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0040567

HEADQUARTERS
 2d Battalion, 26th Marines
 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 FPO San Francisco, 96602

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 3/TRG/jwp
 1 October 1967
 0077 67

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03)
 Via: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 September to 30 September 1967

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A
 (b) FMFPACO 5750.8
 (c) DivO 5750.1A

Encl: ✓ (1) 2d Battalion, 26th Marines Command Chronology

1. In accordance with references (a), (b), and (c), the following report is submitted.

D. Chaplin

D. CHAPLIN

2nd Bn/26th Mar. Comm chron.

DECLASSIFIED AT THREE (3) YEAR INTERVALS
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER TWELVE (12) YEARS

Copy No. 01 of 22

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HEADQUARTERS

2d Battalion, 26th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FME
FPO San Francisco, 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 SEPTEMBER TO 30 SEPTEMBER 1967

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ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. Designation

2nd Battalion, 26th Marines

Commanders

LtCol. D. CHAPLIN 1-30Sep67

SUBORDINATE UNITS

H&S Co.	Capt. A. H. MULLIGAN	1-30Sep67
"E" Co.	Capt. E. G. BREEDING	1-30Sep67
"F" Co.	Capt. M. L. PIPER	1-12Sep67
	1stLt D. M. PULTZ	13-27Sep67
	Capt. E. J. MARTIKKE	28-30Sep67
"G" Co.	Capt. A. J. WALKE	1-30Sep67
"H" Co.	Capt. G. J. LATTIMORE	1-30Sep67

ATTACHED UNITS

"L" Co 3/26

Capt. R. C. CAMP

17-30Sep67

2. Location

1-30Sep67

Phu Bai, RVN

3. Staff Officers

Executive Officer	Maj J. H. LANDERS	1-30Sep67
S-1	1stLt J. E. QUINN	1-6Sep67
S-2	2ndLt T. MCCOURT	7-30Sep67
S-3	GySgt G. R. GOODSON	1-11Sep67
S-4	2ndLt R. H. HENRY	12-30Sep67
S-5	Maj C. H. JOHNSON	1-12Sep67
	Capt G. F. KURTH	13-30Sep67
	Capt E. J. MARTIKKE	1-27Sep67
	1stLt R. G. BROWN	28-30Sep67
	GySgt A. W. ADAMS	1-11Sep67
	2ndLt G. A. GONZALEZ	12-30Sep67

4. Average Monthly StrengthUSMCOFF
34ENL
1050USNOFF
2ENL
47ARVNOFF
1ENL
8

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PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

1. Personnel

a. Number of replacements received: 3 USMC officers;
 45 USMC Enlisted; 0 USN Officers; 3 USN Enlisted.

b. Number of Personnel Rotated:

Enlisted USMC
 10

Enlisted USN
 2

Officers USMC
 1

Officers USN
 0

c. Number of Personnel lost through attrition other than rotation:

- (1) WIA - 44
- (2) DOW - 0
- (3) KIA - 1
- (4) Humanitarian/Emergency transfers - 1
- (5) Non-Battle injuries - 4
- (6) Intra-division/regiment transfers - 2 USMC Officers;
 34 USMC Enlisted; 2 USN Enlisted.

d. During September 82 out-of-country R & R quotas were received and 39 in-country R & R quotas to China Beach were received.

2. Administration

a. Awards

- (1) Silver Star - 1
- (2) Meritorious Mast - 4

b. Promotions

- (1) To Sergeant - 12
- (2) To Corporal - 54
- (3) To Lance Corporal - 8
- (4) To Private First Class - 3

c. Postal Services - Satisfactory

d. Exchange Facilities - Available and stocked with necessities.

e. Courts-Martials

	<u>COMPLETED</u>	<u>PENDING</u>
General Courts-Martial	0	0
Special Courts-Martial	3	1
Summary Courts-Martial	4	1

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INTELLIGENCE

HUE-PHU BAI TAOR

1. Enemy Situation at Beginning of Period

a. Enemy activity was continued towards the disruption of the September 3d Elections. Terrorism was being increased and friendly installation began receiving small arms and mortar fire, with the PHU BAI Vital Area receiving a mortar attack at 010100H.

2. Significant Activities

a. The enemy stepped up his interdiction of Highway #1, mining the road on 16 separate occasions and destroying 1 bridge.

b. The enemy executed a highly successful attack against CAC-A6/9, destroying all buildings, two (2) bunkers, several weapons, communication equipment, and all personal gear. Friendly casualties were 5 KIA's and 13 WIA's.

c. The enemy initiated 17 mortar attacks against friendly installations and fired on 10 patrols.

d. The enemy employed electronic measures to jam communication equipment during mortar attacks.

3. Summary of Enemy Activity

a. The increased enemy activity throughout the PHU BAI TAOR indicates that another enemy unit, probably of battalion size, has been employed in this area. Also that one engineer/sapper unit is operating in direct support of that unit. The enemy units in this area have the capability of massing for a coordinated attack and have demonstrated this ability in using mortars in support of a ground attack.

b. Interrogation reports from Chieu Hoi's and PW's tend to indicate that the enemy food supply is at a critically low level. All indications point to the fact that the enemy has only accumulated enough rice to last on a day to day basis. The enemy has yet to be successful enough in his rice collection activities to store a quantity sufficient to last him through the coming monsoon. The possibility of enemy reinforced elements entering the area only compounds his problem.

(1) In substantiation of the above are the facts that approximately 3800 lbs of rice was captured (coords: YD 879061, YD 892088, YD 957077, YD 956085, ZC 092990, and AU 817047), and that the enemy has been forced to come out of the Hills with greater frequency and in greater numbers than in the previous reporting period.

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(2) The primary route from the Troui Mountains base camp goes through the Ap Phu Bai (ID 9010) hamlet as evidence by the contact at (ID 905097) which resulted in 17 Enemy KIA(C) and 2 POW's. The other major route originates in the same general area but crosses Highway #1 in the vicinity of (ID 945070) and terminates at the collection point of Ha Vinh (ID 956087) and Bong Mon (2) (ID 978077). In both instances the withdrawal route is identical to the route used to enter the area.

c. On three (3) separate occasions, the enemy delivered heavy volumes of automatic weapons and small arms fire and maintained continuous close contact for as long as 2½ hours. During these fire fights the enemy maintained contact until approaching daylight and/or the pending arrival of friendly units caused them to break contact.

d. The continuing increase in enemy initiated activities indicate that all local and main force units have probably come under control of a regimental headquarters.

4. Enemy Personnel and Equipment Losses:

KIA(C)	40
KIA(P)	79
PW	4
CIV DEF	3
DET	13
WPNS	25

5. Weather and Terrain

a. In general, the weather had no adverse affects on operations. However, a considerable increase in precipitation was recorded (9.72 inches) and rain showers, usually of short duration, occurred 23 days.

b. The area around AP-PHU BAI is predominately flat coastal low-lands which are in turn bordered on the north and east by the Gulf of Tonkin, and to the south by the mountains which are an eastern extension of the Annamite Chain. The flat coastal lowland is mostly under rice cultivation. Along the coast, many sand dunes are encountered. In the areas not under cultivation, vegetation ranges from grasslands, brushwood thickets, and stands of bamboo. Hedgerows are often found around hamlets and rice fields. Many of the mountains are bare of vegetation but for the most part they are covered by a dense broadleaf evergreen forest. The taller trees reach heights of 75-90 feet, with some ranging to 150 feet. The canopy is generally continuous, and in areas where it is broken, a thicker undergrowth with spiny rattans, full bushes, vines, and briars will be encountered.

TRAINING

1. Our Battalion training order was rewritten in September with the goal of strengthening our training program. We concentrated our training toward those subjects considered of a priority nature by higher headquarters and designed to supplement our present mission in PHU BAI. An eye has also been kept on training for possible commitment near the DMZ. Training was conducted by the company at PHU BAI base designated Sparrow Hawk and Sparrow Hawk Reserve.

Another area of particular concern was NCO leadership. The CONUS rotation of trained and experienced NCO's brought about this problem area. Therefore, a NCO School was established and will commence the first week in October. Lesson plans were just coming in as September ended. See Enclosure (1).

2. Classes Conducted

a. Priority subjects taught during the month were:

- (1) Ambushes and night ambush firing (Div) 3430.1).
- (2) M-16: Functioning, care and cleaning.
- (3) Vietnamese customs and traditions
- (4) Patrolling (Div0 3430.1).

b. Other training conducted included:

- (1) Assult of a fortified position conducted on an ARVN live fire range.
- (2) Preparation of Demolition charges.
- (3) Functioning of the Flame thrower.

3. Formal Schools

a. Three marines returned from Formal school training.

- (1) One L/ CPL and one PFC attended Vietnamese Language School.
- (2) One L/ CPL attended Basic Ammo Technician School.

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NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL and other SPECIAL TYPES of WARFARE

1. NBC and other Special Types of Warfare.

- a. During September a new NBC SOP was written (Battalion Order 3400.1A). 1st Lt MATTHEWS has been appointed NBC Officer, and Sgt Meier who has a 5711 MOS has been appointed NBC NCO.
- b. The NBC Officer has become familiar with all the applicable directives and is presently planning a NBC training program to commence during October. See Enclosure (2).

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COMMAND AND CONTROL

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1. Command and Control

a. Mission. During the period 1 Sept to 30 Sept 1967 the Battalion was assigned the following mission.

- (1) Conduct extensive patrols and ambushes to deny the enemy freedom of movement and prevent interdiction of LOC's in the assigned operating area.
- (2) Assume command and control of Vital Area Base Defense.
- (3) Maintain close coordination of CAC operations, with emphasis on security and support.
- (4) On order conduct Golden Fleece Operations.
- (5) On order provide security forces for scheduled Rough Rider operations.
- (6) During daylight hours maintain Sparrow Hawk reaction force on 5 minute alert.
- (7) Provide support of village/hamlet election security.
- (8) On order conduct planned program of County Fair Operations.
- (9) Control and coordinate fire support for defense of GIA LE Combat Base.
- (10) Maintain rapid reaction capability to counter enemy attacks against low-level government structures.
- (11) Be prepared for security operations along Route # 1 PHU BAI to HAI VAN Pass in support of MCB upgrading project.
- (12) On order provide security for Hydrographic and/or topographic operations being conducted in areas contiguous to PHU BAI TAOR.
- (13) Support as required, combat operations being conducted in areas contiguous to PHU BAI TAOR.
- (14) Provide security for CB Rock Crusher/Bridge at NAM HOA.

b. Task Organization: During the reporting period the Battalion was Task Organized basically as follows:

2d Bn, 26th Marines(Rein)

LtCol D.B. CHAPLIN

H&S Co

Capt A.H. MULLIGAN

Co E (Rein)

Capt E.G. BREEDING

Co E

Det, H&S Co(-)

FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plt

Det, Med Plt

FAC Pty

Det, Comm Plt

FO Tm, "B" Btry, 1st Bn, 13th Mar

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~~DECLASSIFIED~~Co F (Rein)

Co F
 Det, H&S Co (-)
 FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plt
 Det, Med Plt
 FAC Pty
 Det, Comm Plt
 FO Tm, "B" Btry, 1st Bn, 13th Mar

Capt E. J. MARTIKKE

Co G (Rein)

Co G
 Det, HQ Co, 26th Mar
 Det, H&S Co (-)
 FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plt
 Det, Med Plt
 Sec, 81mm Mort Plt
 Det, Intel Sec
 FAC Pty
 Det, Flame Sec
 FO Tm, "B" Btry, 1st Bn, 13th Mar
 Scott Dog Tm, H&S Co 3d MP Bn, FMF

Capt A. J. WALKE

Co H (Rein)

Capt G. J. LATTIMORE

Co H
 Det, HQ Co, 26th Mar
 Det, H&S Co (-)
 FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plt
 Sec, 81mm Mort Plt
 Det, Flame Sec
 Det, Comm Plt
 Det, Intel Sec
 Det, Med Plt
 FAC Pty
 FO Tm, "B" Btry, 1st Bn, 13th Mar

OPCONCo L, 3d Bn, 26th Marines (Rein)

Capt R. CAMP

Co L
 Det, H&S Co
 Sec, 81mm Mort Plt
 Sec, 106mm RR Plt
 Det, Med Plt
 Det, Comm Plt
 Det, Sec Plt (Mess)
 3d Plt, Co B, 3d AT Bn
 1st Plt, "D" Btry, 1/44 Arty USA
 Det, ~~Co C~~, 3d Bn, 13th Mar

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~~DECLASSIFIED~~81mm Mortar Plt. H&S Co

2dLt J. R. MEEKS

106mm Recoilless Rifle Plt. H&S Co

SSgt W. O. NEWSON

Direct Support

D/1/44

Capt L. R. CLARK (USA)

c. COMMAND POSTS

- (1) Only two companies from 2/26 operate in the field at any one time. This is due to other committments within the PHU BAI Vital Area and convoy security. Therefore a rotation system has been established which allowed each company between 48 hours to one week to operate in their assigned sector.
- (2) The company assigned the southern sector of our operations normally has his Command Post at PHU LOC District Headquarters which includes the Army Advisor to the district chief, the Combined Action Company Commander, Hotel Company and the District Chief.
- (3) The company that operates in the other sector of the PHU BAI TAOR usually locates his Command Post at Combined Action Platoon Two Hotel Company, because it is centrally located for control pruposes.

d. Attachments and detachments: Lima Company, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines OPCON on 17 September.

e. Control

- (1) All companies are controlled by radio and/or land line from the Combat Operations Center located within the PHU BAI Vital Area. The two companies which remain in PHU BAI Vital Area are controlled by land line and do not guard the Battalion Tac Net. The two companies deployed in the field both guard the tac net and can also communicate via the Combined Action Platoons located within their sector of operations.
- (2) The primary difficulty of control is inherent in the mission assigned. In order to provide saturation patrolling throughout the PHU BAI TAOR units must be spread over relatively large distances. Therefore radios on occasion have difficulty reaching the COC, causing us to relay from OPs located in high ground in the TAOR.

f. Problem areas

- (1) These are two problem areas. The first, the weather, has caused us to rotate our companies oftener than desired. This problem is encountered only with the advent of the monsoon season.

The second problem area is mobility. Due to the size of [REDACTED] of operation, limited helicopter support, availability of trucks and distances involved, it is extremely difficult to mass sufficient troops to meet threats or targets of opportunity. Added flexibility and mobility would greatly improve our ability to accomplish our mission more effectively. See Enclosure (3).

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CLOSE COMBAT

1. Close Combata. Operations conducted(1) Patrols

(a) Saturation patrolling by platoon and squads was conducted throughout the PHU BAI TAOR pursuant with our mission. Platoon patrol bases are established during daylight with squad size patrols radiating from the base. At darkness each platoon breaks into three squad ambushes and moves clandestinely out into pre-reconnciered ambush sites. See enclosure (3). Squad ambushes are utilized in order to provide greater coverage within the TAOR.

One successful squad ambush occurred on the night of 27 Sept 67 when Corporal Melchesedic Jackson's reinforced squad ambushed approximately forty VC. The marine squad called illumination, gained fire superiority and finally drove the VC from the field after a forty-five minute fire fight. A MedEvac was called in to evacuate three WIA and 1 KIA. A reaction squad from a combined action platoon came to their assistance. A sweep of the killing zone revealed seventeen (17) enemy KIA. The squad had to fight for the bodies as the VC continued the fight off and on. Finally the VC broke contact. See Enclosures (3) and (8).

(2) Operations

(a) Platoon operations consisted of Company E (-) working with the PBRs during the Green Wave operation. Navy PBRs were assigned to operate in the GAI HAI lagoon to prevent VC water traffic and to work in conjunction with friendly troops in area. From 18 to 29 Sept Company E made liaison and planned two reinforced platoon type operations. On 23 and 24 Sept respectively the company was landed and provided fire support by the PBRs. However no contact was made in either case. See Enclosure (4)

(b) A company size operation was conducted on 24 Sept when intelligence sources indicated that 100 to 200 VC were moving through the center of the PHU BAI TAOR. Company F, which was located in the vicinity of suspected contact was reinforced with a platoon from Company G. Squad and platoon size ambyses were established. Contact was made which resulted in 1 KIA(c) and 5 KIA(p) VC. It appeared the VC carried off many other casualties. See Enclosure (5).

We continued to provide a company minus for all Rough Rider convoys to either Camp Evans or Dong Ha as the primary infantry security element.

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(c) The lone Battalion operation was our participation in Operation LIBERTY which lasted from 30 August to 5 Sept. This operation was designed to prevent enemy interference with the National Vietnamese elections by interdicting and denying enemy access to populated area on Route #1.

(d) One joint operation was run with ARVN forces along the northern portion of the PHU TU TAOR on 20 Sept 67. Marine forces involved consisted of a company minus, reinforced. The ARVN forces were conducting a sweep of the PHU TU peninsula while the marines secured the left flank. See Enclosure (6).

b. Significant Events.

(1) Sequential listing of all contacts, and results attained.
(See enclosure 7).

01 Sept 67 At 0108H Phu Bai Vital Area came under mortar and small arms fire. Received estimated 90 Rds of 82mm Mortar and 20 to 30 Rds SAF. At 0125H counter mortar fire commenced, ceased counter mortar at 0130H. Results 131st AVN Co, USA, 1 KIA and 3 WIA, FLSG-A USMC 3 KIA, 27 WIA, 155 Gun Btry USMC 3 WIA, HQ Bn USMC 19 WIA, PMO USMC 3 WIA.

At 0800H Hotel Company sweeping area of suspected mortar sites which mortared Phu Bai at 010108H Sept 67 found 3 mortar positions with aiming stakes vic ZD 887111. Several increments found in area. Also found 1-81mm mortar Rd which was blown in place.

At 0934H 2/26 minesweep security truck hit mine at vic AT 876984, resulting in 3 USMC WIA, 1 MedEvac.

At 1015H X0 2/26 reported that bus hit mine at AU 863999, killing 9 civilians and wounding nine.

02 Sept 67 At 1545H Company H picked up 1 male VN about 20-25 years of age with no ID card who was observing Plts movement. Turned detainee into CAC-A3 for questioning.

03 Sept 67 At 0120H CAC-H1 reported that VC hit ballot box outside of CAC-H1's compound with 6 or 7 60mm mortar Rds and SAF. PF's returned fire, enemy broke contact.

At 0645H to 0745H, X0 2/26 vic ZD 097007 reported enemy fired 30-50-Rds 82mm mortars from vic ZD 095991 and ZD 115973. Appeared to be one gun at each coord. During attack all TACP freq. were jammed. Incoming Rds contained #2 bird shot. Fired 10 Rds 81mm counter battery fire, enemy fire ceased. Two vehicles and several tents received minor damage. 1 VN child killed, 2 children wounded, 3 USN WIA, 2 USMC WIA. (all inf.nor).

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03 Sept 67

At 0845H CAC-H6 reported that 1 VN female was wounded by VC Booby Trap at vic ZD 155019. Woman was brought to CAC-H6 for medical assistance, but died.

At 0930H CAC-A6 reported that a grenade exploded in market place vic YD 818183. Approx. 15 minutes later a grenade exploded at YD 822180. VN girl's body was found, believed she stepped on a mine, which caused explosion.

At 1000H CAC-H6 reported 3 60mm Mortars landed vic ZD 142009. Two VN women were wounded. Both women were brought to CAC-H6 for treatment, one died of wounds, the other was treated and Med-Evacated to A-Med.

At 1025H CAC-H6 reported that 2 mortar Rds landed outside CAC-H6 CP. Village officials said that mortar positions were at ZD 162987. Arty mission called with good coverage. There were no casualties.

At 1520H Company F found a suspected wounded VC harboring in a hut at vic ZD 142003. Suspect was taken to CAC-H6, after interrogation determined to be a innocent civilian.

At 1605H CAC-H7 received 6-8 60mm mortar Rds which hit near bridge vic ZD 806996. Arty mission called with good target coverage. There were no casualties.

At 1620H Company F patrol apprehended a VC female suspect, in a church at ZD 143008. Suspect was taken to CAC-H6 to be treated and MedEvacated.

At 2110H CAC-A HQRS, received approx. 5-6 82mm mortars and small arms attack from side of compound. Main attack was a late ambush at vic YD 841175 set off by patrol from Cau Vue. Enemy came from South and fled North.

04 Sept 67

At 0400H Hq Bn, sector "B" heard movement outside the perimeter wire. A pop-up flare was fired and 3 people were observed running from wire. Opened fire, and checked area at first light finding 2 bodies 40 meters from wire. Both bodies were identified by a Captain Hoe of the ARVNS, who said that the 2 victims were AWOL and lived in a Village near by.

At 0840H CAC-H6 and Company F received 3 unknown type mortar Rds from suspected enemy vic ZD 141001. Swept area with negative results. 1 USMC WIA (minor).

At 2115H Company E ambushed 10 VC on Hwy #1 at ZD 055022, 2 VC seen fall. Area searched with negative results. 2 VC KIA(P).

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05 Sept 67
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At 0530H VC blew up bridge at YD 839176. Bridge security did not observe any VC. Believe bridge blown by VC underwater team.

At 0800H Operation Liberty Terminated.

At 1430H CAC-H3 reported VC released 5 VN that had been kidnapped prior to the elections. VN informed Hamlet Chief that there were Approx 100 VC in grid square YC 9598.

09 Sept 67

At 1000H CAC-H3 reported that 11 water buffalo were killed yesterday by a Marine Unit. An investigation is being held by CAC-H.

At 1230H Company H found 2 105 Rds and 2 aerial rockets at YD 890051. Rockets appear to be of U.S. make. Rockets and 105 Rds destroyed in place. Full description of rockets forwarded to G-2.

At 2205H CAC-H1B made contact with 5 VC at YD 923104. VC returned 50 - 100 Rds of automatic fire then broke contact and headed in a North-Easterly direction. Results of incident, 1 PF KIA and 2 VC KIA(c). Captured 1 AK-47, 1 cartridge belt, 2 small notebooks, 2 magazines, $\frac{1}{2}$ lb of TNT, small bag of rice, civilian clothing, 1 set of utilities, poncho, extra ammo and personal belongings.

10 Sept 67

At 2100H CAC-H2 opened fire on 12 VC at YD 945027. Results of action 1 VC KIA(c) and one AK-50 captured.

11 Sept 67

At 0300H at YD 820181 CAC-A6/9 received 12 direct hits with AP6-2 rockets, approx. 20 Satchel Charges, and 8 Rifle Grenades. CAC-A6/9 returned fire. Results of Action 5 USMC KIA, 10 USMC WIA, 3 PF's WIA, destroyed structures in compound, 5 buildings, 2 bunkers, front gate, and all radio communication. There were 8 VC KIA(p).

At 11430H, MP Bn reported 1 USMC firing at MP manning South Checkpoint. A CB in Sector D shot the Marine doing the firing in the shoulder. Results 1 non-battle casualty.

At 1930H in the vic YD 781132 3rd Eng. Bn received sniper rounds. Arty mission called, sniper fire ceased. Results of action, 1 USMC WIA and Med Evacuated, Results of enemy unknown.

At 2140H CAC-H2 patrol ambushed 7 VC at YD 947065. VC fled in Southerly direction. Supt area with negative results.

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11 Sept 67 At 2315H, YD781132 3rd Eng Bn received 7 to 8 60mm Rds, also automatic and semi-automatic SAF. Returned SAF and called Arty mission. Results of action: 1 USMC WIA.

13 Sept 67 At 0330H, Company H patrol at YD898097 made contact with 30 VC, exchanged fire at 100 meters. VC broke contact and fled Southwest. Swept area with negative results.

At 0845H, YD836196, Company F detonated a pressure type Booby Trap on trail. Results: 1 USMC WIA.

At 1925H, ZC883998, a patrol from Company G was ambushed from hedge row. Patrol assaulted through ambush. Results of action: 3 VC KIA(c), 2 USMC WIA.

At 2200H, YD863150, 30 VC commenced firing on CAC-Al's PE's village. CAC-Al called in fire mission and then went to check the area. They then received 200-300 SAF, VC fled area in a northerly direction, a secondary mission called. PF's of CAC-Al researched area of contact. Villagers reported observing VC retreating North with 6 enemy KIA. 2 VC and 4 Regional Forces and also 3 WIA's. KIA's were caused by second fire mission. Results: 6 Enemy KIA(p).

At 0840H while minesweep proceeded down Route #1 at ZD134010, VC detonated 6 155mm Artillery Rds which had been placed along road as mines. There were no casualties. Minesweep incident was followed immediately by a mortar attack on CAC-H6. At this time CAC-H7 had made contact and CAC-H7A patrol had made contact at AU205025. 100 VC were estimated in the area. A Reactionary Force from CAC-H7 was sent to assist CAC-H7A who were pinned down by enemy fire. Enemy then broke contact and sporadic enemy fire was received with no effect. Results of incidents: FR/KIA 2 USMC, 1 PF, FR/WIA 3 USMC, 2 PF. MedEvac 4. 2 VC KIA(c), 15-20 KIA(p). Captured 1 Chi-Com grenade, rifle grenade and 1 satchel charge.

At 2125H, YD975050, 7-10 VC walked into CAC-H8B's ambush. Ambush initiated by a Claymore mine, VC returned 200-300 Rds small arms fire plus 2 grenades, then broke contact. Results of Action: 1 Enemy KIA(c), 3 Enemy KIA(p). Captured 1 SKS Carbine Rifle, 1 cartridge belt, 20 Rds 7.62 Chi-Com and 2 Chi-Com grenades. 1 USMC and 1 PF WIA (Minor).

14 Sept 67 At 140415H Vic YD892088, H3 initiated ambush on 10 VC. Fired 250 M-60 Rds, 500 M-16, 4 M-79 and one grenade, VC returned 25 Rds small arms and disbursed. Searched area at 1st light, resulting in 1 enemy KIA(c). Captured 1 AK-47 w/magazine, 150 lb. pack of rice and medical supplies. 2 KIA(p).

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14 Sept 67

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At 0915H, 3rd SP Bn found 10 82mm Chi-Com Rds at [REDACTED] and YD 823137. Also markers constructed of mounds of rock, bamboo, and grass arrows pointed in direction of Gia Le Combat Base. Rds were 2 to 3 months old and were destroyed in place.

At 2015H, YD 995072, CAC H2 and Company H patrol fired on 12 VC. Enemy disbursed. Sweep of area revealed 1 Enemy KIA(c). Captured 1-K50, Cartridge belt with NVA buckle, 1 rice carrying bag and one raincoat.

15 Sept 67

At 1015H, vic AU 804051 patrol from Company G received fire from 2-4 VC while crossing bridge. Returned fire and VC broke contact. Swept area with negative results. 1 USMC WIA and medevaced by vehicle.

At 1015H, vic YD 912093, Company H Plt was charged by 3 water buffaloes. Fired on water buffaloes killing one. One USMC wounded by buffalo and medevaced.

16 Sept 67

At 0920H in vic YD 831210 a patrol from Company F detonated anti-personnel mine. Results 1 USMC WIA.

At 1140H vic YD 831196 a patrol from Company F detonated a well camouflaged pressure type booby trap, resulting in 1 USMC WIA. (MedEvaced)

At 2000H in vic ZD 094003 a patrol from Company G enroute to ambush site received fire from undetermined number of VC. Patrol returned fire and observed 4 VC fall. Company G dispatched 2 reaction forces and also received fire at ZD 096998. Assaulted through area with Neg. results. Returned to first encounter and observed 1 VN running. Detained same. Results of action 6 USMC WIA (MedEvaced), 1 USMC WIA minor, 1 non-battle casualty 4 VC KIA(p).

17 Sept 67

At 0030H CAC-H5 in vic ZD 085011 saw 1 VN boat moving towards their ambush point. Boat contained 1 VN suspect with no I.D. card. Suspect had piece of paper and 30 dollars. Detainee taken to CAC-H5.

At 0215H, CAC-H7 compound at ZD 201010 received incoming B-40 rockets fired from ZD 198015 by approx. 4-5 VC. Compound received small arms and M-79 Rds. CAC-H7 and Company G defended compound with SAF and mortar fire.

At 0930H L Co 3/26 OPCON 2/26.

At 2100H, CAC-H3 reported VC kidnapped 3 VN males from NAM-PHU-CAN vic YD 963051. Checked area with negative results.

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18 Sept 67 At 0720H minesweep truck hit 105 Rd. mine vic ZD 068012. Results: 5 USMC WIA. Truck badly damaged.

19 Sept 67 At 1815H CAC-H3 reported that a PF at bridge, vic YD 963067, killed himself accidentally with a grenade. PF's and ARVN handled burial.

At 1930H Company F patrol made contact with 5 VC. VC fled west. 1 KIA(p).

At 2105H L Company 3/26 patrol spotted 3 VC in the water and 2 more on the bank of river vic YD 754142. Patrol fired, 1 VC fell into the water. Checked area and found $\frac{1}{4}$ lb TNT primed. 1 KIA(p)

20 Sept 67 At 0700H CAC-H5 reported that the man captured from the MAC-V compound a month ago was reported being seen at vic ZC 079984 and ZC 083984. He was reported saying he did not want to return to the Americans. He is a Negro American Army Sgt. Man was seen at 1700H with Approx. 20 VC with Small arms, he was not armed. Information received from Village Chief.

At 0930H Company E patrol came across 15 VN males and 2 females carrying wood cutting gear towards the mountains. Kit Carson Scouts believe one was an ARVN Draft Dodger or VC Detainee had no I.D. and was taken to PMO.

At 1105H MCB-74 had an industrial accident. A chain snapped and hit a CB across back, resulting in lacerations across the back and internal bleeding. Man Med-Evacuated.

At 2050H Company F patrol made contact with undetermined number of VC at YD 956076. Patrol opened fire with SAF, claymores and M-26 grenades. Results: 3 VC KIA(c), captured 1 M-1 Carbine, 1 ChiCom bolt action 7.62mm Carbine with bayonet, 2 cartridge belts, 2 M-1 magazines, 1 AK-47 magazine, 2 uniforms with khaki trousers and green shirts, documents, list of names, and photos.

At 2055H CAC-H3 reported that friendly unit made contact at vic YD 953082. When firing illumination one round fell in hamlet around CAC-H3 CP. 5 VN treated for wounds.

21 Sept 67 At 0020H, 3d Tank Bn patrol ambushed 4 VC at YD 836169. Results 2 VC KIA(p).

At 1730H Company E reported one man was bitten by a rat. Man sent to BAS following morning for treatment.

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21 Sept 67 At 2015H CAC-H8 PFs ambushed 30 VC at vic YD 976048. Swept area and found 1 VC KIA(c). Captured 1 SKS-44 weapon.

At 2200H Company F patrol made contact with 15 VC with automatic weapons carrying rice at vic YD 916101. Results: 4 USMC WIA, 3 Med-Evacated (1 minor) 4 enemy KIA(p), 1 detainee picked up and turned over to PMO.

22 Sept 67 At 0400H CAC-H8 patrol firing on enemy wounded 2 VN children. Children Med-Evacuated to A-Med.

23 Sept 67 At 0905H Company E while providing security on two vehicles heading east, second CB vehicle side-swiped 2 vehicles from Recon. Results: 1 USMC suffered broken arm and was Med-Evacuated. Minor damage to vehicles.

At 1300H CAC-H5 was informed by villagers that a VC was killed 2 days ago at ZC 084999. CAC-H5 checked area and found 1 dead VC and 1 M-1 Carbine. PRUs made contact in that area 2 nights ago and were credited with kill.

At 1600H CAC-H3 reported one VC turned himself and one weapon into CAC-H3 CP vic YD 967064. VC turned over to CIT.

At 2140H CAC-H7 reported that Thua Lum Bridge, vic ZD 201011, received SAFF from estimated VC squad. Manned perimeter and returned fire. Results 1 VC KIA(p).

24 Sept 67 At 0010H PFs from CAC-H6 initiated ambush on 7 VC entering house at vic ZD 013019. Results 1 VC KIA(c) and 2 KIA(p). 3 PF WIA. Captured 1 AK-47 and 1 9mm pistol, 3 AK-47 magazines and 900 piasters.

At 1130H CAC-H3 reported that 2 VC that wanted to Chieu Hoi were re-captured by 30 VC at 0900H vic YD 960080. Villagers told CAC-H3A that VC came in by boat from Phu Thu and left in same direction. CAC-H3A went to get Chieu Hoi with negative results. Patrol returned with 1 VN woman who might be VC. Detainee turned over to CIT for interrogation.

At 1520H 3d Tank Bn patrol made contact with 2 VC on trail at vic YD 831166. Results 1 VC KIA(c). Captured 1 7.62 ChiCom weapon, 1 M-26 grenade and 1 poncho. 2 civilian detained and taken to Division CIT.

At 1600H CAC-H4 reported 1 VN female age 11 was killed vic ZD 015033. Enemy fire was observed by AO in area. [redacted] contact in area reported.

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24 Sept 67 At 2250H Company F patrol ambushed 3 VC vic YD 908112. Results 1 VC KIA(p).

25 Sept 67 At 0300H CAC-H3B sighted 110-115 VC moving South vic YD 957077, then fired on another group of approx. 100-105 VC. Results 2 VC KIA(c). Captured 1 AK-47 and 1 AK-50, 4 bags of rice and hats.

At 0500H Company F patrol ambushed unknown number of VC vic YD 942068. Swept area and found 1 VC KIA(c). At 0745H villagers informed PFs that 1 VC wounded in last night's action was hiding in Venh-Vy vic YD 942067. Company F and H 2 Actual brought VC to CAC-H2 for treatment. VC said his unit was K-4 Plt 804th B Battalion, and that there were 14 VC killed or wounded. Results of over all contact 1 KIA(c), 14 KIA(p), and 1 POW. Captured Cartridge belt, 30 Rds AK-47 ammo, and 2 blocks TNT.

At 1145H CAC-H2 received information from villager in Ha Chan vic YD 957098 that 1 VC was wounded last night and requested aid from them. Patrol sent out and found 1 VC not wounded. POW turned over to CIT. Captured 2 ChiCom grenades, 1 NVA belt and buckle, 2 canteens, and 1 poncho.

At 1500H 3d Tank Bn patrol fired on one VC at YD 835169. Results 1 VC KIA(p). Civilians informed patrol that VC killed was Chinh, a 17 year old from village of Phuong Lam.

At 1600H Company F patrol found 1 VC mortar site at vic YD 943035. Mortar site was 6 feet in diameter. Also found 1 M-26 grenade which was blown in place.

At 1935H Company E patrol while moving into ambush site made contact with 15 enemy moving in Southeast direction at ZD 200860. 1 VC was seen to fall. Results 2 USMC WIA (minor) and 1 VC KIA(p).

At 2100H CAC-H8B patrol heard movement to rear of ambush site. Threw 1 grenade and fired approx 70 Rds SAF. PFs and rear security had been mistaken for VC. Results: 1 PF WIA.

At 2200H CAC-H8 reported that 3 VC kidnapped a 18 year old VN boy vic YD 982083. VC came and departed by boat.

26 Sept 67 At 0145H L/3/26 was probed by suspected enemy, received 1 ChiCom grenade and SAF. Returned fire and swept area finding 1 bloody M-26 grenade. Result of action 1 USMC WIA and 1 VC KIA(p).

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26 Sept 67

At 2330H CAC-H7 81mm fired 3 Rds of HE H&I at vic AU 809019. Checked out area and found 7 civilians killed and 11 wounded. 2 Rds were direct hits on house, 3rd Rd hit 10 meters short of house. All people were in house. There was some kind of meeting being held and VC were present. Found blood trails, believed to be where VG had carried off bodies in Northeast direction Resulting in 1 VC KIA(p).

27 Sept 67

At 0320H CAC-A7 and Special Forces reported seeing several VC reconning ambush site. At 0510H VC launched an assault lasting 45 minutes. Sweep of area revealed much blood and drag marks. 6 Chinese mercenaries WIA.

At 0400H Company H ambush sank 1 Sampan with 2 people aboard in stream near village of Thon Ha Vind vic YD 956085. Ambush received fire which appeared to be M-79 grenade. Swept area and found 30 50 lb sacks of rice in burlap bags with "AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP" written on the sides. VN reported that VC come to this hamlet every 5 days to pick up rice. Rice taken to CAC-H3.

At 0500H 3d MT Bn gate guard challenged a person 40 meters from his postion then received approx. 15 Rds SA. Sentry returned fire with negative results. Guard was wounded in leg.

At 1600H CAC-H1 treated 1 VN woman for shrapnel wounds. Woman believed to be VC sympathizer. Detainee taken to PMO for interrogation.

At 1800H CAC-H7 and Company G at AU 817047 found 5½ 55 gallon drums of rice, syringes, and several bottles of unknown medicine. Rice destroyed as per instructions of District Chief. Other supplies taken to CAC-H7.

At 2115H a squad from Company H at YD 904097 ambushed approx. 40 VC moving North to South. Company H patrol fired 2000 M-16 Rds, 50 .45 Cal Rds, 20 M-26 grenades, 40 M-79 Rds and 1000 M-60 MG Rds. VC returned 300 SA and 12 grenades. Results: 1 USMC KIA, 5 USMC WIA, (3 Med-Evac) 17 enemy KIA(c), 3 KIA(p), 2 POW. Weapons captured: 9 AK-47s, 3 SKS carbines, 16 AK-47 magazines, 9 ChiCom grenades and miscellaneous 782 gear.

At 2115H Company H and CAC-H2 with sniper team from 26th Marines observed 2-4 VC standing on Road. VC fired either 1 rifle grenade or M-79 Rd. Returned 200 SA. Sniper hit 1 VC results 1 enemy KIA(p).

28 Sept 67

At 2115H CAC-A2 made contact with 2 to 3 VC, vic YD 909157. Results 1 VC KIA(p), Captured 1 M-1 Carbine.

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29 Sept 67

At 0225H CAC-A OP at YD 846173 received 3 Rds 82mm mortars or B-40 rockets. OP also received 2 Plastic Shape Charges. PFs returned fire. Seacrched area with negative results.

At 1200H CAC-H3 reported that a wounded VC with ~~weapon~~ turned himself in as a Chieu Hoi at YD 950050. Chieu Hoi turned over to CIT for investigation and medical treatment.

At 2000H Company G patrol was ambushed by unknown number of VC while enroute to ambush site vic ZD 193006. Received 2 concussion grenades. Patrol spotted 3 VC and pursued with negative results. 4 USMC WIA (minor)

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LOGISTICS

1. Logistics

During the month of September battalion supply continued to support the activities of this unit in the defense of Phu Bai. Every effort was made to obtain those critical items needed to take motor transport and communications equipment off deadline. Due to heavy requisitioning for the monsoon season, two requests for additional funds for SFA expenditures were submitted to Commanding General, 3d Marine Division. A total of 30 antennas 27A and 18 antenna bases AB591 were received from FLC. However, these items remain in short supply. 300 magazine assemblies for M16 rifle were obtained, but there will still be a need for them in the future.

The magazine assemblies of .45 cal. pistols remain on priority 02 requisitions which continue to be unfilled. Cleaning material for the M16, though received in limited quantity this month, is also short in supply. Again this month the battalion's requisitions for seven PRC-25 radios and one 60mm mortar base plate remain unfilled. Light weight utilities were received in the quantity of 800. Small sizes are still a problem to obtain. Fortification material has been obtained in sufficient amounts from FLSG "A". The magnetic compass continues to be a critical item and is on order in the quantity of 90. Black cushion sole socks and I.D. tags are also critical items. The maintenance situation for the month of September is still in poor shape. There are five vehicles deadlined to 2nd echelon maintenance and 13 deadlined to 3rd echelon. The sole cause of the continuing deadlines is the lack of repair parts support. Electrical power supply continues to be provided by FLSG "A". "A" rations are fed to companies while they are in the rear. Ice cream is available on a semi-regular basis. This battalion is presently using one 600 and one 100 cubic foot reefer. The other 100 cubic foot reefer had been code X. The battalion is furnished two, sometimes three trucks each morning for household purposes. There has been no problem procuring transportation for tactical purposes. Requests for helicopter support for Recon and resupply have been met completely.

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COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONIC CHRONOLOGY

1. Communication elements of this command operated and maintained continuous communications in the PHU BAI enclave.

a. Wire

- (1) Provide internal wire communications for the command posts.
- (2) Wire equipment is totally committed.
- (3) All equipment failures have been coped with and corrected without delay.

b. Radio

- (1) Radio has been the primary means of communications for field operations and the PHU BAI Perimeter.
- (2) Radio sets, AN/PRC-25, continue to provide good communications.
- (3) Accessories for radio sets, AN/PRC-25 are no longer a serious problem.
- (4) Repair parts for radio sets, AN/PRC-25 are in shortage; thus preventing our repair facility from promptly returning those radios in need of electronic maintenance.

c. Message Center. No major problems.

d. No radio relay problems.

e. Maintenance and Supply. The following combat essential equipment is deadlined:

- (1) AN/MRC-83 - 1
- (2) AN/MRC-87 - 1
- (3) AN/PRC-25 - 6
- (4) AN/PRC-47 - 2

f. Problem Area. Personnel shortages.

- (1) 2591 (E-8) 1
- (2) 2815 2
- (3) 1341 1

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FIRE SUPPORT AND FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION

1. Artillery Units Providing Support/Reinforcing Fires

a. Direct Support

1. "B" Btry, 1st Bn, 13th Marines

b. General Support

1. "L" Btry, 4th Bn, 12th Marines

2. 1st 155 Gun Btry (SP), 4th Bn, 12th Marines

2. Naval Ships Providing Naval Gunfire Support. None.

3. Type and Number of Missions Fired

a. Artillery

(1) Observed Missions	43
(2) Unobserved Missions	14
(3) H&I Fires	1905
(4) Group Fires	0
(5) Neutralization Fires	0
(6) Prep Fires	0
(7) Training/Practice Fires	0
(8) Defensive Fires	1
(9) Registration Fires	0

b. Naval Gunfire. None.

c. 81mm Mortars

(1) Observed Missions	24
(2) Unobserved Missions	28
(3) H&I Fires	3027
(4) Group Fires	0
(5) Neutralization Fires	2

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(6) Prep Fires 0

(7) Training/Practice Fires 4

(8) Defensive Fires 2

(9) Registration Fires 0

d. 106mm Recoilless Rifle. None.

e. 60mm Mortars. Data Not Available.

4. Ammunition Expenditure by Type and Caliber

a. Artillery

(1) 105mm Howitzer

HE	3122
WP	12
ILL	1280
SMK	0

(2) 155mm Howitzer and 155mm Gun (SP)

155 How: 155 Gun (SP):

HE	784	HE	501
WP	24	WP	0
ILL	210	ILL	140
SMK	0	SMK	0

b. 81mm Mortars

HE (med)	3721
HE (light)	106
WP	45
ILL	1118

c. 40mm (Twin 40's). Data Not Available.

d. Naval Gunfire. None.

5. Significant Events

a. 010108H - PHU BAI BASE and VITAL AREA hit by enemy mortar attack. Counter-mortar plans fired by B-1-13 and supporting arms. Resulted in ceasing enemy fire.

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b. 202045H - B-1-13 and "L" 4/12 fired 601 rounds of illumination for F/2/26 while in contact. Resulted in 2 En KIA(c) and numerous weapons and equipment.

c. It is noted that KIA's were doubled for this month due to numerous reports of enemy activity.

m. d. B-1-13 is credited with an assist and a well done for illumination fired for Hotel Company when in contact which resulted in 17 En KIA(c).

COMBAT AIR SUPPORT

1. Combat Air Support

a. Close Air Support and daily logistics was supplied by the squadrons of the 1st Marine Air Wing.

b. Events during period 1 September to 30 September 1967

1 Sep At 0835H, routine request for TAOR to be run at 021300H - cancelled.
At 1020H, priority medevac for 1 US, pick up coord AT 8798.
At 1020H, routine request for resupply for Golf Co 2/26, destination at coord YD 098087, cargo - 1,460 lbs.
At 1025H, routine request for resupply for Foxtrot Co 2/26, destination at coord YD 830050. Cargo 0/3400 lbs.
At 1245H, emergency request for medevac for 3/0 U.S. pick up at coord YD 950007. Complete at 011311H.
At 1510H, priority request for AO to work with Golf Co 2/26 destination at coord YD 898073.
At 1655H, routine request for AO to work with people in Phu Loc.
Asked to check out ZC 072933.

2 Sep At 1830, emergency request medevac for 1/0 pick up coord ZC 098006 complete at 021910H.

3 Sep At 0200H, routine request for AO to work with Echo Co 2/26, cancelled.
At 1004H, routine request for admin/flight 4/pass picked up one pass at YD 858088 it was cancelled.
At 1030H, routine request for resupply for Hill 230 1/5160 complete at 010900H.
At 1200H, emergency request for resupply for Phu Loc area. Complete at 031507H.
At 1300H, routine request for AO to check out coord ZD 139021.
At 1630H, priority request for medevac for 1/0 U.S. pick up coord YD 968024, complete at 031725H.
At 2145H, priority request for AO to work for B/1/13 on conduct of fire net. Complete at 2400H.

4 Sep At 0810H, routine request for TAOR/admin 5/0 to be run at 051300H, S-3.

5 Sep Routine request for TAOR/admin 4/0 to be run at 061300H - S-3. This was cancelled. Requested at 050905H.
At 1125H, priority request for AO to checkout coord ZC 098006. complete at 1500H.

6 Sep At 0900H, 1 priority and 1 emergency medevac. 2/0 pick up coord YD 858088 and YD 913055. Priority complete at 1150H and emergency complete at 0930H.
At 1000H, routine request for resupply to Hill 230 3270/25 pass to be run on 070700H. Complete at 070940H.
At 1000H, routine request for TAOR/admin 5/0 cancelled.

7 Sep Routine request for TAOR/admin 5/0 cancelled, at 0900H.

8 Sep At 0900H, routine request for TAOR/admin 5/0 run at 091300. Went to ZC 097007 to set down.

9 Sep At 0930H, routine request for TAOR/admin 5/0 run at 101300H. At 1130H, routine for AO to work in Phu Loc on station all night.

10 Sep At 1030H, routine request for resupply 097500. Hill 230 complete at 111030H. At 1040H, routine request for TAOR/admin. 5/0 to be run on 111300H. At 1100H, routine request for AO to work with Hotel 2/26 complete at 11430H.

11 Sep At 0625H, emergency request for AO to check out YD 8218, complete at 0745H. At 1115H, routine request for TAOR/admin 5/0 to be run on 141300H.

12 Sep At 0700H, routine request for TAOR/admin 5/0 run at 121300H. At 0930H, routine request for AO to check out coord ZC 146975. Complete at 1300H. At 1000H, emergency request for medevac 1/0 US pick up coord Hill 230. Complete at 1030H. At 1400H, priority request for AO - cancelled. At 1700H, routine request for resupply to Hill 230, 0/4000. Complete 130900H. At 2000H, emergency request for medevac 2/0 at coord ZD 097007.

13 Sep At 0830H, priority request for medevac 1/0 U.S. - cancelled. At 0845H, priority request for AO to check out AU 800010. Complete at 131015H. At 130945H, emergency request for medevac 1/0 called in for CAC-H7 complete at 131020H.

14 Sep At 1200H, routine request for TAOR/admin 5/0 cancelled. At 1735H, priority request for medevac at YC 888184. Complete at 141810H. At 1930H, routine request for TAOR/admin 5/0 destination ZD 047007. This was cancelled. At 2035H, priority request for AO to check out coord YD 968046 complete at 2205H.

15 Sep At 1024H, priority request for medevac at YD 912093. Complete at 151126H. At 1100H, priority request for AO to work with Golf Co. Checked out AU 805053. At 1230H, routine request for AO - cancelled. At 1400H, routine troop lift and emergency medevac at coord YC 888784. 43 troops lifted out, complete at 151510H. At 1630H, priority request for medevac 1/0 U. S. pick up coord at YD 738132. Complete at 151700H.

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15 Sep At 1830H, priority request for medevac 1/0 U.S. pick up coord YD 738130. Called in for 1/4. Complete at 151905H.

16 Sep At 0745H, routine request for AO to check out YD 8319. Complete at 0940H.
At 0910H, emergency request for medevac 1/0 U.S. pick up coord YD 831202. Complete at 0940H.
At 1015H, routine request for AO, to check out coord YD 831202. Complete at 1140H.
At 1145H, emergency request for medevac 1/0 U.S. pick up coord YD 835189. Complete at 1205H.
At 1330H, routine request for resupply 27/5700 for Hill 230 for 180700H.
At 2020H, emergency request for medevac 6/0 U.S. pick up coord ZD 097007, complete at 2200H.

17 Sep At 1000H, routine request for TAOR/admin 5/0 ran at 181300H.

18 Sep At 1515H, routine request for AO to check out perimeter request for times 1600 - 1930 and 2200 - 0630H.
At 1715H, routine request for TAOR/admin, run at 201300H.

19 Sep At 0720H, routine request for AO to check out AU 8109 - 8601. Complete at 1155H.
At 1300H, routine request for TAOR 5/0 for 201300H.
At 1710H, routine request for flight to take Chaplain off Hill 230. Complete at 201700H.
At 1710H, routine request for resupply to hill 230 32 up 27 back/4000. Complete at 211000H.

20 Sep At 1110H, emergency request for medevac 1/0 U.S. NBC pick up coord ZD 094006. Complete at 201206H.
At 1615H, routine request for TAOR 5/0 run at 211300H.
At 2215H, emergency request for a flareship to go to YD 9507. Complete at 210100H.
At 2200H, emergency request for ammo resupply 0/1000 destination coord YD 924085. Complete at 2345H.

21 Sep At 0800H, routine request for TAOR/admin run at 221300H.
At 1300H, routine request for resupply. 4/300 to Hill 230.
At 1915H, routine request for AO to work for Echo Co 2/26 checked out coord ZD 130815. Complete at 1206H.
At 2300H, emergency request for medevac 4/0 U.S. YD 916097, complete at 220030H.

22 Sep At 0030H, emergency request for resupply to Foxtrot Co 2/26 at YD 923084, complete at 0105H.
At 0220H, priority request for flareship to work with Foxtrot 2/26 at coord YD 962051. Complete at 0325H.

23 Sep At 1910H, routine request for resupply to Hill 230 0/5800. Complete at 250943H.

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24 Sep At 0730H, routine request for TAOR/admin 5/0 run at 251300H.
At 1045H, emergency request for medevac 1/0 U.S. ill pick up
coord YD 740134 (Rock Crusher) complete at 1057H.

25 Sep At 0400H, priority request for AO to check out a couple of villages
complete at 1140H.
At 1610H, routine request for AO to check out coord ZC 097936 to
ZC 097930 east to ZC 110936 to ZC 110930. This was cancelled.
At 1930H, routine request for resupply to Hill 230 0/3600 run at
271000H, complete at 271114H.

26 Sep At 0135H, emergency request for medevac, pick up coord YD 740134,
complete at 0203H.
At 0920H, routine request for AO to check out coord ZC 1093,
complete at 1115H.
At 1707H, routine request for resupply to Hill 230 run at 281300H.

27 Sep At 1825H, routine request for medevac 1/0 civilian at YD 925104
went to Hue Hospital. Complete at 1855H.
At 2245H, emergency request for medevac for Hotel Co 2/26 at YD 903095.
Complete at 2400H. There was 3 WIA - U.S. and 1 KIA U.S.

28 Sep At 0715H, routine medevac for 2 WIA NVA suspects pick up coord
YD 903097. Complete at 0800H.
At 1000H, routine request for TAOR/admin 5/0 run at 281315H.
At 1000H, routine request for TAOR/admin 5/0 run at 291300H.
At 1110H, routine request for AO - cancelled.
At 1900H, emergency request for medevac 3/0 U.S. at ZD 095004,
complete at 1947H.

29 Sep 291135H, routine request for AO to check out YD 957026. Complete
at 1200H.

30 Sep At 1000H, routine request for TAOR/admin 5/0 run at 301300H.
At 1000H, routine request for TAOR/admin 5/0 run at 011300H.
At 1940H, routine request for resupply 0/1636 for Hill 230.
Run at 020700H.
At 1740H, routine request for TAOR/admin 5/0 for 021300H.

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MEDICAL AND DENTAL SUPPORT

A. Name of Surgeon: LT Bruce D. Mason MC USNR

B. Significant Events: Nothing of significance to report.

C. Medical Trends: The Medical Ward has the capacity for 10 patients and between 30 to 40 patients are seen daily at Sickcall.

D. Number of Battle Casualties: 00

E. Number of Non-battle patients treated: 792

- (1) Admissions to BAS: 17
- (2) Emergency treatment:
 - (a) Heat Casualties: 5
 - (b) Lacerations: 20
 - (c) Trauma: 10
 - (d) Burns: 7
- (3) Number of consultations to 3rd MedBn and NSA Hospitals: 42
- (4) Cases of significant diseases in the area:
 - (a) Malaria: 09
 - (b) Hookworm: 01
 - (c) Bacillary Dysentary: 00
- (5) Cases of Venereal Disease: 13
 - (a) Acquired out of country: 11
 - (b) Acquired in country: 02

F. Preventive Medicine and Sanitation:

- (1) Number of Inoculation: 434
- (2) Other: The use of mosquito repellent is in effect. All personnel are participating in the malaria prophylaxis program weekly, on Sundays, and have received instructions in Personal Hygiene.

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MEDICAL AND DENTAL SUPPORT

G. Civil Affairs Medical Support Rendered:

- (1) Number treated: 138
- (2) Referrals for corrective surgery: 00
- (3) A total of four (04) MedCap trips were made to the Village of Gau Hai in the month of September. A deworming treatment and vitamin therapy is automatically started on all local people seen.

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CHAPLAIN SUPPORT

1. CHAPLAIN SUPPORT FOR MONTH OF SEPTEMBER 1967

a. Name of Chaplain: Samir Jamil HABIBY, Lt, CHC, USNR

b. Number of Services, attendance and type:

(1) BATTALION SERVICES:

	No.	Attendance
(a) General Protestant	26	1025
(b) Holy Communion	12	133
(c) Lay Leader	1	25
(d) Roman Catholic	2	30
(Roman Catholic Services in the PHU BAI CP area are now all conducted at the 3d MARDIV CP Chapel - once daily, and twice on Sundays)		
Totals	41	1,213

(2) OTHER SERVICES:

(a) Episcopal Holy Communion	3	(DIV CP)	36
(b) Jewish Church Party	1		4
(c) Ec Orthodox Church Party	1		2
Total	3		42

(3) BATTALION CHAPLAIN HOSPITALIZED 11 September 1967

(a) The Battalion Chaplain provided religious coverage during his hospitalization and subsequent limited duty status through the following Chaplains: Chaplain's DAVIS, JOHNSON, RYAN, and WESTLING. Chaplains DAVIS and RYAN took services for men of the Battalion during their visits to the CAPS (NOTE: recorded above in totals)

c. Religious Instruction:	2 Classes	54
d. Indoctrination Lectures	2 Lectures	50
e. Counselling Sessions		35
f. Hospital and BAS Calls		21

g. Civic Action: (Materials given to S-5)

(a) People to People Clothing (Boxes)	2
(b) Several Hundred Cookies and Sweets for the MEAT/ITEM Festival at CAO KAI	
(c) Provided Sweets and Chewing Gum for the civilians wounded in the Mortar Incident	
h. Pocket Books Distributed to the Battalion	574
i. Comfort Items, Distributed to Battalion (Boxes)	5
J. Items (g), (h), and (i) above were received from Friends of the Battalion in the USA.	
k. Facilities and Motor Transportation - Adequate	

DECLASSIFIED

~~DECLASSIFIED~~Civil Affairs/Military Government/Community Relations.

1. Mission: To conduct a civic action program that will enhance the prestige of the civil government and to conduct psychological operations to further the efforts of the Government of Viet Nam in re-establishing its effective control over the people.

2. Civic Action Projects and Operations.

a. 1 Sept-30 Sept. The 2nd Battalion 26th Marines was responsible for Civil Affairs in the Village of Loc Tri. During that period the following Civic Action was conducted.

(1) The materials for a shower were taken to the Dispensary, the shower is now completed.

(2) An enlarged diagram was made of the Loc Tri area to be used for making future plans of projects in the adjoining hamlets.

(3) A Mid-Autumn Festival was conducted, 600 children and 150 adults attended the festival.

(4) Preparations were made to establish and start a Civil Affairs Program at Nam Hoa by I, Co, 3rd Bn, 26th Marines temporarily attached to 2nd Bn, 26th Marines.

(5) 57 Serious Incidents were investigated and solatium was paid. The Civil Affairs Officer visited all persons which were wounded and the family of the ones killed.

(6) MEDCAP by the Battalion Medical Officer and his team of Corpsmen treated 191 patients.

Psychological Operations for the month of Sept 1967.

a. 3,962,000 leaflets were dropped.

b. Aerial broadcasts 13 hours 10 minutes total broadcast time.

c. Approx 500 leaflets and newspapers were distributed hand to hand.

d. 1 film festival.

Remarks: The people of Loc Tri have been very receptive to the Civil Affairs Team. The Village Chief seems very pleased with the effort 2nd Bn, 26th Marines is making to enhance the prestige of his people. The Village is not secure from VC and the infrastructure has not been eliminated.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

Enclosures - - -

- ✓ 1 2d Battalion, 26th Marines Training Order and NCO School Bulletin.
- ✓ 2 2d Battalion, 26th Marines NBC S.O.P.
- ✓ 3 Map: Hue; Vietnam 1:50,000 sheet 6541 IV with overlays of day/night activities for 27 September 1967.
- ✓ 4 Operation Order 100-67
- ✓ 5 Operation Order 103-67
- ✓ 6 ARVN Operation Overlay

NIF - 7 Significant Events

- ✓ 8 Sketch of Corporal Jackson's ambush on 27 September
- ✓ 9 Operation Order 96-67

10. County Fair Operation Report, dated 16 Sep 1967

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS

2d Battalion, 26th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco, 96602

BnO 1500.1B
3/GFK/bjb
22 September 1967

BATTALION ORDER 1500.1B

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Training Program

Ref: (a) DivO 1510.3B
(b) ForceO 1560.1A
(c) DivO 1540.2
(d) DivO 3435.1B
(e) DivO 3430.1
(f) BnO 5101.1A
(g) Div (Fwd) Order 5100.1
(h) DivO 5511.2A
(i) DivO 8020.2
(j) DivO 5101.4

Encl: (1) Classroom/Field Training Inspection Report Form
(2) Sample Training Record/Report

1. Purpose. To provide units of this Battalion with a training program designed to prepare the individual, unit and Battalion for immediate deployment and combat.

2. Cancellation. BnO 1500.1A

3. Policy. The conduct of training will be in accordance with 2/26 SOP and policies outlined in this order.

a. General. All training will be oriented toward the type of operations being used by Marine Corps Forces in Vietnam. This training will include, but is not limited to, the following:

(1) Counterinsurgency Operations. To be effective, counterinsurgency operations must include an understanding of the limitations placed upon military operations by the local populace. All Marines must be thoroughly familiar with the political, economic, civic and psychological aspects of Vietnam.

(2) Counterguerrilla Operations. These operations are military actions of the armed forces of an established government and its allies against guerrilla forces. Training is required by companies of this Battalion in the tactics and techniques employed by infantry in counter-guerrilla operations.

Encl

BnO 1500-1B
22 September 1967

(3) Anti-guerrilla Operations. These operations are concerned with protection of command posts against guerrilla forces. All companies of this command will insure that their personnel are thoroughly trained in scouting and patrolling, local security, camouflage, blackout discipline, mines and booby traps, and march security.

(4) Civic Action Operations. Civic action is the program being used by Marine units to gain the support and confidence of the local population of Vietnam. Included in this program is the improvement of health, education, and welfare of the Vietnamese people. In return, we receive vital information concerning location, size, organization, etc., of the Viet Cong. This program is producing excellent results and company commanders are encouraged to familiarize all personnel of their command with the Civic Action Program.

(5) Ambush and Counter-ambush. Ambush is one of the most effective offensive tactics employed by guerrilla forces. Unit commanders will conduct as concurrent training ambush and counter-ambush exercises on both tactical and motor marches. Reference (e) publishes information concerning employment of ambushes which may be of assistance to operating companies.

(6) "Tactical Trends and Training Tips". These pamphlets are published under FMFM Pac Bulletin 1500 and contain information on lessons learned by Marine units in combat in the Republic of Vietnam. Battalion S-3 will distribute these to company commanders who will insure that they get the widest possible dissemination both during regularly scheduled training and, as time permits, on field exercises.

(7) Land Mine, Booby Traps, and Demolition Training, Phu Bai TAOR. Reference (c) requires that fire team leaders, squad leaders, platoon sergeants, Company Gunnery Sergeants, Platoon Commanders and Company Commanders attend subject course. The course is not limited to above mentioned personnel, but these personnel constitute the minimum personnel training requirement.

(8) Countermeasures against Mines and Booby Traps. Reference (d) outlines specific countermeasures to reduce the number of casualties resulting from mine/booby trap incidents. Company Commanders are directed to give wide and continued publicity to the contents of this order.

(9) In-country Training-Troop Indoctrination. In accordance with reference (a) and (b). Certain topics are to be presented to new arrivals in Vietnam indoctrination lectures/discussions. Company Commanders will notify the Battalion S-1 when an indoctrination period has been scheduled so that arrangements can be made with the CO, Surgeon, Chaplain, and Sgt Major. In-country Training-Troop Indoctrination will be inserted in record book when individual has been given lecture.

(10) Safety Regulations for Individual Weapons. Reference (g) and BnO 5101.1A establishes safety regulations and directs unit commanders to schedule classes at the lowest level on the contents of this order and such other safety precautions deemed necessary to insure maximum safety in weapons usage.

22 September 1967

(11) Security of Information and Material. Reference (h) directs the establishment of an indoctrination program directed toward the individual Marine making him aware of his security responsibilities. Company Commanders will insure that their program encompasses the subjects listed in said reference.

(12) Safety Precaution for the Use and Handling of grenades. Reference (i) contains precautions and instructions on the grenades, Unit commanders will insure that all personnel are thoroughly indoctrinated in procedures for handling grenades and in safety precautions.

(13) Accidental Discharges of Weapons. Reference (f) requires enforcement of strict set of rules of prevention, supervision, and at frequent intervals, indoctrination, arming and disarming are incorporated in training schedules.

(14) Medical. All personnel of this Battalion will be instructed in preventive measures against diseases and poisonous flora and fauna prevalent in Southeast Asia. Emphasis will be placed on field sanitation, personal hygiene, and proper care of the feet in a hot, humid climate. Emphasis will also be placed on heat exhaustion and heat stroke. Company Commanders will insure these subjects are scheduled as concurrent training and placed on the weekly training report under the remarks column. Company Commanders will insure that personnel take adequate salt tablets and that proper check is made to insure malaria pills are taken.

b. Training Support. Training support available upon request includes:

(1) Transportation. Submit requirements to arrive at the Battalion S-4 by 1500 the day prior to requirement. Transportation pick-up located at the east corner of the mess hall.

(2) Special Equipment. Submit to S-4 24 hours prior to requirement.

(3) Class V, Submit to S-4, 24 hours prior to requirement.

(4) Class I, Submit to S-4, 24 hours prior to requirement.

(5) Lesson Plans, FM(s) and FMFM's are available at the S-3 Training Office.

(6) Request for outside specialized instructors to assist in more technical training should be made to the S-3 at least 2 days in advance.

4. Action

a. Companies will be rotated in such a manner as to permit each Company time enough to meet minimum training requirements. The Company Commanders will coordinate with the S-3 in establishing a training schedule for the period of time their companies are in the Phu Bai area. Company Commanders will schedule and cause to be conducted at least four (4) hours training each day that the company is free to conduct training. Maximum attendance is mandatory.

(1) The following subjects will take priority and must be completed before commencing other training:

22 September 1967

Name, Nature, Care and Cleaning and Operation of the M-16.

Vietnamese Customs, Orientation and Civic Action

Ambush and Counter-Ambush (Immediate Action Drills) tactics and Techniques.

Patrolling.

(2) Other subjects to be conducted after the above priority subjects have been completed include:

Code of Conduct

Field Fortifications

Lessons Learned in Viet Nam

Leadership

Handling of POW's

H&S OFF Cdr
Field Scrutinization

Attack of a Fortified Position

H&S OFFC Gberrain Appreciation

Technique of Fire

FO Procedure

b. H&S Company will set up a training schedule for Hills 180 and 230. The following subjects will be included.

- (1) Weapons Instruction and Application
- (2) Demolition Training
- (3) VC Mines and Booby Traps
- (4) The employment of Gas.

c. NCO School. See Bn Bul 1510

d. Company Commanders will insure that each instructor is thoroughly familiar with his subject. Lesson Plans should be reviewed by an officer and submitted one day before the class to the Battalion S-3 for review and filing.

e. Arrangements for classroom facilities will be made with the Battalion training NCO. Classes will be monitored and evaluated on a periodic basis. Monitors will be members of the Battalion S-3 section and will complete enclosure (1) upon return to the S-3 section. We are also subject to periodic evaluation by inspectors or contact teams from higher Headquarters.

BnO 1500.1B
22 September 1967

f. Company Commanders will maintain company training records as depicted in enclosure (2) on all training accomplished, to include general military subjects, specialist training, MCS training, rifle/pistol FAM and qualification scores, swimming qualifications and gas mask size. These records will be kept current on a weekly basis and used as a guide for subjects required to be covered in future training.

g. Company Commanders will submit a list of training completed during each week by 0800 on Monday of the following week to this Headquarters (Attn: S-3).

h. All school quotas assigned by higher headquarters will be fulfilled regardless of operational commitments, unless otherwise excused by this Headquarters (S-3).

i. Company Commanders are responsible for establishing a weight control program and will be guided by the requirements set forth in MCO 6100.3 Series.

D. Chaplin
D. CHAPLIN.

DISTRIBUTION: "A"

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Bn0 1500.1B
22 Sept 1967

CLASSROOM/FIELD TRAINING INSPECTION REPORT FORM

UNIT INSPECTOR: _____ DATE: _____

LOCATION: _____ TIME: _____

SUBJECT: _____ **INSTRUCTOR:** _____

METHOD OF INSTRUCTION: PERSONNEL PRESENT:

LENGTH OF TIME OBSERVED: LESSON PLAN AVAILABLE:

LESSON PLAN PROPERTY USED: WAS CLASS REHEARSED:

STUDENT INTEREST:

(POOR/AVERAGE/EXCELLENT)

DID THE INSTRUCTOR EXHIBIT COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE OF SUBJECT:

REMARKS/RECOMMENDATIONS BY TRAINING INSPECTOR:

RANK AND NAME OF INSPECTOR

ENCLOSURE (1)

DECLASSIFIED

Bn0 1500.1B
22 September 1967

From: Company Commanders
To: Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 26th Marines (Attn S-3)

Subj: Company _____ Training Record/Report, submission of
Ref: (a) BnQ 1500-1B

1. In accordance with reference (a) the following training was completed during the period of _____ to _____ (month), 1967.

Priority Subjects DATE HOURS #PERS ATT

Nomenclature, Care and Cleaning and Operation of the M-16.

Vietnamese Customs, Orientation and Civic Action

Ambush and Counter-Ambush (Immediate action drills) tactics and techniques.

Patrolling.

b. Other Training DATE HOURS #PERS ATT

Code of Conduct
Lessons Learned in Viet Nam
Field Sanitation
Leadership
Handling of POW's
Field Fortifications
Attack of a Fortified Position
Terrain Appreciation
Techniques of Fire
FO Procedure

c. FAM FIRE DATE HOURS #PERS ATT

d. Remarks:

ENCLOSURE (2)

HEADQUARTERS

2d Battalion, 26th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco, 96602

BnBul 1510
3/GFK/jwp
23 Sept 1967

BATTALION BULLETIN 1510

From: Commanding Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: School for NCO's

Ref: (a) BnO 1500.1B

1. Purpose To promulgate instructions for the establishment of an NCO School within each rifle company.

2. General

a. This command continues to experience less than optimum results in its contact with the VC. The placement of ambushes relative to principal VC routes has been most successful. Intelligence continues to influence placement of most ambushes. Once contact has been made, however, the VC have either escaped or suffered minimum casualties.

b. This situation can be corrected only if the NCO's are thoroughly familiar with the proper techniques of ambushing and patrolling.

3. Action

a. Company Commander will establish a school for NCO's within their respective companies.

b. The subjects to be emphasized are indicated in Battalion Order 1500.1B paragraph 4A. The responsibilities of the unit leader regarding each subject should be the theme of the school. Continuity of the NCO Training throughout the battalion is the goal, and the continuity can be achieved by teaching the subjects listed as "priority" and "other" subjects in paragraph 4A of the Battalion Training Order. Thus the NCO School, coupled with the training conducted for the other Marines should produce successful operations in the field.

c. All instructors should be aware of the contents of reference (a). Instructions regarding material assistance, lesson plans, reports and the monitor program are also included in reference (a).

BnBul 1510
23 Sept 1967

d. Company Commanders should keep progress reports on each NCO and be able to provide the Battalion S-3 with these records.

4. Self Cancellation. 23 March 1968

D. Chaplin
D. CHAPLIN

DISTRIBUTION: "A"

HEADQUARTERS
 2d Battalion, 24th Marines
 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 FPO San Francisco, 96602

BnO 3400.1A
 24M/1967
 14 September 1967

BATTALION ORDER 3400.1A

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Distribution List

Subject: Standard Operating Procedure for Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defense

Reft: (a) NCO 3400.1A
 (b) DIVO P3400.1A

1. Purpose. To prescribe NBCD training and proficiency standards for individuals and units of this Battalion and to establish NBCD procedures to be employed during, before, and after an NBC situation.

2. Classification. BnO 3400.1

3. General. NBC weapons will produce mass casualties and extensive damage. For this command to carry out its mission, action must be taken to protect its personnel, their arms, equipment and supplies from the effects. Training and readiness measures must provide the capability to take defensive action to minimize the reduction in combat effectiveness from an NBC attack.

4. Scope. Reference (a) sets forth policies concerning the assignment of personnel to NBC Defense duties and the training and proficiency standards required of all Marines and units. Reference (b) establishes the criteria for all NBC Defense in the 3d Marine Division. This order supports and amplifies references (a) and (b) and prescribes the procedures to be followed by this Battalion for NBC Defense.

5. Organization. NBC personnel will be assigned in accordance with current tables of organization, references (a) and (b), and this order.

6. Battalion Organization.

(1) The Battalion will appoint in writing a Battalion NBC Officer.

Final

BnO 3400-1A
17 Sept 1967

(2) The Battalion will establish an NBC Defense Center (NBC-3). The NBC-3 Team will be located within the S-3 Section.

(3) The Battalion Aid Station will maintain one Medical Check Team consisting of one Medical Officer and ten hospital corpsmen. It will maintain one radiac recording team consisting of one recorder and two radiac readers.

5. Company Organization

(1) Each Company will appoint in writing an NBC Officer and one NBC NCO. The NBC Officer will inform the Battalion NBC Officer of appointments and changes to the NBC team.

(2) Each Company will appoint in writing one primary and one alternate Monitor/Survey Team consisting of the monitor, one radio operator/recorder, and one driver.

(3) Each Company will appoint in writing a Decontamination Team consisting of ten (10) men.

6. Staff Responsibilities

a. S-1

(1) Reports to the Commanding Officer on the number of personnel approaching maximum radiation dosage.

(2) Plans and supervises routine rotation and replacement of individuals who have received the maximum radiation dose.

b. S-2

(1) Maintains a current estimate of enemy NBC capabilities.

(2) Ensures wide and rapid dissemination of information regarding probabilities of NBC attack.

c. S-3

(1) Coordinates all matters pertaining to NBC Defense within the Battalion.

(2) Prepares plans for continuation of the Battalion's mission in the event of mass evacuation of a subordinate unit or units.

d. S-4

(1) Supervises area damage control and mass evacuation.

(2) Recommends the establishment of decontamination stations in coordination with the NBC Officer.

(3) Estimates requirements for and makes recommendations on the distribution of NBC supplies and equipment.

BnO 3400.1A
14 Sept 19677. NBC Officer

- a. The Battalion and Company NBC Officer will:
 - (1) Advise Commanding Officer and Staff on NBC matters.
 - (2) Assist in preparing troop safety plans.
 - (3) Establish and coordinate the functions of the NBC-3 team.

8. Proficiency Standards and Training

- a. Proficiency standards and training that must be achieved by each individual and unit are contained in references (a) and (b).
- b. Company NBC Officers will insure that all teams have NBC Training.

9. NBC Warning System and Procedures

- a. The NBC Warning Systems and Procedures that will be followed are set down in references (a) and (b). Each Company NBC Officer will make sure that all personnel in his company are familiar with the Warning Systems and Procedures in references (a) and (b).

10. Protection

- a. First and second echelon decontamination will be performed as prescribed in FM 21-40.

11. Decontamination

- a. First and second echelon decontamination will be performed by company personnel.

- b. Requests for third echelon decontamination will be submitted to Battalion S-4.

- c. All sections will perform or supervise the decontamination of their respective types of equipment.

12. Supply

- a. All NBC supplies and equipment available will be stored at Battalion Supply and issued when the situation demands.

- b. Emergency requisitions for replacement of NBC supplies and equipment will be forwarded through normal channels by the most expeditious means available.

BnQ 3400.1A
14 Sept 1967

13. Reports

- a. NBC Training reports will be submitted to the Battalion NBC Officer.
- b. NBC reports are contained in reference (b).

D. Chaplin
D. CHAPLIN

DISTRIBUTION: A

Copy No. 1 of 6 Copies
2nd Bn, 26th Mar (Rein)
NAM HOA, RVN
100800H Sept 1967

Annex: B (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 96-67

Ref: (a) Maps: VIET NAM, 1:50,000 Sheet 6541 IV.
(b) DivO 03443.1

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. See INTREP and INTSUM.

b. Friendly Forces

(1) Annex A (Operation Overlay)

2. MISSION

CO, Co A, 1st Bn, 4th Marines will exercise overall responsibility for planning, coordination and controlling the conventional fires in and near his TAOR, thereby ensuring maximum effective fire support, troop and civilian safety.

3. EXECUTION

a. The Arty Btry presently in D/S of 1/4 will provide Arty support to Co A 1/4 until 15 Sept.

b. A Arty liaison team from 4/12 will be positioned with the ARVN Arty Wpns at NAM HOA and will receive fire mission called by the FO team attached to the company on 15 Sept. The ARVN Arty Wpns will be in D/S of Co A 1/4.

c. The ARVN Arty unit and US Army advisor located with them will request clearance from the 12th ARVN Arty Div before firing a mission.

4. TARGET INFORMATION

a. Hamlet or village may be attacked without prior warning if in the judgement of the ground commander his mission would be jeopardized by such warning.

b. All supporting arms fire on hamlets or village will be controlled by an airborne or ground FO and will be executed only after approval of the 12th ARVN Arty Division.

c. Close air support mission on hamlet or village will be controlled by FAC and executed only after Bn FSCC approval.

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E C D E M

(9)

S-2-S-2

Supporting arms will not be fired into any populated area except when the Inf. CO on the ground personally determines the area to be hostile and such action is necessary to save Marine lives and there is no alternative course of action.

e. See Fire Support Plan Overlay.

f. Restricted Targets

(1) Every effort will be made to preserve religious, cultural and public utility installations.

5. AIRCRAFT SAFETY

a. Air sentries and lookouts

(1) The Arty FO will check fire when it appears that aircraft are in danger.

(2) The Arty liaison team should assign an air sentries when firing the guns in order to check fire when friendly aircraft are in a damage area.

6. SAFETY OF GROUND FORCES

a. No - Fire - Line - CO, Co A will establish a no - fire - line, and inform their HQ of its origin and any changes.

b. Since the two positions being occupied by Co A are within range of each other, care must be taken to direct bullet trajectory.

7. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS

a. The Arty liaison team should be prepared to call for five clearance for the 105mm Howitzer over the Bn tactical net in the event the primary channel fails.

b. Requests for general support 155 Arty fire should be requested over the Bn tactical net.

D. Chaplin
D. CHAPLIN

Lieutenant Colonel, US Marine Corps
Commanding

Appendix;

✓ 1 - Fire Support Coordination Overlay

DISTRIBUTION: CO, Co A (1)
CO 4th Marines (1)
CG 3rd MarDiv (1)
File (1)

(9)

18

HEADQUARTERS
 2d Battalion, 26th Marines
 3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 FPO San Francisco 96602

46/GAG/meg
 3100
 16 Sep 1967

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 (Attn: G-5)
 Subj: County Fair Operation Report
 Ref: (a) Div0 3100.d

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following report is submitted on County Fair Number 26-2:

COUNTY FAIR COMMENCES: 0400, 27Sep67
 COUNTY FAIR TERMINATES: 1000, 28Sep67

LOCATION: Hamlet - Thon Binh An Grid Coordinate - AU 8105
 262200Z Sep67

PARTICIPATING FORCES: One Company of RF's
 One Platoon of PF's
 One Company of Marines 2/26
 One Marine Squad CAC H 6/7

PLANS FOR PROVIDING SECURITY FOR THE AREA OF THE COUNTY FAIR OPERATION:

- (1) Plans are being made for the formation of a CAC unit.
- (2) PF and USMC units will patrol area.

REASONS FOR SELECTING THON BINH AN AS A COUNTY FAIR SITE:

- (1) Located within or contiguous with other areas that are being returned to government control.
- (2) There is evidence of Viet Cong activity, determined by intelligence sources, by the presence of snipers, mines and booby traps.
- (3) The hamlet was selected in close coordination with the local officials of the government of Vietnam.
- (4) Located in a semi-cleared area.
- (5) The hamlet is physically capable of being cordoned off in order to prevent exfiltration of Viet Cong.

G. A. Gonzalez
 G. A. GONZALEZ
 By direction

ENCL-10