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HEADQUARTERS
2d Battalion, 12th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

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SER 003A10369
6 Apr 1969

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)
Via: (1) Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
(2) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
(3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 March to 31 March 1969

Ref: ✓(1) 2d Battalion, 12th Marines Command Chronology for the
period 1 March to 31 March 1969

1. Enclosure (1) is submitted in accordance with references (a) and (b).

C. J. Killeen
C. J. KILLEEN

2nd BN/12TH MAR

CMD CHRON

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 MARCH--31 MARCH 1969

PART I ORGANIZATIONAL DATA
PART II NARRATIVE SUMMARY
PART III SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
PART IV SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS *P 12a is "intelligence"*

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PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. DESIGNATION

2d Battalion, 12th Marines

LTCOL J. SCOPPA JR. 058530/0802
 USMC (1-30 March)

LTCOL C. J. KILLEEN 050163/0802
 USMC (31 March)

SUBORDINATE UNITS

Hq. Btry, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines

CAPT W. W. COOK 083044/0802
 USMC

Battery "D", 2d Battalion, 12th Marines

CAPT M. R. ROSS 088020/0802
 USMC

Battery "E", 2d Battalion, 12th Marines

CAPT H. C. BARNUM 084262/0802
 USMC

Battery "F", 2d Battalion, 12th Marines

CAPT C. F. NORTON 080524/0802
 USMC

Mortar Battery, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines

1STLT C. A. SMITH 095751/0802
 USMC (1-23 March)

1STLT G. E. HODGE 096971/0802
 USMC (24-31 March)

3d Provisional 155 Towed Battery
 2d Battalion, 12th Marines

CAPT T. S. HUTCHINSON 094802/0802
 USMC

1st Provisional 155 Towed Battery
 (1-9 March) OPCON

1STLT J. FERRARI 096860/0802
 USMC

2. LOCATION 1-31 March, RVNDECLASSIFIED
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3. STAFF OFFICERS

Executive Officer

MAJ R. H. LEDET 063172/0802
USMC

S-1

1STLT N. W. CARMEN 096338/0130
USMC

S-2

1STLT J. C. CHASE 0101806/0802
USMCR

S-3

MAJ E. A. CONDON JR. 072264/0802
USMC

S-4

CAPT W. W. COOK 083041/0802
USMC

Maison Officer

MAJ K. E. SOESBE 071961/0802
USMC (1-23 March)

MAJ J. D. McNAMARA 078628/0802
USMC (24-31 March)

Ordnance Officer

WO C. L. SERGENT 0105810/2020
USMC

Supply Officer

CAPT P. M. SHEEHAN 095667/3002
USMCR

Motor Transportation Officer

1STLT R. R. SIMSON 0104775/3502
USMCR

Communications Officer

1STLT A. S. KYLE 0102617/2502
USMC

A. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

USMC		USN	
OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
36	598	3	16

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PART II

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NARRATIVE SUMMARY

During the month of March 1969, the 2d Battalion, 12th Marines fired 577 missions and 44,785 rounds in support of the 9th Marines, Special Forces, the 1st Brigade 5th Infantry Division (Mech), and U.S. Army advisors with PF, RF, RVNAF, and CIDG forces. By caliber, 37,161 105mm, 2,444 155mm, and 5,180 4.2" mortar rounds were fired. The majority of firing was in support of the 9th Marines on Operation DEWEY CANYON, which ended on 18 March.

By the end of February, the 9th Marines had just about run out of real estate in the DEWEY CANYON AO, and organized opposition by regular enemy forces had collapsed. It was obvious that most of enemy troops not killed or captured had withdrawn into their Laotian sanctuary. There was evidence of, and scattered activity from, small groups of enemy throughout the AO--mostly mortar crews--but it was also apparent that no further significant troop contacts would occur.

Route 922 had been successfully interdicted; thousands of tons of the enemy's food and medical supplies and ammunition caches had been captured and destroyed; the equivalent of two batteries of his medium artillery (twelve 122mm field guns) had been captured or destroyed, along with prime movers and ammunition trains; his underground headquarters, storage complexes, and troop quarters, as well as his fortified positions, had been overrun and destroyed; and a significant portion of his AAA potential had been located and destroyed. In short, by 1 March, with the exception of a clean-up detail, the DEWEY CANYON mission had been accomplished and it was time to go elsewhere.

At the start of the reporting period, Battery D, Mortar Battery and the 3d Provisional 155 Battery were located on FSB CUNNINGHAM (GS YD1813) with the Battalion CP; Battery F and the 1st Provisional 155 Battery were on FSB ERSKINE (GS YD1610) 4 KM to the southeast; and Battery E was on FSB TURNAGE (GS YD2508), 8 KM to the southeast. Operation DEWEY CANYON was then in its 41st day. (TAB A)

Reflecting the tempo of operations, 23,468 of the rounds fired in the month--over 50%--were observed fires on targets of opportunity. On some days, observed fires accounted for approximately 85% of the firing.

Surveillance of fire missions this month included 94 NVA KIA(C), 45 Probable KIA/WIA, and 1 WIA; 52 bunkers, 12 structures, 1 fortified cave position, 1 Power line and 1 mortar destroyed; 4 bunkers partially destroyed; 37 secondary explosions; 44 prepared positions destroyed; and 1 large POL fire.

The original concept of Operation DEWEY CANYON envisioned a "leapfrogging" retraction from the AO, with each element always under a protective artillery fan--just the reverse of the technique used to get into the AO. This would have required about ten battery displacements; and, since a reasonable level of Class 5 has to be maintained at all times during the leapfro maneuver, it

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entailed approximately 25 heavy lifts per cannon battery and 5 heavy lifts for Mortar Battery, not including other normal resupply lifts. If good weather prevailed throughout, and there were an abundance of helicopters, a leapfrog retraction could be accomplished in about seven days.

As the operation drew to a close, however, several factors dictated a reappraisal of the retraction plan. First, the weather showed no signs of cooperating; second, continuation of the operation throughout a retraction phase would require an initial surge of approximately 100 heavy lifts of artillery Class 5 to bring on-position stocks up to appropriate levels. That this level of support would not likely be forthcoming was evident from the daily shortfall of normal Class 5 resupply during the last week of February and in the first few days of March. For example, 93 Class 5 resupply lifts were required on 1 March to sustain operations and 35 were received; 94 lifts were required on 2 March and only 2 were received. Part of the shortfall was due to intermittent marginal weather; a large part of it was due to limited helicopter assets. Finally, the 9th Marines were scheduled to relieve the 3d Marines in the VCB-Rockpile-Route 9-CamLo AO so that the latter could participate in Operation Maine Crag, which was already in progress.

The foregoing considerations dictated a faster retraction, with less helicopter assets, than a leapfrog maneuver would permit. Consequently, plans were revised to lift all units directly to VCB without any intermediate stops, and with a minimum of Class 5. This required a delicate balance of firing vis-a-vis weather and the possibility of resupply and/or retraction. It also meant that one battery had to retract without covering artillery fires.

Over two months earlier, on Operation Dawson River West, Mortar Battery had displaced from VCB to LZ "Charlie" to cover the orderly retraction of two batteries from FSB Snapper. Since the Mortar Battery can displace very rapidly, using only 8 CH46's (provided no Class 4 or 5 is carried), and since the 4.2" mortar provides excellent close-in support, it could cover both its own position and retraction of the last cannon battery from the same position or any other position within range, and then be extracted with a minimum of effort and with minimum exposure to hostile action. Although it was not initially planned to use the Mortar Battery as just described, the capability to do so provided additional flexibility at this stage of the operation, and that capability was incorporated in Plan A, which will be described shortly.

The retraction plan originally had 2/9 (-) scheduled to lift to VCB on 3 March, and for 1/9 to lift to VCB on 4 March. After 1/9 was out, Battery F and the 1st Prov. Battery (who had been covering the 1/9 portion of the AO from FSB ERSKINE) could displace to VCB, and G/2/9 would close ERSKINE. On 5 March, 3/9 (-) and Battery E would lift to VCB, leaving one company from 3/9 at FSB TURNAGE as security for the ARVN 105mm battery located there. On 6 March the ARVN infantry would retract from their AO under cover of their battery on TURNAGE, and FSB CUNNINGHAM would be evacuated, all units there going to VCB.

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Finally, On 7 March the ARVN battery and the one company from 3/9 would extract from FSB TURNAGE under the cover of fixed wing aircraft, and the retraction would be completed.

The first step in the retraction plan--the retraction of 2/9 (-)--went as scheduled. Everything else changed. The weather turned from marginal to bad. In addition, before clearing the DEWEY CANYON AO, the 9th Marines were tasked with the add-on mission of linking up with and extracting a Special Operations Group (SOG) that had been operating adjacent to the AO. A third development was the discovery of additional caches in the eastern portion of the AO that had not been exploited further.

On 8 March, 1/9 commenced an overland movement to TAM BOI mountain (GS YD2404) and FSB ERSKINE was evacuated, with Battery "F" going to CALU and the 1st Prov going to VCB. Two plans were developed ("A" & "B") for further operations in the AO and for retraction, both of which hinged on whether or not 1/9 linked up with the SOG by 1300 hours 10 March. If they did, Plan "B" provided for their extraction that day, followed by the displacement of all artillery on FSB CUNNINGHAM to VCB before dark. Then on 11 March, K/3/9 would have closed CUNNINGHAM, after which the ARVN battery, Battery E, and I/3/9 would be extracted from FSB TURNAGE and move to VCB under cover of fixed wing aircraft. Plan "A" provided for the displacement of Mortar Battery to TAM BOI on 10 March to cover 1/9; for the closing of CUNNINGHAM as scheduled above; and finally for the employment of Mortar Battery as described earlier to cover the closing of FSB TURNAGE.

A modified Plan "A" was implemented, which followed the same general idea as the original, but which changed frequently as weather and other factors dictated.

One of the factors which had a significant bearing on the techniques used in this retraction phase was the enemy's timing of rocket, mortar and artillery attacks to coincide with the approach of helicopters. The full array of this capability was exercised for the first time during the evacuation of FSB ERSKINE. It was known that the enemy would not normally fire his artillery or rockets if an aerial observer was on station. It was also known that he would not, as a rule, fire his artillery or rockets unless his forward observer could observe the target area. The retraction plan for FSB CUNNINGHAM, therefore, included aerial observers on station and a smoke screen between the FSB and likely OP locations, as well as for a program of mortar/rocket suppression fires.

The weather finally broke sufficiently on 15 March to move Mortar Battery to TAM BOI, and to extract all artillery from CUNNINGHAM. Nonessential gear was left behind with a small rear echelon, to be brought back as soon as weather and helicopter availability permitted. Helicopter approach and retirement lanes had been established which permitted all batteries to fire a continuous smoke/mortar suppression program until the last gun was lifted out.

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During their displacements, the batteries on CUNNINGHAM fired over 1,000 rounds, including 547 rounds on active missions and 389 rounds of HC/WP smoke for the smokescreen plan.

The 3d Prov Battery was lifted to DONG HA (GS YD2159), where it moved into a prepared position adjacent to the 2/12(Rsar) headquarters cantonment, and ended a 9-month period of continuous FSB operations. This move from CUNNINGHAM to DONG HA was made entirely by U.S. Army CH-47 "Chinook" helicopters, the first time that a CH54 "Skycrane" had not been used to move the 155mm howitzer, and proved that dependence on the scarce CH54's for 155mm battery moves is not always necessary. Under certain conditions, the CH47 can lift the towed 155 without any difficulty. Upon arrival at DONG HA, 3d Prov was chopped to 4/12.

Following the departure of 3d Prov, Battery D displaced by platoons to VCB, and occupied a temporary position north of the VCB LSA. With all batteries except two out of the DEWEY CANYON AO, the Battalion FDC decentralized technical control of Battery E and Mortar Battery, and moved to VCB. To provide fire support for those units still in the AO, Battery E was given a mission of direct support of those units, and tactical fire direction of Mortar Battery. All 1/9 and 3/9 units came up on a common COF net, and the 1/9 FSCC was given responsibility for all fire support coordination in the AO.

This was one of the few times that the Battalion FDC had decentralized both tactical and technical fire direction. To facilitate a smooth transition of fire support, to provide a secondary check for Battery E, and to give Battery E the capability to conduct a secondary technical check on Mortar Battery, the Battalion Assistant Operations Chief and two men were sent to TURNAGE early on the morning of the 15th with additional FDC and radio equipment. During the short time that this decentralized arrangement was in effect, the two batteries fired in excess of 2,000 rounds and accounted for 34 NVA KIA(C), 18 secondary explosions, 6 mortars silenced, and numerous bunkers and fortified positions destroyed.

On 18 March, Battery E displaced to CALU and Mortar Battery displaced to VCB, and Operation DEWEY CANYON closed at 2000 hours. A statistical summary of the operation is attached at TAB B.

Upon arrival, the battalion was given the additional mission of firing in support of the VIC (Vandegrift Installation Coordinator) AO, which included the VCB/CALU complex and Route 9 to the KHE GIA bridge. VIC had been given OPCON of 2/9 for this security mission. Since Battery F, 1st Prov and 3d Prov had been chopped to other units upon their return from the DEWEY CANYON AO, Battery D was the only firing unit under battalion control that could support the mission. Consequently, a detachment (3 guns) of Battery G located at VCB was chopped to 2/12, and quick fire channels were established with other units located at GATES, VCB and the Rockpile, who could fire in support of the VIC mission. This detachment would remain OPCON of 2/12 until 20 March.

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The mission of the 9th Marines after DEWEY CANYON was to assume responsibility for the areas being vacated by the 3d Marines as they moved out on Operation Maine Crag; to control and protect Route 9 and the Vandegrift Installation; and in cooperation and coordination with the GVN, to provide security for the CAM LO/MAI LOC resettlement areas and the Revolutionary Development Cadres. In addition to assuming this mission, the 9th Marines and supporting units would participate in a recreation program at CUA VIET as they returned from the DEWEY CANYON AO, as time and circumstances permitted. This involved numerous changes in boundaries and fire support arrangements throughout the last half of the month, including several to accommodate the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division's Operation "Montana Mauler" in the central portion of the new AO. The situation had settled down by the end of the month, however, and the battalion was deployed as shown in TAB C.

PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

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1. 2d Battalion, 12th Marines

a. Combat Mission Assigned. Direct support of 9th Marines

b. Significant Operations Conducted. The 2d Battalion, 12th Marines participated in Operation "Dewey Canyon"; and provided reinforcing fires for the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division in Operation "Montana Mauler".

c. Displacements and Changes in Operational Control.

8 MAR F/2/12 helilifted from FSB ERSKINE to CALU (YD 014454)

8 MAR 1st Prov helilifted from FSB ERSKINE to VCB (XD 999495)

9 MAR 1st Prov chopped OPCON to 3/12 091200H; (then displaced to FSB CATES)

10 MAR F/2/12 chopped OPCON to 1/12 102000H

15 MAR 3d Prov 2/12 helilifted from FSB CUNNINGHAM to DONG HA (YD 218599)

15 MAR W/2/12 helilifted from FSB CUNNINGHAM to FSB TAM BOI (243046)

15 MAR D/2/12 helilifted from FSB CUNNINGHAM to VCB (XD 999495)

15 MAR 3d Prov chopped OPCON to 4/12 151700H

16 MAR assumed OPCON of detachment of Btry G (3 guns) 160800H at VCB (XD 997477)

18 MAR F/2/12 moved from CALU to the ROCKPILE (XD 982541) (while OPCON to 1/12)

18 MAR E/2/12 helilifted from FSB TURNAGE to CALU (YD 015454)

18 MAR W/2/12 helilifted from FSB TAM BOI to VCB (YD 003481)

20 MAR Chopped OPCON of detachment Btry G 200800H

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22 MAR Assumed OPCON F/2/12 at the ROCKPILE 220800H
 22 MAR F/2/12 moved from the ROCKPILE to CALU (YD 015454)
 22 MAR E/2/12 moved from CALU to the ROCKPILE (XD 982541)
 23 MAR D/2/12 moved from VCB to C-2 (YD 132641)
 23 MAR W/2/12 moved from VCB to the ROCKPILE (XD 983546)
 25 MAR F/2/12 moved from CALU to VCB (XD 997476)
 28 MAR E/2/12 helilifted from the ROCKPILE to FSB FULLER (YD 019593)

d. Casualties Inflicted on the Enemy. 94 NVA KIA(C), 45 Probable KIA/WIA, 1 WIA

e. Casualties Sustained. 13 WIA

f. Logistics During the month of March 1969, resupply of ammunition continued to be heavy. By the end of the month LSA operations at Quang Tri and Camp Evans were discontinued and full-scale operations at Vandegrift Combat Base LSA were resumed. The opening of two additional LSA's for helicopter delivery was necessary to accomplish resupply in Operation Dewey Canyon because adverse weather conditions and excessive turn-around times from VCB. With the exception of one firing battery on a Fire Support Base requiring helicopter resupply, all Class V resupply was being accomplished with organic motor transport assets by the end of the month. A rotation program has been established for vehicles resupplying Class V in order to perform preventive maintenance.

Since the conclusion of Operation Dewey Canyon all cannon ordnance has been LTI'd and maintenance performed as needed and/or required. Similarly, all small arms and crew served weapons have been inspected and repaired as necessary. Generally, the first half of March saw a heavy demand on all Battalion assets; the latter part has been a time for repair and rehabilitation.

Supply activities have included completion of/for consolidated issue of clothing and 782 gear. A program of utilities recovery and laundering has been initiated.

The Battalion medical department has completed a series of plague shots. A neighboring village, Thiet Trang, has had a slight epidemic of plague (See Civic Action).

During the month of March this Battalion drew and moved approximately 36,000 rounds of ammunition and all classes of other supplies.

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g. Civic Action During March Medcaps were held on 8 March (50 patients); 15 March (50 patients); 22 March (76 patients); 30 March (47 patients); The wet garbage was delivered daily and the villagers are continuing to keep this area in excellent police.

On 26 March a 10 year old girl from Troung Xa was taken to D-Med where she was admitted for Bubonic plague. Also on 26 March two corpsman from 2/12 BAS examined other villagers and found four more suspected cases of plague. None were serious enough to warrant hospitalization.

On 27 March 470-500 people in Troung Xa and Thiet Truong were immunized with plague vaccine.

On 28 March a 15 yr old boy was taken to D-Med and admitted for Bubonic plague. On Sat 30 March a representative of PMU inspected both hamlets and gave recommendations for improving conditions to prevent rat and fly breeding.

At present it is felt an epidemic has been prevented.

On 30 March a black 2 month old male pig was presented to the school teacher and schoolchildren. The children will raise him and sell him in about a year; funds will be used to buy school supplies.

The new S-5, Lt Peterson, is on OJT in the Civil Affairs area. He will attend the next available Personal Response Course.

h. Personnel

(1) Strength and Shortages. The battalion was at 94% manning level strength for officers and 87% of manning level strength for enlisted. Significant shortages exist in occupational fields 08, 21, 25 and 35. Due to the shortage of 60 personnel in MOS 0811 most of the shortages remain unfilled. There was a heavy increase in out of country medical evacuations during March. Of the 19 personnel medically evacuated, 5 were from hostile wounds.

(2) R&R. Forty-five men of this battalion participated in out of country R&R during March and 16 men went on in-country R&R.

(3) Promotions. 19 Privates First Class were promoted to Lance Corporal during March to fill billet vacancies. In addition four men were promoted to Corporal and five men were promoted to Lance Corporal meritoriously.

(5) Award Recommendations. A total of 118 recommendations for awards were forwarded during March 1969. These included one Silver Star recommendation, twenty Bronze Star recommendations, fifty seven Navy Commendation Medal recommendations and forty Navy Achievement Award recommendations. The great majority of these award recommendations were for heroic action during Operation Dewey Canyon. Three personnel were also

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recommended for the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry during March.

(5) General Administration. The weather difficulties in the early part of the month and the nonavailability of helicopter transportation required the postponing of some administrative matters such as office hours. The majority of the administrative accomplishments were completed in the latter part of the month. The vast changes in administration directed by the Individual Records and Accounting Manual and the Unit Diary Reporting under the Manpower Management System commenced on 1 March 1969 with a minimum of confusion. The administration of all batteries was inspected during March by the S-1 with satisfactory results.

(6) Legal. During March a total of 11 Battery Commanders Office Hours were held and 6 personnel were brought to Battalion Commander's Office Hours. One Special Court Martial was awarded during the month. Three recommendations for administrative discharge for unfitness were forwarded, and four informal investigations were conducted.

i. Intelligence. The final stages of Operation Dewey Canyon found all units relying heavily on the special intelligence detachment attached from III M.F. The employment of this unit was instrumental in the successful extraction plans for FSB Cunningham, FSB Turnage and 1/9 from Tam Boi. After the termination of Dewey Canyon, emphasis was placed on updating intelligence in the Regimental AO. A sub team from the 17 LIT detachment was dispatched to assist 1/9 operating in the vicinity of the CamLo resettlement village. As the month of March terminated limited enemy contact along route 9 indicated the presence of elements of the enemy's 1st & 3d battalions of the 27th Regiment and the 31st LF group. Total losses sustained by the enemy in the 9th Marines AO's in March were:

KIA-317	SALT-4000lbs
IWC-267	140mm rds-249
CSWC-81	BUNKERS-231
SLA (AMMO)-256,656	STRUCTURES-76
AA (AMM)-64,967	VEHICLES-24
82mm mortar rds-5,831	RIFLE GRENADES-3,196
CHICOMS-13,112	120mm rds-887
RPG RDS-3,690	AP MINES-22
60mm rds-7,741	AT MINES-1,102
RICE-68,205 lbs	122mm ARTY RDS-328

j. Communications The first of March found the Communications Platoon supporting the battalion's operations at Dong Ha, Vandegrift Combat Base, Camp Evans, QuangTri, and Fire Support Base Cunningham. On FSB Cunningham, numerous problems were encountered with wire lines being cut by incoming rounds. A notable feat in VHF-FM communications was accomplished by Battery E,

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when they communicated loud and clear with an AN/PRC-25 radio and whip antenna from Tiger Mountain to Vandegrift Combat Base, a distance of over 46 KM.

During the helicopter displacement from Cunningham on 15 March, Battery D had several antennas and miscellaneous communications equipment destroyed by a direct hit from an 82mm mortar round.

Upon return of the CP to VCB on the 15th, the switchboard was moved from the FDC to the Communications tent. A vigorous maintenance and tac marking program was commenced and is still in progress. A line was installed from the battalion switchboard to the 12th Marines switchboard. Two log periodic antenna radiating sections which had been damaged on the operation were repaired by the Seabees by an aluminum welding process.

Two technicians were transferred to "D" and "E" battery respectively, because experience on operation Dewey Canyon showed that a large majority of repairs can be made in the field using only a multimeter soldering iron and spare radio modules. Four radio operators were brought in from the field to the battalion FDC. The 5th 155 Gun Battery extended the period on the temporary loan of 4 AN/PRC-25 radios to the battalion. Work continued on a communications bunker in Dong Ha that will eventually house the message center, radio watch and switchboard. The remote lines to Signal Hill were cut by a bulldozer on 28 March. Large distances between units in the new AO initially created problems with frequencies. It was found that low-band frequencies were required for dependable communications to C-2 and the Khe Gio bridge from Vandegrift.

k. Chaplain Service. Chaplain Carl E. Drake Jr. (Lt. USNR), 73908/4105 reported to Headquarters Btry, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, on 12 March 1969. Chaplain Drake relieved Chaplain Salvatore Rubino as chaplain on 15 March 1969.

The replacement of Chaplain Rubino, a Protestant Chaplain, by Chaplain Drake, a Catholic Chaplain, began the implementation of the 3d Marine Division plan to place catholic chaplains with artillery battalions, and Protestant Chaplains with the infantry battalions. This plan is a result of the fire support base concept whereby artillery and infantry work in close proximity. The Protestant and Catholic Chaplains, when holding divine services for their respective units, are expected to provide divine services for the adjacent artillery or infantry units. This will better provide regular divine services and personal counselling for both Catholic and Protestant personnel.

During the month of March Chaplain Drake visited each of the batteries for purposes of Divine Services both on Sunday and during the week. He also used these opportunities to meet the battery Commanders and to visit with the enlisted men informally.

In accordance with the previously mentioned plan of unit coverage, the Chaplain also provided services for units of the 9th Marines. At the Rockpile and A-4 services were provided for all the units in the area.

A total of 12 services were held during March, 1969, with a total attendance of 325

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PART IV

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

- ✓ PERTINENT MESSAGES Pgs 13-15
- ✓ EXTRACTS OF FIRE MISSIONS FROM S-3 WORKSHEETS Pgs 16-26
- ✓ TAB A-- Map : Positioning of Artillery during final phase of Operation Dewey Canyon; showing displacements after Dewey Canyon (Orig copy only)
- ✓ TAB B - Summary of enemy losses from Operation Dewey Canyon
- ✓ TAB C - Map: Positioning of Artillery On 31 March 1969 (Orig copy only)

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PERTINENT MESSAGES

022200H

From: Bulldozer

To: Delmar, Jawbreaker, Heritage, Hungarian
 Warning Order

1. Cancel my 012300H,
 2. It is anticipated that the 9th Marines will commence closing out Operation Dewey on 3 March 1969. For planning purposes the following extraction schedule is provided.

- A. 3 Mar69
 2/9 (-) to VCB
 Externals from FSB's to VCB
- B. 4 Mar69
 1/9 to VCB
 (Close FSB Erskine to VCB after 1/9 move complete)
 Externals to VCB
- C. 5 Mar69
 3/9 (-) to VCB
 1 Rifle Co. remains as security for FSB Turnage
 "E" Btry to VCB
 Hqts. 9th Marines to VCB
 Hqts. 2/12 to VCB
 Externals to VCB
- D. 6 Mar69
 Close FSB Cunningham to VCB
 2/3 (-) to VCB
 ARVN BN to VCB (Suggested)
 ARVN CP to VCB (Suggested)
- E. 7 Mar69
 Close FSB Turnage to VCB

- 3. All units submit helo frags requirements in accordance with above schedule. QuangTri to be used as alternate destination.
- 4. Maximum use of A0's and fixed CAP during all lifts.
- 5. Troop lift capacity for all Bn. size and larger troop lifts should be equal to 12 CH-46's throughout the lift.
- 6. The Rifle Co (Rein) assigned as security for FSB Turnage should be equipped 106mm RR, 81mm mortars, 60mm mortars, and adequate stocks of all types of Class V, MCI and water.

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FRAG O 08-69
 From: 9th Marines
 To: 1/9
 info: 2/9, 3/9, 2/12, Task Force Hotel

1. Situation: No change
2. Mission: No change
3. Execution:
 - A. 1/9
 1. Displace units to general vicinity area bounded by grids 235042, 246037, 246050, and 235050.
 2. Be in position NLT 091700H.
 3. Construct LZ capable of heavy lifts helos.
 4. Be prepared to receive advance party 4.2" mortar battery at 100800H. Battery to follow at 101400H.
 5. Be prepared to recommend general 4.2 battery positions.
 6. Report crossing LOD and when in position.
 7. Remained prepared to effect linkup with friendly forces operating adjacent to your AO.
4. Admin & Log: No change
5. Command & Comm-electronics: No change

FRAG O 11-69
 From: 9th Marines
 To: 1/9, 3/9
 info: 2/12, Task Force Hotel

1. Situation: No change
2. Mission: No change
3. Execution:
 - A. 1/9
 1. Displace A1/9, B1/9, & Charger to co-locate with C,D1/9
 2. If inclement weather, execute earliest possible 13 Mar69.
 3. If weather permits early medevac, execute subsequent to medevac completion.
 - B. 3/9, No change
 - C. Coordinating instructions
 1. 9th Marines extraction dates change to 13-14 Mar69.
4. Admin & Log: No change
5. Command & Comm-electronics: No change

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FRAG O 12-69

1. No change
2. No change
3. A. No change
- B. Delmar: extract 17 Mar69. No other change
- C. Southern: (1) Extract 17 Mar69, no change in extract plan.
(2) Chop So L (-) to this HQ. 170800H
- D. C/I No change
4. No change
5. No change

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PART IV

FIRE MISSION EXTRACTS FROM 1 MARCH TO 31 MARCH

PERIOD 282300 to 012300

- 1345 FM, E/2/12 (203016), Active mortars, Delmar 64
 EOM 1440, 1A0HEQ&D, Mortars silenced, 1 Secondary, BX 3008
- 1515 FM, F/2/12 (208025), Active mortars, Colorado W
 EOM 1622, 38HEQ, Mortars silenced, BX 3049
- 1022 FM, F, D, E/2/12 (205055), 30 NVA in the open, Delmar 64
 EOM 1658, 436HEQ, 7 KIA, 10 Probable KIA/WIA, BX 3053
- 1448 FM, W/2/12 (153120), Small arms fire, Fox 5
 EOM 1503, 20HEQ&D, 2 WP, Area neutralized, BX 3044
- 1425 FM, W/2/12 (147118), Small arms fire, Fox 6
 EOM 1447, 30HEQ&D, 4 WP, Area neutralized, BX 3046

PERIOD 012300 to 022300

- 2101 FM, 1st Prov (149996), Trucks, Collar Zone
 EOM 2150, 57HEQ, 1 Large secondary, BX 3219
- 2030 FM, 1st Prov (149997), Enemy movement, Collar Zone
 EOM 2100, 19HEQ, Area neutralized, BX 3194
- 1605 FM, F/2/12 (203016), Active mortar, Delmar 64
 EOM 1622, 52HEQ&D, Mortar ceased, BX 3142
- 1655 FM, F/2/12 (14810041), Movement, Cockpit
 EOM 1709, 15HEQ&D, Area neutralized, BX 3018
- 1140 FM, F/2/12 (190046), Enemy troops, Delmar 61
 EOM 1307, 30HEQ&D, 2 KIA, 4 Probable KIA/WIA, BX 3126
- 1322 FM, F/2/12 (208018), Mortars and movement, Delmar 62
 EOM 1343, 77HEQ, Mortars silenced, area neutralized, BX 3136
- 0930 FM, D/2/12 (098128), Enemy contact, Hinderance
 EOM 1605, 34HEQ, 2 WP, Contact broken, area neutralized, BX 3125

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PERIOD 012300 to 022300

1600 FM, E/2/12 (148028), RPG/Recoilless fire, Delmar 63
 EOM 1620, 17HEQ, RPG Surpressed, area neutralized, BX 3141

PERIOD 022300 to 032300

1730 FM, E/2/12 (207024), Known enemy position, Delmar 64
 EOM 1531, 135HEQ, 2 WP, Area neutralized, BX 3248

1504 FM, D/2/12 (191048), Enemy sniper fire, Colorado P
 EOM 1920, 56HEQ&D, 6 WP, Sniper fire ceased, area neutralized,
 BX 3258

1208 FM, E/2/12 (20410203), Active mortars, Delmar 64
 EOM 1224, 25HEQ, Mortar silenced, area neutralized, BX 3008

1220 FM, F/2/12 (198028), Active mortars, Delmar 63
 EOM 1300, 24 HEQ&D, 4 WP, Mortar silenced, area neutralized,
 BX 3241

1255 FM, E/2/12 (251084), Direct fire, bunkers, suspected mortar site,
 Echo 6, EOM 1350, 21HEQ&D, 2 Bunkers destroyed, BX 3245

1035 FM, D/2/12 (130120), Contact, Heritage 61
 EOM 1435, 168HEQ&D, 5 WP, 1 Secondary, BX 3238

1320 FM, D/2/12 (132123), Bunkers and NVA, Colorado O
 EOM 1605, 126HEQ&D, 2 WP, Several secondaries, 12 Structures burning,
 BX 3244

0900 FM, 3d Prov (200049), Prep fire, Delmar 61
 EOM 1035, 96HEQ, 1 WP, 3 KIA, 27 Bunkers destroyed, BX 3234

PERIOD 032300 to 042300

1635 FM, E/2/12 (195050), Snipers, Delmar 61
 EOM 1920, 18HEQ, 2 WP, 6 Probable KIA/WIA, BX 3346

1345 FM, E/2/12 (220018), Contact, Delmar 62
 EOM 1615, 120HEQ, 4 WP, Area neutralized, BX 3334

1600 FM, F/2/12 (20260250), Active mortars, Delmar 64
 EOM 1626, 30HEQ, Mortars silenced, BX 3248

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PERIOD 032300 to 042300

- 1343 FM, F/2/12 (215018), Contact, Delmar 62
 EOM 1626, 51HEQ, 4 WP, Area neutralized, BX 3333
- 0700 FM, D/2/12 (13001246), Contact, Heritage
 EOM 0820, 48HEQ&D, 4 WP, Area neutralized, BX 3316
- 1032 FM, D/2/12 (126127), 50 cal. position, Heritage 61
 EOM 1100, 40HEQ&D, 2 WP, 1 Secondary, BX 3323
- 1155 FM, E/2/12 (324077), Active mortar, Hungarian 22
 EOM 1241, 55HEQ, 2 WP, Mortar silenced, BX 3325
- 1209 FM, F/2/12 (194020), 2 Squads of NVA, Delmar 61
 EOM 1300, 115HEQ, 4 WP, 5 Probable KIA/WIA, BX 3526
- 1200 FM, 1st Prov (194028), 2 Squads of NVA, Delmar 61
 EOM 1250, 42HEQ, 5 Probable KIA/WIA, BX 3526
- 1150 FM, D/2/12 (195050), Contact, Delmar 61
 EOM 1305, 140HEQ, 4 Probable KIA/WIA, BX 3324
- 0820 FM, D/2/12 (173165), Contact, Heritage 63
 EOM 0855, 60HEQ, 4 WP, 3 KIA, 1 WIA, BX 3321

PERIOD 042300 to 052300

- 1730 FM, D, W/2/12 (136128), Automatic weapons, Heritage 63
 EOM 1945, 57HEQ, 11 WP, 1 Secondary, 2 Bunkers, BX 3401

PERIOD 052300 to 062300

- 1930 FM, F/2/12 (221018), Active mortar, Delmar 64
 EOM 1959, 20HEQ, 2 WP, Mortar silenced, BX 3434
- 1930 FM, E/2/12 (20740231), Active mortar, Delmar 64
 EOM 1957, 46HEQ, Mortar silenced, BX 3392
- 1651 FM, E/2/12 (220020), Active mortar, Delmar 64
 EOM 1711, 12HEQ, 2 WP, Mortar silenced, BX 3427
- 1835 FM, E/2/12 (20740231), Active mortar, Delmar 64
 EOM 1850, 30HEQ, Mortar silenced, BX 3434
- 1115 FM, E/2/12 (195050), Squad of NVA, Delmar 61
 EOM 1220, 121HEQ, 2 WP, 4 KIA, BX 3414

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PERIOD 052300 to 062300

1607 FM, E/2/12 (241007), 50 cal. position, Southern 2A
EOM 1635, 40HEQ, Firing stopped, area neutralized, BX 3424

1130 FM, D/2/12 (195050), NVA in the open, Delmar 61
EOM 1220, 72HEQ&D, 4 WP, 2 KIA, BX 3414

PERIOD 062300 to 072300

2030 FM, D/2/12 (193030), Contact, Delmar 62
EOM 2113, 52HEQ, 2 WP, 3 KIA, BX 3486

1740 FM, E/2/12 (247037), Mortar position, Colorado F
EOM 1805, 12HEQ, Mortar silenced, BX 3472

1550 FM, W/2/12 (174097), Mortar position, Fox 5
EOM 1715, 48HEQ, Mortar silenced, BX 3457

1734 FM, F/2/12 (21940219), Active mortars, Delmar 64
EOM 1900, 25HEQ&D, 2 KIA, 2 Probable KIA/WIA, BX 3427

1401 FM, E/2/12 (231070), Active mortar, Southern 61
EOM 1625, 147HEQ&D, 1 Cave, 1 Power line, 2 Bunkers, 1 LG sniper position and 15-20 small sniper positions destroyed, BX 3455

1620 FM, F/2/12 (217047), Active mortars, Delmar 63
EOM 1652, 17HEQ, 4 WP, Mortar silenced, BX 3462

1048 FM, E/2/12 (23160466), NVA in the open, Southern 62
EOM 1102, 24HEQ, 1 KIA, BX 3441

1255 FM, E/2/12 (207023), Active mortar, Delmar 64
EOM 1305, 18HEQ, Mortar silenced, BX 3392

1058 FM, D/2/12 (100095), Possible artillery site, Colorado R
EOM 1409, 146HEQ&D, 8 WP, 1 Secondary, 1 Bunker damaged, 2 Bunkers destroyed, BX 3452

1435 FM, F/2/12 (20740231), Active mortars, Delmar 62
EOM 1506, 45HEQ, 2 WP, Mortar silenced, BX 3456

1505 FM, 1st Prov (198060), Active mortars, Delmar 63
EOM 1540, 16HEQ, Mortar silenced, BX 3458

1455 FM, D/2/12 (130150), Platoon of NVA, Heritage 61
EOM 1550, 54HEQ&D, 8 WP, Large fire, possible fuel dump, BX 3454

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PERIOD 072300 to 082300

1300 FM, D/2/12 (170088), Active mortar, Southern 24
EOM 1910, 19AHEQ, Mortar silenced, BX 3493

1300 FM, W/2/12 (163146), Active mortar, Southern 24
EOM 1910, 92HEQ, Mortar silenced, BX 3559

1940 FM, D/2/12 (DIRECT FIRE), Active mortar, Delta 6
EOM 2045, 5AHEQ, 3BH, 11FCTI, Mortar ceased, BX 3562

1935 FM, 1st Prov (15970047), Contact, Collar Bone
EOM 2050, 2AHEQ, Area neutralized, BX 3518

1950 FM, W/2/12 (163137), Active mortar, Southern 64
EOM 2022, 90HEQ, 2 WP, Mortar silenced, BX 3564

1320 FM, 3d Prov, E/2/12 (21940219), Active mortars, Colorado R, Delmar 64
EOM 1557, 80HEQ&D, 2 WP, 1 Secondary, 2 Bunkers destroyed, BX 3427

1620 FM, 3d Prov, D/2/12 (19480347), Enemy bunkers, Colorado T
EOM 1800, 5AHEQ&D, 6 WP, 1 Secondary, 1 Bunker destroyed, BX 3552

1720 FM, E/2/12 (195036), NVA and bunkers, Colorado G
EOM 1835, 60HEQ&D, 2 WP, 1 Secondary, 1 Fire, 1 Bunker destroyed,
BX 3553

1750 FM, D/2/12 (223041), Active 50 cal., Delmar 64
EOM 1845, 110HEQ&D, 3 KIA, BX 3554

1340 FM, 3d Prov (227033), Active mortars, small arms, Delmar 64
EOM 1430, 27HEQ, 2 WP, 1 Probable KIA/WIA, BX 3548

0937 FM, 3d Prov (192026), Contact, Delmar 61
EOM 1040, 30HEQ&D, 2 WP, 2 KIA, BX 3520

0930 FM, E/2/12 (327099), Contact, ARVN AO
EOM 1040, 58HEQ&D, 2 WP, Area neutralized, BX 3521

1004 FM, E/2/12 (187031), Active mortars, Delmar 24
EOM 1034, 45HEQ&D, 2 WP, Mortar silenced, BX 3537

0710 FM, 1st Prov (160000), Enemy movement, Bulldozer
EOM 0750, 2AHEQ, Area neutralized, BX 3513

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PERIOD 082300 to 092300

- 2005 FM, D/2/12 (235042), Enemy movement, Delmar 63
EOM 2050, 52HEQ&D, 2 WP, 2 KIA, BX 3613
- 1623 FM, E/2/12 (21290177), Suspected enemy movement, Charger
EOM 1706, 72HEQ, 2 WP, Area neutralized, BX 3601
- 1800 FM, D/2/12 (161143), Active mortars, Delta 6
EOM 1810, 20HEQ, Mortar silenced, BX 3607
- 1710 FM, E/2/12 (219026), Active mortars, Delmar 62
EOM 1800, 82HEQ, 4 WP, Mortar silenced, BX 3604
- 1750 FM, W/2/12 (165145), Active mortars, Southern 62
EOM 1820, 26HEQ&D, 4 WP, Mortars silenced, BX 3606
- 1052 FM, E/2/12 (214023), Active mortar, Hard Charger
EOM 1133, 40HEQ&D, 2 WP, Mortar silenced, BX 3591
- 1331 FM, E/2/12 (20889943), Troops in the open, Hard Charger
EOM 1359, 103HEQ, 1 Secondary, BX 3594
- 0720 FM, E/2/12 (241040), Prep fire, Delmar 24
EOM 0723, 30HEQ&D, 3 Probable KIA/WIA, BX 3578
- 0649 FM, 3d Prov (16150080), Enemy movement, Collar Bone
EOM 0838, 7HEQ, 1 KIA, BX 3564
- 0940 FM, E/2/12 (20740231), Active mortars, Delmar 62
EOM 1000, 18HEQ&D, 2 WP, Mortar silenced, BX 3392

PERIOD 092300 to 102300

- 1710 FM, D/2/12 (230080), Active mortar, Southern 61
EOM 1745, 75HEQ, 4 WP, 2 KIA, 1 Probable KIA/WIA, 1 Mortar,
1 Secondary, BX 3653
- 1340 FM, E/2/12 (233025), Active 50 cal. site, Delmar 63
EOM 1545, 128HEQ, Firing ceased, area neutralized, BX 3638

PERIOD 102300 to 112300

- 1712 FM, E/2/12 (2182027A), Contact, Delmar 62
EOM 1905, 198HEQ, 4 WP, Area neutralized, BX 3728

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PERIOD 102300 to 112300

1245 FM, W, D, E/2/12 (163107), NVA in the open, Southern 62
EOM 1310, 126HEQ, 5AFCTI, 2 WP, 1 Secondary, area neutralized,
BX 3712

0740 FM, 3d Prov (105054), Rocket site, Colorado R
EOM 0900, 20HEQ, 2 WP, 1 Secondary, BX 3705

0428 FM, E/2/12 (215040), Active mortar, Delmar 62
EOM 0505, 60HEQ, 4 WP, Mortar silenced, BX 3700

PERIOD 112300 to 122300

1920 FM, E/2/12 (208029), Enemy movement, Delmar 61
EOM 1940, 20HEQ, 2 WP, 5 KIA, BX 3751

0545 FM, E/2/12 (21820274), Contact/Mortars, Delmar 62
EOM 0605, 40HEQ, Mortar silenced, BX 3728

1350 FM, E/2/12 (235047), Sniper, Delmar 64
EOM 1408, 24HEQ, 2 WP, Sniper silenced, BX 3735

PERIOD 122300 to 132300

2242 FM, E/2/12 (21820274), Enemy movement, Delmar 62
EOM 2255, 88HEQ, Area neutralized, BX 3728

1315 FM, E/2/12 (232043), Contact, Delmar 61
EOM 1402, 46HEQ, 2 WP, Area neutralized, BX 3757

1428 FM, E/2/12 (235045), Active mortar, Delmar 63
EOM 1435, 14HEQ, Mortar silenced, BX 3758

PERIOD 132300 to 142300

1602 FM, E/2/12 (230036), Active mortars, Delmar 64
EOM 1622, 12HEQ, Mortar silenced, BX 3771

1750 FM, D/2/12 (230044), NVA in the open, Delmar 64
EOM 1800, 5HEQ, 2 KIA, BX 3774

1615 FM, D/2/12 (233045), Active mortar, Delmar 63
EOM 1634, 14HEQ, Mortar silenced, BX 3772

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PERIOD 142300 to 152300

- 1535 FM, E/2/12 (218033), Active mortar, Delmar 6A
EOM 1700, 148HEQ&D, 2 KIA, BX 3835
- 1840 FM, E/2/12 (228045), 20 NVA in the open, Delmar 63A
EOM 1901, 90HEQ&D, 2 WP, 5 KIA, 5 Secondaries, BX 3009
- 1400 FM, D/2/12 (160115, 168115, 179124), Suspected mortar position,
Delmar 6A, EOM 1545, 152FCTI, Mortars suppressed,
- 1100 FM, D/2/12 (165134, 165135, 16451360, 16251370), Smoke plan,
Hungarian 3, 121HCTI, BX 3804, 3805, 3806, 3807
- 1115 FM, D/2/12 (232043), Active mortars, Delmar 63
EOM 1245, 94HEQ, 2 WP, Mortars silenced, BX 3809
- 1100 FM, W/2/12 (170130, 167140, 163147, 167123, 166135, 164140, 160144),
Counter mortar/Smoke plan, Bulldozer, EOM 1300, 98HEQ, 258 WP

PERIOD 152300 to 162300

- 1745 FM, E/2/12 (229047), Snipers, Delmar 63
EOM 1756, 22HEQ, 1 Probable KIA/WIA, BX 0043
- 1928 FM, E/2/12 (235035), NVA in the open, Delmar 61A
EOM 1958, 49HEQ&D, 2 WP, 12 KIA, BE 0044
- 0700 FM, E/2/12 (25180527), Contact, Delmar 6A
EOM 0720, 50HEQ&D, Area neutralized, BX 3686
- 0940 FM, W/2/12 (227040), Active mortar, Delmar 63A
EOM 1020, 52HEQ&D, Mortar silenced, BX 2041

PERIOD 162300 to 172300

- 1133 FM, E/2/12 (258075, 246068, 236073, 223089, 221101), Suspected
and active mortar positions, Delmar 63, EOM 1885, 400HEQ&D, 10 WP,
BX 0048, 0049, 0050, 0051, 0052, 0053

PERIOD 172300 to 182300

- 0753 FM, W/2/12 (231043), Active mortar, Delmar 61
EOM 0818, 62HEQ&D, Mortar silenced, BX 4001

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PERIOD 172300 to 182300

- 0753 FM, E/2/12 (231043), Active mortars, Delmar 61
EOM 0822, 82HEQ&D, Mortar silenced, BE 0064
- 0825 FM, E/2/12 (231033), Active mortars, Delmar 61A
EOM 0848, 54HEQ&D, 1 Secondary, BE 0065
- 0850 FM, E/2/12 (242012), Known enemy mortar position, Delmar 61A
EOM 0925, 72HEQ&D, 2 WP, 4 KIA, 12 Secondaries, BE 0066
- 1100 FM, E/2/12 (242030), Active mortar, Delmar 61A
EOM 1135, 20HEQ&D, Mortar silenced, BE 0067
- 1617 FM, D/2/12 (051575), Active mortar position, Protractor 18
EOM 1744, 96HEQ&D, 4 WP, Mortar silenced, BX 0015
- 0626 FM, E/2/12 (235035, 231037), Active mortars and RPG's, Delmar 61A
EOM 0655, 117HEQ, 5 KIA, BE 0061, 0062
- 0638 FM, E/2/12 (23280421), NVA in the open, Delmar 63
EOM 0743, 14HEQ, 4 KIA, BE 0062

PERIOD 182300 to 192300

- 1211 FM, D/2/12 (052576), Active mortar, Jawbreaker 2A
EOM 1300, 12HEQ, 4 WP, Mortar silenced, BX 0038
- 1536 FM, E/2/12 (070425), Contact, Drakepool
EOM 1723, 33HEQ, 10 WP, Enemy withdrew, BX 0060

PERIOD 192300 to 202300

- 1434 FM, Bitter Adam (8A2AAA), Enemy movement, Jawbreaker 61
EOM 1500, 25HEQ&D, 12 WP, 3 Secondaries, BX 0068

PERIOD 202300 to 212300

- 1300 FM, F/2/12 (057577), Active mortar, Jawbreaker 63
EOM 1345, 20 HEQ, 2 WP, Mission taken over by Seaworthy AO, BX 0080
- 1500 FM, F/2/12 (056577), Active mortar, Seaworthy 98-2
EOM 1614, 36HEQ, 6 WP, 2 KIA, BX 0082

PERIOD 222300 to 232300

- 1050 FM, E/2/12 (028598), Active 50 cal., Salinas 62A
EOM 1120, 30HEQ&D, 2 WP, Weapon silenced, 2 Secondaries, BX 0142

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PERIOD 222300 to 232300

1551 FM, E/2/12 (045585), Active mortar, Colorado A
EOM 1730, 140HEQ&D, 2 WP, 7 Bunkers destroyed, 25 fighting
holes uncovered, BX 0148

PERIOD 232300 to 242300

1455 FM, D/2/12 (046639), Contact, Swami 24
EOM 1730, 23AHEQ, 1 KIA, BX 0234

1122 FM, E/2/12 (046627), NVA on the move, Swords 24
EOM 1223, 50HEQ, 2 WP, 1 KIA, 3 Probable KIA/WIA, 2 Bunkers
destroyed, BX 0213

PERIOD 242300 to 252300

1710 FM, E/2/12 (034585), Active AK fire, Jawbreaker 62
EOM 2039, 110HEQ, 2 WP, Weapons silenced, BX 0291

0941 FM, E/2/12 (059586), Active mortar, Jawbreaker 61
EOM 1530, 148HEQ, 2 WP, 1 Secondary, BX 0284

PERIOD 252300 to 262300

0320 FM, Carpet I (04106405), Contact, Swami 87A
EOM 0716, 23AHEQ, 6 WP, Area neutralized, BX 0305

PERIOD 262300 to 272300

1350 FM, Hayley Swords (093713), Suspected enemy position, Colorado H
EOM 1435, 124HEQ, 2 Bunkers destroyed, 3 Bunkers damaged, BX 0451

1755 FM, E/2/12 (052586), Active 50 cal. site, Jawbreaker 62
EOM 2030, 22HEQ, 16 WP, Weapons silenced, BX 0461

2203 FM, D/2/12 (125718), Heavy enemy movement (SID target), Delmar 63
EOM 2352, 353HEQ&VT, Area neutralized, enemy moving away, BX 0422

2218 FM, Carpet E (050586), Active mortar, Jawbreaker 61
EOM 0056, 96HEQ, 6 WP, Mortar silenced, BX 0421

PERIOD 272300 to 282300

1406 FM, F/2/12 (061592), Prep fire, Colorado W
EOM 1556, 263HEQ&D, 2 WP, 2 Bunkers destroyed, 2 trails destroyed,
BX 0525

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PERIOD 272300 to 282300

0247 FM, D/2/12 (043654), Contact, Swami 24
EOM 0430, 195HEQ, 2 WP, 3 KIA, BX 0443

PERIOD 282300 to 292300

2050 FM, D/2/12 (090557), Active mortar, Mack V
EOM 2133, 12HEQ, 8 WP, Mortar silenced, BX 05900040 FM, D/2/12 (169609), Contact, Mack V
EOM 0108, 10HEQ, 2 WP, 9 KIA, BX 0571~~SECRET~~

2112, 2112-49
PZ II, TAB B

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ENEMY LOSSES--OPERATION DEWEY CANYON

I. Personnel:

1627 KIA
5 POW
8 DET
2 CHIEU HOI

II. Motor Transport:

84 Vehicles

III. Bunkers/Structures:

1000

IV. Weapons:

1223 SA
243 CSW
26 Mortars
66 AA Weapons
12 122mm Field guns
4 85mm Field guns

IX. Communications equipment:

5 Radios
1 Switchboard
2 Multiplexors
2 Field phones
6000 ft. of communications wire

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V. AMMO:

690,598 SA Rds.
63,012 Mortar Rds
28,286 AA Rds.
7,530 HOW/GUN Rds.
14,808 RPGs
60,429 Grenades
2,920 Mines
1,027 Rockets
2,998 Recoilless rifle rounds

VI. Explosives:

1,910 $\frac{1}{2}$ lbs

VII. POL:

2,750 Gal. Fuel
370 Gal. Grease

VIII. Food:

228,730 lbs

TAB B
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