

HEADQUARTERS
2d Battalion, 12th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco 96602

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1:JJS:jre
Ser: 014-66
5 March 1966
Copy 1 of 8 copies

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 12th Marines (Attn: S-3)
Subj: Command Chronology Report for the Period 1-28 February 1966
Ref: (a) 3dMarDivO 5750.1
(b) RegtO 5750.1

Encl: ✓ (1) Incident Report of Battery "E" of 21Feb66

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the following report is submitted.

a. Organizational data including attachments:

(1) Designation/Location: 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF, Da Nang Sector, South Vietnam.

(a) Battery "L", 4th Battalion, 12th Marines remains attached.

(b) Mortar Battery, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines remains detached, attached to BLT 3/4.

(2) Period Covered: 1-28 February 1966.

(3) Name/Rank of Commanding Officer and Staff, including T/O billet assignment:

Commanding Officer: LtCol E. O. SPECKART, 050159/0802 USMC

Executive Officer: Maj C. F. KEISTER, 055758/0802 USMC

Adjutant/S-1: 1stLt T. R. PRESTON, 079337/0130 USMC

S-2: 1stLt S. M. SCHACHT, 083885/0802 USMC

S-3: Capt A. C. FRANKENBERGER, Jr., 075230/0802 USMC

S-4: Capt A. TRENT, 070676/0802 USMC

Enclosure (3)

Supply Officer: 1stLt D. L. WHITE 088184/3002 USMCR
 Motor Transport Officer: 1stLt W. J. SMALLWOOD 087288/3502 USMCR
 Communication Officer: Capt T. W. TAYLOR 070675/2502 USMC
 Liaison Officer: Maj E. F. WHIPPLE JR. 064693/0802 USMC
 Headquarters Commandant: Capt D. M. PHILLIPS 077602/0802 USMC

(4) Average Strength for the period: 643

b. Sequential Listing of Significant Events, Especially as they relate to:

(1) Personnel: At the end of the reporting period, the battalion was at 87% of T/O strength. There were no shortages of personnel serious enough to impair the ability of the battalion to perform its mission. Twelve combat casualties were sustained, including two enlisted personnel killed in action. One enlisted Marine was evacuated for non-combat medical reasons. Seventy-eight members of the battalion participated in the R&R program.

(2) Administration: There were no unusual or significant events to report.

(3) Intelligence: Continued dissemination of intelligence information is accomplished through daily briefings to keep officers and noncommissioned officers abreast of the current and overall situation. VC activity during this period was noted to be relatively intense with a degree of enemy activity directed toward the batteries, a specific incident is described in enclosure (1). As a result, battery patrol activity was increased to provide additional information concerning enemy activity. Such patrols have uncovered likely positions and markers that indicate the enemy could occupy with mortars in order to support attacks on battery positions. Two-man crater analysis teams were designated in each battery to further aid in the positive location of suspected enemy positions that are believed to be used for mortar attacks.

(4) Training: The level of formal training continues to be curtailed due to the operational commitment of the battalion. On-the-job training is therefore heavily relied upon to maintain a level of proficiency in concert with the battalion's mission. A two day mine school was attended by fifty personnel from the batteries. The school is specifically oriented toward familiarization of VC booby traps, mines and techniques. The battalion sent six personnel to a two week FO School at Phu Bai. Familiarization firing for battalion personnel has continued with .50 cal. machine guns, M-60 machine guns and M-14 rifles. Sixty-nine personnel have completed FAM firing during the month of February. One officer attended embarkation school and one enlisted man is under water safety school instruction in Saigon.

(5) Operations: The battalion fired a total of 1552 missions in support of 9th Marine operations, expending 6247 rounds of 105mm howitzer and 857 rounds of 155mm howitzer ammunition. Enemy casualties for the period were 14 KIA and 24 WIA with additional casualties of an unknown number dependent on the lack of positive surveillance due to tactical situations and observer confirmation.

Battery "L" was deployed for "Operation Double Eagle" during the period as indicated.

(a) Phase I Double Eagle, one platoon deployed at coord AT 620-611, 1-11 Feb 66 and at coord AT 616-642, 11-13 Feb 66.

(b) Phase II Double Eagle, two platoons deployed at coord BT 278-522, 19-27 Feb 66 and at coord BT 230-531, 27-28 Feb 66.

"Operation Rough Rider" commenced on 25 Feb 66 with the battalion establishing liason at Hoi An with the 57th RVN Artillery

(6) Command and Control: There has been no change in the command post location or the mission of the 2d Battalion, 12th Marines.

(7) Communications/Electronics: With the initiation of "Operation Rough Rider" during February, reliable communications were possible only through OP#2 at Cam Khe, Hill 327 acting as a relay until the convoy was south of the grid line 40. The LnO at Hoi An was able to relay only through OP#2 to contact the convoy. Such communications were possible up to approximately 38,000 meters and while this was a noteworthy achievement, it exceeded the normal capabilities of the equipment employed, the PRC-9 with RC 292, and should not be relied upon for such operations where radio communications is the key factor for artillery support of convoys. A possible location for the LnO to improve communications would be to move him from Hoi An to Dien Ban. Wire continues to be the primary means of communications with the batteries. The lines to "D" Battery are degenerating primarily from the lack of the required PO-Z poles which are not available through the supply system at this time.

(8) Logistics: The logistics posture of this command is satisfactory. During the past month the requisition fill rate has remained constant. Operating stock level is still not sufficient. Problems have developed in the area of replacement/repair parts for field ranges, repair parts for the M109 155mm How(SP). Every effort has been made to obtain necessary spare parts with submission of requisitions and appropriate tracer action. A shortage of trained supply NCO's exists and a program of on-the-job training has been established within the battalion to help relieve the problem. The contonement program for the month of February included the construction of a permanent type recreation/club for enlisted personnel and construction of a dry storage area for the battalion galley.

(9) Air Defense: Air defense capabilities for the battalion remain the same.


[REDACTED]

(10) Civic Action/Military Government/Community Relations:

(a) Civic Action: Medical personnel treated 134 Vietnamese civilians for various ailments. Distribution of 203 bars of soap, 44 pounds of food and 350 pounds of clothing was made to families in the vicinity of battery areas.

(b) Military Government: Nothing to report.

(c) Community Relations: Nothing to report.


J. J. SNYDER

Incident Report of Battery "E", 2d Battalion, 12th Marines of 21 February 1966

1. At 210129H, Battery "E", 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, vicinity AT 988671, initially received 60mm mortar fire on south west edge of the perimeter. At the same time outpost #3 on the south west edge of the battery received 2 direct hits from Viet Cong 81mm rocket. Mortar fire continued for about 10 minutes with impact moving in two parallel lines to the north east corner of the battery position.
2. Under cover of the mortar fire it is estimated that at least five enemy and probably more armed with what appeared to be Russian sub-machine guns penetrated the perimeter in the vicinity of outpost #3. The south and south east area forward of the position was illuminated with 81mm mortars and 105mm howitzers on a continuous basis. During the fire fight one Viet Cong gained access to the #1 howitzer position and placed a charge of approximately 15 pounds against the ammunition bunker which caused minor damage to the bunker. He was shot by one of the members of the howitzer section. Another Viet Cong gained access to the #2 howitzer position and placed a similar charge under the carriage of the #2 howitzer which damaged both wheels, the right brake drum and the right equalizer putting the weapon out of action. The Viet Cong is believed to have been shot by a member of the #3 howitzer section. The enemy then withdrew dragging their wounded with them. During the withdrawal one additional Viet Cong is believed to have been hit.
3. During the attack the Viet Cong established bases of fire in vicinity AT 987669 and 991672 (This was revealed during a dawn search of the area). The entire attack lasted about 20 minutes.
4. Crater analysis obtained at 210220H indicated that the mortar location could have been in the vicinity of Le Son (1) (AT 980660). Completion of crater analysis at dawn revealed that 40 60mm mortar rounds and six 81mm rocket rounds had impacted in and around the battery position. The azimuths of fire determined from crater analysis confirmed that the mortars were probably located either in Le Son (1) or somewhere on a line between Le Son (1) and the Battery "E" position. The pattern of the craters in the position, roughly two parallel lines running from south east to north east indicates that there were two mortars involved. Several days prior to the attack the #1 howitzer had been pulled out of action and delivered to FLSG for 6 months maintenance. Since no maintenance float was available there was no weapon in the #1 position. It is believed that it was the intention of the Viet Cong to destroy this howitzer also and that the ammunition bunker was attacked as an alternate target.
5. Weather conditions during attack:
 - a. Foggy with a slight drizzle.
 - b. Visibility approximately 50 meters.

Enclosure (1)

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6. A sweep of the area by Company "C", 2d Battalion, 9th Marines revealed nothing.

7. Results of the attack:

- a. H&I fires of Battery "E" interrupted for approximately 20 minutes.
- b. Wheels of 105mm howitzer, right equalizer, and possibly axle damaged (FLSG reports that weapon should be back in action by 22 or 23 February 1966).
- c. One ammunition bunker slightly damaged (repairs completed 211500H).
- d. Minor material damage to tents, strongbacks, galley, etc.
- e. One Viet Cong KIA (possible), and two Viet Cong WIA (possible).
- f. One Marine KIA and seven WIA (four were evacuated, three returned to position during the morning of 21 February 1966 and one was further evacuated to Okinawa).

Enclosure (1)

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