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HEADQUARTERS
Battalion Landing Team 1/26
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMF
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3/RCS/tad
5750
003428369
10 October 1969

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade
Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 September to 30 September 1969

Ref: (a) MCO 5720.2A
(b) FMFPACO 5750.8
(c) BrigO 5750.C
(d) RegtO 5750.1

Encl: (1) Battalion Landing Team 1/26 Command Chronology
N/A (2) Unit Journal
(3) Report/Critique of Sensor Implementation

1. In accordance with provisions of references (a), (b), (c), and (d) enclosure (1) is submitted herewith.

J. C. Goodin
J. C. GOODIN

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1/26
10/19/69

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HEADQUARTERS
Battalion Landing Team 1/26
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMF
APO San Francisco, California 96602

[REDACTED]

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 September to 30 September 1969

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SECRET

PART IORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. DESIGNATIONBattalion Landing Team 1/26

LtCol. J. C. GOODIN

1-30 Sept 69

TASK ORGANIZATIONH&S Company (-) (Rein)

Capt. C. M. REGAN

1-16 Sept 69

1st Lt. P. S. COURTIN

16-30 Sept 69

Det. Hq. Bn. 5th Mar Div

Company A (Rein)

1st Lt. M. J. ARENT

1-30 Sept 69

Company A

Det. H&S Co.

FO Team

Det. Comm Plt.

Det. Med. Plt.

S-2 Scout

FO Team "A" Btry 1/13

Det. 1st Plt., Co. A, 5th Engr. Bn.

Det. 2nd Plt., Co. A, 5th SP Bn. (HST)

Company B (Rein)

1st Lt. J. E. HENNESSEY

1-30 Sept 69

Company B

Det. H&S Co.

FO Team

Det. Comm Plt.

Det. Med. Plt.

S-2 Scout

FO Team "A" Btry 1/13

Det. 1st Plt., Co. A, 5th Engr. Bn.

Det. 2nd Plt., Co. A, 5th SP Bn. (HST)

Company C (Rein)

Capt H. W. REED

1-24 Sept 69

1st Lt. W. M. GORMAN

24-30 Sept 69

Company C

Det. H&S Co.

FO Team

Det. Comm Plt.

Det. Med. Plt.

S-2 Scout

FO Team "A" Btry 1/13

Det. 1st Plt., Co. A, 5th Engr. Bn.

Det. 2nd Plt., Co. A, 5th SP Bn. (HST)

ENCLOSURE (1)

Company D (Rein)

Capt E. J. LLOYD

1-30 Sept 69

Company D
Det. H&S Co.

FO Team
Det. Comm Plt.
Det. Med. Plt.
S-2 Scout

FO Team "A" Btry 1/13
Det. 1st Plt., Co. A, 5th Engr. Bn.
Det. 2nd Plt., Co. A, 5th SP Bn. (HST)

<u>81mm Mortar Plt. (-)</u>	1st Lt. F. C. HAYES	1-30 Sept 69
<u>106mm RR Plt.</u>	2nd Lt. L. F. NASON	1-30 Sept 69
<u>"A" Btry 1/13 (-) (Rein)</u>	Capt J. B. CREEL Jr.	1-30 Sept 69
<u>"W" Btry 1/11</u>	1st Lt. C. A. BELLIS Jr.	1-16 Sept 69
	1st Lt. S. C. DECOTEAU	17-30 Sept 69
<u>1st Plt., Co. A, 5th Amtrac Bn. (Rein)</u>	1st Lt. J. T. BARTEE	1-30 Sept 69
<u>1st Plt., Co. A, 5th AT Bn. (Rein)</u>	1st Lt. L. M. LEWIS Jr.	1-30 Sept 69
<u>1st Plt., Co. A, 5th Engr. Bn. (-)(Rein)</u>	1st Lt. J. S. HEYNE	1-30 Sept 69
<u>1st Plt., Co. A, 5th MT Bn. (Rein)</u>	1st Lt. C. F. GRIFFIN	1-30 Sept 69
<u>1st Plt., Co. A, 5th Recon Bn. (Rein)</u>	2nd Lt. J. C. MANCINI	1-30 Sept 69
<u>2nd Plt., Co. A, 5th SP Bn. (-)(Rein)</u>	GySgt. J. L. PARKER	1-30 Sept 69
<u>1st Plt., Co. A, 5th TK Bn. (Rein)</u>	1st Lt. C. S. CERTAIN	1-30 Sept 69
<u>LSU ONE</u>	1st Lt. W. DOMKE	1-30 Sept 69

2. LOCATION

- a. 1-7 Sept 69 - US3 Iwo Jima
- b. 8-30 Sept 69 - DaNang-RVN

3. STAFF OFFICERS

Executive Officer
S-1/Adjutant
S-2
S-3
S-3A
S-4

Maj. D. B. TOWNSEND	1-30 Sept 69
2nd Lt. D. F. MARTIN	1-30 Sept 69
1st Lt. BARNEBE	1-30 Sept 69
Maj. E. C. O'BRYNE	1-30 Sept 69
1st Lt. R. C. SMITH	1-30 Sept 69
Capt. W. W. MOOREHEAD	1-13 Sept 69
Capt. B. N. BAILEY	14-30 Sept 69

4. AVERAGE STRENGTH

USMC

USN

OFF
63

ENL
1775

OFF
3

ENL
69

PART II

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NARRATIVE SUMMARY

1. From 1 Sept 1969 to 7 Sept 1969 BLT 1/26, embarked aboard SLF/ARG shipping, continued to carry out an extensive training program, in preparation for their forthcoming operation, DEFIANT STAND. Emphasis was placed on physical training, and mine and booby trap warfare.
2. On 7 Sept 1969 the BLT landed from ARG shipping to take part in combined search and clear amphibious operations, employing SLF Alfa and elements of the 2nd ROKMC Brigade, against VC/RVN forces on Barrier Island. The BLT's AO was the southern portion of Barrier Island. The northern portion was assigned to ROKMC elements. The BLT's specific mission was to conduct helo and surface assaults at L-Hour and H-Hour on S-Day to seize LF objectives A and B, to establish a blocking position vic BT 185501, and to conduct search/clear operations in their assigned areas. On S-Day two (2) Companies landed by helicopter assault in LZ's along the east bank of Truong Giang River. L-Hour was delayed about 90 minutes due to heavy overcast. Resistance was light. At H-Hour two (2) Companies landed without resistance over Green Beach. These two (2) Companies commenced search and clear operations to the north and into their assigned blocking positions. The BLT conducted extensive day and night activities, destroying numerous bunkers and tunnels. Blocking positions were established along the northern edge of the BLT AO in support of the ROKMC RLT to the north. The BLT lost one (1) LVTP-5 from an enemy mine. Enemy activity was minor. Artillery and NGF were used to advantage, denying the enemy access to the river crossings and escape routes. On 19 Sept 1969, the BLT began executing the tactical withdrawal plan. The BLT was reembarked on ARG shipping, transported to DaNang and offloaded 20 Sept. BLT 1/26 assumed responsibility for the TAOR previously held by 2/26.

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PART III

LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS1. MISSIONS/OPERATIONS

- a. Major Operations. The Battalion Landing Team participated in one (1) major operation during this reporting period.

(1) DEFIANT STAND 7-19 September 1969.

b. Command Relations

- (1) Throughout operation DEFIANT STAND Battalion Landing Team 1/26 was OpCon to CTG 79.4.

c. Combat Missions Assigned

- (1) Operation DEFIANT STAND. Conduct **heliborne and surface amphibious assaults** in southern portion of Barrier Island. Conduct search and clear operations in AOA to locate, capture, or destroy all enemy, caches or installations.
- (2) Establish blocking positions on northern boundary of south portion of AOA NLT 1600H S+3 in coordination with the ROKMC RLT-2 assault in northern position of AOA.
- (3) Establish ARTY/MORT FSB vic. Green Beach BT 237486.
- (4) Provide landing force reserve of one (1) platoon located ashore at grid BT 237486.

d. Command Control

- (1) On Operation DEFIANT STAND the BLT rear was embarked aboard the USS Iwo Jima, LPH-2. The Command Post was co-located with the FSB/BSA vic. BT 237486.

Company A CP	was located	BT 232498
B CP		BT 210492
C CP		BT 207485
D CP		BT 214466
FSB/BSA		BT 237486

Control and communications were good.

- e. Organic Operation. Operation DEFIANT STAND was characterized by extensive day patrols and night ambushes. Emphasis was placed on the destruction of enemy fortifications and denial of infiltration routes through close observation and harrassing and interdicting fire on all avenues of approach.

- f. NEC Warfare. There was one report of the enemy employing gas. Company D made this report, reference: Spot Report 132145H.

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SECRET2. INTELLIGENCEa. Enemy Situation. (Operation DEFIANT STAND)

- (1) There had been an increase in enemy activity in the vicinity of the AO during the month prior to the beginning of this reporting period. There had been unconfirmed reports of organized units operating within the AO, however, no significant contact had been reported. Small scale encounters with armed enemy forces had occurred. Anti-aircraft fire incidents had been reported more frequently including the use of 12.7mm/.50 cal. automatic fire.
- (2) The enemy has long had the ability to attack at any time or place on Barrier Island, to defend well concealed and reinforced bunkers, and to evade direct or sustained contact with our forces. With elements of the Q-80th and the V-25th Battalions (LF) working in this area the individual guerrilla has gained much training with these units, not only in offensive and defensive measures, but in immediate evasive action to be taken when an amphibious force is launched. The enemy has the ability to withdraw or conceal his forces utilizing the waterways for withdrawal or using prepared tunnels and bunker complexes for concealment of troops, supplies and equipment.

Because of BLT 1/26 having been assigned special operations on Barrier Island before, we were able to more accurately pin-point river crossing sights and evasion routes. Frequent sightings of the enemy in the open within pre-assigned artillery and naval gunfire targets allowed BLT 1/26 to slow the enemy down by causing him to find new evasion/escape routes across the Truong Giang River.

Three strings of Minisid sensors were implanted across the river on evasion/escape routes used by the enemy.

A full sensor report/critique is included as an enclosure to this report.

b. Enemy Initiated Incidents/Actions

The only enemy initiated incidents were numerous probes of all friendly perimeters and harrassing fire attacks with 60mm mortars, RPG, automatic/small arms fire, and in one (1) incident the use of tear gas (CS). The only general trend established by the enemy was the fact that he failed to follow up his harrassing incidents of fire with ground attacks.

c. Enemy Losses

- (1) KIA- 44
- (2) POW-6

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- (3) Equip Captured - 740 lbs rice; 350 lbs potatoes; 50 lbs tobacco; 1500 lbs fertilizer; 30 new pr. PJ's; misc. 782 gear, documents.
- (4) IWC - 2
- (5) CSWC - 0
- (6) Detainees - 849

d. Enemy Trends

- (1) During Operation DEFIANT STAND, 7-19 Sept 69, several times company/platoon defensive perimeters were mortared with RPG and small arms fire following. No enemy assaults were launched to follow-up these attacks by fire.

On one (1) occasion, the enemy employed tear gas (reference After Action Report for Operation DEFIANT STAND; DTG 132045H, Company D) and again there was the absence of a ground attack which led us to believe they were either experimenting or were untrained in proper gas warfare.

With the ROK Marine Forces on the northern portion of Barrier Island and BLT 1/26 in the south, the enemy used evasion routes to escape the cordon that was quickly being formed around them. The main evasion route was across the Truong Giang River, and to the west via three (3) crossing points.

Hit and run tactics with complete evasion from the ROK Marines and BLT 1/26 AOA seemed to be the only trend followed by the enemy during Operation DEFIANT STAND. These hit and run attacks may very well have been used as a diversionary tactic to get larger enemy units across the river while friendly elements were engaged in the defense of their positions.

- (2) 21-30 Sept the only noticeable enemy trends are those of enemy units firing rockets at various tactical targets within the DaNang area from sites located outside the DaNang Barrier. With the rice harvest well underway, the enemy has started moving down out of the mountains on rice resupply runs. Until they are resupplied enough to gain their strength back and the majority of their sick have recovered it is unlikely that any heavy contact with friendly forces will be planned. Long range rocket tactics may be used as a diversionary tactic while large rice runs are conducted. Overall, this seems to be the only existing method available to the enemy to partially accomplish his mission here within the BLT 1/26 TAOR.

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~~SECRET~~e. Weather Conditions

During the entire operation, rain showers frequented the assigned area of operations. On three (3) occasions, the showers persisted throughout the night and into the following morning hours.

The temperature ranged from a high of 104 degrees to a low of 73 degrees, with a mean relative humidity of 84 per cent.

3. SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

a. 070700H to 072400H September 1969.

- (1) On 6 Sept. S-Day changed from 8 Sept. to 7 Sept. 1969.
- (2) On S-Day, L-Hour was delayed approximately 90 minutes due to heavy overcast.
- (3) The first enemy contact came at 071235H when Company A conducting search and clear operations in vic. grid BT 225497 wounded one (1) enemy. Results: one (1) POW.
- (4) At 071510H Third Platoon, Company B reported seeing two (2) VC at grid BT 222482.
- (5) At 071530H a tunnel complex at Bn. CP grid BT 237487 was discovered. Results: destroyed one (1) tunnel complex.
- (6) 071900H Company C received four (4) 60mm rounds and sniper fire from vic. BT 194486. Artillery and 60mm mortars were fired with unknown results. Results: one (1) USMC WIA.

b. 080001H to 082400H September 1969.

- (1) 080900H Company A at grid BT 226517 received ten (10) to fifteen (15) rounds small arms fire. Company called in artillery with negative results. Results: one (1) USMC WIA.
- (2) 080950H Third Platoon, Company C found two (2) enemy KIA's at grid BT 194514. One (1) was VC and the other NVA. The Platoon searched the area with negative results.
- (3) 081300H Third Platoon Company B spotted two (2) or three (3) enemy at grid BT 213488. Fired small arms, M-79, 60mm mortars, and artillery. Results: Negative.
- (4) 081345H Alpha Btry 1/13 found two (2) CHICOM grenades, assorted medical supplies, and one (1) blue uniform, one (1) bottle saline and one (1) camera. The Engineers destroyed the bunker and turned in the supplies to S-2. Results: one (1) bunker destroyed.

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- (5) 081630H Two (2) Marines from Amtracs were wounded when their vehicle hit a land mine. Marines were not medevaced. Results: two (2) USMC WIANE, one (1) destroyed Amtrac.
- (6) 081030H Company D found two (2) male KIA's and two (2) Russian grenades, one (1) SFD M-26, a 60mm mortar dud, and numerous family bunkers. The bunkers were blown. Results: two (2) enemy KIA's, ordnance blown, and numerous bunkers blown.
- (7) 081830H Company C made contact with three (3) enemy at grid BT 196484. Results: three (3) enemy KIA's and one (1) USMC WIANE.
- (8) 081900H Two (2) LVTP's got bogged down in mud on the west side of Truong Giang River at grid BT 174486, while in support of Recon, whose mission was to emplace Minisids in that area. Security was set in around the vehicles. Results: unit spent night on west side of the river.
- (9) 082015H Company A fired on suspected enemy position at grid BT 216509. Results: two (2) secondary explosions.

c. 090001H to 092400H September 1969.

- (1) 090200H One (1) Marine from Company C was wounded while firing at running indigenous personnel at grid BT 196482. Results: one (1) USMC WIANE.
- (2) 091200H Company D swept vic BT 197470. Results: three (3) enemy KIA's and three (3) detainees.
- (3) 091600H At Company B's LZ Helicopters received small arms fire from grid BT 208500. Company B dispatched a reaction force which came under fire from about ten (10) enemy. Company B returned fire with small arms, M-79, M-60, 60mm and 81mm mortars. Results: Negative.
- (4) 091800H An OP from Company B observed twenty (20) VC moving northwest carrying heavy bundles at grid BT 174485. Fired on VC with 90mm. Results: four (4) VC KIA's.

d. 100001H to 102400H September 1969.

- (1) 100745H Company C spotted twenty (20) enemy at grid BT 174485. Fired small arms. Results: one (1) VC KIA and one (1) NVA KIA, four (4) CHICOM's and two (2) sacks of rice captured.
- (2) 101300H H&S Company patrol swept area at grid BT 230485, finding twenty (20) bunkers and thirty (30) detainees. Results: twenty (20) bunkers were blown and thirty (30) detainees were turned over to ITT.

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(3) 101430H First Squad, First Platoon, Company B received small arms fire from grid BT 207517. Returned fire with small arms and LAAW's. Results: three (3) USMC WIA's and two (2) USMC KIA's.

(4) 101800H Company A swept vic grid BT 176485. Results: destroyed four (4) bunkers, fifty (50) living structures and discovered fifteen hundred (1500) lbs of fertilizer, two hundred (200) lbs of rice, fifty (50) lbs of tobacco. Seven (7) detainees and assorted documents were turned into S-2.

(5) 101830H Company C spotted six (6) VC at grid BT 193478. Fired 90mm. Results: six (6) VC KIA's.

(6) 102130H Company D received small arms and M-79 fire from grid BT 212470. Company D returned fire with small arms. Results: one (1) friendly WIA.

(7) 102205H Second Squad, Third Platoon, Company A in night defensive position detected movement at grid BT 174484. Blew claymore mines. Results: two (2) VC KIA's.

e. 110001H to 112400H September 1969.

(1) 110130H First Platoon, Company B made contact with unknown number of enemy at grid BT 210504. Results: one (1) USMC KIA and six (6) USMC WIA's. Enemy casualties unknown.

(2) 111200H First Platoon, Company A, 5th Engineers found twenty-seven (27) bunkers, three (3) rockets, three (3) CHICOM's and documents at grid BT 235488. Results: twenty-seven (27) bunkers blown and three (3) rockets, three (3) CHICOM's and documents turned over to S-2.

(3) 111715H Company C spotted one (1) VC at grid BT 171489. Fired 106's. Results: one (1) VC KIA.

(4) 112050H Company C received 60mm and M-79 rounds. Returned fire with small arms, 81mm, 60mm mortars and M-79. Results: one (1) USMC WIA.

f. 120001H to 122400H September 1969.

(1) 120930H Second Platoon, Company A found and destroyed thirty (30) bunkers at grid BT 238484.

(2) 121130H Company C picked up one (1) male, age twenty-eight (28), at grid 198483. After being questioned the man stated he was a VC. He was turned over to ITT. Results: one (1) detainee.

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- (3) 121630H Company D spotted four (4) VC suspects at grid BT 195468, also found thirty-one (31) bunkers, one (1) case of 105 rounds and a booby trap made from a 50 cal. round. Artillery was called. Results: thirty-one (31) bunkers destroyed and one (1) case 105 rounds blown.
- (4) 121820H One (1) woman with gunshot wound was brought into Company B's position by the villagers. Results: one (1) VN civilian medevac.
- (5) 122245H Company C took approximately eight (8) M-79 rounds, RPG and mortar rounds from grid BT 199487. Artillery was called in on enemy positions. Results: four (4) USMC KIA's.

g. 130001H to 132400H September 1969.

- (1) 131000H First Platoon, Company A, 5th Engineers blew twenty-nine (29) bunkers and four (4) rockets at grid 2248.
- (2) 131100H An old man and a young boy entered Company B's position BT 204509. The young boy had a head wound and was medevaced.
- (3) 131236H At grid BT 217513, Second Platoon, Company A spotted one (1) VN male. The man fled and was fired upon, received leg wounds. Man was turned over to S-2. Results: one (1) wounded detainee.
- (4) 131840H Company D spotted eleven (11) VC at grid BT 201468. 106's were fired. Results: eleven (11) VC KIA's.
- (5) 131900H Second Platoon, Company A found four (4) M-26, one (1) 60mm HE round, one (1) 105 HE SFD's and six (6) detainees at grid BT 211488. Results: ordnance was blown in place and six (6) detainees were turned over to S-2.
- (6) 132045H Second Platoon, Company D made contact with fifteen (15) to twenty (20) enemy at grid BT 211488. Company D reported receiving gas, method of delivery unknown. Reference Spot Report 132145H. Results: Negative.

h. 140001H to 142400H September 1969.

- (1) 140745H three (3) VN's with wounds from artillery turned themselves into Second Platoon, Company B's position at grid BT 203508. Interrogation revealed one (1) VC. Results: one (1) POW.
- (2) 141100H Second Platoon, Company D found and destroyed five (5) 61mm Chinese mortar rounds, one (1) 60mm mortar round, sixty (60) rounds of 50 cal., ten (10) smoke grenades and one (1) anti-tank mine at grid 198480. Results: All ordnance blown in place.

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- (3) 141415H At grid BT 205506, First and Second Platoon, Company B made contact with twenty (20) VC. Returned fire with small arms. Results: two (2) USMC WIA.
- (4) 141800H Recon captured three (3) male VN at grid BT 212500 and turned them over to S-2. Results: three (3) detainees.
- (5) 141855H Company D killed one (1) VC with 106 fire at grid BT 215463. Results: one (1) VC KIA.

i. 150001H to 152400H September 1969.

- (1) 150100H Company C received two (2) RPG rounds and small arms fire from grid BT 193449 resulting in one (1) USMC WIA. Returned fire with small arms. Results: negative.
- (2) 151045H Amtrac Platoon found a male at grid BT 239488, that had died of fragmentation wounds.
- (3) 151100H The Second and Third Platoons, Company D found two (2) VC male bodies at grid BT 216491. Swept area finding one hundred (100) lbs of rice. Results: two (2) VC KIA's and one hundred (100) lbs of rice.
- (4) 151930H Company A at grid BT 217508 received two (2) RPG rounds wounding four (4) Marines. Returned fire. Results: negative.
- (5) 152100H Second Platoon, Company D took a NGF WP short round. Results: nine (9) USMC NBC.
- (6) 152130H First Squad, Third Platoon, Company A made contact with unknown sized enemy force at grid BT 213525. Platoons also tripped a SFD M-26 at this same grid. Results: one (1) USMC KIA and two (2) USMC WIA's.

j. 160001H to 162400H September 1969.

- (1) 160915H Company D observed nine (9) enemy in boats at grid BT 196498. Fired artillery. Results: negative.
- (2) 161400H Company D found one (1) Vietnamese male at grid BT 204474. Sent him to ITT for interrogation. Results: one (1) detainee.
- (3) 161700H Company A, Second Platoon found at grid BT 213525, three (3) bunkers, two (2) living structures, and tripped a booby trapped M-26. Results: two (2) USMC WIA's, three (3) bunkers and two (2) living structures blown.
- (4) 162330H Bn CP received small arms fire from grid BT 238483. Returned fire with M-79 and small arms fire and then swept. Results: One (1) USMC WIA.

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k. 170001H to 172400H September 1969.

- (1) 171710H Company A destroyed forty-five (45) bunkers and one (1) 105 HE round.
- (2) 171730H At grid BT 214488 the First Squad Third Platoon, Company B observed two enemy. Fired small arms. Results: one (1) VN female KIA.
- (3) 172045H Company B received fire from three (3) enemy positions at grids BT 209494, 209490, and 212494. Returned fire with artillery, 81mm, NGF, and tanks. Results: unknown.
- (4) 172045H Company C received fire from approximately twenty-five (25) enemy at grid 209494. Returned fire with small arms. Results: negative.

l. 180001H to 182400H September 1969.

- (1) 181830H Company A called an artillery mission on grid BT 195480. Results: ten (10) VC KIA's.

m. 190001H to 192400H September 1969.

- (1) The BLT executed the withdrawal plan from Barrier Island.

n. 200001H to 202400H September 1969.

- (1) BLT 1/26 chopped to CG First Marine Division effective 201200H September 1969. Reference: CTG 79.4 message 191139H September 1969.
- (2) 201200H 26th Marines assumed OpCon of BLT 1/26. Reference: 26th Marine message DTG 201600Z September 1969.

o. 210001H to 212400H September 1969.

- (1) 210600H BLT 1/26 assumed responsibility for assigned AO in accordance with 26 Marine message DTG 190825Z September 1969.

p. 210001H to 302400H September 1969.

During the period following the BLT's assumption of the AO, previously the responsibility of the 2nd Battalion 26th Marines, there are no significant events to report, except that at approximately 300600H September 1969 two (2) 140mm enemy rockets, impacted in the vic. of Alpha 1/13's position grid AT 924724. All available information indicated the rockets were fired from a southwesterly direction. No casualties resulted. There have been many activations along the Da-Nang Anti-infiltration systems, but no real contact with the enemy. The BLT continues to carry out assigned missions in accordance with Regiment Frag Order 39-69 (Annex A Operation Order Overlay).

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~~SECRET~~4. FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATIONa. "A" Battery, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines

- (1) Types of fire support employed: prep fires, harrassing and interdicting fires, counter mortar/rocket fires, zone fires, shifting fires, time-on-target fires, and fires on targets of opportunity.
- (2) During the month of Septemer, "A" Battery 1/13 fired 7606 rounds.

HE - 6703
 Ill - 480
 WP - 369
 COFRAM - 54

b. 4.2 Mortar Battery, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines:

- (1) Types of fire support employed: prep fires, harrassing and interdicting fires, counter mortar/rocket fires, zone fires, shifting fires, time-on-target fires, and fires on targets of opportunity.
- (2) 4.2 Mortar Battery fired a total of 355 missions.
- (3) 4.2 Mortar Battery fired a total of 2640 rounds.

HE - 2350
 Ill - 168
 WP - 122

c. Naval Gunfire.

- (1) Ships available included USS Taussig and various USCG WPG's.
- (2) Type of missions fired: prep fires, harrassing and interdicting fires, counter mortar/rocket fires, zone fires, shifting fires, time-on-target fires, and fires on targets of opportunity.
- (3) Naval Gunfire fired a total of 4586 rounds.

USS Taussig

HE - 3006
 Ill - 695
 WP - 121

USCG WPG

HE - 725
 WP - 39

d. 81mm Mortar Platoon

- (1) Types of mission fired: prep fires, harrassing and interdicting fires, counter mortar/rocket fires, zone fires, shifting fires, time-on-target fires, and fires on targets of opportunity.

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- (2) 81mm Mortar Platoon fired a total of 326 missions.
- (3) 81mm Mortar Platoon fired a total of 3966 rounds.

HE - 3012
 WF - 313
 ILL- 641

5. AIR SUPPORT

a. Units

From 1 Sept. to 20 Sept, all resupply helicopter support for BLT 1/26 was supplied by HMM 265. From 21 to 30 Sept, support was supplied by 1st MAW. Fixed wing support for the entire month was supplied by 1st MAW.

b. Missions

- (1) Resupply - 26 missions.
- (2) Close Air Support.
 - (a) 2 AC 47 missions, 2 AC 119 missions.
 - (b) Types of ordnance-- 7.62.
- (3) TPQ's none.
- (4) Flare Support - 2 missions.
- (5) Observations - 8 missions.
- (6) MED-EVAC - 12 missions.

c. Significant Events

- (1) During the evening of 7 Sept. Company C was supported by a AC 119 "Shadow 45" working as low as 2000 feet in heavy rain showers while receiving return fire from small arms.
- (2) Early in the morning of 11 Sept. Company B had an emergency medevac in a hot zone. The medevac was organized by "Hostage Jack", a UH-1G. He coordinated his fires with Spooky 11, and AC-47, so well that Klan medevac was fired on only once during the medevac.
- (3) During late evening of 15 Sept. Klan medevacs went into a hot zone without gunship support for a Marine with severe head wound.
- (4) During late evening 17 Sept. Klan medevac went into a hot zone without gunship support for a Marine with a severe head wound.

ENCLOSURE (1)
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6. PERSONNEL

a. Combat Losses.

WIA	OFF	ENL
Evac	0	22
Minor	2	18
KIA	0	5
MIA	0	0

b. Non-Combat Losses

Injured	OFF	ENL
Evac	0	47
Minor	0	16
Killed	0	0

c. WIA's Returned to Duty

Fourteen (14)

d. R&R Trips. 116

e. Personnel Rotated PCS - 6 Off - 110 Enl

f. Replacements Received - 5 Off - 262 Enl

7. ADMINISTRATION

a. Personnel Accounting

On 19 September 1969, the BLT S-1 along with all company/battery administration sections and supply elements for the BLT moved ashore as part of the off load phase of the current afloat phase for the BLT. The move was completed on the evening of the 19th. Company/Battery administration remains intact with close supervision from cognizant BLT Staff. The entire administration of the BLT is centrally located in order to expedite due process of administration.

b. Awards

1 - Bronze Star

c. Promotions

19 to Sergeant
405 to Lance Corporal
3 to Private First Class

SECRETd. Significant Events

No significant events transpired other than those mentioned above.

8. LOGISTICS

- a. Supply/Resupply. During Operation DEFIANT STAND (7 - 19 Sept 1969) battalion supply operating stocks were set up aboard the USS Iwo Jima with two days of Classes I, III and V maintained in a BSA ashore at Barrier Island. Amtracs from "A" Co 5th Amtrac Bn served as the primary transportation vehicles for resupply of the letter companies. HMM-265 provided supplementary transportation for retrieving retrograde material at company positions as well as delivering Class II items to the BSA on an as required basis. FLC DaNang provided resupply of Class I, III and V after the initial landing and coordination for delivery of these resupply items at Bridge Ramp, DaNang, was accomplished by Supply/S-4 representatives at 1/26 rear in the 3/26 cantonment. On 17 Sept the BLT started backloading to ARG shipping while at the same time vehicles and operating stocks were being offloaded at DaNang in preparation for moving into the BLT's new AO at Hill 10. Augmented trucking was requested from and supplied by the 1st Marine Division and all vehicles and cargo were relocated at Hill 10 by 23 Sept. Battalion operation stocks were located at Hill 34 along with LSU maintenance personnel. The major problem encountered during this time was a failure on ARG's part to provide boating to pick up the Class I and V resupply items at Bridge Ramp on the scheduled dates which were pre-arranged before the operation thus resulting in brief shortages of certain high-usage items of small arms ammunition.
- b. Food/Water. All food consumed during Operation DEFIANT STAND came from stocks in the BSA. Water was obtained from water buffalos which were refilled at the ARG's two LSDs, COLONIAL and WHETSTONE, twice daily by a LSM-8 shuttle boat. Hot meals were prepared aboard the LPH Iwo Jima during the latter half of the operation and one (1) company per day received one (1) "A" ration and iced juice drinks. Canned fruit juice, chocolate milk and SP packs were sent to the companies from the BSA every two (2) or three (3) days on the regular resupply run. At the Hill 10 AO the companies are presently subsisting on MCI's with water provided from water point at Hill 10. All company positions presently have some messhall facilities on position. While considerable improvement is needed to make these messing facilities operable, every effort is being made to establish working messhalls at the company CP's in the near future.
- c. Maintenance. 1st Force Service Regiment (FSR) provided this unit with the necessary support in repairing deadline combat essential equipment and we are still in the state of C-1 operational readiness. Items that have been deadlined for 3rd and 4th echelon repair have either been replaced by Float Maintenance Equipment or turned in for repair and returned to the BLT within a short time. The only combat loss sustained during Operation DEFIANT STAND was the total destruction of one (1)

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LVTP5A due to a land mine. The amtrac has been replaced by a float vehicle from FLC, DaNang.

- d. Camp Facilities Development. At the Hill 10 AO, BLT personnel are living in four (4) permanent or semi-permanent camps and the BLT has attempted to improve existing facilities within its capability. Several problem areas exist at the Hill 10 cantonment that will require major engineering improvements to correct in the near future. These engineering assistance project areas are as follows: complete rewiring of the cantonment electrical system; installation of a water purification unit at Cobb Bridge; repair/relining of overhead water storage tank at "A" Co/FSB Sixshooter, west of Dai La Pass; complete repair of messhall plumbing and waste disposal drainage systems; clearing and improving of weather-beaten ammunition storage areas to provide adequate space and overhead cover and protection from monsoonal climate conditions. Major storages of camp property include two (2) ME-10 messhall refrigerators.

9. NEW TECHNIQUES

Reference enclosure (3), Sensor Implementation, Report and Critique.

10. TRAINING

- a. A total of two hundred and fifty (250) newly joined personnel attended indoctrination class.
- (1) A total of eight (8) personnel attended formal schools as follows:
- (a) NCO Leadership School - four (4) - Camp Hansen, Okinawa.
 - (b) M-79 School - four (4) - DaNang RVN.
- (2) The above is in addition to the weekly training schedule which is being conducted on Company level. A total of two (2) training schedules were distributed to the companies.

11. COMMUNICATION

a. General

The communication platoon operated one (1) command post on Barrier Island and one (1) aboard the LPH-2 Iwo Jima until 18 Sept. 69. On 18 Sept. 69 the command post on Barrier Island was secured and all personnel returned to the LPH. On 18 Sept. a liaison visit to 2/26 was made. On 19 Sept the forward echelon air lifted into 2/26 AO to exchange communication equipment. Eight hundred and ten (810) lbs of communication equipment and ten (10) communicators were in the forward echelon. On 20 Sept. the change over was completed.

b. Radio

- (1) Barrier Island radio circuits were the Bn. TAC, Co. TAC, SLFTAC, TAC/LOG, HST. TACP local NGF, FD/CMD, HR/TAR, and liaison circuit with KMC.
- (2) 19 Sept. the Bn. COC and necessary radio circuits were installed at the 2/26 area (Hill 10). One radio with operator was installed at Hill 34 on the Log/Admin circuit.

c. Radio Relay

No radio relay was used on Barrier Island. 1/26 radio relay team took over the 2/26 radio relay site.

d. Wire

Switchboards were installed at the command post and at Delta Company position on Barrier Island. This was secured on 18 Sept. 1969. Switchboards and telephone communication exist from Hill 10 to 26 Marines and 1st Marine Division telephone system.

e. Message Center

Message Center was established aboard the LPH-2 until 20 Sept. Comm/Crypto guard was passed to 26th Marines effective 201200Z Sept. 1969. Message Center was established at Hill 10 on 20 Sept 1969 with courier runs to 26th Marines twice daily at 0830H and 1530H.

f. Maintenance/Supply

Maintenance was aboard the LPH-2 until 20 Sept 1969. On 20 Sept. maintenance was established at Hill 10. No supplies held at Hill 10.

g. Significant Events

At Hill 10 the camp had two (2) electrical systems installed. The generator had not had proper preventive maintenance and the phases of the generator were not balanced. The wiring (electrical) was bad and created a safety hazard.

12. CIVIC ACTION

- a. Leaflet drops were conducted on 26, 27, 29, and 30 September 1969, vicinity of AT 921728 to AT 926705 and AT 952650 to AT 944644. Also requested leaflet drops for other areas in the AO to be announced later.

- b. Three (3) pieces of 3 X 6 tin were taken to a villager's house near An Phuoc High School on 27 Sept 1969 to repair the building that was damaged by a BLT 1/26 2½ ton truck. We made a token payment of 300 \$VN for replacement of a water jug which was also damaged. Owners of the building were satisfied.
- c. A Med Cap was conducted on 29 Sept 1969 at Hieu Duc High School. Approximately 100 people were treated for minor ailments, also 15 teeth extractions were made by the dental technician.
- d. Solatium payment was made to Tran Van Tu on 30 Sept 1969 for the amount of 1000 \$VN for accident of 23 Sept 1969 in which his Honda-50 was damaged by a Marine jeep from BLT 1/26.

13. MEDICAL AND DENTAL

a. Medical.

- (1) Location of the BAS: 01 Sept 69 to 18 Sept 69 (USS Iwo Jima)
19 Sept 69 to 30 Sept 69 (Hill # 10)
- (2) Number of Doctors/Corpsmen: 01 Dental Officer
02 Doctors
71 Corpsmen.
01 Dental Technician
- (3) Casualties/Injuries treated:
- (a) Combat: 37
- (b) Non-Combat: 562

b. Dental

- (1) Location of Dental Clinic: 01 Sept 69 to 30 Sept 69 USS Iwo Jima
- (2) Number of personnel treated: Information not available.
- c. Significant Events. HM3 EDWARD C. KALINA, B81 69 08, USN, killed in action on 10 September 1969.

14. RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES

a. Personnel

- (1) Lt. W. A. WILL, CHC, USNR
- (2) L/Cpl. T. V. WILSON, Chaplain's Driver

b. Services Conducted

- (1) Cumulative Total 7, Attendance 241
- (2) Communion given 194

c. Counseling

- (1) Pre-Marital - 0
- (2) Marital - 2
- (3) Personal - 16
- (4) Religious - 1

d. Hospital and Brig Visits

- (1) Brig - 0
- (2) Hospital - 2 - 16 patients visited.

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PART IV

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

- 1. Unit Journal**
- 2. Report/Critique of Sensor Implementation**

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SECRET**SECRET - NOFORN**REPORT/CRITIQUE OF SENSOR IMPLEMENTATION

1. Several problems arose because the Minisids were emplaced poorly. Instead of being emplaced 200 meters apart, they were set approximately 75 to 100 meters apart. Another problem encountered was that two (2) strings of sensors were emplaced in the vicinity of villages. This resulted in an undue amount of activations caused by animals and villagers in the area. A third problem resulted from the numerous trail systems that existed in the area. Because of the number of trails and the lack of previous information concerning their trafficability, there was no reliable guideline to use when emplacing the sensors. A fourth problem encountered was the direct result of the terrain in the area. Barrier Island consists mostly of sandy terrain and scattered small shrubs. It would be advantageous to design an antenna whose camouflage would correspond to the terrain in such areas. The existing antenna is easily recognized. A final problem existed because the sensors were emplaced on the western side of the Truong Giang River. The LVT's were forced to remain on the western side for an entire night. During this period, they were constantly confronted with small arms fire. Because of this incident, it became impractical to use LVT's to check the result of fire missions. Consequently, the results of fire missions went unknown.
2. The main problem encountered with the P-sids was their extreme sensitivity. In one instance, Delta Company had employed P-sids along a trail approximately 800 meters from their position. The sensitivity setting used was one. It was found that every time the 105's were fired in the Battalion CP the P-sids were activated. The sensors were located approximately 2,000 meters from the 105's.
3. Because the Battalion was occupying a blocking position, many of the P-sids were utilized around perimeters. In these cases, Bravo and Charlie Companies found the P-sids to be invaluable and have requested more of them. Although no kills resulted from their use, several company commanders believe that the advance warning they received enabled them to employ their 60mm mortars. They felt this disrupted the enemy and prevented them from being able to mount surprise attacks with RPG's and other organic weapons.

SENSOR READOUT


Number of sensors - 9
 Number of strings - 3
 Number of significant sightings - 43
 Number of fire missions - 36
 BDA - Unknown

ENCLOSURE (3)
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1/26 507 69

APPENDIX "I" (PHASE "I" OVERLAY) ANNEX "A"
 MAP SHEET : HOI AN 6640 I
 1:50,000



1/26 SEP 67

MAP SHEET: HOI AN 6640 I
1:50,000

54 21
RED BEACH

5-8 SEPT.

