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HEADQUARTERS

Battalion Landing Team 2/26
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMF
FPO San Francisco, 96602

3/WEL/jmm
5750
1 February 1969

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMF

Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1 January to 31 January, 1969

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A
(b) FMFPACO 5750.8
(c) BrigO 5750.1C
(d) MAP: Binh Son, Sheet 6739 I, Series L 7014, 1:50,000
(e) MAP: Quang Ngai, Sheet 6739 II, Series L 7014, 1:50,000
(f) MAP: Dai Loc, Sheet 6640 IV, Series L 7014, 1:50,000

Encl: ✓(1) Battalion Landing Team 2/26 Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a), (b), (c), enclosure (1) is submitted herewith.

W. F. Sparks
W. F. SPARKS
Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 January to 31 January, 1969

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Enclosure (1)

PART I

UNCLASSIFIEDORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. DESIGNATIONCOMMANDER

Battalion Landing Team 2/26	LtCol SPARKS	1-31 Jan
2nd Battalion, 26th Marine Regiment	LtCol SPARKS	1-31 Jan

SUBORDINATE UNITS

H&S Co	1stLt SIVULICH	1-31 Jan
E Co	1stLt MILLER	1-31 Jan
F Co	Capt STOLZ	1-31 Jan
G Co	Capt SEAL	1-31 Jan
H Co	Capt FARMER	1-31 Jan

ATTACHED UNITS

Btry "B", 1stBn, 13thMar	Capt FRANZEN	1-31 Jan
Mort Btry, 1stBn, 12thMar	1stLt Saunders	1-31 Jan
1stPlt (Rein), Co "A", 5th ATBn	SSgt HOOKANO SSgt DUEANAS	1-22 Jan 22-31 Jan
1stPlt (Rein), Co "A", 5th AmTracBn	GySgt MOSQUEDA 1stLt BARTEE	1-8 Jan 8-31 Jan
1st Clearing Plt(Rein), Co "D" 5th MedBn	Lt(USN) HARP	1-31 Jan
2nd Plt (Rein), Co "C", 3rd MTBn	1stLt LAMBIN	1-31 Jan
2nd Plt (Rein), Co "C", 3rd EngrBn	2ndLt MC PHERSON	1-31 Jan
3rd Plt (Rein), Co "A", 5th TkBn	2ndLt JENNINGS	1-31 Jan
Det, HQ, 26thMar (Radio Relay)	1stLt BAIRD	1-31 Jan
Det, Comm Sup Co, 9th MAB (Radio Relay)	1stLt BAIRD	1-31 Jan
Det, HQBn, 3rdMarDiv (MP's)	Pfc BAXTER	1-31 Jan

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Det, HQBn, 3rdMarDiv (Postal)

2ndLt FITZGERALD 1-31 Jan

Det, HQBn, 3rdMarDiv (Disbursing)

1stLt LOVELACE 1-31 Jan

Det, HQBn, 3rdMarDiv (Photo)

Not in activation

Shore Party Plt (Rein), H&S Co, 3rd SPBn 1stLt O'NEILL 1-31 Jan

Det, 15th Dental Co, 9th MAB

Lt(USN) GABUS 1-31 Jan

LSU, BLT 2/26

1stLt BURNS 1-31 Jan

Naval Gunfire Liaison Team

1stLt FRAIL 27-31 Jan
Lt(JG) CASSIDY 1-31 Jan2. LOCATION

BLT Rear

USS OKINAWA (LPH-3) 1-25 Jan

1/26 CP 25-31 Jan

BLT CP's

1-5 Jan

Vicinity BT 167491

6-12 Jan

USS OKINAWA (LPH-3)

13-24 Jan

Vicinity AT 7388 (BS 7388)

24-25 Jan

USS OKINAWA (LPH-3)

26-31 Jan

Vicinity AT 9557

3. STAFF OFFICERS

Executive Officer

Maj J.D. LYNCH 1-31 Jan

Adjutant

1stLt J.A. MC ELROY 1-31 Jan

Personnel Officer

1stLt J.D. DEPIETRO 1-31 Jan

S-1

1stLt J.A. MC ELROY 1-31 Jan

S-2

SSgt H.E. ROLAND 1-31 Jan

S-3

Maj D.H. CLARK 1-31 Jan

S-4

Capt G. BEST 1-31 Jan

S-5

1stLt R.I. MORGAN 1-31 Jan

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4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
57	1749	8	94

5. DETACHED UNITS

1stPlt (Rein), Co "A", 5th ReconBn 2ndLt HELIMAN 1-31 Jan

PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

January began with the BLT still operating on VALIANT HUNT. This operation ended for the BLT on 05Jan (See After Action Report - VALIANT HUNT in part IV).

All units reembarked on 05Jan for limited rehabilitation and training. Staff Officers began preparation and planning for the next operation, BOLD MARINER.

At 0700H, on 13Jan, the BLT commenced Operation BOLD MARINER (See Op Ord 120A-69 in part IV). Companies F, G, and H, 106mm RR Platoon, 82mm Mortar Platoon and Headquarters personnel with the Alpha Command Group were landed by helicopters to establish cordon positions. Company E conducted an amphibious landing across Blue Beach with the mission of tying in the cordon with the beach, and to provide security for the Fire Support Base at Blue Beach. Tanks and ONTOS were phased in for added security. Shore Party Platoon established the Beach Support Area.

After security was established at Blue Beach, 4.2" Mortar Battery and an Army 105mm How Battery were inserted.

The cordon was bounded on the east by the ocean, the north by Company H, the west E, F, and G Companies. Extending south from BLT 2/26 was BLT 3/26, Army and ARVN units.

Civilians were given instructions to come to the Marines' lines. They were then relocated to Collection Points where I.T.T., C.I.T., and National Police Field Forces provided shelters and conducted their interrogations. Once the civilians were removed the cordon began to tighten, searching and clearing as the units moved up.

While closing the cordon numerous enemy contacts were made. Several extensive tunnel complexes were found, and many documents and other intelligence material located.

The operation ended for BLT 2/26 when it was phased out on 24Jan.

The BLT reembarked on the 24th, and disembarked on the 25th to Namo Beach for staging purposes and preparation for Operation LINN RIVER which was scheduled to begin on the 27th.

Companies E, F(-), and G(-) were trucked to 1stMarDiv LZ, #410, at 0800H, 27Jan. From there they were scheduled to be helilifted to Operation LINN RIVER. The remaining units, including elements of H and G Companies, were scheduled to be helilifted from Namo Beach at 1300H directly to the operation area.

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An attempt to lift the first elements from Namo Beach failed. The dust created by the beach sand downed all helos. The operation was delayed until the 28th to allow the units to relocate to the Paddock where an adequate LZ was available.

At 0800H, 28Jan, the first elements of BLT 2/26 were lifted from Red Beach to the operational area. Because of sniper fire, and mechanical problems, the number of helicopters for the lift was reduced from 8 to 3. Four replacement helicopters were made available, and the lift was completed at 1530H.

Companies E, F and G met sporadic enemy resistance with Company G encountering mutually supporting bunkers. The bunkers held up Company G's progress until such time as 1/7 was able to assist them by employing tanks. The cordon was established completely at 1830H, bounded on the East by 1/7, the North by Company F, the West by Company E, and the South by Company G, with Company H in a reserve position approximately 600 meters West of ~~E~~ Company.

Constant enemy probes and sniper fire harassed the BLT throughout the operation. On the 30th, Company H was inserted inside the cordon to search and clear the Southern sector of the cordon. Company H met sporadic enemy resistance, but effectively executed their mission on the 31st.

At 2400H, 31Jan, BLT 2/26 was still conducting Operation LINN RIVER.

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PART III

LISTINGS OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS1. MISSIONS/OPERATIONSa. Major Operations

(1) 1 - 5 January 1969

(a) VALIANT HUNT (Continuation from December. See After Action Report, Operation VALIANT HUNT in PART IV)

(b) Quang Tin and Quang Nam Provinces, Da Nang area.

(2) 13 - 24 January 1969

(a) BOLD MARINER (See Operation Order 120A-69 in PART IV).

(b) Quang Binh Son

(3) 28 - 31 January 1969

(a) LINN RIVER

(b) Quang Nam Province

b. Command Relations

(1) During the period 1 - 24 January, the BLT was under the operational control of SLF - ALFA.

(2) During the period 25 - 31 January, the BLT was under the operational control of 7th Marines.

c. Combat Missions Assigned

(1) VALIANT HUNT

(a) 1 - 5 January

(1) Establish a cordon around the objective area.

(2) Assist in population screening and searches for enemy caches.

(3) Conduct patrols and ambushes as necessary to protect the integrity of the cordon.

(2) BOLD MARINER

(a) 13 - 24 January

~~SECRET~~

- (1) Establish a cordon around the objective area.
- (2) Establish a collection point for POW's and detainees.
- (3) Conduct detailed search, clear and destroy operations in area of cordon.

(3) LIMN RIVER

- (a) 28 - 31 January

- (1) Conduct a cordon and search operation to fix and destroy enemy forces.
- (2) Interdict enemy movements.
- (3) Deny enemy staging areas.
- (4) Capture enemy equipment, weapons and infrastructure personnel.

d. Command Control

- (1) During the period 1 - 5 January, the BLT CP was located ashore with all the companies. The rear was aboard the USS OKINAWA (LPH-3), and contact was maintained by TAC/LOG radio nets.
- (2) Between 6 - 12 January, all units were aboard ARG shipping with the BLT HQ aboard IPH-3.
- (3) During 13 - 24 January, the HQ Command Group was again ashore with the companies, and maintained communications with the TAC/LOG radio nets.
- (4) Between 24 - 25 January, all units were aboard ARG shipping with the BLT HQ aboard IPH-3.
- (5) Between 25 - 31 January, the HQ Command Group was ashore with the companies, and maintained communications with the TAC/LOG radio nets. The BLT Rear was located at 1/26 CP during this period.

e. Organic Operations

- (1) During the period, the BLT conducted 155 IP's; 9 OP's; 92 ambushes; and 132 patrols.

f. NBC Warfare

During the period there were no NBC type devices used by or against the BLT.

2. INTELLIGENCEa. Enemy Situation

(1) At the beginning of the reporting period BLT 2/26 was in the final stages of Operation VALIANT HUNT. This operation was conducted within the known operating area of the Q80 and the Q81 LF Companies, with a combined strength of 150 men. Engagements with the enemy within the AO was limited to sniper fire and small groups of VC who attempted to slip through the cordon. During the extraction of BLT 2/26 enemy forces in and around the AO engaged the helicopters on 31 occasions with small arms and automatic weapons.

(2) Operation BOLD MARINER

(a) This operation commenced on 13 January in an area around ~~BATANGON~~ Peninsula (BS7784). This particular area was generally accepted as being a VC stronghold. Enemy units which were known to be in and/or around the AO were the 38th VC LF Battalion, the 48th VC LF Battalion and the 95th LF Sapper Company. In addition, it was estimated that there were approximately 200-300 local guerrillas who were primarily local hamlet security forces.

(b) Enemy units actually engaged by BLT 2/26 were never identified, however, PW's and Chieu Hoi identified the 38thBn, the 48thBn and the 95th Sapper Company as being in adjacent areas to the BLT 2/26 AO. One detainee apprehended in the first days of BOLD MARINER stated that the VC warned the villagers of a pending allied operation on 10 January. This information plus information provided by numerous other detainees indicated that the VC units (the 48th and 38thBns) moved away from the coastal area in a south-southwest direction 4-5 days prior to the landings. Engagements with enemy units were limited to small cells as they attempted to leave the cordon area. Hotel Company did on one occasion engage an estimated 30 armed enemy as they attempted to leave the cordon at approximately 2000H on 19 January. Although a specific enemy unit was not identified, captured documents indicated that it was a 57mmRR unit. These documents along with a captured enemy map were evacuated to higher headquarters for further exploitation, however, BLT 2/26 has received no official "readback".

(c) It became apparent that no large enemy unit was located within the BLT 2/26 AO, however, local VC guerrillas, members of the local Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) and civilians used extensive tunnel systems for protection and concealment. The tunnel systems were located under villages and in high ground, which was just above sea level, e.g., 20-40 meters.

(2) At the end of the reporting period, BLT 2/26 was operating in and around DAI LOC District on Operation Linn River. Enemy units that were known to be in and/or around the operating area were the V25 and R20 MF Bns, and the DAI LOC LF Company, however, no enemy units were identified. Enemy activity was restricted to small scale sniper attacks by small groups of VC operating in 2-3 man cells.

b. Enemy Initiated Incidents/Actions

(1) The enemy activity during the reporting period consisted of sniper attacks, attempts at breaking cordons and a limited amount of Surprise Firing Devices (SFD) were encountered. At no time during the reporting period did BLT 2/26 engage an enemy force of appreciable size.

c. Enemy Losses

VALIANT HUNT BOLD MARINER LINN RIVER*

(1) Casualties

NVA KIA	7	0	15
VC KIA	27	42	0

(2) Captured VC/NVA

POW's	5	11	3
CHIEU HOI	1	1	0
DETAINEES	3431	1435	0
VC INFRASTRUCTURE (VCI)	40	14	0
VC CIVIL DEFENDENTS	25	124	0
VCS	8	0	0
DOUBTFUL CASE	0	37	0

* At the end of the reporting period Operation LINN RIVER was still being conducted; hence figures are as of 31Jan69.

(3) Equipment Captured

- 1 - Cal. .38 Pistol
- 1 - Browning Automatic Rifle
- 3 - U.S. M-1 Carbines
- 3 - U.S. Garand Rifles
- 3 - SKS Carbines
- 8 - AK-47 (Soviet Model)
- 1 - AK-47 (Czech Model)
- 1 - Mosin-Nagant Carbine
- 12 - M-26 Grenades
- 19 - CHICOM Grenades
- 2 - 155 Rounds
- 1 - 106 RR Round

1 - 57 RR Round
19 - 82mm Mortar Rounds
28 - 60mm Mortar Rounds
17 - RPG Rounds
2 - Claymore Mines
2 - M-79 Rounds
11 - AK-47 Magazines
6 - BAR Magazines
5 - Carbine Magazines
1 - Bayonet
5 - Sewing Machines
3 - Communist Flags
2 - Cartridge Belts
155 Pounds Medical Supplies
17,910 Pounds of Rice
100 Pounds of Assorted Documents

d. Enemy Trends. It was noted that the local civilians located within the BOLD MARINER AO would hide with the VC and NVA in tunnel networks. These tunnel networks for the most part could contain well in excess of 100 people. The VC/NVA, knowing that the Marines would concentrate their assaults on the high ground, hid in the extensive tunnel systems which were located on the lower ground. Once the cordon collapsed and the Marine units advanced over and beyond the tunnels, the enemy forces were then free to leave the tunnels and move well away from the operating area.

e. Weather Conditions. During the reporting period, weather remained favorable for friendly offensive operations. Helicopter and fixed wing aircraft were afforded outstanding flying conditions.

3. SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

01 Jan An element of Company G, while on an ambush site at BT 159482, received a M-79 round resulting in 1 USMC WIAE.

01 Jan A patrol from the BLT C.P., at BT 176497, spotted 3 individuals, dressed in black, retreating from them. The patrol took them under fire with negative results.

01 Jan Company H, at BT 139504, was hit by a command detonated SFD resulting in 1 USMC WIAE. They commenced a thorough search of the area. While conducting the search another SFD, attached to a gate, was detonated resulting in 1 USMC WIAE, 1 PRU WIAE and 3 PRU KIA's. They continued the search. At BT 143508, Company H, while searching hooches set fire to several haystacks. After four exploded the patrol was pulled back, and artillery and 82mm mortar missions were called in on the area. Company H, at BT 146496, while moving to an ambush site spotted four people moving away from them, and opened fire with small arms; results unknown.

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01 Jan At BT 169494, Company F sighted movement in the river near some fishing nets, and fired five M-79 rounds with negative results.

01 Jan BLT units, during this twenty-four hour period, found two tunnels, one of which contained 100 kilos of rice, and destroyed both of them. The rice was evaced. A cave was discovered, containing clothing and 5 rounds of .45 cal. ammo. And 10 women, 7 teenagers, and 7 men were screened, then detained.

02 Jan Company H, at BT 136504, detonated a SFD resulting in 3 USMC WIAE.

02 Jan At BT 168494, Company F found a bunker, with tunnel complex, containing 3 VC's, medical supplies, documents, and a transistor radio. The POW's were delivered to the collection point, and the gear was turned over to S-2.

02 Jan In addition to the above, BLT units found 2 bunkers, a large metal cylinder, 1750 pounds of rice, toilet items, medicine, food, 24 BA-30 batteries, a VN I.D. card, clothing, lamp wicks, 2 fishing nets and $1\frac{1}{2}$ gallons of fuel oil.

03 Jan Company F, at BT 182483, upon hearing movement in a bunker ordered the occupant to come out. The individual was an aged VN female. A M-26 was thrown into the bunker, and the woman was told to reenter and remain in the bunker. At BT 182488, an element of Company F, in the process of setting up an ambush site, accidentally tripped a flare which caused a claymore to detonate. There were no casualties, and the ambush site was relocated.

03 Jan At BT 144485, Company H received small arms fire from their south. Pursuit revealed 4 people retreating toward the river, and accurate fire from Company H resulted in 1 VC KIA and 1 VC POW. The POW was subsequently killed in a poorly executed attempt at escape.

03 Jan Equipment picked up by BLT units included numerous bunkers, 1 SKS rifle, 900 pounds of rice, various documents, clothing, a VN I.D. card, medical gear, 30 cement crocks, a bandoleer of full M-16 Rifle magazines, and a sewing machine.

04 Jan Company H, at BT 145501, discovered a bunker occupied by two VC's who refused an offer to surrender. A M-26 resulted in two VC KIA. Further search of the area revealed another bunker, and the very same circumstances. Result: 2 VC KIA. At BT 145488, a patrol sighted 2 VC on a trail. Upon spotting the patrol the VC attempted to flee, but were apprehended and became POW's.

04 Jan During this twenty-four hour period, BLT units uncovered several caches of SFD manufacturing material, a goodly amount of explosive ordnance, numerous bunkers and 250 pounds of rice.

05 Jan BLT 2/26 secured Operation VALIANT HUNT.

13 Jan BLT 2/26 and attachments commenced Operation HOLD MARINER.

13 Jan Company H, at BS 706895, while security for a downed helicopter, received deadly accurate sniper fire resulting in 1 USMC KIA. Return fire silenced the sniper's shooting. From BS 715892, Company H received small arms fire and 2 grenades into their position. They returned fire with small arms and M-26's: results negative. Later they again received small arms fire and 2 grenades. Returned fire with the same weapons: results unknown.

13 Jan In the vicinity of BS 720871, Company G, checked an area where a detainee had reported 10 VC were hiding in a tunnel. A small tunnel, containing a VN male, was found. The suspect was detained, and the tunnel destroyed. Company G lines were probed from both inside and outside the cordon, and the company opened fire with small arms, M-26's, 81mm mortar mission and artillery. Moans were heard from the area of BS 714887, and Company G continued H&I with small arms, M-26's, 81mm, and arty.

13 Jan BLT units found, during the course of this reported date, several tunnels, twenty spider holes, a cave and 600 pounds of mixed corn and rice.

14 Jan Company F, at BS 712887, engaged 1 VC, running away from them, with M-16's and a claymore. A check of the area revealed nothing. At BS 712876, Company F, spotted 1 VC running away from them, and when their attempt to apprehend him failed, they opened fire resulting in 1 VC KIA.

14 Jan At BS 714877, Company G, being probed, opened fire with small arms and M-26's resulting in moaning. The area was kept under fire, and a check at first light revealed 1 VC KIA and equipment. At BS 715892, Company G, while being probed, received 1 USMC WIAE from M-26 when in the process of conducting H&I to his direct front. Finding a tunnel with spider hole entrance, Company G began searching it when a VC emerged, and became an immediate KIA from M-16 fire.

14 Jan At BS 716873, the I.T.T. Center, a sixteen year old VC managed to free his hands, and attempted escape. He was chased, and in the ensuing struggle of being forced to the ground, his head struck a sharp rock. A valiant effort to save him failed.

14 Jan An element of Company H, at BS 703898, received sniper fire from their front, and returned fire with small arms and M-79. They searched area with negative results. At BS 720895, while on an ambush site, Company H apprehended two VN females. The noise they were making attracted a VN male who entered the site, and was ordered to halt twice. Choosing to ignore the warning, Company H opened fire resulting in 1 VC KIA. The ambush was relocated. At BS 721896, Company H had four VN males enter their ambush site, and opened fire on them. A check of the area had negative results. An ambush site, at BS 722895, was hit by three grenades while setting up, and received 1 USMC KIA, 9 USMC WIAE.

14 Jan Company E, at BS 724904, captured 1 VC female. At BS 724902, a Company E ambush, upon spotting a VC ordered him to stop. When he absolutely refused, he was shot. An I.D. card, recovered, was believed false.

14 Jan During these past twenty-four hours, BLT units discovered numerous bunkers, various documents, one .38 cal. pistol with holster, a cartridge belt, a whistle, medical gear, several tunnels, two SFD's, and 1200 pounds of rice.

15 Jan At BS 712878, Company G, upon having a VC attempt to crash their lines, opened fire resulting in 1 VC KIA. He had prior shrapnel wounds on his back.

15 Jan Company F, at BS 724903, captured an armed VC female. Her equipment was: 3 grenades, 1 mine, trip wire, and a blasting cap. She was delivered to the collection point.

15 Jan An element of Company H, at BS 705896, while on patrol was ambushed from a tree line, and detonated a SFD. In their attempt to effect a medevac, 2 more SFD's, found in a "S" pattern, were detonated. The patrol called an 81mm mortar mission, then accomplished the medevac. Results: 1 USMC KIA and 5 USMC WIAE.

15 Jan In addition to the gear taken from the female POW, elements of the BLT found a cave containing four VC gas masks and one BAR cleaning rod; plus two 81mm rounds in a bunker which they promptly destroyed.

16 Jan At BS 712884, Company F found a cave, threw in a M-26, and as the smoke cleared a VN male, approximately 60 years old came out and surrendered. Company F, at BS 733890, observed twenty armed VC, and called a mortar mission on them. Results: 10 VC KIA. A Fox Company L.P., upon hearing movement in the hedgerow at BS 725886, commenced fire with small arms and M-26's. A search had negative results. At BS 724884, a L.P. from Company F heard movement, and opened fire with small arms and M-26's. A search revealed 1 KIA, and 1 VN male and two children. Believing them to be a recon team, they were delivered to the collection point.

16 Jan An element of Company G, set in on an ambush site at BS 723875, spotted an individual on their flank. They opened fire with small arms and M-26's, but a search had negative results. Company G, having movement to their rear opened fire with small arms and M-26's. A search at first light had negative results.

16 Jan At BS 722892, Company H had movement to their rear. They immediately converged on the area with small arms fire and M-26's. A search revealed four VC KIA.

16 Jan In the course of this day's activities BLT units found a tunnel complex along a trench line, one SFD, some old punji pits, one TA 312 radio, 500 pounds of rice and 251 pounds of wax.

17 Jan A company F L.P. at BS 725886, heard movement to their front, and opened fire with small arms and M-26's; results negative. At BS 725887, some VN people, after being challenged by company F, attempted to flee. The directing of highly accurate fire resulted in 1 armed VC KIA. Company F, at BS 726879, heard voices on their flank, and threw M-26's with unknown results. Spotting a VN in front of their lines, at BS 726888, Company F opened fire which resulted in 1 VC KIA.

17 Jan Having movement to their rear, at BS 722892, Company H called in a mortar mission, fired small arms and threw M-26's. A search of the area revealed 4 VC KIA. Searching bunkers, at BS 724894, Company H captured 1 old VN male, 3 young females, 2 young VN males and 6 children. One armed VN female refused the offer to surrender, and expired from M-26 fragments.

17 Jan At BS 743886, Company E recovered 1 VC KIA from a lake. Death caused by shrapnel. An element of Company E, at BS 724924, while on their way to their L.P. site spotted 1 VC, and immediately opened fire. The body was heard to fall, and the L.P. site was relocated.

17 Jan BLT units during this period found several tunnels, one BAR with one magazine, three carbine magazines, a few hand grenades, several rnds of small arms ammo, one 57mmRR round, three SFD's, a hand drawn map of North and South Viet Nam, various documents, several pictures, a wallet, assorted clothing, and two caches of medicine.

18 Jan Company H, at BS 730895, while conducting a sweep accidentally detonated a SFD, buried on a trail, and had 1 USMC WIAE.

18 Jan At BS 726888, Company F observed an individual on a trail, and immediately employed heavy accurate small arms fire. A quick search revealed 1 armed VC KIA.

18 Jan Units of the BLT uncovered a large military-type classroom and mess-hall, that is believed to be a C.P. or training site, several tunnels numerous caves, various documents, a few Chi-Com grenades, some trip wire, 2 punji pits, one SFD, and assorted clothing.

19 Jan Company G, at BS 737872, spotted three/four VC, and called in a 60mm mortar mission to their position; results unknown. At BS 730875, an element of Company G observed three VC sneaking around some hooches in a village, took them under fire with heavy small arms fire, M-79, 60mm and 82mm mortars; results unknown. A killer Team from Company G, at BS 732874, spotted one VC departing a hooch with a small bundle.

A perfectly aimed M-79 round struck him in the chest, but failed to explode. The stricken individual slumped over and disappeared. Pursuit was made by the K. Team, following a blood trail, but after twenty minutes they returned to their lines; final results unknown.

19 Jan While conducting a sweep of the village at BS 735892, an element of Company H accidentally detonated a M-26 resulting in 1 USMC WIAE.

19 Jan At BS 725880, Company F received small arms fire from the entrance of a cave. Company F proceeded to check it out. At BS 725873, Company F removed 102 VN from a tunnel complex. Approximately fifty are male of military age; the rest are old men, women and children. Five VC fired upon the Company, and the heavy accurate return fire resulted in 5 VC KIA.

19 Jan During this period BLT units found an extensive tunnel and bunker complex, two SFD's, two M-1 carbines, two M-1 Garand, two Chi-Com grenades and an ~~extensive~~ amount of small arms ~~amm~~ amm.

20 Jan An element of Company H, while sitting in their ambush site at BS 734891, spotted approximately 30 armed and equipped VC, and sprang the ambush resulting in 5 VC KIA and an undetermined number of VC WIA. A search of the area netted: 1 Carbine, 9 M-16 magazines, 1 M-26, 1 Chi-Com, 2 packs and 2 Cartrige belts. At BS 735886, Company H observed 15 VC moving south carrying wounded, and engaged them with small arms fire. A search of the area had negative findings, and a Gunship mission was called.

20 Jan The 1stProvPlt, at BS 726869, while on patrol, spotted 2 VC. One of the VC was armed, and the patrol employed small arms fire against them; results unknown.

20 Jan During this reported period, BLT units found 1 dud 250 pound bomb, 1 dud 105mm round, and some old punji traps.

21 Jan Company G, at BS 724877, spotted a VN moving around a wall, gave challenges that were ignored, and opened fire with small arms. Result: 1 VC KIA. At BS 731873, while checking the area of last night's action, found 1 VC KIA. The cause of death was shrapnel wounds. Company G, at BS 72977, had a prisoner escape from them into a tunnel. The POW had been captured by 3/26, then taken to G Company for the purpose of pointing out a VC weapons cache and tunnel complex. After the POW entered the tunnel he cut the restraining rope from around his neck, and refused to exit. He was destroyed along with the tunnel by the engineers. At BS 723877, Company G observed a VC in the village. He was ordered to halt, but refused, and was killed by small arms fire. 1 AK-47 was captured. Company G, at BS 735875, spotting 4 VC moving south, called in a 4.2" mortar mission: results unknown.

21 Jan HT units, during this reported period, found 15 fighting holes, and a cave/tunnel complex. The complex believed to be used as living quarters, were destroyed, and all entrances and exits were sealed.

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Enclosure (1)

22 Jan Company E, at BS 743886, discovered a wounded VN, 32 year old female. She had been struck by mortar fragments, and was medevaced by the company.

22 Jan At BS 720875, Company G received sniper fire which they silenced with accurate M-79 return fire. An element of G Company, conducting a sweep at BS 713883, tripped a SFD that only partially exploded, and suffered no casualties. They later encountered 2 VC, one of which was armed, and took them under heavy small arms fire with negative results.

22 Jan Continuing the assigned mission BLT units found several tunnels, a tunnel complex, 7 punji pits, 4 fighting holes, and the following duds; a 250 lb bomb; a 155mm artillery rnd; a 81mm mortar rnd. All of the positions and ordnance, in addition to a previously reported dud, were destroyed.

23 Jan An element of Company H, at 734893, while providing security for their engineers, spotted a VN male off the trail. He had an object in his hand, and was fired on by the security unit resulting in 1 VN detainees WIAE. At BS 720890, Company H heard and observed 10 VC approaching down the trail. The VC point man was carrying grenades, and two others were seen to be armed. The Company opened fire, and are believed to have hit one. The VC moved off into heavy brush, were pursued by fire, and the company called for reinforcements.

23 Jan A patrol from Company F, at grids BS 721879, BS 721877 and BS 720875, was hit by 9 rounds of M-79, and M-16 rifle fire. A 60mm mortar mission, plus an air strike, were called. Search of the area revealed 9 M-79, and 27 M-16, spent casings. AT BS 720877, a freshly vacated tunnel was found, then destroyed.

23 Jan BLT units, on this last day of Operation BOLD MARTINER, found several large tunnel complexes, one SKS Soviet Carbine, 2 VN I.D. cards, and various documents.

24 Jan BLT Performed administrative back-load.

25 Jan BLT administrative off-load.

26 Jan BLT Staged for commencing OPERATION LINN RIVER.

27 Jan Start of OPERATION LINN RIVER REVISED 28Jan69.

28 Jan Company F, at AT 946571, received sniper fire, but could not locate the source and didn't return fire.

28 Jan While inbound to the LZ at AT 948558, a Marine with Company E was wounded in the left wrist, and became a routine medevac for the following morning. Company E received ground fire of an unknown caliber to other helicopters while inbound to the LZ.

28 Jan At 962567, Company G, while moving through the area met with heavy enemy resistance. An estimated 3-5 enemy were delivering accurate fire from well concealed positions. Company G returned fire with small arms, M-79, M-60, LAAW's, M-26's and satchel charges; all with little telling effect. Severe casualties were inflicted, but the Company was pinned down and couldn't get to them. Tanks were called up, and their big .50 cal machineguns allowed Golf to destroy the enemy positions. The action resulted in 5 USMC KIA, 4 USMC WIAE, 3 NVA KIA and 3 AK-47 rifles captured. Continuing to move to their position, Company G, at AT 960564, received deadly sniper fire resulting in 4 USMC WIA, and the Company called an Air Strike.

28 Jan In addition to the reported captured gear, BLT units on the first day of this new operation found several bunkers, a 5 bunker complex, 19-82mm rounds, 19-60mm rounds, 550 AK-47 rounds, a large amount of increments, 2 M26's, 1 Chi-Com grenade, a F.O. map and plot board, medical supplies, 3 NVA canteens, various articles of clothing, and a large amount of documents.

29 Jan A VN male, wearing black pajamas, and carrying rice and 2 demolition charges, walked right into Company E's ambush at AT 955564. A heavy volume of fire from the Company resulted in 1 VC KIA. At AT 956564, Company E, upon receiving 5 AK-47 rounds, gave answering fire with a mortar mission. Company E observed 2 VN's attempting to flee, at AT 955564, and killed them with small arms; result 2 NVA KIA. At AT 956568, Company E received sniper fire, but due to the tactical situation, was unable to return fire. Within 10 minutes, at the same location, Company E again received sniper fire resulting in 1 USMC WIAE. An element of Company E, while probing at AT 949569, found 2 VC KIA; death from shrapnel. At AT 958561, Company E received sniper fire, and again answered with a mortar mission. An hour later, while at the same position, sniper fire resulted in 1 USMC WIAE. In the evening, still in the same position, sniper fire resulted in 1 USMC KIA.

29 Jan At AT 942577, Company F sighted an estimated 10 VN moving South, and being unable to tell if they were armed, sent a patrol to intercept them. They were children gathering parachutes. At AT 941576, Company F spotted 4 VN adults, and sent their O.P. to investigate. Company F, at AT 949581, received sniper fire. They returned fire with small arms and called a fire mission; results unknown.

29 Jan Company H, at AT 955565, received sniper fire, and returned fire with small arms, M-79 and a mortar mission; results unknown. At AT 956568, while moving into a tree line, Company H received sniper fire, and answered with an air strike. Company H, at AT 955567, apprehended 1 VC/NVA WIA, and held him for interrogation. At AT 951566, Company H, upon calling a Naval Gunfire fire mission, suffered 1 USMC WIA from shrapnel.

29 Jan At AT 965568, Company G was hit by 2 rounds of 81mm WP and 4 rounds of 81mm HE friendly fire resulting in 5 USMC KIA and 8 USMC WIAE. At the same grid, Company G received sniper fire, and returned fire with unknown results. At AT 962567, Company G heard enemy movement, and fired M-79; results unknown.

29 Jan BLT units, on this reported day, found in excess 600 AK-47 rounds, 8 RPG rounds, 1 Chi-Com grenade, 150 AK belts, several NVA uniforms, 1 khaki shirt, 1 black shirt, 2 pair sandals, 2 canteens, 2 mess kits, 1 "E" tool, 6 pans, eating utensils, and 1 can of cooking oil.

30 Jan Company H, at AT 960567, spotted 1 VN charging toward Company E's lines, and notified them. At AT 956578, Company H, upon receiving fire from a bunker, fired a LAAW and were rewarded with 1 VC Chieu Hoi and 1 AK-47. At AT 959564, Company H spotted 3 VC running West, and took them under fire; results negative. At AT 958568, Company H received fire from 4-5 enemy, but their return fire had negative results. On a LZ, at AT 963569, Company H found a body, male, 25-35 years old, that was possibly Chinese. 1 enemy KIA. At AT 951575, Company H heard movement, and fired a 60mm mission; movement ceased.

30 Jan At AT 958561, Company E received small arms and M-79 fire, and they answered with a 60mm mission; results unknown. Company E, at AT 956564, received sniper fire resulting in 1 USMC WIA. The Marine died within a matter of minutes becoming a KIA. Again, at AT 958561, Company E received sniper fire, this time resulting in 1 USMC KIA.

30 Jan At AT 954567, Company G took fire resulting in 1 USMC WIAE. At AT 963568, Company G received 1 suspected 60mm incoming round, and was attempting to locate the source of fire when it was discovered to be a LAAW from Company H. Company G, at AT 979565, spotted 10-15 NVA heading East, and took them under fire with small arms; results were unknown. A corpsman with Company G, at AT 963567, had an accidental discharge while in the process of clearing his pistol. 1 USMC WIA became a routine medevac. At AT 958563, Company G received sniper fire, but due to the tactical situation was unable to return it. Company G, at AT 957570, received a round of friendly arty resulting in 1 USMC WIAE. At AT 962567, Company G received small arms fire, and answered with M-79; results unknown.

30 Jan Company F, at AT 941571, apprehended 5 children, but 2 adults, who were accompanying them, escaped. At AT 949581, Company F heard movement, and threw a M26 with unknown results.

30 Jan The BLT called an air strike on a heavy bamboo thicket, containing 2 or more snipers, at AT 958561. They later called a napalm run on the same area. Snipers, attached to Company G, fired but 2 rounds of their .308 rifle, yet confirmed 1 NVA KIA at 800 meters range. The body was not recovered.

30 Jan The units of the BLT, on this reported day, discovered a tunnel complex, 3 tunnels, 4 bunkers, 1 NVA weapon, 2 AK-47's, 3 RPG rounds, 1 NVA pack,

ENCLOSURE (1)

and 35 bags of rice.

31 Jan The BLT, at AT 950550, called an air strike on some freshly dug bunkers and trails; results unknown. BLT engineers, at AT 948573, blew 80% of an obstructing tree line with C-4.

31 Jan At AT 960563, Company G found a tunnel containing 1 NVA body, age 25-30 years old, that appeared to have died from arty shrapnel. Company G, at AT 967567, observed 3 NVA moving Southwest, and called for arty and a F.O. Results: 3 NVA KIA.

31 Jan Besides the tunnel previously reported, BLT units this day found 7 bunkers, 3 fighting holes, 760 AK-47 rounds, 150 .30 cal rounds, 25 9mm pistol rounds, 8-60mm rounds, 8-82mm rounds, 1-105mm round with a C-4 booster, 1 M-79 round, 1 Chi-Com grenade, 1 blasting cap, 9 82mm fuses, 2 wooden molds believed used for making Chi-Com grenades, 1 AK-47 magazine, 2 homemade gas masks, 5 battle dressings, 1-82mm aiming stake, 1 Russian aiming circle, 1 Russian battery, 10 pounds of rice, numerous NVA uniforms, a list of names, a notebook on 82mm mortars, and a document containing a list of NVA transferred to the K535 from the following units: K510B, K504, K502, K506 and 82K537. This document was dated 25 January 1969.

4. FIRE SUPPORT

a. B Btry, 1st Bn, 13th Marines (105mm)

(1) Missions fired for the period are as follows:

38 HE I's
6 HE destruction

(2) Of the above, 6 missions were observed.

(3) Total rounds expended are as follows:

335 HE
12 WP

b. W Btry, 1st Bn, 12th Marines (4.2")

(1) Missions fired for the period are as follows:

8 HE destruction

(2) All missions observed.

(3) Total rounds expended are as follows:

599 HE

7 WP

c. Naval Gun Fire Team

(1) Ships available for support:

(a) USS DAVIS (DD937) 01Jan-05Jan
(b) USS CORREY (DD817) 13Jan-14Jan
(c) USS NEWPORT NEWS (CA148) 17Jan-22Jan

(2) The following missions were delivered:

(a) 5"/38

(1) H&I 228 1703 rounds expended
(2) TDF 2 30 rounds expended
(3) Illum 1 26 rounds expended

(b) 8"/55

(1) H&I 5 64 rounds expended

(3) The following missions were observed:

(a) 5"/38 11
(b) 8"/55 2

d. 81mm Mortar Platoon (Organic)

(1) Missions fired for the period are as follows:

45 HE
28 WP
11 Illum

(2) All of the above missions were observed.

(3) Total rounds expended are as follows:

2012 HE
162 WP
112 Illum

e. General Support

(1) India Btry, 3rd Bn, 11th Marines fired 2 observed missions, expending 36 rounds HE and 2 rounds WP. They also fired 30 H&I, unobserved missions, expending 240 rounds HE.

f. There were no significant events reported by any Fire Support unit.

5. AIR SUPPORTa. Units

(1) HMM 362

(2) 1st MAW

(3) 7th Air Force

b. Missions

(1) Resupply - Daily during Operations

(2) Close Air Support

(a) Missions - 36

(b) Ordnance - Napalm/20mm Aerial Cannon

(3) TPQ's - 3

(4) Flare Support - Nightly during Operations

(5) Observation - Daily during Operations

(6) MED-EVAC - 155

c. Significant Events

(1) None reported during this period.

6. PERSONNELa. Combat Losses

	USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
WIA	1	62	0	2

KIA	1	19	0	1
MIA	0	0	0	0

b. Non-Combat Losses

	USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
Killed	0	0	0	0
Injured	0	6	0	3

c. WIA's Returned to Duty

15

d. R&R Trips

138

e. Personnel Rotated (PCS)

131

f. Replacements Received

Officer - 14

Enlisted - 374

7. ADMINISTRATION

a. The BLT is composed of four (4) Rifle Companies, one (1) H&S Company and two (2) Batteries. Each unit is capable of performing internal administration and each is assigned it's own reporting code. While at sea all Company and Battery offices were located aboard the USS Okinawa.

b. Awards

Silver Star - one (1)

Bronze Star - five (5)

Navy Commendation - one (1)

VN Cross of Gallantry - twenty-nine (29)

c. Promotions

First Sergeant - one (1)

Gunnery Sergeant - one (1)

Sergeant - one (1)

Corporal - eighty-nine (89)

Lance Corporal - one hundred seventy-seven (177)

Private First Class - twenty-four (24)

d. Significant Events

(1) None reported during this period.

8. LOGISTICS

a. Supply/Resupply

- (1) On the last part of Operation VALIANT HUNT, period 1 through 5 January 1969, resupply of Class I, IV and V was conducted from the BSA, while Class II came from the USS OKINAWA (LPH-3). All resupply from the BSA was by helicopter.
- (2) Helicopter resupply from Chu Lai proved unsatisfactory because of the requirement to move all detainees by helicopter for Operation GOLD MARINER. The BSA was established using Class V moved by boat from the IKA where 5 days of ammunition had been pre-staged. Other Class V items were requested from LSU-3 at Chu Lai where liaison had been established, and moved by LCU to the BSA. Resupply from the BSA was mainly by helicopter, but was backed up by Mule and AmTrac.
- (3) Operation LINN RIVER was supported with Class I and V from the LSA at Hill 55 while other supplies were trucked from the BLT Rear to Hill 55 for subsequent transportation by helicopter. During the Operation it was possible to resupply by truck from the LSA which was the most desirable method since our Shore Party did not have to rely upon the availability of helicopters.

b. Food/Water

- (1) During this period the tactical elements subsisted on "C" Rations supplemented with fruits, juices, milk and ice cream, and one hot meal about every fifth day when in the field. Water continued to be a problem because of limited water containers. Natural sources were utilized when possible.

b. All new personnel, assigned to the BLT during this reported period, received a thorough indoctrination lecture prior to being sent to the field.

11. CIVIC ACTION/PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

a. Civic Action

(1) BLT 2/26 was actively engaged in mobile operations in January, and consequently did not engage in any formal civic action programs. Instead, emphasis was placed on disciplined conduct of Marines when in civilian areas. Medical care was provided to Vietnamese civilians who requested it on an as required basis.

b. Psychological Warfare

(1) The tremendous success of our "psyops" phase can be mainly attributed to the use of portable speaking apparatus, and the utilization of cooperative local villagers as speakers. Through the use of a portable speaker it was possible to broadcast anywhere and anytime. We were able to broadcast into tunnels, which in one instance, resulted in 34 detainees. Initial broadcasts instructing villagers to come to our lines had negligible from all the villages further than 500 meters from our lines. This information was derived when we began to tighten the cordon towards the villages beyond the initial 500 meters. On one occasion, prep-fires were about to begin on a target, an A.O. spotted 10-12 villagers doing daily chores inside a village. To avoid unnecessary harm to these villagers and still continue the mission, portable speakers were employed to reiterate our directions and warnings. Within 15 minutes, 143 detainees were collected. Detainee interrogation indicated that our initial broadcasts were too far away to be totally understood; that even if understood, the aged and sick would have been physically unable to travel the distance, and that very little cooperation is received through the use of taped, broadcasts.

12. COMMUNICATIONS

a. Radio

(1) From 1-5 January, during Operation VALIANT HUNT Phase II, constant communications were established and maintained between the BLT and SLF, the rifle companies and supporting units. The Tactical Air Control Party continued using UHF and VHF radio equipment in support of the BLT.

[REDACTED]

(2) From 13-24 January, during Operation BOLD MARINER, constant communications were established and maintained with CTG 79, SLF "A", and SLF "B" using secure voice equipment. Radio communications were also established between the rifle companies and supporting units. The TACP continued using UHF and VHF radio equipment in support of the BLT.

(3) From 27-31 January, during Operation LINN RIVER, constant radio communication were established and maintained between the 7th Marines and the BLT. Radio communications were also established between the rifle companies and supporting units. The TACP maintained UHF and VHF communications in support of the BLT.

b. Radio Relay

(1) Radio Relay was not used during this reporting period. However, classes were conducted by Radio Relay chief on the use and employment of the equipment.

c. Wire

(1) From 1-5 January, during Operation VALIANT HUNT Phase II, wire lines were layed to the rifle companies and supporting units. Wire lines were also layed to all sections within the Command Post. All wire lines were terminated into a switchboard in the CP.

(2) From 13-24 January, during Operation BOLD MARINER, the wire section established wire lines in the same manner as 1-5Jan.

(3) From 27-31 January, during Operation LINN RIVER, a wire was established between Company F and the CP. Local wire lines within the CP, and supporting units, were also established.

d. Maintenance/Supply

(1) The maintenance/supply section maintained a supporting capability aboard the USS OKINAWA. One radio repairman was with the forward CP to repair radios that went down. A daily courier run was established between the rear CP and the forward CP for the purpose of delivering necessary radio equipment, batteries and supplies.

e. Significant Events

(1) None reported during this period.

(1) On 15 January 1969, HN Edwin C. ZOLLINGER, B81 95 36 lost his right foot from a mine blast. On 29 January 1969, HN Larry F. HUNT, B31 47 93 was killed in action.

13. RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES

a. Personnel

(1) Chaplain assigned: Lt Jerry A. ZANDSTRA, CHC, USNR
(2) Chaplain's Assistant: LCpl Wayne ROBERTS

b. Services Conducted

Type	Number	Attendance
Sunday Worship- Protestant	3	152
Sunday Mass- Catholic	4	141
Weekday Worship- Protestant	10	99
Weekday Mass- Catholic	13	174
Holy Communion- Protestant	2	55
Memorial Services	2	247
New Year's Day Service	1	41

c. Facilities

(1) Forecastle, hanger deck and mess decks on ship.
(2) FLC Chapel and 7th Engineer Chapel for Memorial Services.
(3) Any available spot in the field.

d. Significant Events

(1) Received usual amount of "goodies" for the troops. They were distributed promptly to the various companies and units of the BLT. Wrote Thank You notes to the donors on behalf of the command.

- (2) Spent a good deal of time in visitation again this month. Places visited included: Ship's sickbay, NSA Hospital, 1st MedBn, and the brig.
- (3) Assisted several men in arranging, and making, priority status MARS calls.
- (4) Attended Division Chaplain's meetings 3 times during the month. Division proved very helpful in meeting our religious supplies requirements, and in supplying us with reading materials for the troops in the field.

HEADQUARTERS
Battalion Landing Team 2/26
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMF
FPO San Francisco, 96602

15 February 1969

From: CO, BLT 2/26

To: CTF 79.

Subj: Operation BOLD MARINER

Ref: (a) CTF 79 Message of 080358Z Jan69 - *see pt IV, Task A, T-6 79.4/51c afja*
(b) CTF 79 Message of 220226Z Jan69

Encl: (1) Lessons Learned
(2) Tunnel System
(3) Tunnel System
(4) Tunnel System
(5) Tunnel System
(6) Tactics/PsyOps Employed

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the enclosed is submitted.

W.F. Sparks
W.F. SPARKS
Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding

LESSONS LEARNED

OPERATION BOLD MARINER

1. Operation BOLD MARINER has provided valuable information on the tunnel systems used by the Viet Cong forces in the area north and northwest of BATANGAN Peninsula.

2. Observations concerning the surrounding terrain in which tunnels have been discovered are:

a. One of the first indications of the presence of a tunnel complex is mounds of dirt, shaped and formed to resemble a grave-site. During the early stages of BOLD MARINER an Aerial Observer (AO) supporting BLT 2/20 reported the presence of numerous grave-sites. According to the AO the number was far in excess of the amount that should in his opinion, be present. Shortly after his report was received 2/20 encountered the tunnel complex. After a close examination of the surrounding terrain it was noted that there was an unusual amount of grave-sites. After digging up a few grave sites which revealed no coffins it became apparent where and how the VC had disposed of the dirt from the tunnel excavation.

b. The terrain in which tunnels were found normally had trench lines paralleling the pattern of the tunnel system. It was noted in the trench lines that either air holes and/or entrances were found.

c. The tunnels encountered were located in high ground which was firm with a laterite soil. The pattern of the tunnel was generally found to go deeper into the high ground with the exits being found on an opposite slope in dense underbrush.

d. The tunnels located and found in and around hamlets would extend themselves from one side of the hamlet to the other.

3. No two tunnels had the exact same pattern, however, they did have similar characteristics, these are:

a. The immediate entry/exit would have a general height of 2-3 feet, which would extend a distance of 8-10 meters.

b. The main tunnel corridor would have an average height of 6 feet and a minimum width of 3 feet.

c. The thickness of the tunnel from ground surface to corridor ceiling could only be estimated to be in excess of 15 feet.

d. Each tunnel had a minimum of two secondary exits which when constructed were sealed. The secondary exits apparently were to be used only in the time of emergency.



e. Air holes and secondary exits could be found in thickets of briars and/or dense underbrush. The air holes are extremely difficult to discover as they are approximately 6 inches in diameter or less on the surface. One method of concealment is as follows: A six inch air hole at the base of a tree (located in dense underbrush) with a large rock placed on the opposite side of the hole from the tree.

f. Exits and/or entrances were cleverly concealed by constructing a small box and fitting it into a frame built into the surface level over the entrance. The box has dirt in it from the surrounding area and blends in with the terrain. The box will have a small wire hook attached to allow easy removal from the ground. It takes only a few leaves and twigs to completely conceal the outline of the wooden frame entrance.

g. Lighting was provided by using candles or oil lamps. They were suspended from the walls of the tunnel.

h. Tunnel interior, gave the impression that a "trencher" had dug them out. All the walls were evenly shaved and tailored as was the deck of each tunnel.

i. There was no shoring or any other foreign material used in the construction of the tunnels.

j. The secondary exits while effectively blocked, were done in such a manner as to facilitate removal by one man without the aid of tools. Below listed are 3 examples of blocked exits.

- (1) Upright log supporting a medium layer of dirt.
- (2) Rocks of 6 inches in diameter or larger piled to support a medium layer of dirt.
- (3) Runway matting to form a dike.

4. Destruction of tunnels encountered by 2/25 was carried out by the Engineer Platoon attached to the Battalion Landing Team. Below are some observations on the demolition techniques employed by that platoon.

a. The tunnel shown in Enclosure (2) is approximately 200 meters in length and has many side rooms. In addition, this tunnel had two distinct levels. Forty-two cratering charges were used to collapse this tunnel. Enemy activity in the area precluded a complete evaluation of the results. The amount of debris observed from the explosion indicated considerable destruction.


b. The tunnel shown in Enclosure (3) was destroyed by using forty-five cratering charges and eighty pounds of C.S. gas. Approximately $\frac{1}{2}$ of the tunnel was completely collapsed and the rest caved in, as evidenced by

very large cracks in the soil. The strength of the laterite prevented the soil from collapsing. C.S. gas was seeping from the large cracks in the soil.

c. The tunnel shown in Enclosure (4), the largest and most extensive found by 2/26, required sixty cratering charges and eighty-one pounds of C.S. gas to destroy it. The main tunnel was completely collapsed and the branches were either collapsed or caved in as evidenced by cracks and heaves in the soil. Residual gas was evident for 24 hours after destruction.

d. The tunnel shown in Enclosure (5) was a single level tunnel which required fifty cratering charges to destroy. The tunnel overhead was blown completely off and a long crater approximately 15 meters wide was the result.

5. The Engineer Platoon stated that cratering charges were found to be the only suitable military explosive for tunnel destruction. C-4 does not work well on collapsing laterite tunnel systems. Cratering charges were employed as follows: two charges together every 7-8 meters with emphasis at the bends of the tunnel and approximately 3 meters from each entrance/exit.


TUNNEL SYSTEM LOCATED
VICINITY (BS732674)

NOTES:

1. This tunnel system was located under a village and paralleled the main village trail.
2. Numerous air holes were found directly above the tunnel ceiling.

Enclosure (5)

IV

TUNNEL SYSTEM LOCATED
VICINITY (BS730877)

NOTES:

1. Main Tunnel corridors average height is 6-feet.
2. Main Tunnel corridors average width is 4 feet.
3. Other corridor heights varied from 2-3 feet.
4. Other corridor widths averaged 3 feet.


Enclosure (4)

IV

TUNNEL SYSTEM LOCATED
VICINITY (BS725873)

Blocked Entrance

Air Hole



17M

20M

20M

10M

Air Hole #2

-2M- Entrance

15M Air Hole #1.

Station #1

20M

16M

8M

Station #2

2M

15M


10M

Enclosure (3)

IV

NOTES:

1. <- Rise in Tunnel
2. From Station #1 to Airhole #2 the height of the tunnel is generally $6\frac{1}{2}$ feet.
3. From Station #1 to Airhole #2 the width of the tunnel is generally $3\frac{1}{2}$ feet.



1. Indicates lower level of tunnel (55 meters in length, partially filled with water).
2. 2 Ft. drop from entrance to 1st air hole.
3. Depth of 15 Ft. from 1st Air hole to 1st Blocked exit.
4. Depth ranges from 15 Ft at 1st blocked exit to 6 Ft at exit #1.
5. Depth of lower level tunnel entrance is 6 Ft and gradually slopes to surface.

Enclosure (2)

(IV)

~~SECRET~~1. TACTICS

a. The tactic of a cordon operation, as experienced during HOUD MARINER and previous operations, is extremely critical during the early stages if all maneuver elements are required in the cordon. Until the cordon line is diminished to the point where one maneuver element may be extracted, forward movement is necessarily a skirmish line attack. Not only is this a poor attack formation but any determined attempt by the enemy to penetrate the cordon would be difficult to repulse. Accordingly, a company size unit was removed from our portion of the cordon as soon as possible to provide defense in depth and a maneuver element for attack of enemy strong points as the cordoned area was reduced.

b. To supplement the maneuver company, small units were assigned patrol missions 500 meters inside and outside the cordon. This increased our security, confused the enemy as to the exact location of our lines, and provided us valuable tactical information of the area and enemy posture. The patrols also decreased the lethargy which seems to set in when the troops are in a temporary static position.

c. After tightening the cordon to its last position and prior to extraction, patrols of 2000 meters or more were conducted to our rear covering the area we had previously cordoned and cleared. The enemy had closed in behind to loot villages that had been cleared and to probe cordon positions as they changed. It was found that the long range patrols eliminated sniper fire that is normally received during extraction.

2. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

The tremendous success of our "psycops" phase can be mainly attributed to the use of portable speaking apparatus and utilization of cooperative local villagers as speakers. Through the use of a portable speaker it was possible to broadcast anywhere and anytime. We were able to broadcast into tunnels which in one instance resulted in 34 detainees. Initial broadcasts instructing villagers to come to our lines had negligible results from all the villages further than 500 meters from our lines. This information was derived when we began to tighten the cordon towards the villages beyond the initial 500 meters. On one occasion prep fires were about to begin on a target; an AO spotted 10-12 villagers doing daily chores inside a village. To avoid unnecessary harm to these villagers and still continue the mission, portable speakers were employed to reiterate our directions and warnings. Within 15 minutes, 143 detainees were collected. Detainee interrogation indicated that our initial broadcasts were too far away to be totally understood, that even if understood the aged and sick would have been physically unable to travel the distance, and that very little cooperation is received through the use of taped, stereotyped broadcasts.

~~SECRET~~
Enclosure (6)

IV