

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS
1st Battalion (Rein), 13th Marines
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

0014391

6/AN/ceb
5750
4 June 1968
Ser: 006A15868

~~SECRET~~ (Unclassified Upon Removal of Enclosure (1))

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: (1) Commanding General, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade
(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 May 1968 to 31 May 1968 (U)

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8

Encl: (1) Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted herewith.

A. Novak
A. NOVAK

Copy to:

Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division
Commanding Officer, Twelfth Marines
Commanding General, 1st Marine Division
Commanding Officer, Eleventh Marines

~~SECRET~~ (Unclassified upon
Removal of Enclosure
(1))

LCN: 00806

COPY 1 OF 12 COPIES

~~SECRET~~

MAY 1968

PART IV

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

*Filed
ref* { TAB "A" - 5th 155 Gun Battery (SP) (-) (Rein) Command Chronology for
period 1 - 31 March 1968

- TAB "B" - Battery "K", 4th Battalion, 12th Marines Command Chronology
for period 1 - 31 March 1968

✓ TAB "C" - A/RPT (OPN SCOTLAND)

Page // of 2/ pages

ENCLOSURE (1)

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS
1st Battalion(Rein), 13th Marines
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

Command Chronology

1 May 1968 to 31 May 1968

Index

- Part I -Organizational Data
 - Part II -Narrative Summary
 - Part III -Sequential Listing of Significant Events
 - Part IV -Supporting Documents
 - ✓TAB-A - BTRY K-12TH MAR
 - ✓TAB-B - 5TH-155 mm GUN BTRY
 - ✓TAB-C - Operation RICE After Action Report
- } Filed
Sep

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. Designation

1st Battalion, 13th Marines

Commander

Lt.Col J.A. HENNELLY
 1May68-23May68
 Lt.Col A. NOVAK
 24May68-31May68

Subordinate UnitsAdministrative ControlHeadquarters Battery, 1st Battalion,
13th Marines

1stLt J. W. HUGHES, Jr

5th 155 Gun Battery (SP) (Rein)

Maj E. B. BEALL

Battery "K", 4th Battalion, 12th Marines

Capt P. M. BURTON

Operational ControlHeadquarters Battery, 1st Battalion,
13th Marines

1stLt J. W. HUGHES, Jr

Battery "A", 1st Battalion, 13th Marines

Capt V. B. SNIDER

Battery "B", 1st Battalion, 13th Marines
5May to 17 May 1968

Capt J. C. UECKER

Battery "C", 1st Battalion, 13th Marines
1 May to 19 May 1968

Capt W. J. O'CONNOR
 1May68-6May68
 Capt M. F. SHASKI
 7May68-31May68

1st Provisional 155 Howitzer Battery,
3d Battalion, 12th Marines
17 May to 19 May 1968

Capt W. K. LAW

Battery "A", 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery
3 May to 5 May 1968

Capt. WATSON

Detachment, Mortar Battery, 2nd Battalion,
13th Marines
27 May to 31 May 1968

1stLt T. BERRY

2 Guns, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines
27 May to 31 May 1968

1stLt ABBY

~~SECRET~~

Detachment, 238th Field Artillery (Radar)
1st Battalion, 40th Artillery
3 May to 17 May 1968

SP 5 C. OGDEN

2. Location.

Headquarters Battery, 1st Battalion,
13th Marines

Quang Tri, RVN
1May68-18May68
Danang, RVN
19May68-31May68

Battery "A", 1st Battalion, 13th Marines

Hard Core, Quang Tri, RVN
1May68-18May68
Danang, RVN
19May68-31May68

Battery "B", 1st Battalion, 13th Marines

Quang Tri, RVN
5May68-17May68

Battery "C", 1st Battalion, 13th Marines

LZ Sharon, Quang Tri, RVN
1May68-17May68
Danang, RVN
18May68-19May68

1st Provisional 155mm Howitzer Battery,
3d Battalion, 12th Marines

Quang Tri, RVN
17May68
Danang, RVN
18May68

Detachment, Mortar Battery, 2d
Battalion, 13th Marines

Danang, RVN
27May68-31May68

2 Guns, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines

Danang, RVN
27May68-31May68

5th 155 Gun Battery (SP) (-) (Rein)

LZ Sharon, Quang Tri, RVN
1May68-31May68

1st Platoon, 5th 155 Gun Battery (SP)

Cam Lo (C-3), RVN
1May68-31May68

"8" Platoon

Ca Lu, RVN
1May68-28May68
Khe Sanh, RVN
29May68-31May68

Battery "K", 4th Battalion, 12th Marines

Camp Carroll, RVN
1May68-31May68



3. Staff Officers

Executive Officer

Maj R. W. CAMPBELL
1May68-11May68Maj R. P. GREEN
12May68-28May68

S-1

Capt B. D. NICHOLAS

S-2

1stLt. L. M. PALM
1May68-2May68

S-3

Maj G. R. HOUCHIN

S-4

Capt J. P. ROGERS

4. Average Monthly Strength

	USMC		USN		USA	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
Hq Btry, 1st Battalion, 13th Mar	14	132	2	3	-	-
Battery "A", 1st Battalion, 13th Mar	9	123	0	2	-	-
Battery "B", 1st Battalion, 13th Mar	6	105	0	2	-	-
Battery "C", 1st Battalion, 13th Mar	9	120	0	2	-	-
5th 155 Gun Battery (SP) (-) (Rein)	9	185	0	5	-	-
1st Prov 155mm How Battery	4	75	0	2	-	-
Battery "K", 4th Battalion, 12th Mar	4	120	0	3	-	-
Detachment 238th Arty (Radar), 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery	-	-	-	-	0	7
Battery "A", 1st battalion, 40th Art	-	-	-	-	4	40
Detachment, Mortar Battery, 2nd Battalion, 13th Marines	1	24	0	1	-	-
2 155mm How (TOWED), 4th Battalion, 11th Marines	0	14	0	0	-	-

PART II

UNCLASSIFIED

COMMANDERS NARRATIVE

During the period 1 May to 17 May 1968, the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines, consisting of Headquarters Battery, Battery "A", and Battery "C", participated in Operation Rice under OPCON of the 12th Marines.

At 030400Z May 1968, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines assumed OPCON of Battery "A", 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery and Detachment, 238th Field Artillery (Radar), 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery, USA.

At 050700Z May 1968, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines dropped OPCON of Battery "A", 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery and at 051200Z May 1968, the Battalion assumed OPCON of Battery "B", 1st Battalion, 13th Marines. At this time, the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines was assigned a mission of direct support of the 26th Marines and of providing and coordinating the defensive fires for Headquarters Battalion, 3d Marine Division, in defense of the Quang Tri Airfield. Battery "I" and 2nd Provisional Battery (-), 3d Battalion, 12th Marines provided reinforcing fires to 1st Battalion, 13th Marines in defense of the Quang Tri Airfield. The 5th 155mm Gun Battery (SP) reinforced the fires of 1st Battalion, 13th Marines during this period; a total of 227 rounds were fired by this unit.

On 10 May 1968, the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines fired 193 rounds in support of the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines as they were operating in the vicinity of Quang Tri City. A subsequent sweep of the area revealed 14 enemy KIA which were credited to the artillery.

At 170400Z May 1968, the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines assumed OPCON of the 1st Provisional 155mm Howitzer Battery (4 tubes) and chopped OPCON of Battery "B", 1st Battalion, 13th Marines to the 3d Battalion, 12th Marines.

At 170715Z May 1968, OPCON of 1st Battalion, 13th Marines was passed to the 11th Marines. At this time the Battalion consisted of Headquarters Battery, Battery "A" and Battery "C", 1st Battalion, 13th Marines and 1st Provisional 155mm Howitzer Battery, 3d Battalion, 12th Marines. The 11th Marines assigned the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines the mission of direct support 26th Marines who were initiating Operation MameLuke Thrust.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

At 190400Z May 1968, OPCON of the 1st Provisional 155mm Howitzer Battery was passed from 1st Battalion, 13th Marines to 4th Battalion, 11th Marines, and OPCON of Battery "C", 1st Battalion, 13th Marines was passed to the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines.

On 21 May 1968, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines fired 74 rounds in support of 3d Battalion, 26th Marines as they conducted offensive operations in the vicinity of Hill 502. A subsequent search of the area revealed 18 enemy KIA which were credited to the artillery.

At 230400Z May 1968, LtCol A. NOVAK assumed command of 1st Battalion, 13th Marines, relieving LtCol J. A. HENNELLY.

At 262330Z May 1968, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines assumed OPCON of Detachment, Mortar Battery, 2nd Battalion, 13th Marines and at 270100Z May 1968, the Battalion assumed OPCON of two (2) 155mm Howitzers (TOWED) from 4th Battalion, 11th Marines.

At approximately 1000, 28 May 1968, the vehicle in which the Battalion Executive Officer was riding struck a mine; the Executive Officer was killed instantly.

Ammunition expended for the month of May is as follows:

<u>MISSIONS</u>			<u>AMMUNITION</u>			
<u>OBS</u>	<u>UNOBS</u>	<u>INTELLIGENCE(H&I)</u>	<u>105</u>	<u>155</u>	<u>4.2</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
201	147	2095	13,417	878	616	14,911

Friendly casualties during the month were:

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA(serious)</u>	<u>WIA(non-serious)</u>
2	10	3

Enemy casualties during the month credited to artillery:

KIA(C)
41

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

PART III

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

- 3 May 1968 Assumed OPCON of Battery "A", 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery and Detachment, 238th Field Artillery (Radar), 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery, USA
- 5 May 1968 OPCON of Battery "A", 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery chopped. OPCON of Battery "B", 1st Battalion, 13th Marines assumed.
- 10 May 1968 The 1st Battalion, 13th Marines fired 193 rounds in support of 3d Battalion, 26th Marines as they operated in the Quang Tri City area.
- 17 May 1968 1st Battalion, 13th Marines assumed OPCON of 1st Provisional 155mm How Battery (TOWED), and chopped OPCON of Battery "B", 1st Battalion, 13th Marines and CMR Detachment, 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery.
- OPCON of 1st Battalion, 13th Marines assumed by 11th Marines.
- 1st Battalion, 13th Marines assigned a mission of direct support of the 26th Marines.
- 19 May 1968 OPCON of 1st Prov 155mm How Battery (TOWED) passed to 4th Battalion, 11th Marines.
- OPCON of Battery "C", 1st Battalion, 13th Marines passed to 3d Battalion, 11th Marines.
- 21 May 1968 1st Battalion, 13th Marines fired in support of the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines as they operated in the vicinity of Hill 502.
- 23 May 1968 Command of the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines assumed by LtCol A. NOVAK.
- 26 May 1968 1st Battalion, 13th Marines assumed OPCON of Detachment, Mortar Battery, 2nd Battalion, 13th Marines and two 155mm Howitzers, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines.
- 28 May 1968 1st Battalion, 13th Marines Executive Officer killed in mining incident in the vicinity of Hill 41, Danang, RVN.

HEADQUARTERS
1st Battalion, 13th Marines
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

B71168

3/GRH/rjb
11 Apr 1968
Ser: 003A10768

SECRET

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 26th Marines

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation Scotland

Ref: (a) DIVO 3100.1D

1. Code Name. Scotland
2. Date of Operation. 012400H Nov67 to 310800H March 1968.
3. Location. Khe Sanh, Huang Hoa District, Quang Tri Province, RVN.
4. Task Organization.

a. OPCON UNITS

- (1) Headquarters Battery, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines.
1 November 1967 to 31 March 1968.
- (2) Battery "A" (Rein), 1st Battalion, 13th Marines.
1 November 1967 to 5 January 1968.
- (3) Battery "A", 1st Battalion, 13th Marines.
5 January to 31 March 1968.
- (4) Battery "B", 1st Battalion, 13th Marines.
21 January to 31 March 1968.
- (5) Battery "C" (Rein), 1st Battalion, 13th Marines.
1 November 1967 to 5 January 1968.
- (6) Battery "C", 1st Battalion, 13th Marines.
5 January to 31 March 1968.
- (7) Detachment Mortar Battery, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines.
1 November to 9 November 1967.
- (8) Mortar Battery, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines.
9 November 1967 to 31 March 1968.
- (9) Battery "I" (-), 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines.
1 November to 9 November 1967.
- (10) 1st Provisional 155 Howitzer Battery (Rein), 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines.
5 January to 31 March 1968.
- (11) Detachment, 238th Field Artillery (RADAR), 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery.
22 January to 31 March 1968.

COPY 3 OF 14 COPIES

LCN: 00788

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

TAB-C

113

AFM RPT (OPM SCOTLAND)

1 NOV 1967-31 MAR 1968

SECRET**5. Supporting Forces.**

The 2nd Battalion, 94th Artillery, U.S. Army headquartered at Camp Carroll, RVN, provided 175mm Gun reinforcing fires during Operation Scotland. The support provided resulted from almost daily requests for reinforcing fires with an average ammunition expenditure of 155 rounds per day.

6. Intelligence. See After Action Report for Operation Scotland, 26th Marines.

7. Missions.

a. The missions assigned to the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines were:

(1) To provide mortar and howitzer fire for both long range and close in support for the defense of the Khe Sanh Combat Base, and hills 881S and 861.

(2) To support 26th Marines ground elements in tactical operations within the area of operation.

(3) To support the defense of the U.S. Special Forces Camp at Lang Vei by close-in defensive fires, counter mortar fires and support of relief forces.

(4) To deliver effective counter mortar/rocket fires against enemy units in the 26th Marines area of operation.

(5) To deliver harassing and interdiction fire on designated target areas within the 26th Marines area of operation.

(6) To deliver antimechanized fires as required.

(7) To provide defensive fire support to hill 950 as required.

(8) To provide planned fires in order to isolate any penetration of the Khe Sanh Combat Base.

(9) To support by fire, a counterattack on hills 881S, 861 and 950.

8. Concept of Operations.

a. Centralized control of all artillery firing elements in the 1st Battalion, 13th Marines Fire Direction Center. Integrate the Gun Direction Computer (FADAC) in order to provide rapid computerized firing data.

b. Coordinate supporting fires with infantry and reconnaissance units under the operational control of the 26th Marines.

c. Establish liaison communications with support elements in order to provide meteorological data.

d. Conduct survey operations in order to establish directional control and accurate locations for all firing elements and observation sites on a common grid system.

e. Establish a Battalion observation post on hill 950.

f. Ensure complete cross training of artillery personnel within sections. Institute programs of instruction in fire adjustment for reconnaissance personnel and in artillery procedures for infantry personnel.

g. Develop artillery support plans for the defense of the Khe Sanh Combat Base, Combat outposts on hills 861, 881S and 950, the U.S. Special Forces Camp at Lang Vei and the Ruong Hoa District Headquarters.

SECRET

**DECLASSIFIED
SECRET**

(4) On 21 December 1967, three 155mm Hows from Battery "C" (Rein) were displaced to a position on the western side of the Khe Sanh Combat Base to provide increased range in support of operations conducted by 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines. On 24 December 1967, the three weapons were returned to Battery "C" (Rein) firing positions.

(5) At 1700, 5 January 1968, with the arrival of the command group, the 1st Provisional 155 Howitzer Battery (Rein) was established. Work commenced on the position located at XD 8409 4178 in preparation for receipt of the 155 Hows located in the Battery "A" and Battery "C" positions.

(6) On 16 January 1968, two 4.2" mortars located with Battery "C" were relocated with Mortar Battery (Rear) at grid 8431 4157. Movement of these weapons provided centralization of four 4.2" mortars at one position, alleviating many fire direction problems and allowing greater weapon density.

(7) On 17 January 1968, the six 155mm Hows that had been positioned with Battery "A" and Battery "C" were relocated to the prepared position at XD 8409 4178.

(8) On 18 January 1968, One 105mm How from Battery "C" was displaced to the rifle range to demonstrate the firing technique to employ the XM 546 "Bechive" projectile.

(9) At 0500, 21 January 1968, the Khe Sanh Combat Base received a heavy rocket and mortar attack. The attack hit one of the two ammunition storage areas causing extensive damage. Battery "C", 1st Battalion, 13th Marines, located within 200 meters of the ammunition storage area, received considerable damage. As a result, the three 105mm How from Battery "C", were displaced to Battery "A" position area. With nine weapons, "A" Battery was then divided into two firing units of four and five weapons respectively.

(10) On 21 January, ~~OFCON~~ of Battery "D", 1st Battalion, 13th Marines was assumed. On arrival, the Battery was displaced at XD 8403 4174. On 22 January "D" Battery relocated and occupied the old Battery "C" position. Ammunition bunkers, gun positions and personnel bunkers were repaired and on 22 January 1968, the three Battery "C" Hows were displaced back to join Battery "D" at which time a Battery Group was established.

(11) On 22 January 1968, a Counter Mortar-Rear Detachment of the 238th Field Artillery (Radar), 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery, U.S. Army arrived and was emplaced within the Khe Sanh Combat Base.

c. Coordination and Centralized Control.

(1) Coordination was effected with the Battalion Fire Support Coordination Centers of 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines, 2nd Battalion, 26th Marines, and 1st Battalion, 9th Marines upon their arrival at the Khe Sanh Combat Base on 13 December 1967, 17 January 1968, and 22 January 1968 respectively. Liaison was continued with the 2nd Battalion, 94th

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

- h. Develop a rapid response capability to counter enemy mortar and rocket attacks.
- i. Establish and or improve firing positions within the Khe Sanh Combat Base and on hill 861 and 881S.
- j. Conduct timely registration to develop and maintain accurate firing data.
- k. Maintain a 6400mil fire capability at all times.

9. Execution.

a. The 1st Battalion, 13th Marines commenced participation in Operation Scotland with OPCON of Battery "A"(Rein), Battery "C"(Rein), and Detachment Mortar Battery; 1st Battalion 13th Marines and Battery "I" (-), 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines. Batteries "A" and "C" were each reinforced with two 155 Howitzers (Td).

3. Displacements:

(1) On 2 November, 12th Marines Message 020430Z Nov67 was received stating the intention to return Mortar Battery (-), 1st Battalion, 13th Marines from Camp Evans, RVN to 1st Battalion, 13th Marines at Khe Sanh, and return Battery "I" (-), 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines, to Camp Carroll, RVN. Planning commenced where by three 105mm Hows from Battery "C" (Rein), 1st Battalion, 13th Marines would be heli-lifted to hill 881S as replacement weapons for the three 105mm Hows of Battery "I" (-), when that unit displaced to Camp Carroll. With this exchange of weapons, the three vacant 105mm How positions at Battery "C" (-), would be utilized as gun positions for the three 4.2" mortars returning with Mortar Battery (-), 1st Battalion, 13th Marines. Planning was completed, and on 9 November 1967 the exchange occurred. At 091730Z November 1967, OPCON of Battery "I" (-), 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines was changed to 12th Marines and at 091740Z November 1967, OPCON of Mortar Battery (-), 1st Battalion, 13th Marines was assumed by 1st Battalion, 13th Marines. On 9 November 1967, Battery "C"(Rein) 1st Battalion, 13th Marines had three 105mm How emplaced on hill 881S and three 105mm How emplaced within the Khe Sanh Combat Base. Mortar Battery, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines had two 4.2" Mortars and one 107mm Howstar located on hill 861 and three 4.2" Mortars emplaced within the Battery "C" (Rein) position.

(2) On 2 December 1967, one 4.2" mortar was brought down from hill 861 and together with one 4.2" mortar from the Battery "C" position, the 2 weapons were emplaced at XD 8431 4157. At this time, one 4.2" mortar and 107mm Howstar remained on hill 861, two 4.2" mortars remained in the Battery "C" position, and two 4.2" mortars were located in the new position.

(3) On 14 December 1967 two 155mm Hows of 1st Provisional Battery, 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines arrived at Khe Sanh Combat Base and were placed under OPCON, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines, however, ADCON remained with 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines. One weapon was positioned with Battery "A"(Rein), 1st Battalion, 13th Marines and the other with Battery "C"(Rein), 1st Battalion, 13th Marines. With the addition of these weapons, each Battery was reinforced with three 155mm Howitzers.

SECRET

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

f. Artillery Fire Support Plans:

(1) In November 1967, defensive fire planning for the Khe Sanh Combat Base continued with the selection of 4.2" mortar positions on the eastern and western sides of the Combat Base. When completed, 4.2" mortars within these positions improved the close-in defensive fires for the Combat Base. During November, defensive fire plans were modified to include Forward Operating Base #3.

(2) On 6 January 1968, a forward observer was sent to the U.S. Army Special Forces Camp at Lang Vei to register defensive fires for the Camp. These defensive fires were completed by 11 January 1968. Defensive fires for the Huong Hoa District Headquarters at Khe Sanh were also completed on 11 January.

(3) On 13 January 1968, the Artillery defensive fire plan for hills 881S, 861, 950, and the Combat Base was approved. By 15 January 1968, the close-in defensive fires had been registered.

(4) During the period of Operation Scotland, defensive fires were modified and re-registered as necessary.

g. Counter Mortar/Rocket Response:

(1) The counter mortar/counter rocket plan was revamped in January 1968 in order to provide a more responsive reaction plan. A summary of this revised plan is as follows:

(a) Initially provide counter mortar fire in all eight sectors assuming the origin of incoming mortars will be hardest to detect and no direction is immediately available.

(b) Subsequently, when an AZ has been determined, saturate the sector from which enemy fire is being received in order to cause the enemy to cease fire, with the possibility of neutralizing the firing position and/or ammunition storage areas.

(c) Keep the enemy under continuous fire both in the firing position and during the extraction period.

(d) Mass all mortar and artillery weapons on the specific target grid when sufficient data is reported by observation agencies.

h. Improvement of firing positions:

(1) With the arrival of an additional 155mm How and 27 personnel on 5 January 1968, the establishment of a 155mm Howitzer Battery (Rein) was feasible. Concrete firing pads, gun positions, and ammunition bunkers were attacked and continued improvement occurred throughout the operation.

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

Artillery, headquartered at Camp Carroll, RVN, to provide 175mm Gun reinforcing fires and meteorological data for the Khe Sanh Combat Base.

(2) The 1st Battalion, 13th Marines Fire Direction continued centralized tactical and technical control of all firing units.

d. Survey and Observation Posts:

(1) On 16 March 1968, survey was completed to the Detachment 3rd Tanks at Khe Sanh Combat Base. This action placed tanks on a common grid with all artillery units and provided the opportunity to use the tank in the indirect fire role.

e. Artillery Training.

(1) Four forward observer schools were conducted during the month of November 1967, to train replacement personnel from Company "B", 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion. Adjustment of fire was emphasized and training missions from hill 8819 were conducted. A forward-observer school was presented to the U.S. Army Forward Operating Base #3 on 26 November 1967. The instruction included target location, the initial fire request, and projectile-fuze combination and effects. Adjustment procedures were emphasized during a firing problem.

(2) On 12 December 1967, a six-day school commenced to train personnel of the 26th Marines and attached units in artillery forward observer fundamentals and procedures. The school consisted of formal classroom instruction followed by a practical application period where students adjusted artillery fire. By 20 December 1967, 87 personnel had been trained.

(3) A two-day school commenced on 21 December 1967, to train personnel from 3rd Platoon, Company "B", 3rd Tank Battalion in fundamentals and procedures for indirect fire. Classes on the aiming circle and laying the tank for direction were followed by periods of application. Fire direction techniques were studied and drills conducted. Instruction and application periods continued to enable the Tank Battalion to provide increased long range artillery support in conjunction with the Artillery Battalion.

(4) On 19 January 1968, one 105mm How from Battery "6" Forward (Hill 881) demonstrated the firing technique to employ the XM 546 "Beehive" projectile. Section Chiefs of the guns and representatives of infantry units observed the performance of the new projectile.

(5) On 30 March 1968, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines, conducted a six-hour course of instruction for 15 members of Forward Operating Base #3. This period consisted of instruction on the Initial Fire Request and subsequent corrections.

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

(2) In Mid-January 1968, numerous revetments were dug as protection for the Battalion vehicles.

(3) On 21 and 24 January 1968, heavy rocket and mortar attacks occurred in the vicinity of Battery "C" position area. Damaged areas resulting from attacks were rebuilt and improvement of overhead cover was emphasized. Improvement of fighting holes and underground living bunkers continued throughout the Battalion.

(4) 4 new bunker for the Fire Direction Center was completed in Mid-February and this section was relocated.

(5) During February 1968, living and ammunition bunkers were built within the 1st Provisional Battery area to replace the temporary structures constructed when the Battery displaced during the middle of January 1968.

(6) The 1st Battalion, 13th Marines position areas were improved considerably during the month of March. Due to increased availability of ammunition cases, canisters, and other building materials, numerous below-ground bunkers were completed and gun positions and ammunition bunkers improved. Increased use of available tractors assisted in the personnel bunker building program and provided the opportunity to increase the serviceability of vehicles through the digging of vehicle revetments. These improvements were hampered considerably during January and February due to tractors being inoperative much of the time. These tractors were worn out in service due to work required in building the Khe Sanh Combat Base airfield and the rock quarry.

1. Maintenance of Firing Data

(1) The Gun Direction Computer was employed an average of 1200 hours per month during the period of Operation Scotland. Through the use of the computer, GPT settings were computed three times daily for all Batteries and charges from meteorological data provided by 2nd Battalion, 94th Artillery, U.S. Army, Camp Carroll, RVN.

(2) Throughout the months of November, January, February, and March, registrations were conducted to update muzzle velocities for all Batteries and all charges. In between registrations, rounds were fired at survey net check points to insure the capability to maintain mass the fires of the Battalion.

(3) In addition to the computer, a manual "back-up" solution to the gunnery problem was maintained at all times throughout the 6400 mil capability.

(4) Six rounds of selected ammunition projectile, M444, were fired to ascertain accuracy of projectile when fired at short ranges (less than 2000 meters).

SECRET

SECRET10. Results.a. Friendly Personnel Losses, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines:

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA (Serious)</u>	<u>WIA (Non-serious)</u>
18	64	74

b. Enemy Personnel Losses:

<u>KIA (C)</u>	<u>KIA (P)</u>	<u>WIA</u>
345	92	29

c. Enemy Weapons Destroyed:Mortars: 6, MG 1

7

d. Enemy Weapons Captured: 0e. Secondary Explosions: 204f. Bunkers Destroyed: 27g. Structures Destroyed: 3011. Adequacy of Administrative Plans.

a. The administrative plans for Operation Scotland as published were adequate however, the tactical situation changed to such a degree that planning was conducted on a day to day basis. The Battalion, during the first portion of Operation Scotland, was short of personnel in the firing Batteries (ADCON to 3rd MARDIV). The Battalion was able to carry out its assigned mission by providing each Battery with personnel from the Headquarters Battery (ADCON to 9th MAB) even though the administrative responsibility belonged to Battalions of the 12th Marines. As the tempo of the operation increased all firing Batteries were brought up to T/O strength and were maintained at that level throughout the operation. No significant problems were encountered once the personnel situation stabilized.

b. When the transportation situation permitted, during the early phase of Operation Scotland, the supply of equipment and material from support elements located far removed from Khe Sanh was adequate and the Battalion received fairly good service on requisitions. When the tactical situation became one of increasing enemy presence, transportation for normal requisitions became nil but the increase in the availability of fortification material and ammunition was excellent. The supply support from the LSU at Khe Sanh has been one of outstanding accomplishments. The major problem as Operation Scotland ended was the non-receipt of the many items placed on requisition at the beginning of the operation.

c. Maintenance continued throughout the operation, however, as the operation progressed the availability of spare parts to effect maintenance caused the program to become one of 1st echelon and very minor 2d echelon. Enemy fire caused many maintenance problems which have not yet

SECRET

SECRET

been solved, such as the repair of vehicles. Maintenance of weapons and the arrival in Khe Sanh of critically required repair parts to keep artillery pieces firing was accomplished throughout the operation and was due in large measure to the efforts of the LSU.

d. Casualties suffered by the Battalion during Operation Scotland are as follows:

Killed in Action, Total	18
Died of Wounds at Other Facilities	2
Wounded in Action, Total	138
Returned to duty in 8 Hours	74
Wounded and MEDEVACED	64

The treatment of casualties within the Battalion was decentralized in that each of the Batteries received treatment first by the Battery Corpseman and then treatment by a Medical Officer located in close proximity to the Battery position. All DECEVAC's except those from outlying hills, were routed through the "C" Med facility created by the 26th Marines. All casualties taken to "C" Med for MEDEVAC were litter cases with the exception of a few. These litter cases were handled as little as possible and as rapidly as safety permitted. Casualties from firing elements on outlying hills were MEDEVACED by helicopter, often straight to medical facilities at Dong Ha. Treatment prior to being evacuated normally consisted of triage, control of hemorrhage, splinting of fractures and cleaning and dressing of wounds. In minor cases when the patient was in no real distress, wounds were probed for missile fragments and debridement was carried out. Morphine was given for pain when necessary and treatment for shock initiated before evacuation. With the exception of two casualties who had multiple extreme wounds, all casualties have since been sent to service hospitals where further treatment and convalescence is possible. Of the WLA's 90% survived and 50% returned to a duty status within 8 hours.

e. Communications.

(1) During Operation Scotland, the Battalion maintained three conduct of fire nets and a Battalion Fire Direction net for the conduct of the artillery operations. The nets were monitored by all firing Batteries, F. O.'s, A. O.'s, the Battalion FDC and the 26th Marines FSCC. In addition, the Battalion Communication Center monitored the Base Rotation Net for dissemination of "incoming" alerts. These nets were FM nets utilizing portable equipment dispersed throughout the C. P. and relayed into the control centers. All nets provided good communications with a minimum of backup equipment required.

(2) The Battalion wire system included hot lines from the firing Batteries to the FDC, CMC and Tank Platoon to the FDC, and from the FDC to the FSCC. Administrative lines were established both within the C. P. area and to external switching controls. The majority of the wire lines were established using cable installed by the 26th Marines. It was found that the multi-paired cabled provided much more reliable communications than lines constructed of WD-1/TP. Utilization of another command's cable

SECRET

SECRET

system, however, required very close liaison for repair and maintenance.

(3) While general resupply was slow, lack of material never affected the communications established. A shortage of repair parts, and of qualified technicians precluded most unit maintenance and necessitated evacuation of equipment for repairs.

(4) During the early phases of Operation Scotland the Battalion Communication Section operated from a G.P. tent above ground. Hostile fire soon rendered this position untenable, and as rapidly as material and time allowed, the Center and switching central were moved underground into a bunker. During the operation the validity of dispersing the radios, and antennas was proven as was the advisability of laying lateral wire lines.

f. Medical Evaluation. No serious problems concerning sanitation were encountered during Operation Scotland. The waste material in the heads was burned daily. Spot inspections of bunkers and other areas maintained high sanitation standards. With the exception of one or two occasions when water was in short supply, the showers were operating and were being utilized. Personal cleanliness was stressed throughout the operation; there were no cases of infections or disease because of uncleanness. Rats were seen in all bunkers and around trash areas within the Battalion but did not pose a health hazard in that rat traps and the scarcity of garbage helped to keep the rat population to a minimum, consistent with the field conditions.

g. Civic Affairs. The civic affairs conducted by this Battalion consisted mainly of MEDCAPS and were terminated with the evacuation of the surrounding area on 20 January 1968. Due to the location of the unit and various Vietnamese government civil affairs projects being conducted in the area, the only type of assistance rendered the local people was twice weekly MEDCAPS. As medical supplies diminished due to lack of funding, even this was curtailed. The problem of funding was solved, however, and the evacuation of the local civilian population ended the programs. During Operation Scotland the MEDCAPS treated approximately 550 people and participated in the 26th Marines Christmas program in the villages of a REUNG, TA CONG and the hamlet of TA CAUNG where gifts were distributed to approximately 350 children.

J. A. Hennelly
J. A. HENNELLY

DISTRIBUTION:

CG, 9th MAB 2
CO, 26th MAR 7
CO, 12th MAR 2
S/C FILES 3

SECRET