

2nd Ba: 11th Marines
S & C FILES
CONTROL # 056-66
COPY 148

HEADQUARTERS
2d Battalion, 11th Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3/BFO/jac
5750
1 Jul 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 11th Marines, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
Subj: Command Chronology (Report Symbol 1stMarDiv - 5750-6)
Ref: (a) DivO 5750.2A
Encl: (1) Command Chronology

1. The Command Chronology for this Battalion is submitted in compliance with reference (a) for the period 28 May to 30 June 1966.

J. B. Stribling
J. B. STRIBLING

10/8

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECLASSIFIED
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TAB (A)
ENCLOSURE (2)

UNCLASSIFIED

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1. Organizational Data

- a. Designation. 2d Battalion (-), 11th Marines
- b. Location. Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam
- c. Period Covered. 28 May to 30 June 1966.
- d. Command and Special Staff

Commanding Officer (28 May to 30 June) LtCol J. B. STRIBLING
 Bn Executive Officer (28 May to 10 June) Major J. E. DAUSMAN
 Bn Executive Officer (11 June to 30 June) Major M. P. FENNESSY
 Bn Sgt Major (28 May to 30 June) Sgt Major P. T. OTT
 Bn S-1 (28 May to 30 June) Capt C. W. MEIER
 Bn S-2 (28 May to 30 June) GySgt J. GARCIA
 Bn S-3 (28 May to 30 June) Major B. F. OGDEN
 Bn S-4 (28 May to 30 June) Capt R. E. ALEXANDER
 Bn Ln Officer (28 May to 30 June) Major J. E. DAUSMAN
 Bn Supply Officer (28 May to 30 June) 1stLt J. P. MANGAN
 Bn Comm Officer (28 May to 30 June) Capt P. N. CLOUTIER
 Hq Btry Commandant (28 May to 30 June) Capt G. W. GORE
 Hq Btry 1st Sgt (28 May to 30 June) 1st Sgt M. W. REYNOLDS
 Btry "D" Commanding Officer (28 May to 30 June) Capt C. G. DOKOS
 Btry "D" 1st Sgt (28 May to 30 June) 1st Sgt P. M. RUDOLPH
 Btry "E" Commanding Officer (28 May to 30 June) Capt F. R. BUBENHOFER
 Btry "E" 1st Sgt (28 May to 30 June) MSgt P. J. TIMS
 Btry "F" Commanding Officer (28 May to 30 June) Capt J. E. HARRIS
 Btry "F" 1st Sgt (28 May to 30 June) 1st Sgt M. L. WILLIAMS
 Mort Btry Commanding Officer (28 May to 30 June) 1stLt V. D. SWEENEY
 Mort Btry 1st Sgt (28 May to 30 June) 1st Sgt B. J. SABON

2. Commander's Narrative Summary of Significant Events

On 3 June 1966, Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines assumed Operational Control of Batteries "D" and "E" and 107mm Mortar Battery, which had been under OPCON of 1st Battalion, 11th Marines. Two events of particular significance occurred during the month of June. During the period 9-12 June, a battalion command group together with D-2-11 and W-2-11 participated in Operation APACHE in direct support of 2d Battalion, 5th Marines. (See Para. 3.e) L-4-11 also participated in a general support role, reinforcing the fires of 2d Battalion, 11th Marines. These three batteries fired a total of 98 missions including 939 rounds of HE, 122 rounds of WP and 77 rounds of Illum.

On the nights of 4 and 10 June, the battalion CP received light sniper fire with no friendly casualties; but at about 0005 on the night of 19-20 June, the

ENCLOSURE (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

battalion was subjected to an intensive hostile attack until 0430 hours. During the course of the attack, conducted by a VC company of an estimated strength of 100, approximately 100 82mm mortar rounds, rifle and hand grenades, and about 5000 rounds of hostile small arms fire were received. An estimated 10,000 rounds of small arms were returned in addition to firing 587 rounds of 4.2 mortar illumination. Enemy casualties were 14 VC KIA (Conf) and 24 VC KIA (prob). Friendly casualties were 3 USMC KIA, 12 WIA, one 107mm Howtar tube destroyed and one 105mm howitzer tube damaged. One (1) U. S. Thompson SMG (Cal..45), three (3) CHICOM Ars (7.62mm), three (3) Russian SMGs (9mm) and approximately 50 CHICOM hand grenades were captured. See Tab 2 for detailed narrative.

On 18 June, two howitzers with crews from D-2-11 were airlifted to a Special Forces Camp at Tien Phuoc and on 28 June, E-2-11 was attached to 3d Battalion, 11th Marines in connection with Operation OAKLAND.

A summary of missions fired and total ammunition expenditure for June is as follows:

MISSIONS FIRED

	<u>UNOLS</u>	OBS	H&I	TOTAL
105mm	236	129	231	596
107mm	140	73	155	368

ROUNDS EXPENDED

	<u>HE</u>	WP	ILLUM	TOTAL
105mm	4865	392	43	5300
107mm	2576	243	1043	3862

3. Detailed Description of Significant Events

a. Personnel. Losses due to battle include 15 of which 3 were KIAs and 12 WIAs who were evacuated. This unit sustained 8 non-battle casualties. Personnel losses due to administrative reasons include 4 officers and 35 enlisted transferred from the battalion. In turn, we have received 4 officers and 13 enlisted as replacements. This organization captured no POW's. Morale and personal services include minimum P.X. and postal facilities. During the month of June, 30 promotions were effected, and 18 Purple Hearts awarded.

b. Administration. Part of this month was used for setting up facilities to carry out route administration.

c. Intelligence. See Tab 2.

d. Training. Increased emphasis is being placed on training in connection with execution of helicopter deployment, with particular attention to the lift of a 105mm howitzer in three components. In this regard, section drill is conducted on a weekly basis.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

e. Special Operations

(1) Operation APACHE, a battalion-size search and clear operation, was conducted by the 2d Battalion (-) (Rein), 5th Marines during the period 9-12 June. On 9 June, all participating units were helilifted from their respective base camp into the area of operations. 2d Battalion (-), 11th Marines was helilifted to vicinity Coordinates 305 145 in the following sequence: W-2-11, a Command Group, and D-2-11(-). W-2-11 was equipped for this operation with six 4.2 inch mortars instead of their organic Howtar. D-2-11 employed only four of their six 105mm howitzers. L-4-11 displaced to vicinity of Hill 54 (Coordinates 395 145) to reinforce the fires of 2d Battalion, 11th Marines.

(2) On 10, 11, and 12 June, two maneuver companies conducted individual search and clear operations, returning in late afternoon to the combat base camp where a perimeter defense was established. Thus, all-around artillery fire capabilities were required at all times. A summary of missions fired and rounds expended follows:

MISSIONS

	OBS	UNOBS	H&I	TOTAL
105mm	9	8	15	32
107mm	18	10	16	44
155mm	8		14	22

ROUNDS EXPENDED

	HE	WP	ILLUM	TOTAL
105mm	367	44		411
107mm	499	55	29	583
155mm	73	23	48	144

ACCUMULATIVE SURVEILLANCE

5 VC KIA(Conf)
 12 VC KIA(Prob)
 15 VC WIA(Prob)
 10 VC WIA(Poss)
 2 Villages partially destroyed
 2 Secondary explosions

All units were retracted by helicopter and returned to their respective base camps on late afternoon of 12 June.

f. Command and Control. Not applicable.

g. Close Combat. See Tab B.

ENCLOSURE (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

- h. Fire Support.** Not applicable
- j. Air Defense.** Not applicable
- k. Combat Air Support.** Not applicable

l. Civil Affairs/Civic Action. The Civic Action Program for 2-11 has focused around the Med Cap Program in Khuong Binh hamlet. This hamlet was being serviced by 1-11 until their departure, at which time 2-11 took over on June 8, 1966. This organization continued service there until 28 June, 1966 and gave aid to 279 people. Included in this amount was 20 dental cases, which were serviced by a dentist from the 11th Marines. On 29 June, 1966, a greater need for Med Cap grew in the area of Khuong Nhon and 2-11 shifted their efforts to this hamlet. In this area the Med Cap team has serviced nearly 100 Vietnamese and will continue to place efforts in this hamlet.

- m. NBC.** Not applicable.

DECLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (1)

CONFIDENTIAL

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

Appendix A (List of References) to 2d Battalion, 11th Marines (-) Command
Chronology, 3 June to 30 June 1966.

References

- a. Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000, AMS Sheet 6639 1 Series L 7014 Not attached
- b. Appendix B

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

~~_____~~

A-1

Appendix A to
ENCLOSURE (1)

Appendix B (Documentation) to 2d Battalion, 11th Marines (-), Command
Chronology of 3 June to 30 June 1966.

Contents

✓ S-3 Journal (CAL-8)
✓ Special Report

Tab (1)
Tab (2)

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

B-1

Appendix B to
ENCLOSURE (1)

DECLASSIFIED

Attack on 2d Battalion, 11th Marines Position

1. At approximately 0005 hours on the night of 19-20 June 1966, the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines (-) (Main), was attacked by a Viet Cong Company of an estimated strength of 100 insurgents. At that time, the battalion position area contained the following units:

Headquarters Battery

Battery "D"

Battery "E"

107mm Mortar Battery

Battery "K" (-), 4th Battalion, 11th Marines

Battery "L" (-), 4th Battalion, 11th Marines

Platoon, 3d 155mm Gun Battery (SP)

Battery K-4-11 and Battery L-4-11 position areas were occupied by security elements totaling 55 enlisted men; the officers, howitzers, and crews being absent on an operational deployment.

2. Narrative Summary of Events

The attack was opened with intensive hostile automatic weapons fire, 82mm mortar fire, and rifle and hand grenades. The main attack was borne by Battery "D", which received an estimated 100 rounds of mortar fire, rifle and hand grenades and rifle and automatic weapons fire directed in and around their howitzer emplacements. At least six 82mm mortar rounds were known to have detonated in and adjacent to the 155mm Gun Platoon. Five of these craters were intact at first light, and a thorough crater analysis determined that the hostile mortar position was located at coordinates 4039 0900, in an area behind a hill (Red Hill) adjacent to the attack/withdrawal route. Approximately twenty other craters were discovered in the area the following day.

Battery "D" position area was immediately enveloped in dust and smoke from the intensity of exploding mortars and grenades. Two VC entered the number three howitzer emplacement and were immediately killed in hand-to-hand combat. One VC was killed about four feet in front of the number one gun parapet, by a corporal from the number two gun pit who saw him spraying automatic weapons fire. A fourth VC was killed the same distance in front of the number five gun parapet. One Thompson SMG, one CHICOM AR (7.62mm) and one Russian SMG (9mm) were recovered from these bodies. All four carried fragmentation and concussion grenades of Chinese manufacture. They wore homemade skull caps of gray cloth or camouflage

DECLASSIFIED

Tab 2

DECLASSIFIED

silk parachute material; but were otherwise naked except for a pair of brief black shorts. Each wore a web or leather belt with a square brass buckle on which was engraved a single five-point star. Slung from the belt was a packet containing a compress bandage, magazine pouches with loaded magazines, a canteen, a plastic poncho, and a wicker basket containing up to six (potato masher) grenades.

The attack continued for about an hour, during which time Battery "D" sustained fourteen WIA and two KIA, Mortar Battery 1 WIA, "E" Btry 1 WIA, "L" Btry 1 KIA, and "K" Btry 1 WIA. One WIA died of wounds after being medically evacuated. All wounded were helicopter evacuated within ninety minutes of opening hostilities. The wounded, after emergency treatment in the Battalion Aid Station, were taken to the 5th Marines CP Helipad by vehicle, because of the relatively greater security which was known to exist there at that time.

It is significant to note at this point an occurrence which was not officially discovered until during debriefing the following day. As one of the 3/MT trucks evacuating wounded to the 5th Marines' Helipad approached the road leading out of the battalion position area, the driver momentarily flicked-on the headlights to ascertain his exact position. The time was about 0115 and incoming small arms fire was continuing. The vehicle was passing through the Mortar Battery position at an oblique angle to the road and barbed wire fence which runs parallel to the road. Fixed squarely in the headlights was an estimated group of thirty-five VC, crouched low, immediately outside of the wire. The driver instantly extinguished his headlights, and as the assistant driver prepared to fire his automatic rifle at the VC, was prevented from doing so by the driver, who reasoned that there was a better chance of proceeding "passively" his mission being to get the wounded to the helipad. Apparently he was correct, for they were not fired upon. Other groups of 15-20 VC were reported to have tried to rush the wire but were beaten back by fire from the fighting bunkers.

Within minutes after initiating of hostilities, two VC penetrated the 107mm Mortar position by stealth, and successfully placed a demolition charge in the tube of one Howtar, destroying the tube and damaging the sleigh. The particular Howtar was being used for position area illumination, and thus temporarily interrupted illumination to the rear of the position.

Several members of the Howtar Battery observed two figures who appeared to be wearing "skivies" and a camouflage helmet, deliberately walk to the mortar. They were thought to be Marines going to their post until the demolition exploded. The two intruders began firing their automatic weapons and tossing hand grenades as they made good a hasty escape. The other mortar crews were reluctant to deliver a heavy volume of so many Marines in the adjacent mortar positions. At the time, several Marines of the off-duty gun crews wore nothing but undershorts and a helmet, having rushed to their posts without time to dress, thus two VC who were also wearing shorts and camouflage material around their heads were initially mistaken for Marines.

DECLASSIFIED

Tab 2

DECLASSIFIED

Battery "L" received small arms and grenade fire at the rear of their position, wounding one Marine who later died of wounds.

Three VC penetrated the rear of Battery "K" position and were killed by small arms fire. A fourth VC was believed killed just outside the tactical wire, but was retrieved by a VC recovery team. Three weapons were captured including two Russian SMGs (9mm) and one CHICOM AR (7.62mm).

From the initiation of the attack until about 0200, machine gun and automatic weapons fire was directed into the area outside Battery "D" tactical wire, although the presence of many VC there was largely a matter of speculation, after the first hour. A .50 Cal. mounted on a 155mm Gun(SP) directed fire along the outside of the wire with apparent devastating effect and may well have made a significant contribution toward preventing the initiation of the exploitation phase of the attack. Hostile harrassing fire continued until about 0300. Utilizing continuous overhead illumination provided by the organic Howitzers, VC body recovery teams were prevented from recovering three bodies opposite Battery "D" tactical wire. Final contact was apparently broken at about 0430.

At first light, a patrol was sent out to a distance of about 1000 meters along the route of attack/withdrawal, which passed directly through a small farming village opposite Battery "D" position. The patrol discovered extensive blood trails and various parts of human anatomy, in addition to discarded items of enemy equipment, including web belts, canteens, plastic pouches, ponchos and grenades. The farmers who were questioned denied any knowledge of the attack, although their farms were centered in the attack area.

Three bodies were recovered immediately in front of Battery "D" tactical wire, and one CHICOM AR (7.62mm) and several hand grenades were recovered. These three dead were dressed in the same manner as those recovered within the position area. One body also carried a pair of wire cutters which had been modified to cut with a minimum of noise.

The area was littered with human gore, including two scalps. Inasmuch as one of the recovered bodies was decapitated, the second scalp was considered sufficient evidence to substantiate another confirmed KIA.

The following day it was discovered that gun #1 of "D" Battery had also been damaged. The sight was damaged by a bullet and the tube was damaged about 18 inches from the muzzle. This was not apparent until the tube was punched the following day, as no damage was apparent from the outside except paint removed from the top. No VC were known to enter this gun pit although one was killed in front of the pit while firing an automatic weapon. The gun received heavy grenade and mortar fire and five of the casualties were from this gun crew. Two points of entry/exit through the tactical wire were determined at day-break. At both points, entry/exit was effected by crawling through the triple concertina fence, carefully avoiding the trip flares located inside the wire. At no point was the wire cut. One gray skull cap and one camouflage silk cap were caught in the wire where entry/exit had been made.

DECLASSIFIED

✓ - 9212

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Upon request, the U. S. Army Advisor from Ly Tin District Headquarters inspected the scene after daybreak with several Vietnamese local officials who identified two of the bodies. One was a resident of the village to the direct front of the battalion, and another was a former resident of Ky Xuan Island, where all of the males have been noted by their absence for several months. These two were dressed in a different manner from the rest and are thought to be guides for the suicide squad. The adviser further identified the VC dead as being members of a traditional "Death Squad" by their manner of dress. Their mission is to effect initial penetration with a platoon of about fifteen members, which, if successful, is followed by the exploitation phase executed by the main body positioned directly outside the tactical wire.

The operational area of the particular "Death Squad" was later tentatively identified to be Quang Ngai Province, south of Chu Lai. In addition, the U. S. Army Adviser at Tam Ky District Headquarters obtained information which indicated that the planned attack was to have been conducted by a total of three companies, two of which were unable to reach the objective area in time to participate. Within 72 hours after the attack, the adviser at Ly Tin District Headquarters was able to determine through local agents that an estimated total of 38 VC were killed during the attack.

Coincidental with the attack on 2d Battalion, 11th Marines, a Popular Force element about 2500 meters Northeast was subjected to mortar attack, receiving an estimated 40 rounds in about three minutes. It is believed that the same mortar position was utilized for both attacks.

An ambush provided by 2d Battalion, 5th Marines about 300 meters Northeast of 2d Battalion, 11th Marines position area (Red Hill) was prevented from effective participation throughout the attack by being continually subjected to defensive fires from 2d Battalion, 11th Marines, inasmuch as their position was directly adjacent to the hostile attack/withdrawal route.

Another ambush from 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, shot and killed 3 VC, apparently withdrawing from a probe at the rear of Battery "K" position.

Thus a total of 14 VC KIA were confirmed with an additional 24 VC KIA(Prob).

One U. S. (Thompson) SMG (.45 Cal), three CHICOM automatic rifles (7.62mm), three Russian SMGs (9mm), several loaded automatic weapons magazines and about fifty hand grenades were captured.

Sixteen USMC WIA and four USMC KIA were sustained.

DECLASSIFIED

JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
 SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

CONFIDENTIAL
 (Classification)

UNIT OR SECTION	
S-3, 2d Bn (-), 11th Marines (-)	
PLACE	
Chu Lai, RVN	
FROM (Date and hour)	TO (Date and hour)
031200H June 1966	302400H June 1966

TIME		SERIAL NO.	DATE TIME GROUP	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS	ACTION TAKEN	
IN	OUT				M-Maps S-Staff	T-Troops F-File
		1	031200	Assumed OPCON of D-2-11, E-2-11 and W-2-11.	S	
		2	040530	E-2-11 received two hostile rifle grenades. One detonated in front of Local Security Bunker. One Dud.	S	
		3	042120	CP received Approx. 15 Rds SA fire. Return 10 Rds SA. Unknown results. No friendly casualties.		
		4	051215	D-2-11 fired 3 volleys SH HE at 18-20 VC on trail. 3 KIA (Prob); 6 WIA (Prob).		
		5	071030	D-2-11, E-2-11 and L-4-11 fired 324 Rds HE and 230 Rds WP at suspected concentration of 200 VC at COORD square 3513. Area neutralized.		
		6	091400	CMD Group, D-2-11 and W-2-11 Helilifted to vicinity of COORDS 305 145 in support of operation "APACHE". During period 9-12 June, D-2-11, W-2-11 and L-4-11 fired 98 missions including 939 rds HE, 122 rds WP and 77 rds Illum. Total VC casualties from Arty fires were: 5 KIA (Conf), 12 KIA (Prob), 15 WIA (Prob), 10 WIA (Poss), 2 villages partially destroyed and 2 secondary explosions.		
		7	100030	2-11 Mar CP received approx. 10 rds hostile sniper fire. No casualties.		
		8	121830	CMD Group, D-2-11 and W-2-11 closed Base Camp by helicopter upon completion of operation "APACHE".		
		9	180530	Two horitizer sections (complete) from D-2-11 were airlifted to support Special Forces camp at Tien Phouc, COORDS 115 140.		
		10	200005	Under hostile attack until about 0430, by EST VC Company of 100. Received approx 100 82mm Mortar rds, rifle and hand grenades, and about 5000 rds of hostile SA fire. 14 VC KIA (Conf), 24 VC KIA (Prob). 3 USMC KIA; 12 WIA; one 107mm Mortar tube destroyed, one 105mm How tube damaged. Captured one (1) US Thompson SMG (Cal. .45), three (3) CHICOM ARs (7.62mm); three (3) Russian SMGs (9mm) approx 50 frag and concussion grenades, and numerous items of individual equipment.		
		11	201230	E-2-11 fired 4 volleys SH HE at 15 VC in house at COORD 396 110. Surveillance patrol found extensive evidence of human casualties. Estimate 5 KIA (Prob), 4 WIA (Prob).		
		12	281530	E-2-11 detached to OPCON 3-11 Mar for Operation "OAKLAND"		

(See reverse side for instructions)

(Classification)
 CONFIDENTIAL
 TAB 1

INSTRUCTIONS FOR KEEPING JOURNAL

1. Heading:

a. Unit or Section:

- (1) Enter designation of unit if this is a unit journal for regiment, air group, or smaller unit.
- (2) Enter designation of section if this is a section journal maintained by a general staff section.

b. Place: Enter coordinates or name of locality.

c. From: Enter date, time, and time zone that journal is opened.

d. To: Enter date, time, and time zone that journal is closed.

2. Body:

a. Time In:

(1) Unit Journal. Enter time information is received within unit. In most instances this would be TOR at unit communication center.

(2) Section Journal. Enter time information is received within section.

b. Time Out:

(1) Unit Journal. Enter time outgoing information is delivered to addressee. In most instances this would be TOD by unit communication center.

(2) Section Journal. Enter time outgoing message is delivered to originator's communication center for transmittal, or time information is transmitted by releasing section.

c. Serial No.: Number each entry consecutively as information is received by keeper of journal.

d. DTG: Enter date/time group of radio message.

e. Incidents, Messages, Orders:

(1) Important incidents, messages and orders are recorded as they are made known.

(2) Although brief, entries must include all vital elements of information, such as what, where, when, how, and who.

(3) Original entries should not be altered, but should be supplemented or corrected by later entries when necessary.

(4) A synopsis of written or oral messages is entered in the journal, leaving the full account for the journal file and other supporting documents.

(5) Oral messages are reduced to writing and processed like written messages.

f. Action Taken: This column is used to indicate administrative action taken, such as, routing to cognizant unit staff officer(s), dissemination of pertinent information and/or filing of message. Some of the more common symbols used to indicate action taken are: "M", posted on situation map; "S", circulated to unit staff; "T", information disseminated to troops or subordinate units; "F", filed in journal file.

3. Ending:

a. Summary: A brief summary of major activities, with reasons underlying decisions, is entered in the journal at the close of each day. This is written in narrative form under the column entitled "Incidents, Messages, Orders."

b. Closing: Journals are closed daily or at the end of periods or phases prescribed by higher authority.

4. Journal File:

Journal file is considered a part of the journal. It contains messages, orders, records of conversation, and other documents supporting journal entries.