

HEADQUARTERS
3d Battalion, 11th Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

3/11 Control 0034-67
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5750
4 Dec 1967

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 11th Marines, 1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 November to 30 November 1967

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8
(c) DivO 5750.2B
(d) RegtO 5750.2D

Encl: ✓(1) 3d Battalion, 11th Marines Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) through (d), enclosure (1) is submitted.

George T. Balzer
GEORGE T. BALZER

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3408N/11TH MAR

CMD CHROD

Nov 1967

HEADQUARTERS
3d Battalion, 11th Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) FWP
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
1 November 1967 to 30 November 1967

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Enclosure (1)

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PART I
ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. DESIGNATIONCOMMANDER

3d Battalion, 11th Marines

LtCol G. T. RALZER
1-30 Nov

SUBORDINATE UNITS

Headquarters Battery

Capt G. L. BORTLE
1-30 Nov

Battery "G"

Capt R. T. PAGE
1-30 Nov

Battery "H"

Capt R. W. BROWN
1-30 Nov

Battery "I"

Capt D. F. MILLER
1-30 Nov

107mm Mortar Battery

Capt C. K. ABLES
1-30 Nov

2. LOCATION

1-30 November: Da Nang, Quang Nam, Republic of Vietnam

3. STAFF OFFICERS

Battalion Executive Officer

Major O. K. JOHNSON, JR.
1-30 Nov

Battalion Liaison Officer

Major W. W. BARTON, JR.
1-10 Nov

Major J. F. SPANGLER
11-30 Nov

S-1/Personnel Officer

1st Lt. J. C. FITZSIMMONS
1-30 Nov

S-2/S-5

1st Lt. T. M. ELLIOTT
1-17 Nov

1st Lt. J. D. DAVIS
18-30 Nov

S-3

Major J. C. ADAMS
1-30 Nov

S-3A

1st Lt. E. P. VISSER
1-30 Nov

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S-4/Ordnance Officer

Survey/Metro Officer

Motor Transport Officer

Communication Officer

Medical Officer

Regimental Naval Gunfire LNO

Battalion Naval Gunfire LNO

Capt J. M. LUTTON

1-30 Nov

Capt R. L. RINEHART

1-30 Nov

1st Lt. P. T. KEARNEY

1-30 Nov

Capt G. B. BARNETT

1-30 Nov

LT. L. V. ANGIOLETTI, USNR

1-30 Nov

LT. W. LONG, USNR

1-30 Nov

LT. JR. A. W. FAHEY

1-30 Nov

LT. F. C. POWLER

7-30 Nov

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTHUSMC

OFF ENL

40 552

USN

OFF ENL

4 9

OTHER

OFF ENL

0 0

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NARRATIVE SUMMARY

On 1 November, the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines was in direct support of the 7th Marines in that portion of the Da Nang TAOR occupied by its Battalions. The units of 3d Battalion, 11th Marines were located as follows: Headquarters Battery at coordinates AT 963619; Battery "G" at coordinates AT 923691; Battery "H" at coordinates AT 921795; Battery "I" at coordinates AT 883580; and Mortar Battery at coordinates AT 964618. Two 4.2 inch mortars were located at coordinates AT 815382 reinforcing Battery "E" 2d Battalion, 11th Marines. On 7 November, four 155mm howitzers (towed) with crews were assigned to this battalion and were further assigned to Mortar Battery. At 1748 on 13 November a forward control group opened the FDC for Operation FOSTER at the position of Battery "I". Battery "B", 1st Battalion, 12th Marines was assigned OPCON to 3d Battalion, 11th Marines for Operation FOSTER and occupied position at coordinates AT 885581 at 1800 on 14 November. Battery "I" supported Operation FOSTER from its normal position. Battery "B" supported Operation FOSTER from its position from 1800 14 November until 1030 29 November except for a 2 day period when it dropped from OPCON 3/11 to prepare for Operation DENVER (which was cancelled). Battery "B" temporarily dropped from OPCON between 1700 25 November and 1030 27 November. Battery "E" was returned to OPCON Blt 2/3 at 1030 on 29 November. At 1200 30 November, the operation was terminated.

MISSIONS FIRED IN DA NANG TAOR

TOTAL MISSIONS FIRED	17,097
Targets of Opportunity	718
Harrassing and Interdiction	15,996
Registrations	31
Defensive Fires	68
Fire for Effect	225
Prep Fires	18
Counter Rocket Fires	0
FO School	41
AMMUNITION EXPENDED	76,209

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PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

7 Nov 67 Received four 155mm howitzers (TD) with crews from
2d Bn, 11th Marines and assigned them to Mortar Btry

13 Nov 67 Opened forward FDC for Operation FOSTER at the
position of Battery "I" (grid AT 883580) at 131748H.
Assumed OPCON Battery "B", 1st Bn, 12th Marines.

14 Nov 67 Battery "B", 1st Bn, 12th Marines occupied position at
grid AT 88535819 at 141800H and laid on azimuth 4000 mils.
Began support of Operation FOSTER

25 Nov 67 Battery "B", 1st Bn, 12th Marines chopped from OPCON
3d Bn, 11th Marines at 251700H. Did not displace.

27 Nov 67 Battery "B", 1st Bn, 12th Marines returned to OPCON
3d Bn, 11th Marines at 271030H.

29 Nov 67 Battery "B" 1st Bn, 12th Marines from OPCON 3d Bn, 11th
Marines. Displaced at 291030H

30 Nov 67 Operation FOSTER ended at 301200H. Closed forward FDC.
Battery "I" resumed normal activities.

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PART IV
DOCUMENTATION TO COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 November 1967 to 30 November 1967

- ✓Tab (A) S-1 Journal
- ✓Tab (B) S-2 Journal
- ✓Tab (C) S-3 Journal
- ✓Tab (D) S-4 Journal
- ✓Tab (E) After Action Report, Operation FOSTER

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Enclosure (1)

S-1, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines
Da Nang Combat Base
010001H Nov 1967 to 302400H Nov 1967

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JOURNAL

010001H	Journal Opened
011300H	Jd LTJG FAHEY, USN
051500H	Jd Major SPANGLER
071600H	Jd LT FOWLER, USN
121600H	Received and awarded 1 Purple Heart
160800H	Dr 1stLt JONES, COMUS
230800H	Dr 1stLt ELLIOTT, COMUS
251400H	Jd Capt MACK, 2dLt LARSON
261300H	Received and awarded 1 Purple Heart
302400H	Journal Closed

IV-A-1

SECRET
Enclosure (1)

S-2, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines
 Da Nang Combat Base
 010001H November 1967 to 302400H November 1967

SECRET
JOURNAL

010001H

Journal Opened

071810H

Men on watch in tower and bunker on finger 3, Hill 55, received incoming sniper rounds. Tower approx. 10 rounds and bunker approx. 5 rounds. Returned approx. 50 M-16 automatic rounds. Spotted 2 probable VC. Direction 1600 approx. 500 meters

081150H

At grid 966585 approx. 3 rounds of 50 cal. were fired on Battery "I"s truck convoy. Approx. 200 meters west of kilo I tower. No damage to vehicle.

191630H

At grid 964597 a 3 1/4 ton truck from Headquarters Battery received automatic weapons fire from treeline on both sides of road. Fire was returned. Also received fire 800 meters further along road.

302400H

Journal Closed

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S-3, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines
 Da Nang Combat base
 010001H November 1967 to 302400H November 1967

SECRET
JOURNAL

010001H	Journal Opened
012400H	Fired 535 Missions expending 3003 rounds
022400H	Fired 352 Missions expending 2633 rounds
032400H	Fired 579 Missions expending 2579 rounds
042400H	Fired 579 Missions expending 2602 rounds
052400H	Fired 625 Missions expending 1768 rounds
062400H	Fired 534 Missions expending 1605 rounds
072400H	Fired 509 Missions expending 1571 rounds
082400H	Fired 445 Missions expending 1790 rounds
092400H	Fired 529 Missions expending 1915 rounds
102400H	Fired 514 Missions expending 1679 rounds
112400H	Fired 571 Missions expending 1984 rounds
122400H	Fired 460 Missions expending 1655 rounds
130900H	Operation FOSTER began
131748H	3/11 Forward FDC Opened Journal, Assumed OPCOM "B" 1/12
132400H	Fired 457 Missions expending 1790 rounds
142400H	Fired 450 Missions expending 1577 rounds
152400H	Fired 509 Missions expending 1758 rounds
162400H	Fired 467 Missions expending 2174 rounds
172400H	Fired 589 Missions expending 2429 rounds
182400H	Fired 574 Missions expending 2562 rounds
192400H	Fired 610 Missions expending 2879 rounds

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SECRET

S-3, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines
Da Nang Combat Base
010001H November 1967 to 302400H November 1967

SECRET
JOURNAL

202400H	Fired 463 Missions expending 2189 rounds
212400H	Fired 508 Missions expending 2402 rounds
222400H	Fired 507 Missions expending 3022 rounds
232400H	Fired 511 Missions expending 3513 rounds
242400H	Fired 714 Missions expending 3178 rounds
251700H	Battery "B" 1st Bn, 12th Marines from OPCOM 3/11
252400H	Fired 655 Missions expending 3055 rounds
262400H	Fired 790 Missions expending 4242 rounds
271030H	Battery "B" 1st Bn, 12th Marines to OPCOM 3/11
272400H	Fired 834 Missions expending 4267 rounds
282400H	Fired 826 Missions expending 3900 rounds
291030H	Battery "B" 1st Bn, 12th Marines from OPCOM 3/11
292400H	Fired 712 Missions expending 3216 rounds
301200H	Operation FOSTER ended
302400H	Fired 688 Missions expending 3153 rounds
302400H	Journal Closed

S-4, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines
Da Nang Combat Base
010001H November to 302400H November 1967

SECRET
JOURNAL

010001H	Journal Opened
130900H	Operation FOSTER began
301200H	Operation FOSTER ended
302400H	Journal Closed

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1st Marine Division (Rein) FMF
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3 December 1967

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines
Via: Commanding Officer, 11th Marines

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report

1. Code Name. Search and Destroy Operation FOSTER
2. Date of Operation. 130900H to 301200H November 1967
3. Location. Quang Nam Province
RVN Map Vietnam 1:50,000 AMS Series L7014
Sheets 6540 I, 6540 II, 6540 III, 6540 IV
4. Command and Control. Headquarters, 7th Marines
5. Reporting Officer. LtCol GEORGE T. BALZER
Commanding Officer
3d Battalion, 11th Marines
6. Task Organization.

Det, HQ Btry, 3d Bn, 11th Mar
Btry "I", 3d Bn, 11th Mar
Btry "B", 1st Bn, 12th Mar (SLF)

1stLt E. P. VISSER
Capt D. F. MILLER
Major E. P. RICHTER

7. Supporting Forces.

Btry "K", 4th Bn, 11th Mar
Btry "E", 2d Bn, 11th Mar
Btry "B", 8th Bn, 4th Artv (SP)
U.S. Army
Det, 3d 8" Howitzer Btry, FMF
Det, 3d 155 Gun Btry, FMF

Capt A. L. CATALLO
Major G. L. CATES
Capt G. LARCE
1stLt G. J. CUMMINS
1stLt G. J. CUMMINS

8. Intelligence. 7th Marines INTSIMSSECRET

TAB E

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9. Mission. Provide artillery fire support to USMC forces participating in Operation FOSTER

10. Concept of Operation. The Commanding Officer, 11th Marines directed 3d Battalion, 11th Marines to provide artillery support to the deployed forces in the area of operations.

11. Execution. The Forward Command group from Headquarters Battery, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines arrived at the artillery base on Hill 65 (vicinity grid AT 881580) at 131740H and established central tactical/technical fire direction in the FDC of Battery "I", 3d Battalion, 11th Marines. Initially the operational forces were supported from Hill 65 by Battery "I", 3d Battalion, 11th Marines with six 105mm howitzers and Battery "K", 4th Battalion, 11th Marines with six 155mm howitzers. Battery "I" gave priority of fires to 3d Battalion, 7th Marines. Battery "K" gave priority of fires to 2d Battalion, 3d Marines. On 14 November, Battery "B", 1st Battalion, 12th Marines (SIF), with six 105mm howitzers, occupied position on Hill 65 (grid AT 88535819) and was ready to fire by 141925H. Battery "B" was assigned the mission of direct support of Operation FOSTER with priority of fires to 2d Battalion, 3d Marines; however, because of the tactical situation, Battery "B" was initially placed in a reinforcing role until 190005H. Because of the location of units from the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines relative to Battery "B's" FIRECAP, Battery "B" was to revert to this role twice during the operation. Battery "K", 4th Battalion, 11th Marines assumed priority of fires to 2d Battalion, 3d Marines on both occasions, while Battery "E", 2d Battalion, 11th Marines, available on a not to interfere basis, was also used extensively. Battery "B", 8th Battalion, 4th Artillery (SP), U.S. Army with four 175mm Guns was assigned the mission of General Support, Reinforcing 3d Bn, 11th Mgr. Fires from Detachment, 3d 8" Howitzer Battery, FWP and Detachment, 3d 155 Gun Battery, FWP, each with 2 guns, were available on a not to interfere basis. As of 251700H Nov 1967 Battery "B", 1st Battalion, 12th Marines withdrew from Operation FOSTER to prepare for Operation DENVER. Operation DENVER was cancelled. As of 271030H, Battery "B", 1st Battalion, 12th Marines reassumed its original mission in support of Operation FOSTER. At 301200H Nov 1967, Operation FOSTER ended and all units returned to the control of their parent organizations.

MISSIONS FIRED

Targets of Opportunity	219
Registrations	3
Prep Fires	29
Defensive Fires	47
H & I's	1361
TOTAL	1659

AMMO EXPENDED

HE	10,976
WP	593
ILL	8
OTHERS	3
	11,580

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12. Results. The following surveillances on artillery fires were received from units participating in Operation FOSTER:

VC/NVA KIA (Conf)	21
VC/NVA KIA (Prob)	162
VC/NVA WIA	16
Structures destroyed	39
Structures damaged	24
Bunkers and tunnels destroyed	11
Boats destroyed	2
Secondary explosions	1

13. Administrative Matters. Administrative Plan 301-67 applied to this operation.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques. Nothing significant to report.

15. Commanders Analysis. Several lessons were learned during Operation FOSTER.

a. Records were kept on the number of VC/NVA that got away without one artillery fire for effect. After 8 days on Operation FOSTER, a cumulative total of approximately 500 VC/NVA were not brought under fire by artillery. Reason--air instituted check fires. During this operation the following artillery capability could be brought to bear on targets in the operational area.

- 18 - 105mm Howitzers (Towed)
- 6 - 155mm Howitzers (SP)
- 2 - 155 Guns (SP)
- 2 - 8" Howitzers (SP)
- 4 - 175mm Guns (SP)

Each check fire caused a portion, on all of the above resources to remain idle.

There was a case where 75 VC were being brought under fire by artillery. The adjacent battalion (2/3) called in an air strike on the same target and called a check fire, but only after air was making its run. Result--an air craft was almost shot down by friendly artillery firing with a Sav-A-Plane and 75 VC escaped while the situation was being resolved. This poor coordination between air and artillery must cease if the full potential of artillery is to be realized and if we expect to inflict significant injury to the VC war effort.

It can't be recommended strongly enough that air should not be used on targets within the range and destructive capability of artillery. Air should stay beyond the visual capability of ground FO's when an AO

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isn't available. When an AO is on station air should be kept away from areas within the effective range of the direct support artillery. There should be only two exceptions to this rule. First, air should be called in on targets too "hard" to feel the effect of artillery. Second, if for any reason artillery is unable to fire, then air should fill in the supporting arms vacancy.

Another technique that was not used in this problem was the passing of the check fire control to the appropriate FO. Time and again check fires were instituted for administrative helicopter missions that were not near the gun-target line. Helicopters should be guided along a safe route to the position of the company for which their load is destined. This is the function of the Battalion Air Officer. The artillery FO team and the direct support battery should both be alerted to the arrival of the aircraft so that either of the two can institute a check fire in a timely fashion. The closest coordination can be effected by having the FAC co-locate with the FO while the aircraft is in the area. The FAC can give the pilot further route guidance while the FO precisely times the check fire with the aircraft's arrival. This would minimize the time that artillery is in a check fire. It would also give the aircraft greater safety since the enemy would be engaged by artillery fire until the very last instant prior to the landing or air strike. An airborne FAC could effect the same coordination. By checking with the Air Officer in the Battalion FSOO and getting the Mike number on which to contact the FO team, the FAC would then be able to contact the FO and effect direct liaison for the air activity in the company zone of action.

b. Existing battery FDC's should be constructed with a view towards facilitating a centralized tactical/technical FDC for two or more batteries. This would permit rapid establishment of an effective centralized FDC on short notice.

c. Wire and radio communication was satisfactory, however mutual interference was noted on several nets. This could have been eliminated with time for more detailed planning and co-ordination with all units concerned.

d. Radio Relay operation was satisfactory once communication was established. It required six days to bring the Radio Relay shot up owing to problems with several RF units and generators. More notice should have been given the Division Communication Company to allow them to properly check out all communication equipment before they committed it to the operation. In the future, no equipment should be used in an operation that has not first been completely checked out.

e. Jamming is becoming more and more a problem with the number of PRC-25's that have been lost to the enemy. It is recommended that a spare frequency be obtained for use as an alternate G.O.F. frequency.

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
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This frequency could be passed out to all FO's before the operation started. If jamming was encountered, a smooth frequency change could be initiated with little or no loss of reliable communication.

f. The use of "Eye-ball frequency" was noted. There is no security in the use of these frequencies and they should be eliminated.

g. The haste in which this operation was initiated didn't allow for complete distribution of the communication plan. Battalions from two regiments were operating together for the first time. It was necessary to distribute "M" numbers and frequencies so that the FO's in both battalions could communicate with the FO's. Artillery units that were joined for the operation needed both C.O.F. frequencies plus the normal fire direction nets. Liaison personnel needed all the frequencies used to properly coordinate artillery fires. The result of the lack of distribution time was confusion and communication problems during the initial days of the operation. This difficulty did not cause a support failure.


GEORGE T. PALZER

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