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HEADQUARTERS
2d Battalion, 12th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

3D MARINE S&C FILE
DI# 222869

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SER: 03A/1969
3 July 1969

#27569

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: (1) Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
(2) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
(3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 June to 30 June 1969

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A
(b) FMFPACO 5750.8A

Encl: (1) 2d Battalion, 12th Marines Command Chronology for the period 1 June to 30 June 1969

1. Enclosure (1) is submitted in accordance with references (a) and (b).

C. G. Killeen
C. G. KILLEEN

2ND BATT/12TH MAR

CMD CHRON

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 June--30 June 1969

- PART I ORGANIZATIONAL DATA
- PART II NARRATIVE SUMMARY
- PART III SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
- PART IV SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (p. 11 - 2)

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PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. DESIGNATION

2d Battalion, 12th Marines

LTCOL C. J. KILLEEN 050163/0802
USMC

SUBORDINATE UNITS

Hq. Btry, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines

CAPT C. F. NORTON 080524/0802
USMC

Battery "D", 2d Battalion, 12th Marines

1STLT G. E. HODGE 096071/0802
USMC

Battery "E", 2d Battalion, 12th Marines

CAPT H. C. BARNUM 084262/0802
USMC

Battery "F", 2d Battalion, 12th Marines

CAPT K. K. UPDERGROVE 084249/0802
USMC

Mortar Battery, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines

1STLT J. D. MASON 0103654/0802
USMC

3d Provisional 155 Towed Battery
2d Battalion, 12th Marines (1-29 June)

CAPT T. S. HUTCHINSON 094820/0802
USMC

3. STAFF OFFICERS

Executive Officer

MAJ R. H. LEDET 063172/0802
USMC

S-1

CAPT N. W. CARMEN 096338/0830
USMC

S-2

1STLT H. L. PRICE 0105231/0802
USMC

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S-3

MAJ E. A. CONDON 072264/0802
 USMC

S-4

CAPT C. F. NORTON 080524/0802
 USMC

Liaison Officer

MAJ J. D. MCNAMARA 078628/0802
 USMC

Ordnance Officer

WO C. L. SERGENT 0105810/2020
 USMC

Supply Officer

1STLT H. J. PETERSON 0106012/3002
 USMC

Motor Transportation Officer

1STLT R. R. SIMSON 0104775/3502
 USMCR

Communications Officer

1STLT R. BRYSON 0105878/2502
 USMCR (13-30 June)

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
49	638	3	17

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PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

1. General Overview of all Activities. From 1-23 June, the battalion provided fire support for Operation Cameron Falls, a search and destroy operation athwart infiltration routes in the Ba Long and Da Krong valleys south of Vandegrift Combat Base (VCB).

The disposition of the battalion at the opening of the reporting period was as follows: The CP and Mortar Battery at VCB (XD990478 and XD998474), Battery D at FSB SHEPHERD (XD929408), Battery E at FSB WHISMAN (XD973334), Battery F and the 3d Provisional 155 How (T) Battery at CALU (YD016456). On 1 June Mortar Battery helilifted to FSB WHISMAN, where it remained until 11 June, when both batteries there helilifted to FSB HENDERSON (YD081411) to support operations southeast of VCB. On 14 June Mortar Battery displaced to VCB, and was chopped to 3/12 for VCB defense. Battery E was similarly displaced and chopped to 3/12 on 15 June as operations in that portion of the AO were terminated.

At 1830 hours 15 June, it was announced that 2/12 was one of the units that would withdraw from RVN prior to 30 August. The following day, Battery F was chopped to the 5th Battalion, 4th Artillery (U.S. Army) for Operation UTM MESA in the Khe Sanh Plateau and the suspected infiltration routes southwest of Khe Sanh.

On 18 June, Mortar Battery displaced to Dong Ha and was chopped to 4/12 for defense of Dong Ha Combat Base. This move was made in response to a new threat to DHCB from an NVA Regiment which had infiltrated into SVN through the DMZ subsequent to the withdrawal announcement of 15 June.

Upon termination of Operation CAMERON FALLS on 23 June Battery D and the 3d Prov displaced to Dong Ha, where they assumed a stand-down posture and commenced preparations for embarkation.

At 1800 hours 29 June, the 3d Provisional 155 (Twd) Battery, 2/12 moved to Dong Ha and was deactivated, and the personnel transferred to units within the battalion to accomplish embarkation at T/O battalion strength, as directed. Excess T/E items were redistributed to units slated to remain in RVN, or turned in to the maintenance float.

On 25 June, 2/12 reassumed OPCON of Mortar Battery 2/12, and the battery was also placed in a stand-down posture in preparation for embarkation.

By the close of the reporting period, the battalion had fired 19,274 rounds (15,890 105mm, 1,540 4.2", 1,844 155mm) and was credited with 29 NVA KIA (Confirmed), 4 bunkers destroyed, and 1 secondary explosion.

Two of the most significant missions fired by the battalion occurred on the nights of 5-6 June and 9 June. At approximately 1600 hours 5 June, H/2/9 made contact on several sides of their night defensive position. A medevac chopper was shot down, and it was obvious that a superior enemy force had the company surrounded. All batteries of the battalion were brought to bear, firing on 24 different targets throughout the contact, and expending 687 HE, 157 ILLUM, and 57 WP. The confirmed surveillance was only 7 NVA KIA, but

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the true value of the artillery support rendered that night may be better evaluated from the message sent to the FDC from the forward observer (TAB B).

On the night of 9 June, a squad outpost observed approximately 50-60 moving lights in a column estimated to be between 500-600 meters long. Four organic batteries and three GS batteries were brought to bear, and 1,053 rounds of all calibers were expended on the target. Because of extremely rugged terrain and dense vegetation that restricted visibility to 3-5 meters, only 21 NVA KIA were recovered, but there was ample evidence of many more kills. What had been a sizeable enemy force moving into position south of CALU was decimated.

At the close of the reporting period, those batteries still OPCON 2/12 were out of action preparing for embarkation. It is estimated that the battalion will be operational for a short period in July with Batteries E and F firing in support of forces defending VCB; by mid-July the entire battalion is scheduled to be in a stand-down posture and the first elements should be embarking for Okinawa.

2. Command Relations. Throughout the period, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines was under the operational and administrative control of the 12th Marines.

3. Mission Assigned. Direct support of 9th Marine Regiment.

4. Intelligence. For the majority of June, 9th Marines (-) conducted Operation CAMERON FALLS in the lower Da Krong River Valley; First Battalion, 9th Marines, was attached to Task Force Group Guadalcanal on the Khe Sanh Plateau. The operation was a reconnaissance in force with an average of eight enemy engaged in each firefight. Two contacts were of significant size to be mentioned. On 1 June an LP for G/2/9 at FSB Whisman alerted the lines to a probe from the north. Shortly afterwards the FSB was assaulted from the east by a company-size enemy unit utilizing RPG's, RPD's, S/A, grenades, satchel charges. The Marines returned fire with organic weapons and arty pieces discharging firecracker rounds at point blank range. After the enemy retreated, the FSB counted 21 NVA/KIA, 1 POW, HOI CHANH, and various small arms, and innumerable chicom concussion grenades. Employing the psyops "early word" broadcast system, the Hoi Chanh appealed to his friends in the mountains to the NW of FSB Whisman to rally. The Hoi Chanh claimed he was from a Recon unit while the POW asserted he was from the 7th Bn, 24th Regt, with the mission of carrying rice for the 4th Bn, 24th Regt. H/2/9 on 5 June made contact with a company-size unit using light machineguns, S/A, and snipers tied in trees. The firefight lasted 28 hours during which one medevac bird was shot down and sunk in the Da Krong River. Spooky, flare ships, and artillery were employed extensively throughout the fight. The following day the enemy broke contact about 1400H and 57 NVA/KIA were counted in the battle area. (See TAB B)

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On 8 June F/2/9 discovered a regimental CP and a field hospital on a trail network leading to the NE and a short distance from H/2/9 contact of 5-6 June. This discovery leads to the possible conclusion that a security force engaged H/2/9 while the CP moved on to the NE.

On the 11th 3/9 found a cave and tunnel complex farther down the Da Krong River with fifty 3-man living spaces which had been used approximately one month before. On the 17th 2/9 recovered from a dead NVA a sketch of the attack plan of 3/9's position on Dong Cho Mountain. This information was relayed to 3/9 and that night an alert ambush from K/3/9 spotted 60 lights 10 meters apart moving slowly up Kong Ja Ri (north). Within 30 minutes over 1100 artillery rounds were delivered on the target. A combat patrol two days later confirmed 14 NVA/KIA and several extremely foul-smelling grid squares.

The captured documents and the living complexes indicated that the enemy traveled route 926 and the Laotian salient to the Da Krong River. They were in the process of moving NE when 2/9 and 3/9 were helilifted to positions astride the enemy's lines of communication and intercepted them. Further, it is quite possible that the 9th Marines upset a schedule for attacking friendly installation and FSB's farther to the east.

5. Operations. During the month of June 2d Battalion participated in Operation Cameron Falls and two batteries participated in Operation Utah Mesa.

6. Results of Operations.

- a. Casualties inflicted on the enemy. 29 KIA (Confirmed)
- b. Casualties sustained. 2 KIA, 17 WIA
- c. Equipment. 4 Bunkers destroyed, 1 Secondary explosion

7. Supporting Arms. Paragraphs 1 through 6 above.

8. Logistics. On 1 June, all Batteries were engaged in Operation Cameron Falls. All resupply was staged and dispatched from the Vandegrift LSA under the control of 3rd Shore Party Battalion. Ammunition resupply was controlled by the 12th Marines. 2/12 provided one M35 and two personnel to augment the regimental LSA section. From 1 June to the 23rd, S-4 personnel handled no ammunition and staged only Class I, II, III and IV supplies. Every lift that was requested was provided with no more than one day slippage. On 15 June, 2/12 was notified of its redeployment as part of the 9th Regimental Landing Team. A phased standown commenced on 22 June according to a pre-announced schedule. Battery D, 3d Provisional Battery and Mortar Battery became administrative and were billeted in the Army compound adjacent to the 2/12 CP at Dong Ha West. Preliminary loading/embarkation plans were received from the 9th RLTF and the battalion set to mount out at T/E level. T/E deficiencies would be corrected by (1) Additions from Special Allowances, (2) Reallocation

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of 3d Prov Battery Equipment and (3) Priority walk-through requisitioning. On 26 June, the four Howitzers of 3d Prov Battery were inspected and turned into FLSG-B for six month maintenance and eventual turn-in. On 27 June, three TD-15 tractors were transferred to 3d Engineers Battalion as directed by the Commanding General. Embarkation preparation continue. Very little correcting had to be effected on the MEDS cards which is the information source for the mechanical embarkation system. The largest correction required was the updating of vehicle numbers which reflected the acquisition of new trucks over the past three months. The shortage of mount-out (4.2) boxes is the largest problem confronting the logistics section. 625 boxes have been on order since April however, to date we have received 200 boxes. The Battalion is now making use of all available packing material.

9. Communications. During the month of June, Communications Platoon continued support of the battalion in Bn Command Posts at VCB and Dong Ha West. In addition communication support was provided for batteries at CaLu, Cates, Shepherd, Spark, Lenaru, and Whisman fire support bases and Vandegrift Combat Base.

On 15 June, the COI for this division was changed. The change over in call signs and frequencies was accomplished with a minimum of confusion and compromise. However difficulties were experienced due to three upper-band frequencies assigned to this battalion. The three frequencies 71.50 MHz (M-419), 71.75 (M-426), and 72.90 (M-417) were found to be too high for any but line-of-sight communication. A reduced communications commitment prevented major communication difficulties.

The battalion CP was moved from VCB to Dong Ha West on 24 June. No communications difficulties were experienced since dual facilities were experienced since dual facilities were available at Dong Ha. One FDC watch was left at VCB for communication with Fox and Echo batteries. This watch also included one operator assigned to Signal Hill.

On 27 June three radio operators were temporarily assigned to Fox battery due to casualties sustained on that date. From notification of Fox's need for replacements to their arrival was approximately three hours. One AF-2236 log periodic antenna was also damaged on this date and was replaced on 28 June.

General difficulties encountered during June included careless destruction of wire remote lines, and insufficient AN/PRC-77's for operation of covered circuits. On 3 and 14 June were remote lines from Signal Hill to VCB were destroyed by careless fires at the Signal Hill end of the lines. The destruction was caused by trash fires which were not properly supervised. In both cases repairs were effected immediately. A continuing problem has been the nonavailability of AN/PRC-77's for voice encryption. Presently this battalion has four AN/PRC-77's of which one was borrowed from the 12th Marine

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Regiment and one is deadlined due to mechanical failure. The three available AN/PRC-77's are deployed providing a covered capability for two batteries in the field and personnel at VCB.

At this time there are no foreseeable problems in the communications of this battalion either during the move to Okinawa or after the move has been completed.

10. Equipment. The shortage of Panoramic Telescopes 12A7, temporarily reduced the effectiveness of the Battalion. For a the period 2-11 June two 105 and one 155 howitzers were down due to lack of sights. During June, 2d Battalion had nine sights in FLSG-B for repairs. By 30 June, however we had all guns up and spare sights on hand.

11. Civic Action. In June, an active civil affairs program has been carried on. Most notable, is that in a period of only two weeks enough building materials, such as lumber, roofing tile, cement, and reinforcing rods, were procured to enable the villagers of Thiet Trough to begin remodeling their school. A change that has been instigated in this period is that the village uses its own trucks to haul the garbage from the 2/12 messhall. This arrangement assures the village timely delivery and at the same time releases the trucks of this battalion to carry on with the battalion's work.

Because of the work being done on the school house, the village chief has temporarily halted the medcaps. The medcaps will again be held on a weekly basis once the school is remodeled.

12. Personnel and Administration.

(a) Personnel Strengths. The battalion was maintained at 100% of manning level strength during the month of June. However the latest manning level is a reduction of approximately 8% from the previous authorized levels which was necessary to maintain the Provisional 155mm How Btry (Tw).

(b) Upon receipt of information concerning the pending move of the battalion efforts were concentrated on bringing all batteries to T/O strength. The 3d Provisional 155mm How Btry (Tw) was dissolved on 29 June and personnel were reassigned to other batteries.

(c) The only noteworthy T/O deficiencies at the end of June were the billets for a GYSGT MOS 0441 and a GYSGT MOS 3371. These billets remained unfilled.

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(d) Promotions. This battalion promoted 38 Privates First Class to Lance Corporal by additional promotions authorized by CG 3d Marine Division. Four men were meritoriously promoted to Corporal and 3 men were meritoriously promoted to Lance Corporal. The Commanding General, 3d Mar Div meritoriously promoted one Corporal to Sergeant.

(e) R&R. Forty-one personnel were sent on out of Country R&R during June. The in-Country R&R program has not been reopened.

(f) Award Recommendations. During the month of June a total of 28 recommendations for awards were submitted. This included 5 Bronze Star recommendations, 8 Navy Commendation recommendations, and 15 Navy Achievement recommendations.

(g) Legal. During the month of June of 5 Battery Commanders Office hours were held and 6 Battalion Commanders Office hours were held. One man was referred to trial by Special Courts-Martial, 4 recommendations for undersirable discharge, and 2 recommendations for discharge for unsuitability were submitted during June.

13. Training. The following number of personnel attended formal schools;

SNCO Leadership - 1
Infantry Weapons Repair - 2
Basic Ammunition Techniction - 1
Teletype - 1

A total of 3 officers attended an informal Fire Direction Officers course, given by 12th Marines. A formal XXIV Corps course on Fire Direction and Forward Overvation were held in Phu Bai. One officer was nominated for each course.

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PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

01 JUNE W/2/12 helilifted from VCB to FSB WHISMAN
11 JUNE W/2/12 helilifted from FSB WHISMAN to FSB HENDERSON
11 JUNE E/2/12 helilifted from FSB WHISMAN to FSB HENDERSON
14 JUNE W/2/12 helilifted from FSB HENDERSON to VCB and went OPCON to 3/12
15 JUNE E/2/12 helilifted from FSB HENDERSON to VCB and went OPCON to 3/12
16 JUNE F/2/12 helilifted from CALU to FSB GATES and went OPCON to 5/4
18 JUNE W/2/12 moved to DONG HA and went OPCON to 4/12
23 JUNE D/2/12 helilifted from FSB SHEPHERD to DONG HA
25 JUNE Assumed OPCON of W/2/12
29 JUNE 3d Prov moved from CALU to DONG HA and was disbanded.

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PART IV

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. Copies of Staff Journal. None
2. Originated messages. N/A
3. Copies of Op orders. None
- ✓ 4. Other.
 - ✓ a. Significant missions from 1-30 June 1969, TAB A
 - ✓ b. Message from Dustlight 64, TAB B

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SIGNIFICANT MISSIONS 1-30 JUNE 1969

PERIOD 012300 to 022300

0725 FM, E/2/12 (942325), Bunker Complex, Smitty "W"
EOM 0835, 120 HEQ&D, 4 WP, 3 Bunkers destroyed, 1 Secondary, BX 2444

PERIOD 022300 to 032300

1835 FM, 3d Prov (982334), Night defensive fire, Dustlight
EOM 2045, 12 HEQ, 2 WP, 1 KIA (Confirmed), BX 2684

PERIOD 042300 to 052300

0724 FM, W/2/12 (97273037), Active artillery, Dustlight 63
EOM 0831, 54 HEQ, 6 WP, 1 Bunker destroyed, BX 2880

PERIOD 052300 to 062300

0232 FM, D/2/12 (01953635), Contact, Dustlight 64
EOM 0915, 100 HEQ, 5 WP, 7 KIA (Confirmed), BX 3005

PERIOD 082300 to 092300

2030 FM, D/2/12 (875423), Movement, Sky Merchant
EOM 2327, 21 HEQ, Loud moaning sounds, BX 3252

PERIOD 092300 to 102300

2205 FM, D, E, F/2/12 and 3d Prov (987412), Column of lights, Elite Action
EOM 2320, 366 HEQ, 10 WP, 21 KIA (Confirmed), BX 3481

PERIOD 132300 to 142300

0743 FM, D/2/12 (873387), Active mortars, Coconut Candy 24
EOM 0848, 114 HEQ, Mortars silenced, BX 1047

TAB A

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FROM: DUST LIGHT 64
TO: LITTLE CULL

DURING OUR PRESENT CONTACT WHICH LASTED ALL NIGHT INTO THE FOLLOWING DAY, YOUR THOROUGH COVERAGE ACCOUNTED FOR 7 CONFIRMS AND IN OUR OPINION, MANY MORE PROBABLES.

DELTA GOT CREDIT FOR 7 CONFIRMS BY BODY COUNT: FIRES DELIVERED BY FOX, WHISKEY, AND BEWARE ISOLATED THE BATTLE AREA.

TWO TO FIVE AIR STRIKES WERE CALLED, BUT WE WERE UNABLE TO SORT OUT WHAT DAMAGE WAS DONE BY EACH.

FROM MY POINT OF VIEW, WHISKEY SILENCED 2 OR 3 SNIPERS ON OUR MOST EXPOSED REAR.

FOX STOPPED ANY PROBABLE ASSAULTS BY ITS FIRES IN WHAT WAS LATER DISCOVERED TO BE THEIR ASSEMBLY AREAS AND CP POSITION.

THE TIMELY ILLUMINATION DELIVERED BY ECHO AND BEWARE WAS EXCELLENT.

I'M SURE THE ROUGH BODY COUNT OF 57 KIA WAS DEFINITELY ASSISTED BY THE NUMBER OF TIMES THEY WERE ABLE TO SEE WHAT THEY WERE SHOOTING AT. ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF EXCEPTIONAL TARGET COVERAGE.

IN ITSELF A HIGH BODY COUNT SHOWS THE INABILITY OF THE ENEMY TO DRAG OFF THEIR DEAD.

OVERALL A GREAT SHOW AND OUTSTANDING SUPPORT.

THANK YOU MUCH,
DUST LIGHT 64

TAB B
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