

HEADQUARTERS
2d Battalion, 12th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
APO San Francisco, 96602

Copy 1 of 9 Copies
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5700
Ser: 0140966
4 June 1966

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 12th Marines (Attn: S-3)
Subj: Command Chronology Report for Period 1-31 May 1966
Ref: (a) DivO 5750.1
(b) RegtO 5750.1

Encl: (1) Extracts, S-3 Journal
(2) Combat Operations After Action Report; Operation GEORGIA

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) the following report is submitted:

a. Organizational data including attachments:

(1) Designation/Location: 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF, Da Nang Sector, South Viet Nam.

(a) After termination of Operation GEORGIA on 10 May 1966, Headquarters Group, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines returned to parent unit control.

(b) Subsequent to Operation GEORGIA, Battery F 2d Battalion, 12th Marines remains detached OPCON to 3d Battalion, 9th Marines for extended operations in the AN HOA area.

(c) Battery A, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines attached OPCON 30 May 1966.

(d) Mortar Battery, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines remains detached.

(e) Mortar Battery, 3d Battalion, 12th Marines detached 31 May 1966.

ENCLOSURE (2)

(2) Period covered: 1-31 May 1966

(3) Name/Rank of Commanding Officer and Staff, including T/O billet assignment:

Commanding Officer:	LtCol J.J. SNYDER 048875/0802 USMC
Executive Officer:	Maj S.M. MORROW 052130/0802 USMC (1-26 May 1966) Maj W.H. MORGAN 060176/0802 USMC (27-31 May 1966)
S-1:	1stLt J.E. KSZYSTHIAK Jr 084228/0802 USMC
S-2:	1stLt R.G. BURNSTEEL 087483/0802 USMC (1-26 May 1966) 1stLt W.A. SCHARNITZKY 091023/0802 USMC (27-31 May 1966)
S-3:	Maj R.J. JOHNSON 067493/0802 USMC
S-4:	Capt L.T. GUNDLACH 078621/0802 USMC
Supply Officer:	1stLt D.L. WHITE 088184/3002 USMC
Motor Transport Officer:	1stLt G.E. De ANGELIS 089480/3502 USMC
Communication Officer:	Capt R.P. LEARNARD 082493/2502 USMC
Liaison Officer:	Maj G.W. RYHANYCH 060715/0802 USMC
Survey Officer:	1stLt D.P. GARNER 089739/0802 USMC
Chaplain:	Lt R.K. HANSEN 667714/4105 USNR
Headquarters Commandant:	Capt D.F. TRENSKI 076420/0802 USMC (1-8 May 1966) Capt R.A. FURTADO 077663/0802 USMC (9-15 May 1966) Capt C.G. SIMPSON 085076/0802 USMC (16-31 May 1966)

(4) Average strength for period: 542

b. Sequential listing of significant events especially as they relate to:

(1) Personnel: The battalion was at 94% T/O strength at the end of the reporting period. There are no shortages of critical personnel that would seriously hinder the mission of the battalion. The battalion had seven combat casualties

[REDACTED]

and eight Marines evacuated for non-combat medical reasons. Fifty-six Marines participated in the R&R program during the month of May.

(2) Administration: There are no significant or unusual events to report.

(3) Intelligence: Dissemination of pertinent intelligence information was accomplished by daily briefings for staff officers and distribution of intelligence summaries to the batteries. The mining of roads increased as evidenced by two vehicles being involved in mine incidents. A prime mover and howitzer struck a mine returning from Hill #55 and the truck was damaged beyond repair by approximately a forty pound electrically detonated device. No damage was sustained to the howitzer. A similar mining incident occurred involving another M35 truck, but the mine was detonated prematurely and no major damage was sustained to the truck. The batteries have been subjected to sporadic harassing fires from snipers with several incidents of VC unsuccessfully probing battery positions. Specific details are noted in enclosure (1), extracts from the S-3 Journal.

(4) Training: Operational commitments within the battalion continue to curtail training. Training of FDC and communications personnel is presently supplemented by instructional courses in fire direction procedures and communications fundamentals. Communication and motor transport water-proofing courses were conducted for the battalion and battery personnel. One man attended the ammunition technician course and the Battalion S-4 attended an aerial delivery demonstration at CHU LAI. Seven officers attended field fortification school and forty personnel attended land mine warfare school.

(5) Operations: The battalion fired a total of 366 observed missions and 1350 R&I missions in support of the 9th Marines and ARVN operations, expending 8,876 rounds of 105mm ammunition, 466 rounds of 155mm ammunition, and 284 rounds of 107mm ammunition for a total of 9,626 rounds of ammunition. Enemy casualties and structures destroyed during this period include 28 KIA, 45 MIA, 20 KIA (poss) and 27 MIA (poss). Seven houses and one bunker were reported to be destroyed. During the firing conducted on 12 May 1966, VC casualties were reported to be 125 but actual body count was not confirmed. This does not reflect statistics from Operation GEORGIA.

[REDACTED]

(a) Enclosure (1) contains significant missions and pertinent spot reports for the month of May.

(b) Operation GEORGIA: Artillery support composed of a headquarters group of the 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, Battery B, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines, and Battery F, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines terminated on 10 May 1966. The combat after action report for this operation is submitted as enclosure (2).

(c) Battery F, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines remained in the Operation GEORGIA area at AN MOA to support continued operations by the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines.

(6) Command and Control: On 30 May 1966, Battery D, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines displaced to Hill #55, coordinates (AT965618), and Battery A, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, moved into the Battery D position, coordinates (BT064680). Battery E, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines remained in position at coordinates (AT986644). Battery F, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines maintained a firing position at coordinates (AT872-473). The command post location and mission of the 2d Battalion, 12th Marines remains the same.

(7) Communications/Electronics: In accordance with a division directive, the battalion communications officer ordered five additional AN/PRC-47 radios for Headquarters Battery to replace the AN/GRA 9 radio. The communication platoon received one Y-8 technician MOS 2847 for technical operations of the AN/MRC 110 radio which is expected to be issued to this battalion in the near future.

(8) Logistics: The command continues to maintain a satisfactory logistics capability. The motor transport deadline rate has averaged 15-17% during the period. The shortages of trained mechanics and non-commissioned officers motor transport personnel has attributed to the slight increase in the deadline rate over previous reporting periods. The cantonment program has progressed satisfactorily except for shortages of screen doors and plumbing fixtures for one battery. Shortages of fortifications material is still a problem, though some shortages have been alleviated since the last reporting period. Second echelon motor transport and communications maintenance continues to be completed in a reasonable amount of time despite repair part shortages.

(9) Air Defense: Air defense capabilities remain the same.


[REDACTED]

(10) Civic Action:

(a) Medical personnel treated eighty-four civilians for various ailments and distributed 170 bars of soap.

(b) Military Government: Nothing to report.

(c) Community Relations: The battalion chaplain made frequent visits to the World Evangelization Crusade Orphanage, providing financial support and distributing clothing and personal comfort items.


J. E. SNYDER

Extracts S-3 Journal for period 0001-2400 6May66

061210H 4 Spot report 061140H sent to 12th Marines:
LOCATION: 941643
INCIDENT: Patrol frm Mort3/12 searching for
 rounds recvd about 60 rds SA fire
ACTION TAKEN: Patrol returned about 100 rds of
 SA fire. Notified infantry of incident. VC
 broke contact. GySgt Joseph B. RUSS, 1155153/0811
 KIA. Patrol searching for long rd continues
 with Lt Riorden, patrol leader of 8 man patrol.

Extracts S-3 Journal for period 0001-2400 9May66

090835H 4 FM frm AGG (092595) Az 0500, VC in trenches,
 Btry D, BD222, EOM 1000, cease fire Div FSCC
 6 WP,

Extracts S-3 Journal for period 0001-2400 10May66

101345H 6 Passed following information frm ~~CG 2-18~~ to
 12th Mar S-3. Artillery confirmed kills on
 Opn GEORGIA:

VC KIA (BC)	39
VC KIA (poss)	112
VC WIA (conf)	2
VC WIA (poss)	81

Extracts S-3 Journal for period 0001-2400 12May66

121230H 8 FM frm E-2A, Mort fire (012585), Btry E, 4 HE,
 EOM 1305, mort fire ceased, BE388 on call

121330H 9 FM frm FSCC 1/9 (928545) Btry E Fwd, 200 VC
 in trenchline, BE393, 103 HE, 60 VT, rds on tgt,
 5 houses burning, EOM 1535

121535H 12 FM frm F-1 (940580) 5 VC, Btry E, BE389, 12 HE
 8 WP, 2 to 3 VC KIA (poss) 1 VC KIA (BC) EOM 1550

121600H 15 FM frm E-2A (015600) VC mortars, Btry E, BE390,
 26 HE, rds on tgt, EOM 1625

1
 Enclosure (1)

- 121700H 14 FM frm F-1 (941582) sniper fire, Btry E,
18 HE, several structures burning EOM 1720
- 121815H 16 FM frm AGF (047667) 5 VC with/AM, Btry E, 18 HE,
excell eff on tgt, BE395
- 121816H 17 LATE ENTRY: FM frm E-2A, 30-40 VC in treeline,
(923545) Btry E Rvd, 26 HE, excell eff on tgt

Extracts S-3 Journal for period 0001-2400 13May66

- 131835H 8 FM frm E-4 (015623) VC firing frm house, Btry E,
10 HE, EOM 1845, house destroyed
- 131955H 9 Spot report frm E/2/12 sent to 12th Marines:
LOCATION: 9364344
INCIDENT: Rcvd 10-15 rds AM fire vic treeline
300 meters west of position
ACTION TAKEN: Returned 5 50 cal MG rds, 1 hand
illum., 4 81mm illum.
COMMANDERS EVALUATION: VC broke contact
COMMANDERS ACTION: Notified adjacent units

Extracts S-3 Journal for period 0001-2400 15May66

- 151215H 13 FM frm AO (997607) sniper fire, Btry E, BE400,
EOM 1245, 28 HE, 2 buildings burning, 2 houses
damaged, 2 WIA (poss) sniper fire ceased

Extracts S-3 Journal for period 0001-2400 17May66

- 171100H 8 Spot report frm E/2/12 sent to 12th Marines:
LOCATION: 983633
INCIDENT: #5 gun and prime mover returning
with section frm Hill#55 struck a mine on the
road. Truck demolished. Marines thrown off
vehicle. Vehicle struck 40 lb electrically
detonated mine. Extensive damage to rear under-
carriage of truck, howitzer not damaged.
ACTION TAKEN: Gun and section equipment re-
turned to btry position
FRIENDLY WIA: Pfc MAJOR Med Evac

Extract S-3 Journal for period 0001-2400 19May66

191932H 8 FM frm Seabrook B-2 (048703) Btry E, BE406,
4-5 VC, 13 HE 1 WP, gd eff on tgt, no surv.

Extracts S-3 Journal for period 0001-2400 20May66

201815H 11 Spot report regarding ARVN convoy frm OP#2
sent to 12th Marines:
LOCATION: North of SONG CAU DO on Alt Hwy #1,
vic. GS9971
INCIDENT: ARVN convoy of 6 trucks flying VN and
~~Buddhist~~ flags hit by VNAF airstrike. Air-
craft made four passes on convoy. Convoy halted
at rd junction vic. (001722)
ACTION TAKEN: Hq/2/12 placed on 100% alert

201830H 12 INCIDENT: two ARVN tanks blocking at RJ vic.
(001722) Tanks destroyed two trucks at RJ. Appx
100 armed troops taking refuge in buddist temple
vic. (999719)

201850H 13 INCIDENT: OP#2 reports two tanks and four trucks
(troops dismounted and now moving with tanks)
moving west on road vic. of temple (999719)

Extracts S-3 Journal period 0001-2400 21May66

211650H 13 FM frm F-3 (977670) 100 VC, Btry E, BE408,
30 HE 2 WP ECM 1710

Extracts S-3 Journal period 0001-2400 22May66

221720 H 7 FM frm AO Sacred Romeo, Mort3/12, VC in trench,
28 HE, two direct hits on trench, 5 buildings
burning ECM 1733

221910H 12 FM frm F-4, hvy sniper fire, (038644) BE410,
8 HE 6 WP, excell cover. sniper fire ceased

221936H 14 FM frm F-3 VC with AM, (016622) BE412, 4 WP
5 HCSmk 16 HE-VT gd eff on tgt, sniper fire
ceased

221930H 15 FM frm SB, BE411, Btry D firing, BD225, 18 HE, unobserved, good coverage

222015H 16 FM frm F-3, VC in treeline, (010623), Btry E, BE413, 2 HCSmk, 6 WP gd eff on tgt, sniper fire ceased

Extracts S-3 Journal period 0001-2400 23May66

231735H 8 Spot report frm D/2/12 sent to 12th Marines:
LOCATION: 068689
INCIDENT: Btry D truck ran into road mine and ambush by appx 7 VC. Mine detonated in front of truck causing minor damage, two broken headlights and forced truck off road.
ACTION TAKEN: Infantry patrol dispatched
FRIENDLY VIA: one minor (superficial cut to dvr)
COMMANDERS EVALUATION: No serious damage, VC mine detonated prematurely

231955H 9 Spot report frm D/2/12 sent to 12th Marines:
LOCATION: 064680
INCIDENT: 3 Marines KIA. Standing around LAAM 1 man B-2-4 disarming. 2 men B-2-12 observing. LAAM exploded. Infantry man hurt bad. 2 Btry D men also wounded
ACTION TAKEN: Med Evac request
FRIENDLY VIA: 3

Extracts S-3 Journal period 0001-2400 24May66

242050H 9 Spot report frm Mort3/12 sent to 12th Marines:
LOCATION: 964616
INCIDENT: Post 3A received appx 3 rds SA fire appx 15 meters left and 50 meters in front of post
ACTION TAKEN: Outpost returned 3 to 4 rds SA fire
COMMANDERS EVALUATION: Sniper fire

242135H 10 FM frm 9thMar FBCC, (044628), ARVN under mortar attack, Btry D, BD 628, 12 HE, unobserved

Extracts S-3 Journal period 0001-2400 26May66

- 261700H 9 Spot report frm E/2/12 sent to 12th Marines:
LOCATION: 006623
INCIDENT: E-2-9 conducting search & destroy
 opn ran into 5-10 lb mine in bamboo thicket.
 Trip wire activator. Pfc TONG wounded by shell
 frag, right leg below thigh
ACTION TAKEN: Pfc TONG Med Evaced
- 261958H 12 FM frm A1A, hvy sniper fire, (003633) Btry D,
 BD229, 44 HE 44 WP, gd eff on tgt, sniper
 fire ceased
-

Extracts S-3 Journal period 0001-2400 28May66

- 281315H 4 FM frm E-4 (050635) sniper in village, Btry E,
 BE 419, 20 WP, sniper fire ceased, excell eff
 on tgt, EOM 1325
-

Extracts S-3 Journal period 0001-2400 30May66

- 301545H 7 Assumed OFCON of Btry A/1/11
- 302057H 13 Spot report frm A/1/11 sent to 12thMar & 9th Mar:
LOCATION: 064630
INCIDENT: Btry A rcvd hvy SA fire frm left front
 and right front of btry position. No indication
 of size of VC force
ACTION TAKEN: Btry returned 200 rds SA fire,
 300 rds 50 cal, 800 rds of M60 MG and 3 rds of
 direct fire 105mm
-

Extracts S-3 Journal period 0001-2400 31May66

- 310845H 4 FM frm Sacred Yankoe, (992575) VC in caves,
 Btry E, BE 429, 24 HE, EOM 0858, Given to Btry
 L, destruction of cave
- 311155H 6 FM frm F-3 (928569) VC with AW, Btry D, BD 230,
 18 HE, excell eff on tgt, EOM 1210

311215H 7 FM frm F-3, BD230, Btry D, 24 HE, EOM 1252

311325H 8 FM frm F-3 (925571) VC in trenches, Btry E,
14 HE 12 WP, excell eff on tgt, EOM 1340

311810H 10 FM frm E-3 (999623) VC sniper fire, Btry E,
BE426, 1 HC 6 HE 6 WP, Excell eff on tgt, EOM
1818

311823H 11 FM frm E-3 (004623) VC sniper fire, Btry E,
BE 427, 1 HC 6 HE 6 WP, excell eff on tgt
EOM 1830

6 Enclosure (1)

HEADQUARTERS
2d Battalion, 12th Marines (-) (Rein)
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco 96602

5:SMW:wfe
3100
12 May 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding Officer, Provisional Artillery Battalion
To: Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines
Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report; Operation GEORGIA
Ref: (a) DivO 3100.1B
Encl: (1) Combat Operations After Action Report for the Provisional
Artillery Battalion

1. The subject report is submitted herewith as enclosure (1).

S. M. MORROW

Copy to:

CO, 1st 8" Howitzer Battery, (SP)
CO, 1st Bn, 12th Marines (2)
CO, 2dBn, 12th Marines (3)
CO, 4thBn, 12th Marines (1)
CO, 12th Marines (3)
CO, 9th Marines (3)
CG, 3dMarDiv (7)

ENCLOSURE (2)

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HEADQUARTERS
2d Battalion, 12th Marines (-) (Rein)
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco 96602

5:SM:wfe
3100
12 May 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding Officer, Provisional Artillery Battalion
To: Commanding Officer, 12th Marines
Via: Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report; Field Artillery in support
of Operation GEORGIA

Ref: (a) 3dMarDiv OpO 343-65
(b) 3dMarDiv OpO 368-66
(c) 3dMarDiv OpO 385-66
(d) 9thMar OpO 111-66
(e) 3dBn, 9thMar OpO 368-66

Encl: (1) Task Organization
(2) Overlay of Artillery Dispositions during Operation GEORGIA
(3) Chronology of Events
(4) Summary of Missions Fired and Ammunition Expended

1. Code Name. Operation GEORGIA; Search and Destroy operation to open area to GVN influence.

2. Dates of Operation. 200800H April 1966 - 100800H May 1966

3. Location. AN HOA (AT 8747)

4. Control or Command Headquarters.

a. Infantry: 3d Battalion, 9th Marines (-) (Rein), LtCol W. W. TAYLOR

b. Artillery: Provisional Artillery Battalion, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, Maj S. M. MORROW

5. Task Organization. Enclosure (1)

a. Enclosure (1) was the Task Organization in effect on 200800H April 1966.

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b. On 240800H April 1966 the 1st Provisional Amphibian Howitzer Platoon was attached to the Provisional Artillery Battalion for command and control.

c. The General Support Group composed of 1-8" Howitzer (M-55) (SP); 1-155mm Gun (M-53) (SP) and 2-155mm Howitzers (M-109) (SP) was formed and positioned at AF 966618 on 19 April 1966 to provide general support for Operation GEORGIA.

d. On 270630H April the 1st Provisional Amphibian Howitzer Platoon was attached to 3d Battalion, 9th Marines.

6. Supporting Forces:

s. Phase I

(1) Planned

12-105mm Howitzers
1-8" Howitzer (M-55)
1-155mm Gun (M-53)
2-155mm Howitzers (M-109)

(2) Utilized

12-105mm Howitzers
1-8" Howitzer (M-55)
1-155mm Gun (M-53)
2-155mm Howitzers (M-109)

b. Phase II

(1) Planned

12-105mm Howitzers (Including 6-LVTH-6a)
1-8" Howitzer (M-55)
1-155mm Gun (M-53)
2-155mm Howitzers (M-109)

(2) Utilized

12-105mm Howitzers
1-8" Howitzer (M-55)
1-155mm Gun (M-53)
2-155mm Howitzers (M-109)
6-105mm Howitzers, 34th ARVN Artillery Battalion 261300H April-
100800H May 1966

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a. The initial intelligence estimate received prior to the operation indicated that the below listed units were in the objective area:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>OPERATING AREA</u>
5th Battalion	Probable	500	DUC DUC
LF Company	Confirmed	100	DAI LOC District DUC DUC District

b. In addition to the above units, there were an unknown number of guerillas reported to be operating throughout the area. Intelligence also reported that there were three (3) confirmed battalions and three (3) local Force Companies with a combined strength of 1760 outside of the objective area, but capable of reinforcing within 12 hours.

c. From 20 April to 26 April VC contact was exceedingly light with only occasional sightings of small groups of 4-10 personnel. On the morning of 26 April, infantry elements conducting a sweep west of the SONG THU BON river, in the southwestern portion of the TAOR, sighted and engaged elements estimated to be one MF platoon. Significant contact was again made during the period 1-2 May in the central portion of the eastern sector. On 3 May, contact was made with an estimated three companies while conducting a river crossing into the western portion of the TAOR at (AT 880514).

d. The operating area is bisected by the SONG THU BON, which enters the area at coordinates (AT 855440) and exits the area at coordinates (AT 919532). The terrain west of the SONG THU BON is generally flat and consists primarily of paddy lands; however there are some segments of high ground in the northwest corner of the TAOR containing wooded slopes and short grass. Hamlets and individual houses are scattered throughout the area, but the population is less dense than in the area east of the SONG THU BON. The terrain east of the SONG THU BON consists of two diverse segments. The northern segment is generally flat paddy land, most of which is ten meters or less in elevation, although there are several hills of more than thirty meters elevation in the northeastern portion. The entire area is relatively densely populated. Vegetation is heaviest around the population centers and waterways. The southern segment of the area east of the SONG THU BON rises sharply to elevations of over two hundred meters along the entire southern limits of the area. The slopes begin relatively gentle, but gradually become very steep in the areas of higher elevation along the southern edge. Vegetation is heavy along the stream beds and at the higher elevations.

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12 May 1966

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e. A fair weather road enters the area at coordinates AT 858430 and exits at BT 002518. At coordinates AT 903520 this road separates into two branches, one generally following the east bank of the SONG THU BON, and the other branch coursing east, generally running north to south in the center portion of the area. A segment of the western branch of the road connects to a recently constructed military defense position atop the mountains at coordinates AT 867440. The area west of the SONG THU BON contains only trail and pathways and trafficability is very poor. In addition to the road network, there is a single track railroad which enters the area at coordinates BT 003517. This railroad runs southwest to coordinates AT 848458. This railroad is presently inoperative.

f. Observation in the lowlands throughout the entire zone of operations was marginal and restrictive to ground observers due to frequent hedge rows and other vegetation. Forces operating in the foothills along the southern and western portion of the zone were afforded good observation into lowlands to the north.

g. Weather throughout the operation was generally favorable with heavy rains and reduced visibility occurring only on 30 April, 6, 7, 8 and 9 May. The days were characterized as being hot, humid and clear. Cloud cover did not impede or impair operations except on 7 May. The greatest impairment to operations was the intense heat and humidity experienced daily from around 1200 to 1500 hours.

h. The artillery command group did not have an intelligence section as a part of its headquarters during the operation. The only intelligence gleaned through artillery channels was that derived through requests for fire by both ground and aerial observers. The primary source of intelligence was the intelligence section of 3/9 and the local district chief.

8. Mission. Provide artillery support for 3d Battalion, 9th Marines (-) (Rein) during movement to An Hoa (AT 8747) area and during subsequent search and destroy operations in the objective area.

9. Concept of Operation.

a. Planned.

(1) Artillery support for Phase I will be provided by the attachment of a provisional artillery battalion to the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines at 0800 on D-1 and airlift to the vicinity of AN HOA (AT 8747).

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(2) Upon completion of Phase I (D+2) and when not employed in a direct fire role, the 1st Provisional Amphibian Howitzer Platoon will displace on order to vicinity of AN HOA (AT 9747) and reinforce the provisional artillery battalion.

(3) General support fires will be provided by one 155mm howitzer (M-109) platoon; one 155mm gun (M-53) and one 8" Howitzer (M-55) positioned at AT 966613.

b. Utilized.

Reconnaissance prior to the operation by the respective battery commanders, the battalion S-3 and commanding officer provided an excellent opportunity to preselect firing positions and a command post site. Firing battery positions were selected from which support could be rendered throughout the entire zone of operations, except for the extreme eastern portion. The concept of operation was executed as planned except that Battery "F" was displaced to the vicinity of AT 906477 on 281600H April in order to support a sweep of the extreme eastern portion of the zone of operation. The battery returned to its primary position area on 291830H April after the forces conducting the sweep had returned to an area which could be adequately supported from primary positions. Mortar Battery, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, was on four hour alert throughout the operation for possible deployment, but was not utilized. Six 105mm howitzers of the 34th ARVN Artillery Battalion were available to support the operation outside of the FCL by the U. S. Army Advisors at HOI AN.

c. Disposition of artillery units in the objective area. See Enclosure (2)

10. Execution. See Enclosure (3).

11. Results. See Enclosure (4).

CONFIDENTIAL12. Administration Matters.a. Supply.

(1) All classes of supply with the exception of potable water, were drawn from the LSA through supply point distribution. Fresh potable water was readily available in the AN HOA complex. No difficulty was experienced in obtaining this commodity nor any class of supply from the LSA.

(2) The concept for logistic support of artillery units employed in Operation Georgia provided that firing batteries would deploy with 3 DOA, with an additional 125 rounds of illumination and 50 rounds of HC smoke, per battery, and that the LSA would maintain a dump level of 5 DOA. As of 1830 on D-1, there was only 1 DOA available at AN HOA for the battery which was in position. By the evening of D-Day both batteries were in position and had 3 DOA on hand. The LSA achieved its 5 DOA by D+2. Artillery ammunition was plentiful throughout the operation and only on 3 May did the dump level go below the 5 DOA; however, there was an airdrop on 4 May of 600 rounds of HE and this provided an adequate dump level until resupply could again be effected by C-123 aircraft on 5 May. Close liaison was maintained throughout the operation by the LSA Commander and the Artillery Battalion Command Group. Artillery ammunition was ordered on a daily basis based on the previous day's expenditure rate. Normal resupply was effected in 3 days based on aircraft availability with emergency air drop available on 4-6 hour notice.

(3) Experience gained during this operation indicated a reluctance on the part of all observation agencies to utilize Fuze MTSQ in the attack of targets. Invariably, Fuze VT was called for when requesting fire. Thought should be given to either increasing the allowance of Fuze VT and reducing Fuze MTSQ or else reorienting the thinking of observers along the lines of utilizing more Fuze MTSQ.

b. Transportation.

(1) Aside from the fact that the type of aircraft which would be available for movement of the provisional artillery battalion to the objective area was not finally settled until D-2, little difficulty was experienced during the movement to AN HOA of personnel and equipment. The use of C-123 aircraft was advantageous to artillery employment for it allowed each battery to bring an M-37 truck in addition to the howitzers and other required equipment.

(2) The lack of adequate aircraft availability on D-1 precluded artillery from deploying F/2/12 into the objective area as originally scheduled. The same problem hampered the rapid build up of Class V on D-1 to an adequate level; however this problem was overcome on D-Day.

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(3) Transportation within the objective area posed little or no problem due to the availability of two-2½ ton trucks from local ARVN sources when required for ammunition resupply and for the deployment of F/2/12 on 28 April. In addition, 3/9 provided one M-274 to each firing battery for administrative/resupply runs throughout the operation.

c. Communications.

(1) The artillery organization was such that communication requirements for the Provisional Artillery Battalion were basically the same as they would be for a normal artillery battalion employment. Two conduct of fire nets, a fire direction net and the DAO net were established and guarded by the Provisional Artillery Battalion FDC. Battery B and Battery F each guarded one conduct of fire net, the battalion fire direction net and were prepared to come up on the other battery's conduct of fire net if required. The FSCC and the LVTH-6 platoon each guarded both conduct of fire nets and the fire direction net. There were two companies forward observers operating on each conduct of fire net. The AO net was used in its normal capacity. The fire direction net was also the primary link between the "General Support Group" (Hill number 55) and the "Provisional Artillery Battalion Command Group". If at all possible, when the AO had a fire mission, the AO and the battery assigned the mission would switch to the fire direction net for the completion of the mission. This left the conduct of fire nets free for receiving fire missions from forward observers.

(2) Wire communications was utilized in the following manner: One administrative line from each firing battery into the Provisional Artillery Battalion Command Group switchboard, one hot line from each of the firing batteries to the Artillery Battalion Command Group FDC, one trunk line to 3/9, two lines to radio relay which linked the Provisional Artillery Battalion Command Group with the General Support Group, one hot line to FSCC and one hot line to FSCC forward on Hill #55. No problems were encountered.

d. Maintenance. During the course of the operation it was reported by both forward observers and aerial observers that F/2/12 had two pieces that were consistently shooting short from 100 to 300 meters. The sheaf was checked each day in order to determine which pieces were involved and special corrections applied to compensate for the dispersion. A contact team was requested through LSA when it became apparent that the weapons involved were still erratic even though special corrections were being applied. As a result of the contact team's inspection, new tubes were placed on the faulty weapons and no further problems arose.

13. Special Equipment and Techniques.

a. The concept of operation for Operation GEORGIA provided that artillery would be in position on D-1 prepared to support preliminary operations during Phase I. This mission resolved itself into two basic tasks:

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(1) Provide artillery support for Command Group Alpha and attached units on D-1 in the objective area.

(2) Provide artillery support for Command Group Bravo during movement by surface means into the objective area on D-Day and D+1.

b. There were no special problems envisioned or encountered in carrying out the task in sub-paragraph a(1) above.

c. The entry into and retraction from the objective area was considered to be the most critical phase of the entire operation from the artillery support standpoint since all attached artillery could not cover the entire movement. Artillery elements were prepositioned on D-1 and prepared to carry out both tasks enumerated above. The problem of artillery support, mission clearance and communications during movement of Command Group Bravo into and out of the objective area was handled in the following manner.

(1) Since the ground movement of Command Group Bravo would carry it through both the 3d and 9th Marines TAORs during its movement into and out of the objective area, clearance was obtained from Division FSCC to allow artillery to fire in support of the column, if needed. The concept employed was that artillery would fire on anything that fired on the column. In order to have positive clearance and control, the liaison section of 3d Battalion, 9th Marines was split during Phase I. The Liaison Chief and two radio operators were sent overland with Command Group Bravo, while the remainder of the team was airlifted into the objective area on D-1. This technique allowed the liaison section with Command Group Bravo to monitor both conduct of fire nets of attached Forward Observers and to permit or deny requests for fire during column movement. The general support group at AT 966618 monitored the same nets. Although artillery support was not required during entry and retraction from the objective area, this technique ensured speed of response in case artillery fire was required.

(2) This same technique was utilized within the objective area on sweeps of more than one day's duration and proved very effective.

14. Commander's Analysis.

a. Planning.

(1) Initially Operation GEORGIA was to be supported by only one 105mm Howitzer Battery (F/2/12). This battery was to be reinforced by the fires of the 1st Provisional Amphibian Howitzer Platoon subsequent to D+1, when not otherwise employed by the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines and by a general support group at Hill #55. On D-5 it was determined by higher headquarters that an additional 105mm Howitzer Battery (B/1/12) would be employed. This, in turn, generated a requirement for a provisional battalion command group. No difficulty was encountered in fulfilling either requirement. Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines had previously anticipated

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a possible requirement for a provisional command group and had prepared a Table of Organization and a Table of Equipment to support it. Both the T/O and T/E proved to be satisfactory for this operation.

(2) Although there was a T/O for a Provisional Battalion Command Group, the designation of individuals for this group was not accomplished until D-4 and this allowed but three days for planning before deployment. Coupled with the limited time factor was the problem of availability of personnel to work during the planning phase. The majority of the personnel continued to perform their primary duties and were available for Operation GEORGIA on a full time basis only on D-2. This situation should be remedied in future operations involving a provisional command group.

b. Transportation. The concept of operations provided for the artillery batteries and the command group to be airlifted by either fixed wing or helicopter into the objective area. All artillery units had loading plans and serial assignment tables for movement by either mode of transportation; however, it was not finally determined until D-2 which mode would actually be used. Since the mode of transportation was to dictate the point of departure for the operation as well as the weight of the palletized loads, too little time was available for proper preparation of palletized loads for the movement to the objective area.

c. Liaison. The liaison officer assigned to the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines had been on the job for only two weeks when Operation GEORGIA commenced. The Naval Gunfire Officer had been with the battalion for an even shorter period of time. Neither individual was experienced in his duties and this initially detracted from the effectiveness of the liaison section in proper fire planning, control and coordination. The section was further disrupted by having to provide a mobile FSCC for movement into the objective area and for periodic sweeps within the objective area. The Provisional Artillery Battalion command group CP was in the close proximity to the infantry COC and it required close supervision of the artillery commander to get the FSCC functioning in an acceptable manner. Mention has been made elsewhere of the mobile FSCC. Suffice it to say, the concept worked, but to the detriment of the regular FSCC staffed by inexperienced personnel.

d. Operations.

(1) B/1/12 was in position, laid and registered by 1400 on D-1. F/2/12 had one gun in position along with the Battery FDC by 1700 on D-1. The Provisional Artillery Battalion command group was set up and assumed control by 1800 on D-1. During the planning phase it was decided that batteries would exercise technical fire direction at least until 1200 on D-Day. This was decided because the command group had not functioned together prior to deployment. Both batteries had exercised technical fire direction techniques prior to deployment. Decentralized control was very effective during Phase I and was utilized throughout the remainder of the operation based on

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results achieved during D-1 and D-Day. Although the Provisional Battalion Command Group was designed by T/O and T/E to exercise technical fire direction, the decentralized method proved effective and provided invaluable experience to battery FDC personnel as well as the command group FDC personnel who were attached to the batteries during the course of the operation for training and as watch standers.

(2) A critical phase of the operation from a strict artillery standpoint arose during the deployment of F/2/12 to its supplementary position from 281300H to 291830H April. The battery was emplaced approximately 2000 meters outside the friendly perimeter and was assigned two ARVN platoons as security elements. The battery commander was directed to prepare direct fire cards as a measure of self defense in the event of hostile attack. The position area lent itself well to the employment of direct methods. When an enemy mortar attack occurred on 290250H April two guns had been previously laid on sectors from which mortar fire was received and the gunners were responsive to the threat. By the time the sixth mortar round had impacted, the guns were taking the mortar positions under fire. It is the conviction of the undersigned that it was only through the responsiveness of these gun crews that no material damage or personnel casualties were sustained from the mortar attack.

(3) Close and harmonious liaison was effected between the infantry unit and supporting artillery. The infantry commander and his staff were well versed in the role of artillery, its capabilities and limitations. As a result, artillery was employed effectively throughout the operation. If there were to be any criticism of artillery employment, it would be that there was a tendency to over-emphasize artillery to the detriment of other organic supporting arms. A good case in point would be the number of night defensive fires and on-call fires which flowed in nightly. It is believed that at least a portion of these fires could have been just as effectively rendered by both 60 and 81mm mortars which were available to each of the companies during this operation.

e. Observation Agencies.

(1) Forward Observers.

(a) Throughout Operation GEORGIA there appeared to be a reluctance on the part of artillery Forward Observers to request Fuze MTSQ in the attack of targets. Invariably FOs requested Fuze VT in their initial requests. This practice is not only costly when comparing the price differential between these types of fuzes, but also resulted in the dump level of Fuze VT being nearly depleted on two different occasions. Both B/1/12 and F/2/12 conducted frequent time registrations and it was only at the direction of the FDOs that any MTSQ missions were fired.

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(b) Generally, Forward Observer procedures were very good during the conduct of fire missions with the exception of giving a complete and proper surveillance upon the completion of missions.

(c) During the operation, the two batteries were responding to requests for fire from eight different observers, since each company utilized split FO sections. This practice is acceptable and caused no undue amount of confusion until the nightly requests for on-call and night defensive fires started being received. Invariably each forward observer would request a minimum of four night defensive fires and up to seven or eight on-call fires. All night defensive fires were fired in and on-call fires were fired in when requested by the observer. It is believed that the quantity of these types of fire were totally unrealistic to actual requirements of the normal infantry unit deployed in the field.

(2) Other Ground Observers.

(a) Artillery fired in response to request for fire from reconnaissance OPs on numerous occasions. Some very fine missions were fired by these observers; however, there was a great tendency on the part of these observers to enter fire for effect too early and then to chase the fleeing target with volley fire by commanding "repeat range, repeat fire for effect" rather than re-entering the adjustment phase. Obviously, this procedure is costly in terms of ammunition expenditure and indicated that further training of reconnaissance observers in artillery adjustment procedures is required.

(b) Reconnaissance OPs have a primary mission of observing and reporting, with the added capability of being able to adjust artillery fires on lucrative targets of opportunity; however, communications for this later function are believed to be inadequate. The reconnaissance platoon operated on a separate net and this was the only net utilized for both normal reporting and for the adjustment of artillery fires. Rather than switch to a conduct of fire or fire direction net, the reconnaissance platoon commander chose to relay requests for fire to the FSCC. In turn, the request went to the Provisional Artillery Command Group and then to the firing batteries. To further delay the responsiveness of artillery, on several occasions "at my command" missions were requested when normal "will adjust" would have sufficed. This method of transmission was totally inadequate for effective artillery response and many lucrative targets escaped because of the obvious time delay.

(3) Aerial Observers. Either through design or default aerial observer representatives were not present during planning conferences. It was only on the evening of D-1 that liaison was effected between the aerial observers and the artillery command group. At that time the frequencies of the conduct of fire nets and the fire direction net were passed by the artillery commander to the aerial observers. Even after this information was passed, it was noted that certain of the AOs were not prepared to switch

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frequencies to either of the conduct of fire nets or the fire direction net in order to fire or register batteries. This resulted in the battalion command group acting as a relay agency and detracted materially from the timeliness of artillery fires during the initial phase of the operation. This problem was overcome shortly after the initiation of Phase II of the operation.

f. Training. 105mm towed Howitzer gun crew and chiefs of sections must continue to train in accordance with the principle spelled out in FM 6-75. The areas for improvement run from preparation of position areas to insure a 6400 mil traverse capability to cannoneers drill to insure speed of response, commensurate with reliability and accuracy, in the execution of fire commands. The same general comments apply to the training of FDC personnel in accordance with the principles set forth in FM 6-40. Only by continued and proper training techniques will artillerymen achieve the standards of accuracy and response set forth in Table XIV of FM 6-40.

15. Recommendations.

a. Every effort should be made to have an aerial observer representative present at planning conferences prior to the commencement of the operation in order to provide that section with artillery frequencies to be utilized.

b. Take appropriate steps to insure that key personnel for provisional artillery battalion headquarters are available on a full time basis as early as possible in order that proper and complete planning can be followed.

c. When other than organic transportation means are to be employed for the introduction of artillery into the objective area, the transportation means to be utilized and the availability must be established as early as possible in order to insure timely preparation and planning by artillery units.

d. Continue to train all observation agencies in proper adjustment techniques, methods of attacking various types of targets, use of Fuze MTSQ and on the importance of making a surveillance at the end of each mission.

e. Continue to emphasize standard basic artillery techniques on reliability, accuracy and speed of response as outlined in FM 6-75 and FM 6-40 and the attainment of standard times by all artillery batteries.

f. Provide reconnaissance elements with additional radio equipment or make provision for these elements to come up on artillery frequencies when requesting and conducting fire missions.

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g. Continue to stress to supported infantry commanders the capabilities, limitations and role of artillery. Primary emphasis to be placed on fire planning and the use of all supporting arms, including organic mortars.

S. M. Morrow
S. M. MORROW

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(Task Organization)

Time Zone: H

3d Bn, 9th Marines

LtCol TAYLOR

H&S Co (-)
 Co "B" (-), (Rein), 3d SP Bn
 Det, FLSG (A)
 Det, Hq Bn FLSG (A)
 Det, Ammo Co
 Det, EOD Plt
 Det, Maint Co
 Det, Supply Co (Bulk Fuel)
 Det, 3d ITT
 Sqd, Scout Dog Plt
 Det, 3d MT Bn
 Det, MASS-2, 1st MAW
 Refugee T, 41st Civil Affairs Co (USA)
 Det, 3d Med Bn

1stLt RANK
 Capt GOODYEAR

Co "F" (Rein), 2d Bn, 9th Marines

Capt RECKEWELL

Co G
 Det, Comm Plt, H&S Co
 Det, Med Plt, H&S Co
 Sect, 81mm Mort Plt, H&S Co
 Sect, 106mm RR Plt, H&S Co
 FO Tm, Btry "E", 2d Bn, 12th Mar

Co "I" (Rein), 3d Bn, 9th Marines

Capt MATTMILLER

Co "I"
 Det, Comm Plt, H&S Co
 Det, Med Plt, H&S Co
 Sect, 81mm Mort Plt, H&S Co
 FO Tm, Btry "D", 2d Bn, 12th Mar
 FAC Tm, H&S Co

Co "M" (Rein), 3d Bn, 3d Marines

Capt RUSHING

Co M
 Det, Comm Plt, H&S Co
 Det, Med Plt, H&S Co
 Sect, 81mm Mort Plt, H&S Co
 Sect, 106mm RR Plt, H&S Co
 FO Tm, Btry "F", 2d Bn, 12th Mar
 FAC Tm, H&S Co

1st Plt, Co "D", 3d Recon Bn

Lt SCHWARTZ

Enclosure (1)

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CONFIDENTIALProv Artillery Group

Btry "B", 1st Bn, 12th Marines

Btry "F", 2d Bn, 12th Marines

Major MORROW

1st Prov Amphibian Howitzer Flt

Capt THAMES

Co "C" (-), 3d Engr Bn

Capt HICKS

Bn Reserve, Co "L" (Rein), 3d Bn, 9th Mar

Capt COLCOMBE

Co "L"

Det, Comm Flt, H&S Co

Det, Med Flt, H&S Co



Sect, 81mm Mort Flt, H&S Co

FO Tn, Btry "D", 2d Bn, 12th Mar

Enclosure (1)

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ENCLOSURE (2)

1 of 1

ARTILLERY DISPOSITION
OPERATION GEORGIA
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

20 April 1966

The Provisional Artillery Battalion for Operation GEORGIA was attached to 3d Battalion, 9th Marines effective at 0800. Battery B, 1/12 was airlifted to AN HOA (AT 8747) and occupied battery position at (AT 8768 4753), azimuth of fire 0400. Registration was conducted at (AT 903544). The General Support Group moved to Hill #55 (AT 966617). The Provisional Artillery Battalion Command Group was established in the vicinity of the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines Command Post at 1800. Eight H&I fires were assigned to Battery B on suspected VC withdrawal routes.

21 April 1966

Battery F, 2/12 completed airlift and moved to battery position at (AT 87394730), azimuth of fire 0400. Registration was conducted at (AT 903544). Artillery support commenced with the movement of a mechanized column consisting of two rifle companies, F/2/9 and M/3/3, and the 1st Provisional Amphibian Howitzer Platoon (LVTH-6's), from Hill #55 to AN HOA. The General Support Group (GSP) covered the initial advance of the column. At 2030, 2045, 2050 and 2115, the GSP fired observed mission at (AT 872579), (AT 869576), (AT 879588) and (AT 896579) on VC positions with no surveillance reported. At 1320, 1400, 1500, 1625 and 1820, Battery B and Battery F fired five missions for Recon OP's at (AT 925485) on armed VC, (AT 934463) on VC in ravine, (AT 928477) on VC, (AT 928491) on suspected VC OP and at (AT 820525) on VC in open, with no surveillance reported. The mechanized column assumed a night defensive position on Hill #65 (AT 879576). Fourteen H&I concentrations were fired during this period.

22 April 1966

Support of the mechanized column continued as the column crossed the SONG THU BON river at (AT 927535). A deliberate sweep was conducted toward PHU DA (AT 865490) by L/3/9 (-) towards blocking positions in the vicinity of (AT 940505) in conjunction with the advance of the mechanized column. No fire missions were conducted from the column during this period. Artillery support was provided by the attached LVTH-6's utilizing direct fire technique. Recon OP's reported VC activity along the southern boundaries of the FCL and emphasis was placed on H&Is along foot trails and areas where VC were reported to be withdrawing from the zone of operation. Twenty H&I concentrations were fired during this period. Three night defensive fires and three on-call fires were fired and one observed mission was fired for Recon at (AT 828524) on VC in the open, with no surveillance reported.

23 April 1966

F/2/9 at (AT 913521), M/3/3 at (AT 919521) and I/3/9 at (AT 929521) launched a coordinated sweep to the southwest. Little artillery support

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was called for during this operation. At 1255, 1314, 1320, 1710, 1715, and 1850, six observed missions were fired at (AT 887516) on VC snipers, (AT 879514) on VC snipers, (AT 825447) on suspected VC activity, (AT 913513) on VC snipers, (AT 887506) on VC in the open, and at (AT 944476) on 8 VC with weapons. The mission fired at (AT 944476) resulted in two (2) VC KIA (poss) and three (3) VC WIA (poss), no surveillance was reported on the other missions fired. Extensive booby traps were encountered during this period and FO D-1 with I/3/9 was wounded by an M-26 device. The radio operator for E-2 operating with F/2/9 was wounded during a village sweep. Both casualties were evacuated.

Because of the lack of survey control in this area, a survey team from the 12th Marines was requested to establish adequate local survey control. The survey party performed a sun shot to establish azimuth control and a permanent survey control point was established for the AN HOA area.

H&I fires continued to be emphasized and were the bulk of delivered fire for this period with nineteen concentrations being fired.

24 April 1966

Search and destroy operations continued to meet little opposition and VC elements avoided contact. The primary source of observed fire missions came from Recon OP's. At 0730, 0745, 1345, and 1630, four missions by Recon OP's were fired at (AT 878515) on 15 VC, (AT 945474) on 15 VC, (AT 792493) on VC snipers, and (AT 800478) on 10 VC in open, with surveillance of two or three VC KIA or WIA (poss) reported at (AT 945474, no surveillance on the other missions was reported. At 1730 a TOT was fired at (AT 947458) to (AT 948461) on 17-25 VC, no casualty estimate was reported. Nineteen H&I concentrations were fired during this period.

25 April 1966

A three company search and destroy operation commenced with I/3/9 (AT 895475), L/3/9 (AT 905480) and M/3/3 (AT 914493) moving northwest to the SONG THU BON river. Little VC contact was experienced and artillery support was not requested during the operation. At 0845, 0945, and 1010 three missions were fired for Recon OP's at (AT 205484) on VC in open, (AT 196505) on suspected VC OP and at (AT 965457) on 5 VC in the open with a surveillance of five (5) VC KIA confirmed at (AT 965457). At 1245 and 1325 two missions were fired at (AT 972461) and (AT 971458) for destruction of a VC village, surveillance indicated that the village was destroyed. At 2350 a mission was fired at (AT 899474) on a suspect VC mortar position with the surveillance of rounds on target, mortar fire ceased. The LVTH-6's were attached to the Provisional Artillery Battalion and assumed their indirect fire capabilities. A registration was conducted and the LVTH-6's were laid on azimuth 0400. During this period, forty-five H&I concentrations were fired by the Provisional Artillery Battalion.

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26 April 1966

Infantry operations continued past the SONG TINH YEN River with a search and destroy operation conducted by I/3/9 and M/3/3 which ran generally southwest from (AT 857469) to (AT 825470) to (AT 850500) and (AT 818480). Blocking positions were occupied by L/3/9 from (AT 838505) to (AT 815493) and by F/2/9 from (AT 805480) to (AT 815460). Battery F was registered at RP#5 (AT 812519) and laid on azimuth 5200 to support the operation. No artillery support was called for during this operation. At 1415 one fire mission was conducted for Recon OP at (AT 805496) on 10 VC in the open with a surveillance of three (3) VC KIA (BC) and two VC WIA (poss). Battery B and Battery F were registered on RP#6 (AT 948489) and laid on azimuth 1400 in preparation for a four day operation commencing on 27 April.

Liaison was established with the 34th ARVN Artillery Battalion and a Program of H&I fires was initiated for the ARVN Artillery at DIEN BA (BT 065582), NONG SON (AT 821388) and TRA KIEU (BT 032510). These H&I's were initiated to augment the H&I's fired of Battery B and Battery F and in order to allow Battery B and Battery F to concentrate their fires within the FCL. ARVN Artillery units were assigned concentrations along the southwestern borders of the FCL. Forty H&I's were fired by the Provisional Artillery Battalion and eighteen H&I's were fired by ARVN Artillery at DIEN BA, NONG SON, and TRA KIEU.

27 April 1966

The 3d Battalion began a four day operation to the north east. M/3/3 was helilifted to (AT 940465) to begin a search and destroy operation through the NUI DO mountains region (AT 950470) to (AT 983488). I/3/9 and L/3/9 were deployed by LVT to the vicinity of (AT 906483) and (AT 914575). Axis of advance for I/3/9 proceeded northeast (AT 906483) to (AT 960501) and L/3/9 proceeded northeast (AT 915475) to (AT 960489). The LVTH-6's were attached to the operational force in order to utilize their direct fire capabilities. At 0810, 1015, 1120, 1215, 1250, 1345, 1725, and 1900 eight observed missions were fired at (AT 909481) on VC in the open, (AT 948447) on 10 VC in the open, (AT 909481) on 6 VC in the open, (AT 948515) on 8 VC in the open, (AT 934508) on 4 VC in the open, (AT 943514) on 4 VC with rifles, (AT 953517) on 3 VC with automatic weapons and at (AT 957515) on reported small arms fire. A surveillance of two (2) VC WIA (poss) was reported at (AT 928483), no surveillance was reported on the other targets. Twenty-five H&I concentrations were fired; no H&I fired by the ARVN Artillery for this period.

28 April 1966

Continued support of the operation indicated that the rifle companies had moderate contact with VC elements. Battery F was displaced to (AT 908478) at 1500 to provide artillery support during the last phase of the four day operation. At 0305, 0835, 1025, 1030, 1045, 1155, 1217,

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1513, 1615, 1653, 1800, 2000, and 2100, thirteen observed missions were fired at (BT 064594) on possible mortars firing on DIEN BAN, (AT 958517) on 5 VC with weapons, (AT 975475) on 3 VC in the open, (AT 971471) on 2 VC in the open, (AT 958522) on VC with weapons, (AT 965521) on 10 VC in tree line, (AT 961526) on reinforced VC squad, (AT 991544) on 10-15 VC crossing river, (AT 992551) on 6 VC near trench line, (AT 976528) on 8 VC with automatic weapons, (AT 986525) on snipers in tree line, (AT 007518) on 5 VC and at (AT 973522) on a preplanned barrage. Surveillance on missions at (AT 951517) reported two (2) VC WIA (poss) and two (2) VC KIA (poss), at (AT 961526) twelve (12) VC casualties were reported, at (AT 991544) five (5) VC KIA (BC) were reported, at (AT 992551) six (6) VC KIA (poss) were reported and at (AT 976528) one (1) VC KIA (poss) and three VC WIA (poss) were reported. Four night defensive fires were fired in along the southern boundries of the AN HOA complex. Thirty H&I concentrations were fired by the Provisional Artillery Battalion and eight H&I concentrations were fired by ARVN Artillery at TRA KIEU.

29 April 1966

At 0250 Battery F (AT 908478) reported that they had received mortar rounds in the vicinity of their battery perimeter. Suspect mortar positions were taken under direct fire and the mortar attack was broken off because of the battery's immediate reaction. Battery B commenced suppressive fires at 0253; however, Battery F's direct fire had apparently driven off the attackers. An early morning patrol uncovered six (6) 60mm mortar rounds at (AT 911485) and one (1) 81mm mortar round at (AT 912484). Two (2) 60mm mortar rounds landed within the battery perimeter, but no casualties or material damage was sustained. Eight (8) 81mm mortar craters were discovered in the vicinity of (AT 904474), and nine (9) 60mm mortar craters were found in the vicinity of (AT 906473).

Infantry operations during the last phase of the four day operation resulted in little VC contact and artillery support for this period was negligible. At 0210, 0253, 0325, 0935, 1100, and 1930, six observed missions were fired at (AT 967524) on suspect mortar position, (AT 917488) suspect mortar position, (AT 975522) on a prearranged barrage, (AT 955533) on VC in trenchline, (AT 945474) destruction of footbridge, and at (BT 012482) on 5 VC in rice paddy. No positive surveillance was given for these missions. Because of the advance of the infantry companies during the search and destroy operations, Battery F displaced to its original battery position (AT 87394730) at 1830 and continued support of the operation.

Forty-three H&I concentrations were fired by Provisional Artillery Battalion and eighteen H&I concentrations were fired by ARVN Artillery at NONG SONG and TRA KIEU.

30 April 1966

The infantry search and destroy operation was terminated and minimal artillery support was rendered during this period. At 1044, 1630, 1800, 1830, and 1855, five observed missions were fired at (AT 949490) on VC

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in the open, (AT 908464) on an estimated VC platoon, (AT 907467) on an estimated VC platoon, (AT 952570) on 4 people digging positions, and at (AT 898453) on 11 VC in open. No surveillance was reported on these missions. Sixty-one H&I concentrations were fired by the Provisional Artillery Battalion and no H&Is were fired by the ARVN Artillery during this period.

1 May 1966

Infantry operations were not conducted on this day. Battery B and Battery F registered on RP#1 (AT 903544). At 1220, 1445, 1630, 1755 and 1907 five observed missions were fired at (AT 903493) on a suspected VC platoon, (AT 944474) on 11 VC, (AT 943474) on VC crossing bridge, (AT 944474) on 5 VC crossing bridge, and at (AT 945474) on 7 VC near bridge. Surveillance reported on mission at (AT 945474) resulted in two (2) VC KIA (BC) and ten (10) VC KIA (poss) and the bridge destroyed. These missions were fired for AO's and the Recon OP's. Forty-three H&I concentrations were fired by the Provisional Artillery Battalion and forty-one concentrations were fired by the ARVN Artillery at NONG SON and TRA KIEU.

2 May 1966

Two infantry companies, I/3/9 and L/3/9, commenced a one day search and destroy operation along the SONG TINH YEN-SONG THU BON river from (AT 875480) to (AT 925510). Contact with small enemy elements was more frequent and artillery support was more active during this period. At 0942, 0950, 1030, 1054, 1130, 1454, 1658, 1750, 1825, 1845, and 1850 eleven observed missions were fired at (AT 936474) on 6 VC, (AT 934472) on 4 VC with weapons, (AT 814508) on VC village, (AT 942472) on 4 VC with weapons, (AT 900504) on 6 VC, (AT 867506) on snipers, (AT 911491) on VC squad firing, (AT 885492) on 30 VC in the open, (AT 900501) on VC squad in open, and at (AT 908496) on a VC squad in the open. Surveillance on missions at (AT 934460) resulted in seven (7) VC KIA (poss) and one (1) VC WIA (poss), at (AT 814508) three (3) VC KIA (poss), at (AT 900504) six (6) VC KIA (poss), at (AT 867506) two (2) VC KIA (poss), at (AT 885492) ten (10) VC KIA (poss) along with five (5) VC WIA (poss) and at (AT 908496) four (4) VC KIA (BC), six (6) VC WIA (poss), eight (8) buildings destroyed and two secondary explosions in two buildings. Artillery fire during this period began to indicate that guerrilla size units were suffering severe casualties as evidenced by the amount of blood and flesh reported in areas where artillery fires had been delivered. Observation of enemy casualties was not possible at all times due to the high underbrush and irregular terrain features. The VC's determined effort to retrieve casualties and conceal their dead and wounded made it difficult to accurately estimate the actual number of VC casualties sustained. During this period forty-nine H&I concentrations were fired by the Provisional Artillery Battalion and seventeen H&I concentrations were fired by ARVN Artillery at NONG SON, TRA KIEU and QUE SON.

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3 May 1966

M/3/9 and A/1/9 were helilifted to the 3/9 CP to replace M/3/3 and F/2/9. At approximately 1230, M/3/9 and L/3/9 moved by LVT's to the vicinity of (AT 877515) to commence company patrols in the vicinity of (AT 860510 to AT 870510) in response to intelligence reports that a VC main force unit was within the area. After crossing the river (AT 876 512), M/3/9 came under intense enemy fire and was immediately engaged by the enemy. During this period artillery support was the heaviest experienced during Operation GEORGIA. When enemy contact was finally terminated Battery B, 1/12 and Battery F, 2/12 had expended 1085 rounds in support of the engagement. Continuous artillery support was rendered from 1250 until 2100. At frequent stages continuous zone fire was employed in the face of advancing friendly troops and periods of sustained fire were common. Systematic destruction of hostile villages was initiated whenever infantry companies came under enemy fire. It was reported by local intelligence agencies that the combined effect of infantry, air and artillery fires had devastating effect upon the enemy. Surveillance of enemy casualties was not possible during the period due to the constant engagement with the enemy and the tempo of the operation; however, areas where artillery fires had been directed were reported to have contained a considerable amount of blood and flesh, which indicated heavy enemy casualties. At 1015, 1250, 1325, 1330, 1340, 1430, 1435, 1514, 1535, 1615, 1645, 1720, 1730 1850, 1855, 1920, 2015 to 2100 and 2235 twenty observed missions were fired at (AT 835542) on VC in trench, (AT 912439) on VC in trench, (AT 877514) on VC mortar and automatic weapons fire, (AT 915502) on VC in trench, (AT 919503) on VC in trench, (AT 869518) on 30 VC firing, (AT 872522) on VC in trench, (AT 891511) on VC in village, (AT 869518) on-call continuous fire, (AT 888527) on small arms fire from village, (AT 886527) on a VC village, (AT 866517) on a prep fire on a VC village, (AT 882527) on VC village, (AT 869518) on mortar fire, (AT 869509, AT 874512, AT 880518, and AT 884515) on call continuous fire and at (AT 868517) on VC small arms fire from village. Forty-five H&I concentrations were fired by the Provisional Artillery Battalion and thirty-four H&I concentrations were fired by ARVN Artillery at NONG SON and TRA KIEU.

4 May 1966

L/3/9 and A/1/9 commenced a one day search and destroy operation from (AT 901509) to (AT 928522) then south to (AT 920480). I/3/9 established blocking positions from (AT 920485) to (AT 940485). Artillery support was negligible during this period. At 0045, 0845, 1135, 1826, and 1923 five observed missions were fired at (AT 889505) on VC mortars, (AT 890 511) on 4 VC in tree line, (AT 899507) as covering fire, (AT 820550) on automatic weapons, and at (AT 872532) a TOT on reported VC activity. A surveillance was reported at (AT 872532) of excellent effect on target, ten (10) VC KIA (poss), five (5) VC WIA (poss); however, the surveillance was also attributed to an air strike as well as the artillery fire delivered and no specific number of casualties could be credited to artillery

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fires alone. Four night defensive fires and one on-call were fired during this period. Thirty-four H&I concentrations were fired by the Provisional Artillery Battalion and twenty-three H&I concentrations were fired by ARVN Artillery at NONG SON and TRA KIEU.

5 May 1966

A/1/9 and L/3/9 commenced a one day sweep northwest along an axis generally from (AT 908488 to AT 885495) while M/3/9 assumed blocking positions from (AT 879487 to AT 890500). Artillery support during the sweep was negligible. Battery B, 1/12 and Battery F, 2/12 registered at (AT 80405168) in preparation for a major search and destroy operation expected to commence on 7 May. TOT missions were fired based on current intelligence at 1845 at (AT 869517) on suspect VC Battalion position, at 1912 at (AT 890518) on VC suspected Battalion position, and at 2030 at (AT 829483) on suspect VC Battalion CP. No surveillance was given during these missions. During this period thirty-three H&I concentrations were fired by the Provisional Artillery Battalion and ten H&I concentrations were fired by ARVN Artillery at NONG SON and TRA KIEU. Five on-call and four night defensive fires were fired-in during this period.

6 May 1966

I/3/9 began a sweep from (AT 908480) north to (AT 910486) then east to (AT 920486) and on into blocking positions established by L/3/9 at (AT 921480 to AT 921490). Little contact was encountered and artillery support was not rendered during this operation. At 0915, 1155, and 1715 three observed missions were fired at (AT 932488) on VC snipers, (AT 985479) on three armed VC and at (AT 947483) on 2 VC. Surveillance reported that at (AT 985479) two structures were destroyed and one (1) VC WIA (poss) and two (2) VC KIA (poss). Surveillance at (AT 947480) reported one (1) VC KIA (poss) and one (1) VC WIA (poss). From 2000 until 2015 four TOT's were fired at (AT 822471) on suspect VC platoon, (AT 852481) on suspect VC company, (AT 868526) on suspect VC company and at (AT 834543) on suspect VC Battalion area. No surveillance was rendered and TOT's were fired based on current intelligence information. Battery B, 1/12 and Battery F, 2/12 conducted registration at (AT 848520) in preparation for 3/9's four day operation northwest of the SONG TINH YEN-SONG THU BON river. The batteries were subsequently laid on azimuth 5400. Thirty-three concentrations were fired by the Provisional Artillery Battalion and twenty H&I concentrations were fired by ARVN Artillery at NONG SON, TRA KIEU and QUE SON.

7 May 1966

3/9 commenced a four day search and destroy operation north of the SONG TINH YEN river. At 0815 A/1/9 moved to the vicinity of (AT 880510) and made a faint subsequent to a diversionary battalion prep fire at (AT 859488) to (AT 860491). At 0825 a battalion prep fire commenced at (AT 858496) then shifted to (AT 862498) in preparation for the river crossing

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by M/3/9 at (AT 868497). After M/3/9 completed its river crossing and secured an initial area, A/1/9 moved across the river at (AT 868497) and moved to blocking position in the vicinity of (AT 862501). I/3/9 and L/3/9 were then moved across the river and the search and destroy operation commenced in a northerly direction. During this period seven observed missions were fired at 0905, 0940, 1055, 1145, 1250, 1500, and 1530, at targets (AT 847491) on VC in village, (AT 847492) on VC in Trenchline, (AT 865508) on VC in trenchline, (AT 932507) on VC in trenchline, (AT 858514) on VC snipers, (AT 810505) on 8 VC with weapons, and (AT 810505) on VC with weapons. Surveillance were reported at (AT 847492) two (2) VC KIA (poss), and (AT 810505) two (2) VC KIA (poss) and two (2) VC WIA (poss). No surveillance was reported for the other targets. During this period thirty-five H&I concentrations were fired by the Provisional Artillery Battalion and twenty-two H&I concentrations were fired by the ARVN Artillery at NONG SON, TRA KIEU and QUE SON.

Battery F, 2/12 received two new 105mm Howitzer tubes and placed them on howitzers five and six.

8 May 1966

The 3/9 search and destroy operation continued in a northeasterly direction. The progress of the operation was hampered by intermittent periods of heavy rain. Little contact with the VC was experienced and artillery support was minimal for this period. The advance of the companies placed them in the vicinity of (AT 855525). Battery B, 1/12 and Battery F, 2/12 were laid on azimuth 6000 as a result of the advance of the column. At 0950, 1325, 1330, 1347, 1400, 1438, and 1514, seven observed missions were fired at (AT 849497) on VC building bunkers, (AT 901502) on 20 VC with weapons, (AT 947479) on 3 VC in the open, (AT 904508) on 15 VC in the open, (AT 904508) continuation of fire on 15 VC in the open, (AT 940476) on 10 VC camouflaged with foliage, and (AT 973467) on VC in underbrush. A surveillance was reported at (AT 940476) of four (4) VC KIA (poss) and three (3) VC WIA (poss). No surveillance was reported on the other targets. Battery F, 2/12 registered howitzers five and six at (AT 809501). Four night defensive concentrations and four on-call concentrations were fired-in during this period. Thirty-nine H&I concentrations were fired by the Provisional Artillery Battalion and twenty-two concentrations were fired by the ARVN Artillery at NONG SON and TRA KIEU.

9 May 1966

The search and destroy operation continued it's northeasterly advance to the SONG VU GIA river (AT 885554) to (AT 900549). Enemy contact continued to be negligible and no artillery support was rendered during this period. One observed mission was fired at (AT 810510) with a surveillance of one (1) VC KIA (poss) reported. Two on-call concentrations were fired in for this period. Thirty H&I concentrations were fired by the Provisional Artillery Battalion and twenty-two H&I concentrations were fired by ARVN Artillery at NONG SON, and TRA KIEU.

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10 May 1966

Operation GEORGIA was terminated at 0815 with the infantry companies of 3/9 at (AT 885554) to (AT 900549). Artillery support of the Provisional Artillery Battalion continued until all companies of 3/9 were extracted from the objective area and while LVT's moved up the SONG AI NGHIA river. No artillery support was rendered during the final phase of Operation GEORGIA.

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SUMMARY OF MISSIONS FIRED AND AMMUNITION EXPENDED

MISSIONS	20Apr	21A	22A	23A	24A	25A	26A	27A	28A	29A	30A	1May	2M	3M	4M	5M	6M	7M	8M	9M	10M	TOTAL
OBSERVED	3	18	11	22	10	11	5	12	21	16	7	7	24	33	10	19	5	14	17	3		268
UNOBSERVED	4		1												1		8	6				20
REGISTRATION	1	1		2	2	2	3		1		1		1			2	2		1			19
ILLUMINATION										1												1
DIRECT FIRE										1												1
H & I's	8	8	11	21	19	18	28	40	26	35	42	61	43	49	44	34	34	29	35	29	31	<u>645</u> 954

AMMUNITION	20Apr	21A	22A	23A	24A	25A	26A	27A	28A	29A	30A	1May	2M	3M	4M	5M	6M	7M	8M	9M	10M	TOTAL
105 HE	22	197	69	204	233	293	204	222	208	353	445	445	466	1527	213	255	280	724	241	251		6852
WP	2	7	5	14	81	16		38	165	119	11	11	80	29	29	147		5	4	1		784
HC				7				5	6	10			1		1	1		3	4			38
ILLUM										15												15
155 GUN HE	3			6	12		5	6		5	18	18	5	4	5	8	5	6	15			121
155 HOW HE	14		6	13	9			8	35	35	25	25	12	40	42	32	8	25	10	20		259
8" HOW HE	3	10	6	9	22	6	15	5	28	27	32	32	42	21	27	19	28	15				<u>247</u> 8,316

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