

HEADQUARTERS 5d Battalion, 26th Marines PPO, San Francisco, California 96602

3/WJW/wmf 5750

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From: Commanding Officer

Tc:

Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rain), FMF Facific

Command Chronology for period 1 February to 28 February 1967. Subja

Ref:

(a) PMF PACO 5750.8

(b) DivO 5750.4A

Enclo $\sqrt{(1)}$ 3d Bathalion, 26th Merines Command Chronology for period 1 Tehrang to 28 Pebruary 1967


1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), Enclosure (1) is submitted.


K. L. HOCH

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HEADQUARTERS

3d Battalion, 26th Marines FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 February to 28 February 1967

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PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

DESIGNATIONS

COMMANDER

3rd Battalion, 26th Marines

LtCol K. L. HOCH (1-28Feb67)

SUBORDINATE UNITS

H&S Company

Capt R. J. SASEK (1-28Feb67)

Company I

Capt R. E. HINES (1-19Feb67) (KIA) Capt W. F. FARRELL III (20-28Feb67)

Company K

lstLt A. L. SISCO (1-24Feb67)

Capt F. D. BYNUM (25-28Feb67)

Company L

Capt R. F. ROLLER Jr. (1-28Feb67)

Company M

Capt A. D. DEBONA (1-28Feb67)

SUPPORTING UNITS

BtryC, 1/13, 4thBn, 12th Mar Co B (-), 3dATBn

Capt T. J. BRACKMAN (1-28Feb67) Capt S. L. CAMBY (1-12Feb67) (KIA)

lstPlt Co B, 3dEngrBn

2ndLt G. J. GIBSON (12-28Feb67) 1stLt J. E. BISHOP (1-28Feb67)

1stPlt, Co A, 3dMTBn

lstLt W. C. CAILE (1-8Feb67) lstLt W. L. FRISCH (8-28Feb67)

2ndFlt. Co A 3dMTBn

2ndLt G. R. WADE (1-16Feb67)

Btry D, 1stBn, 44th Arty Btry G, 2ndBn, 65th Arty

lstLt G. H. KARSON, USA (1-28Feb67) 1stLt D. M. BOWIE, USA (1-28Feb67)

LOCATION: Phong Dien District, Thua Thien Province, RVN.

STAFF OFFICERS:

Executive Officer

Maj D. J. FULHAM (1-28Feb67)

S-1

2ndLt R. D. SPENCER (1-28Feb67)

Personnel Officer

2ndLt E. L. KNOX (1-28Feb67)

2ndLt T. A. BAILEY (1-28Feb67)

S-3

Maj W. J. WOODRING Jr. (1-28Feb67)

S-3A

Capt W. F. FARRELL, III (1-19Feb67)

S-4

Capt M. L. VOS (20-28Feb67) lstLt M. A. KING (1-28Feb67)

Comm Officer


Capt J. L. STEELE (1-28Feb67)

Supply Officer

Capt G. A. RADNIECKI (1-28Feb67) 1stLt P. E. SULLIVAN (-28Feb67)

Motor Transport Officer Medical Officer

Lt J. F. IPPOLITTI, USN (1-28Feb67)



DECLASSIFIED

Asst Medical Officer Chaplain Lt J. C. NAUMAN, USN (1-28Feb67) Lt B. WATTIGNY, USN (1-28Feb67)

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH: (Includes supporting units)

USMC		USN		OTHER		
Off	Enl Off	En1	` .	Off	Enl	
45	1325 3	54		2	46	

Enclosure (1)



3



PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

At the beginning of February 1967, the 5d Battalion, 26th Marines was engaged in Operation CHINOOK I, a search and destroy operation in PHONG DIEN District, THUA THIEN Province that began on 19 December 1966. The material covered in this part of the February Command Chronology is a continuation of Part II Narrative Summary to the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines Command Chronology, 1. January 1967.

1 FEBRUARY 1967

At OCCAH, the 3/26 CP was located vic (YD 535319). Co L and Co M were providing perimeter security and operating in the NW sector of the TAOR. Co K was operating in the Hill 56 area, vic (YD 578282); and Co I was operating in the Hill 51 area, vic (YD 549282).

At 1015H, K-3 at vic (YD 588264) received 5 rounds SAF from vic (YD 597264) from unknown number of enemy K-3 returned fire and pursued enemy, who returned 5 additional rounds SAF. Enemy broke contact and fled to E.

At 1245H, K-3 at vio (YD 599267) received SAF from vic (YD 601266) from an estimated 2 auto and 2 semi-auto weapons. K-3 returned SAF and moved to vic (YD 597265), where they received SA and MG fire from an estimated 15-20 VC at vic (YD 601265), resulting in 2 USMC TAW. K-3 returned SA, MG, and 3.5 fire, and called a zone fire arty mission. Good coverage of target, but unable to determine results because of being unable to cross river and trees obscuring vision. Two wounded men were medevaced at 1317H, but one died surroute to Thu Bai

At 1330H; 3/26 received report from ARVN District HQ that a VC Bn with/, 82mm mortars and unknown numbers of 60mm and MG's was working in Thon Huynh Lien-Mon Vinh Nguyen area. While 3 batteries of arty prepared the area, Co M(-) moved to search area and M-2 occupied blocking position at vic (YD 488317) with ONTOS and Twin-40's.


At 1645H, M-2 fired on 25-30 VC moving N at vic (YD 491323) with ONTOS and SA, resulting in 1 VC KIAC. The rest of the VC fled N without returning fire.

At 1700H, M-2 called arty on 5 VC at vic (YD 485327), resulting in 1 VC KLAP.

At 1820H, Co M(-) at vic (YD 495325) detonated a pressuredetonating 105 round resulting in 2 KIA and 3 WIA.

In searching the village, Co M found evidence of recent occupation: 7-8 fresh fighting holes and boby-trap of 81mm round with 4 blocks TNT vic (YD 491323); 15 more fighting holes vic (YD 498326). All destroyed.

During the day, 1 dud 250 lb bomb vic (YD 595264) and 1 dud 500 lb bomb vic (YD 577265) were destroyed in place.





2 FEBRUARY 1967

Companies continued to operate in their respective areas. At 1400H, Co K at vic (YD 582272) called arty on 5 VC carrying

weapons at vic (YD 585254), resulting in 1 VC KIAF.
At 1515H, Co K OF at vic (YD 582272) called arty on 5 armed VC at vic (YD 585254), resulting in 3 VO KIAC and 1 VC KIAP. At 1534, the same OP called arty on 8-10 VC who attempted to recover the bodies, resulting in 5 more VC KIAC and 2 more VC KIAF.

At 1625H, Co I found body of dead VC at vic (YD 545284), 1 VC

KI/.C.

During the day, the following body traps were destroyed: 3 M-26 grenades in C-ration cans vic (YD 549300), 1 M-26 grenade in C-ration can vic (YD 550309), pull-wired 60mm mortar round vic (YD 548317), and 2 punji pits vic (YD 549300) and one M-16A1, which was found vic (YD 549302) with a pressure wired 60mm mortar round and block of C-4 as a detonator

3 FEBRUARY 1967

Companies continued to operate in their respective areas.

At 1200H, Co I at vic (YD 551309) detorated a pull wired M-26

grenade in a C-ration can, resulting in 1 USMC WIA.

At 1510H, Co K OP at vic (YD 584269) received 3 rounds SAF from across river at vic (YD 577268). Called arty but unable to observe results.

At 1640H, Co I OP at vic (YD 553289) found 2 VC bodies. One killed by grenade shrapnal, other by bullet would. Two VC KIAC.

4 FEBRUARY 1967

Company & moved from the Battalion perimeter, to IEII 50 vic (YD 578282) to relieve Co 2 and begin operations in that area. Coll reliaved Coll on the Battalion perimeter and Co M moved from the Battalion perimeter to vic (YD 493289) to commence operations in the Hill 67 area. Co K continued to operate in Hill 56 area.

At 0615H, AO called arty on 6-8 VC at vic (YD 535253) resulting

in 2 VC KIATA

At 0920H and 0938H AU called 2 air strikes on 10 VC vic (YD 538253) resulting in 4 VC-RTAP.

At 1313H. Co K OF at vic (YD 578274) called arty on 3 VC at vic

(YD 565255) with good effect on target.

At 13:5H, Co K apprehended 3 detainees at vic (YD 567308).


Delivered to District HQ.

During the day, 3 punji pits vic (YD 531290) and 1 punji pit rigged with pull-release device and block of TMT vic (YD 559299), were destroyed. Also, 4 tunnels and 5-7 recently occupied bunkers vic (YD 556296).

The Commanding General and Assistant Chief of Staff 3d MarDiv

were at 3/25 CP from 1100 to 1140H.





5 FEBRUARY 1967

Companies operated in their respective greaters. 80

At 4200H, Co K (T at vic (YD 493326) fired on 4 VC at vic (YD 493323) and observed 2 fall.

At 1205H, Co M at vic (YD 494288) called arty on 2 VC at vic (YD 471284) with good coverage of area.

At 1230H, Co K in conjunction with Tr's and blocking forces from AT's, H&S, and Co I compisted S&C of villages in grid squares YD 5730, 5630, 5631, and 5531. Apprehended 29 detainees, all of whom were delivered to District Hu.

At 1536H, Co K OP vic (YD 582272) received 3 rounds SAF from vic (YD 580266). Called artillery with good coverage, but unable to observe results.

At 1745H, Recon team at vic (YD 615230) called arty on 6 armed VC at vic(YD 605238), resulting in 4 VC KIAP.

At 21000, Co L at vic (YD 5,8280) fired Twin-40's at incermittent lights at vic (YD 550267). Lights extinguished.

At 2259H, Bn perimeter at vic (YD 534322) received approx 30 81 and 32mm mortar rounds. I-1 reported flushes at vic (YD 520304) and counter-mortar plan was fired. The 81mm mortar plt received 5 WIA's, all of whom were treated at BAS. Equipment damage consisted of numerous holes in G tents, minor vehicle damage, and 2 M-60 machine guns damaged beyond repair.

At 2318H, Go I ambush reported unknown number of enemy moving SW along road at vic (YD 505328). Arty fired, but no dead VC were

found during search the next morning.

During the 24-hour period, 2 punil braps vic (YD 551309) and 1 unarmed M1621 vic (YD 567308) were destroyed.

6 FEBRUARY 1967

Companies continued to operate in their respective areas. At 0835H, Co h sniper team at vio (YD 581271) fired SAF and called arty on 5 VC moving along elver at via (YD 585264). Five KIAP, 2 by snipers, 3 by arty.

At 1330H, M-2 at vic (YD 478318) fired SAF at 2 VC moving west at vic (TD 480319). Searched area with no further contact.

At 1350H, M-2 fired on 4 VC at vic YD 471315 resulting in 1 VC KDAC, other three fled W. Captured 1.30 cal M1, 2 ChiCom grenades, 2 Claymore mines, and 35 electric blasting caps.

At 1440H, Co M at vio (YD 492282) detongred a trip-wired M-26


granade, resulting in 1 USMC WIA.

At 1538H, Co M at vic (YD 489285) detomated another trip-wired M-26 grenade, resulting in 1 USMC WIA.

As 1600H, I=3, vie (YD 546288) found the resttered remains of a VC

Filled by artillery, One VC KIAC.

At 1720H, Co L OF at vic (YD 561285) called arty on 1 armed VC at vic (YD 555297) with good effect on target. Searched area with no sign of body.





At 1732H, Co Lat vic (YD 548282) called arty on 1 VC at vic (YD 548259), with good coverage of area.

At 1745H, M-2 at vic (YD 494324) received 30 rounds SAF from 2 VC at vic (YD 494322). Returned SAF and called arty. VC fled in unknown direction. No further contact.

At 1745H, Co L CF at vie (7D 556293) received 15-20 rounds SAF from 2 VC at vic (YD 556296). Returned SAF and M79, and VC fled N.

at 1800H, Co Lat vic (YD 548282) fixed arty and ONTOS on 18 VC at vic (YD 575246). Unable to observe results, as VC entered treeline.

At 1840H, Co L at vic (Y) 548282) called easy on 3 VC moving E at vic (Y) 575246). Unable to observe results, as VC entered treeline.

At 1915H, Co K OP at vic (YD 582272) called arty on 25 VC at vic (YD 579239). By sia of illumination PO observed VC carrying bodies and called arty again 20 VC KIAP:

At 2055H, Spock arrived on station and began firing at vic (YD 579259) and (YD 575246). At 2115H Go K FO, with aid of illumination, and Go K FMC directed Spock's fire on groups of 4-6 VC moving frantically about area of via (YD 579259). FO observed 22 VC KIAP.

At 2140H, Spook expended all flares and left AO. All movement vic (YD 579259) and (YD 595246) had ceased at that time.

During the 24-hour period, 2 bunkers vic (YD 535288) were

The Commanding Officer, 4th Marines was at the 3/26 OF from 1330 to 15450.

↑ PERRIARNIE 267 - Talele State (tr. 1914 Prof.) (ECC.) (Style (1914 Prof.) (ECC.)

Companies continued constantions in their respective ereses to at 10450; Co K Grade (IB 521269), malled erry end VI moving in SW vice (YR 597253), resulting in 5 VI KIAC.

At 14101, 1-31-21 - CYB-555296, detonated a trip-wired M-26 s grenade, fesulting in TESESWIP. It seems and Ind. arts on 5 VC nov

W wio (YE 610231); neculting in 2008 KEAR.

At 1825H; Co L OF via (YE 548278) called arty on 7 V6 win to lin. (YE 573247); resulting in 2 YO (CAR)


At (855H, FCo F OP ric (TR 582270) celled arty on 7-9 VC vic-(YR 579261), resulting in 2 VC WWP 22

With Att 2000H2 to Karion (YD 578232) coalled acty on 5-6 lights moving U.via (YD 560245) a diagnos extinguished.

At 2145E, Go K. 120 (Y) 577282 coalled arty on 2 lights light (YD 557268)). Hights went oit, but reappeared in same location at 2225H. Arty fired again, and Mights went out.

At 2146E, E&S Caltivis (Th. 192327) fired on Se4 VC vic (YD 544323).
VC dissemmeaned to darkness.

At 2350H, TPS-21 vic (YI) 5000 6) sighted unknown number of enemy moving waris (YI) 5000 . Army called, no further movement observed.



8 FEBRUARY 1967

At 0700H, TET began. Companies conducted operations IAW 3d MarDiv Frag 0 4-67.

At 1050H, a 2-man recon element of M-2 vic (YD 495324), received 10 rounds SAF from 4 VC at ranges of 15 and 35 meters. Element returned fire. On arrival of reinforcements, M-2 found 2 VC KFAC, 1.45 cal pistol, 1 BAR, and bunker with bamboo cover.

At. 1215H, Co L OP vic (YD 558282) received 1 round SAF from unknown location to their NW.

meters from their position moving towards OF. VC attempted to fire but OF shot him first. One VC KIAC, and OF recovered 1 AK-47.

At 1655H, L-2 vic (YD 557298) encountered 1 VC who moved between main body and rear security and attempted to fire on main body.

L-2 fired 4 rounds, resulting in 1 VC KIAC. Recovered 1 AK-47, 2 ChiCom grenades, 3 propaganda messages, and currency marked "Bank of Laos".

During the day, a total of 243 VC were sighted moving freely in the CHINOCK AO. Over 100 of these were positively identified as carrying weapons, and many carried heavy packs. The general trend of movement was S and E toward the Co Bi Thanh Tan Valley. Most of the 40 reported sightings were of groups of 5 or fewer VC although two groups of 37 and 33 armed VC were sighted moving SE vic (YD 582257) and (YD 587247) respectively.

9 FEBRUARY 1967

TET - Companies continued to operate IAW 3d Marbiv Frag 4-67.

TET period continued. At 1010H, K-1 vic (YD 594268) received 5 rounds SaF from vic (YD 596263) and (YD 599264). Returned SAF and VC fled NE.

At 1830H, L-3 found graves containing 3 bodies. Three VC KIAC. During the 24-hour period, 159 VC were sighted, in the CHINOCK AO. Approx 20 were observed carrying weapons. Most of the 36 sightings were of small groups moving S and E towards the Co Bi Thanh Tan Valley.

Between 15 and 20 pandi pits were destroyed vic (YD 545315).

and 3 were destroyed vic (YD 545325).

The Assistant Wing Commander III MAW visited 3/26 CF from 1150H until 1225H.

10) FEBRUARY 19677

TET - commanies continued to operate IAW 3d MarDiv Frag 0 4-67
At 1024 H. L-2 vic (YD 564297) sighted 1 VC aiming his weapon on rear of L-2. L-2 responded with SAF, resulting in 1 VC KIAC.
Captured 1 NVA type 550 cal MG and 1 pair NVA 6x30 binoculars.

At 1039H, K-2 vic (YD 585265) received 10-15, rounds SAF from vic (YD 589268). K-2 returned fire with SAF and MG. No further contact.





At 1055H, K-2 vic (YD 590269) detonated pull-wired 250 lb bomb resulting in 1 friendly KIA and 1 friendly WIA.

At 1105H, Recon tesm vic (ID 495254) was ambushed by unknown

number of VC, resulting in 1 LSING WIA.

At 1322H, K-2 vic (YD 590269) received 20 rounds SAF from 10 VC vic (YD 595257). K-2 returned SAF, MG, and M-79 and called in arty with good effect on target. No further contact.

At 1415H, AC received SAF from 8=10 VC vic (YD 598258). Called

in arty with good effect on target.

At 1642H, L-2 found remains of body killed by arty 1 VC KIAC.

At 1715H, Co M apprehended 3 detainees who entered their position with a Chieu Hoi pass and hands over their heads. Detainees were evacuated to Phu Bai.

At 1730H, M-2 OF vic (YD 472315) fired on and killed 3 VC who moved NE to within 15 meters in front OP position. While 2nd squad M-2 picked up enemy's weapons, it received intense SAF from S. First and 3d squads, both within 200 meters of 2d, moved to assist, but both squads received enemy SAF when they started moving. All three squads received approx 8 60mm mortar rounds apiece, artillery called and mortar fire ceased. Enemy maintained solid contact for 60 minutes before withdrawing to NW at 1830H. Enemy force estimated at 30-40 with BAR, carbine and other auto weapons plus mortar crews. Wore khaki trousers and shirts with helmets. Unlike test firefights, enemy advanced against heavy SA and mortar fire, and maintained solid contact for 60 minutes. Results: 5 USMC WIA; 6 VC KIAC; 9 VC KIAP, 1 weapon captured.

During the 24-hour paried, 76 VC were signted in the CHINOCK AO, and of these. 50 were observed with weapons. One group of 17 armed VC sighted in vio (YD 5525) was believed to have been laying mines.

The following booby traps were destroyed: 1 punji pit with trip wire leading to 155mm round vic (YD 546284), 1 box of explosives rigged with pressure device vic (YD 517313), 1 pull-wired 155mm round vic (YD 590269), and 1 pull-wired ChiCom grenade vic (YD 551294).

11 FEBRUARY 1967 -

TEN - companies continued to operate IAW 3d MarDiv Frag 0 4-67. Co I moved from the Battalion perimeter to Hill 55 vic (YD 578282) to relieve to I and begin operations in that area. Co K relieved Co I on the Battalion perimeter, and Co M moved from Hill 57 area to Battalion perimeter in preparation for SaD operation with Company I. Co L continued to operate in Hill 51 area.

At 1100H, L-3 vic (YI) 557292) found 2 garres containing 2 MG KIAC, both killed by artillery.

At 1345H, Co K vic (YD 580313) and (YD 578312) received 2 hand

grenades thrown from bus travelling SE on Hwy #1.

During the 24 hour period 1 trip-wired ChiCom grehade w/ 2 M-79 rds attached vic (YD 556297), 1 fighting hole vic (YD 556297), and 3 recently occupied bunkers vic (YD 557297) were destroyed.





12 FEBRUARY 1967

At O700H, TET ended. Co. M and Co. I, with tanks, ONTOS and twin 40's supporting fire from the Hill 56 area, began a gearch and Destroy operation through the Co Bi Thanh Tan Valley. Co. K and Co. L continued to operate in their respective areas.

During the 24-hour period 2 250-1b. bombs, one with a trip wire attached, vic (YD 600259): 1 250-lb. bomb rigged w/pressure device vic (YD 602257), and 2 500-1b. bombs vic (YD 597257) were blown in place.

At 0730H, the Fwd Command Group moved with Co. M, ONTOS, twin-40's, and tanks, to link with Co. I at Hill 56 before conducting a two-company Search and Destrey through Co Bi Thanh Tan Valley.

At 0900H, an ONTOS vic (YD 589269) detonated what was determined to be a 250 lb. @ bomb, resulting in 7 KTA and the total destruction of the ONTOS. The ONTOS Company Commander and a Platoen Commander were among those killed.

At 1035H, Co. M vic (YD 600264) received 5-10 rds SAF from vic (YD 605263). Co. M returned fire and VC fled.

t 1100H, Fwd CP vic (YD 578281)fired on 4-5 VC moving S

vic (YD 578251) w/ONTOS. Enemy appeared in brush.
Az 1200H, Co. M. vic (YD 598264) called 8" guns from PK-17 on 4 VC in a bunker vic (YD 595253), scoring a direct hit on bunker 4 VC KIAC.

Between 1400 and 1530H Co. M received sporadic sniper fire from their right flank. In each instance, Co. M returned fire and sniper ceased firing..

At 1540H, Co. N vic (YD 5952.93) received 1 WIA from sniper fire, and at 1843H, Co. Mreceived a second WIA from sniper fire.viw (YD 600250). In both cases, Co. M returned SAF and the enemy broke contact.

At 1910H. I-2 vic (YD 602265) fired on 20 VC vic (YD 604265)

who were moving towards their position. VC fled Sa,

At 1945H, Co. L CP vic (YD 5A9281) received 5 60mm. Mortar rds. Observed muzzle flashes vic (YD 555295) and called in arty with good coverage of target and mortars ceased. OP vic (YD 545286) heard VC screaming.

At 2031H, I-2 vic (YD 602266) fired on 3 VC vic (YD606266), who fled ?.

13 FEBRUERY 1967

Co. M and Co. I concluded Search and Destroy operation through Co Bi Thanh Tan Valley. Forward Command Group and Co. M returned to Battalion perimeter. Co I returned to Hill 56. Co. L and Co. K continued to operate in their respective areas.

At 0430H, 106 plt LP vic (YD 542318) received 3-4 rds SAF from unknown number of enemy vic (YD 543317). 106 plt returned 50 rds SAF. Not starthor contact.

Buclosums (1)



At 0820H, 3/26 fwd vic (YP 578281) called antillery on 1 VC in brush vic (YP 570261) with good effect on target.

At 0820H, Co. M vic (YD 592293) received 1 rd SAF from vic

(YD 593253). Returned fire and searched area.

At 1001H, Co. N vic (YD 92293) received another rd SAF from vic (YD 593253). Returned fire with no further contact.

At 1100H C . I OP vic (YD 586254) received 4 rds SaF f om vio

(YD 587253). Returned out with no further centact.

At 1200H, resupply helicopter enroute to Co. M vic (YD 578264)

received SaF from vic (YD 574265). Co. M returned SAF.

nt 1315H, I-2 vic (YD 604266) received 4 rds SaF from vic (YD 601260). Returned SaF, but unable to observe results.

mt 1420H, 3/26 fwd vic (YD 578281) fired twin-40's on 4 VC moving W vic (YD 575265) with unknown results.

at 1450H, 3/26 fwd vic (YD578281) received 15-20 rds SAF from

4-6 VC vic (YD 570278). Returned fire with unknown restalts.

At 1610H, 3/26 fwd vic (YD 578281) called artillery on 15 VC moving W vic (YD 569251). Good coverage of area, but unknown results.

At 1715H, 3/26 fwd vic (YD 578281) fired on 4 VC vic (YD

570262) with tanks, resulting in 2 VC KLAP.

During the 24-hour period the following dud ordnance was destroyed: 3 250-lb. bombs vic (YD 588288), (YD 580265), and (YD 579268); 1 500-lb. bomb vic (YD 580268); and 2 Zuni 2.75 rockets vic (YD 580266);

A Soviet M-1891/30 rifle was Captured vic (YD 577266).

14 FMERULRY 1967

Companies operated in their respective areas.

At 1700H, 3/26 chopped Operational Control to the 4th Marines.

AV 4th Mar Fr g 0 4-67.

During the 24-hour period a 60mm, mortar rd embedded in trail with its nose up vic (YD 554295) and a ChiCom premade hanging waist high in a tree vic (YD 553295) were destroyed.

15 FEBRU RY 1967

CONTRACTOR S.

Co. I moved from Hill 56 to blocking position north of Hwy #1 vic (Y.) 595354) in support of Search and Destroy operation by 1/9. Other companies continued to operate in their respective areas.

At 1845H, Co. Livis (YD 548281) called artillery on 1 armed VC moving W vic (YD 535275) with good effect on target but unknown results.

At 1910H, Co. I vic (YD 575345) fired S.F and MG at 4 VC vic

(YD 5783:2). VC fled S and were lost in darkness.

During the 24-hour period 1 3-man shelter with overhead cover via (YD 525285) and 2 recently occupied shelters via (YD 523285) were destroyed.







Companies continued to operate in their respective areas.

At 0951H, L-1 vic (YD 542324) apprehended 7 detainees outside Battalion perimeter. Delivered to 4th Marines.

At 1415H, L-2 vic (YD 577278) apprehended 6 detainees without authorized ID. Delivered to 4th Marines.

At 2400H, Operation Chinook I ended and 3/26 commenced Operation Chinook II. IAW CG 3rd MarDiv 14 1255Z Feb67.

17 FEBRUARY 1967

Companies continued to operate in their respective areas. At 1115H, Co. L ambush vic (YD 529290) fired on 4 VC who were digging in village vic (YD 526287). VC fled SW.

At 1122H, K-3 vic (YD 536352) apprehended 1 detainee 25 meters outside Bn. perimeter. Delivered to 4th Marines.

... At 1700H, L-2 vic (YD 549301) fired on 2 VC moving E vic (YD 549303). Results: 2 VC KIAC, 2 wpns captured.

At 2025H, I-1 ambush vic(YD 604358) engaged 20-30 VC moving W vic (YD 604358). Enemy returned fire with SA and granades for 20 minutes before breaking contact. Ambush saw 4 VC KIAC within 30 meters, 2 of which were later dragged off, and captured 2, including a lieutenant. PW's said unit was moving to Ap Trung Kieu vic (YD 5939, 5940). Search of area following day revealed blood-stains, pieces of bloody clothing with bullet and shrapnel holes, and scuff marks evidencing the dragging off of bodies. Results: 4 VC KIAC, 7 VC KIAC, 2 PW/VC, 2 wons captured.

During the 24-Sour period punji pits vic (YD 595357, YD 593358, YD 594358, YD 602356) and 4 shelters vic (YD 526287) were destroyed.

18 FEBRUARY 1967

Comparise continued to operate in their respective areas. At 1245H, So. M. wic (YD 502326) received 1 WIA from rock fragments thrown by 81mm. mcrtar rd.


At 2310H, L-23 and sh vio (YD 576276) engaged 2 VC moving S vio (YD 576277). VC returned SAF. Results: 1 USMC WIA; 2 VC Map.

During the 24-hour period 10 punji pits vic (YD 509327). 25 panji pits vic (YD 495326, YD 507326), 53 fighting holes vic (YD 495326), 8 bumbons with overhead cover and 21 masonite structures vic (YD 495328), 1 105mm. dud vic (YD 496327), and 7 fighting holes vic (YD 490327) were destroyed.

19 FEBRUARY 1967

Co M moved from Battalion perimeter to vic (WD 473313) to begin operations in the Hill 42 area. K-3 moved to vic (YD 538321) to provide security for D/4/12. Other companies continued to





At 0225H, L-23 ambush vic (YD 576276) fired on 2 VC moving W vic (YD 675276) approx 70 meters from their position. VC fled without returning fire. Area searched; m bodies or weapons found.

At 0945H, L-2 vic (YD 575282) fired on 1 VC vic (YD 575283), who was wounded and evacuated to A-Med. Results: 1 VCC, 1 wpn captured.

At 1135H, Co. I vic (YD 599356) detonated a bouncing-type mine. Results: 1 USMC KIE (India Company Commander), 3 USMC WIA.

At 1240H, Co. Lambush vic (YD 583279) called artillery on 5 VC vic (YD 587271). Results: 5 VC KLAP.

20 FEBRULRY 1967

Companies continued to operate in their respective areas. At 0010H, H and S Co. vic (YD 538317) fired 1 rd SAF at suspected energy movement vic (YD540316).

At 0740H, Co. M vic (YD 484328) fired on 2 armed VC vic (YD 481328). Saw 1 fall but search of area revealed no body.

At 2110H, Co. K CP vic (YD 549282) called artillery on 4 armed VC moving SE vic (YE 570270). Results: 4 VC KTAP.

At 1255H, L-1 OP vic (YD 572289) called artillery on 5 armed VC vic (YD 581289). No evidence of enemy casualties observed.

At 1340H, L-3 vic (YD 581289) fired on 3 armed VC vic (YD 580280). VC disappeared in brushline with no further contact.

At 1445H. Co. L CP vic (YD 548282) called arithmery on 5 VC vic (YD 575263). VC disappeared into treeling and unit unable to observe results.

At 1510E, C and C helo with S-3 aboard received 15-20 rds from an automatic weapon. Artillery fired zone fire in area. No further enemy fire received from area.

At 1730E, L-3 vic (YD 581277) called artillery on 4 VC moving toward village vic (YD 578262) with excellent effect on target. Results: 4 VC KIAC.

At 1835H, L-3 called artillery on 4 VC moving toward village vic (YD 578262). Results: 4 VC KLAP.

at 1920H, M-1 fired on 4 armed VC vic (YD 455309) carrying packs and sacks of rice, Results: 2 KInC, 1 wpm captured.

At 2000 H, I-33 ambush vic (YD 595355) received 1 USMC WIA from punji trap.

At 2015H, L-32 ambush vic (YD 580273) fired on 1 VC vic (YD 581271) with unknown results.

Enclosure (1)

13,





Co. K moved from Battalien perimeter to Hill 51 vic (YD 548282) to relieve Co. L and begin operations in the Hill 51 and Hill 24 areas ... Co. L moved from Hill, 51 to Battalion perimeter to relieve Co. K. Co. L and Co. M continued to operate in their respective areas . The respect to the second of the sec

At 0100H, Co. K vic (YD 535323) called 81mm, mortars on signallight that appeared at an old enemy mortar position vic (YD 535327) Light extinguished.

At 0240H, L-3B ambush vic (YD 580274) suffered 1 WIA when hand grenade thrown at suspected enemy exploded in air.

At 1355H, Co. L vic (YD 549282) called artillery on 5 VC moving E vic (YD 565268). Excellent effect on target. 5 VC KIAP.

At 1843H, Go. K vic (YD 549282) called artillery on 5 VC moving NW vic (YD 562263) with good effect on target, unknown results.

cht 2040H, Co. K vic (YD 549282) called artillery on 8-10 VC spotted by MPS-21 moving SE vic (YD 543268). No further movement detected.

During the 24-hour period, 1 M-16 antipersonnel mine rigged for pressure detonation, was destroyed vic (YD 598355).

22 FEBRUARY 1967

e tradicio de la compania Companies continued to operate in their respective sectors. At 0825H, Co. K vic (YD 549282) called artillery on 2 VC vic (YD 529276). Good effect on target, unable to observe results. At 1125H, K.1 vic (YD 576287), called artillery on 2 VC moving W vic (YD 562291). Unable to observe restits.

At 1143H, Co. K called artillery on 2 VC digging vic (YD

STAR THE STAR ASSESSMENT

536266) with good effect. 2 VC KIAP.
At 1325H, Co. K CP vic (YD 549282) called artillery on 10 VC in open area vic (YD 574280). Cancelled mission after first rd because too close to K-1's position. K-1 searched area, but did not make contact with VC.

At 1645H, M-33 Cr vic (YD 487341) fired SA and M-79 at 4 armed VC vic (YD485339) . VC returned 8 rds and fled NE.

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Companies continued to operate in their respective areas. At 0305H, M-11 vic (YD 457311) called artillery on area where sounds of voices and digging were heard vic (YD 455308). Undetermined results.

At 1000H, M.11 ambush vic-(YD.454309) fired SAF and called artillery on 3 armel VC searching the bodies of 2 previously killed VG vic (YD 455309). Results: 1 VC KIAC, 1 VC KIAP.

At 1025H, K-1 vic (YD 576280) called artillery on 1 VC vic (YD 577268) with unknown results.





At 1100H, K-1 vic (YD 576280) called artillery mission on 2 VC vic (YD 545240) with unknown results.

At 1120H, Co, K vic (YD 549282) called artillery on 2 VC vic (YD 556254) and rounds burst directly on 1 VC. 1 VC KIAP.

At 1210H, Co. K vic (YD 549282) observed 5 VC in treeline vic (YD 556254). Artillory called with excellent immediate coverage. 5 VC KIAP.

At 1500H, 3/26 began a 3-day Psychological Operation in Pho Trac with a broadcast by the village chief and movies shown by an HE team at the Catholic Refugee Camp.

At 1530H, I-33 ambush vic (YD 597354) apprehended 4 females without ID. Delivered to 4th Marines.

During the 24-hour period 1 250 lb. bomb rigged with a trip wire over a 1 ft. deep pit was blown in place.

The Commanding General (Acting) 3d MarDiv visited the 3/26 CP and Co. K CP between 1155H and 1235H.

24 FEBRUARY 1967

Co. M moved from the Hill 42 area to vic (YD 451345) to begin operations in the Hill 22 area. Co.'s I, K, and L continued to operate in their respective sectors.

At 0430H, M-2 vic (YD 453347) received 1 rd SAF from vic (YD456348). No rds returned, no further contact.

At 0750H, M-2 vic (YD 463353) spotted 11 VC with packs and rifles moving S vic (YD 453351). VC fired on M-2, and M-2 returned fire, resulting in 4 VC KIAC. Captured 1 AK-47, 1 French 9mm. submachinegun, 6 blocks TNT, 4 ChiCom grenades, and assorted clothing and uniforms. The Superior possess.

At 0800H, M-3 vic. (YD: 451345) spotted 4 VC: w/packs and rifles running along trail vic (YD 449346) ... M-2 fired, resulting in 2 VC KIAC and 1 VC KIAP . Captured 1 French submachinegun, 1 compass, 1 map w/25 overlays, ratiletters to Majors General in the second to

were 4t 0930H; Kt 2A: OP vic (YD 570280) called artillery on 1 VC moving S, and carrying a bag vic (YD, 568277). Excellent effect ing a paint out workles are not by the

*At:0945H, K=2:vic:(YD 575278) called artillery on 1 VC vic (YD 565269). Excellent coverage of target, no further movement observed: Partition and the property


At 1055H, M-1-vic (YD 448342) fired on 3 VC bn trail vicin (YD: 448344) with SA and mortars, resulting in 2 VC KIAC, 1 PW/VC (wounded in buttocks and leg) Wounded VC owned 9mm. submachinegun captured at 0600H; these cars to spec

At 1100H, Co. I vic (YD 596355) apprehended 4 detainees from willage of AppTried Duang. One man carried what appeared to be a pay record w/905 new piasters and 300 old piasters. Delivered to 4th, Marines. For a see still a constitute via section (65) so so since of the constitute of the section of the section of the second constitution of the

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to de cita de la carega que de desta parter de la parte par el carega de la carega de la carega de comparte de

At 1540H, hero near Co. K CP vic (YD 549282) received sniper fire from vic (YD 553282). Held's marked area for fixed wing airstrike. No results observed.

At 1640H, K-2 vic (YD 578282) called artillery on 20 armed VC moving SE vic (YD 571262). Also fired Quad -50's in area. Good coverage of area. 5 VC KLP.

Wietnamese girl who detonated what appeared to be a Bouncing Betty type mine.

At 1735H, Co. M vic (YD 448347) fired on 1 armed VC crossing stream vic (YD 447347). 1 VC KIAC, 1 wpn (AK-47) captured.

At 2010H, Co. M found 1 VC deed of gunshot wounds vic (YD 458351) and 1 9mm. French submachinegum. Apparently killed in M-2 firefight at 24 0750H.

At 2330H, Co. K vic (YD 549282) fired Quad -50's on approx 5 VC moving SW vic (YD560271) who were sighted by TPS-21. Movement ceased.

During the 24-hour period 1 punji pit vic (YD 598352) was destrowd.

25 FEBRUARY 1967

Co. I moved from blocking position vic (YD 595354) to the Battalion perimeter. L-3 moved to vic (YD 538321) to relieve K-3 as security for D/4/12. Other componies continued to operate in their respective areas.

At 1125H, K-1 vic (Y) 549282) called artillery on 7 VC vic (Y) 552296) resulting in 1 VC KUC and 1 VC KLAP.

At 1272H, K-2 vic (YD 587287) received approx 20 rds carbine fire from vic (YD 585285) and (YD 592286). Returned fire and called artillery. VC broke contact. No casualties.

At 1215H, M-11 ambush vie (TD 451345) ambushed 12 VC on trail at range of 5 meters, killing 10 and wounding 2. 1 Marine WTA from buttstroke to head. Unptured 2 ChiCom machinegums, 2 40mm. rocketlaunchers. 1 AK-47, and 20 ChiCom granades. VC did not return any fire, as all were hit before they could chamber a round. Results: USMC: 1 WTA; ENEMY: 10 KTAC, 2 PW/VC, 5 wpns captured.

At 1230H, K-2 apprehended 1 detained vic (YD 582277). Delivered to 4th Marines.

At 1550H, N-2 vic (YD 549282) reciived 1 rd SAF from vic (YD 467351). No further contact.

At 1445H, K-2 wic (YD 579272) called artillery on 1 VC vic (YD 570302). Good coverage, negative surveillance.

At 1505H, K-2 vic (YD556296) detonated 2 M-26 grenades tripwired to C-ration cans, resulting in 3 USMC WIA.

At 1625H, K-2 vic (YD 554294) detonated a ChiCom grenade rigged with a trip wire, resulting in 2 USMC WIA.

At 1640H, Co. K CP vie(YD 549281) called artillery on 3 VC vic (YD 552258), resulting in 1 VC KIAP.

At 1700H, K-3 vic (YD 508276) apprehended 1 detainee who





wandered into an ambush. Belivered to 4th Marines.

At 1990H, H-1 vic (YD 422342) sighted 5 VC standing on that wic (YD 439344) and heard unknown number of VC. Engaged enemy with SAF and artillery. 2 VC KIAP. Heard digging at same location later.

At 2150H, L-3 with TPS-21 vic (YD 529344) sighted 12-14 VC vic (YD 538352) moving towards 1.3's position.

At 2255H, L-3 called 81's on VC, who had moved to vic (YD533351).

Good coverage.

At 2345H, L-3 called artillery on 8-10 VC vic (YD 536353). Both target areas were searched. Excellent coverage by VT rds, but no bodies found.

26 FEBRUARY 1967

Co. L moved from Battalion perimeter to vic (YD 465277) to begin operations in the Kne Mit area. Co. M moved from vic (YD 451345) to vic (YD 435359) to begin operations in the Hill 23 area. Other comp nies continued to operate in their respective areas.

At 1145H, K-1 vic (YD 590267) called artillery on 3-5 VC chopping wood along river vic (YD 586264). Unable to observe results.

At 1424H, K-1 vic (YD 587267) fired on 7 armed VC on opposite river bank vic (YD 583264). Saw 1 fall and be dragged off. Called artillery on VC as they fled down the trail vic (YD 579258) with good coverage. No further contact. 3 VC KIAP.

At 1540H, K-1 vic (Y8587267) called artillery on 7 VC carrying

boats vic (YD 576257). Good coverage. no surveillance.

At 1605H, K-1 vim (YI) 587267) cakled artillary on 10 armed

VC vic (YD 572248). Good coverage. 3 VC KIAP.

At 1648H, Co. K OF vic (YD 549282) fired Quade50's, 60mm. mortars, and artillery on 15 VC moving SE vic (YD 541271). K-2 searched area and found nothing.


at 2220H, Co. K CP vic (YD 549282) called artillery on TPS-21 sighting of a stationary reinforced squad vic (YD 565280). Search of area following morning gave no evidence of enemy casualties.

During the 24-hour period, 37 fighting holes, 18 of which had overhead cover, extending from vic (YD 477365) to (YD 477362) were destroyed. Several punji pits in the same area were also destroyed.

27 FEBRUARY 1967

Companies continued to operate in their respective areas. At 0710H, M-1 vic (YD 418363) sighted 110 VC moving S vic (D 418z66). VC were well spread out-- 40 maters between individuals, and carried mortars and automatic weapons and wore brown khaki uniforms and packs---apparently NVA. VC did not enter M-1's killing zone, but M-4 opened fire and called artillery to tlock trails vic (YD 422350) and YD 418362). M-1 and M-3 moved to support





M-1. 3 VC fell in initial volley and VC returned approx 400 rds SAF and 3 rds 60mm. mortar, which came from S. VC broke contact at 0745H, splitting N and S of Co. M position, 75 fleeing S, 35 fleeing N. VC believed to have been vic (YM 4338) since end of column not seen. Subsequent searches of area revealed much bloodshed. Results: USM: 1 KIA, 5 WIA; ENEMY: 1 KIAC, 15 KIAP.

At 0845H, Co. M vic (YD 433374) received 2 enemy mortar rds.

No casualties. Rds sale ad to have come from S.

At 0950H, 3/26 assumed Operational Control of D/1/9 IAW 4th Mar 27 0145Z Feb 67. 3/26 fwd and D/1/9 moved up Hwy #1 to conduct S and D parallel to Song Thac Ma river towards Co. M block vic (YD 4237, 4336).

At 1356H, M2 vic (YD 425375) fired on 10 armed VC crossing river vic (YD 428376), killing 2 and wounding 1. VC returned 20 rds before fleeing W. 2 VC KIAC, 1 PW/VC who was delivered to 4th Marines.

At 1530H, D/1/9 vic (YD 447372) received 3-4 rdsSAF from SW, resulting in 1 USMC WL. D/1/9 returned fire and sniper fire ceased.

At 1835H, K-3 vic (YD 580277) received 5-6 rds SAF from vic (YD 587274). Captured 1 VC while searching area. Detained overnight and delivered to 4th Marines following day. 1PW/VC.

At 1910H, 3/26 dropped Operational Control of D/1/9 to 1/9

IAW 4th Mar 1350Z Feb 67.

At 2000H, Co. M found 1 dead VC vic (YD 428326). 1 VC KIAC. During the 24-hour period, 1 booby-trapped ChiCom grenade was blown in place. Between 12-15 60mm. Mortar rds, 3-5 81mm. mortar rds, 5 M-26 grenades, 1000 rds .50 cal, and 500 rds .30 cal ammo found vic (YD 587274). Mortar ammo blown in place. .50 and 30 rds delivered to 4th Marines.

28 FEBRUARY 1967

Co. M movel from vic (YD 435355) to Battalion perimeter. Other companies continued to operate in their respective areas.

At 0850H, Co. K CP vic (YD 549281) called artillery on 2 VC in treeline vic (YD 557262) with good effect on target, resulting in 1 VC KIAP.

At 0830H, K-3 vic (YD 586274) called artillery on 4 armed VC entering a house vic (YD 575265). Good coverage but unable to observe results.


At 1143H, K-3 vic (YD 579274) received SAF from 67 VC in grush and treeline vic (YD 575267). VC had 3 auto and 3 other rifles. K-3 received 1 WIA and returned SAF and called artillery. Good coverage of target. Enemy fire ceased.

At 1600H, L-1 vic (YD 456279) fired on 1 armed VC vic (YD 456276). Saw VC fall. Search of area revealed camouflaged shelter with tunnel out the rear and 1 bolt action ChiCom rifle.

at 1910H, K-2 vic (YD 595270) received 2 rds SAF from estimated 1 VC vic (YD 596264). VC fled under fire in unknown direction.







SEQUENTL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

A. CONDUCTED ASSIGNED AND SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS
CONDUCTED

During the first half of February, 3d Battalion, 26 Marines continued to conduct Operation Chinock I, a search and destroy operation in Phong Dien District, Thua Thien Province. Chinock I ended at 16 2400H, and at that time Chinock II began.

Chinook II was also a search and destroy operation, although in a slightly extended TaOR and conceived as a two-battalion operation, employing 1st Battalion, 9th Marines as well as 3d Battalion 26th Marines.

The Battalion was required to provide one company as a blocking force in support of a search and destory operation by 1st Battalion, 9th Marines on the Northern side of Hwy #1. Otherwise, the mission and b sic concept of operation remained the same as in Chinook I during the month of February.

operated in the same manner as it had throughout the operations by conducting platoon and company sized search and destroy operations and establishing observation posts during the day, and by employing ambushes and listening posts at night.

Companys in the field would operate from company patrol bases with all ambushes, patrols, and security posts departing and returning to the company perhapters. Resupply was accomplished daily, either by vehicle or by helicopess.


After operating in this manner for six weeks, the Bettalian discurded it as being unsuccessful. Baytime search and destroy operations generally resulted in more casualties to the Marines than to the VC. The causes of this fact were several. During the day, the VC travelled in small groups, rurely larger than 4 or 5. They employed observation posts and made use of informers to alert themselves of percaching Marines. They had an adventage in knowledge of the terrain and, during the monsoons, when the Battalian's only means of troop movement was by fook, they had an adventage in mobility. They were able to withdraw over pre-planned and concepted routes of withdrawal, using tunnels and stream crassings unknown to the Marines or dissappear into exmouflaged spider holes.

For these reasons, R were rarely spotted on search and destroy operations. Once aware of a unit's approach, they would set heaty booby traps in the unit's path or fire a few rounds before disamppearing into the termin. Snipers would also fire at Marines in order to cause the Marines to maneuver over booby trapped areas.

as a-result, the Marines suffered numerous daytime casualties from booby-traps and sniper-fire, while rairely even seeing their enemy during the day.








For these reasons, the Battalion adopted a new method of operation. Daily resumply runs, company-sized perimeters, and daytime search and destroy patrols were abandoned. Instead, once a Company Commander was assigned an area he would subdivide it into three platoen sectors, each about 1000 meters square in area, in which either one platoen or three squad ambush sites would be established. Squads within the platoen were positioned where they could provide mutual fire support, and platoens within the company were placed within easy reinforcing distance from each other. Thus, the company had the security of a company perimeter, without its large, easily detected concentration of troops.

Instead of conducting daytime search and destwoy patrols, units would remain in their ambush positions during the day as well as night. All movement, both day and night, was minimized, but when movement was necessary as in moving into a new location, it was done at night. By moving only at night, the companies made it extremely difficult for the VC to detect their locations.

Instead of being resupplied every d y in the vicinity of the company CF, companies began to operate with a three days supply—teach marine carrying a case of C-rations and using local water with helizone tablets. Resupply was accomplished by being backed into the area at night, or by being delivered to a rendezvous area by vehicle or helicopter during the day, and then carried back to the ambush area at night. Whenever possible, resupply was scheduled to coincide with the companies movement from one area to another.

Once an ambush position was established, the unit would wait for the VC. Maximum emphasis was placed on concealment: fires, tents, poncho shelters, and overt movement were prohibited.

particularly for Co. M, which operated just off trails to the West of the Song O Lau, but also for Co. I in the sandy areas to the North of Highway #1. Contacts became more frequent, and—most important—these contacts were generally initiated by Marines against VC who wandered too close to their ambush positions, instead of by VC firing from covered and concealed positions against Marine patrols. Enemy casualties, particularly confirmed kills and PW's, showed a





definite increase, as aid weapons captured; while USMC casalties declined.

The key to the success of the new method of operation is that the VC must move through the Chinook AO, in order to get rice in the lowland areas, while the sompanies can afford to wait for them to come. When the VC do appear, the Marines are ready to fire and in relatively secure positions.

Since movement is greatly curtailed, there is far less risk involving booby-orap incidents. Moreover, since units move and establish positions at night, the VC do not even know where to set up booby-traps. The reduction in movement has also resulted in a corresponding reduction in heat, foot, and exposure casualties.

The policy of waiting for the VC to come to us instead of searching the AO in order to find them has enabled the Battalion to fullfill its mission with even greater success than before. Not only are areas physically blocked by embuch positions, but the VC do not use an area in which they have been ambushed for two weeks. Besides a definite increase in enemy casualties, his morale has suffered a damaging blow. Previously he could determine the losations of Marine units fairly easily and was confident in the knowledge that he could bypass their ambush areas. Under the new system, he is never sure where the units are, and all his movements are made with uncertainty.



DECLASSIFIED



1. Friendly Casualties (1-28 February 1967)


Killed 6
Died of Wounds 1
Wounded 70
TOTAL 77

2. Enemy Casualties (1-28 February 1967)

KIA (G) 78 KIA (P) 157 VC Captured 7








- 1. With Higher Units: From 1-14 February, 3/26 was under the operational control of the 3d Mar Liv. When the 4th Marines arrived on 14 February, they assumed operational control of the Battalion. No unusual problems were encountered in command relations.
- 2. With Other Morine Units: Detween 0350 and 1910 on 27 February, 3/26 had Operational Control of 5/1/9 for a search and destroy operation along the Song Thac Ma River. We problems were encountered. When the din Marines arrived on February 14, the assignment of certain supporting units were altered, but ithis was accomplished smoothly.
- 3. With Vietn mose Units: Close liason was maintained with Phong Dien District Headquarters at The frack and with the Third ARVN Regimental Headquarters at FK-17. Information was exchanged daily regarding operations and vital intelligence information was exchanged as seen as it was available.

Civil affinits and psychological operations were conducted jointly between the Battalian and District Headquarters. Several Search and Clear Operations were conducted in conjunctionwith Popular Forces Units. All detainess apprehended and all rice captured were delivered to District Headquarters. In addition, Dist H), Ra brd ANVA-Regt, arm 3/26 maint ained close lieson in artillery and provided mutual fire support in their artillery fires.





A CONTRACT

- 1. The Battalien's communications during Fabruary remained generally unchanged from January. Assumption of command by Headquarters 4th Marines only changed the names of the circuits to the next higher headquarters, not the requirements. The only real change was the loss of the MRC-62 Radio Relay which went to Regiment. The Battalien S-3 and the FSCC each still have a hot line to the next schelon as before. There are now wire lines to Regiment rather than radio relay channels to Division. The two community used channels to Division are available through the Regimental switch board.
- 2. The only real difficulty experienced was generator failure again. Fower was available from the 4th Marines and the TU402 was taken to FISC-A für repair on 24 February. Other equipment failures have been infrequent and repair has been timely both when working directly with FISC-A and 1 ter when working through the 4th Marines Corm Repair Section. The Battalion was able to assist other units in this area a number of times by temporarily replacing their inoperable commequipment.



E. PIRE SUPPORT

Fire support for the month of F brunry was controlled by 3/26 FSCO from the 1st to the 15th. Catrol was taken over by 4th Marine Raisent and 3rd B tablion 12th Marines upon their arrival in the 3/26 perimeter. Normal search and destroy operations were conducted and OP! were mained in the 40.

O. Frankly 67 C. M tracked a suspected enemy concentration, preceded by an extensive preparation by 81mm. mortars, a 105mm. Howitzer Bary, two 8" Howitzers, and support from two 105mm. Howitzers of the 11 RVN Artillery in Pho Trach. All fires were planned and controlled in the FSCC, under the tactical supervision of the S-3 who initiated the Prep Fires and troop movement, to achieve coordination between the ground elements and supporting fires.

The mir observer initiated and adjusted fire missions with a rtillery that were relayed through FSCC. This has proven to be the best fethod to employ the air observer, because the FSCC can direct and control his activity for the most efficient coverage of the AC.

The Recommisance units operating in the Chinock area were a valuable source of intelligence information. They also controlled air and artillary missions with good effect.

On the night of 5 Feb 67 the 3/26 Bn area received a mortar attack from approximatly 900 meters fo the south. The Bn 81's, C Btry and the 155 Howitzer Btry from FK-17 fired counter-mortar fire and energy mortars were silenced. The direction of the energy mortars was relayed to the 3-3 from an ambush position outside the southern edge of the perimeter. This information was passed to the FCCO. After locating this position on the mag it was immediately attacked by zone fire.

Illumination missions were fired at more than maximum range in emergency situations. This was done by using charge 7 and an elevation of 800 mills and by adjusting the time setting to get a workable height of burst.

On 12 Feb the FSCC along with the CF group displaced to the ridge line overlooking the village of Co Bi. A two company search and destroy massion was conducted with support from 81's, 185's, 155's, 8". 106 ONFOS, twin forties and tanks. FSCC was able to control and coordinate effective prep fires. which were used to lead the infantry on their sweep to the west. From the Bn OP point targets were engaged by direct fire from the ridge. In this situation, radio communication is imperative, and if possible wire should be laid to supporting arms units nowed to a secure perimeter for the night, the vacated ridge line was registered in with 81mm. mortars and artillery fires. This was done to provide heavy and.



accurate H&I fires designed to prevent the area from being mined and booby trapped. The H&I fires worked effectively for there were no mines or booby traps on the CP group's return to the ridge line the next morning.


On 12 Feb Co. I received 60mm. mortar fire from north of their position. Artillery and 81mm. mortars fired zone fire at the suspected mortar position and silenced the hostile weapons. There was no surveillance because of darkness, but the forward observer reported considerable screaming and yelling from within the target area.

On 17 Feb 4th Marine Regiment assumed control of Chinook II, with 3rd Bm 12th Marines controlling the artillery units. Two 105mm. Btrys (C and I) and a 4 gun 155mm. Btry were under control of 3/12.

On 27 Feb the Bn command group once again became mobile and displaced forerd to YD 4658. The FSCC operating from a MRC 109 assisted by a radio operator, journal clerk, the air liason officer, and the 81mm. Plt. Commander was able to coordinate and control effectively all supporting fires.

The ARVN artillery unit at Pho Trach was also used to provide reinforcing fires and illumination when other supporting units were not in range or otherwise engaged.

The FSCC encountered no major problems in the normal coordination and clearing of missions during the month, however it is the opinion of this FSC that all supporting units should be controlled at the Bn level F500 when only one Bn has the responsibility for the OP area. In this case the fires from all sources can be utilized, integrated and coordinated to a fine degree without undue confusion or delay. The S-3 and FSCC representatives have direct contact with units on the ground, therefore, this first hand information of the testical situation will inspire a harmonious fire support plan that can be initiated and influenced expeditiously by the Tresponsible Bn. Commander. Even when a higher headquarters assumes the direction of an operation, the higher level FSCC could monitor the situation but not function in the same manner as it does when two or more Bn's are manauvering in the same area. In effect we have an FSCC superimposed on the Br FSCC. This duplication of effort in many instances seriously effects control and coordination and impairs the effectiveness of fires integrated with ground maneuver.



- F. AIR SUPPORT
- I. No enemy aerial activity of any sort encountered.

III. AIR SUPPORT

- a. Medivacs

 - 1. 24 Medivacs missions were flown.
 2. 4C WIA's and 7 KIA's were evacuated.
- b. Fixed wing support.
- 1. 47 sorties were flown in our support, resulting in 22 confirmed en. KIA's, 4 probable Kia's, and 130 en. structures were destrayed or demaged foulidings, bridges, caves).
 - c. Resupply
 - 1. 46 surties were flown in support of 3/26.
 - d. Command & Control
 - 9 scrtles were flown for reconnaisance purposes.
 40 soriles were flown by A01s.



TO CL

1. Operations

a. The company continued in D/S of 3/26, operating with infantry patrol bases, delivering H&I fires, patrolling and manning defensive positions on the Battalion perimeter.

b. The company participated in one sweep and destroy operation on 12 and 13 Feb 67 with 10 vehicles employed in a support by fire role at coord 582275.

c. Heavy sections were employed in support of infantry patrol bases at coord YD 578282 and YD 487323 from 2-13 Feb and 1-11 Feb 67 respectively.

2. Statistics

Patrols	Unit Sptd	# veh	<u>Objective</u>	
1 Feb 67	Co. M	6	YD 473304 &	489319
5 Feb 67	Co. M	3	YD 498275	

3. Ammo Expended

Type Mission Direct Fire Recon by Fire H&I	# Rnds 300 19 10	Type Ammo 30 Cal 106mm.	Tgt Loc 487323 487323 655728 5725	Results 4 VC KIA (Prob) Unknown Unknown
Direct Fire	80	500al /		
-do- H%I	18 25	106mm.	575245 5827 5826	3 VC KIA (Prob) Unknown
H&I	. ქ1	105mm.	5826 5827 5926	€d0-
Recon by Fire	100 56	30 Cal 106mm.	575265	Negative Unknown
	Mission Direct Fire Recon by Fire H&I Direct Fire -do- H&I Recon by Fire	Mission # Rnds Direct Fire 300 Recon by Fire 19 H&I 10 Direct Fire 80 -do- 16 H&I 25 H&I 51 Recon by Fire 100	Mission # Rnds Ammo Direct Fire 300 30 Cal Recon by Fire 19 106mm. H&I 10 106mm. Direct Fire 80 50Cal Spt -do- 18 106mm. H&I 25 106mm. H&I 61 106mm. Recon by Fire 100 30 Cal	Mission # Rnds Ammo Loc Direct Fire 300 30 Cal 487323 Recon by Fire 19 106mm. 487323 H&I 10 106mm. 655728 5725 5725 5725 Direct Fire 80 500al 4326 Spt 4326 5pt -do- 18 106mm. 575245 H&I 25 106mm. 5827 5826 5827 5926 Recon by Fire 100 30 Cal 575265 -do- 56 106mm. G3 5725

Recapitulation of Ammo Expended


30 Cal 50 Cal Spt 106mm

400 80 189

4. Friendly Casualties

12 Feb -- 2 Officers, 5 Enlisted KIA -- Vehicle hit mine

5. Equipment Lost or Deptroyed --- 1 ONTOS, 1 M-14 Rifla,
2 Cal 45 Pistols, 1 Submachinegun Cal 45, 1 PRC-25



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H. ARMY ARTILLERY SUPFORT

1. Quad-50's

a. During February, G. Battany, 65th Artillery, US Army continued its primary mission of perime at security.


b. A secondary mission was Rough Rider security, All Rough Riders were accompanied by a section of quad-50's.

- c. Throughout February, the quad-50's continued to deliver night-time H&I fires. Over 42,000 rounds were expended in these fires.
- d. One quad-50 was employed with the company occupying. Hill 51 throughout February.
- e. On 23 Feb 67, two mounts were deployed to Pho Trach for security of D Eattery.
- f. On 27 Feb 67, 2 mounts were deployed for security of the C Battery when it displaced North to support the Search and Destroy operation involving D/1/9 and M/3/26.

2. Twin-40's

- a. The Battalion had 2 sections of D Bertery, 1st BN (AW) (SP). 44th Artillery, US Army in its support until 26 Feb 57, when a third section arrived from PK-17.
- b. During February, at least one section remained on the perimeter to provide fire support at all times.
- c. The twin-40's continued to deliver night-time H&I fires during the month.
- d. During the Scanch and Destroy Operation through the Co Bi Thanh Tan Vailey, one scotion of twin-40's supported the operation by fire from the Hill 56 area. The other section was utilized in transporting supplies from LSA to the Hill 56 area.
- e. Twin-40's were used throughout the month to assist in resupply and troop acvenents about the AD.





I. ADMINISTRATION.

- 1. No major administrative problems were encountered during the period covered by this reports.
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Maclosure (1)

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
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1. During the period covered by this report, the Battalion joined 70 enlisted personnel while 2 Officers and 11 enlisted were reassigned to other units. 1 Officer and 24 enlisted were transferred by service records due to being evacuated out of Vietnam as a result of injuries received.

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


- K. INTLLLIGANCE-
- 1. Significant factors concerning intelligence during period.
- a. Sightings of 341 in groups of 1 to 35 from 7-14
 February in the Co Bi Tahn Tan valley just west of the bong
 Bo liver and a report by a captive (platoon leader from the
 800th in) that the 800th Bn did move from the mountains vic
 Y: 600358 to areas north of Phong Dien commencing 7 Feb
 indicate that the enemy is still free to move just outside the
 eastern boundary of AO using the Song Bo liver as a principle
 svenue of approach.
- center of this AO has been effectively interdicted.
- c. On 24 Feb M Co engaged a total of 15 enomy vic GS YD 4434 in three separate groups. On 27 Feb M Co sighted approximately 110 enemy vic GS YD 4236, 4336. The condition of footpaths and the size of contacts indicate that the enemy is using this area south of the Song Thac La Liver as a principle route for movement to and from the mountains thereby avoiding routes closer to established USIC positions.
- d. Mines and booby traps continue to be a major obstacle. Enery employment on paths and routes of least resistance are most frequent.
- e. Meanons and equipment captured indicate that there is increased NVA activity in the area and that the enemy is adequately supplied. We reports indicate the possibility of food shoutages and low morale among some enemy units.
- f. Factics -- enemy continues to evoid prelonged engagements preferring to break contack quickly. Enipers and booby traps comprise their major efforts in this 40. But the size of enemy units sighted, equipment captured and the unit's identification outside AO strongly indicate the enemy's capability of leunching a major attack in this area in battalien size or larger.
- 2. Weather and terrain a property of the control of the

i. A. weather & Cloudy to partly cloudy skies prevailed with associated light tropical showers. However, precipitation

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was significantly reduced from previous month enabling troops to have with greater case through NO. Temperatures ranged from a low of 57 degrees to a high of 87 degrees averaging 72 degrees for the north.

- b. Terrain -- Streams and flooded rice paddies continued to be the major obstrates, area bounded by YD 4337, 4335, 4535, 4537 consists of grass and shrub 2 4 feet high and rolling halls with excellent fields of fire. Paths are well traveled leading directly into mountainous regions. The Song That No River and the branch of the Song O-Lau River which crosses lighway One at YD 476377 must be considered principle evenues of travel for the energy which bound a complex of paths already noted as being heavily traveled.
- 3. Encry Personnel and equipment losses from 1 28 February 1967.

- Forsonpel	
KIA (C)	78
KIA (P)	157
Detainoes	20
ACC	7
Innocent Civilian	ns. 12
Civil Defendants	1

b. Equipment
Approximately 175 lbs of individual web equipment
and uniforms.

3	Weamons V	
	Individual ;	25
	Crow sorved	2
	Tosel	25



L. CIVIL AFFAIRS

District Construction of the Section o

i vide til storationer i kritisk kommune og det en er en En er en en er en en

- 1. During the period from 1 Feb to 28 Feb 67 periodic visits were made to the refugee camps in and around The Trach for the purpose of delivering sundry goods. A total of 50# of seap, 250% canned goods, and 50% cannot use distributed.
- 2. On 18 February 1967 coordination was made with the Phong Dien District Chief by 3/26 doctors to hold sick call twice a week in the dispensary in Pho Trach and periodic sick calls in the refugee camps in close preximity to Pho Trach.
- 3. The refugee village under construction vic YD 530350 is progressing satisfactorily. A bulldozer was made available on request of the District Chief for use in clearing land where necessary. Constion bexes are collected from battalion units and delivered to the refugees for use as siding on new huts.
- 4. On 6 Feb Lt. Col. K.L. Hoth, Commanding Officer 3d Bn, 26th Marines, presented a gift to the District Chief, Phong Dien (D), on behalf of the J.G., 3d Mar Div, in celebration of Tet.








M. PSYCH LOGICAL OPERATIONS

- 1. Throughout the period the target audi mode within the free fire zone of the AO was hit with leaflets and aerial broadcasts with themes exploiting Tet, allied superiority and allied air power. Safe conduct passes and Chieu Hoi leaflets were also dropped.
- 2. On 20 Teb an audio (HE) team was employed vic YD 5424 for a period of three days with the mission of broadcasting to VC/NVA and VC guerilla cadre in the area.
- 3. 23-25 Feb an audio/visual (HE) team was employed in Pho Trach (H) to show movies and broadcast. Target areas included the refugee camps and the hamlet of Pho Trach.
- 4. To date there has been no response to the "Rewards for Information" program which commenced 1 February







LUGISTIUS SUF UNT

11. General. There were no serious problems in lotistics during February. Alt Althrum several items of ordnance and a few vehicles were deadlined, these shortages did not affect the combat readiness of the Battalion at any time.

2. Ordnance

- a. During February many weapons were delivered to the Battalion armery for repair. These items were repaired and returned to the using unit after being test-fired on the Battalion range to insure that all defects had been corrected.
- b. The 81mm mortar platoon received four new 81mm, mortars and bipods. These items were badly needed by the Battalion, since mortars had been frequently deadlined because of various defects.

Communications 3.

- a. The only combat loss during February was one AN/PRC-25.
 b. The Battalion is still without an AN/MRC-radio vehicle, and no replacement is expected in the near future.

Motor Transport


a. Repair parts for weblibles were very difficult to obtain. ad in el parati,

5. Logistic Support

a. Helicopters and others were used for resurally of companies

operating in the field, both methods were effective,

b. Individual equipment was difficult to obtain. The Battalian Had a large quantity of vorn and unserviceable body armor. The problem in this particular area was alleviated by the 3rd MarDiv's new system of exchanging worn sets of body armor for new sets, on a one for one basis.





- 1. Until 14 February 1967, 1st Platoen, B Company, 3d Engineers continued in D/S of 3/26. At that time, the platoen dropped Operation Control to 4th Marines. A detatchment was left in D/S of 3/26.
- 2. Engineers continued to conduct a daily mine sweep of the access road to Highway #1 throughout February.
- 3. On operations of platoon size or larger, a term of engineers would accompany the unit to handle mines, dud artillery rounds, sircraft ordnance, and booby trans.
- 4. Engineers continued to assist in the construction of facilities within the Battalion perimeter.

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- 1. Personnel: At the present time the BAS has a total of 54 personnel. This includes 2 medical of ficers and 52 hospital corpsmen. The total is one short of our T.O. strength of 55.
- 2. Capabilities: The BAS is capable of treating routine medical problems and of performing minor surgical procedures; as more extensive surgical procedures require evacuation to the 3rd Medical Battalion at Phu Bai. A small laboratory kit, including a microscope has been ordered but not received at this time.
- 3. Supply: Medical supplies are obtained from FLSU-2 or from the 3rd Medical Battalion at Phu Bai. Supplies have been adequate for our needs.
- 4. Training: Hospital corpsmen receive on the job training under the supervision of the medical officers and the Chief Hospitalman. Teaching conferences are held when possible.
- 5. Dental: There are no facilities at the BaS for dental care. Dental patients are evacuated to the 3rd Medical Bn. for care.
- 6. Sanitation: Daily sanitation inspections are made by one of the medical officers or by their sanitation representatives.
- 7. Malaria prophylaxis: The malaria prophylaxsis program consists of taking one chloroquine-primaquine tablet each week on Sunday. Tablets are dispensed by the platoon corpsmen who maintain a check list in order to assume that their troops have taken the tablets. The platoon corpsmen supervise while each Marine ingests his tablet.
- 8. Medcap: In conjunction with the Regimental Aid Station the IMAS has established a medical civil action program at Phong Dien and other nearly villages. Medical teams consisting of one doctor and two corpsmen assist the local medic at Phong Dien twice weekly.







Summe

9. The following are the monthly sick sall and monthly ward reports.

(a) Monthly Sick Call

						յաքիր,	1011
	H&S	I	K	<u>L</u>		Outfits	Total
Immersion Foot	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	<u>0</u>	5	9 7	 , .	1 6
Burns	27	3	0	2	4 .	17	52
Skin Infections	30	28	13	39	35	18	1 64
Systemic Infections	0	0	0	1	1 (Ö	2
Lacerations	10	12	2	4.	8 7	3	-44 -
Upper. Resp. Infect.	. 1	1	· (0,	0.	1 .	16 - 9 - 9 -	4
Skin Rash	. 3	0	0.	Q):	0 , . :(0,	· 3
Dental	4	2	3	11	3	1:	14
Others	52	31	18	18	35	3 4	189
WIA	6 .	Q	1	1	2	2:	12.
KIA	O	0	1	0	2.	6	පි
Euncs	3	3	3· ·	1	5	3	18
Ward	.7	. 8 .	5	11	16	2	49
V. D.	0	0	Q	Q	0 " , ;	2.	2
Total Company	143	90	46	83	1.20	94	576
* /							•

(b) Monthly Ward Report

	I	<u>K</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>H&S</u>	Other .	Total
Boil	1	7	-5	2		Ö	11
Cell ulitis	1	2	11	3	2	0.	10
Imm. Foot	0.	. 0	0	5	0 -	0 /	. 5
Infections	0	1	1	1	0	0	3
URI	· O	Ο.	O.	2:	1	0	3
Sp r a i ns	· O .	Ö	2	-0	Ο .	0	3
Swelling	0	0 🚉	``2	0	0	Ο.	2:
Pss. Eracture	1	0	0	0	1	O .	2
Missle Wound	1	0	0	0	0	1	2
Contussion	0	0	Ο -	1	0 -	O.	1 .
Scrapnel	0	Ο,	O	Q.	1	0	1 1
Cýst	1	. "O.	0	0	0	O	1 .
Poss, Hepititis	0	-0	Ö	O_{z}	O)	1	1
Vlcer	Q	0	0	.1	0	0 %	1
Battle Fatigue	1	0	0	O.	0	0 (1
Chest Pain	. 0	. • 1 .	0	Q	0	-O	1
Swollen Testes	Ó	0	1	0	0	0	1
Totals	8	5	11	1 6	7	2	49

The following are to be noted:

- 1. The most common disorder seen at sick call is skin infection. Personal hygiene must continue to be stressed.
- 2. Disorders such as immersion foot and upper respiratory infections which were formerly more significant now have




declined_in incidence due to/a change in the weather.

- 3. Nearly half of the patients hospitalized on the BAS ward had boils or cellulitis which are both basically skin infections.
- 4. The percentage of patience evacuated was 3.1%. This contrasts to the 6.3% evacuated in January. Most of the evacuations were either dental patients or those with extensive missile injuries
 - 5. The figures reflected in the above tables are based on statistics on patients treated at BAS only. It should be noted that casualties evacuated directly to the 3rd Medical Battalion at Phu Bai do not appear in these figures.

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40.







Q. TRAINING

The following training was given during February.

- 1. Orientation: Personnel joined as replacements received an orientation from the Commanding Officer. Upon being assigned to a company, they would receive orientation from their Company Commanders.
- 2. Safety Regulations and FAM Firing: all personnel joining the Battalion were instructed in proper procedures regarding weapons and ammunition. Particular emphasis was placed on regulations pertaining to chambering rounds in weapons and handling of grenades.

Before joining companies, all personnel fam-fired their weapons and established battle sights on the Battalion range. The range was frequently used by the companies on the battalion perimeter to test-fire weapons and redetermine battle-sights.

- 3. Introduction to the M-16E1, 5.56mm. rifle: A total of personnel from the battalion received instruction on the M-16E1.from a three-man instructional team from III MAF. The class consisted of 6 hours of instruction, during which all personnel fired the M-16E1 on the Battalion range. Personnel receiving this course were primarily NCO's, who then used the knowledge gained from it to instruct the remainder of their units on the operation of the M-16E1 in preparation for the M-16E1 replacing the M-14.
- 4. Operation of the AN/TPS-21: During February the Battalion scouts and technicians from 4th Marines held classes on the operation of the AN/TPS-21. Six men from each company received 10 hours of instruction and 30 hours of application. These men would then assist the Battalion scouts in operating the TPS-21 whenever one of the instruments was assigned to their particular company.





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1-4 Feb: Normal activities with daily Catholic Mass in CP.

5 Feb (1st. Sun of Month): Protostant Services by visiting Chaplain. Cath lic Services at 3/26 CP; C. Btry and Brave Btry at PK-17 with normal attendance at these Services. Week of 5 Feb-regular activities of daily Catholic Mass at 3/26 CP.

8 Feb: People-to-people arrogram at Pho Trach. Chaplain, Bn Surgeon, two corpsmen, Comm 0, and security vidited Refugee Camp, administered modical assistance, and contributed several cartons of unused. C-rations to camp.

10 Feb: Protestant Dervices at 3/26 EP.
12 Feb (2nd Sun of Month): Protestant Dervices with Chaplain from Phu Bai addisting. Catholic services at 3/26 CP; C Btry; 3/12 CP, and again in Lyening at 3/26 CP. Chaplain administered to KIA's of ONTOS disaster when returned to 3/26 CP Sunday afternoon.

15 Feb: Another People-to-Péople program at Pho Trach. Visited Missionary at Catholic Refugee Camp accompanied by Comma O and security squad. Brought cartons of C-rations not being used here. Normal activities at CP rest of week.

17 Feb: Protestant Services at 3/25 SP. Catholic Services for M Co. in their CP stace they were going out into the Field.

19 Feb (3rd Sun Of Month): Protestant Services at 3/26 CP; C Btry. Catholic Services at 3/26 CP.

24 Feb: Call d to Regiment Sick Bay to anoint Catholic KIA from Sparrowhawk of 2/9.

25 Feb: Chaplein accompanied Chaplein of 1/9 to OP of 1/9 in attempt to have services, Timing very bad as men just returned from two weeks in field, chow was in progress, and it was raining. Arranged to return following day.

26 Feb: Protestant Services at 3/26 CP; C Btry and I Co. Catholic Services at 3/26 CP; C Btry, I Co.; 3/12. Good church attendance today. Memorial services for Capt. R. 3. Hines and I Cc. held today at 3/26 CP. Assisted in Services by 4th Marines Chaplain. CO of 3/26 gave an enlightening talk. 3/26 Chaplain conducted prayers for the Dead. Services began with Invocation and Scripture readings by 4th Marines Chaplain. Catholic Mass followed Service. Protestant Services followed immediately.

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27 Feb: Chapl in of 3/26 accompanied Chaplain of 1/9 to conduct Catholic services for Alpha and Charlie Co. of 1/9. Regular activities rest of week. Anointed one KIA from M Co. brought in night of 27 Feb.

28 Feb: People-to-People program at Refugee Camp. Since word received this is our lest week, we made our last visity today bringing C-rations left over. Acompanied by doctor, corpsmen, Companied by doctor,


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PART IV

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

The following Division and Regimental orders and messages concerning Operation CHINOOK were received by the Battalion during February.

- Third MarDiv Frag 0 4-67 (Operations Prior To And During TET).
- Fourth MarDiv Frag O (Operation CHINOOK).
- CG Third MarDiv 082352Z Feb 67
- CG Third MarDiv 141255Z Feb 67 (Termination of CHINOOK II)
- Fourth Mar Frag O 5-67 (Operation CHINOOK II).
- Fourth Mar Frag O 6-67 (Operation CHINOOK II)
- Third MarDiv LOI 1-67 (U).
- Third MarDiv Frag 0 8-67 (CHINOOK II)
- 9. CG Third MarDiv 201135Z Fe b 67 (Redeployment Planning Info)
- Fourth Marines 270145Z Feb 67 (Change of OpCon)
- Fourth Marines 270935Z Feb 67 (Operation CHINOCK II, Thase II)
- Fourth Marines 271350Z Feb 67 (Movement of Units)

