. In accordance with reference (a) enclosures (1) through (3) are submitted.

F.D. Mac Lean, Jr.
F.D. MAC LEAN, JR.

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY 1-31 AUGUST 1966

1. Organization Data:a. Designation Location:

(1) 3d Battalion, 9th Marines

(2) 1-31 August occupied Battalion CP vic (AT 875473) (An Hoa)

b. Period Covered: 1-31 August 1966c. Commanding Officer, Staff and Principal Subordinates:

(1) Commanding Officer -----	F.D. MAC LEAN, JR. Major 1-31 August 1966
(2) Executive Officer -----	W.D. HUBBARD, Major 1-31 August 1966
(3) S-3 -----	G.E. YARBROUGH, Captain 1-31 August 1966
(4) S-2 -----	C.S. TUTT, 2nd Lt. 1-31 August 1966
(5) S-4 -----	T.H. FITZPATRICK, 1st Lt. 1 August 1966 W.E. KONRATH, 1st Lt. 2-31 August 1966
(6) S-1 -----	H.T. MACKIN, 1st Lt. 1-10 August 1966 H.L. TIEKING, 2nd Lt. 11-31 August 1966
(7) CO, Co. "I" -----	T.A. MC GOWAN, 1st Lt. 1-3 August 1966 G.D. NAVADEL, Captain 4-31 August 1966
(8) CO, Co. "K" -----	R.F. STALEY, 1st Lt. 1-31 August 1966
(9) CO, Co. "L" -----	C.J. PYLE, Captain 1-31 August 1966
(10) CO, Co. "M" -----	J.G. COOPER, Captain 1-31 August 1966
(11) CO, B&S Co. -----	K.L. FORAN, 1st Lt. 1-31 August 1966

d. Average Monthly Strength:

(1) USMC Officer -----	29
(2) USMC Enlisted -----	924
(3) USN Officer -----	3
(4) USN Enlisted -----	55

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Enclosure (1)

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2. Significant Events:a. Personnel

(1) Wounded in Action -----	38	(Med. Evac., 55)
(2) Killed in Action -----	8	
(3) Died of Wounds -----	0	
(4) Non Battle Casualties -----	24	
(5) Non Battle Deaths -----	0	

b. Intelligence:(1) Situation:

(a) Enemy activity and sightings during the month of August were comparable with July. On August 20 contact was made with an estimated company reinforced from a main force battalion believed to be operating in the area. Mining and booby trap activity has increased particularly in vicinity of Liberty Road. Harassing and sniper fire has increased with an upsurge of ambush activity in the vicinity of the Liberty Road. Accuracy at long ranges and percentage of hits, indicates a marked improvement in marksmanship and use of scope mounted rifles by VC in this area. Liason with Duc Duc District and ARVN forces has improved and is fairly reliable. Information from local intelligence sources indicate the presence of two battalion size units in the TAOR.

(b) During the month of August there was a complete personnel change in the scout section. Most of the scouts are new in Vietnam. A vigorous training schedule was conducted in Map Reading, Night Observation Devices, Scouting, Physical Conditioning, Radio Procedure and handling of captives.

(c) During the first part of August the reconnaissance platoon attached to 3d Battalion, 9th Marines was understrength and scouts were used to supplement this shortage. On 4 August a reconnaissance team with two scouts made contact with approximately 65 VC and was extracted. One scout has been on OP Zulu at all times to observe and call supporting fires if necessary.

(d) During Operation Swanee the scouts were used to make reconnaissance river crossings, handle captives, and operate as point and security for the forward command group.

(e) On 23 August the battalion scouts, reinforced by a rifle squad, conducted a patrol to Cu Ban (1) (AT 939533) acting on information from a VCS on a cave where cadre and guerrillas hide. The

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patrol found nothing in the cave, but a bunker in that vicinity yielded 5lbs. of C-3 and 1lb. of TNT.

(f) The reconnaissance platoon attached to the battalion had no significant sightings during the month of August. There were four emergency night extractions made as a result of the observation post being compromised by woodcutters.

(2) Enemy Losses:

(a) Personnel:

(1) VC KIA (CONF)	-----	78
(2) VC KIA (PROB)	-----	48
(3) VCS	-----	57
(4) VCC	-----	2

(b) Destroyed Enemy Material:

(1) Tunnel	-----	14
(2) Bunkers	-----	72
(3) Caves	-----	3
(4) Structures	-----	7
(5) Spider Holes	-----	39

(c) Destroyed/Captured Equipment:

(1) Explosive Devices	7 Grenades
(2) Mines	-----
	4 Chi Com Grenades
	5 M-26 Grenades
	1 Aircraft Bomb 250lb. Fragmentation
	1 50 Cal. Round
	1 Shoe Box Mine
	1 M-79 Round
	2 M-16 A1 Mines

(d) Weapons:

(1)	1 - M-14
(2)	2 - Chi Com Carbines
(3)	1 - Russian Rifle
(4)	1 - M-1

c. Training: Training during this period was directed toward maintaining a high degree of proficiency in combat skills. Special training was conducted for all replacement personnel prior to assignments to company units. Ref: 3d Battalion, 9th Marines msg 230910Z.

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d. Communications/Electronics:

During the month of August, the communications platoon continued to provide communications support for operations within the An Hoa TAOR. Radio sets AN/PRC-25 were received, processed and issued to replace radio sets AN/PRC-6 and AN/PRC-10. Eight (8) PRC-10's were retained for use with 60mm mortars. All other PRC-10's and all PRC-6's were withdrawn and readied for turn-in. Use of PRC-25's has reduced the load on the technical shop as only 90 pieces of equipment were repaired this month, and has reduced the supply problem of batteries as only two types of batteries are in large demand, BA-386's and BA-30's.

e. Close Combat:Operation Macon:

During this period 3d Battalion, 9th Marines engaged in search and clear operations. Conducted local ambushes and established PPB's along Liberty Road and Bridge site and within the companies respective TAOR's, to gain control and to counter and minimize any enemy activity along and in the vicinity of Liberty Road from An Hoa to the southern bank of the Song Thu Bon GS (92-53).

Phase III Operation Swanee:

This battalion conducted Phase III of Operation Swanee on 20 August 1966. See enclosure (3).

f. Fire Support and Fire Support Coordination:


(1) During the month of August, Battery F, 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines, fired 53 combat missions of which 11 missions were in support of the reconnaissance platoon. Three unobserved missions were fired based on reliable intelligence information from Duc Duc District Headquarters. Total casualties from artillery for month were 16 VC killed, confirmed by body count, and another 53 probable killed.

(2) H and I fires varied from 10 to 15 targets per night with 20-60 rounds per night depending on the availability of ammunition. The greatest percentage of the H and I's were fired west of the Song Thu Bon in the vicinity of suspected VC assembly areas and supply routes.

g. Medical and Dental Support:

(1) Since the last report this Battalion Aid Station has experienced no lack of material needed for medical support and the functioning has been adequate.

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(2) There were approximately 731 visits to sick bay this past month. 726 Marines, 4 Navy and 1 Army. Light duty was given to 120 personnel and no duty to 12. There were 24 patients admitted to the sick bay ward. 35 men were medically evacuated not as the result of hostile action.

(3) The Med Cap program: A total of 1293 Vietnamese civilians were treated at the refugee village and this Battalion Aid Station.

(4) Immunizations were given 437 men this month.

(5) Sanitation in this area has remained poor. Refer to recent reports of sanitation inspections to the Commanding Officer.

(6) The dental detachment attached to the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, during inclusive dates, 25 July 1966 to 25 August 1966, has treated 210 Marines patients and performed 453 procedures. During the same period 33 Vietnamese civilians were treated for a total of 43 procedures. Patient attendance at the dental clinic has decreased during the past month.

h. Chaplain Support:

(1) Divine Services:

(a) Protestant:

1. No. Services: 18
2. Total Attendance: 441

(b) Catholic:

1. No. Services: 5
2. Total Attendance: 139

(2) Memorial Services: 3

(3) Counseling:

(a) The Battalion Chaplain counseled an average of two men per day during the month of August.

(4) Significant Events:

(a) The Battalion Chaplain participated in Phase III of Operation Swannee.

(b) An office/living area has been provided at the rear of the chapel for the use of the Battalion Chaplain.

(c) A Bible Class was started at 28 Aug, to continue each Sunday.

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1. Civic Affairs:

(1) Public Health: The public health activities conducted this month evolved around the MEDCAP program. A total of 2270 civilians were treated medically during the month.

(2) Public Welfare: Public welfare activities included the distribution of 625 pounds of food and 485 pounds of clothing to people who would have otherwise done without these items, and gave material assistance to repair buildings in a refugee village which was damaged by a VC mortar attack.

(3) Food and Agriculture: The second Duc Duc District Farmers Seminar, sponsored by 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, was held on 15 August 1966, at which time the farmers decided to form farmers organizations at the hamlet and village level.

(4) Public Safety: Operation Macon continued this month as a clear and hold operation along Liberty Road designed to provide security for the civilian as well as military elements engaged in road construction and is continuing to provide special security for civilian vehicles traveling on Liberty Road.

(5) Civilian Supply: 3d Battalion, 9th Marines assisted in delivery of 100 bags of cement provided by USAID for repair of irrigation systems in villages adjacent to the An Hoa Industrial Complex.

(6) Education: Materials were provided for the rebuilding of a school in Mau Chaun (2) Hamlet (AT 888474) which was destroyed by the VC earlier this year. English language classes have been conducted two times each week for approximately 25 persons in the An Hoa Industrial Complex.



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3d Battalion, 9th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

3/GEY/elc
3100.1
25 August 1966

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 9th Marines
Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report

Ref: (a) DivO 3100.1B
(b) 9th Marines Operation Order
(c) Map: Vietnam 1:50,000 series L 7014 Sheet 6640IV

Encl: (1) Artillery
(2) Air
(3) Intelligence

1. Code Name: Operation Swanee Phase III, Hydrographic Survey
2. Dates of Operation: 200600 - 202000d August 1966
3. Location: Quang Nam Province, Duc Duc District
4. Command HQ:
3d Battalion, 9th Marines
Maj. MAC LIAN
5. Task Organization:

Co. "I"	Capt. NAVADEL
Co. "L"	Capt. PYLE
Co. "M"	Capt. COOPER
Co. "C" 1/9	Lt. CONNELL
Co. "B" (-) 3d Tr. Bn.	Capt. TUNGENT
Co. "B" (-) 1st Amphib Bn.	Capt. HERMAN
6. Supporting Forces: (See enclosures 1 through 3)
7. Intelligence: (See enclosure 4)
8. Mission: Provide physical security for and protect elements of CTF 116 Det. conducting hydrographic survey of the Son Tra Bon, and to engage and destroy any enemy force encountered.

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A/H RPT (OPN SWANEE PHASE III)

20 AUG 1966

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9. Concept of Operation:

3d Battalion was to provide security for the survey party from the Liberty Bridge site to the furthest point of advance in the area of (AT 836454), and for return trip to Liberty Bridge site, the concept was altered prior to execution of Phase III so that the operation would terminate upon reaching the furthest point of advance. Four reinforced companies were to provide the security required for Phase III. Three companies were to be along the west bank of the Song Thu Bon on the peninsula formed by the Song Thu Bon and Song Vu Gia, two attacking and securing the river bank and one in reserve. One company was to secure the east bank of the Song Thu Bon. At the termination of the operation the 3d Battalion troop units and command group were to cross the Song Thu Bon by boat and return to the An Hoa operating base, and the reserve, Co."C" 1st Battalion, 9th Marines was to assume OPCON of the armor elements on the west bank and recross the Song Vu Gia at which time OPCON of that company and the accompanying armor would be relinquished by this command.

10. Execution: 9th Marines Operation Order 120-66, 161300H August 1966 received on 16 August 1966 directed the execution of Operation Swanee. Phase II of the operation terminated on the afternoon of 18 August and the commencement of Phase III was scheduled for 20 August. On the afternoon of 19 August companies "L" and "M" and the battalion command group occupied positions in the vicinity of the splash point at (AT 902547). At about 200630H they were joined by Co."C" 1st Battalion, 9th Marines and elements of Co."B" 3d Tk. Bn. and Co."B" 1st Amtrac Bn. Co."I" reinforced was in position to secure dominating terrain features on the east bank.

At about 200730H Co."M" commenced crossing the Song Vu Gia (AT 902547) and secured the crossing area, and was followed by a heavy section of tanks from Co."B". At about 0800, Co."L" crossed and commenced to move south to the Song Thu Bon. Company "M" moved to the south west to protect the right flank of Co. "L". At this time there was a heavy section of tanks in direct support of Co."L" and a light section in support of Co."M". The command group and security force reserve followed companies "M" and "L". Company "L" reached the Song Thu Bon at about 1030 and began to move southwest along the river bank providing security for the survey party. Company "I" continued to advance parallel to Co. "L" securing the right flank of Co."L" the command group and security force reserve followed in trace of Co. "I". At about 201230H Co."L" engaged an estimated 40 VC in the vicinity of (AT 872574), resulting in no friendly casualties and an undetermined number of enemy casualties.

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At the same time Co. "I" engaged an estimated 40 VC near AT 973525, resulting in 10 enemy KIA confirmed and an additional 20 KIA probable. Friendly casualties were 5 KIA and 5 WIA. Four VC units broke contact to the northwest and west, however, sporadic enemy contact continued until about 1530. At about 201000 the CAC of one survey party reported that sufficient data for completion of the survey had been accumulated and at about 1530 a decision to terminate the operation was made. During the afternoon Co. "I" had light enemy contact receiving fire from the opposite bank of the Song Thu Bon and returning S/A and 60mm fire with undetermined results. Co. "I" experienced two mine incidents resulting in 4 USMC WIA's. Commencing at about 201700H 3d Battalion, 9th Marines troop units west of the Song Thu Bon crossed the river by foot in the vicinity of AT 867514, completing the crossing at about 1900H. At 1730 Co. "C" 1st Battalion, 9th Marines was dispatched with 2nd platoon Co. "B" 3d Tk. Bn. to the crossing point at AT 902547 with the instructions that OPCON would be chopped to parent unit upon crossing the Song Vu Gia. Co. "C" reported crossing the 53 grid line at about 1825H and then without being chopped from OPCON of 3d Battalion, 9th Marines apparently secured from 3d Battalion, 9th Marines battalion tactical net. Phase III of Operation Swamsee terminated at 202000H.

11. Results:

a. Friendly

(1) KIA ----- 5
 (2) WIA ----- 16
 (3) MIA ----- 0

b. Enemy

(1) KIA ----- 10
 (2) WIA ----- 0
 (3) MIA ----- 0

c. Fortifications Destroyed: None

d. Equipment Captured or Destroyed: None

12. Administration: No Report

13. Commander's Evaluation: The enemy located west of the Song Thu Bon did not want a major engagement with USMC force at this time. Moving troop units into the area by foot gave the enemy more than ample opportunity to escape.

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14. Recommendations: That when an offensive operation is launched against enemy forces located between the Song Thu Bon and Song Vu Gia that all mechanical means of mobility available be utilized to deliver large numbers of USMC troop units to the most likely point of contact as quickly as possible in order to make enemy escape improbable if not impossible.

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F.D. MAC LEAN, JR.

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ARTILLERY

1. General: Artillery support for Phase III was provided by Battery "F", 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines on call. Reinforcing fires were provided by Battery "D", 4th Battalion, 12th Marines. Artillery support for Phase III was timely and effective. The fires west of the Song Thu Bon were controlled by the forward element of the FSCC with the command group. Existing stocks of Class V were more than sufficient. Prep fires were employed effectively prior to the initial crossing of the Song Vu Gia on the 20th of August.

2. H and I Fire. H and I fires were used in a controlled capacity due to restrictive ammunition supply rates. However, ten H and I fires were employed in the operations area every night during the operation. Also normal H and I fires were employed east of the Song Thu Bon.

3. Operations:

a. Forward Observing: Forward observers engaged several targets of opportunity. However, these targets were of such a fleeting nature that only the first adjusting rounds or in a few cases the first fire for effect was effective. A forward observer also proved very effective in firing check rounds for the prep fires.

b. Prep Fires: Prep fires were employed to cover the initial river crossing on the morning of 20 August. Maximum effectiveness was obtained by preparing a schedule of on call fires when units were prepared to cross LOD.

c. FSCC: A split FSCC was employed. The forward element with the command group exercised complete control of fires west of the Song Thu Bon. This enabled the fires to be cleared as rapidly as possible. The only problem incurred when two units within close proximity to each other moved together and requested fires. Control of fires was difficult to exercise by the FSCC due to no knowledge of the exact location of these units. However, the forward observers with these units coordinated between themselves and the FSCC monitored this coordination. Although this took more time, it did allow for effective coordination.

d. Shell HC Smoke: Shell HC smoke was used in several instances as an initial marking round. It proved ineffective because it either did not detonate or it was impossible to observe the impact of the round. Also in cases it obscured the target.

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AIR

4. Air support for Operation Swanee was provided by the 1st Marine Air wing. During the course of the operation, 33 Marines were relieved by helicopter, 3 reconnaissance extractions (one emergency) and two insertions were accomplished, five forward air strikes and one helicopter resupply mission were conducted.

5. Air support during Operation Swanee was excellent with the exception of the following:

(1) During the course of a fire fight, Co. "M" FAC team contacted an AO and asked him to check out grid square 8753, for a possible air strike on the VC who fled into that area. The AO reported that he did not have a target in 8753 but that he did have one in grid square 8652. However, he neglected to inform the FSO personnel with the command group of the new target, so that proper coordination could be established. On his own, the AO called an air strike in grid square 8652. The first bomb landed dangerously close on Co. "L" position, and the air strike was cancelled before any damage was done to friendly units.

2. Recommendations: It is recommended that AO's engage only those targets requested by the ground unit. And if the AO discovers a target of opportunity in an area other than that designated by the ground unit, he should make absolutely sure that there are no friendly units in the area.

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INTELLIGENCE

1. a. Enemy forces estimated to be in the objective area prior to commencement of the operation were the R-20 Battalion with a strength of approximately 400 men, plus an undetermined number of guerrillas in each of the hamlets.

b. Other units considered to be within reinforcing distance of the area of operation were local hamlet guerrillas with undetermined strength.

c. Many courses of action were considered to be as follows:

- (1) Conduct small scale attacks, ambushes and harrassing action with up to one battalion augmented by local guerrillas.
- (2) Defend with up to one battalion augmented by local guerrillas.
- (3) Withdraw out of area of operation.
- (4) Conduct a delaying action to cover the withdrawal of the R-20 battalion.

d. The enemy employed capability (3) and (4) contact was made with at least one company. While approximately 200 VC were observed by reconnaissance OP fleeing to the west. VC broke contact after each engagement.

e. The area, particularly the hamlets, contained elaborate systems of trenches and fighting holes.

f. Terrain Analysis:

(1) Critical terrain in the area of operations were the individual hamlets, the Song Thu Bon and Song Vu Gia rivers and the river bank on the eastern side of the Song Thu Bon river.

(2) Observation and Fields of Fire: Observation in rice paddy areas was good. Numerous hamlets and dense vegetation restricted observation and reduced fields of fire.


(3) Cover and Concealment. Cover and concealment was provided by tunnels, trenches, caves, grass mats, hedgerows and bamboo fences in the hamlets. Dikes offered limited cover and concealment in the rice paddies. Cemeteries consisting of large mounds along the Song Thu Bon provided good cover and concealment.

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(4) Obstacles: Natural obstacles were limited to the river. Man made obstacles were the nanlets and bamboo fences. Large mounds in the cemeteries proved to be obstacles to tracked vehicles.

(5) Avenues of Approach: The avenues of approach were covered by fire with many of them augmented with fighting holes and trenches.

g. Captured Material, Weapons and Documents:

(1) Material and documents captured were returned to 1st Battalion, 9th Marines command post.

h. VC Tactics:

(1) The VC employed a delaying type action with at least one company. While reconnaissance OP observed approximately 200 VC fleeing to the west. Concealed snipers were employed extensively during and after the contact with the delaying force.

(2) Mines and Booby Traps: There was limited use of mines and booby traps throughout the operation.

i. Conclusion:

(1) There was a reinforced VC battalion in the area of operation prior to and on D-Day.

(2) The VC will, when possible, withdraw/exfiltrate from an area rather than face USMC units when they believe the time and place are not to their advantage. Small groups of guerrillas will harass USMC forces to allow the VC time to exfiltrate.

(3) There are still fortified areas within the area of operation as well as an undetermined number of guerrillas.

(4) Main force VC units can and do reenter the area by infiltration anytime USMC units are not physically in the area.

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