

0054 / 69 #
Serial No. 030160-69
Copy 3 of 20 Copies

HEADQUARTERS
Battalion Landing Team 2/26
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMF
FPO San Francisco, 96602

3/WEL/lel
5750
1 March 1969

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMF
Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1 February to 28 February, 1969
Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A
(b) FMFPACO 5750.8
(c) BrigO 5750.1C
(d) MAP: Dai Loc, Sheet 6640 IV, Series L 7014, 1:50,000
Encl: (1) Battalion Landing Team 2/26 Command Chronology

1. In accordance with references (a), (b), and (c), enclosure (1) is submitted herewith.

G.M. Edmondson Jr.
G.M. EDMONDSON, JR.
Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: CG, 9th MAB 01-02
CTG 79.4 03-18
S&C Files 19-20

HEADQUARTERS
Battalion Landing Team 2/26
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMF
FPO San Francisco, 96602

3/WEL/lel
5750
1 March 1969

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 February to 28 February, 1969

INDEX

PART I ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

PART II NARRATIVE SUMMARY

PART III LISTINGS OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

PART IV SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS - / / -

SECRET
Enclosure (1)

P.C.D.

PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. DESIGNATION	COMMANDER	
Battalion Landing Team 2/26	LtCol SPARKS	1-27Feb
2nd Battalion, 26th Marine Regiment	LtCol EDMONDSON, Jr	27-28Feb
<u>SUBORDINATE UNITS</u>		
H&S Co	1stLt SIVULICH	1-28Feb
E Co	1stLt MILLER	1-28Feb
F Co	Capt STOLZ	1-28Feb
G Co	Capt SEAL	1-28Feb
H Co	Capt FARMER	1-12Feb
	1stLt WINKLER	12-28Feb
<u>ATTACHED UNITS</u>		
Btry "B", 1stBn, 13thMar	Capt FRANZEN	1-28Feb
Mort Btry, 1stBn, 12thMar	1stLt SAUNDERS	1-28Feb
1stPlt (Rein), Co "A", 5th ATBn	SSgt DUEANAS	1-28Feb
1stPlt (Rein), Co "A", 5th AmTracBn	1stLt BARTEE	1-28Feb
1st Clearing Plt (Rein), Co "D", 5th MedBn	Lt(USN) HARP	1-28Feb
2ndPlt (Rein), Co "C", 3rd MTBn	1stLt IAMDIN	1-28Feb
2ndPlt (Rein), Co "C", 3rd EngrBn	2ndLt MC PHERSON	1-28Feb
3rdPlt (Rein), Co "A", 5th TkBn	2ndLt JENNINGS	1-28Feb
Det, HQ, 26thMar (Radio Relay)	1stLt BAIRD	1-28Feb
Det, Comm Sup Co, 9th MAB (Radio Relay)	1stLt BAIRD	1-28Feb
Det, HQBn, 3rdMarDiv (MP's)	Pfc BAXTER	1-28Feb
Det, HQBn, 3rdMarDiv (Postal)	2ndLt FITZGERALD	1-28Feb

Det, HQBn, 3rdMarDiv (Disbursing)	1stLt LOVELACE	1-28Feb
Det, HQBn, 3rdMarDiv (Photo)	Not in activation	
Det, 15th Dental Co, 9th MAB	Lt(USN) GABUS	1-28Feb
Naval Gunfire Liaison Team	Lt(JG) CASSIDY	1-28Feb
Shore Party Plt (Rein), H&S Co, 3rd SPBn	1stLt O'NEILL 2ndLt QUINN	1-22Feb 22-28Feb
LSU, BLT 2/26	2ndLt FRIEL 2ndLt DEAN	1-22Feb 22-28Feb

2. LOCATION

BLT Rear	1/26 Command Post	1-12Feb
	USS OKINAWA (LPH-3)	12-28Feb
BLT Command Posts		
1-7 Feb	Vicinity AT 9557	
7-8 Feb	Vicinity AT 9554	
8-12 Feb	Vicinity AT 9653	
12-28 Feb	USS OKINAWA (LPH-3)	

3. STAFF OFFICERS

Executive Officer	Major J.D. LYNCH	1-18Feb
	Major W.C. GOUTY	19-28Feb
Adjutant	1stLt J.A. MC ELROY	1-28Feb
Personnel Officer	1stLt J.D. DEPIETRO	1-28Feb
S-1	1stLt J.A. MC ELROY	1-28Feb
S-2	SSgt H.E. ROLAND	1-28Feb
S-3	Major D.H. CLARK	1-18Feb
	Major J.D. LYNCH	19-28Feb
S-4	Capt G. BEST	1-28Feb

S-5

1stLt. R.I. MORGAN

1-28Feb

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

USMC		USN	
OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
60	1669	8	90

5. DETACHED UNITS

1stPlt (Rein), Co "A", 5th ReconBn

2ndLt HELLMAN

1-28Feb

PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

At the beginning of February 1969, the BLT was still engaged in Operation LINN RIVER under the operational control of the Seventh Marine Regiment. The BLT Forward Command Post remained in the field with the deployed units and the Rear Command Post remained at the First Battalion, 26th Marines Command Post. The Fire Support Base, Shore Party Platoon, radio relay unit, and BLT Liaison were operating from Hill 55 at the 7th Marine Regimental Command Post. This operation lasted until 070759H, with the BLT continuing the cordon and sweep mission. The concept of operations employed by the BLT worked quite effectively, and resulted in a very good contact kill ratio. A large amount of enemy equipment was captured, and sent to the rear for possible further intelligence value.

Numerous tunnel systems, a large number of bunkers, and other prepared positions, (most of which were recently occupied, attesting to the hard push on the enemy by the rapid moving BLT units), were uncovered and promptly destroyed beyond further use to the enemy. In denying him a place of concealment, the BLT was better able to find, fix and destroy his forces.

At 070800H, the BLT was shifted to the operational control of the Fifth Marine Regiment. The units at Hill 55, less the Fire Support Base, relocated to Hill 10, the position of the First Battalion, Fifth Marines Command Post. The F.S.B. was displaced to an area north of Liberty Bridge.

Operation TAYLOR COMMON, in which the BLT was now involved, had been in progress for some time. BLT 2/26 carried out its assigned mission, (see PART III this report), aggressively.

On numerous occasions sniper fire was encountered by the BLT, but with the proper deployment of forces, was quickly suppressed. Some casualties were sustained from Surprise Firing Devices, though a large number were discovered prior to being detonated and were destroyed in place.

No large enemy forces were engaged, and it was reported to the BLT that the enemy was avoiding contact in the whole Area of Operations.

On 12 February, the BLT was phased out of Operation TAYLOR COMMON, and on 13 February back-loaded aboard ARG shipping and began a vigorous training program in preparation for redeployment.

The BLT was placed under the operational control of Special Landing Force "ALPHA", and became the only reserve available to III MAF during the expected Tet Offensive. In this capacity, the BLT maintained a capability to conduct a helicopter landing within one hour of initial notification.

On 27 February, the Battalion held a Change of Command ceremony aboard the

~~SECRET~~

USS OKINAWA. Lieutenant Colonel G.M. EDMONDSON, Junior, relieved Lieutenant Colonel W.F. SPARKS as Commanding Officer of the BLT.

The BLT was still embarked aboard ARG shipping on 28 February, and was continuing its training program.

UNCLASSIFIED

PART III

LISTINGS OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS1. MISSIONS/OPERATIONSa. Major Operations

- (1) 1 - 7 February 1969
 - (a) LINN RIVER (Continuation from January)
 - (b) Quang Nam Province
- (2) 7 - 12 February 1969
 - (a) TAYLOR COMMON
 - (b) Quang Nam Province

b. Command Relations

- (1) During the period 1-7 February, BLT 2/26 was under the operational control of the 7th Marines. The Command Headquarters remained at 1/26 Command Post.
- (2) During the period 7-12 February, BLT 2/26 was OPCON to the 5th Marines. The BLT Headquarters was again located at 1/26 Command Post.
- (3) During the period 13-28 February, the BLT was OPCON to SLF "A", and became the only reserve available to III MAF. All units were back-loaded on 13 February, and remained aboard ARG shipping. The Command Post of the BLT was aboard the USS OKINAWA (LPH-3).

c. Combat Missions Assigned

- (1) LINN RIVER
 - (a) 1 - 7 February
 - (1) Conduct a cordon and search operation to fix and destroy enemy forces.
 - (2) Interdict enemy movements.
 - (3) Deny the enemy staging areas.
 - (4) Capture enemy equipment, weapons and infrastructure personnel.

~~SECRET~~

(2) TAYLOR COMMON

(a) 7 - 12 February

(1) Find, fix and destroy enemy forces within the A.O.

d. Command Control

- (1) During the period 1-7 February, the BLT Command Post was located in the field, and moved as necessary with the units. Communications were maintained by radio, utilizing relay methods, and daily admin runs were made. A liaison was kept at Hill 55, along with the Fire Support Base. The BLT Rear was set up at 1/26 Command Post, and had wire contact with the subordinate units.
- (2) During the period 7-12 February, the BLT Command Post again remained with the units in the field, and moved as necessary. Communications were maintained by radio, utilizing relay methods, and daily admin runs were made. The liaison, and radio relay unit, moved to the 1/5 Command Post at Hill 10, while the F.S.B. was displaced to an area north of Liberty Bridge. The BLT Rear remained at 1/26 Command Post.
- (3) During the period 13-28 February, all units were aboard ARG shipping with the BLT Headquarters aboard IPH-3.

e. Organic Operations

- (1) During the period, the BLT conducted 52 IP's; 3 OP's; 31 ambushes; and 40 patrols.

f. NBC Warfare

- (1) During the period, there were no NBC devices used by, or against, the BLT.

2. INTELLIGENCEa. Enemy Situation

- (1) At the beginning of February, BLT 2/26 was in the final stages of Operation LINN RIVER. Intelligence provided by the 7th Marine Regiment indicated the presence of the Q-83rd Battalion, the T-89th Sapper Battalion, V-25 Local Force Battalion, and the R-20 Local Force Battalion in and around the Area of Operations. POW's confirmed the presence of elements of the T-89th Sapper Battalion in the cordon area. The source indicated the location of elements of the 31st NVA Regiment in adjacent area to the southwest. Due to the ~~reasons~~ beyond our control, BLT 2/26 was not informed of POW interrogation results, or document translation results. Therefore, it is impossible, at this time, to determine the effectiveness of this operation.

(2) OPERATION TAYLOR COMMON

- (a) Information provided to BLT 2/26 prior to Operation TAYLOR COMMON indicated that elements of the 36th VC Regiment and the 38th VC Regiment were located in and around the assigned Area of Operations. The estimated strength of those units was 780 and 1,145 respectively.
- (b) During this operation the enemy refrained from a direct contact with the BLT. The enemy employed harassing tactics to include Surprise Firing Devices, and grenade throwing. During the night of 9-10 February it was estimated the 40 to 50 enemy troops engaged Hotel Company as they formed their night time defensive positions. The would-be attackers were driven off by Company H organic arms, "Spooky", and the employment of a flare ship working with an aerial observer, who controlled flights of fixed wing aircraft.

b. Enemy Initiated Incidents

- (1) During both Operation LINN RIVER and Operation TAYLOR COMMON, the enemy engaged the BLT primarily with harassing small arms fire. The enemy also employed numerous Surprise Firing Devices, and a small number of mines.

c. <u>Enemy Losses</u>	LINN RIVER	TAYLOR COMMON
(1) Casualties		None Claimed
NVA/VC KIA	26	None Claimed
(2) Captured Personnel		
POW's	3	None Claimed
VC Infrastructure	1	None Claimed
Detainees	506	328
(3) Captured Equipment		
RPG Rounds	17	None Claimed
82mm Rounds	19	None Claimed
60mm Rounds	27	None Claimed
AK-47 Rounds	3060	None Claimed
Chi-Cam Grenades	5	2
M26 Grenades	2	1
Rice	3510 pounds	None Claimed
Medical	5 pounds	None Claimed
Assorted Documents		
Assorted Civilian/Military Clothing		

(4) Destroyed Enemy Positions

Bunkers	9	1
Tunnels	1	1
Fighting Holes	4	9

d. Enemy Trends

- (1) During Operation LINN RIVER, after one major engagement, the enemy employed harassing small arms throughout the operation.

e. Weather Conditions

- (1) During the period, weather conditions favored friendly operations.

3. SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

- 1 Feb At AT 949565, Company E saw movement, and fired a 15 round 60mm mortar mission. The movement ceased.
- 1 Feb At AT 958564, a Marine from Company G, while donning a bandoleer of M26's, lost the pin from one. He yelled "grenade", and as everyone scrambled for cover, the M26 exploded triggering another grenade. The end result was 1 USMC DAI, 2 USMC WIA.
- 1 Feb A group of ARVN, VN, and Marine CAP personnel, blundered into the BLT A.O., and attempted to enter the cordon. They were turned back and "requested" to stay out of the area while the operation was in progress.
- 1 Feb Company H, at AT 957557, discovered 1 NVA/VC KIA, age 25; then they reburied the body.
- 1 Feb On this first day of a new month, BLT units reached Phase Line Blue. They found 9 bunkers, 4 fighting holes, 3 new trails, a bullet-torn NVA uniform, and 3 documents; one of which pertained to the National Liberation Front.
- 2 Feb Company G, at AT 958568, received 2 rounds of unknown caliber artillery. They suffered 1 USMC KIA, 2 USMC WIA.
- 2 Feb The BLT Command Post, at AT 954580, received a stray round of small arms resulting in 1 USMC WIA.
- 2 Feb A misdirected 3.5" rocket round struck Company F's position at AT 950582, and resulted in 1 USMC WIAE. Company F, at AT 955584, received a flechette round causing 2 USMC WIA's.

~~SECRET~~

- 3 Feb At AT 949572, Company E spotted an enemy trooper, and fired a M79 round with unknown results.
- 3 Feb Company G, at AT 956567, observed 1 VC moving southeast, but at first mistook him for a friendly. They were unable to determine if he was armed, so an element was dispatched to engage him. At AT 957568, Company G received 3 mortar rounds while conducting a suppressing fire mission. They called an immediate check fire.
- 3 Feb The BLT units, on this reported day, in completing a sweep to a designated phase line, discovered 2 AK-47 rifles, 4 AK-47 magazines, 500 AK-47 rounds, 1 Chi-Com grenade, 1 cartridge belt, 1 notebook, NVA clothing, several dried blood trails, 1-1,000 pound bomb, 1-500 pound bomb, and 1-90mm round.
- 4 Feb A total of 305 detainees were rounded up, and delivered to the collection point by BLT units.
- 5 Feb An Observation Post from the BLT Command Post spotted 17 enemy troopers, at AT 941573. 6 NVA, wearing tan uniforms and pith helmets were riding water buffalo loaded with canvas bags. 2 other NVA, wearing green uniforms, were working with 3 VC on improving some type position. 6 more wore clothing of various color. After obtaining a sniper, and clearance to fire, the enemy were taken under fire. At varying ranges, up to 600 meters, the sniper picked off 4 NVA before they completely scattered. An artillery mission, and an air strike were called with unknown results.
- 5 Feb BLT units collected 27 more detainees.
- 6 Feb Company G, at AT 963603, tripped a SFD resulting in 4 USMC WIAE.
- 6 Feb On this reported day, BLT units uncovered 2 Chi-Com grenades rigged as a SFD, 1-1,000 pound bomb, 1 M1 rifle, and collected 203 detainees.
- 7 Feb At AT 935539, Company H received inaccurate sniper fire, and answered with a volume of small arms fire that silenced the sniper. They continued to move. At AT 952532, Company H again received sniper fire. Their well directed return fire drove the sniper off, and they continued to move.
- 7 Feb An element of the BLT discovered 1 anti-vehicle mine, and destroyed it.
- 7 Feb At 070800H, the BLT shifted from Operation LINN RIVER right into Operation TAYLOR COMMON without missing stride.
- 8 Feb Company H, at AT 968530, spotted an individual observing their lines.

S-E-C-P-V

Approximately 5 minutes later, the Company received sniper fire. Suppressing the enemy fire with small arms and M79 fire, a squad maneuvered to the suspected sniper site, but he had fled. At AT 964524, Company H spotted 3 more VN observing their position. An immediate mortar mission was called, and right behind it went a platoon (-) to check the area. The enemy again had fled the scene. At AT 966526, Company H found a sandbagged, fortified position. As the company approached, 2 occupants made good their escape despite the M79 fire brought upon them. At AT 968531, Company H, through the use of a starlite scope, observed an individual sitting in the grass. A M79 round was fired, and he disappeared from view.

- 8 Feb An aerial observer, working for the BLT, spotted large groups of VC fleeing to AT 986517. Clearance to fire was given, but after 2 rounds was checked by Recon personnel in the immediate area.
- 8 Feb Company G, at AT 950540, received sniper fire, and silenced it with their small arms return fire. At AT 962544, Company G, while bringing in detainees, received sniper fire from a tree line. The company withdrew under the cover of well directed small arms return fire, and called an artillery mission. Golf suffered 2 USMC WIAE; the arty mission had unknown results.
- 8 Feb At AT 964539, Company E received inaccurate sniper fire, and quickly silenced it with M79. A check of the area had negative results.
- 8 Feb BLT units, on this day, rounded up 182 detainees, one of which was a 7 year old wounded by shrapnel. He was treated by a corpsman, and taken in with the rest.
- 9 Feb A forward observer, attached to Company H, at AT 977538, went in front of the lines and made a costly head-call. Being mistaken for an enemy, he was shot, and became a WIAE. At AT 982538, Company H tripped a SFD resulting in 1 USMC WIAE. Company H, at AT 988537, received sniper fire and answered with artillery and mortar missions. The missions had unknown results, but the sniper fire certainly ceased. At AT 988537, Company H received Chi-Com grenades into their position after noticing heavy movement. Artillery and mortar missions were called, and "Spooky" appeared on station. Company H continued to fire M79's. At the same grid, Company H was taken under enemy small arms fire, and returned controlled small arms and M79 fire. "Spooky" remained on target. Company H, at AT 982534, tripped a SFD resulting in 2 USMC WIAE. At AT 983538, Company H received sniper fire, and silenced it with an arty and mortar mission.
- 9 Feb Company G, at AT 965557, received 1 M26 into their lines resulting in 9 USMC WIAE. They returned fire with M79, M60 and LAAWS with unknown results. Company G, at AT 973548, found a SFD in the entrance to a

S E C D

pagoda. Destroying it set off a secondary explosion of approximately 60-70 pounds of C-4 which reduced the pagoda to a pile of rubble.

- 9 Feb At AT 941532, Company E received sniper fire, and drove off the intruder with accurate small arms. Company E, at AT 938528, received sniper fire and 1 Chi-Com grenade. They silenced the fire with small arms, and pushed on. At AT 958530, Company E observed 3 VN males, and took them under fire with small arms, M60 and 81mm mortar. The fire had unknown results.
- 9 Feb Company F, at AT 963537, tripped 3 SFD's resulting in 5 USMC WIAE.
- 9 Feb BLT units, continuing to move, corralled a total of 113 detainees, and discovered 25 family-type bunkers, 8 spider holes, 1 freshly dug fighting hole, and 1-105mm round.
- 10 Feb At AT 989527, Company H received sniper fire, and quickly put a halt to it with small arms. At AT 989527, Company H again received sniper fire, and drove him off with controlled small arms. At AT 979527, Company H, tripped a SFD resulting in 1 USMC WIAE. Company H, at AT 976524, sighted 8 individuals sneaking through elephant grass, and took them under fire with M79 and M26 with unknown results.
- 10 Feb Company E, at AT 964537, heard movement, and tossed a M26. The movement abruptly ceased. At AT 974544, Company E received sniper fire, and answered with small arms and a mortar mission with unknown results. At AT 974544, Company E again received sniper fire. Having no visual contact, the company fired small arms, and called a 81mm mission. A check of the area had negative results.
- 10 Feb At AT 970534, Company F received sniper fire from 2 enemy troopers, and answered with small arms and 60mm mortar. At AT 974532, Company F tripped 1 SFD resulting in 1 USMC WIAE.
- 10 Feb "Spooky", in support of Golf, at AT 995525, received ground fire which did not last long.
- 10 Feb Company G, at AT 990525, received sniper fire, and reacted by forming a 360 degree perimeter with Company F. Golf returned fire with small arms, M60, M79 and 60mm, and silenced the enemy.
- 10 Feb BLT units, on this reported day, discovered 9 fighting holes, 1 tunnel, 1 new trail, a well dug staircase, 2 marked new punji traps, an early warning device, 2 new 3.5" rocket rounds, 1 SKS, and a well marked SFD.
- 11 Feb At AT 973535, Company F spotted movement to their northeast, and received a M26 into their position. The company fired small arms, M79, and threw M26's on the suspected enemy position; the movement ceased. At AT 947526, Company F accidentally detonated a SFD that resulted in 1 USMC WIAE.

~~S E C R E T~~

- 11 Feb Company G, at AT 985527, received sniper fire which they silenced with controlled small arms and 60mm mortar. A check of the area had negative results.
- 11 Feb At AT 940527, Company H tripped a SFD resulting in 1 USMC WIAE. At AT 920557, Company H tripped another SFD resulting in 1 USMC WIAE.
- 11 Feb A VC, at AT 956537, was fired upon by a well directed M79 round from Company E. A check of the area revealed 1 SKS and 7 rounds.
- 12 Feb Company E, at AT 928527, had 1 Marine bitten by an enemy snake of unknown type. The Marine was medevaced.
- 12 Feb At AT 965524, a Marine from Company G became a NBC when he was struck by fragments of a M26 he had just lobbed into some elephant grass. He was medevaced.
- 12 Feb The BLT was phased out of Operation TAYLOR COMMON.
- 13 Feb BLT units began back-loading to ARG shipping to become the only reserve available for III MAF in preparation for the expected Tet Offensive.
- 27 Feb LtCol W.F. SPARKS was relieved of command of the BLT by LtCol G.M. EDMONDSON during Change of Command ceremonies aboard the IPH-3.

4. FIRE SUPPORT

a. B BTRY, 1st Bn, 13th Marines (105mm)

- (1) Missions for the period are as follows:

89 H&I's
37 HE destruction

- (2) Of the above, 37 missions were observed.

- (3) Total rounds expended are as follows:

1521 HE
71 WP
43 Illum

b. W Btry, 1st Bn, 12th Marines (4.2")

- (1) Missions for the period are as follows:

4 HE destruction

~~S E C R E T~~

- (2) All missions observed.
- (3) Total rounds expended are as follows:

129 HE
4 WP
9 Illum

c. Naval Gun Fire Team

- (1) The Naval Gunfire Team had no missions.

d. 81mm Mortar Platoon (Organic)

- (1) Missions for the period are as follows:

11 HE destruction
4 H&I's

- (2) Of the above, 11 missions were observed.

- (3) Total rounds expended are as follows:

962 HE
40 WP
6 Illum

e. General Support

- (1) Tango Btry, 2ndBn, 11th Marines fired 1 observed mission, expending 60 rounds HE, and 2 rounds WP. They also fired 24 H&I, unobserved, missions, expending 122 rounds HE.
- (2) 1st Field Artillery fired 2 missions, expending 79 rounds HE.
- (3) W Btry, 2ndBn, 11th Marines fired 11 unobserved H&I missions, and expended 84 rounds HE.
- (4) A Btry, 1stBn, 11th Marines fired 35 unobserved H&I missions, and expended 141 rounds HE.

f. Significant Events

- (1) None reported during this period.

5. AIR SUPPORT

~~C R E D~~a. Units

- (1) HMM 362
- (2) 1st MAW
- (3) 7th Air Force

b. Missions

- (1) Resupply - Daily during operations
- (2) Close Air Support
 - (a) Missions - 10
 - (b) Ordnance
 - (1) Napalm
 - (2) Snake-Eye Bombs
 - (3) 20mm Aerial Cannon
 - (3) TPQ'S - 2
 - (4) Flare Support - Nightly during operations
 - (5) Observation - Daily during operations
 - (6) MEDEVAC - 30

c. Significant Events

- (1) At approximately 2000 hours on the night of 9 February, Hotel Company, 2/26, while in a defensive position in the eastern sector of the Battalion's assigned Area of Operations, detected movement around their perimeter. Within a short time they began receiving Chi-Com grenades. A call went out for an AC-47 "Spooky" Gun/Flare Ship. Within 20 minutes of the call, in a remarkably rapid response, the "Spooky" was on station, had identified friendly positions and fired a marking burst. Although sporadic enemy fire was directed at him, the "Spooky" continued in his deadly orbit, and drove the enemy back into a tree line. In the meantime, an air request for a fixed wing strike had gone out. It was answered by a "Mayfly" air observer in an OV-10 followed closely by two flights of A-4's from VMA-223 at Chu Lai. These came on station just as the "Spooky" ran out of ammo. A "Fingerprint" flare ship

began dropping in the target area. Under the flares, "Mayfly" marked the tree line and the lead A-4 rolled in hot, east to west. Intense small arms and .50 caliber fire reached out from the enemy positions, but the A-4 held on target and two tanks of napalm tumbled into the tree line. The enemy fire dwindled with each succeeding run as the enemy was driven back into Hotel Company's positions. With the A-4's expended, another "Spooky" from the 2nd Special Operations Squadron, came on station. In addition to the enemy troops, he took under fire one of the automatic weapons sites that had fired at the A-4's. By this time, the enemy force had obviously been badly mauled although it was impossible to determine the extent of their casualties. The pressure on Hotel Company was relieved and they had not suffered a single casualty, nor did any of the rest of the Battalion for the remainder of the night; the first night for some time in which the Battalion had no casualties. The aerial support was as fine as any ground commander could have hoped for, firstly in the rapid response of the initial "Spooky" arrival, and secondly in the accurate, very well coordinated night air strikes. The night air strikes were particularly noteworthy in that they are rarely ever used in Vietnam.

6. PERSONNEL

a. Combat Losses

	USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
WIA	2	43	0	1
KIA	0	1	0	0
MIA	0	0	0	0

b. Non-Combat Losses

USMC	USN
------	-----

S.R.P.

	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
Killed	0	2	0	0
Injured	0	28	0	0

c. WIA's Returned to Duty

37

d. R&R Trips

168

e. Personnel Rotated (PCS)

103

f. Replacements Received

Officer - 5

Enlisted - 20

7. ADMINISTRATION

a. The BLT is composed of four (4) Rifle Companies, one (1) H&S Company, and two (2) Batteries. Each unit is capable of performing internal administration, and each is assigned its own reporting code. While at sea all Company and Battery offices were located aboard the IPH-3.

b. Awards

Bronze Star - one (1)

VN Cross of Gallantry - eleven (11)

c. Promotions

First Lieutenant - four (4)

Sergeant - one (1)

Corporal - eight (8)

Lance Corporal - ten (10)

Private First Class - one (1)

d. Significant Events

- (1) None reported during this period.

8. LOGISTICSa. Supply/Resupply

- (1) The remainder of Operation LINN RIVER period, 1-7 February, was supported from Hill 55 by truck with Class I and V. Companies provided clean changes of utilities from BLT Rear which was established at 1/26 Command Post.
- (2) Operation TAYLOR COMMON was supported from An Hoa by helicopter. Class I and V were provided while limited amounts of II, III, and IV were moved from BLT Rear to An Hoa for further movement to the field by helicopter. Time of resupply was completely unreliable because of the commitments of the gun ships which were used as escorts for all resupply helicopters entering our A.O. This greatly curtailed the movement and maneuverability of the BLT.

b. Food/Water

- (1) During Operation LINN RIVER elements subsisted on "C" Rations supplemented with fruits, juices, milk, ice cream, and hot meals prepared by personnel at Hill 55, and transported by the BLT. On Operation TAYLOR COMMON there was no hot chow, and food supplements were limited. Water resupply was a problem which was partially solved by the use of plastic containers on Operation LINN RIVER. These containers were useable for only one delivery. On Operation TAYLOR COMMON natural sources of water were the main resupply source.

c. Maintenance

- (1) Because of the accessibility of 1st FSR, and prior liaison, major items of equipment were repaired and returned without the complications of transportation encountered while aboard ship. There is a critical shortage of the Shore Party equipment, because one 6,000 pound R/T Forklift was Code H, and both 2N Cranes are down. One has been sent to Okinawa for 4th echelon repairs, and one has been in FSR since November for repair.

9. NEW TECHNIQUES

- a. The BLT, for the first time employed, simultaneously, "Spooky", a flare ship, and an aerial observer who controlled two flights of fixed wing aircraft during the hours of darkness.

~~S E C R~~

- b. Though by no means new, counter-sniper fire employed by the BLT was quite effective. The organic snipers confirmed enemy KIA's at good distances.

10. TRAINING

- a. During the period 1-12 February, the BLT was deployed to the field, and remained tactical. As soon as practical after reboarding ARG shipping, a training program was set up. A requirement was placed upon the BLT and attached units to initiate and submit a weekly training schedule to the S-3. The subjects stressed were those in preparation of tactical redeployment. In addition, training on handling and safety of weapons, and classes on the misuse of narcotics and drugs were covered.
- b. All new personnel, joining the BLT while on operation, received a thorough indoctrination prior to joining their respective units in the field.

11. CIVIC ACTION/PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

- a. BLT 2/26 was actively engaged in mobile operations during the first half of February, and consequently did not engage in any formal civic action programs. Instead, the emphasis was placed on disciplined conduct of Marines when in civilian areas. Medical care was provided to Vietnamese civilians who requested it on an as required basis.

12. COMMUNICATIONS

a. Radio

- (1) From 1-7 February during Operation LINN RIVER, constant communications were established and maintained between the BLT, SLF "ALPHA", 7th Marines, the rifle companies and supporting units. The Tactical Air Control Party used UHF and VHF radio equipment to control aircraft in support of the BLT.
- (2) From 7-12 February during Operation TAYLOR COMMON, the BLT established communications as above except with the 5th Marines vice the 7th Marines.
- (3) From 13-28 February, the BLT was aboard ship. A TAC/LOG circuit was established between the USS DULUTH, USS FORT MARION, USS WINSTON and USS OKINAWA.

b. Wire

- (1) From 1-7 February during Operation LINN RIVER, the wire section layed a line between the Command Post and Company H. The wire line

previously laid between the Command Post and Company F was removed. Wire lines were also layed to all sections and supporting units within the Command Post.

- (2) From 7-12 February during Operation TAYLOR COMMON, no wire lines were layed.
- (3) From 13-28 February while aboard ship, the wire section set up a "hot" line between the S-4 and Supply, and between the comm office and the maintenance shop.

c. Maintenance/Supply

- (1) This section maintained a supporting capability at the BLT Rear and aboard the USS OKINAWA. One radio repairman was with the forward Command Post to repair radios that developed troubles. A daily courier run was established between the rear and forward Command Posts for the purpose of delivering necessary radio equipment, batteries and supplies.

d. Significant Events

- (1) On Operation LINN RIVER, the PPS-6 was employed by each rifle company and the Command Post. The results of using the PPS-6 were several small arms and M79 contacts. One PPS-6 was hit by shrapnel, sent to the BLT Rear for further transfer to FSR, and was repaired and returned.
- (2) On 12 February, 1 AN/MRC-109 was wrecked while on a courier run to the 26th Marines Command Post.

13. MEDICAL/DENTAL SUPPORT

a. Medical

- (1) BAS Administration was handled by the section aboard the USS OKINAWA, and at 1/26 Command Post. All sick call was handled by our Medical Officers, and 3-5 corpsman utilizing the BAS facilities of the USS OKINAWA and at 1/26.
- (2) Currently, there are 2 Medical Officers with the BLT. They were distributed so 1 was always in the BAS of the OKINAWA (while afloat), and the other was assigned to the Alpha Command Group. Corpsmen were assigned as follows:

4	1/26 BAS
2	Alpha Command Group
8	Rifle Companies

1	Amtracs
2	Recon
1	Sanitation
3	Battalion Medical Supply
1	Administration
3	Medical Records
2	Btry "B", 1/13
2	"W" Btry, 1/12
2	Engineers
1	Dental
1	Anti-Tanks
1	Tanks
3	Share Party

(3) Casualties/Injuries Treated

(a) Combat Casualties	48
(b) Non-Battle Casualties	32
(c) Routine Sick Call	240

b. Dental

(1) Our Dental Clinic was established and operated aboard the USS OKINAWA. Lt J.C. GABUS, DC, USNR, with the help of DTG2 PANTLIK, manned the clinic for the BLT.

c. Significant Events

(1) On 7 February 1969, HN F.E. LOUDERMILK, B53 02 62, was Wounded In Action, and later medevacued to the USNH, Yokosuka, Japan. Also medevacued to that hospital, was HN L.F. PLUDE, B50 72 41.

14. RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIESa. Personnel

(1) Chaplain assigned: Lt Jerry A. ZANDSTRA, CHC, USNR
 (2) Chaplain's Assistant: LCpl Wayne ROBERTS

b. Services Conducted

Type	Number	Attendance
Sunday Worship- Protestant	4	253
Sunday Mass- Catholic	4	214

Weekday Worship- Protestant 14 123
Weekday Mass- Catholic 11 107
Holy Communion- Protestant 13 457
Memorial Services 2 384

c. Facilities

- (1) Used forecastle, hangar deck, and mess deck on ships.
- (2) Used 7th Engineer Chapel for services at 1/26 Command Post.
- (3) Used any available spot in the field.

d. Significant Events

- (1) Prepared and delivered a series of drug use and abuse lectures in conjunction with the Doctor and Legal Officer. Delivered the series on three occasions.
- (2) Spent a good deal of time in visitation. Places visited included: NSA Hospital, 1st MedBn Hospital, 1st Medical Hospital, and the ship sickbay and brig.
- (3) Attended Division Chaplain's meeting. Stocked up on supplies and reading material for the troops.
- (4) Distributed "goodies" to the troops which had been sent by very thoughtful people back in the States. Wrote each a letter of thank you on behalf of the command.
- (5) Assisted several men in arranging and making priority status MARS calls.
- (6) Acquired and distributed special services gear to the troops.
- (7) Served as middle man for "Operation VALENTINE". Wrote thank you letter to the donors. Displayed heart in wardroom and crew mess. Worked with Regimental ISO in news release.