

HEADQUARTERS
2d Battalion, 12th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco 96601

3:SMS:smg
4 October 1965
Ser: 025-65
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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 12th Marines (ATTN: S-3)
Subj: Command Chronology Report for the Period 1-30 September 1965

Ref: (a) 3dMarDivO 5750.1
(b) RegtO 5750.1

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the following report is submitted:

a. Organizational Data:

(1) Designation/Location: 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF. Danang Sector, South Vietnam.

(2) Period Covered: 1-30 September 1965.

(3) Name/Rank of Commanding Officer and Staff, Including T/O Billet Assignment:

Commanding Officer: LtCol J. K. KNOCKE 034373/0802 USMC
1-7 September 1965

Maj E. O. SPECKART 050159/0802 USMC
8-30 September 1965

Executive Officer: Maj E. O. SPECKART 050159/0802 USMC
1-7 September 1965

Maj J. C. LOVE 055339/0802 USMC
8-30 September 1965

Adjutant/S-1: 1stLt T. R. PRESTON 079337/0130 USMC

S-2: 1stLt A. G. GERWIG 088312/0802 USMC

S-3: Maj C. F. KEISTER 055758/0802 USMC

S-4: Capt H. C. SOMMERVILLE 060802/0802 USMC

Supply Officer: 1stLt H. J. PAYNE 088942/0802 USMC

ENCLOSURE (6)

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Motor Transport Officer: 1stLt M. P. MAGUIRE 088912/3502 USMCR
 Communications Officer: Capt E. S. LAWBAUGH 072681/2502 USMC
 Liaison Officer: Capt C. D. BAILEY 065692/0802 USMCR
 Headquarters Commandant: Capt R. N. PEGLER 078281/0802 USMCR

(4) Average Strength for the Period: 507.

b. Sequential Listing of Significant Events:

(1) Personnel: During this period the battalion was at approximately 87% of T/O strength. This figure does not include Mortar Battery which remained attached to 4th Battalion, 12th Marines at Hue Phu Bai. There were no shortages of critical personnel that might have seriously affected the ability of the battalion to perform its mission. During the month of September the battalion suffered the following casualties:

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>Non-battle (Evac)</u>
1 Enl	1 Off 2 Enl	1 Off 4 Enl

(2) Administration: There were no significant or unusual events to report

(3) Intelligence: Numerous contacts with small groups of Viet Cong, usually numbering under 15, were made by support infantry units. Most of the action occurred south of the Marble Mountain area (1:50,000 Indochina series L701, sheet 6658 I) BT 075710 and near Cam Ne (2) vicinity coordinates BT 990690. The Viet Cong have made an effort to collect rice taxes in this as well as other areas, but U. S. Marine and ARVN units have provided the protection necessary to allow the villagers to harvest and sell the rice. Having been unsuccessful in their attempts to collect rice tax it is expected that the Viet Cong will attempt to tax the people for cash after they have marketed their rice crops.

(4) Training: Actual missions, both call for fire and harassing and interdiction, as well as service practice on the howitzers and chart drills in FDC, continued to provide ample opportunity for training new personnel. Instruction in a number of areas was given, with special emphasis on the practical aspects of combat. The FO school, with "F" Battery doing the shooting, continued to provide inexperienced or untrained personnel with the practical application required to become proficient. Some eight hours of schooling and firing were conducted. Continued emphasis on familiarization with small arms weapons continued with twelve hours spent on .50 caliber machine gun functioning, immediate action and gun drill. An additional eight hours was used for fam-

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iliarization firing on the .45 caliber pistol, M-14, M-60 and .50 caliber machine guns.

(5) Operations: During the month of September, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines expended the following amounts of ammunition: 5,613 high explosive; 25 white phosphorous; 144 illumination; 13 HC smoke rounds. All of the firing batteries fired "call for fire" missions, as well as harassing and interdictory fires; the latter consuming the major portion of the ammunition fired. Fuze CVT was used in quantity for the first time since this battalion arrived in Viet Nam with what is felt to be great effectiveness. During the month confirmed reports credit this battalion with four Viet Cong killed in action and a store of hand grenades destroyed.

(6) Command and Control: During the month of September, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, remained in direct support of the 9th Marine Regiment, and under administrative control of the 12th Marine Regiment. Battery "F" reverted to operational control of this battalion, after being employed as general support ^{of the Division} reinforcing the 12th Marines. Command posts for the month were as follows: (Map; Indochina, 1:50,000 series 1701, sheets I & IV, 6659 I, II and III)

- (a) Headquarters Battery: Coordinates AT996721
- (b) "D" Battery: 1-6Sep65, Coordinates AT991739
6-30Sep65 Coordinates BT070720
- (c) "E" Battery: Coordinates AT988672
- (d) "F" Battery: Coordinates AT964712

(7) Communications-Electronics: The displacement of "D" Battery to a new distant position created problems in communication. Radio was used to maintain communications initially. By 10 September 1965 the battalion was able to make use of the radio-relay system set up by the 9th Marine Regiment to maintain usually dependable contact with "D" Battery now located near Marble Mountain. Later in the month radio relay shots were tested from the present battalion CP to possible future CP locations. Requisitions for batteries, especially BA279's were at least partially filled after the battalion had been down to a four days supply on hand.

(8) Fire Support and Fire Support Coordination: During this period there was a noticeable improvement in coordination with DASC and as a result it was possible to continue firing during air medical evacuations. Helicopters were instructed to follow prescribed routes when flying to and from their objectives and to avoid, when possible, flying in front of battery positions. Gains have been made in the process required to obtain clearance to fire at "call for fire" targets, but often it may take fifteen minutes or more for clearance, depending on where the target is located.

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(9) Logistics: The month of September saw little progress made in terms of requisitions filled. The completion rate for requisitions continued to be about 15%. All outstanding requisitions that had not been filled in a reasonable amount of time, especially for critical items like batteries, were traced and resubmitted as appropriate. The non-availability of Class IV materials also continued to affect the preparation of defensive positions. Especially in demand were sandbags and concertina wire. The general status of equipment maintenance is considered fair, with most of the problems arising at 3rd Echelon and above levels. Problems in this area seem to arise mostly from a lack of ~~repair~~ parts and to some extent by the fact that repairmen in specific MOS's (1341 and 2111) lack or do not rate the tools or equipment necessary to do their job properly.

(10) Air Defense: Each battery in the battalion continued to remain in an active air defense posture using .50 caliber machine guns in prepared positions as the primary means of defense.

(11) Civil Affairs/Military Government/Community Relations:

(a) Civil Affairs: Medical personnel continued treatment of villagers at Phong-Bac to the extent which facilities and unit requirements permitted. A total of 587 examinations were completed and the diagnosed conditions treated.

(b) Military Government: Nothing to report.

(c) Community Relations: Members of Battery "E" were the guests of the villagers of Phong-Bac for a "Children's Day" celebration. They fed the children and provided candy, cookies and cake. In addition, they distributed 25 dolls, 125 pairs of shower shoes and various articles of clothing to the villagers.

E. O. Speckart
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