

HEADQUARTERS

2d Battalion, 12th Marines
 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 FPO, San Francisco 96601

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3:SMS:trp
 5750
 30 September 1965
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From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding Officer, 12th Marines (Attn: S-3)

Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1-31 July 1965

Ref: (a) 3dMarDivO 5750.1

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following report is submitted.

a. Organizational data, including attachments:

(1) Designation/Location. 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF. Danang Sector, South Vietnam.

(a) When 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, landed at Danang, it was attached to RLT-9 and brought with it the following units:

1. "M" Battery, 4th Battalion, 12th Marines.

2. 1st 8" Howitzer Battery(SP) (-), 12th Marines.

(b) "E" Battery, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, and Mortar Battery, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, landed with their parent organization. "D" Battery, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, had landed with BLT 1/9 in June, 1965, and was attached to 1st Battalion, 12th Marines, until 26 July 1965, when it rejoined the 2d Battalion. "F" Battery, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, was left in Okinawa with BLT 3/9.

(c) Shortly after completion of the landing at Danang, the following detachments were made effective:

1. CMR Team to 12th Marines on 10 July 1965.

2. "M" Battery, 4th Battalion, 12th Marines, to 4th Battalion, 12th Marines at Hu Phu Bai on 20 July 1965.

3. Mortar Battery, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, to 4th Battalion, 12th Marines at Hu Phu Bai on 20 July 1965.

4. 1st 8" Howitzer Battery (SP) (-) to general support reinforcing 12th Marines on 26 July 1965.

(2) Period Covered: 1-31 July 1965.

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30 September 1965(3) Name/Rank of Commanding Officer and Staff Including T/O Billet
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Commanding Officer: LtCol J. K. KNOCKE 034373/0802 USMC

Executive Officer: Maj J. C. LOVE 055339/0802 USMC

Adjutant/S-1: 1stLt T. R. PRESTON 079337/0130 USMC

S-2: 1stLt R. WHITEHEAD 081239/0802 USMCR (1-12Jul65)
1stLt A. G. GERWIG 088312/0802 USMCR (13-31Jul65)

S-3: Capt R. N. PEGLER 078281/0802 USMC

S-4: 1stLt R. A. GOLDMAN 086259/0802 USMCR (1-16Jul65)
Capt G.W. RYHANYCH 060715/0802 USMC (17-31Jul65)

Supply Officer: 1stLt H. J. PAYNE 088942/3002 USMCR

Motor Transport Officer: 1stLt M. P. MAGUIRE 088912/3502 USMCR

Communications Officer: Capt E. S. LAWBAUGH 072681/2502 USMC

Liaison Officer: 1stLt R. WHITEHEAD 081239/0802 USMCR

Headquarters Commandant: 1stLt F. B. WALKER 085475/0802 USMCR

(4) Average Strength for the Month: 415 (including attachments)b. Sequential Listing of Significant Events, Especially as they Relate to:

(1) Personnel: The command arrived in Vietnam at 74% of T/O strength. This figure includes Headquarters, "E" and Mortar Batteries only. There were no significant shortages of critical personnel that would affect the mission of the battalion.

(2) Administration: No significant problems of events.

(3) Intelligence: Daily reports of friendly and enemy activities were disseminated throughout the battalion to personnel in key positions. An up-to-date situation map showing the location of friendly front lines and suspected enemy positions was maintained in the Battalion FDC. Information of value to troops was passed on to the troops as quickly as possible. Information received from CMR was used to determine the location of four enemy mortar positions. Seven other suspected mortar positions were reported.

(4) Training: During this month, in addition to training in FDC and Gunnery procedures, the following instruction was accomplished:

(a) M-60 machine gun, nomenclature and firing - 2 hours.

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3:SMS:trp
30 September 1965

UNCLASSIFIED

- (b) Hand grenades, rifle grenades and pyrotechnics - 2 hours.
- (c) .50 cal. machine gun, nomenclature and functioning - 2 hours.
- (d) FAM firing and zeroing of M-14, M-60, .50 cal. MG - 8 hours.

(5) Operations: The month of July saw preparation of battery positions placing the largest requirement on time and materials. However, the units of the 2d Battalion fired the following ammunition: 126 high explosive; 38 illumination; 61 white phosphorous; 32 HC smoke. Confirmed damage assessments revealed two Viet Cong wounded in action. Much of the ammunition fired was used for harassing and interdiction fires as well as registrations. There were few "call for fire" missions.

(6) Command and Control:

- (a) Attached to RLT-9 from 1-25 July 1965.
- (b) Changed administrative control 12th Marines, operational control 9th Marines, to direct support of 9th Marines as of 26 July 1965.
- (c) Command Posts (Map: Indochina, 1:50,000 series L 701, sheets 6658 I & IV, 6659 I, II & III):
 - 1. Headquarters Battery: Coordinates AT996721.
 - 2. Battery "D": Coordinates AT991739.
 - 3. Battery "E": Coordinates AT98767224.

(7) Communications-Electronics: When this battalion arrived in Vietnam during the first week of July 1965, it was short nine PRC-9s because no repair parts had been available from FSR and there were no PRC-9s in Maintenance float. Radio batteries, held in mount-out stock by FSR, were found to be old, mouldy and damp. It was immediately obvious that the battalion would have to lay extensive wire in order to maintain satisfactory communications. During this month, the battalion communications section laid at least 45 miles of wire which was supplemented by a minimum of 15 miles laid by each of the firing batteries. Requisitions for batteries were filled in a satisfactory manner, with the exception of BA 414s which were impossible to obtain through the supply system.

(8) Fire Support and Fire Support Coordination: Fire support coordination for this unit was extremely complex and clearance to fire became a critical factor in the timely delivery of fires. Prior to firing, all missions had to be approved by the supported infantry company, Battalion, Regiment, 3d Marine Division and RVNAF District Headquarters. Factors influencing this complex system of fire coordination are as follows:

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3:SMS:trp
30 September 1965

- (a) Numerous villages and hamlets in TAOR.
- (b) TAOR is heavily populated by friendly natives.
- (c) Low level air corridors throughout TAOR due to proximity of Danang Air Base.
- (d) Ignoring of restrictive fire plans by helicopters.
- (e) Lack of coordination and control of RVNAF operating in TAOR.

(9) Logistics: When this organization landed in the first week of July the logistic problem encountered was the inability of Headquarters Battery to adequately load and move equipment due to the lack of a sufficient number of vehicles. Shortly thereafter, a serious shortage of sandbags, concertina and other barbed wire prevented swift preparation of complete battery positions. The cantonment program was initiated with the strongbacking of two G. P. tents on 15 July 1965, but there was an overall shortage of serviceable encampment and garrison property.

(10) Civil Affairs/Military Government/Community Relations: Medical personnel treated villagers at the village of Phong-Bac for various physical conditions. This treatment was limited due to operational requirements and insufficient medical supplies. At the same time, liaison was established with the village and a mutual understanding was achieved as to respect of property rights and graves. An agreement was worked out whereby the villagers would dispose of waste products from the position area.

E. O. SPECKART

Copy to:
G-3, 3dMarDiv
S-3

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