

WMDIV 820 FILE
#113569

HEADQUARTERS
2d Battalion, 12th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
APO San Francisco 96602

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SER: 03A08369
6 Feb 1969
MAR

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: (1) Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
(2) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
(3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 February to 28 February 1969
Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A
(b) FMFPACO 5750.8A
Encl: (1) 2d Battalion, 12th Marines Command Chronology for the period 1 February to 28 February 1969

1. Enclosure (1) is submitted in accordance with references (a) and (b).

J. SCOPEA JR.

Downgraded at 3-year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years

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2nd BN/12th MAR

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FEB 1969

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3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 FEBRUARY--28 FEBRUARY 1969

- PART I ORGANIZATIONAL DATA
PART II NARRATIVE SUMMARY
PART III SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
PART IV SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (*Index at p. 12*)

1. [illegible]
2. [illegible]
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6. [illegible]
7. [illegible]
8. [illegible]
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16. [illegible]

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18. [illegible]

19. [illegible]

20. [illegible]

21. [illegible] ENCLOSURE (1)

22. [illegible]

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PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA**DECLASSIFIED**1. DESIGNATION

2d Battalion, 12th Marines

LTCOL J. SCOPPA JR. 058530/0802
USMCSUBORDINATE UNITS

Hq. Btry, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines

CAPT W. W. COOK 083044/0802
USMC

Battery "D", 2d Battalion, 12th Marines

CAPT M. R. ROSS 088020/0802
USMC

Battery "E", 2d Battalion, 12th Marines

CAPT H. C. BARNUM 084262/0802
USMC

Battery "F", 2d Battalion, 12th Marines

CAPT R. W. POOLEY 010495/0802
USMC (1-11 Febuary)CAPT C. F. NORTON 080524/0802
USMC (12-28 Febuary)

Mortar Battery, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines

CAPT C. F. NORTON 080524/0802
USMC (1-11 Febuary)1STLT C. A. SMITH 095751/0802
USMC (11-28 Febuary)3d Provisional 155 Towed Battery
2d Battalion, 12th MarinesCAPT T. S. HUTCHISON 094802/0802
USMC

1st Provisional 155 Towed Battery

CAPT J. B. WILKES IV 094071/0802
USMC2. LOCATION 1-28 Febuary, RVN~~SECRET~~

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3. STAFF OFFICERS

Executive Officer

MAJ R. H. LEDET 063172/0802
USMC

S-1

1STLT N. W. CARMEN 096338/0130
USMC

S-2

1STLT R. W. WYAND 0100794/0802
USMCR (1-10 February)

1STLT J. C. CHASE 0101806/0802
USMCR (11-28 February)

S-3

MAJ E. A. CONDON JR. 072264/0802
USMC

S-4

CAPT W. W. COOK 083044/0804
USMC

Liaison Officer

MAJ K. E. SOLSBEL 07196/0802
USMC

Ordnance Officer

WO C. L. SERGEANT 0105810/2020
USMC

Supply Officer

CAPT P. M. SHEEHAN 095667/3002
USMCR

Motor Transport Officer

1STLT W. T. WHEELER 0103885/3502
USMCR (1-16 February)

1STLT R. R. SIMSON 0104775/3502
USMCR (17-28 February)

Communications Officer

1STLT A. S. KYLE 0102617/2502
USMC

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

USMC		USN	
OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
49	660	2	17

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PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

During the month of February 1969, the 2d Battalion, 12th Marines fired 2,491 missions and expended 80,145 rounds in support of the 9th Marines on operation DEWEY CANYON. By caliber, 65,694 105mm, 5,816 4.2", and 8,635 155mm rounds were expended. In addition to the above, reinforcing fires totalling 1,446 rounds of 175mm and 340 rounds of 105mm were requested and received from nearby U.S. Army and ARVN artillery units, and 2/12 fired an additional 701 rounds of 105mm in support of the ARVN.

Reflecting the tempo of the operation and frequent contacts with the enemy, 51,438 of the rounds fired were observed fires on targets of opportunity. Surveillance for the month included 107 KIA(C), 4 WIA, and 47 probable KIA/WIA; 2 122mm Russian field guns, 6 trucks, 29 bunkers, and 1 82mm mortar destroyed; 4 trucks and 1 bunker damaged; 123 secondary explosions, and 1 fire. One of the secondaries observed on 2 February was described as being 250 meters wide and 500 meters high, which confirmed the presence of huge weapon and ammunition caches in the area. Many of these caches were captured intact by the infantry, including one which is the largest one captured in the war to date.

At the start of the reporting period, the 9th Marines were poised to commence the final and most important phase of Operation DEWEY CANYON-- a three-pronged attack across the uppermost reaches of the DAKKONG valley and into the rugged terrain on and overlooking the Laotian border. Two of the objectives were astride the border, while the third was a prominent terrain feature which provided excellent observation into both Laos and the upper A SHAU valley. From these objectives, the 9th Marines could interdict one of the enemy's most important supply routes leading into Quang Tri Province from Laos.

To initially support this attack, five batteries (D, E, 1st Prov, 3d Prov and Mortar Battery) were positioned on FSB CUNNINGHAM, while the CP and Battery F were at FSB RAZOR (TAB A). The attack, however had to be delayed.

From the start of DEWEY CANYON on 20 January until the opening of the reporting period, the scarcity of heavy lift helicopters (both USMC CH53's and U.S. Army CH47's) had made it impossible to achieve the initial stockage objectives for artillery ammunition at the FSB'S. The seriousness of this initial shortage was quickly magnified when cloud banks and occasional bad weather completely halted helicopter resupply operations during the first 9 days of February. Without the reserve that would have been on :

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hand if the initial stockage objectives had been achieved before marginal weather set in, artillery firing had to be reduced to a virtual standstill. From 1-10 February, the battalion fired only 6,078 rounds--almost exclusively on contact missions--and fired as few as 149 rounds one day (7 Feb).

During this period, the infantry was forced to retract and consolidate their forces, and to assume a modified defensive posture close to the FSB's, until helicopter resupply operations could bring all classes of supply up to minimum operating levels. Water became a critical item on the FSB's because the weather, though marginal, brought relatively little rain. Raincatches were extensively employed, and patrols were sent from the FSB's to collect water from streams in the valleys below. This latter recourse, however, consumed about a whole day and an inordinate amount of manpower for the amount of water collected. On 4 February a water patrol from FSB CUNNINGHAM was ambushed, and two Marines WIA (1 from D/2/12).

Enemy-initiated activity, predictably, increased during this period of retrenchment. On 2 February, FSB CUNNINGHAM received approximately 30 to 40 rounds of incoming from one or more 122mm guns. Although one of the 1st Prov's 155mm howitzers was temporarily disabled by a near-hit, and the 3d Prov's FDC was put out of action by a direct hit, all units remained in action and returned fire continuously throughout the incoming. 1st Prov's FDC immediately took on the duties of the 3d Prov FDC, and the two batteries operated a joint FDC until the latter could be reconstituted. 2/12 units sustained 5 KIA (including 1 DOW) and 5 WIA in this action. After this initial shelling, incoming at FSB CUNNINGHAM continued throughout the reporting period at sporadic but frequent intervals. Crater analyses, in conjunction with tentative sightings by AO's, indicated that the enemy guns were located in Laos just beyond the maximum range capability of the 155mm batteries at FSB CUNNINGHAM.

By 10 February the weather had cleared sufficiently for helicopters to move Battery F to a new FSB, ERSKINE, located about 4 KM southwest of FSB CUNNINGHAM. This location was selected to provide additional overshoot for the objectives on the Laotian border, and significantly improve the battalion's counterbattery capability against the enemy's 122mm guns in Laos. The CP moved to FSB CUNNINGHAM the following day, and the 9th Marines offensive once again moved into high gear.

As elements of 1/9 and 2/9 moved out from FSB ERSKINE on 11 February, they encountered a sizable enemy force which had apparently been positioned to mount a ground attack against that FSB. Batteries D, E, F, Mortar Battery and the 3d Prov Battery fired 59 ILLUM, 2 WP, and 666 HE on the enemy force and likely escape routes. The enemy fled, leaving 25 KIA, numerous weapons, packs, equipment and explosives behind.

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On 13 February the 1st Prov Battery displaced to FSB ERSKINE, and in a counterbattery mission on 15 February destroyed the first of the many 122mm field guns that would be destroyed or captured during this operation. Although it was known by this time that the incoming at FSB CUNNINGHAM came from two or more guns, the destruction of this gun had an electric effect on morale.

At 0430 hours on 17 February, the enemy launched an attack against FSB CUNNINGHAM which featured a coordinated mortar/sapper attack, RPG's, concussion grenades and satchel charges. The Battalion FDC was damaged (and the watch officer knocked unconscious) by several blasts which also scattered radios and FDC equipment; however, technical fire direction was automatically decentralized in accordance with standard instructions, and the battalion continued its mission without interruption. Centralized control was reestablished in about 30 minutes. One howitzer in Battery E was knocked out of action by a mortar round, but was evacuated and replaced the following morning. 3,270 rounds were expended by 2/12 on self-defense missions, targets of opportunity, suspect assembly areas and likely escape routes between 0430 and 0730, including 88 I.C.M. and 59 beehive rounds direct fire. 37 enemy KIA were found within the position at first light. Casualties sustained were 3 KIA (including 2 DOW) and 17 WIA.

On 22 February the 3d Prov Battery was reorganized by higher headquarters into a 4-gun battery. The 3-gun detachment that had been chopped and left behind at FSB CATES was deactivated, and the battery at FSB CUNNINGHAM picked up 1 gun and most of the personnel from that detachment. This reorganization has had the temporary effect of relieving a chronic personnel shortage in that battery. On 25 February ADCON of the Battery was changed from the 11th Marines to the 12th Marines, and chopped to 2/12. This will afford better control of the personnel situation in that battery.

Coinciding with the movement of 3/9 to the area around CO A NONG (commonly known as "Tiger Mountain"), Battery E displaced to the top of that mountain on 28 February and established FSB TURNAGE. This move was designed to provide a continuous balance of fire support throughout the AO, and for 3/9 to the southeast.

Operation DEWEY CANYON was continuing at the close of the reporting period.

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PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1. 2d Battalion, 12th Marines

a. Combat Mission Assigned. Direct support of 9th Marines

b. Significant Operations Conducted. The 2d Battalion, 12th Marines participated in Operation "Dewey Canyon".

c. Displacements and Changes in Operational Control.

10 FEB F/2/12 helilifted from FSB RAZOR to FSB ERSKINE

11 FEB Command Group helilifted from FSB RAZOR to FSB CUNNINGHAM

13 FEB 1st Prov Btry helilifted from FSB CUNNINGHAM to FSB ERSKINE

25 FEB assumed ADCON of 3d Prov Btry (-)

28 FEB E/2/12 helilifted from FSB CUNNINGHAM to FSB TURNAGE

d. Casualties Inflicted on the Enemy. 107 Confirmed VC/NVA KIA, 4 Confirmed VC/NVA WIA, and 5 Probable VC/NVA KIA/WIA

e. Casualties Sustained. KIA 1 officer, 7 enlisted. WIA 1 officer, 39 enlisted. DOW 2 enlisted.

f. Logistics During the month of February an expanded logistics program was undertaken to meet greatly expanded tactical requirements. Because of the distance involved in air resupply, three logistics points of origin were established—one each at Vandegrift Combat Base, Quang Tri, and Camp Evens. Although each was essentially equidistant from the area of operations, a degree of flexibility was achieved with regard to weather and aviation impediments. In retrospect, this system put a tax on vehicle and personnel assets but unquestionably provided resupply that would have otherwise not been accomplished. Still, however, because of weather and aviation problems, the degree of logistic support desired was not provided.

Motor Transport repair facilities were further improved during the month. Concrete decking for a tire repair facility was completed and tented over. Work on a revision of records-keeping procedures has progressed.

Battalion Supply finished the transfer of two tropical huts and other facilities needed for a consolidated issue point of utility clothing and

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782 gear. It is now expected that consolidated issue will be possible by 17 Mar 1969. Several critical supply problems have been solved by sending Battalion vehicles in 9th Motor Transport Battalion convoys to Danang. One shortage that could have seriously hampered operational status, the resupply of BA-30 and BA-382 batteries, was solved in this manner.

Resupply activities during the month of February included the transportation of approximately 75,000 rounds of ammunition, food and water for four organic and two OPCON batteries operating in the field.

g. Civic Action February was an active month for Civil Affairs. This was mainly due to the celebration of Tet, the Vietnamese Lunar New Year, their biggest holiday.

Medcaps were held on February 1st, 8th, and 22nd with a total of 12 adult males, 16 adult females, and 26 children treated in our hamlets of Thiet Trang and Troung Xa.

The wet garbage from the 4/12-2/12 messhall was delivered daily. The residents of the hamlets have become very sanitation conscious. They have constructed a cement deck for the garbage point on their own initiative, have fenced it in, and keep the area in a good state of police.

On 14 February the 2/12 TD-13 was used to clear an area about 50 meters by 75 meters. This area adjacent to the school-house, will be used as a playground.

On 22 February scrap lumber from Bn Supply was delivered to Thiet Trang, and a Republic of South Vietnam flag presented to the schoolmaster, Mr. Lanh, for the new school flagpole.

The biggest project of the month was the Feb 8th Tet Celebration sponsored by 2/12 for both hamlets. Approximately 450 people attended (including 40 Marine-Navy personnel). 600 doughnuts and 600 cups of kool aid were provided by the 4/12-2/12 messhall. 350 gift bags (each containing 1 toy, candy and marbles) were distributed. The toys were purchased from donations by the 2/12 Marines. G-5 provided 350 red Tet envelopes 5 or 10 dong according to the age of the child recipient, 15 boxes of clothing donated by a stateside girl's school were also distributed. The S-5 Officer presented the hamlet chiefs, assistant chiefs, assistant village chief, schoolmaster, and his assistant with personal gifts. A short speech was given to the elders wishing them a prosperous and happy New Year and the hamlet chiefs thanked 2/12 for their effort and friendship.

The 40 Marines at the conclusion of the party were taken on a tour of each hamlet to learn about the Vietnamese, see their homes, and to view several civil affairs projects.

As the month came to a close plans were being formulated for 2/12's part in the projected move of Troung Xa across the Camlo River back to their permanent land. This project is being coordinated with Camlo District Headquarters.

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h. Personnel

(1) Strength and Shortages. The battalion was at 98% manning level strength for officers and 92% of manning level strength for enlisted. Significant shortages exist in MOS's 0848 and occupational fields 21, 25, 28, 30 and 35. These shortages are filled from personnel from occupational field 08. On 26 February 1969, 3 officers and 67 enlisted personnel of the 3d Provisional 155mm Howitzer Battery came under the administrative control of this battalion. All personnel were joined on the rolls of Headquarters Battery.

(2) Forty one men of this battalion participated in out of country R&R during February 1969 and 14 men went on in-country R&R during February.

(3) Sixteen Privates First Class were promoted to Lance Corporal during February to fill billet vacancies. Three Lance Corporals were meritoriously promoted to Corporal and one Private First Class was promoted to Lance Corporal meritoriously during the month of February.

(4) Award Recommendations. A total of 33 recommendations for awards were forwarded during February 1969. These included one Bronze Star recommendation, 5 Navy Commendation Medal recommendations and 27 Navy Achievement Award recommendations.

(5) General Administration. The weather difficulties encountered during the first 10 days of the month which precluded helicopter transportation to the fire support bases caused many administrative problems. Battery pay officers were unable to pay personnel and return the pay roster to disbursing until after the 15th of February. Some R&R quotas were not met as the individual was unable to leave the fire support base. All mail, classified material and documents for the commanding officer and Battalion staff officers forward were necessarily held in abeyance during this period of foul weather.

i. Communications February was an active month for the Communications Platoon. The first of the month found the battalion CP at FSB Razor, 34 KM from Vandegrift Combat Base and 43 KM from Dong Ha. Radio communications to both positions from FSB Razor was fair to good, once the log periodic antennas were erected on high ground above the jungle canopy. Although the CP went without resupply for 9 days, the CP communications capabilities was not affected because an adequate supply of batteries and back up equipment had been laid in initially. However the forward observer sections had to shut down except for fire missions because of a shortage of batteries

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in the field. The portable voice encryption system was used for the first time. It proved a dependable means of secure communication to the 12th Marines and to the firing batteries on other Fire Support Bases. The introduction of this equipment has virtually eliminated formal classified message traffic. Almost all frag orders are now passed directly to the battery Commanders.

On 11 February, the battalion CP displaced to FSB Cunningham. Numerous problems were encountered at the new position. Wire lines to the firing batteries were repeatedly damaged by fires and incoming rounds. Radio communications to Vandegrift Combat Base (40 KM away) was poor and extensive use was made of a battalion relay station on Hill 819. After several days it was found that the range 48 to 52 MHz was the best for communications to Vandegrift. Below 48 MHz, interference prevented good reception on both ends. Above 52 MHz, the signal faded during the hot hours of the day. A frequency change solved this latter problem, and dependable VHF-FM communications were finally established. A high frequency, single side band net was set up, which provided loud and clear communications between Dong Ha and Vandegrift, and between Dong Ha and Cunningham, but with negative results between Vandegrift and Cunningham, where the majority of the administrative traffic had to be passed. A TAC-97 radio relay van in support of the operation also proved to be undependable, because of generator and replacement parts problems.

j. Intelligence Early in January 1969, several items sparked an interest in the area of current operations. First, Route 922 from Laos into the A Shau had obviously been reopened by the NVA, after having been in disuse for many months. Second, enemy AAA units became increasingly evident and active along the road network both in Laos and in the upper reaches of the A Shau valley. High performance aircraft received fire; an A-6 was lost; helicopters and reconnaissance aircraft were being fired upon with 12.7mm, 37mm, and 25mm AA weapons. Third, truck traffic on the road in Laos doubled during a short period--at a time, truck sightings exceeded 1,000 a day. Fourth, the entry of a large enemy force was evident from the network of heavily-used trails, and from the fact that visual reconnaissance efforts were being contested by small arms fire (as opposed to AAA fire) throughout the area. Fifth, sophisticated wire communications were sighted. Finally, agent reports and other intelligence sources indicated the probable movement of enemy forces into and through the area for later commitment into the mountains west of Hue and southwest of Quang Tri. From there, the enemy would be able to launch attacks on populated areas as far south as DaNang with speed and surprise.

Enemy units identified in the DEMEY CANYON A.O. to date are the 559th Transport Group; the 17th, 18th and 19th Battalions of the 6th Regiment; the 2d Battalion of the 1st Engineer Regiment; elements of the 812th Regiment; the 1st Artillery Regiment--and possibly the 675th; the 88th Field Hospital;

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and the MRTH (Military Region of Hue).

enroute

All materiel captured to date apparently had been to Quang Nam Province for use in the MRTH.

The enemy had several 122mm field guns in the southern portion of the AO, on the RVN side of the Laotian border, well within range of all FSB's, which were in semi-fixed positions pointing east. The positioning of these guns would indicate that the enemy either expected an operation to commence at the head of the A Shau valley, and thence move south down through the valley (in which case he could attack with his artillery from the rear), or that he was prepared to defend his Laotian sanctuary against an allied sweep coming up the A Shau. Whatever the case, almost all of the artillery employed against friendly forces in the DEWEY CANYON A.O. to date is positioned in Laos, on an azimuth of approximately 4,000 mils from FSB CUNNINGHAM. The enemy's capability to fire from that area has not been completely neutralized to date for several reasons: first, there is reliable evidence that he has many gun positions that are well concealed, probably in caves, which can be spotted only at the time of firing, and only by an aerial observer. AO/observation aircraft assets to date have not permitted the continuous surveillance required to spot all firing. Second, the maximum range of the 122mm field gun exceeds by 7KM the longest-range weapon that can be helilifted to an FSB (the Towed 155mm How), and consequently, can often be attacked only by fixed wing aircraft. The limitations imposed on CAS by the weather described in the Narrative Summary, in conjunction with the shortage of AO/observation aircraft assets described above, has precluded the timely engagement of the enemy's guns by CAS in many cases. Third, the enemy appears to be using the "roving gun" tactic which was successfully employed by us in the Korean War. Aerial observers report that the enemy has many alternate prepared gun positions adjacent to road networks, and the infantry has discovered some recently-occupied gun positions that had only one or two shell casings in them. Finally, in the absence of an aerial observation capability for those enemy guns within range, crater analysis is the only means for approximating the location of those guns, and being an approximation, a large volume of fire is required to attain a reasonable degree of assurance that the weapon(s) will be neutralized. As noted elsewhere in this report, however, ammunition resupply problems would not always permit the volume of fire required for such assurance. (See item #5 in Part IV-- Supporting Documents).

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PART IV--SUPPORTING DOCUMENTSCONTENTS*Tab*

- ✓1. * 9th Marines OPORD 2-69 (Ser 003A019, Copy #19 of 35 copies) *DAWSON RIVER SOUTH*
20 Jan 69
- ✓2. * 2/12 OPORD 2-69 (Ser 003A02369, Copy #8 of 20 copies)
19 Jan 69
- ✓3. 9th Marines 012130H Feb 69, Class 5 Resupply
- ✓4. 9th Mar msg 042000H Feb 69, Warning Order/Redeployment Plan
- ✓5. 9th Mar msg 100800H Feb 69, Artillery Ammo Request
- ✓6. * Annex A to 9th Mar FRAG 0 4-69 *[Overlay]*
- ✓7. 9th Mar msg 271200H Feb 69, FRAG 0 6-69
- ✓8. EXTRACTS FROM S-3 2/12 WORKSHEETS; SIGNIFICANT MISSIONS FOR THE PERIOD 1-28 Feb 69.

Ser 13-25
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** Follows enclosure to page 25*

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O 012130H
 FM 9th MAR
 TO CG TF HOTEL

INFO CG 3D MARDIV

1. Initial Requirement of on-position Class V has yet to be filled. Continuing short-fall in helo resupply support, Recent inclement. weather, and accompanying draw down of stocks have caused significant sustained shortage of class I, III, and V. Consumption has been curtailed but problem remains.
2. Estimate 48 heavy lifts required on 2 Feb to bring Arty Ammo, POL, and water to previously established minimum levels and thereafter approx. 24 heavy lifts daily to maintain adequate level. Figures based on 5 pallets 105mm Ammo per lift.
3. Requirement for surge effort to approx 56 heavy lifts anticipated on 3 Feb for FSB ERSKINE and approx 62 heavy lifts on about 6 Feb for subsequent FSB. Additional surge efforts required during eventual retraction phase.
4. Accordingly, request sufficient CH-47 Augmentation be programmed to preclude jeopardizing mission.

I 042000H
 FM 9th MAR
 TO 1/9, 2/9, 3/9

INFO CG 3D MARDIV, CG TF HOTEL, 2/12

I) Assumptions

1. That present weather will persist indefinitely.

II) In recognition of difficulties imposed by weather i. e. resupply of class I, V, batteries, and medevacs and the increase in enemy contacts of undetermined strength in isolated areas, it is considered prudent to realign our forces. Accordingly if weather on th AM of 5 Feb69 remains same as present the following actions will be taken.

1. For 2/9
 - (a) Withdrew 2/9 G to 2/9 E Pos.
 - (b) On order 2/9 F moves to FSB CUNNINGHAM and chops to 3/9
 - (c) On order 2/9 CP, E & G moves to FSB RAZOR

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2. For 3/9

- (a) Withdrew 3/9 K & M to FSB CUNNINGHAM
- (b) Be prepared on order to accept & assume OPCON of 2/9 F
- (c) Be prepared to receive elements of 2d ARVN if so directed

3. Coordinating instructions

- (a) All captured food supplies will be retained and transported to appropriate FSB. If quantity too great to transport contact this HQ for instructions.
- (b) Effective immediately, all units consume only one meal per day.
- (c) Continue extensive patrolling from static positions.
- (d) Destroy all captured enemy supplies and equipment which would hinder movement.
- (e) TPQ drops of supplies will be coordinated separately.

A. Once weather breaks and resupply made we will press on with earlier plans.

I 100800H
 FM CG 9th Mar
 TO CG TF HOTEL

INFO CG 3D MARDIV

1. As you know, class 5 stockage objectives for the Arty Batteries on this operation were not achieved initially, nor have daily resupply requirements been filled. The initial stockage objectives totalled 9000 105 HE, 2000 155 HE, and 1000 4.2" HE. Daily resupply requirements were stated as 3000 105 HE, 1000 155 HE, and 200 4.2" HE.

2. I recognize that shortage of helicopters and adverse weather are the principal causes of this problem, but the results are also apparent: The Arty has not been able to engage many targets of opportunity with appropriate and decisive weight, H and I and T.O.T. programs had to be drastically curtailed; and it has not been possible to implement aggressive and continuous counterbattery/mortar programs. Although serious, these limitations have had to be accepted to date. I am convinced, however, that they cannot be accepted into the next phase of this operation. Arty stockage objectives must be achieved and maintained if adequate fire support is to be provided.

3. As of nightfall 9 Feb, 105 Ammo was about 3000 rounds under stockage

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objective, 155 about 800 under, and 4.2" about 400 under. When added to the normal resupply requirements for 10 Feb, this translates to about 75 heavy lifts for class 5 Arty resupply alone on 10 Feb. A Battery move from FSB RAZOR to FSB ERSKINE, consisting of about 30 heavy lifts, must also be accomplished on 10 Feb. The above only underscores the obvious, but may be helpful.

I 271200H
 FM 9th MAR
 TO 1/9, 2/9, 3/9, 2/3, 2/12

INFO CG 3D MARDIV

1. No change

2. No change

3. Execution

(a) 9th Marines continue present OPs while extending operations South & Southeast in AO, and establish a posture favorable for expeditious extraction of 9th Mar unit upon termination of current OPs.

(b) 1/9, Be prepared on order to assume defensive responsibility for FSB CUNNINGHAM and FSB ERSKINE and adjacent AO's. Be prepared on order to secure and open FSB RAZOR and a 4.2" mortar position.

(c) 2/9, Continue operations east along rt 922 and Ap Baum vic 1604 to the 19 NS grid line.

(d) 3/9, Continue assigned mission. Conduct detailed 3/9 & 1/9 OPs Southeast in AO. Be prepared on order to secure LZ to be designated for the insertion of 2/3 units for planning purposes, FSB TURNAGE.

(e) 2/3, Be prepared on order to help conduct helolift into secure LZ to be designated, for planning purposes FSB TURNAGE.

(f) Coordinating Instructions

(1) Boundry change (3/9 and 2/3). From junction of trail and eastern 9th Mar boundry vic 289020 NW to fork in trail vic 279033, continue NW along right fork of trail to point where trail intersects with rt S48

(2) Effect time of boundry change as directed.

(3) 2/3 assigned responsibility for rt S48.

(4) Troop lifts and associated log lifts originating in 9th Mar AO w/be fragged thru 9th Mar 1'.

(5) All captured gear w/be destroyed unless otherwise directed by Commanding Officer, 9th Marines.

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Tab 5-7

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(6) All units establish and maintain a highly mobile posture.

4. Admin/Log

a. All Log requirements for following day must reach 9th Mar 4 by 2000H daily. This report is to include days on hand as of 0800H the following day Class I, water, BA 386s, and Class V.

b. All 9th Mar units will concentrate max effort to program Log requirements so as not to delay Tactical operations.

5. Cmd/com/elect. No change.

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PART IV

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

EXTRACTS OF MISSIONS FROM 2D BATTALION, 12TH MARINES

PERIOD 312300 JAN to 012300 FEB

1310 FM, E/2/12 (248135), Suspected weapons emplacement, Junkie Sprays
EOM 1330, 18 HEQ&D, 2 WP, 1 Bunker damaged, BX 0445

PERIOD 012300 to 022300

1205 FM, E, D/2/12 (240134), 2 Platoon of NVA, Junkie Sprays
EOM 1455, 330 HEQ&D, 4 WP, 2 KIA, Blood trails, BX 04721340 FM, D/2/12 (224132), Enemy movement, AK 47 fire, Desert Sands
EOM 1440, 8 HEQ&D, 2 WP, Area neutralized, AK 47 fire ceased
BX 0473.1545 FM, 1st Prov (14350756), Active enemy artillery, Jawbreaker 62
EOM 1645, 90 HEQ&D, 6 WP, 1 Secondary 250 m. wide, 500 m. high
BX 04791510 FM, D/2/12 (145076), Active enemy artillery, Delta 5
EOM 1545, 120 HEQ&D, Area neutralized, BX 04801545 FM, E/2/12 (116064), Active enemy artillery, Southern 24
EOM 1645, 126 HEQ&D, Area neutralized, BX 04821205 FM, 1st Prov (240134), 5 Platoon of NVA, Junky Sprays B
EOM 1455, 80 HEQ&D, Area neutralized, BX 0472

PERIOD 022300 to 032300

0940 FM, E/2/12 (209034), Stalled enemy trucks, Bulldozer
EOM 1035, 30 HEQ, 10 WP, Area neutralized, BX 0519

PERIOD 032300 to 042300

1623 FM, F/2/12 (118286), Suspected enemy mortar, Delmar 61
EOM 1702, 44 HEQ&D, 1 Secondary, BX 05840945 FM, D/2/12 (108099), 20 NVA in the open, Jawbreaker 63
EOM 1038, 44 HEQ&D, 2 WP, Area neutralized, BX 03811115 FM, D/2/12 (103095), Contact, escape route, Jawbreaker 63
EOM 1155, 8 HEQ, 4 WP, Area neutralized, BX 0557

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PERIOD 032300 to 042300

1400 FM, F/2/12 (100164), 6 NVA in the open, Jawbreaker 61
EOM 1616, 162 HEQ&D, Area neutralized, BX 0559

PERIOD 042300 to 052300

0822 FM, F/2/12 (127280), Known enemy position, Delmar 61
EOM 0901, 19 HEQ&D, 1 Secondary, BX 0598

PERIOD 072300 to 082300

1450 FM, D/2/12 (19351116), 2 Squads of NVA, Colorado Romeo
EOM 1500, 4 WP, Mortar silenced, BX 0670

1435 FM, W/2/12 (19431093), 2 Squads of NVA with mortars, Colorado Romeo
EOM 1530, 229 HEQ&D, Area neutralized, mortar silenced, BX 0666

PERIOD 092300 to 102300

1445 FM, D/2/12 (115134), Active enemy sniper, Jawbreaker 61
EOM 1515, 128 HEQ&D, 4 WP, 1 Secondary, 1 Fire, BX 0815

1035 FM, W/2/12 (200130), Blocking fire, Bulldozer
EOM 1105, 36 HEQ&D, 1 KIA, BX 0810

PERIOD 102300 to 112300

2107 FM, D, E, F, W, 3d Prov (156105, 162118, 175107, 173115, 153105
120108), Contact/Enemy withdrawal route, Delmar 24, 62, 63,
Jawbreaker 24, EOM 2250, 2 WP, 666 HEQ&D, 59 ILIFT, 25 KIA,
BX 0922, 23, 24Z, 36, 40Z, 41Z, 42, 43, 1000

0945 FM, D/2/12 (194111), Active automatic weapons, Southern 64
EOM 1100, 24 HEQ&D, 2 WP, 2 KIA, 1 WIA, BX 0877

PERIOD 122300 to 132300

1650 FM, E/2/12 (190078), Contact, Delmar 63
EOM 1730, 10 WP, 106 HEQ&D, 5 KIA, 4 WIA, BX 1178

1757 FM, W/2/12 (266101), Prep fire, Southern 62
EOM 1920, 5 WP, 105 HEQ&D, 2 Bunkers destroyed

1306 FM, D, F/2/12 (211045), 3 enemy trucks, Colorado C
EOM 1555, 4 WP, 70 HEQ&D, 2 trucks damaged, BX 1161

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PERIOD 122300 to 152300

1400 FM, W/2/12 (209098), Enemy sniper fire, Colorado R
EOM 1510, 2 WP, 60 HEQ&D, 1 Bunker destroyed, BX 1180

1420 FM, E/2/12 (220102), Enemy sniper fire, Colorado R
EOM 1515, 2 WP, 45 HEQ&D, 1 Bunker destroyed, BX 1175

0911 FM, E/2/12 (232068), 3 NVA and 1 truck, Colorado C
EOM 1020, 4 WP, 130 HEQ&D, 1 KIA, 1 secondary

PERIOD 152300 to 142300

1755 FM, 1st Prov (15560399), Anti-aircraft pit, Colorado M, C
EOM 2102, 11WP, 102 HEQ&D, Anti-aircraft pit destroyed, BX 1291

1015 FM, D/2/12 (207106), Automatic weapons position, Southern 62
EOM 1047, 2 WP, 42 HEQ&D, Automatic weapons positions destroyed
BX 1277

0807 FM, F/2/12 (194A0807), Prep fire, Delmar 63
EOM 0956, 2 WP, 25 HEQ&D, 1 KIA, 1 Probable KIA/WIA, BX 1279

1427 FM, 3d Prov (194A0807), Known enemy position, Delmar 61
EOM 1513, 4 WP, 56 HEQ&D, 1 KIA, BX 1292

0930 FM, E/2/12 (222101), 37mm position, Southern 61
EOM 1032, 200 HEQ&D, Area neutralized, BX 1272

0035 FM, E/2/12 (194A0807), Platoon of NVA in canopy, Delmar 24
EOM 0126, 4 WP, 92 HEQ&D, 4 KIA, BX 1249

PERIOD 142300 to 152300

1425 FM, 1st Prov (075031), Suspected enemy artillery position, Protractor
EOM 1849, 38 HEQ&D, 1 122 Russian field gun destroyed, BX 1435

2050 FM, E/2/12 (237091), Lights, Southern 24
EOM 2130, 6 WP, 100 HEQ&D, 1 Secondary, BX 1472

1525 FM, D/2/12 (153067), Suspected enemy position, Colorado G
EOM 1620, 6 WP, 52 HEQ&D, 1 Large fire, BX 1437

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PERIOD 142300 to 152300

- 0940 FM, E/2/12 (229108), Known enemy position, Southern 61A
EOM 1210, 8 WP, 170 HEQ&D, 1 Secondary, BX 1412
- 1222 FM, 1st Prov (19630706), Prep/Bunkers, Delmar 61
EOM 1425, 2 WP, 80 HEQ&D, 3 KIA's, 4 Bunkers destroyed, BX 1419

PERIOD 152300 to 162300

- 1319 FM, 1st Prov (18670800), Known enemy position, Delmar 62
EOM 1340, 8 WP, 82 HEQ&D, 1 Secondary, BX 1555
- 1130 FM, D/2/12 (189062), Enemy sniper, Delmar 64
EOM 1300, 2 WP, 155 HEQ&D, 1 KIA, BX 1558
- 1900 FM, 3d Prov (190075), Enemy movement, Delmar 63
EOM 2317, 1 WP, 7 HEQ&D, 2 Probable KIA/WIA, BX 1473

PERIOD 162300 to 172300

- 1420 FM, F/2/12 (150044), Prep fire, Jawbreaker 64
EOM 2021, 8 WP, 147 HEQ&D, 1 Secondary, BX 1639
- 0430 FM, D, E, F, W, 1st Prov, 3d Prov, (190160, 185180, 171151, 170140, 157133, 179133, 160134, 155140, 180136, 164134, 193135, 173135, 160160, 173132, 149132, 185120, 153129, 183158, 180138, 180133, 153154), Contact missions, Southern 63, EOM 0630, 59 Beehive, 88 I.C.M., 159 WP, 2207 HEQ&D, 697 ILLTI, Ground attack repulsed,
- 1200 FM, F/2/12 (188068), Active mortars, Delmar 62
EOM 1800, 4 HCS, 38 HEQ&D, 2 KIA, 3 Probable KIA/WIA, 1 mortar destroyed, BX 1635

PERIOD 172300 to 182300

- 2030 FM, D/2/12 (198068), Known enemy position, Delmar 61
EOM 2222, 1 WP, 82 HEQ&D, 1 Secondary, BX 1839
- 2030 FM, F/2/12 (175332), NVA in the open, Heritage 63
EOM 2128, 2 WP, 62 HEQ&D, 2 KIA, BX 1845
- 1855 FM, F/2/12 (119082), Prep fire/Contact, Jawbreaker 63
EOM 2022, 460 HEQ&D, Numerous secondaries, 5 Bunkers, BX 1790

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PERIOD 172300 to 182300

- 1700 FM, E/2/12 (238102), Active mortars, Southern 63
EOM 1818, 6 WP, 50 HEQ&D, 1 Secondary, BX 1799
- 1308 FM, D/2/12 (17170506), Contact, Delmar 64
EOM 1730, 75 HEQ&D, 6 KIA, 8 Probable KIA/WIA, BX 1786
- 1055 FM, E/2/12 (171048), Contact, Delmar 64
EOM 1400, 2 WP, 300 HEQ&D, 11 KIA, 6 Probable KIA/WIA, BX 1782
- 1200 FM, 1st Prov (19010561), Contact, Delmar 61
EOM 1610, 8 WP, 94 HEQ&D, 4 Probable KIA/WIA, BX 1780
- 2135 FM, 3d Prov (19760448), Enemy vehicle, Delmar 63
EOM 0215, 45 HEQ&D, Large fire and numerous secondaries, BX 1706

PERIOD 182300 to 192300

- 2045 FM, 3d Prov (182040), Truck loaded with Ammo, Delmar 63
EOM 2050, 2 WP, 20 HEQ, 1 truck destroyed, 8 secondaries, BX 2404
- 2140 FM, E/2/12 (133153), Enemy movement, Hayride
EOM 2145, 20 HEQ&D, 2 Secondaries, BX 2034
- 2032 FM, F/2/12 (19360528), Enemy movement, Delmar 63
EOM 2225, 17 WP, 440 HEQ&D, 4 Large secondaries, numerous smaller secondaries, BX 2029
- 1756 FM, W/2/12 (160120), Known enemy position, Heritage 63A
EOM 1852, 250 HEQ&D, 5 Secondaries, BX 1991
- 1957 FM, E/2/12 (212053), Active 50 cal., Delmar 61
EOM 2115, 11 WP, 332 HEQ, 6 Secondaries, BX 2027
- 1520 FM, D/2/12 (189060), Contact, Delmar 61
EOM 1705, 2 WP, 159 HEQ&D, 6 KIA's, BX 1967
- 1100 FM, E/2/12 (24051430), Contact/Bunkers, Colorado Y
EOM 1127, 4 WP, 102 HEQ&D, 3 Bunkers destroyed, BX 1952
- 2215 FM, D/2/12 (19220584), Track vehicle, Delmar 63
EOM 2300, 2 WP, 200 HEQ&D, 1 Secondary, BX 1868

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PERIOD 192300 to 202300

- 2115 FM, E/2/12 (13580992), Heavy contact and lights, Amanda
EOM 2307, 5 WP, 75 HEQ&D, 2 Secondaries, BX 1992
- 2052 FM, D/2/12 (19220584), Contact/Vehicle, Delmar 63
EOM 2318, 17 WP, 334 HEQ&D, 2 trucks damaged, BX 2047
- 0500 FM, F, 3d Prov (19360528), Trucks moving down the road, Delmar 63
EOM 0630, 2 WP, 150 HEQ&D, 27 Secondaries, BX 2113
- 0627 FM, E/2/12 (186046), Prep fire, Delmar 64
EOM 1031, 2 WP, 930 HEQ&D, 7 KIA, 9 Probable KIA/WIA, BX 2116
- 1746 FM, F/2/12 (131115), Harbor site, Colorado G
EOM 1835, 4 WP, 126 HEQ&D, 1 Large secondary, 4 Bunkers, BX 2153

PERIOD 212300 to 222300

- 1450 FM, F/2/12 (13920250), Convey route, Jawbreaker 64A
EOM 1645, 2 WP, 124 HEQ&D, 2 KIA, 3 trucks destroyed, BX 2496

PERIOD 222300 to 232300

- 1727 FM, D/2/12 (208048), Bunker complex, Colorado O
EOM 1830, 2 WP, 12 HEQ&D, 1 Bunker destroyed, BX 2612
- 1805 FM, 3d Prov, F/2/12 (243043; 241041), 122 field gun, Colorado P
EOM 1930, 1 WP, 320 HEQ&D, 1 122 gun destroyed, BX 2610
- 0916 FM, E/2/12 (226047), Contact, Southern 63
EOM 1008, 6 WP, 70 HEQ&D, 2 KIA's, BX 2589
- 0935 FM, F/2/12 (225041), NVA in the open, Southern 63
EOM 1005, 2 WP, 115 HEQ&D, 2 KIA's, BX 2590
- 0957 FM, 1st Prov (258082), Bunker complex, Southern 61A
EOM 1115, 6 WP, 34 HEQ&D, 3 KIA's, BX 2592
- 1702 FM, E/2/12 (24260412), 122 field gun, Colorado C
EOM 1730, 55 HEQ&D, 1 122 field gun damaged, BX 2610

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PERIOD 232300 to 242300

- 1320 FM, 1st Prov (149022), 3 NVA in the open, Jawbreaker 64
EOM 1745, 2 WP, 108 HEQ&D, 3 KIA's, 1 Probable KIA/WIA,
2 Bunkers destroyed, BX 2702
- 1715 FM, F/2/12 (212048), Bunker complex, Colorado R
EOM 1800, 2 WP, 102 HEQ&D, 1 Secondary, BX 2714
- 1730 FM, F/2/12 (212053), Bunkers, Colorado R
EOM 1810, 2 WP, 36 HEQ&D, 1 Secondary, BX 2715
- 1845 FM, D/2/12 (128065), Enemy movement, Jawbreaker 63
EOM 1920, 2 WP, 24 HEQ&D, 1-6 Probable KIA/WIA, BX 2718
- 1240 FM, 1st Prov (133017), 6 NVA, Jawbreaker 64A
EOM 1307, 4 WP, 6 HEQ, 2 KIA's, BX 2698
- 2320 FM, D/2/12 (19490582), Contact mission, Delmar 63
EOM 0026, 2 WP, 213 HEQ&D, 26 Secondaries, BX 2681

PERIOD 242300 to 252300

- 1240 FM, F/2/12 (159023), Contact, Jawbreaker 64A
EOM 1630, 2 WP, 370 HEQ&D, 1 KIA, 2 vehicles destroyed,
4 Bunkers destroyed, BX 2523

PERIOD 252300 to 262300

- 1145 FM, F/2/12 (215034), Prep fire, Delmar 6A,
EOM 1329, 2 WP, 124 HEQ&D, 5 KIA's, 3 Probable KIA/WIA, BX 2829
- 1405 FM, 1st Prov (201022), Active mortars, Delmar 62
EOM 1450, 1 WP, 44 HEQ, Mortars silenced, BX 2837
- 1433 FM, 3d Prov (23920172), Active machine gun fire, Southern 62
EOM 1527, 2 WP, 40 HEQ&D, Machine gun fire ceased, BX 2840

PERIOD 262300 to 272300

- 1620 FM, F/2/12 (12430392), Blocking fire, Jawbreaker 64A
EOM 2200, 152 HEQ&D, 7 KIA's, BX 2939
- 0510 FM, D/2/12 (1346079A), 30 NVA in the open, Jawbreaker 62
EOM 0723, 2 WP, 174 HEQ&D, 3 KIA's, BX 2905

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PERIOD 272300 to 282300

1636 FM, D/2/12 (105147), 3 NVA in the open, Amenda

ECM 1735, 10 WP, 22 HEQ&D, 2 Probable KIA/WIA, BX 3001

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6 Feb 1969

TAB A-MAPS/ FIRE CAPS

- ✓ A-1 ARTY FIRECAP FROM FSB's RAZOR & CUNNINGHAM
- ✓ A-2 ARTY FIRECAP FROM FSB's CUNNINGHAM, ERSKINE,
& TURNAGE.

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Tab 8

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 9th Marines (Rein)
 FSB RVN
 20 January 1969
 Ser: 002A019-69

Operation Order 2-69 (Operation DAWSON RIVER SOUTH)

Ref: (a) Maps 7014 VIETNAM, Sheets 6341 I, 6342 II, 6442 III, and 6441 IV.

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces. (See Annex B), Current Intums and Perintreps.

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) Task Force Hotel conducts multi-regimental operations in the DAWSON RIVER and LANCASTER II AO.
- (2) 2nd Bn, 12th Marines direct support; 12th Marines (Rein) General support.
- (3) 1st MAW provides helicopter and Fixed-Wing air support.
- (4) 7th Air Force provides tactical air support.
- (5) Unit of the 2nd ARVN Regiment will conduct operations in the vicinity of FSB DAVIS and Hill 1208 to the northeast of DAWSON RIVER SOUTH AO.
- (6) 101st Airborne Division will conduct operation to the east of the DAWSON RIVER SOUTH AO.

2. MISSION.

a. On order the 9th Marines (Rein) commences offensive operations in the southern DA ERONG VALLEY area in order to kill, capture and destroy the enemy, his supplies and facilities.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations. Operation DAWSON RIVER SOUTH will be conducted as a phased operation.

b. Phase I: With FSB HENDERSON remaining open, FSB TUN TAPEN will be opened on D-2 and FSB SEILON opened on D-1. FSB SEILON will be expanded to accommodate forward staging of an additional 5000 rounds of artillery ammunition, 10 days of Class I for an infantry Battalion and 10 days of batteries.

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Phase II: Encompasses the assault of one infantry battalion (Rein), construction and occupation of an FSB within the 8 KM fan of FSB SHILOH.

Phase III: Includes the assault of one infantry battalion (Rein), construction and occupation of an FSB within 8 KM of a supporting FSB; the displacement of the Regimental Command Post and associated units and the artillery battalion Headquarters.

Phase IV: Includes the assault of one infantry battalion (Rein) and the construction and occupation of an FSB within the 8 KM fan of a supporting FSB.

b. 1st Bn

- (1) Continue assigned mission.
- (2) On order occupy and secure FSB SHILOH.
- (3) On order conduct a heliborne assault into multiple LZ's in AO to be assigned. Secure and assist in development of an FSB within 8 KM of a supporting FSB. Conduct detailed clearing operations in AO.

c. 2nd Bn

- (1) Sec Annex C Operation Overlay.
- (2) On order conduct heliborne assault into multiple LZ's in assigned AO. Conduct detailed clearing operations and commence immediately to secure and assist in development of a FSB within the 8 KM fan of FSB SHILOH.

d. 3rd Bn

- (1) Sec Annex C Operation Overlay.
- (2) Continue assigned mission.
- (3) On order occupy and secure FSB TUN TAVLERN.
- (4) On order conduct heliborne assault into multiple LZ's to assigned AO, conduct detailed clearing operations and commence immediately to secure and assist in development of a FSB within the 8 KM fan of a supporting FSB.

e. Co 'C', (Rein), 3rd Engr Bn. Direct Support 9th Marines (Rein)

f. Regimental Reserve. Reserve will be constituted from least committed, most available forces.

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4. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

- a. Infantry operations will be conducted within 8 KM fan of DS artillery unless otherwise approved by this Headquarters.
- b. D-Day tentatively 22 Jan 69.
- c. L-Hour TBA
- d. Emphasis overland movement.
- e. Emphasis to be placed on capturing enemy personnel.
- f. Process all captured material through this Headquarters.
- g. Submit Spot Reports complete and upon occurrence of incident.

ROBERT H. BARROW
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

ANNEXES:

- ✓ A. Task Organization
- ✓ B. Intelligence (TBI)
- ✓ C. Operation Overlay
- ✓ D. Fire Support Coord.
- ✓ E. Admin & Log.
- ✓ F. Communications
- ✓ G. Thrust Points
- ✓ H. Aviation
- ✓ I. PSY OPS
- ✓ J. Distribution

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Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 2-69.

Time Zone: H

Task Organization.9th Marines (-) Rein.

Colonel BARROW

Hq Co (-), 9th Marines
 Com Co, Headquarters Bn, 3d Mar Div
 Det, 7th ITT
 Det, 3rd SP Bn

1st Bn (Rein)

1st Bn, 9th Marines Lt. Col SMITH
 Det, 3rd SP Bn
 Det, 1st MP Bn (Scout Dogs)
 Det, HqCo, 9th Marines (Snipers)

2nd Bn (Rein)

2nd Bn, 9th Marines Lt. Col FOX
 Det, 3rd SP Bn
 Det, 1st MP Bn (Scout Dogs)
 Det, HqCo, 9th Marines (Snipers)

3rd Bn (Rein)

3rd Bn, 9th Marines Lt. Col LAINE
 Det, 3rd SP Bn
 Det, 1st MP Bn (Scout Dogs)
 Det, HqCo, 9th Marines (Snipers)

2nd Bn, 12th Marines (Rein)

Lt. Col SCORPA

Co C, 3rd Engr Bn

1st Lt. SWINSON

ROBERT H. BARROW
 Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
 Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-69.OFFICIAL:

J. B. Knotts
 J. B. KNOTTS
 Major USMC
 S-3

A-1

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Control No. 0033-69
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1269
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9th Marines (-) (Rein)
VCB, RVN
20 January 1969
Ser: 002A02069

Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 2-69

Ref: Maps: AMS Series L7015, Sheets 6341 I, 6342 II, 6441 IV, 6442 III

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

a. Situation. Information on enemy forces in the objective area is obscure. The area is reportedly a major administrative and logistic area for enemy personnel infiltrating into southern Quang Tri Province, Thua Thien Province and Quang Nam Province. The area is also situated between Base Area 611 in Laos, Base Area 101 Southwest of Quang Tri and Base Area 114 West of Hue. Heavy vehicular traffic has been reported along Route 548 in the southern portion of the objective area. A major engineering effort is also reported in this area with emphasis in the vicinity of Tiger Mountain (YD 253090).

b. Capabilities: Attack or defend in the AO with up to three (3) Infantry regiments, supported by one (1) artillery regiment and one (1) AAA battalion, with a possible reserve division just North of the DMZ.

c. Fortifications: A compilation of fortifications disseminated from various members of the intelligence community was issued to Battalions and supporting units in photos and overlay form.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

a. What are the locations, strengths, and disposition of enemy units within the area of operation?

b. What installations have the enemy established, to include arms caches, supply facilities, base camps, training areas, command posts and observation points.

c. Has the enemy prepared any defensive positions to include mine fields, trench systems, wire defense or any other type defensive system? If so, where and to what extent?

d. Has the enemy prepared any anti-aircraft defensive positions? If so, where and with what type weapon.

e. Has the enemy prepared any artillery defensive positions? If so, where and with what type weapons.

f. What screening activities has the enemy been employing and has there been an increase in his patrol activities?

g. Has there been any significant movement of enemy troops either in or out of the area of operation? If so, where, and what armament and materials?

B-1

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2. What supply and resupply routes and methods are the enemy employing? Are there any indications of the use of draught animals?

1. Has the enemy obtained any new types of arms? If so, what, when, and how is it employed?

3. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS AND MATERIEL

a. Prisoners of war, Chieu Hoi, and detainees will not be separated from their personal gear. They will be immediately segregated and tagged. Notify 9th Marines Headquarters (S-2) immediately upon apprehension so as to expedite disposition.

b. All captured materiel and documents will be tagged showing the following:

- (1) Capturing unit
- (2) Date captured
- (3) Coordinates where captured
- (4) Under what circumstances

c. Captured documents will not be separated from container in which found. Immediate notification of capture will expedite evacuation and translation.

d. Captured materiel will be forwarded as soon as possible. War trophies will be tagged with capturing individual's name, rank, and service number and organization and forwarded to this Headquarters.

4. MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUCTIONS

a. Submit overlays of all roads and trails in order to update map sheets.

b. Accurate reports will be submitted on enemy caches, base camps and fortifications to verify and update target lists.

c. All units will comply with 3rdMarDiv message 251256ZSep68 (U). Only weapons and materiel classified as war trophies will be returned to capturing personnel. All other materiel will be forwarded to higher headquarters.

d. Battalions are directed to review all Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICR's) in order to furnish needed information to higher headquarters.

5. TERRAIN

The objective area consists of rugged mountains and rolling hills. The DaKrong River Valley generally bisects the operating area with mostly rolling hills to the West and rugged mountains to the East. Vegetation West of the DaKrong River consists of elephant grass, brushwood and some forested areas. The vegetation to the East differs in that forest areas predominate and range from a single to triple canopy. Cultivated areas are scattered throughout becoming more prevalent in the southern portion of the objective area. The soil composition is of red clay affording good drainage throughout most of the area. The southern portion of the area is devoid of much of its natural vegetation due to bombardment, will probably afford poor to fair drainage.

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6. WEATHER

January is the coldest month of the year along the Northeast coast. The temperature ranges from 51 degrees to 71 degrees. The humidity will range from 70 to 90%. No significant precipitation will fall, mostly light drizzle and isolated thunderstorms which are at a minimum during the period of operation. Visibility will be poor during the early morning. Fog and drizzle may reduce visibility but fog should clear by 0900. Winds during the period are generally light with speeds less than 10 knots.

BY COMMAND OF COLONEL R. H. BARROW



D. E. WOOD

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Annex J (Distribution) to Operation Order 2-69

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Annex D (Fire Support) to Operation Order 2-69

Operation DAWSON RIVER SOUTH

Refs: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, L7014, Sheets 6341 I, 6342 XI, 6442 XII and 6441 IV.
 (b) CG, 3d Mar Div LOI 2-67
 (c) FMFM 7-1 (Fire Support Coordination)

Time Zone: E

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence), and intelligence summaries as issued.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) 9th Marines (Rein) conducts multi-battalion operations in DAWSON RIVER SOUTH AO.

(2) 2d Bn, 12th Marines (Rein) provides Direct Support.

(3) 7th USAF provides tactical air support.

(4) 1st MAF provides helo and fixed-wing air support.

c. Attachments and Detachments. See Annex A (Task Organization).

2. MISSION.

a. On order 9th Marines (Rein) commences offensive operations in the southern DA KRONG VALLEY area to kill, capture, and destroy the enemy, his supplies and facilities.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations. Operation DAWSON RIVER SOUTH will be conducted as a phased operation. During Phase I FSB KENNERLY will remain open. FSB TUN TAVERN will be opened on D-2 and FSB SHILOH on D-1. FSB SHILOH will be expanded to store 5000 rounds artillery ammunition and 10 days Class I for an infantry battalion. In Phase II one infantry battalion will assault, occupy and construct a FSB within 8 KM of a supporting FSB; displacement of the Regimental Command Post, associated units, and the direct support artillery headquarters. During Phase IV one infantry battalion will assault, occupy and construct a FSB within the 8 KM fan of a supporting FSB.

D-1

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b. Supporting Air and Artillery. Provide close and continuous fire support to 9th Marines.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) D-Day TBA
- (2) Duration of operation approximately 24 days.
- (3) Artillery and air representatives make maximum effort to coordinate at lowest echelon simultaneous air and artillery activity.
- (4) 9th Marines FBOC obtain clearances for all artillery missions and all mortar missions which plot within 1000 meters of a battalion boundary.
- (5) Firing units and forward observers maintain air sentry when firing. Check fire when aircraft are observed approaching danger areas. The unit, observer, or agency instituting the check will cancel the check when the danger has passed.
- (6) Mortar and artillery illumination and screening smoke will not be fired within 2000 meters of adjacent battalions without clearance from this headquarters.
- (7) Harassing Fires (H&I's) will not be planned closer than 1000 meters from friendlies. TOT's will not be planned closer than 1500 meters from friendlies. In this regard, battalions are encouraged to shoot normal missions in lieu of H&I's and TOT's in order to space firing so as to reduce the silent period which normally exists from 1900 until 2200 and to enhance the proficiency of small unit leaders in adjusting fire missions under the supervision of qualified observers.
- (8) Submission of H&I's and TOT's will be as soon as possible consistent with infantry activities and plans.
- (9) Forward Observers report direction to hostile mortars, AAA, and artillery ASAP.
- (10) When contact is too close to safely engage with artillery, FOC's should consider attacking suspect escape routes.
- (11) 9th Marines has requested lateral clearance with 10th Air Cav Div and direct liaison with 7th USAF (ABCCC) for fires late in day. 9th Marines FBOC will report all air and artillery fires delivered in late to higher headquarters.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. See Annex E (Administration and Logistics) to Operation 2-69.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS; : ELECTRONICS.

- a. See Annex E (Command and Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 2-69.
- b. 9th Marines FBOC located initially at VCB.
- c. 2/12 FBO located initially at VCB.

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ADMIN (Administration and Logistics) to Operation Order 2-69

Map: (a) Maps: H7015 VI NHAI, Sheets 6242 III, 6342 II, 6341 I, 6441 IV

HA-1 Zone: II

1. REPLY.

a. General.

- (1) VCB primary source of resupply for classes I, II, III, IV, and V.
- (2) In the event of inclement weather at VCB which would prevent resupply operations, the Quang Tri LRA will be utilized as an emergency source for resupply of all classes.

b. Supplies and equipment available.

- (1) 10 days supply, all classes.

c. Control and distribution.

- (1) Supply point distribution.

d. Prescribed loads.

- (1) Class I
2 days HGI
4 days LRPR (Long Range Patrol Rations)
HGI's will be utilized where normal resupply is possible. LRPR's are for emergency use and will not be consumed without authority from the Battalion Commander. LRPR's that are not consumed during field operations will be turned into LBU at VCB.
- (2) Class II
As prescribed by unit commander. All units, to include Regimental and Battalion Headquarters, will carry 10 days supply of batteries.
- (3) Class III
As required.
- (4) Class IV
All personnel will carry 6 sand bags.
- (5) Class V
Basic allowance plus 1 DOA.

e. Resupply.

- (1) Helo resupply from VCB primary source.

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- (2) Units must be prepared to locate sufficient personnel at Quang Tri LSA to draw, stage and control supplies.
- (3) Helicopters will not be utilized for transporting hot chow unless it is part of and does not interfere with other resupply operations.
- (4) Emergency resupply requests must be approved by the Battalion Commander.
- (5) Battalions tasked with responsibility of providing defense for FSB's will stage 5 battalion days of rations (MCI) in addition to reserve for occupants of FSB.

2. EVACUATION and HOSPITALIZATION.

a. Evacuation.

- (1) Casualties will be evacuated via Co C, 3d Med Bn, VCB.

b. Hospitalization.

- (1) As directed by 3d Med Bn.

3. TRANSPORTATION.

a. Vehicles.

- (1) Vehicle transport of all classes supply will be via main supply route (MSR) Route 9 and is a controlled convoy route.

b. Air (Helicopter).

- (1) Keep landing zones well policed to prevent danger of flying debris.

4. SERVICE.

- a. Normal service support activities available at VCB.

5. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Reports.

- (1) Daily logistic report (LOAREP) will be transmitted to the Regimental COC at VCB via the Logistic Net MTF 1730 daily.
- (2) Expedite return of water cans, slings, nets and cables to VCB or Quang Tri LSA as appropriate.

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Annex F (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Order 2-69

Ref: (a) 3d Mar Div Comm SOP (Div O P2000.4D)
 (b) 3d Mar Div COI (Div O P2000.2G)

Time Zone: E

1. SITUATION.a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 2-69.
- (2) The enemy has the capability to conduct electronic counter-measures and insert deceptive traffic on any communication channel.
- (3) The possibility of enemy radars in the area increases the chances of poor FM communications.

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) See Operation Order 2-69.
- (2) Command Postns Report command post locations as established.

2. MISSION. To provide communication and electronic support for Operation DAWSON RIVER SOUTH.

3. EXECUTION.a. 1st Bn, 2nd Bn, 3rd Bn, 9th Marines.

- (1) Maintain communications on Reg Tac #1.
- (2) Be prepared to insert a manual relay on Hill 819.
- (3) Be prepared to relay logistical traffic through the Regiment.
- (4) Maintain a ten day supply of batteries (BA-386's)
- (5) Take adequate measures to protect equipment from the elements.
- (6) Use RC-292 antennas on Regimental nets.

b. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) Frequency for the logistical net will be announced when required.
- (2) Call signs and frequencies in accordance with references (a) and (b).
- (3) Intelligence Net frequency M-251, 73.8MHz.

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4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. See Annex E (Administration and Logistics)

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Annex G (Thrust Points) to Operation Order 2-69.

Time Zone: H

AIRLINES	3216	ENLISTED RANKS	
BOYS NAMES	0324	AUTO PARTS	0921
GIRLS NAMES	0623	CLOTHING	0516
STATES	1024	MONTHS	1214
COUNTRIES	1626	COLORS	3903
ACTORS	2026	RELIGIONS	3911
MARINE BASES	2427	TOOTH PASTE	3814
BEERS	2926	WHISKIES	3511
FRUIT	3225	CIGARETTES	3708
FURNITURE	3321	FOOTBALL EQUIPMENT	3303
DOGS	2222	SPORTS	1010
COLLEGES	1621	FLOWERS	1410
BIRDS	1919	CEREALS	1813
CARS	1417	SOFT DRINKS	1907
ANIMALS	2115	COINS	2106
OFFICERS RANKS	2715	WEAPONS	2408
ACTRESSES	1606	MAGAZINES	2603
DONALD DUCK	1307	CITIES	2710
DAYS	3001	LITTLE ABNER	2904
OIL COMPANIES	2907	MICKEY MOUSE	2417

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PARTS OF THE BODY

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ISLANDS

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PLANETS

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Annex H (Air) to Operation Order 2-69

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM 1:50,000 AMS L7014 sheets 6341 I, 6342 II, 6442 III, and 6441 IV.

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces. Annex E (Intelligence) to Operation Order 2-69.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) 7th Air Force assets (Single manager concept): 1st MAW provide Fixed-Wing, helicopter and aerial observer support.

(2) ASRT detachment has been requested to accompany forces into objective area.

(3) Portable GCA unit has been requested to accompany forces into objective area.

2. PROCEDURES.

a. Airstrikes within operational area shall be under positive control of TACP, TACP, TAC(A) or ASRT.

b. Coordination of supporting fires. Annex D (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 2-69.

c. TPQ requests for that night and the next day shall be submitted to this headquarters prior to 0930H. Emergency on priority TPQ submit any time.

d. ALO/FAC controlled airstrikes are encouraged.

e. Units operating with the "Transponder Beacon" should request a minimum of two(2) "Beacon" flights per day.

f. Pre-planned Fixed-Wing requests for the following day shall be submitted to this headquarters prior to 1130H.

g. All heliborne assaults into unsecure zones shall be preceded by a minimum of six(6) flights of prep. A minimum of two(2) flights for helo escort shall be requested.

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h. "On Call" Fixed-Wing requested either through AO on station or this headquarters.

i. Helicopter support requests shall be submitted utilizing the following guide:

CH-46	Request by 1330H preceeding day.
Zippo	Request by 1330H preceeding day.
CH-53/47	Request 37 hours in advance.
CH-54	Request 49 hours in advance.

j. Landing zones/pick up zones shall be carefully selected following those policy guidelines used in the past. Confirmation of final landing zone selection/approval shall be a joint effort by participating ground and aviation commanders.

k. All heliborne assaults shall be proceeded by a common briefing attended by concerned ground and aviation personnel (Zippo Team).

l. Units shall closely monitor their organic fires (60mm-81mm) so that they do not constitute a hazard to operating aircraft.

m. All helicopter resupply and medevac landing zones shall be well policed and controlled. Every effort shall be made to locate structures, trash dumps, etc., well away from landing zones. A concentrated effort must be made to reduce danger of flying debris.

n. The current helicopter request format shall be followed for all helicopter support request.

o. Units insure that friendly positions are clearly marked with smoke and/or air panels when so requested. Units with lost communications and an unsecure zone shall mark with yellow smoke and a red smoke thrown in the direction of enemy contact.

3. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

a. Annex F (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Cedar 2-69.

b. Control Agencies.

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4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. See Annex E (Administration and Logistics)

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Appendix 1 (Available Air Support) to Annex H (Air) to Operation Order 2-69.

Available Air Support

1. Medevac. Two(2) helicopters on 15 minute alert, stationed at VANDEGRIFT COMBAT BASE and QUANG TRI Airfield.
2. Aerial Observer/Tactical Air Controllers Airborne. Two(2) aircraft (OV-10/O-11) on station throughout the hours of daylight. One(1) aircraft on 15 minute alert, stationed at QUANG TRI.
3. TPC available day and night, all weather capability except during periods of heavy precipitation.
4. TA 4/TAC(A). One aircraft throughout hours of daylight to perform surveillance in LAOS. Remains under direct control of this headquarters.
5. CAS Aircraft (pre-planned). Support will be provided on a basis of 6.7 sorties per day per infantry battalion. Each battalion 3.5 flights per day.
6. CAS Aircraft (on call). Snake and Napalm available on alert from DA NANG and CHU LAI. Expect 30-45 minute delay unless direct flight is available in near vicinity. divert
7. Flare Ship (C-130). On call for troops in contact and emergency medevacs. Expect 30-45 minute delay.
8. Spooky Gunship/Flare Ship (C-117). On call for troops in contact or emergency medevac. Expect 30-45 minute delay.
9. ECM Aircraft. On call to accompany Flare Ship/Spooky in areas near Laotian border. Expect 15-20 minute delay.
10. Radar Tracking Aircraft (A6A). On call for units with night vehicular sightings. Expect 1-2 hour delay, unless pre-planned.
11. Command & Control Helicopters. One package, 6 hours of flight time, requested daily by this headquarters.

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12. Supply Helicopters. Adequate assets available from 1st MAW and controlled by Task Force Hotel.

13. UH-1E Gunships. Available on request. Two (2) aircraft on 15 minute alert during darkness at QUANG TRI.

14. Troop Transports. Adequate assets available from 1st MAW and available on request.

15. Heavy lift Helicopters. CH-53, augmented with CH-47 and CH-54 assets will be available upon request.


NOTE: Priorities for all air support.

1. Units in contact and/or medevacs.
2. Helicopter lifts.
3. Normal Operations.

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Appendix 2 (Air Schedule) to Annex H (Air) to Operation Order 2-69.

Air Schedule.

L-Hours to be announced.

D-2--- 8 CH-46's lift infantry company to secured FSB TUN TAVERN.
4 CH-53/CH-47 lift artillery batter to FSB TUN TAVERN.

D-1--- 8 CH-46's lift infantry company to secured FSB SHILOH. 8
CH-53/CH-47, 1 CH-54 lift artillery batteries to FSB SHILOH.

D-Day- 17 CH-46's lift 2/9(-) into assault area to secure FSB #1
and commence operations. 3 CH-53/47 for artillery ammunition
resupply.

D+1--- 6 CH-53/47 lift artillery batter to FSB #1.
6 CH-46 LIFT SECURITY COMPANY

D+2--- 3 CH-53/47 for artillery ammunition resupply. 8 CH-46's
lift infantry company to secure FSB #2.

D+3--- 8 CH-53/47 and CH-54 to lift artillery batteries to FSB #2.
6 CH-46 LIFT SECURITY COMPANY

D+4--- 17 CH-46's lift 3/9(-) into assault area to commence operation.
3 CH-53/47 for artillery ammunition resupply.

D+5--- 8 CH-46's to lift infantry company to secure FSB #3. 3 CH-53/
CH-47 for artillery ammunition resupply.

D+6--- 6 CH-53/CH-47 to lift artillery battery to FSB #3.
6 CH-46 LIFT SECURITY COMPANY

D+7--- 17 CH-46's to lift 1/9(-) into assault area and commence
operations. 3 CH-53/47 for artillery ammunition resupply.

D+8 to D+20--- 3 CH-53/47 to perform daily artillery resupply of
ammunition.

D+21--- 17 CH-46's to lift 1/9(-) to VCB, plus, one infantry company
to secure FSB SHILOH. 4 CH-53/47 to lift artillery battery to
FSB SHILOH.

D+22--- 17 CH-46's to lift 3/9(-) to VCB, plus, one infantry company
to secure FSB TUN TAVERN. 6 CH-53/47 and 1 CH-54 to lift artillery
batteries to FSB TUN TAVERN.

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D+23--- 17 CH-46's to lift 2/9(-) to VCB, plus, one infantry company to secure FSB HENDERSON. 4 CH-53/47 to lift artillery battery to FSB HENDERSON.

D+24--- 8 CH-46's to lift two infantry companies to VCB. 6 CH-53/47 to lift two artillery batteries to VCB.

D+25--- 8 CH-46's to lift one infantry company to VCB. 3 CH-53/47 to lift artillery battery to VCB.

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Annex I (Psychological Operations) to Operations Order 2-69.

Ref: (a) Map Sheets 6341 I, 6342 II, 6442 III, 6441 IV.
 (b) FM 33-5, FM- 33-1

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 2-69.

b. Friendly Forces. Operations Order 2-69.

c. Attachments & Detachments. Annex A (Task Organization) to Operations Order 2-69.

d. Assumptions.

(1) The enemy consists of NVA and VC though unit designations are not certain.

(2) There is a very real possibility of forced labor being utilized in the area, origin of which may be BRU or Vietnamese or both.

2. MISSION. To utilize all psyops means available to persuade the enemy to Chieu Hoi and the forced labor to escape.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operations. To employ every means of PSYOPS mission available, keeping in mind the limiting factors of terrain and equipment available.

b. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Send all PSYOPS mission requests to 9th Marines CP giving type, time & location.

(2) Allow three days lapse time on airborne missions. Allow at least three days on requests involving transfer of personnel or material.

(3) Advise this command of all PSYOPS missions carried out by all units, giving time, place and short description of mission including any known results.

(4) Inform this command of all results directly attributable to current PSYOPS missions in the area.

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(5) This command has selected various likely target areas in the AO. This should not preclude units sending in likely areas for various PSYOPS missions.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. See Annex E (Administration and Logistics) to Operation Order 2-69.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS.

a. Annex F (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 2-69.

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 CG, TF Hotel
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 1st Bn, 9th Marines
 2nd Bn, 9th Marines
 3rd Bn, 9th Marines
 2nd Bn, 12th Marines
 101st Airborne Div
 1st MAW
 7th Air Force
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OPERATION ORDER 2-69

Ref: (a) Maps, SVN, Series L7015, Sheet 6341 I (SA MOI); Series L7014, Sheets 6342 II (THON DOC KINH), 6442 II (HAI LANG), 6442 III (BA LONG), 6441 I (AP LAI BANG), and 6441 IV (A LUOI)
 (b) BnO 3000. 1F
 (c) TI 8010-15-1B

Time Zone: Hotel

Task Organization

2d Battalion, 12th Marines

Battery D

Battery E

Battery F

Mortar Battery

1st Provisional 155 MM (Twd) Battery

3rd Provisional 155 MM (Twd) Battery

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy forces. There is evidence of heavy enemy activity in the planned area of operations, including reports of heavy AAA firing and widespread construction activity. Enemy artillery and Mortar attacks are expected.

b. Friendly forces. No non-organic support units will be prepositioned specifically to support this operation, nor will any be given a mission to reinforce this battalion; however, reinforcing fires may be available upon request during the initial phase of the operation from GS units at DONG HA, ROCKPILE, and CALU. The extra fire support available will depend, among other things, on the disposition and mission of those general support units at any given time.

c. Attachments/Detachments. OPCON of a 3-howitzer detachment of the 3rd Provisional 155 MM (Twd) Battery may be chopped in the early phases of this operation. It is anticipated that a U. S. Army CBR section (1- An/MPQ-4A) will be attached to the battalion on D-Day for displacement to one of the forward FSB's.

2. MISSION. Direct support of the 9th Marines for operation DAWSON RIVER SOUTH. The mission of the 9th Marines is to commence offensive operations in the southern DAKRONG river valley area, to kill, capture, and destroy the enemy, his supplies, and facilities.

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Tab 2

3. EXECUTION.SECRET

a. Concept of Operation. Operation DAWSON RIVER SOUTH will be conducted as a phased operation. During Phase I, Fire Support Bases (FSB's) HENDERSON (YD 081411), TUN TAVERN (YD 059327) and SHILOH (YD 106267) will be rehabilitated and reoccupied. (FSB SHILOH will be further developed by TF HOTEL into a forward staging area for artillery ammunition and rations.) Phases II, III and IV will each consist of a 1- battalion assault to seize and occupy suitable terrain for FSB's within 8 KM of a supporting FSB. Tentative location of these new FSB's (names TBA after they are established) are: FSB #1, vicinity YD 137192; FSB #2, vicinity 18413A; and FSB #3, Vicinity TBA. Phase IV will probably be followed by a retraction to the VCB area, possibly to facilitate operations around major installations in the northern ICTZ.

b. Battery D

(1) In position at FSB CATWS (YD 927437) at the opening of DAWSON RIVER SOUTH.

(2) On order rehabilitate and occupy FSB TUN TAVERN (YD 059327). If the former 105 MM position can be reoccupied, battery center is 05943275, altitude 510.

(3) Lay on azimuth 2400; develop 6400-mil capability and high-angle pits for QE 1156.

(4) Be prepared to maintain 2000 Line A, 150 each of lines A, B, C and S, and 60 rounds line Z at TUN TAVERN.

(5) Be prepared to establish and displace to FSB #2 on D+2. Azimuth of lay in the new position 2400; same instructions as above for 6400-mil capability and recoil pits; Class V objective at FSB#2 increased to 3000 Line A with other lines remaining the same.

(6) Be prepared to coordinate with both a 155 Prov Battery and the GMR section for position areas on FSB #2.

(7) Be prepared to close FSB #2 on D+14.

c. Battery E.

(1) In position at CALU (YD 014455) at the opening of DAWSON RIVER SOUTH.

(2) On order, rehabilitate and occupy FSB SHILOH (YD 106267). If the former 105 MM position can be reoccupied, battery center is 10562671, altitude 340.

(3) Lay on azimuth 2400; develop full 6400-mil capability and recoil pits for QE 1156.

(4) Be prepared to maintain 3000 Line A, 150 each of lines B, C and S, and 60 line Z at SHILOH.

(5) Be prepared to establish and displace to FSB #3 on D+5. Azimuth of lay in the new position TBA; same instructions as above for 6400-mil capability and recoil pits; Class V objective at FSB #3 same as at SHILOH.

(6) Be prepared to close FSB #3 on D+13.

d. Battery F.

(1) In position at FSB HENDERSON (YD 061411) at the opening of DAWSON RIVER SOUTH.

(2) Be prepared to establish and displace to FSB #1 on D-Day. Azimuth of lay 2400, develop 6400-mil capability and recoil pits for QP 1156. Class V objective at FSB #1 is 3000 Line A, 150 each of lines B, C and S, and 60 line Z.

(3) Be prepared to close FSB #1 on D+15.

e. Mortar Battery.

(1) In position at VCB (YD 002491) at the opening of DAWSON RIVER SOUTH.

(2) Be prepared to establish a position at and displace to any of the numbered FSB's listed in paragraph 3.a. above, or to a peripheral FSB anywhere within an PFC fan of a supporting FSB, at any time after D-Day.

(3) Azimuth of lay at any new FSB TBA.

(4) Be prepared to maintain 500 line A, and 150 each of lines B, C and Q.

f. 1st Provisional 155mm (Twd) Battery.

(1) In position at CALU (YD 015456) at the opening of DAWSON RIVER SOUTH.

(2) Be prepared to establish a position at and displace to any of the numbered FSB's listed in paragraph 3.a. above.

(3) Azimuth of lay at any new FSB TBA; full 6400-mil capability and recoil pits for QP 1156.

(4) Be prepared to maintain 1000 Line A, and 150 each of lines B, C and S.

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SECRETg. 3d Provisional 155mm (TWD) Battery.

- (1) In position at PSB GATES (TD 92743) at the opening of DAWSON RIVER SOUTH.
- (2) On order displace the CP group, three howitzer sections and an FDC to PSB SHILOH. Leave a limited FDC capability with the 3-howitzer detachment at GATES.
- (3) Lay an azimuth 2400; develop 6400-mil capability and high-angle pits for GR 1156.
- (4) Be prepared to maintain 1000 Line A, and 150 each of lines B, C, and S.
- (5) Be prepared to displace forward to any one of the numbered PSB's cited in paragraph 3.a above.

h. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) D-Day 22 January 1969.
- (2) Tentative Operation Schedule - ANNEX A
- (3) Registrations and registration points - TBA
- (4) Survey. Initially by map spot and resection. Three-point resection preferred if at all possible. A survey party from HQ Battery will attempt to improve the accuracy of battery centers and will perform limited target area survey if possible.
- (5) Met. DONG HA met will be used if appropriate. A visual met station will be established on PSB #1.
- (6) Instructions to Forward Observers. An entire battery will be fired during the adjustment phase on all targets of opportunity as soon as Shell H1 can be observed, unless a lesser volume of fire is requested by the observer, and provided that there is adequate troop safety. If contact targets are too close to friendlies to permit the use of artillery fires, consider blocking escape routes immediately by fire, and then gradually adjusting the fire for effect closer to friendlies by working it through the enemy position.
- (7) Air observers. Available from 12th Liaison through battalion S-3.
- (8) Fire Direction. Centralized. See (10) and (11) below.
- (9) Countermortar/Counterbattery. Active policy. A hot line or quick fire channel will be established. Instruct all personnel to be alert for and actively seek suspect firing locations, particularly at dawn and just before dusk, and report to the FDC by any means at hand. If runners use the panoramic telescope to report deflections to suspect locations, the FDC can plot an azimuth. Emphasize to all hands the urgency of reporting the existence of a suspect location as soon as possible so that some counterbattery action can be initiated by the FDC. Refined target location data can then be sent as it becomes available. An example of a satisfactory initial report would be "Muzzle flashes north of me behind a ridge line."

(2)

(10) FSB Self-defense. The ^{resident} ~~resident~~ infantry commander is responsible for FSB defense. In coordination with the resident infantry commander, plan self-illumination and firecracker missions for self-defense of the FSB. In the event of an enemy assault against the FSB, the self-defense plan will be executed as directed by or approved by the resident infantry commander, preferably with prior notification to the FDC. This plan will be shot in if at all possible, but only with prior approval of and clearance from the FDC.

(11) Battery Position Area Self-defense. Each battery will have a battery position area self-defense plan including Beehive rounds integrated with the FSB self-defense plan. In the event of an enemy assault, the battery position area plan will be fired in coordination with all resident unit commanders, preferably with prior notification to the FDC. It will probably not be possible to fire this plan for adjustment or practice. Adjustment and/or practice missions must be approved and cleared by the FDC.

(12) Ammunition Restrictions. The S-3 will keep the battalion within ammunition restrictions imposed by higher headquarters.

(13) Other Operational and Fire Direction Matters. Reference (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. An admin/logistics section will be established at the Battalion CP to monitor the status of all admin/logistics matters and to provide liaison and assistance as required between forward and rear elements.

b. VCB primary source of resupply. In the event of inclement weather at VCB which hinders resupply operations, the Quang Tri ISA may be used. To facilitate a constant flow of Class V Line "A", an ASP will be established by TF HOTEL at FSB SHILOH. This ASP will store approximately 1000 105 MM, 500 155 MM, and 500 4.2". This ASP will be separate from the Battery ammo dumps at that FSB.

c. Prescribed loads.

(1) Class I: 6 days MCI

(2) Class II: 10 days supply of dry cell batteries. All other items as prescribed by the unit commander.

(3) Class III: 6 days

(4) Class IV: As required to provide adequate overhead protection for personnel and equipment in living and working areas.

(5) Class V: Per paragraphs 3.b through 3.g

d. Control and distribution. Supply point distribution for all classes except I and V, coordinated by S-4 at the ISA. Class I and V automatic resupply by S-4 from ISA.

e. Medevacs and Hospitalization. Medevacs via Co. C, 3d Med Bn, VCB.

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f. MiscellaneousSECRET(1) Reports.

(a) Spot reports immediately on all medevacs, and other significant matters involving operational capability, security of classified material, hazards to personnel or equipment, and evacuation of PSB's (see paragraph (3) below.)

(b) Daily logistic status reports on all classes except Class V to S-4 (at the ISA) by 1700 daily.

(c) Cadillacs every 4 hours or sooner upon request.

(d) Ammunition malfunctions: reports per reference (c) to S-4 within 2 hours after the malfunction; spot reports to S-3 upon occurrence.

(e) Line Tango (105's), Victor (15's) or Sierra (4.2's) to S-3 whenever changed. Report will cite carriage number, reason for being down, whether or not it can be fixed on position or if evacuation is required (if known), and estimated down time (for weapons which can be fixed on position). Weapons down for daily maintenance will be included in these reports. In this regard, permission will be requested from the PDC to put weapons down for routine maintenance.

(f) Casualty reports within 24 hours to S-1 via the forward S-1 liaison section.

(2) Landing Zones and surrounding areas will be kept free of loose material which could become hazards to personnel or aircraft when helicopters are in the area. All installations should be constructed to withstand helicopter flyovers.

(3) Evacuation of PSB's. An Officer in Charge will be designated by the Battery Commander to ensure that all loads are lifted out, and that no Class V, overhead protection, government property or personnel gear is left behind in the position. This OIC, with a working party if required, will lift out with the infantry. The infantry unit commander remaining on the PSB is responsible for the entire area after the battery leaves; therefore, the OIC will report to that commander when the battery position is clear and will receive positive clearance from that commander that the position is completely squared away and that no further police is required. When this clearance has been obtained, the OIC (and working party, if applicable) may depart. Clearance from the infantry commander, however, in no way relieves the battery commander of his basic responsibility to ensure that nothing of use to the enemy is left behind. After clearance has been obtained from the infantry commander, the OIC will report to the Battalion Commander in writing, via the Battery Commander, that he has completely cleared the position.

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SECRET**5. COMMAND and COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS.**

a. Battalion CP initially at VCB; displace to one of numbered FSB's listed in paragraph 3.a. above.

b. See annex B.

J. SCOPPA, Jr.
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

ANNEXES:

- ✓ A. Tentative operation schedule
- ✓ B. Communications

OFFICIALS:

E. A. CONDON, Jr.
Major, USMC, S-3

DISTRIBUTION: SPECIAL

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SECRETTENTATIVE OPERATION SCHEDULESECRET

OPERATION DAWSON RIVER SOUTH

<u>DATE</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>EVENTS</u>
20Jan	D-2	"D" RCN & MAIN TO TUN TAVERN
21Jan	D-1	"E"/3d PROV(-) RCNS & MAINS TO SHILOH
22Jan	D Day	2/9 ASLT FSB #1; "F" RCN TO FSB #1 1200
23Jan	D+1	HQ ADV PTY TO FSB #1 1000; "F" MAIN TO FSB #1 1200
24Jan	D+2	3/9 ASLT FSB #2; "D", 1st PROV & CMR RCN TO FSB #2 1200; HQ MAIN BODY TO FSB #1 1200
25Jan	D+3	CMR TO FSB #2 1000; "D"/1st PROV to FSB #2 1200
26Jan	D+4	3/9 ASLT PERIPHERAL OBJS
27Jan	D+5	1/9 ASLT FSB #3; "E"/3d PROV RCN TO FSB #3 1200
28Jan	D+6	"E"/3d PROV TO FSB #3 1200
29Jan	D+7	1/9 ASLT PERIPHERAL OBJS
30Jan-10Feb		OPNS IN OBJ AREA
11Feb	D+13	CLOSE FSB #3; "E"/3d PROV RCN & MAIN TO SHILOH 0800/1200
12Feb	D+14	CLOSE FSB #2; "E"/1st PROV RCN & MAIN TO TUN TAVERN 0800/1200; CMR TO LZ KIWI 1300; HQ ADV PTY TO VCB 1300
13Feb	D+15	CLOSE FSB #1; "F" RCN & MAIN TO HENDERSON 0800/1200; HQ MAIN TO VCB 1000
14Feb	D+16	CLOSE SHILOH AND TUN TAVERN; "E" RCN & MAIN TO VCB 0800; 3d PROV(-) RCN & MAIN TO CATES 0800; "D"/1st PROV RCN & MAIN TO VCB 1300
15Feb	D+17	CLOSE HENDERSON; "F" RCN & MAIN TO VCB 1300

ANNEX A.

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ANNEX B (Communications) to Operation Order 2-69

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1. SITUATION. See OpOrd 2-69
2. MISSION. Provide communications support for the Battalion commencing on D-Day.
3. EXECUTION

a. Radio

(1) Priority of Nets - The following is the priority of radio nets to be established in the firing batteries:

- (a) Fire Direction Net
- (b) Command Net
- (c) Conduct of Fire Net
- (d) Admin Net

If a battery has only three radios, the Command Net will be monitored in LIEU of the Admin Net. If it is necessary that traffic be passed on the Admin Net, the station will check off the Command Net, pass the necessary traffic, and come back up on the ADMIN NET.

(2) HF (SSB) Nets - Two HF nets will be established:

<u>NET TITLE</u>	<u>MIKE</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>STATIONS</u>
Bn Admin #2	1231	3925	2/12 FDC, 49, 4
Regt Cmd	(P)486 (S)1159	9300 3320	2/12 FDC, 12thMar FDC, Task Force Hotel

(3) VHF (FM) Nets - See current COI

(4) Use of relay stations - The Battalion will maintain one relay station on Hill 819. The firing batteries will be called on to relay as required.

b. WIRE

(1) Four channels of radio relay will be provided as follows:

- 2/12 FDC - ISA (Hot)
- 2/12 FDC - 12thMar FDC (Hot)
- 2/12 FDC - Task Force Hotel FSCC (Common User)
- 2/12 FDC - 9thMar (Common User)

c. MESSAGE CENTER

(1) Courier service to be provided from DONG HA to the forward area.

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