

HEADQUARTERS  
11th Motor Transport Battalion  
FPO, San Francisco 96602

3/JJM/dah  
5740  
01A0760  
17 Mar 1971

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (-)(Rein), FMF (Attn: Field Historian)


Subj: Command Chronology for the period 01-28 February 1971

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.12  
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8  
(c) DivO 5750.2

Encl: ✓(1) Eleventh Motor Transport Battalion Command Chronology

1. In accordance with references (a), (b) and (c), enclosure (1) is submitted.

*C. A. Rosenfeld*  
C. A. ROSENFELD



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## PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. Designation

11th Motor Transport Battalion  
Company "A"  
Company "B"  
Company "C"

Transport Company  
Headquarters and Service Company

Commander

LtCol C. A. ROSENFELD  
Capt D. R. LANGFELD  
1stLt R. A. DAVIS  
01-21 1stLt M. A. HUMM  
22-28 1stLt R. S. MOTLEY  
1stLt W. P. REGAN  
01-14 1stLt A. J. PRIMOS  
15-28 1stLt T. D. JONES

2. Location

01-28 February, Danang, RVN

3. Staff/Officers

Executive Officer  
S-1/Adjutant  
S-2/S-3  
S-4  
S-5  
Medical Officer  
Sergeant Major

Maj J. J. MCDERMOTT  
Capt J. M. HERZOG  
Maj J. A. GALIZIO  
Capt D. R. MARLOW  
1stLt J. A. HARRIS  
Lt J. T. COOK  
SgtMaj T. J. WALKER

4. Average In-Country StrengthUSMCUSNOfficers

23

Enlisted

350

Officers

01

Enlisted

09

ENCLOSURE (1)

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## PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

1. During February 1971 the 11th Motor Transport Battalion conducted twenty five (25) convoys in support of the 1st Marine Division. The 5th Marine Regiment at Combat Base Baldy was supported daily. The Battalion conducted twelve (12) retrograde convoys totaling one hundred seventy seven (177) vehicles in support of the 5th Marine Regiment's redeployment from RVN. Vehicular support totaling eleven (11) vehicles were provided daily, to Division units for general support. The Battalion also committed a daily average of eleven (11) vehicles to units of the Division for miscellaneous runs.
2. Company "C", 11th Motor Transport Battalion was attached to the 39th Transportation Battalion, 26th General Support Group, XXIV Corps, U. S. Army from 07-16 February 1971. See PART IV.
3. The Battalion vehicles travelled 160,582 miles, hauled 14,069 tons, and transported 21,302 passengers during February 1971.
4. The Battalion continued to conduct an active and effective Civil Affairs Program. The Battalion continues to support the following projects indicated by the following data:

Approximately one hundred and twenty (120) cans of waste food products were delivered to the hamlet of Khanh Son for swine consumption. Sixty three (63) villagers were treated through the MEDCAP Program, while seventy nine (79) received treatment at the Battalion Aid Station.

5. During the month of February the Battalion installed five (5), 5 ton cab and fender, antifragmentation armor kits. Installation of these kits results in the following total number of kits installed:

5 ton cab/fender	87
5 ton bed	8
$2\frac{1}{2}$ ton cab/fender	2

6. From 1 February to 6 February 1971 twenty (20) Marginal Terrain Vehicles were transferred to Force Logistic Command for retrograde to Marine Corps Supply Activity, Barstow. It was determined that these vehicles were excess to in-country requirements, thus terminating the use of the Marginal Terrain Vehicles in RVN.

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## PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF EVENTS

1	February	conducted a 16 truck convoy to CB Baldy
2	-do-	13 -do-
3	-do-	14 -do-
4	-do-	14 -do-
5	-do-	17 -do-
6	-do-	14 -do-
7	-do-	10 -do-
8	-do-	14 -do-
9	-do-	10 -do-
10	-do-	22 -do-
10	-do-	13 -do- CB Ross*
11	-do-	15 -do- CB Baldy
11	-do-	8 -do- CB Ross*
11	-do-	20 -do- Danang
12	-do-	8 -do- Danang
12	-do-	11 -do- CB Baldy
13	-do-	10 -do- CB Baldy
13	-do-	8 -do- CB Baldy*
14	-do-	19 -do- CB Baldy
14	-do-	9 -do- CB Ross*
15	-do-	12 -do- CB Baldy
15	-do-	19 -do- CB Ross*
16	-do-	12 -do- CB Baldy
17	-do-	7 -do- CB Baldy*
17	-do-	19 -do- CB Baldy
18	-do-	20 -do-
19	-do-	4 -do- CB Baldy*
19	-do-	19 -do- CB Baldy
20	-do-	18 -do-
21	-do-	15 -do-
22	-do-	33 -do- CB Baldy*
23	-do-	18 -do- CB Baldy
24	-do-	15 -do-
25	-do-	13 -do- CB Baldy*
26	-do-	12 -do-
27	-do-	23 -do-
28	-do-	28 -do-

\* Denotes retrograde convoys

ENCLOSURE (1)

DECLASSIFIED

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PART IV

CHRONOLOGY OF SUBORDINATE COMMANDS AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

/ Combat Operations After Action Report - TAB A

ENCLOSURE (1)

DECLASSIFIED

"C" COMPANY

11th Motor Transport Battalion  
1st Marine Division (-)(Rein), FMF  
FPO, San Francisco 96602

RSM/dah  
3480  
24 February 1971

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (-)(Rein), FMF (Attn: G-3)  
Via: Commanding Officer, 11th Motor Transport Battalion  
Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report

Ref: (a) DivO P3480.1C  
(b) FragO 5-71 OG 1stMarDiv msg 061409Z Feb71  
(c) FragO 7-71 OG 1stMarDiv msg 1400525Z Feb71

Encl: (1) Medical Supplies Useable Data  
(2) Personnel Table  
(3) Vehicles Table

1. Name of Operation: Dewey Canyon II/LAMSON 719
2. Dates of Operation: 7 February 1971 to 16 February 1971
3. Location: Forward Support Area No. 1, Fire Support Base Vandergrift, Cam Lo District, Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam.
4. Command Headquarters: 39th Transportation Battalion, 26th General Support Group, 24th Corps area, U. S. Army.
5. Reporting Officers: LtCol A. ELLIS, U. S. A., Commanding Officer, 39th Transport Battalion; 1stLt Michael A. HUMM, Commanding Officer, Company "C", 11th Motor Transport Battalion.
6. Task Organization:
  - a. 39th Transportation Battalion, 26th General Support Group.
  - b. "C" Company, 11th Motor Transport Battalion.
7. Supporting Forces: Men and material from the following units were attached to Company "C", 11th Motor Transport Battalion:
  - a. Detachments "A", "B", "T", and "H&S Companies, 11th Motor Transport Battalion, 1st Marine Division.

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b. Detachment, Communications Company, Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division

c. Detachment, "C" Company, 1st Shore Party, 1st Marine Division

d. Detachment, 1st Engineer Battalion, 1st Marine Division

e. Detachment, "A" Company, 7th Engineer Battalion, Force Logistics Command

f. Detachment, Truck Company, Force Logistics Command

g. Detachment, Support Company, Force Logistics Command

h. Detachment, Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron-18, Marine Air Control Group-18

i. Detachment, Marine Air Wing Facility Squadron-1, Marine Wing Headquarters Group-1

j. Detachment, Marine Air Base Squadron-11, Marine Air Group-11

k. Detachment, Marine Air Base Squadron-16, Marine Air Group-16

8. Intelligence: Enemy intelligence was indicated by INTSUMS current at the time. Weather conditions varied to the extremes: From cold with heavy rains 7 Feb 1971 to 10 Feb 1971; to heat, humidity and dust 11 Feb 1971 to 14 Feb 1971 and cold rain during the return south to Danang on the 15th of Feb 1971. The road (QL 9) traveled in the area from Quang Tri to Khe Sahn was paved and suited for two way traffic as far as FSA#1 at Combat Base Vandegrift but was of poor condition with one way traffic between FSA#1 at Combat Base Vandegrift and FSA#2 at Khe Sahn. Cover and concealment was excellent along the route traveled and favored the enemy's ambush and sniping attempts from Cam Lo Village west of Quang Tri to Khe Sahn, and through the Hai Van Pass area. The road (QL 1) from Quang Tri to Hue and from Hue (Hwy 551) to Tan My Ramp was of excellent condition and presented no problems except through the congestion of Hue City.

9. Mission: To provide medium and heavy transportation in support of XXIV Corps Combat Operations in Northern Military Region 1, as directed by reference (b) and as indicated below:

a. 11th Motor Transport Battalion provide one reinforced truck company for operations in Northern Military Region 1, and send that company, via convoy to Quang Tri for duty with 39th Transportation Battalion.

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b. 1st Marine Air Wing provided 5 trucks tractor M52A2 and five lowbed trailers M172.

c. FLC provide support to include two trucks, fork lift, rough terrain 6,000 lbs capacity, two trucks M52A2 and two lowbed trailers M172.

d. 1st Engineer Battalion provide one truck tractor M54A2, two lowbeds M172 and eight fork lifts, rough terrain, 6,000 lbs capacity with appropriate operators, maintenance, and supervisory personnel.

e. Company "C", 11th Motor Transport Battalion assume operational control of additional Marines and equipment as provided by supporting units.

10. Concept of Operations: The basic concept of operations was to use FSA#1 at Combat Base Vandegrift as a trailer transfer point. The heavy vehicles such as tractor/trailers and lowbeds would convoy between FSA#1 and the Tan My deep water ramp, thereby utilizing their heavy cargo capacity on the paved road. The medium M-54 5 ton trucks would be loaded at FSA#1 with material brought in by the heavier transports and would proceed to FSA#2 at Khe Sanh using their improved maneuverability on the unpaved road.

11. Execution: Preparations for the initial convoy and combat operations of an extended duration were begun the evening of 6 Feb 1971 and continue up to the time of departure at 0500 7 Feb 1971. A truck convoy consisting of 46 vehicles left the 11th Motor Transport Battalion Motor Pool in DaNang under orders to report to the Commanding Officer, 39th Transport Battalion at Quang Tri. The convoy was split into two serials of approximately equal size, each under the control of a Serial Commander and coming under over-all control of the Company Commander. There were 79 enlisted and 4 officers involved. There was a helicopter aerial observer with the convoy as far as Phu Bai, provided initially by the Marine Corps and subsequently by the Army.

Upon arriving at Phu Bai, an Army M.P. escort diverted the convoy to the Tan My Ramp, a deep water facility east of Hue. The convoy was loaded there and then escorted back through Hue and on to Quang Tri. Twenty-seven (27) vehicles were loaded with class IV supplies at Tan My and both serials were consolidated into one convoy at Quang Tri awaiting insertion into a larger Army convoy for the final leg of the trip to Forward Support Area #1 at Combat Base VANDERGRIFT. While waiting at Quang Tri liaison was made with the Commanding Officer, 39th Transportation Battalion and the mission was explained to the Company Commander.

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At 2330 7 Feb, the Army convoy, including the Company "C" vehicles, moved out from Quang Tri toward FSA#1. At 0100 8 Feb enemy forces using small arms, automatic weapons and B-40 RPG's ambushed the convoy just south of "The Rockpile" in the vicinity of grid coordinates XD 982532. This attack destroyed two Army 5,000 gal tankers filled with J.P. 4 fuel and one Army Guntruck resulting in one KIA and 10 WIA's, all U. S. Army. Members of the Marine segment returned fire to suppress enemy fire. Prior to the main ambush, the rear of the package had received 3 rounds of unspecified incoming and sniper fire at XD 984546. No Marine Corps casualties or damage resulted from this action. Navy Corpsmen attached to the Marine unit treated all casualties.

Upon arriving at Vandergrift, the vehicles with loads were off-loaded and the Company area was designated and occupied (EX 999484). By 0730 8 Feb 1971, seventeen (17) medium trucks had been loaded and dispatched to Khe Sahn (Forward Support Area II), and twelve (12) heavy vehicles sent back to Tan My Ramp to pick up loads destined for FSA#1. After these two initial convoys most of the convoys were night convoys. On 8 Feb 1971 the Company "C" wrecker retrieved an Army tanker-trailer filled with 5,000 gallons of J.P. 4 that had been hit in the previous night's ambush.

On 9 Feb 1971, seven (7) vehicles joined an Army convoy to Khe Sahn, and twelve (12) heavy vehicles returned from Tan My Ramp. From this date on, all Marine Corps vehicles enroute to Khe Sahn were part of larger Army convoys and under Army control. Although these vehicles were kept as an integral unit under the immediate supervision of a Marine Officer. The Tan My convoy continued to be a Marine Corps controlled unit. The convoy to Khe Sahn on this date received mortar fire and small arms fire at approximately 0830 in the vicinity of grid XD 921420. No casualties or damage resulted.

On 10 Feb at 1630, after a convoy of ten (10) heavy vehicles had been dispatched to Tan My twenty (20) medium trucks with class V were staged at FSA #1 for the trip to Khe Sahn, when 15-20 122 rockets were fired into the FSA#1 area and this convoy received sniper fire. One rocket round exploded shrapnel into some of the Marine trailers, damaged the bodies slightly and punctured several tires. There were 3 U.S. Army WIA's. By this time the Company CP within the FSA #1 perimeter was well organized with fighting holes, triple concertina wire, a maintenance area, billeting facilities, an Aid Station, and sanitation facilities.

There was one convoy of sixteen (16) vehicles dispatched to Khe Sahn on 11 Feb. At 1900 six (6) 122mm rockets impacted at FSA#1 near this convoy and resulted in 1 Army WIA, 1 Marine WIA, 4 Army KIA's, and the destruction of one Army forklift and one Van truck. Again Navy Corpsmen attached to Company "C" treated and helped MEDEVAC the Army WIA's.

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The convoy to Khe Sahn on 12 Feb, composed of sixteen (16) vehicles, received ineffective sniper fire along the entire route both to and from FSA#1. A ten (10) vehicle convoy made the trip to Tan My and back on this day.

On 13 Feb eighteen (18) vehicles traveled to Khe Sahn and eleven (11) to Tan My. Additionally (5) Army wrecked vehicles were retrograded to Quang Tri. Two (2) incoming enemy mortar rounds landed in the ammunition supply point at FSA#1 at 0915 the morning of the 14th. At midday word was received from XXIV Corps, that the unit was to return to Danang the following day. Preparations were begun immediately, but two convoys were to be dispatched. Fourteen (14) vehicles were sent to FSA II and eleven (11) vehicles were returning from Tan My Ramp. However, one of the vehicles enroute to Khe Sahn rolled off the road. This vehicle was unable to be recovered and had to be left for recovery the next day. The driver was uninjured. At 1845 seven (7) rounds of 122mm rockets impacted near the company area with one Army WIA resulting. This man was treated and Medevaced by the Navy Corpsmen.

Arriving in Quang Tri at 1800 this same date was a eleven (11) vehicle relief convoy sent north by 11th Motor Transport Battalion as directed by reference (c) to aid the return south to Danang and to assist in recovering the rolled vehicle near Khe Sahn. Three (3) FLC vehicles had left the convoy south of Hue and proceeded to Tan My to recover a FLC vehicle. Seven (7) vehicles continued on QL 9 down to FSA#1 to assist in the convoy's return to Quang Tri.

At 0930 15 Feb, leaving (3) three vehicles behind to recover the rolled vehicle near Khe Sahn, Company "C", began its return as one convoy through Quang Tri and after picking up three (3) FLC vehicles waiting at Phu Bai, down to Danang. The convoy travelled to Danang and arrived at 11th Motor Transport Battalion at 1730.

The vehicle near Khe Sahn was recovered and recovery convoy arrived at Quang Tri the evening of the 15th. This convoy left Quang Tri the next morning and arrived in Danang, ending the operation, at 1230, 16 Feb 1971.

## 12. Results:

- a. Two Marine Corps 5 ton M54A2C trucks were unable to return to Danang under their own power due to non-hostile accidents.
- b. One Marine received a minor fragment wound in his right leg.
- c. Vehicles involved in this operation accumulated 30,717 miles of combat tactical driving, hauled 1,050 tons of material of all classes, retrograded 5 Army disabled vehicles, conducted 15 convoys in 8 days over difficult and enemy infested roads.

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13. Administrative Matters:

- a. Supply - The necessary equipment and rations to sustain the company for one week were taken with the convoy from Danang. The Army command to which the company was attached was to provide any additional logistical support needed. As a further back-up, Marine helicopters were available to fly in any specialized supplies the Army system was unable to provide.
- b. Maintenance - In addition to the mechanics and gear taken along, the company had access to the facilities and help of the 67th Maintenance Battalion which had a forward area at Combat Base Vandegrift.
- c. The company had it's own organic communications equipment and a MRC 83 from Battalion, Communication Company provided excellent inter convoy communication and communication with the Division.
- d. Medical usage data - See Encl (1). Note - Supplies used were primarily in support of U. S. Army Casualties.
- e. Number of personnel involved - See Encl (2).
- f. Type of vehicles - See Encl (3).

14. Commander's Analysis:

Preparation for a Joint-Service Motor Transport Operation should include a pre-deployment analysis of the operational concepts of the supported unit.

The supported unit, 39th Transportation Battalion, employed a free-flow transport system. Vehicles were loaded and dispatched singularly to their destination along a convoy route without positive convoy control during daylight hours. Vehicles that didn't arrive at their destination by the late afternoon were picked up by a patrol that covered the convoy route prior to nightfall.

Vehicles that were dispatched after nightfall reported to a staging area and were manifested. These vehicles traveling in a serial convoy with a pace and trail control vehicle under the supervision of convoy commander.

The supported units Free-Flow Transport System is very effective when dealing with a large quantity of Prime Movers traveling along a secure convoy route. This system, however, is not as effective as the system currently used by the Marine Corps, transport units. This was evidenced by the large number of broken down vehicles and discarded cargos that were evident along their convoy routes which were not recovered. In this situation the Marines tight convoy control and unit integrity proved to be a more effective method of transporting supplies while ensuring positive control over vehicles and personnel. All vehicles and equipment were accounted for upon the Company's return.

R. S. MOTLEY

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## MEDICAL SUPPLIES USAGE DATA

FSN	DESCRIPTION	UNIT OF ISSUE	QUANTITY USED
6515 889 7448	IV Injection set	1 each	7
6510 200 3080	compress, gauze	1 each	15
6510 201 7430	Dressing; field, first aid	1 each	25
6505 754 2809	Eye and Nose drops	1 bottle, 5cc	5
6510 203 8488	4 x 4 gauze sponges	1 package	2
6505 890 1764	Plasma, protein, 5% sn.	1 bottle, 500cc	3
6505 291 8615	Ringer's lactate, inj.	1 bottle, 1000cc	4
6505 129 5518	morphine, 16 mgm.	1 syrette	3
6505 153 8818	tetracaine ointment	1 tube	2
6510 582 7992	roller gauze	1 package	6
6505 753 5043	chloroquin-primaquine	1 bottle/500 tabs	75 tabs
6505 153 8480	H <sub>2</sub> O <sub>2</sub> solution	1 bottle	1
Open purchase	Spray, merthiolate	1 bottle	1
6505 149 8705	surgical soap	1 bar	5
6505 784 4976	Darvon compound	1 bottle/100 caps	40 caps
Open purchase	Bufferin compound	1 bottle/50 tabs	2 bottles
6505 764 3313	Parafon Forte	1 bottle/500 tabs	40 tabs
6505 754 2828	NaCl tablets	1 bottle/1000 tabs	10 tabs
6510 200 2185	2 inch Ace bandage	1 each	6
6505 299 8740	Bacitracin ointment	1 tube	3
6510 599 7469	band-aids	1 box/25 bandages	2

ENCLOSURE (1)

TAB A

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PERSONNEL TABLE

UNITS	INITIAL CONVOY		REPLACEMENTS/ADDITIONS		RECOVERY CONVOY		TOTAL				
	7-15 Feb 1971	Off	8-15 Feb 1971	Off	14-16 Feb 1971	Off	14-16 Feb 1971	Off	Enl	Enl	Off
<u>1st MarDiv</u>											
11th MTBn											
"A" Co		9						1			10
"B" Co		7		2				4			13
"C" Co	2	26		3		1	2	3			31
"T" Co	1	8		2			4	1			14
"H&S" Co		5				1	3	1			8
Bn Total	3	55		7		2	14	5			76
"G" Co 1st S.P. Bn	1	9						1			9
1st Eng Bn		4									4
Comm Co HqBn			1		3			2		1	5
Div Total	4	68	1	10		2	16	7			94
<u>FLC</u>											
Support Co		2									2
Truck Co		1				1	12	1			13
"A" Co 7th EngBn		1									1
FLC TOTAL		4				1	12	1			16
<u>1st MAW</u>											
H&HS 18 MACG-18		2									2
MWFS-1, MWHS-1		2									2
MABS 11, MAG 11		2									2
MABS 16, MAG 16		1		2							3
1st MAW TOTAL		7		2							9
TOTAL	4	79	1	12		3	28	8			119

ENCLOSURE (2)

TAB A

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VEHICLES TABLE

Initial Convoy

TYPE VEHICLES	M54A2C	M52/123	M127	M198	M172	MR110	M151	M49	M543	M149	M105	Total
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UNIT

1st MarDiv

11th MTBn

"A" Co	5	5	5			1	1					17
"B" Co	5											5
"C" Co	15							1	1	1	1	21
"T" Co		5	3	1								9
"H&S" Co					2							2
Bn Total	25	5	8	5	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	54
1st Eng Bn		1			1		1					3
Div TOTAL	25	6	8	5	2	2	3	2	1	1	2	57

FLC

Truck Co	1	2										3
"A" Co 7th ENGBN	1		1									2
TOTAL FLC	2		3									5

1st MAW

H&HS 18, MAG 18	1		1									2
MWFS 1, MWHS 1	1		1									2
MABS 16, MAG 16	1		1									2
MABS 11, MAG 11	2		2									4
MAW TOTAL	5		5									10

TOTAL Vhe By Type	25	13	8	5	10	2	3	2	1	1	2	72
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ENCLOSURE (3)

TAB A

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Recovery Convoy

TYPE VEHICLES	M54A2C	M52A2C	MRC110	M151	M543A2	M105	MRC83	TOTAL
<u>UNIT</u>								
1st MarDiv								
11th MTBn								
"B" Co	1				1			2
"C" Co	1					1		2
"T" Co		3		1				4
"H&S" Co			1	1				2
Bn TOTAL	2	3	1	2	1	1		10
Comm Co, HqBn							1	1
Div TOTAL	2	3	1	2	1	1	1	11
<u>FLC</u>								
Truck Co	2				1			3
<u>TOTAL Veh by Type</u>	4	3	1	2	2	1	1	14

ENCLOSURE (3)

TAB A