

HEADQUARTERS

2d Battalion, 12th Marines (Rein)
 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 c/o FPO, San Francisco 96602

12th MARINES
 S & C FILES
 LOCAL CONTROL
 No. 550-66

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SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding Officer, 12th Marines

Subj: Command Chronology

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
 (b) DivO 5750.1
 (c) RegtO 5750.1
 (d) Map: Vietnam, 1:50000 AMS Series L701, Sheets
 6460 I, 6461 II, 6559 I, 6559 IV, 6560 II, and
 6560 III

Encl: (1) ✓ Organizational Data Sheet
 (2) ✓ Daily Chronological Report of Significant Events
 (3) ✓ S-1 Matters
 (4) ✓ S-2 Matters
 (5) ✓ S-3 Matters: Tab A - Journal; Tab B - Mission & Ammos Breakdown
 (6) ✓ S-4 Matters
 (7) ✓ Communications - Electronics Matters
 (8) ✓ After Action Report, Operation HASTINGS

1. In accordance with references (a) through (c), the
 August 1966 Command Chronology is hereby submitted as
 enclosures (1) through (8).


 C. S. KIRCHMANN
 LtCol. USMC

No. of Copies 12 Copy No. 2

Enclosure (4)

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA SHEET1. Designation and location

Headquarters

3rd Battalion, 12th Marines (Rein)

3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF

FPO, San Francisco 96602

Location: Coordinates YD 876145, Phu Bai, Republic of Vietnam

Headquarters (Forward)

3rd Battalion, 12th Marines (Rein)

3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF

FPO, San Francisco 96602

Location: Coordinates YD 103573, Cam Lo, Republic of Vietnam

2. Period Covered. 1 August 1966 to 31 August 19663. Battalion Commander and Staff

a. 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines (Rein)

- (1) Major S. M. MORROW 052130/0802 USMC, Battalion Commander, 1 August 1966 to 30 August 1966. Lieutenant Colonel C. S. KIRCHMANN 041767/0802 USMC, 31 August 1966
- (2) Major H. C. SOMERVILLE 060802/0802 USMC, Battalion Executive Officer, 1 August 1966 to 2 August 1966. Major L. W. LARSON 055290/0802 USMC, 3 August 1966 to 31 August 1966
- (3) First Lieutenant M. W. JOHNSON 088880/0802 USMCR, S-1/Adjutant
- (4) First Lieutenant R. R. CRAIG 087751/0802 USMC, S-2
- (5) Major B. N. BITTNER 064637/0802 USMC, S-3
- (6) First Lieutenant J. P. JOHNSON 087863/0802, USMCR, S-4
- (7) Captain G. J. SOMERVILLE 080184/2502 USMC, Communications Officer
- (8) First Lieutenant J. J. MAGNER Jr. 090950/3502 USMCR, Motor Transport Officer
- (9) Second Lieutenant M. M. DUFFY 092190/3002 USMCR, Supply Officer
- (10) Second Lieutenant R. L. PORTER 087133/0803 USMC, Survey Officer
- (11) Second Lieutenant W. E. LEE 093684/2020 USMC, Ordnance Officer

b. Battery Commanders

- (1) Headquarters Battery, 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines (Rein), First Lieutenant R. R. CRAIG 087751/0802 USMC
- (2) Battery "G", 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines (Rein), Captain J. K. OSGOOD 077503/0802 USMC
- (3) Battery "H", 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines (Rein), Captain P. T. SUDMEYER 075679/0802 USMC, 1 August 1966 to 25 August 1966. Captain A. P. BARRY 076825/0802 USMC, 26 August 1966 to 31 August 1966

ENCLOSURE(1)

- (4) Battery "I", 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines (Rein), Captain B. T. CHAMBLESS 064290/0802 USMC
- (5) 107mm Mortar Battery, 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines (Rein), Captain R. A. FURTADO 077663/0802 USMC
- (6) Battery "M", 4th Battalion, 12th Marines (Rein), Captain J. B. WAY 081103/0802 USMCR
- (7) 1st 155mm Gun Battery (-)(Rein)(SP) EMF, Captain W. H. WANTLAND 081341/0802 USMC
- (8) Battery "B", First Battalion, 11th Marines, Captain F. S. CARR Jr 072702/0802 USMC, OPCON 1 August 1966 to 11 August 1966
- (9) Battery "E", 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines (Rein), Captain A. TRENT 070676/0802 USMC, OPCON/ADCON 12 August 1966 to 31 August 1966
- (10) Provisional 155mm Howitzer Platoon, 4th Battalion, 12th Marines (Rein), Captain A. P. BARRY 076825/0802 USMC, 3 August 1966 to 26 August 1966. Officer-in-Charge, First Lieutenant T. R. SIGGIN 090427/0802 USMCR, 26 August 1966, OIC.

4. Average Monthly Strength

58 Officers - 800 Enlisted

ENCLOSURE(1)

DAILY CHRONOLOGY1 August

At 0645H the convoy to Dong Ha departed Phu Bai. The CO of Battery "G" with two howitzers and two gun sections left for Cam Lo in the same convoy.

At 1115H the 1st 155 Provisional Gun Battery fired twenty rounds at twenty VC in an outdoor class, Coord YD733121. The mission was fired in support of recon patrol KELSO. The surveillance was one VC KIA and seven probable KIA.

At 1318H Battery "H" fired thirty-four rounds at a suspected VC ambush, Coord YD 841196. The mission was fired in support of a CAC unit. A sweep of the area was made following the mission. Blood trails and debris were found in the area.

At 1525H the 1st 155 Provisional Gun Battery fired twelve rounds at a VC burial detail, Coord YD 730114. The mission was fired for recon patrol KELSO. The surveillance was two probable VC KIA.

At 1600H the liaison team at Hai Lang was extracted and returned to the CP for resupply. They were scheduled to be inserted again at 020500H.

Battery "I" returned to the 3d Battalion area and was temporarily positioned in the Battery "G" position, Coord YD 872138.

2 August

The liaison team scheduled for insertion at Hai Lang was unable to get aboard a helicopter. The team was rescheduled for insertion at 0600H tomorrow.

Information was received from the 4th Marines that Operation "Hastings" would officially terminate at 031200H August 1966. Units participating could be expected to return to the Battalion area not later than 1800H on 3 August.

At 1600H Major L. W. LARSON reported in to the Battalion for duty as Battalion Executive Officer.

At 2335H the 1st Provisional Gun Battery fired twenty-seven rounds of HE at sixty VC, Coord YD 750085. The mission was fired in support of recon patrol KELSO. There was no surveillance at this time. An aerial observer sweep of the area was scheduled for tomorrow morning.

ENCLOSURE (2)

3 August

The artillery liaison team was inserted at Hai Lang at 0630H.

At 1000H Major H. G. SOMERVILLE departed the CP area for Da Nang.

At 1100H Battery "G" fired fifty-four rounds of HE Quick at ten VC, Coord YD042654. The mission was fired in support of a recon patrol on Operation "Prairie". Surveillance was ten VC KIA probable.

At 1225H Battery "G" fired fifty-four rounds of HE Quick at VC on the move, Coord YD 048649. The mission was fired for a recon patrol on Operation "Prairie". Surveillance was eight VC KIA probable.

At 1400H the Composite Platoon returned to the 1st 155 Provisional Gun Battery position at Coord YD 811160.

At 1745H Battery "G" fired one hundred and two rounds with mixed fuzes at three anti-aircraft guns located at Coord YD 054-672. The mission was fired by an aerial observer. Excellent coverage of target area was the only surveillance given.

Information was passed by the Air Liaison Officer with the 4th Marines that a liaison team would be required at Phu Loc for tomorrow in support of a truck convoy to Da Nang. Battery "H" furnished the team, which consisted of one officer and one enlisted. Insertion occurred at 031830H.

The Battalion returned from Operation "Hastings" at 1845H, with the exception of two 155mm howitzers (towed).

At 2000H the Commanding Officer of Battery "M" notified the Battalion that he would remain over-night at Phu Trach with the two howitzer sections.

4 August

At 0800H the Battalion FDC resumed tactical and technical control of the Battalion Fire Direction Center.

At 1000H the Commanding Officer of Battery "M" arrived from Phu Trach with the two howitzer sections from his battery.

At 1145H the Battalion S-3 directed Battery "H" to displace a platoon of 105mm howitzers to GP #20, Coord YD 930059, to support a recon patrol.

ENCLOSURE (2)

At 1230H Battery "I" fired eighty-two rounds at thirty VC in the open at Coord YD 813112. The mission was fired by observers on OP Crow. The surveillance was good effect on target. During the same period, Battery "B" fired fifty rounds on 15 VC, Coord YD 812108. The mission was fired by an observer on OP Crow, and again the surveillance was good effect on target.

5 August

At 0805 Battery "M" fired twenty-four rounds at VC in the tree line, Coord YD 816117. The mission was called by an aerial observer. There was no surveillance.

At 1000H the Battalion was notified of a requirement to station an artillery liaison team at Phu Loc to support a truck convoy coming from Da Nang on the afternoon of 6 August.

At 1025H Battery "M" fired eight rounds at an un-determined number of VC with white stakes. The VC dispersed before the observer could bring rounds in on target.

At 1140H Battery "M" fired twenty-six rounds at an un-determined number of VC in the underbrush, Coord 816117. The mission was called by an aerial observer. There was no surveillance.

6 August

At 0930H the artillery liaison team was inserted at Phu Loc.

From 1500H to 1600H Batteries "H" and "M" fired a total of two hundred and eighty-eight rounds at a VC platoon, Coord YD 850197. The mission was fired in support of the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines. The observer reported excellent coverage of target with many secondary explosions. An infantry sweep later in the day reported 8 VC KIA by body count.

At 1615H the 1st Provisional Gun Battery fired seven rounds of 8" howitzer HE at VC in the underbrush, Coord YD 700100. The mission was fired in support of recon patrol LION, and the surveillance was three KIA(probable), three WIA(probable).

7 August

Catholic and Protestant religious services were held in the Battalion CP area. The usual Sunday routine was followed.

At 1600H the liaison team returned from Phu Loc.

At 1600H a requirement was received from the 12th Marines S-3

ENCLOSURE (2)

to provide an escort for an ARVN convoy which will be travelling through the TAOR on 8 August 1966.

At 1800H a requirement was received to provide an 0848 Gunnery Sergeant for TAD with the 155mm Howitzer Battery at Dong Ha. Gunnery Sergeant R. Murphy was alerted to go to Dong Ha on 8 August 1966.

8 August

At 0600H Gunnery Sergeant Murphy, Battalion Operations Chief, departed for TAD with the provisional battery at Dong Ha.

At 0930H the first of a series of ARVN convoys was escorted through the TAOR by an FO team from Headquarters Battery.

At 1600H "G" Battery was displaced by 2d Battalion, 4th Marines to the vicinity of Coord YD 092576.

9 August

At 1500H Battery "I" was taken off an alert status for going north to Dong Ha, and the Battery Commander conducted a reconnaissance of Gun Position #20 in anticipation of occupying that position on 11 August.

At approximately 1700H Battery "G" moved to YD 128589 due to tactical reasons.

From 1700H to 1730H two registrations were conducted. An aerial observer was used to register both Battery "M" and Battery "I".

10 August

At 1017H the 1st Provisional 155mm Gun Battery attacked twenty VC in the open at Coord YD 898996. Thirty-six rounds of HE were fired with a recon patrol providing the adjustment. Surveillance given was five KIA probable and 5 WIA probable.

Battery "I" displaced three guns with the Battery FDC to Gun Position #20 to support operations in the Troui Operating Area.

11 August

At 0745 Battery "I" displaced the remaining three weapons to Gun Position #20.

Battery "B", 1st Battalion, 11th Marines left Phu Bai by Rough

ENCLOSURE (2)

At 0330H information from the 4th Marines FSCC was received stating that the Rough Rider northbound had been cancelled until further notice. The Battalion received information from the 4th Marines that a Rough Rider convoy north was scheduled for 0800H on the 16th of August.

16 August

At 0530H the liaison team for the Pho Trach and La Vang ARVN artillery positions was heli-lifted into position to support the Rough Rider northbound.

At 0800H the Command Group of 3d Battalion (fwd) 12th Marines, consisting of the Battalion Executive Officer, the Communications Officer, the Survey Officer, and representatives from the S-2 and S-4, were ready to move by convoy to the Dong Ha/Cam Lo area to participate in Operation "Prairie". Also in the convoy was Battery "H", with two attached 155mm howitzers(towed) from Battery "M".

At 0930H the convoy departed from the Battalion area, arriving at Dong Ha at approximately 1300H with no serious incidents during the road march. The Executive Officer and S-3A conferred with the Commanding Officer and S-3 of the 4th Marines. Meanwhile, Battery "H" was directed to proceed west to Cam Lo and commence occupation of the position selected previously during reconnaissance. This position is on the eastern slope of the finger running from Coord YD 108573 to YD 110577. In order to permit the preparation of a good position, it was decided to initially occupy the low ground to the east while preparing gun and ammo pits and other facilities at the permanent position on the side of the hill, where drainage problems could be averted more easily than on the low ground once the monsoon rains started. Battery "H" was to be on the left(south), Headquarters Battery in the center, and Battery "G" on the right (north).

At 1530H the Executive Officer and S-3A arrived at the position. Liaison was effected with the Commanding Officer of the rifle company assigned to defend our positions, and erection of the camp was commenced. One TD-15 tractor belonging to ARVN and one TD-18 tractor belonging to Marine Engineers were made available for the earth-moving work required. A high degree of cooperation between units prevailed.

By 1715H all pieces were reported "laid and ready to fire."

Initially, Battery "G" would remain in its present position at Cam Lo, Coord YD 119582, and would control all fires of the Bat-

ENCLOSURE (2)

Rider to return to its parent unit at Da Nang.

At 1900H an intelligence report was received from the 4th Marines FSCC stating that IUDs had been located at Coord YD 870977, YD 872970, and YD 871973 containing visible comm wire and antennas. Battery "I" fired zone fire, shell mixed, expending a total of eighteen rounds on each set of coordinates. The first volley fired produced a large secondary explosion which the Battery Commander observed from the Battery position.

12 August

At 1000H Battery "E", 2d Battalion, 12th Marines arrived from Da Nang by Rough Rider to join the Battalion.

At 1500H the Battalion Commander, S-3A, and the Liaison Officer attended a briefing on Operation "Prairie". Reportedly, North Vietnamese troops were increasing their activity to such an extent that it was decided to send additional forces back to the old "Hastings" area. Operation "Pawnee", which had been scheduled off and on for the past four weeks, was still scheduled to go, but no definite date has been set.

13 August

At approximately 0900H Battery "H", two 155mm Howitzers from Battery "M", and an advance command group from the Battalion Headquarters were informed that they would be deploying to the Cam Lo area on the 15th of August.

14 August

At 0530H an advance reconnaissance party for the Battalion Command group going to Cam Lo left by helicopter for the Dong Ha/Cam Lo area. The party included the XO, S-3A, CommO, CO of Battery "H" and the Survey Officer.

At 1540H the reconnaissance party returned from Cam Lo.

At 2115H FDC received a fire request from the ARVN. The mission was for illumination to counter-VC attacking an ARVN position at Coord YD 902187. Four illumination rounds were fired.

15 August

At 0001H the FSCC from 4th Marines informed the Battalion that two US Army advisors had been captured and were now being held in a village at Coord YD 855250. At 0300H an infantry company from the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines was heli-lifted into the village. No contact was made, and no fire missions were requested.

ENCLOSURE (2)

talion. This permitted the Battalion FDC to be completely set up before transfer of control, thus assuring no disruption in the fire support.

At approximately 1730H, three additional artillery tubes arrived in position in the form of a heavy section of three M-48 tanks from "C" Company, 3d Tank Battalion. These were emplaced so as to provide maximum long-range fire and at the same time be available as local defense weapons.

At 1030H an FO team met and escorted an ARVN convoy through the Phu Bai TAOR to Hue. The convoy was met on its return trip at 1500H and escorted to the southern boundary of the TAOR by the FO team.

17 August

At 0630H a land line was laid connecting the Battalion FDC and Battery "G".

At 0700H the Battalion FDC assumed control of all fires in the Cam Lo area.

During the morning the Survey Officer and his team carried control to Battery "Y" at Dong Ha.

At approximately 0900H the S-3A received a frag order for a sweeping operation that kicked off at 0700H.

Work continued on the improvement of the position. At 1400H Battery "G" moved its two 155's to the Battalion position.

The liaison teams that were positioned at Pho Trach and La Vang returned to Phu Bai at 1400H.

18 August

At approximately 1000H the Battalion Executive Officer flew forward with the Regimental Commander to visit the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines.

At 1100H an ARVN Lieutenant reported for duties as Liaison Officer for the 2d ARVN Regiment. He was to coordinate fire support for ARVN operations in the Cam Lo area. After discussing the arrangements with the Battalion Executive Officer and the S-3A, the Lieutenant decided that he could best accomplish his mission of coordinating fires from the ARVN artillery position at Cam Lo.

At 1200H Battery "G" began its move to the new position. By

ENCLOSURE (2)

1800H all of the Battery's howitzers had been moved and were ready to fire.

At 1300H the Battalion Executive Officer visited the Cam Lo detachment and its American advisors.

At 1300H an FO team was dispatched to the 4th Marines S-4, where it received further instructions to accompany an LCU taking some tanks to Dong Ha.

The Battalion S-3 reconned the new Battalion position area in grid square YD 8812.

At 1320H a fire mission was received from the FO with "E" Company, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, who was under mortar attack at Coord YD 992587. The first volley was fired at 1322H. After 3 rounds of 155mm WP, "end of mission" was received. At 1332 the same FO reported incoming mortar fire from Coord YD 966585. The mission was processed, and "on the way" was given at 1334H. At 1335H an air strike was called in and a cease fire imposed upon artillery. The FO complained that the bombs were falling at least four hundred meters away from the target. The S-3A instructed the Liason Officer to get the air strike cancelled so that artillery could again fire on the target. At 1344H the cease fire was lifted and the guns resumed fire. A total of one WP and fifty-five HE rounds were expended on this mission. The FO reported the mortars silenced.

At 1415H the S-3A received word from the Liaison Officer to 2d Battalion, 4th Marines that two VC bodies with weapons had been found in a bunker that had been fired upon earlier in the day by Battery "H" 155 howitzers.

19 August

At 0900H the Battalion Executive Officer helcoed forward to visit the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines.

At 1015H a team of Radio Direction Finder operators from 1st Radio Battalion reported to the S-3A. They are to set up one station within the Battalion (fwd) position.

At 1030H the Battalion Commander visited the area accompanied by the Battalion Sergeant Major.

Improvement of the position continued throughout the day.

At 2305H a fire mission was received by the Battalion FDC (rear) from a Combined Action Company Unit via the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines FSCC. The mission was fired on "many VC in the open" at Coord

ENCLOSURE (2)

YD 945074. Thirty rounds of 105mm howitzer HE were fired with no surveillance. However, following evaluation by the CAC unit's commander, there were an estimated thirty KIA probable.

20 August

At 1100H Battery "I" displaced from Gun Position #20, returned to the Battalion CP(rear) and occupied Battery "B's" vacated position.

At 1230H, 3d Battalion 4th Marines commenced Operation "Ottawa", which was to search the area of YD 9421 to 9816 to 9412 to 9712 for two captured American advisors.

At 1852 a fire mission was received from the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines Liaison requesting countermortar fire at Coord YD 995607. Battalion FDC (fwd) sent "on the way" at 1853H, and the mortars were silenced after 6 WP and 80 HE 155mm rounds were expended.

At 2305 Battery "E" fired a mission for 2d Battalion, 9th Marines at Coord YD 945074 on an undetermined number of VC attempting to remove wounded from a fire fight. Thirty-six rounds of HE were expended. The VC were again fired on at 2340H with twelve rounds of HE at the same location.

21 August

At 0830H an infantry sweep of YD 945074 disclosed much blood and pieces of human flesh. No bodies or weapons were found.

At 0900H church services were held in the Enlisted Club.

At 0930H word was received from 4th Marines FSCC that Operation "Ottawa" had been expanded to include from YD 90 easting south-eastward between the Lagune Del Est and Song Dai Giang to the end of the peninsula.

At 1700H Battery "W" was notified to be prepared to send four guns to Dong Ha to support an ARVN tank/infantry sweep, and to set up in the vicinity of Coord YD 1170.

22 August

An FO school was held from 0730H to 1100H for members of Battery "E" Liaison section and for 4th Marines Recon personnel.

At 0930H Battery "W" sent four guns with crews, less ammunition and prime movers to Dong Ha via C-130's in order to establish a position at YD 113702.

ENCLOSURE (2)

From 1330H to 1500H the S-3A conducted an FO school for two officers from Recon.

At 1400H a high burst registration was conducted by the Battalion FDC for Batteries "G" and "H".

At 1630H all the tanks in the forward position moved out to Cam Lo to prepare for a sweep to be conducted to the north.

23 August

At approximately 0830H the S-3 made liaison with several CAC units and their company commanders to check their artillery requirements and on-call planning.

At 1000H Battery "H's" attached 155mm howitzers moved forward to their permanent pits.

At 1200H a water point was put into operation at the Battalion (fwd) position.

At 1400H an artillery ordnance contact team arrived at the forward position to check on any problems the Battalion might have.

At 1600H four tanks arrived in position and were laid for direction.

At 1720H a registration was conducted for Batteries "E" and "M" by an aerial observer.

24 August

At 0930H an FO team was dispatched to the southern boundary of the TAOR to provide an escort for an ARVN convoy.

At 1300H the forward CP received an order to move all four of the 155mm howitzers(towed) forward to a position approximately 1200 meters west along Highway 9. The Battery "G" Executive Officer was designated as Officer in Charge, and displacement by echelons commenced. By 1700H all guns were ready to fire from their new position.

At 1530H the S-3A received a message from the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines stating that a captured North Vietnamese Army soldier had said that he was a member of a reinforced company entrenched in well-fortified caves north of "the Rock Pile", Coord YD 979559. This company is part of a battalion whose mission was to secure "the Rock Pile" and sweep east and capture Cam Lo. The captive stated that the unit has Chinese advisors, that morale is low, and that he had planned to desert several times before but had been watched too closely.

ENCLOSURE (2)

25 August

At 0630H two liaison teams, each with a scout observer and radio operator, were flown by helicopter to Pho Tach and La Vang to provide liaison between the ARVN artillery at these places and the Rough Rider going north. The Rough Rider departed this area at 0700H for Dong Ha and Cam Lo.

Work continued on the improvement of the unit's forward position.

At 0930H the Executive Officer flew to visit the forward lines of 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, returning at approximately 1015H.

At 1030H an FO team escort was provided for an ARVN convoy which passed through the TAOR.

At 1500H the Battalion FDC(fwd) and living tents were moved to the permanent position. This was accomplished by 1830H.

26 August

At approximately 0330H the Battalion (fwd) position was attacked by an enemy force of at least company strength. The attack came from the east and southeast and was obviously aimed at the FDC and the howitzers. The fact that the FDC had been moved on the previous day was probably one of the factors most favorable to our side.

Initially, small arms and automatic weapons fire and numerous grenades were received by the security rifle company defending the position. A heavy volume of fire was delivered on the attacking force, while the 105mm howitzers provided self-illumination by expending 412 rounds of illumination during the attack.

In spite of the heavy fire and the commitment of a reaction squad composed of members of Headquarters Battery in order to reinforce the line, several of the attackers managed to penetrate the position, placing explosive charges in trailers and tents. Six KIA were sustained by the artillery battalion, while the infantry suffered one KIA. A total of seventy-eight bodies of members of the attacking force were counted in and around the position.

At 1104 Battery "I" departed from this position for Operation "Pawnee", and by 1540 the Battery had set up at Coord ZD 151012.

27 August

At 2030H Battery "I" fired at Coord AU 824061 and AU 820060. Eighteen rounds of HE were expended on each target, which were reported by 3d Battalion, 4th Marines FSCC to be enemy boats. Fire was unobserved and there was no surveillance.

At 2300H, 100 to 150 rounds of small arms and automatic weapons fire were received in the battalion's forward position. Fire was

returned and the 105mm howitzers fired illumination in support of the infantry. An estimated force of 20 to 30 enemy had probed the position. No friendly casualties were sustained and an estimated six enemy KIA (probable) were inflicted. The action subsided by 280200H.

28 August

At 0930H the S-3 flew to Dong Ha/Cam Lo area to remain there for the duration of Operation "Prairie".

Religious services were held at the EM Club during the morning

29 August

At 0220H an outpost in front of Battery "G" position saw some bushes moving to his front. He alerted his buddy that he was going to throw a grenade. At that moment an incoming grenade landed in his hole. He jumped clear of the hole in time and threw his grenade. His buddy received multiple fragmentation wounds and was evacuated by air.

Battalion FDC (rear) provided on-call coverage for Marine advisors with the ARVN, but no missions were fired for them.

At 1500H S-3A returned to the rear CP.

Between 1800H and 1900H Battery "I" fired 272 rounds of shell mixed on suspected VC supply dumps in the vicinity of ZC 1696, but with no observation. Also at 1830H thirty-six rounds of HE were fired on automatic weapons in the vicinity of ZC 1696. Again there was no surveillance given.

30 August

At 1000H two guns from Battery "W" arrived at this unit's Phu Bai position area.

At 1300H Major S. M. MORROW departed from the Battalion's Phu Bai area, turning command of the 3d Battalion, 12th Marines to LtCol. C. S. KIRCHMANN.

31 August

At 0815 the Commanding Officer and S-3A attended a briefing at the 4th Marines CP.

At 1030H the Commanding Officer departed by air for Dong Ha and Cam Lo to establish his Command Post.

At 1600H the four 155mm howitzers at the forward position were pulled back into the main defensive perimeter.

At 1745H Battery "I" fired fifty-eight rounds of HE at 30 VC, Coord ZC 158979. No observation was possible due to the hasty movement of the FO from the target area.

ENCLOSURE (2)

25 August

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Work continued on the improvement of the unit's forward position.

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At 1030H an FO team escort was provided for an ARVN convoy which passed through the TAOR.

At 1500H the Battalion FDC(fwd) and living tents were moved to the permanent position. This was accomplished by 1830H.

26 August

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ENCLOSURE(2)

1. Personnel and Administration

This Battalion has maintained an operating level of personnel at approximately 82% of its authorized T/O strength during the month of August. This figure breaks down as follows:

Officers	80%
Staff NCO's	98%
Enlisted	80%

The Battalion joined 25 personnel of various ranks and MOS's while rotating 59 back to CONUS.

2. Morale and Discipline

The state of morale of the command remained at a high level consistent with the conditions under which the unit served. The R&R program again continued to be the most effective morale booster, although the additional First Quarter Fiscal Year 1967 promotion quotas received also helped to a marked degree.

Nightly movies were presented on an intermittent basis in the Battalion CP area, when the projector was working, and there were three clubs which operated nightly.

Nine non judicial punishments were administered.

Chaplain support was adequate.

ENCLOSURE (3)

S-2 MATTERS

During August 1966 the Battalion S-2 Section was concerned principally with intelligence gathered through target surveillance of missions fired.

On 26 August 1966 the Headquarters Section forward was taken under attack. During this attack the material which normally comprises Enclosure (4) was destroyed, and the S-2 Section was reduced to one person, severely hindering the intelligence capability of the Battalion.

AIR OBSERVATION

During August 1966 the Artillery Air Observer flew forty-eight hours of aerial observation in support of Operations "Hastings", "Prairie" and "Pawnee", of which the latter two are still in progress.

ENCLOSURE (4)

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S-3 MATTERS

TAB A: DAILY JOURNAL

TAB B: MISSION AND AMMUNITION BREAKDOWN

ENCLOSURE (5)
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JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(Classification)

UNIT OR SECTION
S-3.3d Bn, 12th Marines
PLACE
Phu Bai
FROM (Date and hour)
010001H Aug 66 TO (Date and hour)
012400H Aug 66

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO

(Classification)

CONFIDENTIAL
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JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-65 (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(Classification)

UNIT OR SECTION	S-3 3d Bn, 12th Marines	
PLACE	Phu Bai	
FROM (Date and hour)	TO (Date and hour)	
020001H Aug 66	022400H Aug 66	

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO.

(Classification) **CONFIDENTIAL**

DECLASSIFIED

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JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

CONFIDENTIAL
(Classification)

UNIT OR SECTION	S-3, 3d Bn, 12th Marines	
PLACE	Phu Bai	
FROM (Date and hour)	TO (Date and hour)	
030001H Aug 66	032400H Aug 66	

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO

(Classification)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

CONFIDENTIAL
(Classification)

UNIT OR SECTION
S-3, 3d Bn, 12th Marines
PLACE
Phu Bai
FROM (Date and hour)
040001H Aug 66 TO (Date and hour)
042400H Aug 66

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO.

(Classification)
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

CONFIDENTIAL
(Classification)

UNIT OR SECTION	S-3, 3d Bn, 12th Marines	
PLACE	Phu Bai	
FROM (Date and hour)	TO (Date and hour)	
050001H Aug 66	050400H Aug 66	

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO.

Classification

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

CONFIDENTIAL
(Classification)

UNIT OR SECTION
S-3, 3d Bn, 12th Marines
PLACE
Phu Bai
FROM (Date and hour)
060001H Aug 66 TO (Date and hour)
062400H Aug 66

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO.

Classification

(Classification) CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(Classification)

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UNIT OR SECTION

S-3, 3d Bn, 12th Marines

PLACE

Phu Bai

FROM (Date and hour)

TO (Date and hour)

070001H Aug 66

072400H Aug66

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO.

(Classification)

CONFIDENTIAL

54

DECLASSIFIED

JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND B-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

UNIT OR SECTION

S-3, 3d Bn, 12th Marines

PLACE

Phu Bai

FROM (Date and hour)

TO (Date and hour)

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

082400H Aug 66

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO.

(Classification)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

CONFIDENTIAL
(Classification)

UNIT OR SECTION	S-3, 3d Bn, 12th Marines
PLACE	Phu Bai
FROM (Date and hour)	TO (Date and hour)
090001H Aug66	092400H Aug66

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO.

CONFIDENTIAL (Classification)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-G5 (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

UNIT OR SECTION

S-3, 3d Bn, 12th Marines

PLACE

Phu Bai

FROM (Date and hour)

TO (Date and hour)

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(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

UNIT OR SECTION

S-3, 3d Bn, 12th Marines

PLACE -

Phu, Bai

FROM (Date and hour,

TO (Date and hour)

110001H Aug 66

112400H Aug 66

CONFIDENTIAL

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ *(Classification)*

DECLASSIFIED

JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

CONFIDENTIAL
(Classification)

Classification

UNIT OR SECTION
S-3, 3d Bn, 12th Marines
PLACE
Phu Bai
FROM (Date and hour)
120001H Aug66 TO (Date and hour)
122400H Aug66

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO.

~~Classification~~ CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNIT OR SECTION	S-3, 3d Bn, 12th Marines	
PLACE	130001H Aug 66 Phu Bai	
FROM (Date and hour)	TO (Date and hour)	
130001H Aug 66	132400H Aug 66	

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO.

(Classification)

CONFIDENTIAL

50

DECLASSIFIED

JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

UNIT OR SECTION

S-3, 3d Battalion, 12th Marines

PLACE

Phu Bai

FROM (Date and hour)

TO (Date and hour)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO.

(Classification)

CONFIDENTIAL

5A

DECLASSIFIED

JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

UNIT OR SECTION

S-3, 3d Battalion, 12th Marines

PLACE

Phu Bai

FROM (Date and hour)

TO (Date and hour)

150001H Aug 66

152400H Aug 66

CONFIDENTIAL
(Classification)

EDEN

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO.

(Classification)

CONFIDENTIAL

5.A

DECLASSIFIED

JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

UNIT OR SECTION

S-3, 3d Bn, 12th Marines

PLACE

Phu Bai

FROM (Date and hour)

TO (Date and hour)

(Classification) **CONFIDENTIAL**

160001H Aug 66

1624.004 Aug 66

(See reverse side for instructions.)

PAGE NO

Classification

(Classification)
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

UNIT OR SECTION

S-3, 3d Bn, 12th Marines

PLACE

Phu Bai

FROM (Date and hour)

TO (Date and hour)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

170601H Aug 66

172400H Aug 66

(See reverse side for instructions.)

PAGE NO.

(Classification)

(Classification)
CONFIDENTIAL

54

DECLASSIFIED

JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNIT OR SECTION
S-3, 3d Bn, 12th Marines
PLACE
Phu Bai
FROM (Date and hour)
180001H Aug66 TO (Date and hour)
182400H Aug66

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO.

(Classification)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

CONFIDENTIAL

UNIT OR SECTION
S-3, 3d Bn, 12th Marines

PLACE

Phu Bai

FROM (Date and hour)
190001H Aug66

TO (Date and hour)
192400H Aug 66

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO.

(Classification)

(Classification)
CONFIDENTIAL

5.A

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

CONFIDENTIAL

UNIT OR SECTION

S-3, 3d Bn, 12th Marines

PLACE

Phu Bai

FROM (Date and hour)

TO (Date and hour)

200001H Aug 66

202400H Aug 66

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO

(Classification)

(Classification)

54

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

CONFIDENTIAL

UNIT OR SECTION

S-3, 3d Bn, 12th Marines

PLACE

Phu Bai

FROM (Date and hour)

TO (Date and hour)

210001H Aug 66

212400H Aug 66

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO

(Classification)
CONFIDENTIAL

5.9

DECLASSIFIED

JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-65 (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

CONFIDENTIAL

UNIT OR SECTION

S-3, 3d Bn, 12th Marines

PLACE

Phu Bai

FROM (Date and hour)

TO (Date and hour)

220001H Aug 66

222400H Aug 66

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO.

(Classification) CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

UNIT OR SECTION

S-3, 3d Bn, 12th Marines

PLACE

Phu Bai

FROM (Date and hour)

TO (Date and hour)

(Classification)
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification)

DATE TIME
GROUP

INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS

ACTION TAKEN

*M—Maps T—Troops
S—Staff F—File*

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO

(Classification.)

(Classification)
CONFIDENTIAL

59

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

~~(Classified)~~ CONFIDENTIAL

UNIT OR SECTION

S-3, 3d Bn, 12th Marines
PLACE

Phu Bai

FROM (Date and hour)

124.0001H Aug 66

24.24.00H Aug 66

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO.

(Classification)

CONFIDENTIAL.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

UNIT OR SECTION

S-3, 3d Bn, 12th Marines

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Phu Bai

FROM (Date and hour)

TO (Date and hour)

CONFIDENTIAL *(Classification)*

Classification

(See reverse side for instructions.)

PAGE NO

(Classification) CONFIDENTIAL

5.4

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

JOURNAL

NAYMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

CONFIDENTIAL
(Classification)

UNIT OR SECTION

~~PLACE~~ **S-3, 3d Battalion, 12th Marines**

Phu Bai

FROM (Date and hour)

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16 (Bank and board)

202400H Aug 00

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Classification)

DECLASSIFIED

5.9

DECLASSIFIED

JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

CONFIDENTIAL
(Classification)

UNIT OR SECTION

S-3, 3d Bn, 12th Marines

PLACE

Phu Bai

FROM (Date and hour)

TO (Date and hour)

270001H Aug 66

272400H Aug 66

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO.

(Classification)

59

DECLASSIFIED

JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

CONFIDENTIAL
(Classification)

UNIT OR SECTION	
S-3, 3d Bn, 12th Marines	
PLACE	
Phu Bai	
FROM (Date and hour)	TO (Date and hour)
280001H Aug 66	282400H Aug 66

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO

(Classification.)

(Classification)

59

DECLASSIFIED

JOURNAL

NAYMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNIT OR SECTION	
S-3, 3d Bn, 12th Marines	
PLACE	Phu Bai
FROM (Date and hour)	TO (Date and hour)
290001H Aug 66	292400H Aug 66

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO

(Classification)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-GS (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNIT OR SECTION	
S-3, 3d Bn, 12th Marines	
PLACE	Phu Bai
FROM (Date and hour)	TO (Date and hour)
300001 Aug 66	302400 Aug 66

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO.

(Classification)

CONFIDENTIAL

59

DECLASSIFIED

JOURNAL

NAVMC 219-65 (REV. 5-63)
SUPERSEDES 2-52 AND 8-56 EDITIONS WHICH WILL BE USED

CONFIDENTIAL

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UNIT OR SECTION	
S-3, 3d Bn, 12th Marines	
PLACE	
Phu Bai	
FROM (Date and hour)	TO (Date and hour)
310001H Aug 66	312400H Aug 66

(See reverse side for instructions)

PAGE NO

(Classification)

(Classification)
CONFIDENTIAL

59

INSTRUCTIONS FOR KEEPING JOURNAL**1. Heading:****a. Unit or Section:**

- (1) Enter designation of unit if this is a unit journal for regiment, air group, or smaller unit.
- (2) Enter designation of section if this is a section journal maintained by a general staff section.

b. Place: Enter coordinates or name of locality.**c. From:** Enter date, time, and time zone that journal is opened.**d. To:** Enter date, time, and time zone that journal is closed.**2. Body:****a. Time In:**

- (1) Unit Journal. Enter time information is received within unit. In most instances this would be TOR at unit communication center.

- (2) Section Journal. Enter time information is received within section.

b. Time Out:

- (1) Unit Journal. Enter time outgoing information is delivered to addressee. In most instances this would be TOD by unit communication center.

- (2) Section Journal. Enter time outgoing message is delivered to originator's communication center for transmittal, or time information is transmitted by releasing section.

c. Serial No.: Number each entry consecutively as information is received by keeper of journal.**d. DTG:** Enter date/time group of radio message.**e. Incidents, Messages, Orders:**

- (1) Important incidents, messages and orders are recorded as they are made known.

- (2) Although brief, entries must include all vital elements of information, such as what, where, when, how, and who.

- (3) Original entries should not be altered, but should be supplemented or corrected by later entries when necessary.

- (4) A synopsis of written or oral messages is entered in the journal, leaving the full account for the journal file and other supporting documents.

- (5) Oral messages are reduced to writing and processed like written messages.

- f. Action Taken:** This column is used to indicate administrative action taken, such as, routing to cognizant unit staff officer(s), dissemination of pertinent information and/or filing of message. Some of the more common symbols used to indicate action taken are: "M", posted on situation map; "S", circulated to unit staff; "T", information disseminated to troops or subordinate units; "F", filed in journal file.

3. Ending:

- a. Summary:** A brief summary of major activities, with reasons underlying decisions, is entered in the journal at the close of each day. This is written in narrative form under the column entitled "Incidents, Messages, Orders."

- b. Closing:** Journals are closed daily or at the end of periods or phases prescribed by higher authority.

4. Journal File:

- Journal file is considered a part of the journal. It contains messages, orders, records of conversation, and other documents supporting journal entries.

CONFIDENTIAL

MISSIONS FIRED	1st	2d	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	12th	13th	14th	15th	16th
Prep Fires	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
H&L's	47	47	50	79	75	121	125	103	77	130	88	115	136	127	91	88
FFE	0	0	0	12	2	2	2	10	0	5	12	2	2	1	2	0
TOTAL UNCOBS	47	47	50	91	75	123	127	113	77	135	100	117	138	128	93	88
Tgt of Opp	4	0	1	11	2	18	20	11	9	4	3	10	8	4	1	0
Regist.	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Def Conc	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL OBS	4	3	2	11	2	20	20	11	9	4	3	10	8	4	1	0
GRAND TOTAL	51	50	52	102	82	143	147	124	86	139	103	127	146	132	94	88
AMMO EXP																
107HE	27	1	57	24	128	59	144	142	250	27	27	32	70	0	11	21
Illum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
WP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
105HE	87	96	47	979	687	1130	621	759	650	237	290	287	414	707	215	123
Illum	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	4	0	0	0	13	0	4	0	0
WP	0	0	1	3	0	9	0	6	0	0	27	30	9	1	0	0
155HE	0	0	0	221	139	94	117	26	223	86	27	56	173	66	92	99
Illum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	114	30	0	0
WP	0	0	0	0	0	2	4	0	60	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
155G HE	8	10	13	0	12	8	14	20	8	86	12	13	5	14	8	8
Illum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
WP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
87 HOW HE	36	16	43	0	0	7	23	26	4	2	2	5	15	9	7	9
TOTAL	158	123	161	1236	966	1311	923	990	1200	438	398	423	734	827	373	260
MISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF																
4th Mar	0	0	0	0	30	19	28	21	17	22	5	0	27	17	23	18
1/4	21	21	18	32	36	35	33	37	16	34	15	19	17	10	0	0
2/4	12	0	0	33	36	62	54	30	6	56	37	39	26	56	32	0
3/4	14	11	11	26	10	0	0	15	23	17	4	40	38	37	0	0
2/1	0	12	10	11	3	10	13	21	5	8	19	29	0	6	0	0
2/9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	34	70
RECON	4	1	13	0	3	17	18	0	1	12	3	0	6	1	4	0
ARVN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CAO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	51	51	52	102	12	143	146	124	75	149	103	127	138	132	94	88
SURVEILLANCE																
KIA																
WIA																

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CONFIDENTIAL

MISSIONS FIRED	17th	18th	19th	20th	21st	22nd	23rd	24th	25th	26th	27th	28th	29th	30th	31st	TOTAL
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Prep Flies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ESL's	71	39	69	56	53	43	39	47	35	36	84	101	63	74	75	238
FFE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	5	0	1	0	62
TOTAL UNOBS	71	39	69	56	56	43	39	47	35	36	87	107	63	75	75	2450
Tgt of Opp	2	2	0	0	2	1	9	0	4	5	4	33	11	11	6	201
Registration	0	0	0	0	3	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	10
Def Conc	0	0	5	3	0	1	0	3	1	1	7	7	0	3	2	33
Total Obs	2	2	2	3	3	2	11	3	5	6	12	40	11	14	8	216
GRAND TOTAL	73	41	74	59	61	45	60	50	40	42	99	147	74	89	83	2626

AMMO EXP

107HE	24	21	28	24	33	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1095
111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
105HE	81	46	87	62	87	84	90	60	87	74	155	977	251	156	230	9892
111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	274	7	0	17	330
111	0	0	0	0	0	12	0	0	12	6	11	1	54	30	6	227
111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
155HE	63	47	45	54	51	52	57	47	68	55	61	425	37	65	66	2622
111	0	0	0	3	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	158
111	0	8	0	0	0	9	0	2	0	0	11	25	0	0	0	121
155GHE	8	4	13	9	11	6	5	15	2	0	6	8	6	14	9	364
111	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
111	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
GRAND TOTAL	173	126	202	153	189	187	175	129	176	136	248	1725	355	269	328	15096

MISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF

1st Mar	0	9	8	10	6	16	7	3	7	1	4	6	6	11	337	
1/2	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	6	0	94	0	0	0	0	144
1/4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	516
2/1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	5	56	0	34	35	31	417
2/4	55	41	53	46	45	34	26	33	31	30	34	17	26	39	37	651
Recon	2	0	5	4	6	4	6	6	4	0	6	7	8	9	0	161
ARW	0	0	6	0	8	4	2	4	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	26
CAC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	16	13	74	59	61	45	50	50	40	42	99	122	74	89	82	2593

SURVEILLANCE

KIA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
WIA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

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5
6

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~1. Logistics

a. Supply. The problem area of the greatest concern at the present time in the Supply effort is a shortage of qualified personnel. The following breakdown of personnel refers:

MOS	UNIT	RATE/HAVE
3041	3-12	12 / 7
3041	M-4-12	1 / 1
3041	155GUNS	4 / 3
3051	3-12	5 / 5
3051	155GUNS	2 / 1
3041	TOTALS	17 / 11
3051	TOTALS	7 / 6

(1) A fact that further compounds this shortage of personnel is the normal rotation of personnel without replacements. During the next two months a total of 4, MOS 3041, will be lost due to rotation.

b. Maintenance. Overall maintenance remains satisfactory. Motor transport deadline is 12%. Communication deadline is a low 1.7%. The only other maintenance problem is there are presently 2 155MM Howitzers deadlined for 2d echelon repair parts.

c. Food Services. A large part of the battalion has remained in the field resulting in 50% "A" rations fed in the Battalion.

d. N/A

e. N/A

f. N/A

g. Water. This Command obtains its potable water from an engineer operated 4th Marine water point.

h. Motor Transport. The high usage of motor transport equipment in this Battalion is creating minor problems in 1st and 2nd echelon maintenance efforts. High usage repair parts are creating another area of concern due to the number of units supported by this Battalion.

i. Embarkation. Embarkation data for each battery is compiled and held on the battalion level. Encampment garrison is included in the present data.

j. Hospitalization and Evacuation.

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(1) There were 718 treatments of military personnel rendered by the Battalion Aid Station during the month of August and 60 patients were referred to "A" Company, 3d Medical Battalion.

(2) During the reporting period there were six KIA's as follows:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK/SER NO.</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
BEASLEY, James T.	Cpl/2101426	HQ, 3-12
LEWIS, Donald A.	Sgt/1933679	HQ, 3-12
GIBSON, Donald F.	SSgt/586164	HQ, 3-12
WILLIAMS, Arthur P.	PFC/2067352	"H", 3-12
FRYE, Richard A.	Cpl/2015504	"H", 3-12
SCARBROUGH, Arthur B.	PFC/2147263	"H", 3-12

(3) There were also 19 WIA's as follows:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK/SER NO.</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DIAGNOSIS</u>
FERGUSON, Mark T.	Cpl/2012155	HQ, 3-12	Fragments RT Hip & Back Fracture RT Leg
BLAIN, Maurice C.	PFC/2068802	"G", 3-12	Shrapnel wound RT Arm
DOWNS, Charles P.	PFC/2145338	"H", 3-12	Shrapnel RT Shoulder-Left Hand
GRUGGEL, John S. Jr.	2ndLt/092076	"H", 3-12	Fragments Left Shoulder & Hand
HENNING, Doyle W.	LCpl/2087697	HQ, 3-12	Shrapnel Back of Head
HITE, Robert M. Jr.	Cpl/2096119	"G", 3-12	Abrasion Left Cheek
MCFARL, Roy T.	Cpl/1996561	"G", 3-12	Shrapnel Left Elbow
MOSS, Rodney C.	PFC/2135344	"H", 3-12	Shrapnel Left Leg
MCDONALD, George E. II	LCpl/2141742	HQ, 3-12	Shrapnel Both Hands and Right Lower Leg
KOWALYK, William	LCpl/2122016	"G", 3-12	M/W Abdomen, Forehead, Right Wrist, Left Arm
RUTLEDGE, Michael D.	Pvt/2158354	"H", 3-12	Shrapnel Wound Head
MORENO, Mario L.	PFC/2110967	"H", 3-12	Non Penetrating Wound Right Side and Left Hand
LOPEZ, Phillip D.	LCpl/2128020	"H", 3-12	M/W above Rt Eye and Chin
WESTFALL, Barry F.	1stLt/089903	"G", 3-12	Shrapnel Left Wrist
PORTER, Richard L.	2ndLt/087133	HQ, 3-12	Shrapnel Right Leg
BELL, Francis E.	Cpl/1992576	"G", 3-12	Multiple Fragmentation Wounds Both Arms and Legs
SIKO, Raymond J.	Cpl/2032793	HQ, 3-12	Shrapnel Left Leg
GALLOWAY, Jerry P.	LCpl/2059667	155GUNS	Dropped round on Rt hand during fire mission
SCHLACTER, John P.	PFC/2078651	"G", 3-12	Wound, Lac. 5th digit Rt Hand

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COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS MATTERS1. Scheduled Projects; Period 1 - 31 August 1966.

- a. Relocation of Message Center/Crypto Center.
- b. Relocation of wire and radio storage space.
- c. Completion of Comm bunker(Message Center/Crypto Center).
- d. Erection of permanent antenna system.
- e. Complete refurbishing of Tech Shop

2. Accomplishments. "a" and "b" of the above were completed except for small final improvements; there was little change in "c" from the last report (90% complete), its yet requiring final sand bags and more protective wire; "d" and "e" were delayed because of lack of personnel due to committments to Operations "Hastings" and "Prairie". Antenna masts have been fabricated from ammo canisters to replace RC-292's at Phu Bai, releasing those antennas for use at Cam Lo.

3. Lessons Learned. Operation "Prairie" has caused the splitting of the Comm Section between the forward and the rear CP's in order to meet the Section's committments at both installations. This has been accomplished through a slight augmentation of personnel and equipment from the firing batteries at both installations. In previous operations ("Jay", "HOLT", and "Hastings") the majority of the Comm Section went to support the operations, leaving a small house-keeping contingent in the rear. In our present situation more can be accomplished at both ends by splitting the Section, which leaves a larger force in the rear to complete projects necessary for the operation of the CP through the monsoon season.

ENCLOSURE (7)
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HEADQUARTERS
 3d Battalion, 12th Marines (Rein)
 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 c/o FPO, San Francisco 96602

3/BNB/rr
 03480
 4 August 1966

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, Task Force Delta

Subj: Combat After Action Report

Ref: (a) 4th Regt 3120.3B
 (b) Task Force Delta Frag 0 1-66

Encl: (1) Daily Chronology of Events
 (2) Table of Ammunition Expenditures, Types of
 Missions Fired, and Casualty Assessments

02166

1. In compliance with references (a) and (b), the following Combat After Action Report is submitted for the 3d Battalion, 12th Marines (-) (Rein).

2. Code Name. HASTINGS

3. Dates of Operations. 15 July to 3 August 1966.

4. Location. Operation "Hastings" took place in the north eastern portion of Quang Tri Province. Area A was bounded on the east by Route #1, on the north by the DMZ, on the west generally by easting grid line 10, and on the south by Route #9. Area B was bounded on the east generally by grid line 10, on the north by the DMZ, on the west generally by easting grid line 93, and on the south by Route #9. Area C was bounded by Route #9 on the north and west, on the south generally by northing grid line 45, and on the east generally by easting grid line 09.

5. Command Headquarters. Task Force Delta

6. Task Organization.

UNIT

COMMANDING OFFICER

3d Bn. 12th Marines (-) (Rein)

Maj. S. M. MORROW

Headquarters Battery

Capt. G. J. SOMMERVILLE

3/BNB/rr
03480

4 August 1966

UNITCOMMANDING OFFICER

Battery "H"

Capt P. T. SUDMEYER

Battery "I"

Capt B. T. CHABLESS

Battery "B", 1stBn, 11th Marines

Capt F. S. CARR

Battery "F", 2dBn, 11th Marines

Capt J. E. HARRIS

Battery "L", 4thBn, 12th Marines

Capt John POWERS

Battery "M", 4thBn, 12th Marines

Capt J. B. WAY

107mm Mortar Btry, 1stBn,

Capt R. J. GRAHAM

11th Marines

7. Intelligence. Intelligence sources indicated that the 324th North Vietnam Army Division had infiltrated into the area of operations. The mission of the 324th was to destroy the 1st ARVN Division and liberate Quang Tri Province, commencing the 20th of July. Terrain in the area ranged from low rolling hills with scrub brush to very steep terrain with a heavy overhead canopy.

8. Mission. The 3d Battalion, 12th Marines (-) (Rein) mission was to provide direct support to Task Force Delta, the ARVN Airborne Division, and to provide reinforcing fires to the 1st ARVN Division Artillery.

9. Concept of Operation. Initially, two batteries of 105mm howitzers and two 155mm howitzers were to be located in the vicinity of Cam Lo (YD 1157) to support Task Force Delta's operations in Area B and to reinforce the fires of the 1st ARVN Division Artillery in Area A and the ARVN Airborne Division in Area C. One 105mm battery was placed at D-5 (YD 0951) to provide direct support to the ARVN Airborne Division operating in Area C.

10. Execution

a. See enclosure (1) for a daily chronology.

3/BNP [REDACTED]
03480
4 August 1966

b. GFT Settings. During the early stages of the operation it was impossible to conduct any registrations. On 19 July a high burst registration was conducted for all 105mm howitzer batteries. The small range and deflection corrections determined by these registrations explained the reason why "closed stick" computations had been so accurate during the early stages of the operation. Throughout the remainder of the operation, due to the met effect cancelling the VE and drift effect, no GFT setting was used.

c. Artillery Thrust Lines. Two artillery thrust lines were established. They were used by forward observers for the purpose of position reporting.

d. Survey. All artillery battery position areas were surveyed from a common battalion SCP. This SCP was located at a map inspected road junction. Directional control was originated from an astronomic observation of the sun.

11. Results. Total KIA confirmed credited to artillery was 109 and probable KIA was 50. Interrogation of prisoners indicated that artillery fire was a major factor in lowering the morale of their units.

12. Administrative Matters

a. Supply. Except for Battery "I" and the 107mm Mortar Battery which received unit distribution, all supply was handled by supply point distribution. As a general rule all classes of supply were maintained at a satisfactory level, and supply support throughout the operation was excellent to outstanding.

b. Maintenance. The high state of maintenance of the ordnance equipment was due primarily to the availability of ordnance contact teams and the 12th Marines Regimental Ordnance Officer throughout most of the operation. Through their efforts an outstanding job was done in maintaining the maximum number of howitzers in firing condition at all times.

In the case of the 155mm howitzer (towed) M 114A1, more adequate Class II, Type II repair parts are needed in the supply system to support this weapon. With the large number of rounds fired, a high maintenance tempo was required. Due to the lack of adequate parts, locally fabricated parts were obtained to maintain weapons in a firing condition.

3/BNB/rr
03480
4 August 1966

c. Medical. A total of 23 Marines were evacuated from the Battalion units without any difficulties. These included 2 DOW, 8 WIA, and 22 non-battle casualties.

d. Civil Affairs. A civil affairs program was conducted in two villages in the Cam Lo area and a Catholic mission in Dong Ha. A MEDCAP program with about 300 villagers receiving treatment was conducted; however, the program was limited, due to the lack of supplies. All batteries participated in the program. Two local barbers were employed to cut hair for all batteries.

e. Transportation and Movement

(1) Headquarters Battery. An advance element of the Battalion Headquarters was flown by C-130 to Dong Ha on 13 July along with organic transportation. On 14 July, Hq displaced to Cam Lo to establish the Bn position area. The Bn Hq (-) moved by Rough Rider on 14 and 15 July to Cam Lo. The Bn Headquarters returned to Phu Bai by Rough Rider on 3 August.

(2) Battery "H". Battery "H" was positioned in Cam Lo as part of Task Unit Charlie on 22 June 1966 by Rough Rider. Upon arrival of the advance element of the Bn Headquarters, the battery joined the advance element in the newly selected battalion position area. The battery returned to Phu Bai by Rough Rider, echeloning elements over 30, 31 July and 1 August.

(3) Battery "I". Battery "I" was flown by C-130 to Dong Ha without prime movers on 13 July. On 15 July the btry was lifted by helicopter to D-5 located at YD 095530. On 25 July, upon withdrawal of the ARVN Airborne Division, the btry was helicopter-lifted to a new position area in the vicinity of the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines. On 2 August the battery was helicopter-lifted to Dong Ha where it was joined by its prime movers which had been brought from Phu Bai by Rough Rider. The battery returned to Phu Bai by Rough Rider on 2 August.

(4) Battery "G". Battery "G" was moved to Cam Lo by Rough Rider, echeloning elements over three days (30, 31 July and 1 August). The battery initially took the same position as was vacated by Battery "H", but on 2 August, the battery was moved to a new position at YD 128588 for Operation "Prairie".

3/BM
03480
4 August 1966

(5) Battery "B". Battery "B" moved to Cam Lo by Rough Rider on 14-15 July with the Battalion Headquarters (-). The battery returned to Phu Bai by Rough Rider on 3 August.

(6) Battery "M". Battery "M" was flown to Dong Ha with its prime movers on 13 July. On 14 July the battery moved to Cam Lo with the advance elements of the Battalion Headquarters where it set up its position area within the Battalion position area. On 17 July the battery was moved to a new position at YD 098573. On 2 August the battery moved back into the battalion position area and on 3 August moved, less one platoon attached to Battery "G", with the Battalion Headquarters by Rough Rider back to Phu Bai.

(7) Battery "L". Battery "L" was flown to Dong Ha with prime movers on 15 July and then moved overland to Cam Lo to setup in the Battalion position area. On 1 August the battery moved to Dong Ha where it was flown by C-130 to Da Nang. One platoon of 155mm howitzers were left in Dong Ha as a detachment under the Op con of Battery "G".

(8) 107mm Mortar Battery. The Mortar Battery was flown to Dong Ha from Da Nang on 16 July. On 17 July the Battery was Helicopter-lifted into the vicinity of the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines (YD982562), and they subsequently were attached to the infantry battalion. On 29 July the Battery was lifted out by helicopter and then flown to Da Nang by C-130.

(9) Battery "F". Battery "F" was Helicopter-lifted from SLF shipping into the Battalion position area on 18 July. On 29 July the Battery was helicopter-lifted back aboard SLF shipping.

f. Communications.

(1) Radio. Extensive use was made of radio during the operation. At the peak point in the operation, five conduct of fire nets were in use supporting seven USMC infantry battalions and the three airborne battalions of the ARVN Airborne Division. In order to support this amount of radio communications, it was necessary to pool the assets of subordinate batteries. The Battalion was able to accomplish this since the bulk of the Battalion's batteries were located in a common Battalion position area. Extensive use was made

3/BNB/rr

03480

4 August 1966

of the radio set AN/PRC-25, which performed in an excellent manner. However, due to the lack of field remote equipment for the AN/PRC-25, the radios had to be located in close proximity to one another, causing mutual interference between radio sets. This situation necessitated special coordination of radio operators within the FDC, reducing the efficiency of the nets significantly during peak traffic periods. The introduction of remoting equipment for the AN/PRC-25 will solve this problem.

(2) Wire. Wire was used primarily for internal communications within the battalion. One trunk line to Task Force Delta was established in addition to one hot line to the Task Force Delta FSCC. A minimum of maintenance was required to maintain the wire system established. Telephones were at a premium since a rear command post at Phu Bai was maintained and local security phones were needed to support the infantry company attached to provide security to the battalion.

(3) Communications Security. A special radio team from the 12th Marines was sent to the battalion with a radio set AN/MRC-83 and an on-line crypto capability. This team was used to send daily situation reports to the 12th Marines Headquarters. This eased the comm-crypto guard responsibility of Task Force Delta.

13. Special Techniques

a. H&I Center. In order to handle the large volume of H&I missions and still answer promptly all calls for fire, an H&I center was established. This Center was an extension of the Battalion Fire Direction Center and manned 24 hours a day by Battery "F". A special phone was emplaced from the Task Force Delta FSCC to the H&I Center so that all H&I's were phoned directly to the H&I Center for processing. After processing, the H&I's were delivered to the battalion FDO for spot checking and transmittal to the batteries for subsequent firing.

b. H&I Clearance. The normal practice for handling H&I sav-a-planes during the night is to submit one sav-a-plane covering the entire H&I program. Thus, when a requirement existed for a resupply or med-evac at night, it was necessary to cease fire on all H&I's. Consequently, a system of dividing the entire operating area into four zones and then submitting four sav-a-planes was developed.

3/BNB/rr
03460
4 August 1966

Using this system certain portions of the operating area could still receive H&I concurrently with resupply and med-evacs.

c. Multiple Mission Handling. On many occasions during this operation more than two missions were processed at the same time requiring a system of keeping each of the different missions separated. To do this the concentration number assigned the mission was used to precede all radio transmissions and commands within the FDC. This provided an identity to what would otherwise not have been meaningful communications.

14. Commander's Analysis.

a. Fire support coordination during this operation functioned more efficiently than on any other operation since the Battalion has been in Phu Bai. In order to insure timeliness of supporting arms it is mandatory that one centralized agency have the authority to clear all missions. To be capable of clearing missions promptly, it is necessary that all information of a tactical nature be made available to that clearing agency.

b. A very heavy work load was placed on radio communications during the operation, with five conduct of fire nets operating simultaneously in a satisfactory manner. With the introduction of the radio set AN/PRC-25 a significant improvement was made over the radio set AN/PRC-9; however, until the remote equipment for these radios is made available the full potential will not be realized.

c. With five batteries of artillery centralized with technical fire direction in the Battalion Fire Direction Center, it is possible for one battalion FDC to handle multiple missions if two FDO's are on duty. During this operation, when more than three missions were in progress, the Battalion S-3 handled missions as an FDO in addition to the regular FDO.

d. By maintaining a centralized technical fire direction capability at the battalion level, maximum control and flexibility was maintained in addition to reducing the cost of men and equipment.

3/BNB/rr
03480
4 August 1966

e. Due to the heavy volume of H&I's fired into enemy territory, it appears that VC/NVA soldiers don't always recognize observed missions when they are in progress if the initial rounds impact at a distance that is harmless, and tend to be complacent with artillery fire until it gets on target. One incident occurred on the 28th of July which is described in enclosure (1). Recon patrols have reported this complacency on other occasions.

15. Recommendations.

a. That maximum efforts be made to complete the provisioning of the new family of radio equipment (AN/PRC-25).

S. M. Morrow

S. M. MORROW

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DAILY SUMMARY OF EVENTS3/BNB/rr
03480
4 August 196610 July

The Bn S-3 was called to the 4th Marines area to be briefed on an upcoming operation. At 1700H the S-3 briefed the ~~Bn~~ staff and battery commanders on the operation. Known as Operation "Hastings", it was to commence the following day, 11 July. Batteries "H", "I", "M", and "B" would participate along with others yet to be designated. "Hastings" would be a combined ARVN, USMC operation in the Dong Ha, Cam Lo area. The designated batteries prepared to road march to the objective area on 11 July 1966.

11 July

At 110020H a request for rules of engagement in case of hostile artillery or mortar fire from the DMZ was sent to the 12th Marines.

At 110400H word was received from the 4th Marines that a bridge at coordinates YD461399 had been dynamited by VC. The battalion was notified of the plan to transport Batteries "I" and "M" to Dong Ha via fixed wing aircraft. A request for six 105mm helo slings was made at the same time.

12 July

At 0800H the battalion commander made a reconnaissance of the CP site and gun positions at Cam Lo in conjunction with the Commanding Officer, 4th Marines.

At 0900H the battalion S-3 attended a planning conference at the 4th Marines CP, concerning alternate transportation to the "Hastings" area.

Battery "M" commenced moving personnel and equipment to the Phu Bai airstrip for transportation to Dong Ha via fixed wing aircraft at 1100H.

At 1130H Battery "I" moved to the Phu Bai airstrip for further transport to Dong Ha via fixed wing aircraft. An advance party of the battalion survey section accompanied the air-lifted batteries and upon arrival put in a hasty position area survey in the Dong Ha area (YD 116579) for the night, since the batteries were not to move to Cam Lo until the following day.

ENCLOSURE (1)
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3/BNB/rr
03480
4 August 1966

At 1700H the Battalion CO, the Battalion S-3A, and the Battalion FDC section departed Phu Bai for Dong Ha via fixed wing aircraft.

At 1900H the Battalion S-3 attended a planning conference at the 4th Marines CP, concerning the latest developments on "Hastings".

13 July

At 0730H Headquarters Battery and Battery "B" joined a convoy of other elements of Task Force Delta for movement to the Operation "Hastings" area. No problems were encountered until approximately 0930H when the convoy arrived at the SongOLan River Bridge at YD 459400. This bridge had been destroyed by VC a few days before and an ARVN ferry was the only means available to cross river. The procedure was very slow allowing only two vehicles to cross the river approximately every ten minutes. Consequently, due to the large numbers of vehicles in the convoy (68) plus the ARVN vehicles that were required to cross the river, the complete convoy did not finish crossing the river that day and set up a defensive position in the vicinity of the firing site. The Battalion S-3 and CommO effected liaison with the District Headquarters at Hai Lang (YD 418481). No incidents occurred during the night.

At 0800H the Battalion S-3A attended a briefing in Dong Ha at the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines CP. Plans were made to move the Task Force Delta CP and elements of the 3d Battalion, 12th Marines into Cam Lo on the afternoon.

At 1030H the advance elements of Battery "L" started to arrive at Dong Ha. The Battery Commander requested to stay at Dong Ha until all the battery's equipment and personnel had arrived.

At 1430H the Task Force Delta Headquarters Commandant led the convoy to Cam Lo. The Battalion Commander pointed out the battery position areas and occupation of the area was begun. Priority was given to putting in the tactical wire.

Battery "H", who had been positioned at Cam Lo in support of Task Unit Charlie since 22 June 1966 was displaced to a new position area within the battalion perimeter at YD 114578. This move was complete by 1800H.

ENCLOSURE (1)
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DAILY SUMMARY OF EVENTS3/BNB/rr
03480
4 August 196610 July

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ENCLOSURE (1)
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3/BNB/rr
03480
4 August 1966

Battery "M" was designated as the Battalion FDC until such time as complete communications were established and the rest of the battalion arrived in position.

At 1800H Battery "L" arrived in the Battalion area and occupied a position at YD 115575. Survey was completed by 1830H for all three batteries.

14 July

At 0730H the remainder of the convoy had crossed a floating bridge over the Song O Lau River after the ARVN worked most of the night constructing it. The convoy moved out at this time for Dong Ha arriving there without incident at 1030H. At 1130H after receiving new infantry security the Headquarters Battery and Battery "B" moved out on Route 9 for Cam Lo arriving at 1150H without incident.

Battery "B" was shown its position area and occupied immediately at YD 117577. All batteries continued to improve position areas.

15 July

At 0725H prep fires were commenced for the landing of the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines. At 0855H prep fires were commenced for the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines. In both cases 20 minutes of prep fires were given, expending 780 rounds of mixed caliber artillery ammunition.

Light contact was made during the morning. During the afternoon a number of observed missions were fired with the most significant mission being fired by an AO at 1840H who fired on a NVA squad in the open at YD 050653. Thirty-eight rounds of 105mm howitzer HE were expended, killing 6 NVA confirmed.

At 1030H the battery commander of the 107mm Mortar Battery reported to the Battalion CP to announce the arrival of his battery with four 4.2" mortars in Dong Ha from Da Nang. The mission initially given the battery was to provide artillery support in defense of the Dong Ha military facilities. The battery was decentralized for technical control and centralized for tactical control. Two more 4.2" mortars were to be flown from Chu Lai to bring the shooting strength of the battery up to six tubes.

ENCLOSURE (1)
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3/BNB/rr
03480
4 August 1966

At 1400H Battery "L" apprehended 2 VC's observing their position. They were taken to the Task Force Delta CP for interrogation.

16 July

At 0630H K Co, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines reported in contact with "many" NVA soldiers. Battery "B" expended 101 rounds of HE. Surveillance was 12 to 13 KIA probables.

During the afternoon numerous unobserved missions were fired based on intelligence. In the early evening hours Force Recon inserted an OP "Night Sticker" at YD 979559 on Hill 264. At 1858H "Night Sticker" fired three observed missions on NVA soldiers in the tree line and open at YD 996564. 82 rounds of 155mm Howitzer ammunition were fired killing a confirmed 33 NVA soldiers.

At 2155H K Co., 3d Battalion, 4th Marines reported in heavy contact and surrounded. Battery "B" fired 65 rounds at YD 037637 with excellent effect on target silencing all small arms fire. Forward observer passed his personal "Thank You" for getting them out of a tight spot.

At approximately 1300H Lt McMullen, an FO with G Co., 2d Battalion, 4th Marines was killed while engaged with the enemy.

17 July

At 0630H Battery "M" displaced to a new position area at YD 098573 in order to extend the artillery fire capability to the west, where it could more adequately support the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines and Recon patrols. Contact during the day was very light and no significant missions were fired.

At 1430H the 107mm Mortar Battery displaced by helo to YD 984563 in support of the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines. The battery was attached to the battalion.

18 July

At 0600H the battalion fired a preparation for the helo landing of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines. One-hundred and two rounds of 105mm howitzer ammunition were expended.

ENCLOSURE (1)
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CONFIDENTIAL

3/BNB/rr

03480

4 August 1966

At 1030H the advance party of Battery "F", 2d Battalion, 11th Marines arrived by helicopter led by the battery commander, Captain J. E. HARRIS. The Battalion Commander and S-3 briefed Captain HARRIS on the situation and instructed him to occupy the position area recently vacated by Battery "M" at YD 116579. At 1115H the main body of the battery began arriving. One sling supporting one of the Battery's 105mm howitzers broke one of its cables, causing the howitzer to land with the muzzle pointing straight down. By skillful maneuvering of the CH-46 aircraft and the prompt and effective action on the part of the battery personnel on the ground, the piece was landed with no damage to it or to the aircraft.

At 1230H Battery "F" reported ready to fire.

Throughout the day the volume of fire placed on the enemy was high with the bulk of fire going to the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines. Commencing around 1520H the battalion was processing multiple missions with the peak volume coming from 1900H to 2300H. During this time as many as five missions were handled by the fire direction center with maximum responsiveness and efficiency. Although no confirmed casualties were given in surveillance. Later interrogation of company commanders involved in the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines action revealed artillery had done an excellent job and caused many casualties, but the exact number was unknown.

19 July

Throughout the day the Battalion continued to fire at a high rate. At 1220H a 257 round prep fire was commenced in support of the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines.

At 1330H a precision registration was fired using Battery "B".

The Battalion was visited by the Commanding Officer of the 12th Marines during the afternoon.

Due to the heavy volume of H&I missions that were being received by the infantry battalions in the field, the Battalion S-3 decided to establish an H&I center as a branch of the battalion FDC. Battery "F" was designated to man the center on a 24 hour basis. The H&I center functioned in a completely separate FDC and computed all H&I's for all batteries. Upon computation of the H&I's, the completed data was brought to the Battalion FDO where it was spot checked and then transmitted to the batteries.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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3/BNB/rr
03480

4 August 1966

20 July

Throughout the day a large number of observed missions were fired. At 2015H a VC mortar position which was attacking the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines was attacked with 36 rounds of 105mm howitzer ammunition. This mission silenced the mortar located at YD 041649. At 2135H the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines reported being fired on by automatic weapons. Seventeen rounds of 155mm howitzer ammunition were fired, silencing the fire, which was coming from YD 010605.

At 2200H Battery "M" reported a premature burst of a 155mm howitzer round approximately 10 feet from the muzzle. PFC Ernest D. MITCHELL, 2168571/0811 U.SMC DOW. Cpl Patrick H. DENT, 1973549/0844 USMC WIA.

21 July

A heavy volume of observed fire was continued throughout the day. At 2100H a Battalion TOT was fired on the 803rd Regimental Command Post at YD 020622. One-hundred and seventy-one rounds were expended on this target. The source of the intelligence was a prisoner who was captured from the regiment.

22 July

A heavy volume of fire continued to be requested by all infantry battalions; however, there were no missions of any significance.

23 July

At 0300H a member of Battery "F" on a security outpost shot and killed another outpost member. The dead Marine was from "M" Company, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines and was assigned as part of the artillery battalion perimeter security. He had gone forward of the outpost to bed down without notifying all other members of the guard.

ENCLOSURE (1)
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3/BNB/rr
03480
4 August 196624 July

At 0035H intelligence sources revealed the location of three NVA unit command posts. These targets were attacked with 65 rounds of 155mm howitzer ammunition.

At approximately 1400H, 100 to 150 rounds of small arms and automatic weapons fire were received in the Battalion area. The infantry company acting as security returned fire and captured two VC's. One Vietnamese girl, aged 11, was killed in the exchange. No Marine casualties were sustained.

At approximately 1430H one of the forward observers with 3d Battalion, 5th Marines reported his company pinned down. Nineteen rounds were delivered by Battery "M" upon which the FO's remarked on the beautiful effect on target and the fact that the company was able to get out of the area. Throughout the evening, numerous counter-mortar missions were fired which resulted in silencing the mortars, and on different occasions secondary explosions were observed.

25 July

At approximately 0130H three missions were fired on VC harbor sites and suspected mortar positions. Three secondary explosions were reported by the observer.

At 1400H the new 4th Marines Regimental CO, Colonel CEREGHINO, visited the Battalion CP as well as the firing batteries.

At 2100H 96 rounds of mixed calibers were delivered on a reported supply cache.

Extremely strong winds were experienced by the Battalion throughout the night. Extensive damage to canvas was sustained.

26 July

During the morning hours some three hundred and forty-eight rounds of 105mm were expended on area neutralization fires in support of the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines.

At 1615H Captain A. P. BARRY, Regimental S-2, arrived with two 155mm howitzers (towed). He was attached to "L", 4/12 for the duration of the operation. Another officer and 2 more howitzers were scheduled to arrive the following day.

At 1700H the Battalion received a message from CG, 3d Marine Division directing the expenditure of 4000 rounds of

ENCLOSURE (1)
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3/BNB/rr
03480
4 Agusut 1966

artillery per day.

At approximately 2200H a grenade exploded near the perimeter wounding a member of Battery "F" slightly. Origin of the explosion was never determined. The wounded Marine returned to outpost duty.

At 1830H, 324 rounds of 105mm ammunition were fired on NVA radio stations which had been located by very current intelligence.

27 July

At 0800H a preparation was fired for 3d Battalion, 5th Marines. A total of 390 rounds were expended on this mission.

At 1400H Captain MCNEAL arrived with two more 155mm howitzers (towed). The officer was assigned to Battery "L" while two howitzers were turned over to Battery "M".

A TD-15 tractor also arrived in the Battalion area. It was to be used to improve the individual battery positions by constructing gun pits and ammunition storage pits.

At 1450H intelligence sources located an NVA radio station at YD 153541, and 108 rounds of 105mm hwotizer ammunition were fired at the target.

Colonel READ, Commanding Officer of the 12th Marines, visited the battalion at 1500H.

28 July

At 0645H a high angle mission was fired at 2 NVA soldiers crossing a stream at XD 923528. During the adjustment, 5 more NVA soldiers appeared in the location. It appeared to the recon patrol, who was adjusting the fire, that the artillery fire did not bother the NVA soldiers since they kept walking as nothing had happened. When fire for effect was called in, the artillery was right of target. The recon patrol noted 3 NVA KIA and 2 WIA. In fire for effect, 5 volleys of a 105mm howitzer battery were fired. During the firing at least 45 more NVA soldiers appeared in the area. More artillery was called in with excellent effect on target, and still more NVA soldiers appeared. At this point the recon patrol counted over 75 NVA soldiers in the impact area. The NVA soldiers were trying to remove their wounded and dead. There seemed to be mass confusion as more and more artillery was brought in. The recon patrol was unable to get an exact count of the

ENCLOSURE (1)
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3/BNB/rr
03480
4 Agusut 1966

dead and wounded but observed at least 58 KIA and possibly more. The patrol could count at least 150 NVA soldiers, and they estimated that there could be 200 more. When air came on station, they attacked the target, and the patrol moved out of the area so the air strike could be called in.

At 1130H a mission was fired at an NVA radio site located in the vicinity of YD 053643. One-hundred and eight rounds of 105mm howitzer ammunition was expended on this target.

The major effort in the Battalion went towards the improvement of the battery position areas. Battery "M" dug its gun and ammunition pits with the aid of the newly arrived TD-15.

29 July

At 0800H Battery "F" was helo-lifted from its position area back to the SLF ships. At 1000H the Mortar Battery was helo-lifted to the Dong Ha airstrip for return to its parent organization.

Battery "L" continued to improve its position by building gun and ammunition pits with the TD-15 tractor.

No contact was made during the day, but the volume of H&I's was ordered to be high to keep the NVA units off balance.

30 July

At 0655H a 72 round TOT was fired by Batteries "B" and "H" on a NVA bivouac area at YD 0156 reported by 2d Battalion, 1st Marines.

Improvement of the positions was continued. Battery "B" completed construction of their gun and ammunition pits with the aid of the TD-15.

At 1300H two guns of Battery "G" arrived in position thus commencing the relief of Battery "H". Two guns of Battery "H" departed at 1500H for the Phu Bai area.

ENCLOSURE (1)
CONFIDENTIAL

-9-

(8)

CONFIDENTIAL

3/BNB/rr
03480
4 August 196631 July

Catholic and Protestant services were conducted during the day in the battalion area. During the morning hours three missions were fired based on intelligence information reported from the Task Force Delta G-2. Two-hundred and nineteen rounds of mixed caliber were fired on three targets located at YD 022637, 147502, and 147507.

At 1000H the remainder of Battery "G" headquarters and 2 more gun sections arrived in the battalion position area. At 1100H the remainder of Battery "H" headquarters and 2 gun sections left for Phu Bai with a Rough Rider.

Information was received that Battery "L" would depart on 1 August for Da Nang by fixed wing aircraft. Battery "I" was alerted to be prepared to move by helo to the Dong Ha air strip and for a further transportation by Rough Rider to Phu Bai at 1530H.

1 August

The Battalion S-3 and Commanding Officer, Battery "G", went on a recon for a new battery position to be occupied during Operation "Prairie". A location at YD 128588 was chosen. Immediately after the recon development of the position commenced.

At 0900H Battery "I" was helo-lifted to Dong Ha. One 105mm howitzer was moderately damaged in the move when it was dropped from a height of 10 feet.

At 1900H the last two guns from Battery "H" left by Rough Rider for Phu Bai. At 1015H Battery "L" commenced departing by air for Da Nang.

Information was received at 1830H that Operation "Hastings" would secure at 031200H, and the Battalion would return to Phu Bai on that day.

2 August

At 0900H the Battalion Commander reconnoitered the Dong Ha area for a position area for the two 155mm hwotizers to be positioned in that area.

ENCLOSURE (1)
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3/BNB/rr
03480
4 August 1966

Throughout the day work was continued in the new Battery "G" position area with the Battery moving into the position at 1400H.

Battery "M" sent the two Battery "L" 155mm howitzers to Dong Ha to occupy that position area at about 1300H. The position area chosen was located at YD 248596.

At 1730H the remaining weapons of Battery "M" moved from their position area into the Battalion perimeter.

3 August

At first light all batteries which were to displace to Phu Bai by Rough Rider commenced preparation for the move. By 1100H all units were ready to move; however, the convoy including the 4th Marines Headquarters, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, and other elements of the 4th Marines were not ready to leave until 1430H. The Rough Rider trip to Phu Bai was slow and uneventful with the Battalion arriving at 1900H.

ENCLOSURE (1)
CONFIDENTIAL

-11-

(8)

CONFIDENTIAL

MISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF	15th	16th	17th	18th	19th	20th	21st	22nd	23rd	24th	25th	26th
4th Mar	23	51	6	39	78	22	21	43	22	14	40	39
3/4	98	27	6	117	30	32	17	0	0	0	0	0
2/4	20	32	30	24	6	35	61	48	34	43	63	3
Recon	3	12	2	12	8	18	3	7	10	3	2	8
3/12	5	1	1	1	4	1	2	0	6	1	0	0
2/1	0	30	56	54	117	139	125	118	104	177	71	107
Air	0	0	3	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1
3/5	0	0	1	26	22	18	29	20	16	25	24	29
ARVN	0	0	0	8	15	15	11	0	24	27	29	0
1/1	0	0	0	0	0	15	16	17	7	6	18	24
2/9	0	0	0	0	0	0	21	37	10	31	29	20
TOTAL	149	153	111	281	280	294	306	290	234	327	276	223

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ENCLOSURE (2)

AMMO EXP	107HE	WP	ILL	105HE	WP	ILL	155HE	WP	ILL	107HE	WP	ILL
107HE	0	0	155	146	606	361	482	416	346	810	553	465
WP	0	0	4	40	76	0	10	0	41	41	0	0
ILL	0	0	1	0	29	92	4	6	25	51	14	17
105HE	1033	1350	602	1129	782	776	1100	814	710	1206	1011	2172
WP	27	36	174	34	38	172	156	107	213	291	314	224
ILL	0	0	0	0	19	49	9	12	39	4	0	0
155HE	752	569	209	534	350	531	436	769	655	952	1468	659
WP	31	25	43	4	20	49	20	24	22	122	51	52
ILL	0	107	10	0	0	8	0	59	0	0	0	9
TOTAL	1843	2087	1198	1887	1920	2038	2217	2207	2051	3477	3411	3598

MISSIONS FIRED	Prep Fires	H&I	FFE	TOTAL UNOBS	Target of Opp	Regis	Def Conc	TOTAL OBS	GRAND TOTAL				
Prep Fires	57	12	13	23	7	1	4	18	4	13	6	10	
H&I	56	103	41	201	213	231	217	206	163	238	164	182	
FFE	0	11	3	0	0	8	16	14	6	0	17	9	
TOTAL UNOBS	113	126	57	324	220	240	237	238	173	251	187	201	
Target of Opp	25	25	16	54	48	59	60	42	31	73	76	21	
Regis	0	0	0	1	5	2	0	0	6	5	0	1	
Def Conc	11	2	3	2	6	3	9	12	7	0	1	10	
TOTAL OBS	36	27	19	57	59	64	69	54	44	78	77	32	
GRAND TOTAL	149	153	76	281	279	304	306	292	217	329	264	233	
SURVEILLANCE	KIA (Conf)	6	33	2	0	4	0	1	1	0	2	0	2
	KIA (Prob)	0	13	6	5	4	3	2	3	4	4	0	0

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE (2)

8

MISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF	27th	28th	29th	30th	31st	1st	2nd	TOTAL
4th Mar	45	77	168	208	131	94	106	1227
3/4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	328
2/4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	405
Recon	7	3	2	0	0	3	3	106
3/12	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	26
2/1	90	75	17	29	131	0	0	1440
Air	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
3/5	6	71	12	0	0	0	0	299
ARVN	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	131
1/1	24	25	25	0	0	0	0	157
1/3	4	8	19	29	0	0	0	208
2/9	16	15	0	0	0	0	0	31
TOTAL	193	279	243	267	262	97	109	4364

AMMO EXP

107HE	384	435	0	0	0	0	0	5159
WP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	212
ILL	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	241
105HE	1409	2073	827	2138	2360	1006	531	23034
WP	276	112	322	119	21	4	297	3127
ILL	26	8	2	0	65	0	0	233
155HE	413	338	480	1216	529	299	146	11305
WP	6	0	5	251	0	10	0	735
ILL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	193
TOTAL	2514	2973	1636	3724	2975	1319	974	44239

MISSIONS FIRED

Prep Fires	10	3	0	0	0	0	1	182
H&I	149	234	238	261	242	94	106	3339
F&E	8	17	0	2	0	0	0	111
TOTAL UNCS	167	254	238	263	242	94	107	3632
Targets of Opp	20	22	4	2	4	3	1	586
Regis	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	21
Def Conc	6	3	0	2	0	0	0	77
TOTAL OBS	26	25	4	4	4	3	2	684
GRAND TOTAL	193	279	242	267	246	97	109	4316

SURVEILLANCE	KIA(Conf)	0	58	0	0	0	0	109
	KIA(Prob)	5	0	0	0	0	0	50

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