

HEADQUARTERS

3d Battalion, 26th Marines 332667
FPO San Francisco 96602



3/TC/1kh 5750 003A19169 10 Jul 1967

From: Commanding Officer

To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF

Subj: Command Chronology

Ref:

(a) FMFPaco 5750.8

(b) 3dMarDivO 5750.1A

Encl: Command Chronology for period 1-30 June 1967 (U)

1. In compliance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.


K. L. HOCH

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PART I

ORGANI TIOMAL DATA

1. DESIGNATIONS

COMMUDIA

3d Battalion, 26th Marines

LtCol K. L. HOCH (1-30Jun67)

SUDCREDENT UNITS

Tess Company
Company I

Company K
Company M
Company M
Company M
Company G, 2/9
Scout Shiper Squad, RLT-26
CCC-A
CAC-H

Capt J. R. CLICKINER (1-30Jun67)
Capt R. D. MALLERD (1-6Jun67)
Capt M. F. COULTER (7-30Jun67)
Capt M. R. WILDPRETT (1-30Jun67)
Capt R. D. BYNCH (1-27Jun67) KIA

Latlet J. AULIK (28-29Jun67)
Capt R. D. CAMP Jr. (30Jun67)
Capt A. D. DIBCMA (1-30Jun67)
Capt R. W. MCGOMMA (1-4Jun67)
Sat R. DOOLMA (15-30Jun667)
Latlet E. D. HAINES (1-8Jun67)
Latlet E. D. RICMARD (1-8Jun67)

2. For matters pertaining to the defense of the Phu Bai vital area perimeter and Gia Le measurent area. The following units fall under the eperational control of the battalion.

IAG-15 B

IGDn

3dl.TBn

LCD-52

WthDn, 12thNer

Hrs 2/4

Hes 1/26

FLS 2/26

FLSG-A

D/1/44

3d ngr Bn

Sector Commanders as designated. (1-8Jun67)

3. ST TF OFFIC RS:

> Executive Officer

S-1/djutant
Personnel Officer
S-2
S-3
S-3A
S-4
Comm Officer
Supply Officer
Notor Transport Officer
Nedical Officer

Maj . FCGO (1-30Jun67)

2dlt R. D. SFENCER (1-30Jun67)

2dlt B. L. KKCK (1-30Jun67)

latlt T. L. BILLI (1-30Jun67)

Maj C. T. HUDY (17-30Jun67)

Cent C. C. REFICLDS Jr. (1-30Jun67)

Cent T. L. BRLY (1-30Jun67)

Cent T. L. BRLY (1-30Jun67)

Cent G. A. RED JECKI (1-30Jun67)


2dlt M. J. RUSSELL (1-30Jun67)

Lt J. F. IPPOLITEI (1-7Jun67)

Lt J. F. LILY (8-30Jun67)

Chaplain

ESCLOSURE (1)



COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 June to 30 June 1967

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
PART I - ORGANIZATIONAL DATA


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PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

At the beginning of June, 3d Battalien, 26th Marines was responsible for the PHU BAI TAOR, the mission it had assumed on 9 March 1967. The material covered in this part of the Command Chronology is a continuation of Part II, Narrative Summary to the Command Chronology for 1 May 31 May 1967.

1 June 1967

I-1 continued as Sparrow Hawk and I-2 and I-3 continued on Sparrow Hawk/Rough Rider Reserve. I-2 squad provided security for minesweep from CAC-H8 to CAC-H5. Co K continued Operation GOLDEN FLEECE I. Co L (-) continued operating in the CAC-A6 and A7 Areas. L-2 continued on Sparrow Hawk/Rough Rider Reserve. Co M continued to operate in PHU LOC Area. G/2/9 continued to operate in NAM HOA Area. The 106 Plt continued to man combat outposts on Hill 180 and Hill 230 and manned a portion of Sector F on the Vital Area Perimeter. The 81 Mortar Platoon provided squads on Hill 180, Hill 230, and Colco Beach, two sections on the perimeter, and one section each with Co K and Co M. D/1/44 continued in direct support of 3/26 with 4 M-55's and 10 M-42's.

At 1705H, M-2 listening post received 8-10 rds AWF from 1 VC walking down trail vic (ZD 009011) resulting in 1 USMC WIA. M-2 returned 20 rds SAF with unknown results.


At 2000H, 2 USMC vehicles moving south towards PHU BAI were ambushed by unknown number of VC vic (YD 825186). Both vehicles ran through the ambush, breaking contact and suffering no casualties. An ARVN detachment fired on the ambush and a L-2 ambush fired on 2 VC, apparently fleeing the ambush position, who were crossing a nearby rice paddy. The VC fled north into a treeline.

2 June 1967


I-2 relieved I-1 as Sparrow Hawk at 1700H, and I-1 assumed Sparrow Hawk/Rough Rider Reserve. I-3 squad provided security for minesweep from CAC-H8 to CAC-H3. L-1 squad moved to HUE at 1400H to provide security for HUE Ramp. All other units continued with assigned missions.

At 1915H, M-3 listening post spotted 2 VC, one of which carried an automatic weapon, walking down a trail vic (ZD 002010). The listening post fired 10 rds at 1 VC at a range of 10 feet and received 3 rds return fire from a third VC. Search of area revealed blood, but no bodies. 1 VC KIA (P).

At 2250H, CAC-H7 vic (ZD 201011) received 10-15 rds SAF from vic (ZD 201009). CAC-H7 returned 30 rds M-60 and 15 hand illum flares with negative results. A CAC-H7 patrol moved into position as blocking force but no further contact was made.



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I-2 relieved of Sparrow Hawk and Co I relieved Co K on Operation GOLDEN FLEECE I at 1130H. K-1 and K-3 assumed Sparrow Hawk/Rough Rider Reserve, and K-2 assumed Sparrow Hawk. G/2/9 was relieved in NAM HOA Area by C/1/4 and assumed Sparrow Hawk/Rough Rider Reserve. All other units continued with assigned missions.

At 0105H, CAC-H7 patrol vic (ZD 203009) fired 20 rds M-16 at 1 VC walking along railroad tracks vic (ZD 203009). Negative results.

At 0730H, CAC-H7 reported that the village chief of BUI MAU vio (2D 203012) was assassinated by being shot in the head twice by VC while making a head call on the outskirts of his village.

At 1030H, L-2 apprehended 1 detainee who was subsequently deter-

mined not to be a VC and released.

At 1135H, L-2 patrol discovered 1 Chi Com mine vic (YD 820167) placed two feet off trail and rigged with green nylon trip wire across trail. Patrol disarmed mine and returned it to CP for examination.

At 1452H, M-3 vic (ZD 013018) found and destroyed two 2.75 inch rocket rds, believed to have been dropped by VC in previous night's contact (see 021915H entry above). Also found additional bloodstains.

At 1815H, M-3 vic (ZD 002010) received 4 rds SAF from an unknown

number of VC. Co M returned SAF with unknown results.

At 2000H, CAC-H5 reported that 20 VC shot and killed one 68-year old VC civilian and stole one water buffalo. CAC-H5 patrol searched area and found 2 pieces of VC literature.

At 2135H, CAC-H1 patrol fired on 1 VC vic (YD 927092) moving towards patrol from west with 75 rds SAF, 1 M-26 grenade, and 3 WP grenades. VC fled to east. Patrol searched area with negative results.

At 2340H, PF's on bridge vic (ZD 197010) received a heavy volume of SAF. PF's called in artillery and the enemy broke contact.

4 June 1967

L-1 squad provided security for minesweep from CAC-H8 to CAC-H5.

Co M and attached morter section returned from PHU LOC Area at 0800H and assumed Sparrow Hawk/Rough Rider Reserve. G/2/9 chopped Operational Control to 2/9 at 0900H. All other units continued with assigned missions.

At 2155H, CAC-H6 patrol vic (ZC 144993) fired on 1 VC walking along

trail vic (ZC 144994). Searched area with negative results.

At 1930H, a Vietnamese cab driver and 3 Koreans were kidnapped by 20 VC dressed in civilian clothes with concealed weapons vic (YD 828178). The VC forced the 4 persons to go with them on foot, but they proceeded into L-2 ambush vic (YD 823166) at 2230H. L-2 ambush fired on the 20 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (C), 2 VC KIA (P), and 1 wpn captured (carbine). VC fled to east and west. The cab driver fled in the confusion and hid in village until the next morning when he reported the incident to CAC-A. The following morning L-2 found 1 Vietnamese boy who was wounded by a stray M-79 round while sleeping in his house. Boy was evacuated to HUE.





5 June 1967

K-2 relieved K-1 as Sparrow Hawk at 0800H, and K-1 provided security for investigation of F-8 that crashed vic (YD 7711). Co L (-) returned from CAC-A6 and A7 and assumed Sparrow Hawk/Rough Rider Reserve. M-1 squad provided security for minesweep from CAC-H8 to CAC-H5. All other units continued with assigned missions.

At 0010H, the Sparrow Hawk cordoned off the village vic (YD 896145) while National Police, CIT's and MP's conducted search for the persons who fled into village after taking pictures of the airstrip that afternoon. \$139 in MPC and \$7 in US currency were confiscated from one civilian, and a camera was found in one of the huts. One unauthorised Vietnamese male civilian who admitted he had been on the airstrip was detained.

At 0130H, CAC-H7 patrol vic (AU 805008) fired on two squads of VC who were setting up an ambush vic (AU 805009) resulting in 1 VC KIA (P).

At 1100H, a water buffalo detonated a mine vic (ZD 078009). Co M found and destroyed another mine at the same location.

At 2030H, C.C-A6 patrol was moving east into a VC ambush site vic (YD 830166) when the point man spotted 1.VC who stood up to stretch. The point opened fire and observed VC fall to his knees. Patrol received return fire from at least two *K-47's before the enemy broke contact and fled in a southerly direction. Results: 1 VC KIA (P), 1 wpn captured (M-1 carbine).

6 June 1967

I-1 was relieved as Sparrow Hawk at 1500H, and assumed Sparrow Hawk/Rough Rider Reserve. L-1 squad provided security for minesweep from CAC-H8 to CAC-H5. Co M participated in a parade in HUE, and M-1 relieved I-1 as Sparrow Hawk at 1500H. All other units continued with assigned missions.

At 2135H, CAC-H7 received 10 rds SAF from an unknown number of VC vic (ZD 201013). C.C-H; returned fire with negative results.

7 June 1967

Co K with one 81mm mortar section attached chopped Operational Control to the 4th Marines at 0600H, and was helilifted northeast to participate in Operation COLG TE. L-1 squad returned from HUE Ramp at 0900H. M-3 relieved M-1 as Sparrow Hawk at 1000H, and M-1 assumed Sparrow Hawk/Rough Rider Reserve. M-2 squad provided security for minesweep from C C-H8 to CAC-H5. All other units continued with assigned missions.

At 0115H, CAC-H6 patrol fired on 1 VC who was believed to be a sentry for a larger force and was sleeping along side of trail vic (ZD 142002) but woke up on approach of patrol and attempted to fire. 1 VC KI: (C), 1 wpn captured (AK-47).



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At 2130H, CAC-H4 patrol received 2 rds 60mm mortar and 2 rds SAF from an unknown number of VC vic (ZD 020015). The CAC-H4 compound received SAF from the same area, resulting in 1 USMC WIA: CAC-H4 returned SAF and called artillery. Subsequent search of area revealed bloodstains. PF's said that VC came by boat from PHU. TU.

At 2145H, MCB-62 (Sector D) fired SAF at 1 VC vic (YD 903137) with

negative results.

At 2357H, MCB-62 (Sector D) fired M-79 at 1 VC vic (YD 903137) with unknown results.

8 June 1967

At 0800H, H&S/2/26 relieved the 106 Platoen of combat outposts on Hill 180 and Hill 230 and relieved the 81mm Mortar Platoen of the commitments on Hill 180, Hill 230, Colco Beach, the Perimeter, and the airstrip. It 1000H, 2/26 relieved 16-3 as Sparrow Hawk. At 1200H, 2/26 relieved the Battalion of responsibility for the PHU BAI TAOR, The Battalion continued to provide personnel for a portion of Sector F on the Vital Area Perimeter. The 106 Platoen was relieved of this requirement by personnel from Battalion Supply and S-1, who were to remain in the rear when the remainder of the Battalion moved to Khe Sanh.

Co I moved by foot from the GOLDEN FLEECE AO to vic (YD 955055)

in preferation for the following day's operation

9 June 1967

Co M, H&S Co and Co L moved by motor march from the PHU BAI Vital area south on Highway #1 and southwest on Highway #545 to vic (YD 931060), where a Battalion CP was established with H&S Company, and C/1/13 and 2 M-42's from D/1/44 established firing positions. Co M and Co L dismounted the vehicles and moved by foot; Co M to a blocking position on the level ground vic (YD 9200 and 9300) and Co L to an attack position along the stream vic (YD 9200). Co I had moved by foot to a blocking position to the east, vic (YD 9402, 9501 and 9500). At 1000H, Co L commenced a sweep to the morth.

At 1221H, Co M vic (YC 902995) received 15 rds AWF from vic (YC 903995). Co M suffered 1 UBMC (IA when a marine tripped a booby-trapped grenade as he moved off trail. Co M returned 150 rds M-16, 100 rds M-60, 4 rds M-79, and 2 LAS/75 with unknown results.

At 1245H, Co M tripped a booby-trapped Chi Com grenade vic (YC 905994)

resulting in 1 USMC WI...

At 1315, 3/26 Battali n. Tactical Net was jammed with a high squealing noise, the Secondary Tactical Frequency was jammed with Vietnamese speaking, and the medevac frequency was also jammed.

At 1348H, Co K returned to PHU BAI Area and chopped operational

control to 3/26.

At 1505H, point men of Co M vic (YC 918982) received 2 rds SAF resulting in 1 USMC WIA. Subsequently the entire column received sporadic sniperfire. M Co returned fire and searched area with negative results.



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At 1515H, rear element of Co M vic (YC 912982) received sniper fire resulting in 1 USMC WIA.

At 1520H, point man of Co L from 3rd Engr Bn tripped a booby-trapped Chi Com grenade vic (YD 904033) resulting in 1 USMC WIA.

10 June 1967

Co L completed sweep to north and Co M began sweep to north upon completion of Co L's sweep. Co I remained in its original blocking position.

At 0707H, Co M vic (YC 902980) received sniper fire from vic (YC 901980)

resulting in 1 USMC WIA.

At 0900H, L-3 found house, 3 huts, 2 fighting holes, and 2 covered bunkers along a three-foot wide trail running north to south vic (YC 909992). Huts were surrounded with 1 ft by 2 ft punji pits and huts contained beds. Searched area and found 1 expended 57mm RR cartidge and 1 BA-287. Destroyed huts, houses, and bunkers.

At 0855H, L-2 fired 20 rds SAF on 1 VC wearing green utilities on trail vic (YC 914991). VC returned 8-10 rds carbine fire and fled east

into underbrush.

At 1000H, Co L located a network of frequently used trails heading north and northwest vic (YC 910990). Co L (-) followed trail northwest to Highway #545, then north along road to vic (YD 903014), then southeast to link up with L-3. L-3 moved north on trail to vic (YD 915005) and received 1 rd SAF. Returned fire and continued to move along trail to link with the remainder of the company.

At 1025H. M-3 found a blood-stained pack, various cooking utensils, 10 sleeping positions estimated as being 1 day old, and a large pool of blood, also estimated as 1 day old, vic (YC 899978). Also found fresh foot prints and have a rire across road at same position. 1 VC

KIA (P)

At 1330H, Co M vas (70 906986) received 4 rds SAF from vio (YC 909987). Co M returned 20 rds N-16 and 4 rds M-79, and searched area with negative results.


At 1940H, M-3 unipped a booby-trapped Chi Com grenade vic (YC 887987) while moving to night ambush site, resulting in 2 USMC WIA.

11 June 1967

At 0700H, Co M tripped 1 booby-trapped Chi Com grenade vic (YC 889984), resulting in 3 USMC WIA.

At 0940H, Co M found 1 sprung bear trap vic (YC 895998) and 1 dud M-26 grenade vic (YC 894999). Blew grenade in place and returned bear trap to CP.

At 1130H, the Battalion (-) returned to the HHU BAI Perimeter by vehicle convoy. The remainder of the day was spent in preparation for the move to KHE SANH.





12 June 1967



At 0800H, the entire Battalion minus a rear of two officers and 38 enlisted, departed PHU BAI aboard a convoy of 111 vehicles. The convoy was run by 3d Motor Transport Battalion, and the order of march of Co.M. Co.I., H&S Co., Co.L., C Battery, Co.K. Four M-55's from D/1/44 provided fire support, and a bridge team from 3d Engineers was also attatched.

At 1235H, the convoy passed DONG HA, and Co K and C Lattery proceeded into DONG HA for the night. The remainder of the convoy was scheduled to proceed on to Khe Sanh, but enroute it received information that Highway #9 was impassable because of a blown bridge vic (XD 913403), and it did not proceed past the Rockpile. Co I, Co I, and Co M established night time positions on Hills near the 3/3 CP, vic (XD 970540), (XD 988551), and (XD 975536), respectively, and H&S Co spent the night at Camp Carroll vic (YD C654).

13 June 1967

At 1100H, the convoy referred and departed the Rockpile area. When the convoy reached KHE CA LU vic (YD 003453), the Engineers were still working on the bridge. Both the Division Commander and the Assistant Division Commander flew into KHE CA LU while the Battalian and Convoy Commanders were there and it was decided to helilift both Co M and Co I directly into KHE SANH. The bridge was completed at 1400H, and Co L and H&S Co departed KHE CA LU by convoy at that time, arriving in KHE SANH at 1630H. The Battalian chopped operational control to the 26th Marines at 1815H. At 1600H, Co K and C Battery left DONG HA and arrived at Camp Carroll at 1800H, where they remained for the night. Co L, Co I and Co M established night time positions just outside the west end of the KHE SANA perimeter via (AD 336418), (XD 038420), and (XD 842424) respectively, and the barrolian SP was established vic (XD 842422).

14 June **19**67

C Battery and Cor Commend Camp Carroll at 0800H, and arrived at KHE SANH at 1300H. C Battery established a firing position via (XD 852415) and Co K assumed the role of Regimental Reserve Company via (XD 843418). All units spent the daylight hours improving their positions. At night, H&S company provided 28 Marines to 1/26 to man LP's and a portion of 1/26's lines.

15 June 1967

At 0510H, a Marine from Co I was wounded by a grenade or setchel charge when he left his position to investigate a noise to his front. Co I returned 20 rds SAF with unknown results. Size of enemy force unknown. 1 USMC WIA.

Led provided security for return of 3d MT Bn convoy to PHU BAI arriving in HHU BAI about 1930H.







At 0800H, L-3 departed on a mechanized patrol with 2 M-42's and 2-M-50's, covering the area between the Khe Sanh perimeter and Hill 861. The patrol reached Hill 861 at 1030H and returned to the perimeter at 1320H. No contact was made at any time.

At 1310H, Co I left on a four-day patrol to cover the area to the northeast of Hill 950. No enemy contact was made the first day. 20 Montagnards were found living vic (XD 827432). The company established night-time positions on Hill 558 vic (XD 820451).

16 June 1967

At 1030H, Co L (-) departed on a three-day patrol around the edge of the valley containing Lang TA TUC vic (XD 803422). No contact was made during the day. Nightime ambushes were established vic (XD 825405) and (XD 827404) by L-2 and L-3 respectively. Co I continued its patrol, moving northwest to vic (XD 808463) where it established its night-time position. Three squad-sized ambushes were established on key avenues of approach to the companys position. No contact was made during the day and progress was very slow due to heavy vegetation.

At 2230H, Co I CP vic (AD 808463) received 1 incoming grenade resulting in 2 USMC WIA. Co I returned 3 M-26 grenades and 50 rds SAF. Enemy casualties, size: and route of withdrawal were unknown. During the day the Battalion CP was moved inside the KHE SANH perimeter to vic (XD 861417). Co M assumed Co L's portion of the outer perimeter.


17 June 1967

L-1 provided security for Rough Rider from Face Bat to Khe Sanh, arriving at 1900H. Co I moved to the north and east. During the day, 2 old bunkers of French construction were found vic (XD 809464) with standard double agree with sucreunding them. There were no indications of recent use. A Jul 500 to bomb was also found vic (XD 816471). The company established might the positions on an unnumbered hill vic (XD 815473).

Co L searched Hill 550 and vic (XD 803408) and Hill 756 area vic (XD 783433) before setting up for night. L-2 established an ambush vic (XD 785429) and L-3 established an ambush vic (XD 785426). No enemy contact was made at any time.

18 June 1967

L-l provided security for Rough Rider from Khe Sanh to Phu Bai, arriving at 1845H. Co I continued to move north and at 1027H discovered a trail system leading north from vic (XD 812482) and east from (XD 318495). One squad of Co I was helolifted to vic (XD 816471) to destroy the 500 lb bomb found at that location the previous day. I-1, I-2 with I-6, and I-3 established ambushes at (XD 855486). (XD 825483), and (XD 818485) respectively.



Co L moved east through valley and L-2, L-3, and L-6 established night-time positions at (XD 802419), (XD 801423), and (XD 804421) respectively. No enemy contact was made at any time.

19 June 1967

At 0445H, I-3 vic (XD 824485) received one rd SAF from an unknown number of enemy vic (XD 824486). I-3 returned 50 rds SAF, 10 M-26 grenades, 14 60mm illum rds, 2 60mm H.E. rds, and 2 4.2 illum rds. Enemy broke contact and withdrew to the north. I-3 received no casualties. Search of area following morning revealed no evidence of enemy casualties.

L-1 flew from Fhu Bai to Dong Ha; where they spent the might-Co L (-) moved east through valley and returned to the Battalion area at 0900H;

Co I moved south through grid square (XD 8247): I-l found 25 bunkers vic (XD 821469): Bunkers were 1-2 weeks old and were 4 ft wide and 3-5 ft deep and were covered with bamboo poles and 2 ft of dirt. Appeared to be a harboring site, since one had been used as a galley. I-l and I-3 established night ambushes at (KD 820466), and I-2 with I-6 at (XD 824464).

At 235頃, I-3 vic (XD 822467) received one incoming artillery/mortar round, resulting in 3 VIA.

20 June 1967

Co I destroyed the two French bunkers it had found vic (XD 809464) at 171215H, and then continued moving south, arriving in the Battalion area at 1500H.

L-2 and L-3 established night ambushes vic (XD 831422) and (XD 833427) respectively.

21 June 1967

L-1 returned to KHE SANH from DONG HA by Rough Rider. Listening posts and 2 squad-sized ambushes were established around the Battalion area.

22 June 1967

Two Companies and a command group began an operation in the southcestern portion of the Operation CROCKETT AO. At 0815H artillery began
propping LZ's for troop lift, and air prepped the LZ from 0830H-0900H.
at 0845H, the first lift began, and at 0910H, Co K began landing vic
(XD 948338). Co M was lifted to vic (XD 952352) by 1155H, and moved to
vic (XD 950348) where it established a blocking position. Co K and the
CP group completed their lift at 1207H and began sweep towards Co M's
block. At 1915H, Co K and Co M linked up and established night time
positions vic (XD 950348).



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No contact was made during the day and movement was extremely slow because of poor terrain consisting of steep slopes covered with 15 foot elephant grass or canopy. In addition, numerous fires started by pyrotechnics and air caused units to move by extremely circuitous routes and to backtrack in several instances.

23 June 1967

At 0432H, M-3 received 1 incoming grenade vic (XD 950348) resulting

in 3 USMC WIA.

From 0850H to 0955H, Co K and the CP group were helolifted to vic (XD 948358) to block and at 0930H Co M began sweeping north from the previous night's position. The movement of both companies was hindered by fires, and at 1230H, the fires were so close that both companies had to be helilifted out of the area. Co K with the CP group was lifted from vic (XD 950362) from 1230H to 1330H, and Co M was helilifted from (XD 950348) from 1245H to 1345H. Both companies landed on Hill 642 vic (XD 910335), and Co M moved to vic (XD 901323) and Co K to (XD 920325) to establish night-time positions.

At 1200H, Co L moved by motor march to vic (XD 858386) and dismounted at that location to begin a search and destroy operation through the area to the southwest. Co L searched HUONG HOA vic (XD 865375), finding evidence of recent movement along an east-west axis and evidence of recent fire fights. The Company established platoon-sized nightime

ambushes south of HUONG HOA vic (XD 864374).

24 June 1967


Co L moved southeast along stream to TA RI vic (XD 876353), and then began nove north, the company made a thorough reconnaisiance of the area in this vicinity and found no evidence of trails or movement for the past six months. Heavy vegetation, including 15 ft elephant grass, greatly hindered movement. The company established nightine positions vic (XD 881359).

Co K conducted a reconnaissance of the area to the east of Hill 642 and Co M conducted a reconnaissance of the area to the west of Hill 642. Terrain in both areas was steep with heavy canopy. No trails existed in the area although the stream network was good. At night several platoen-sized anoughes were established throughout the area.

At 1025H, Co M found a platoon-sized harbor site vic (XD 907324) consisting of eight lean-to style huts. The area had last been used about two weeks previously. M-3 established an ambush at this position for the night, and destroyed all huts the following morning.

25 June 1967

Co L reached Hill 549 vic (XD 885362) at 1100H, and continued to move north to vic (XD 883382) where the company established night-time positions.





At 1245H, Co K found an uncharted stream vic (XD 922323) which showed signs of movement of 3-5 people to the south within past 10-20 minutes. Searched area with negative results. Also found 4 charred rocks used as a stove and some coconut husks about one week old vic (XD 922325).

Co K with the CP group moved to vic (XD 925325) and began a sweep towards the village of LANG TAL KOL TA vic (XD 937331), which was found to be destroyed. Co K established platoon sized ambushes along the stream vic (XD 935328) at hight.

of the area in that vicinity. Platon sized ambushes were established in the southern portion of GS (XD 9232) at night.

At 0925H, the Commanding Officer of the 26th Marines visited the

3/26 CP.

At 1010H, Co K found 4 old lean-to huts vic (XD 925326). Also found blackened rocks used for cooking and chopped bamboo. Estimate area was last used a nonth before.

At 1550H, Co M found and destroyed 4 fighting holes estimated as

being 2-3 weeks old vic (XD 926326).

At 1745H, Co M found and destroyed 35 two-man fighting holes in a hasty circular defense on hill vic (XD 926323).

26 June 1967

Co K with the CP group moved from LANG KOL TA KU northeast along trail through GS (XD 9233) to vic (XD 922342), where they linked with Co M. Previously Co M had moved from previous nights positions north along trail through GS (XD 9132) and (XD 9133) to LANG HUC COC GIANG vic (XD 915343). Co M searched this village, finding no signs of recent activity, and then noved east to link with Co K vic (XD 922342) where both companies established night positions.

Co L maintained last night's position vic (XD 883382) as a screening element. L-1 remained on the Hill as an OP to maintain surveillance over the AO, and L-2 and L-3 conducted recon patrols to the north and

southeast, respectively.

27 June 1967

At 0035H, the KHE SAMH base received approximately 50 rds of 82mm mortar fire from the southwest. Fifteen rds landed in the Battalion area with BAS, and Battalion supply receiving direct hits. The remainder of the rounds landed in the 1/26 and A Battery areas. All artillery units returned counter-mortar fire with unknown results. Battalion casualties were 1 USN KIA, 1 ARVN KIA, 10 USN WIA, and 22 USMC WIA. Subsequently, one of the USMC WIA's died of wounds.

At 0105H, I-1 vic (XD 818412) received 2 incoming mortar/artillery

rounds, resulting in 8 USMC WIA and 1 USMC KIA.

At 0135H, the CH-34 that was medevacing I-1's casualties was downed by mechanical difficulties vic (XD 818412). Another helicopter completed the medevac, and I-1 provided security for the downed helicopter for the remainder of the night.





At 0525H, KHE SANH received 50 rds 102mm rockets. All artillery units in the KHE SANH perimeter saturated the base of Hill 1015 vic (XD 857445), where Hill 950 reported enemy firing position. S-1 suffered 2 USMC WIA.

At 0830H. Co M. Co K, and the CP group began helilift back to KHE SANH.

Co L moved to vic (XD 883398) on Highway #9, where it embarked on trucks, and returned to KHE SANH at 1215H.

I-2 and the Co I CP group moved to vic (XD 818412) and linked with I-1. From that position Co I (-) moved towards Hill 689 vic (XD 803408) to search for enemy mortar position.

I-3 was helilifted to vic (XD 875435) to conduct search for possible

enemy rocket sites on Hill 1015 vic (XD 854454).

At 1230H, a CAC O patrol searching for the enemy mortar positions on Hill 689 received intense SAF from an unknown number of VC on the crest of the Hill. The patrol was driven off the Hill, leaving 2 USMC MIA and 1 PF MIA on the Hill. Co I (-) continued towards Hill 689 to aid the CAC patrol.


At 1615H, Co I (-) had moved to vic (XD 801410) where it held position while an AO conducted an airstrike on enemy on Hill 689 vic

(XD 803409).

At 1722H, Co I reached Hill 689 and began searching for the CAC casualties. Received 2 USMC WIA from an unknown type of booby trap.

At 1740H, Co I (-) continued to move towards crest of Hill 689. I-2 moved to vic (XD 799412) where it encountered extensive AP mines and booby-trapped Chi Com grenades and received SAF from vic (XD 998412). I-1 moved to vic (XD 804409) where they received heavy SAF from vic (XD 809408). I-2 suffered 25 USMC WIA-I-1 suffered 8 USMC KIA (including the platoon commander) and 10 USMC WIA. Both platocns returned SAF, M-79, 3.5, and LAAWs. The enemy consisted of isolated units of squad and platoon size, who fought from well-camouflaged spider holes and several heavily-fortified bunkers. The area was heavily mined and booby-trapped.

At 1810H, L-3 and L-6 landed vic (XD 801405) by helicopter and began moving northeast to Hill 689 where Co I was receiving fire. While in LZ Co L received SAF from vic (XD 806909), and began naneuvering to that position, where Co I established a blocking force. L-3 moved on Left front, L-2 on right front, and L-1 provided security in LZ. L-1 sighted 2 NVA squads vic (XD 801404) advancing towards rear of Co L. L-3 reached crest of Hill 689 and encountered extensive AP mines and booby-trapped Chi Com grenades. Upon advancing across crest, L-3 received sniper fire from 8-9 well camouflaged spider holes. Co L returned fire and destroyed all enemy resistance by 1935H. The spider holes were destroyed with grenades, all casualties were returned to the LZ and evacuated, and Co L consolidated with Co I. Results: (including the company commander) USMC T.A. KIA, 15 WIA. Enemy: 5 KIA (C), 7 KIL (P). 7 wpns captured (AK-47's, 1 Chi Com carbine with scope, 1 RPG). Also recovered 2 rds 82mm mortar, 4 booby-trapped Chi Com grenades, 6 AP mines. Co L also found and evacuated the 2 USMC MIA from the CAC-O patrol. Both were KIA. The enemy force was estimated as being 2 NVA (Rein) Companies. Final estimate of enemy casualties was 25 KIA (C); 66 KIA (P).





At 2000H, Co L found a 20 ft by 6 ft bomb erater vis (XD 802409).
Found 2 bunkers and a tunnel, AP mines, booby traps, grenades, and 82mm mortar rds.

At dusk while flare ships and artillery fired illumination to aid in evacuation of casualties and consolidation of positions, Co L linked with Co I, and both companies established night positions on Hill 689. Extensive H&I fires were conducted on the avenues of approach to the west used by the NVA units.

At 1900H, Co I and Co I received incoming mortar rounds of an unknown caliber from the northwest. The 4.2 Battery on Hill 881 south returned counter-mortar fire and the enemy ceased firing at 1910H.

At 2045H, Co L received 2 incoming 60mm mortar rds from the south-east. No casualties.

28 June 1967

At 0625H, artillery began prepping the Hill 689 area in preparation for a thorough search of the area. Air prepped the area from 0900H to 0930H.

At 0730H, I-3 was helilifted from Hill 1015 to KHE SANH in preparation for rejoining the remainder of the company on Hill 689. The lift was completed at 0752H.

At 0755H, Co I, the district chief and an AO reported a large body of enery troops in GS (XD 8042). At 0820H, Co I called martillery with unknown results.

At 0955H, Co I and Co L began a thorough search of the battlefield to destroy enemy bunkers, mines, and booby traps; and to determine the extent of enemy casualties.

At 1006H, Co L found 1 NVA KIA (C) with a round in his head vic (XD 803408). A grappling hook had been used to drag the body.

At 1015H, Co I found 1 NVA KIA (C) vic (XD 803407). NVA wore olived drab uniform and soft jungle cover and had large amount of 782 gear.

Also found 1 PF KIA at same location. At 1130H Co I found 1 AK-47 vic

(XD 820420).

At 1235H, the Forward CP group, Co M, Slmm mortar plateon and I-3 were helilifted to the Hill 689 area. The lift was completed at 1330H.


At 1530H, Co M called an airstrike on 2 VC running vic (XD 795406), resulting in 2 NVA KIA (P).

At 1600H, Co M fired 60mm morters and called an airstrike on 10 VC at (XD 794406) resulting in 1 NVA KIA (C) and 7 NVA KIA (P).

At 1620H, an AO called an airstrike on 2 enemy bunkers vic (XD 786405),

destroying both bunkers.

At 1700H, Co M sighted 3 VC in the open vic (XD 798406) and an AO reported bunkers in the same area. An airstrike was conducted, resulting in 1 NVA KIA (C), 9 NVA KIA (P), 8 enemy bunkers destroyed, damaged, and 1 secondary explosion.





At 1700H, Co M called 81mm mortars on 3 VC in open vic (XD 782408).

resulting in 1 NVA KIA (C).

Nightine positions were established along the ridgeline running northwest from Hill 689. Co L at (XD 803409), the CP at (XD 802411), the 81 mm Pit (_)at (XD 801411), Co I at (XD 799413), and Co M at (XD 798411).

At 1900H, Co I called artillery on 3 NVA vic (XD 798416) with

negative results.

At 1740H, Co I found 2 NVA KIA and I NVA WIA (PW) and 3 wpns (2 AK-47's and 1 SKS with a bayonet) vic (XD 797413). Weapons were returned to S-2. Also found 2 field rucksacks, 10 Chi Com grenade's

1 AP mine, and assorted food and documents.

At 1940H, Co I received 2 WIA's at west end of airstrip during rocket attack on Khe Sanh. Approximately 25 102mm rockets were fired, nearly all of which landed outside the perimeter, with six falling in Co K's area, but inflicting no casualties, all units in the Hill 689 area observed the enemy firing site vic (XD 7841) and C Battery fired 401 rds, and A Battery 398 rounds of counter-battery fire at that location. The enemy fire deased at 1955H.

At 1955H, Co M fired 81mm mortars on 10 NVA vic (XD 802407) resulting

in 2 NVA KIA (P).

29 June 1967

Co M and Co I swept northwest along ridgeline towards Hill 758.

mir and artillery prepped area thoroughly.

At 0715H, Co M found 1 NVA KIA (C) and 1 wpn (AK-47) vic (XD 798409). KIA had 2 Chi Com grenades, brown uniform, tennis shoes, unit ID card, and 782 gear.

At 0800H, Co I found 2 NVA KIA (C) vic (XD 798409).

At 1330H, Co M sighted 10 NVA on ridgeline vic (XD 786425). Called in 105's, 81's, and fired 106's from B/1/26 and D/1/26. Employed sniper team and a gunship. AO also reported 3 bunkers in area. Results: 9 NVA KIA (P). 1 bunker destroyed, 1 secondary explosion.

At 1900H, Co L called artillery on 3 NVA vic (XD 798446) with

negative results.

30 June 1967

K-3 provided security for a section of tanks and a section of Ontos that were intended to move to Co L's position on Hill 689. The tanks were unable to ford a stream running through the valley between KHE SANH and Hill 689 and returned to KHE SANH with K-3 at 1530H.

Co L conducted a patrol to vic (XD 827385) and returned to Hill

At 1330H. Co L observed 1 NVA KIA (C) vic (XD 796402).









SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

A. COMBAT MISSIONS ASSIGNED AND SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS CONDUCTED:

At the beginning of June, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines continued with the responsibility for the HHU BAI TAOR. As the Vital Area Defense Battalion, the Battalion's mission was to defend the HHU BAI Vital Area and provide security for the TAOR; ensure that adequate surveillance and security were maintained on the perimeter; maintain a reserve/counterattack force during the hours of darkness; maintain combat outposts on Hill 180 and Hill 230; provide personnel for 81mm mortar section at Colco Beach; maintain a reinforced platoon (Sparrow Hawk/Reaction Force) on five-minute alert; maintain one company (Sparrow Hawk/Rough Rider Reserve) on two-hour alert; assume Operational Control of Combined Action Companies A and H; conduct extensive patrolling in assigned AO; provide security for Rough Riders to DONG HA and DANANG; and provide Officer/ Staff NCO and Forward Observor for Road Runners to Operation CHOCTAW AO.

In addition to the routine requirements listed above the Battalion conducted several company-sized operations in the TAOR and adjacent areas.

From 1-5 June, Co L (-) operated within the CAC-A6 and CAC-A7 Areas.

Co K participated in Operation GOLDEN FLEECE I from 1-3 June. On 3 June, Co K was relieved by Co I and Co I completed Operation GOLDEN FLEECE I on 8 June.


Co M conducted search and destroy operations in the PHU LOC Area from 1-4 June.

G/2/9 operated in the NAM HOA Area from 1-3 June.

On 8 June 2/26 relieved 3/26 of responsibility for the PHU BAI TAOR. The following day 3/26 (-) (Rein) moved by motor march to the TRUOI area, where it conducted a three-day search and destroy operation. The Battalion returned to the PHU BAI Vital Area on 11 June.

On 12 June, the Battalion departed PHU BAI by motor march and arrived in Khe Sanh on 13 June, chopping operational control to the 26th Marines upon arrival.

While at Khe Sanh, the Battalion was responsible for a portion of the Khe Sanh perimeter; conducted ambushes, patrols, and listening posts; provided security for convoys; and when designated, provided the Regimental Reserve Company. In addition, the Battalion conducted operations in various portions of the Operation CROCKETT AO.





Co I conducted a search and destroy operation through the area to the north of Hill 950 from 15 to 20 June.

Co L (-) conducted a search and destroy operation around the valley to the south of Hill 861 and Hill 881 from 16 to 19 June.

On 22 June, Co M, Co K, and the Battalion CP group were helolifted into the southerstern portion of the Operation CROCKETT AO to conduct operations in that area. On 23 June, Co L moved by vehicle to HUONG HOA and operated to the west of the other three companies until 27 June when all three companies returned to Khe Sanh.

On 27 June, Co I (-) moved to the Hill 689 area to search for the mortar and rocket positions used by the NVA in the previous nights mortar attack on Khe Sanh. Late in the afternoon Co L was helilifted to the same area to reinforce the Co I (-). Because of the heavy contact made in the area, Co M and the Battalion CP group were helilifted to the same area and the three companies operated in this area for the remainder of the month.



SECRET



1. Sparrow Hawk. The Battalion maintained a reinforced rifle platoon numbering 60 personnel on five-minute alert throughout the period the Battalion was in PHU BAI. The units that provided the Sparrow Hawk are listed in the table below.

From	<u>To</u>	<u>Unit</u>	From	To	Unit
010001 021700	021700 031000	I-1 I-2	050800 061500	061500 071000	K-1 M-1
031000	050800	K-2	0 <i>7</i> 1000	081000	M-3

- 2. Combat Outposts. The 106 Platoon maintained combat outposts on Hill 180 and Hill 230.
- 3. Minesweep of Highway #1. The Battalion provided one reinforced rifle squad for a daily minesweep of Highway #1 from CAC-H8 to CAC-H5. The platoons that provided these squads are listed below.

Date	Unit	Date	<u>Unit</u>	Date	Unit
1	I - 2	4	L-1	7	M-2
2	I - 3	5	M-1	**	
3	I-3	6	L-1		

4. Road Runners. 3d MT Bn conducted a road runner to the CHOCTAW AO every morning. This Battalion provided an Officer/Staff NCO platoon commander and an artillery forward observer for all such convoys. The companies providing these personal are listed below.


<u>Date</u>	Plt Cndr/FO	Date	Plt Cmdr /FO	Date	Plt Cmdr/FO
1	I	4	L	7	M
2	I	- 5	M		
3	H&S	6	${f L}$		

- 5. Operations Conducted. The Battalion conducted platoon or company sized operations throughout the TAOR and in the adjacent PHU LOC and NAM HOA Areas. All such operations are listed below:
- 1-3 June: Co K conducted Operation GOLDEN FLEECE I.
- 1-5 June: Co L (-) operated in CAC-A6 and CAC-A7 area.
- 1-3 June: Co G (2/9) operated in NAM HOA area.
- 1-4 June: Co M operated in PHU LOC area.

Enclosure (1)

SECRET





conducted Operation GOLDEN FLEECE I.

6. <u>Miscellaneous Assignments</u>. In addition to the commitments listed in the previous paragraphs, the Battalion was assigned various other tasks. All such assignments are listed below:

Dates	Mission:	Unit Providing	Location
2 June	Security for Hue	L-1 Squad	Hue
5 June	Investigation of F-8 Crash	K-2	XD 7711
6 June	Parade	Co M (-)	Hue

7. Small Unit Operations. In addition to the company-sized operations listed in the preceding paragraph, over five hundred small-unit operations were conducted during the eight days the Battalion had responsibility for the Phu Bai TAOR. The vast majority of these patrols were conducted by units from Combined Action Companies A and H. Although these operations were rarely larger than squad-size and the patrol routes were usually short, these operations were very valuable in providing security for the villagers living with each CAC unit. In addition, they disrupted enemy movement to village areas and were a good source of information on enemy movements. Although it is not possible to give individual attention to each patrol, the following table gives the daily totals for the various small unit operations that were conducted during this period.

Date	LP's	OP's	Night <u>Ambushes</u>	Night Securi Patrols	ty Day Security Patrols
1	6	4	. 33	17	17
2	6	4	28		_ 16 .
3 .	6	4	30	17	15
4	6	4	25	17	15
5	6	4	22	16	16
6	.6	4	24	16	14
7	4	4	25	19	17
8	4	4	25	19	17
Total	44	32	21 2	136	127





SECRET

C. CASUALTIES

1. Friendly Casualties (1-30 Jun57)

Killed	13
Died of Mounds	1
Wounded	95
TOTAL	109





D. COMMAND RELATIONS

1. With Higher Units: From 1-13 June, during the period it was in PHU BAI and during the period it was enroute by convoy to the KHE SANH, the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines was under the operational and administrative control of the Third Marine Division. At 131815H, shortly after arriving in KHE SANH, the Battalion chopped operational control to the 26th Marines. In both PHU BAI and . KHE SANH, the superior unit was located in close physical proximity to the Battalion. Close limits was maintained with both units and relations were good throughout the month.

2. With Other Marine Units.

- a. While the Battalion was responsible for the defense of the PHU BAI Vital Area, it had Operational Control of all units assigned sectors of the Vital Area perimeter for all matters concerning perimeter defense. Each unit provided a sector commander who was responsible to the Battalion Perimeter Defense Officer, who coordinated all matters pertaining to the perimeter. No problems were encountered in this area, and relations with units on the perimeter were good.
- b. From 1-4 June, the Battalion had operational control of G/2/9. The company operated in the NAM HOA Area until 3 June, when it was relieved by C/1/4. On 4 June, the company departed PHU BAI and chopped operational control to 2/9.

With ARVN/PF/RF Units.

a. Phu Bai

- 1. Direct liaison was maintained with HUONG THUY and PHU LOC Districts through frequent visits to both District Headquarters by the Commanding Officer and the Operations Officer.
- 2. Indirect liaison with Vietnamese units was accomplished through the 3d MarDiv, which supplied the Battalion with a continuous flow of information regarding ARVN operations in the area and intelligence information that was reported by ARVN units.
- A and H, both of which were under the Operational Control of the Battalion. The two companies maintained CAC units in the villages along Hwy #1 that were in or near the FHU BAI TAOR. The former operated in the northern and central section of the TAOR (HUONG THUY DISTRICT); the latter in the extreme southern section and along the stretch of Hwy #1 east of the TAOR (PHU LOC District). Much of the information the Battalion received from HUONG THUY and PHU LOC Districts was relayed through CAC A and H, respectively.










- 1. While in Khe Sanh, the 26th Marines were responsible for relations with the Vietnamese in the Area, and the Battalion usually worked only indirectly with Vietnamese.
- 2. The Battalions ARVN Liaison Officer maintained close liaison with District until he was killed in a mortar attack on 27 June.





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E. COMMUNICATION ELECTRONICS

- t. Message Center. Message traffic is picked up and delivered to the 26th Marines Message Center. Distribution has not changed.
- 2. Radio. All battalion nets and the regimental tac net terminate in the 3/26 COC bunker. Contact with operating elements is made possible through the use of a relay station on Hill 950.
- 3. <u>Wire.</u> Normal intra-battalion wire facilities were installed. In addition two trunk lines were laid to the regimental switchboard, and one hot line was laid from the 3/26 COC to the 26th Marines COC.
- 4. General. On recent operations in the area it was found that normal antenna accessories were not capable of transmitting from the low land and valley areas. Recommended antennas are the vertical, half rhombic, and long wire types employing field wire. Communications were adequate in all respects.



While the Battalion was responsible for PHU BAI, the primary functions of the FSCC were to clear all artillery fire missions in the PHU BAI TAOR and to provide fire planning for the perimeter defense. During this period C Battery, L Battery, and the 1st 155 Gun Battery provided fire support for the Battalion.

On 9 July, the Battalion (-) displaced to the Truoi area for a three-day operation. C Battery displaced with the Battalion and the FSCC

cleared all fire missions during the operation.

From 12-14 July, the Battalion moved by convoy to KHE SANH. The regular fire support available to all Rough Rider convoys was available during the move to KHE SANH. At KHE SANH, the first few days were spent in the tablishing adequate committations in the new area. The Battalian had C Battery operating in direct support, with A Battery reinforcing. In addition a 4.2 inch mortar battery, with sections located on Hill 861 and Hill 881 south, four 155 Howitzers (TD) available in KHE SANH, and the 175 Guns at Camp Carroll were capable of supporting the Operation CROCKETT AO. The primary mission of the FSCC was to clear all Battalion fire missions in the Regimental TAOR. Final clearance was given by the Regimental FSCC.

At KHE SANH the Battalion conducted two operations in which the FSCC moved into the field and had complete control of all fire missions, controlling artillery fires among friendly units and providing fire planning for the Battalion.

From 22-27 June, the Battalion (-) operated in the southeastern portion of the Operation CROCKETT AO. C Battery displaced to vic (XD 894406)

to support the operation.

From 28 June until the end of the month the Battalion operated in the Hill 689-Hill 758 area.





I. Air Defense. No enemy aerial activity of my type was encountered in either PHU B:I or KHE SANH.

II. Air Support.

100

- a. Medevacs. A total of 41 medevacs were flown during June. Twelve USMC KIA, 49 USMC WIA, 2 VN WIA, and 41 NBC's were evacuated.
- b. Fixed Wing. Seventeen fixed wing airstrikes were flown, resulting in 3 KBA(\overline{C}) and 15 KBA(\overline{P}). The strikes were 90 per cent on target with 75 per cent coverage.
 - c. Aerial Observor Flights. Three OIE flights were flown during June.
- d. Command and Control. Eight UH-1E flights were made by this command f r for reconnaissance purposes. These flights were extremely valuable in familiarizing unit commanders with the MHF SANH area.
- e. Resupply and Troop Lifts. A total of 135,090 lbs were flown on resupply missions. Eight troop lifts were made by helicopter during the month.






- 1. Phu Bai Period: During the period the Battalion had responsibility for the PHU BAI T OR, D/1/44 operated in direct support of the Battalion. The Battery's weapons were employed as follows:
- a. Quad-50. The four M-55's in the battery were used primarily to provide security for conveys originating from PAU BAI. A secondary mission of the Quad-50's was to provide a mobile reserve force that would be able to reinforce any sector of the perimeter in the event of attack during the hours of darkness.
- b. <u>Twin-40's</u>. Six of the 8 M-42's under the Battalion's control were stationed permanently at key locations on the perimeter. The other 2 were assigned to the Perimeter Reaction Force during the hours of darkness. The Twin-40's had the additional mission of firing H&I fires from 2130 to 0500 daily.
- c. Spotlight. A 20-inch spotlight from G/W_{2} , was positioned on Hill 180 and provided illumination on call for the western half of the perimeter.

2. Khe Sanh Period.

- a. The Second Battalion, 26th Marines relieved the Battalion of responsibility for the Phu Bai T.OR on 8 June, consequently from 8-11 June the Battalion had no army units operating in their support.
- b. On 12 June, the Battalion departed PHU BAI for KHE SANH. Four M-55's accompanied the convoy and returned to PHU BAI on 15 June with the security unit composed of L-1.
- c. On 15 June, 2 M-42's were attached to L-3 for a mechanized patrol through the area scuth of Hill 861. No enemy contact was made.

DECLASSIFIED





DECLASSIFIED



I. ADI I ISTR TICE

l. To major administrative difficulties were encountered during period covered by this report. Dattalion level personnel accounting has proven to be most effective with the organization solit into forward and rear areas.



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J. TSOTI

1. During the month of June, this pattalion joined 9 officers and 44 enlisted personnel while 2 officers and 17 enlisted were reassigned to other into within RV.. I officer and 11 enlisted personnel were reassigned out of country by service records as a result of medical evacuation.

DECLASSIFIED

TCLOSURI (1)



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1. ENEMY SITUATION 1-11 JUNE

a. From 1-11 June, 1967, the battalion continued in the defense of the PHU BAI TAOR. There were no significant changes in the composition or disposition of the enemy forces during this period. Intelligence data for this period is therefore the same as that reported in the Command Chronology for the period 1-31 May.

(1) Statistics for period 1-11 June 67.

KIA(C)	2
KIA(P)	6
Detainees	22
Ind Wpns Capt	. 3
Grenades Capt	2
Booby traps	2
Rocket rds Capt	2


b. The remainder of this section deals exclusively with the period when 3/26 was openating in the KHE SANH area since 14 June 67.

2. THE KHE SANH AREA OF OPERATION

a. Terrain. The KHE SANH area is thinly populated, rugged and mountainous. Heights over 500 meters are common throughout the area. Terrain is severely disected and thickly vegetated with dense undergrowth, broadleaf evergreen forests and bamboo thickets. Trail networks are plentiful but trafficability to vehicles is almost uniformly restricted to National Route 9. KHE SANH Valley is aligned on a northwest-southeast axis and joins the QUANG TRI and DA KRONG River valleys at a semmon juncture in GS (XD 9240). From this juncture, the QUANG TRI Valley extends northeast to exit at (YD0045). The DA KRONG Valley runs in a meandering path toward the southeast and exits at (YD 0036). Most drainage runoff is transported by the RAO QUAN River which conveys the entire KHE SANH Valley drainage flow and exits the southeastern border at (XD 9040). This river joins the QUANG TRI River and eventually empties into the Gulf of Tonkin. All other drainage flows into the SE PONE River (XD7834) which flows northwest as the Vietnam-Laos border before turning west. This river charges the MEKONG system.

(1) Vegetation.

(a) The valleys are generally covered with elephant grass six to twenty feet in height and low brush. Small areas in the immediate vicinity of villages are utilized for rice and garden cross.






(XD 859395). A broad band of element grass crosses from (AD 6446) to (XD 8630). In addition interwoven beingo thickets are prevalent along with dense jungle in the southwest corner of the area.

- evergreen forest with smaller areas of pine and deciduous trees interspersed. Tree height increases with increased elevation. Tallest trees are 75 to 90 feet high, with some ranging to 150 feet. Canopy is generally continuous with more than 25 percent of the ground covered by 2 to 4 layers of canopy. Trees have shallow roots. Trunks are commonly straight and average 0.3 meters in diameter, increasing somewhat in the higher elevations. Trees are commonly 2 to the canopy the sun receive the undergrowth which becomes more grassy at higher elevations. In areas formerly cleared, shifting cultivation growing for 3-5 years and the discontinuance of the canopy has permitted the development of a much thicker undergrowth than would be expected deeper in the forest. Spiny rattans, full bushes, vines and briars generally are interwound around trees or between bushes.
- (c) The thick primary forest is normally not susceptible to conflagration, however extensive defoliation spraying and the relatively dry period of the southwest monsoon season should produce scattered areas of jungle and elephant grasslands highly susceptible to conflagration.

(2) Avenues of Approach

- (a) The major avenue of approach is Route 9 which enters the KHE SANH area from the east and west.
- (b) The four major rivers, the DA KRONG, QUANG TRI, RAO QUAN, and the SE PONE, afford avenues of approach.
- (c) The floor system of the KHE SANH Valley and the KHE GIANG THOAN (XD 8951) afford the most easily traversed avenues of approach into the heartland.
- b. Enemy Situation, 3/26 had operated in three specific areas of the KHE SANH AO. A discussion of the enemy situation findings, and characteristics of each AO is summarized below.
- (1) I Co operating in area bounded by XD 8049, 8449, 8245, 8046, had no enemy contact or sightings. The village vic (XD 820440) was the only area found to be inhabited. A cement bunker at (XD 809464) was destroyed. At (XD 802468) a series of partially destroyed trenches was found and at (XD 823467) 25 covered





1-xan fighting holes were found and suspected of being a herboring site.

- (2) K,M and the "A" command group operated 22-27 June. In the area bounded by XD 9135, 9132, 9432, 9536. No sightings or enemy contacts were made. The only sign of recent enemy movements was found at (XD 922323) on 26 June on an uncharted stream up a draw to the south, probably 3-5 persons. The hill at (XD 926323) has approximately 35-2 man foxholes in a circular hasty defense not used for 3-4 weeks. There was a trail leading SE off the crest of this hill. Old harboring sites were found at XD 907324, XD 926326, and XD 926323. Throughout the area no prominent trails were located. Travel was channelized to the streambeds and trafficability cross country was at a rate of less than 100 meters per hour.
- (5) The battle of Hill 689 which commenced 271130H when I Co began movement toward the hill at XD 805409 was prefaced by two separate attacks on KHE SAMH base. On 270045H 3/26 CP at (XD 840422) received 25-30 82mm mortar rounds. at 270530H, the perimeter was again hit by 102mm rockets which were believed to have been fired from vic (XL 783409), later confirmed by I and L companies. As a result of this battle and the subsequent 3/26 (-) operation in the area which continued into July, the following was found:
- (a) On 27 June it was estimated that an NVA company was engaged. However as a result of the discovery of harboring sites vic (XD 782399, 778409, 771407, 770407) well used trails leading into two rocket sites at (XD 789405) and (XD 776405), fighting holes in vicinity of each rocket site and the bunker complex vic (XD 789405), it is estimated that at least 2 NVA companies were engaged. Documents indicate that there was also an element of the 29th Regiment -- a rocket/artillery regiment -- involved.
- (b) It is suspected that the enemy withdrew south of the ridgeline running due west and northwest from Hill 689 (XD802409).
- (c) All equipment and weapons found on Hill 689 and in the vicinity of harboring and rocket sites was discarded or abandoned. Nothing was found concealed.
- (d) The prisoner captured 28 June was extremely uncooperative and voluntsened no information.
- (e) The enemy rocket attack on KHF SANH on the evening of 28 June was directed entirely on the base with no enemy rounds being directed toward 3/26 (-) on Hill 689. This attack crighnated from the vicinity of the rocket sites found on the days following.

 Enclosures (1)



4 to 10 feet high on the slopes and crests of the hills and dense undergrowth with single everhead canopy and trees 40-60 feet tall in the draws. The enemy routes definitely correspond to the trace of available fresh water -- in the draws and stream beds concealed by the dense everhead canopy.

(g) L-Co on 15-39 June has thoroughly patrolled Hill 639 and vicinity and found no indications of fresh bunkers. Wherefore, the enemy prepared his positions on Fill 689 between 20 and 27 June.


3. STANDSTICS FOR PERIOD 14-30 JUNE.

a. Enemy Personnel Losses.

KIA(O) KIA(P)	30 82
PW/NVA	î

b. Enemy Equipment Losses:

* · ·	
Total weapons	11
B40	2
IMG Type 56	2
Type 56 Cartine	2
Type 56 Lasmilt rifle	1
M1891/30 mifle	7
Ontoom Grenades	50
82mm Mortan Rounds	2.0
Rounds 7.62 amus	900
Pounds asserted web gear,	
food, elething, and	
equipment :	300.
Chicon Al Mines	3
2-40 Rocket Founds	4 '
Hases for B-40 Rocket	7
•	








L. CIVIL AFFAIRS

- 1. From 1-8 June liaison was made with 2/26 to maintain continuity on the projects in progress in LOC BON(V), FHU LOC(D). To enhance this effort, the 3/26 civil affairs NCO was transferred to 2/26 to provide continuity of personnel.
- 2. During the present operations in the KHE SANH area liaison has been made with the Civil Affairs Officer, 26th Mar. Because of our tactical commitment in non-populated areas, no projects have been initiated to date. 3/26 MedCap supplies were provided to 26 for direct support of CAp-O MedCaps being conducted.




M. ISYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

DECLASSIFIED

1. During the month of June this unit initiated no PsyCps projects in the KHE SANH TACR. Liaison has been made with the PsyCps SNCO of 26th RLT.

DECLASSIFIED





- 1. General. Logistics support was satisfactory during June. There were no major problems in obtaining supplies, transportation, or food services.
- 2. <u>General Supplies.</u> General supplies were adequate except for a shortage of jungle trousers.


3. Transportation.

- a. Transportation was provided by 3d Motor Transport Battalion from 1-13 June, with excellent service. During the remainder of the month the Battalion was supported by the 26th Marine Regiment for all logistics requirements.
- b. The Battalion deployed from PHU BAI to KHE SANH on 12 June 67 with the first serial arriving at Camp Carroll the first day and the second serial spending the night in Dong Ha. On 13 June the first serial arrived at Khe Ca Lu where two rifle companies were helolifted to KHE SANH. The empty trucks were returned to Phu Bai. The remainder of the first serial proceeded to Khe Sanh arriving that afternoon, and the second serial arrived at KHE SANH on 14 June 67. Transportation was provided for the convoy by the 3d Motor Transport Battalion.
- c. Due to the overall tactical committments of the battalion, tactical runs with organic vehicles were frequent. Administrative runs with organic vehicles were held to a minimum.
- 4. Resupply. Resupply was accomplished by helicopter or vehicle convoy while the Battalion was in HNU BAI. Helicopters were used in resupply while in KHE SAMH.
- 5. Ordnance. Ordnance support was provided by FLSG-A at PHU BAI, and an LSU at KHE S WH.
- 6. Food Service. This unit operated a mess hall in Cantonment Two, HMU BAI, from 1-10 June, serving three hot meals a day. At KHE SANH, a field mess was established. Full meals were served for breakfast and dinner and hot soup was served at noon. There were adequate quantities of food and supplies, and food was of satisfactory quality throughout the month.



Enclosure (1)








SCT

- 1. Tersonnel. The Bettellion id Station has a total of the presentel. This consists of the Mospital Commune and I ledded Officer.
- 2. Campbilities. The Battalion id Station is camble of treating all minor redical and surgical moblems. Latients requiring more entersive carecare evacuated to the 3d Endical Dattalion at the Bat.
- 3. Supply. Medical Supplies are obtained from FISC-Lat The Bai. There is no deficit of surflies at this time.
- 4. Training. Hospital Comparer receive on the job training under the supervision of the Hedical Officer and the Chief Pospital Comparen.
- 5. Dental. There are no facilities for dental core at the B.S. Patients requiring such care are executed to the 3d Medical Estation.
- 5. Malaria Prophylaris. Chlorouning-Privaquino tablets are to be taken ence a week on Sunday, preferably with a need. Further preventive measures consist of apraying living spaces with measure repellent and screening of all living spaces.
- 7. Saritation. Daily sanitation inspections are made by the medical officer or one of his representatives.
- 8. Statistics. The following are the statistics for the period 1-30 June 1957.

Dingiosis jums	::: <u>:S</u>	ī	<u>K</u>	Ĩ	Z I.	Other Br	TOTAL
Infection	30	25	45	45	40	5	238
Diarribea	18	7.	4	2	9	า์ธ์	54
Lacerations	3.0	· }	1	• 3	2	4	19
Colds	30	3.4	12	18	15.	37	127
Dental	21	10	16	15	23	19	104
Rash	35	\$	ද ද	: 3	8	29	89
Stomach Disorder	10	5	. 3	. Po	5	12	47
<u>T</u>	33	42	3	15	38	0	Π
I'I	3	9	₹ 0 %	- 3	1	Q	16
Heada c ho s	5	3	3	2	1	8	21
ॅ ्	1.0	3	3	5	3	Ø	27
Foot Dasomor	l ·	ì	0	3	ī	8	$1^{t_{i}}$
· Others	5	2	1	0	. 3	0	11
•	213	128	107	120	132	187	357






P. TRAINING

The following training was accomplished while the Battalion was in the HIU BAI during the first week of June.

- 1. Orientation. Personnel joined as replacements during the month received an orientation from the Commanding Officer. Upon being assigned to a company, they received orientations from their respective Company Commanders.
- 2. Landmine Warfare. During June, 28 of the small-unit leaders in the Battalion attended the three day Landmine Warfare School conducted by the 3d Engineer Battalion at the DONG DA Training Center.
- 3. <u>Personal Response</u>. Three persons attended a one day personal response class presented by instructors from Division G-2 in PHU BAI.
- 4. Test Firing of M-16. All personnel armed with the M-16 in Companies H&S and K fired 400 rds to test their weapons for defects, on June 1 and 2 respectively.
- 5. <u>Vietnamese Religion and Customs</u>. Approximately 50 Marines from all five companies attended a one-hour lecture by the Battalion Chaplain on the religion and customs of the Vietnamese people.
- 6. Company-Level Training. In addition to the above mentioned training, all companies conducted their own formal training when they were in the Battalion Area. Concurrent training was conducted when the companies were operating in the field. The following subjects were stressed: counterinsurgency operations, counterguerfila operations, anti-guerfila operations, civic-action operations, ambush and counter-ambush techniques, tactical trends and training tips, countermeasures against mines and booby traps, safety regulations for individual weapons and grenades, security of information and material, and first aid.


Enclosure (1)





- 1. Hu Bai Period. Until 9 June, the Chaplain was in Phu Bai with the Battalion. Every weekday at 1730, he conducted Catholic Mass at the 3/26 Chapel. In addition, services were held for the units listed below on the designated dates:
 - 2 June: Masses at HMM-163, CAC-H8, H-3, H-2, A-3, and A-1.
 - 4 June: Protestant Services at 3/26 Chapel, Catholic Services at 3/26 Chapel and 8th RRFS.
 - 5 June: Mass on Hill 230.
 - 6 June: Mass at 3/26 Chapel for 2/26 personnel arriving from Operation HICKORY.
 - 10 June: Protestant Services at 3/26 Chapel.
- 2. Khe Sanh Period. On 9 June the Chaplain flew to Khe Sanh with the advance party. While at Khe Sanh, the Chaplain conducted a daily Mass at the Khe Sanh Base Mess at 1930. In addition, services were held at the locations listed below on the designated dates:
 - 10 June: Mass at 1/26 CP.
 - 11 June: .Mass at 1/26 Base Mess, 1/26 Field Mess, and Khe Sanh Base Mess.
 - 12 June: Mass on Hill 881 S.
 - 13 June: Mass on Hill 861.
 - 14 June: Mass on Hill 950.
 - 18 June: Protestant Services at 3/26; Catholic Services at C Battery, 1/26 Field Mess, 3/26 Field Mess, A Battery, and Khe Sanh Base Mess.
 - 19 June: Mass on Hill 881.
 - 20 June: Mass at 3/26 Field Mess.
 - 22 June: Mass at 3/26 Field Mess.
 - 23 June: Masses on Hill 950 and 3/26 Field Mess.
 - 25 June: Protestant Services at 3/26 and Co I; Catholic Services at 1/26 Field Mess, 1/26 Base Mess, 3/26 Field Mess, A Battery and Khe Sanh Base Mess.
 - 26 June: Mass at 3/26 Field Mess. Chaplain met with Division Forward Chaplain at Dong Ha.
 - 27 June: Chaplain assisted medevacs who were flown into Dong Ha from Khe Sanh mortar attack; Mass at 3/26 Field Mess. At night, Chaplain assisted wounded and administered to the dead from Battle of Hill 689.
 - 29 June: Mass on Hill 861.






PART IV

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS NFF.


- 1. The following messages and orders from the 3d Marine Division, the Fourth Marines, and the Twenty-Sixth Marines governed the activity of the Battalion during June.
 - a. CG 3d MarDiv 270654Z May 67 (Redeployment of Units)
 - b. Fourth Marines Frag O 23-67 (Operations CHOCTAW, CUMBERLUND, and COLGATE)
 - c. CG 3d MarDiv O 081137Z June 67 (Rough Rider/Unit Redeployment)
 - d. Twenty-Sixth Marines 120900Z June 67 (Operation CROCKETT Frag 0 4-67)
 - e. Twenty-Sixth Marines 181415Z June 67 (Operation CROCKETT Frag 0 5-67)
 - f. Twenty-Sixth Marines 201420Z June 67 (D-Day and L-Hour Operation CROCKETT Frag 0 5-67)
 - g. Twenty-Sixth Marines 210635Z June 67 (Change to Operation CROCKETT Frag 0 5-67)
- 2. The following 3d Battalion, 26th Marines Operation Orders governed the activity of the Battalion during June.
 - a. Operation Order 1-67 (Defense of PHU BAI)
 - b. Frag Order 4-67
 - c. Frag Order 5-67
 - d. Commanding Officer's Letter, Serial 0041156-67 (Rough Rider; information concerning)
 - JO A/ARPT (OPN GOLDEN FLEECEZ)



Enclosure (1)







HEADOUARTERS

3d Battalion, 26th Marines FFO San Francisco 96502

> 3/TC/1kh 3100 Ser: 003 A20767 26 July 1967

From:

Commanding Officer

Commanding General, 31 Marine Division

To: Via:

Commanding Officer, 26th Marines

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report (U)

llef:

- (a) Map: VINTNAM, Series L7014, 1:50,000, Sheet 6442 II, III.
- (b) Third Mar Div EOI (U) 1-67
- (c) Third Mar Div O PO 2000.2E (COI)
- Third Mar Div O P 2000.4C (Com SOP)
- Third Mar Div 0 3100.1C (Operation Reports)
- CG Third Mar Div 270645Z May 67 (Redeployment of Units)
 CG Third Mar Div 081137Z Jun 67 (Rough Riders/Unit Redeployment) ment)
- Communding Officer's Letter, Serial 0041156-67 (Rough (h) Bider: information concerning)
- (1) Tuenty-Sixth Marines 120900Z:Jun 67 (Operation CROCKETT Trag 0 4-67)
- (j) Twenty-Sixth Marines 181415Z Jun 67 (Operation CRECKETT Trag 0 5-67
- (k) Twenty-Sixth Marines 201420Z Jun 67 (D-day and L-hour Operation CHOCKETT Frag 0 5-67)
- (1) Twenty-Sinth Marines 210635Z Jun 67 (Change to Operation CROCKETT Frag 0 5-67)
- 5d Bn. 26th Marines Frag 0 6-67
- CG Third Mar Div 160653Z Jul 67 (Termination of Operation OROCKITT).
- Code Name. Operation CROCKETT, a Search and Destroy operation.
- Dates of Operation, 131815H June 1967-162400H July 1967.
- Location Huong Hoa District, Quang Tri Province, RVN.
- Task Organization.

DO AIGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS D TLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS DOD INSTRUCTION 5200.10

COM 4 OF 13 COPIES

SECPE

Unit Designation

3d Battalion, 26th Marines

H&S Company

Company I

Company K

Company L

Company M

Commander

Lt Col K. L. HOCH (13 Jun-16 Jul 67) Capt. J. R. CLICKENER (13 Jun-16 Jul 67) Capt W. F. COULTER (13 Jun-16 Jul 67) Capt. W. R. WILDPRETT (13 Jun-16 Jul 67) Capt. F. D. BYNUM (13 Jun-27 Jun 67) lst Lt. J. AULIK (28 Jun-29 Jun 67) Capt. R. D. CAMP JR. (30 Jun-16 July 67) Capt. A. D. DEBONA (13 Jun-16 Jul 67)

Supporting Forces.

a. Artillery Support.

- To During Operation CROCKETT, the 26th Marines had operational control of 3/26 and all artillery units supporting the Operation. Consequently, all calls for fire, except those for the Battalion's own Elementars, were cleared at the 26th Marines FSCC. The Battalion's own FSCC acted primarily as a monitoring station, except the control of the Battalion Command Group displaced to the field to the All force atsoions directly.
- 2. Two 105mm Howitzer batteries (A/1/13 and C/1/13) each with a platform of 155mm Howitzers attached, located at the KHE SANH base, and a 4.2 inch more ar battery (W/1/13) with Sections located on Hill 861 and Hill 881 South provided artillery support for 3/26. All artillery units operated in general support of the Battalion, except in one instance when C Battery displaced and operated in direct support. In addition to these units the 175mm Guns at Camp Carroll (Fattery B, 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery), were also capable of supporting the Operation CROCKETT AO.
- Artillery was employed against observed enemy personnel, enemy bunkers, and tunnel complexes, and suspected enemy positions. Preparatory fires were employed to cover enemy troop movements. In such cases, both the primary and alternate zones would be prepped in order to deceive the enemy as to the actual area of movement. At night, H&I fires were delivered on likely enemy routes and assembly areas. Illumination was available whenever requested.





• MALES

On each of the three instances in which the KHE SANH base received enemy mortar/rocket fire, counter-battery fire was returned and in at least one case proved to have had extremely effective coverage of the enemy firing positions.

b. Tracked Vehicle Support.

- 1. On several occasions during Operation CROCKETT, ONTOS, tanks and twin-40's operated in support of the Battalion on mechanized platoon and company sized patrols. These operations were restricted to daylight patrols of ranges from 12,000 to 20,000 meters. They were able to cover larger portions of terrain than infantry patrols, but were somewhat restricted by several impassable streams in the area.
- 2. Co A, 3d AT Bn provided anti-tank support for the Battalion during Operation CROCKETT.
- 3. The 3d Plt, Co B, 3d TK Bn provided tank support for the Battalion.
- 4. A light section from A/1/44 (USA) was employed on one mechanized patrol.
- c. Engineer Support. On several occasions engineer teams from 1st Plt. Co C, 3d Engr Battalion were attached to 3/26 units operating in the field to aid in disarming mines, destroying dud ordence. and destroying enemy fortifications.

d. Air Support.


- 1. See support was requested by the ALO and FAC through the 26th Maxines ALO. The majority of the air support was preplanned, however on two eccasions the Battalion requested immediate air support. ALL referry ding a proof the received from the helicopters fragged in direct support of the 26th Marines.
- 2. A total of 90 med vacs were lifted from the field by rotary wing. Of these 13 were KLA'S, 45 ware WIA'S, 27 were NBC'S, 4 VC'S KLA'S, and 1 POW (NVA). Flights were flown despite inclement weather and LZ's located in adverse terrain. In no case was a medevac refused or an emergency medevac postponed. Three of the emergency medevacs subsequently died of wounds. A total of 15 resupply missions were flown during Operation CROCKETT, including one emergency resupply at night.
- 3. Ten command and control missions were flown. These flights proved to be quite helpful in terrain familiarization of the unit commanders.
- 4. Aerial observers were used extensively by the unit commenders in the field to control air, adjust artillery, and maintain surveillance of the AO.
- 5. A total of 17 fixed wing flights were controlled by 3/26 ground FAC teams. Fixed wing has proven extremly effective against various NVA targets.





6. Intelligence

- a. Enemy situation prior to operation as estimated by G-2, 3d Marine Division,
- "Despite heavy casualties suffered at hills 861 and 881 north and south; the enemy had not withdrawn from positions previously occupied except where driven out by physical force. Observations and contacts with enemy forces in the area have become more frequent during the latter half of May and indicated that he is reinforcing his forces already in the area. Evidence of enemy activity is found in all directions around KHE SANH, not just to the northwest. The continued construction of bunkers, emplacement of additional antiaircraft weapons and appearance of anti-helicopter devices at possible. HLZ's would indicate that the enemy intends to remain in the area. The current build up in the KHE SANH area could be either: A. defensive in nature, with the mission of protecting enemy infiltration routes that bypass the base or 3. offensive in nature, with the intention of imitiating direct action against KHE SANH itself." This is a summary of the enemy situation prior to 3d Battalfon, 26th Marines! arrival to KHE SANH on 12 June 1957, produced by the 3d Marine Division's G-2 section.
- b. Energy situation actually found as operation was conducted:
 3d Eattalion 16th Marines operation in three specific areas of the
 KHE SANU 401 A discussion of the enemy situation, findings, and characterissues of operation is summarized below:
- 1. It company operating in area bounded by XD 8049, 8449, 8245, 8346, had no enemy contact or sightings. The village vicinity XD 820446 was the only area found to be inhabited. A cement bunker at XD 809454 was destroyed. At XD 802468 a series of partially destroyed transhes was found and at XD 823467 25 covered 1-man fighting holes were found and suspected of being a harboring site.
- 2. No M and the AM command group operated 22-27 June in the area bounded by NO 0175, 9132, 9472, 9536. No sightings or enemy contacts were made. The only sign of recent enemy movement was found at XD 922523 on 26 June for an uncharted stream up a draw to the south, probably 3-5 persons. The hill at XD 926323 had approximately 35 demanders in a circular hasty defense not used for 3-4 weeks. These was a trail leading south east off the crest of this hill. And harborise sites were found at XD 907324, 926326, and XD 926323. Throughout the area prominent trails were located. Travel was channelized to the studen beds and trafficability cross-country was at a rate of less than 300 meters per hour.
- 5. The pattle of Hill 689 which commenced 271130H when I Company began reverent up the hill at XD 805409, was prefaced by two separate attacks on the KHE SANH base. On 270045H 3d Battalion,



SECRET





26th Marines Command Rost at 19 40 22 received 25-30 82mm mortar rounds. At 270530H the KHE SANH perimeter was again hit by 102mm rockets which were believed to have been fired from vicinity XD 783 409, later confirmed by I and L Companies. As a result of this battle and the subsequent 5/25(-) operation in the area which continued into July, the following was found:


- (a) Cn 27 June it was estimated that an NVA company was engaged. However as a result of the discovery of harboring sites vicinity XD 782399, 778409, 771407, 770407; well used trails leading into rocket sites at Th 789405 and XD 776405, fighting holes in vicinity of each rocket site, and the bunker complex vicinity XD 789405, it is estimated that at least two NVA companies were engaged. Documents indicate that there was also an element of the 29th Regiment, a rocket/artillery regiment, involved.
- (b) It is suspected that the enemy withdrew south of the ridgeline running due west and northwest from Hill 689 in vicinity XD 802409.
- (c) All equipment and weapons found on Hill 689 and in the vicinity of harboring and rocket sites was discarded or abandoned. Nothing was found concealed.
- (d). The prisoner captured 28 June was extremely unscoperative and volunteered no information at first, but after intensive information he produced the following:
- (1) Captive was a member of the 1st squad, fat Platoco, 500 Company, K-8 or 8th Battalion of the 29th Regiment. (Mis Referration is confirmed by documents found throughout the area.)
- (2) The 8th Battalion has 4 companies, the C-4, 6_2 6_2 and 6_3 The 7th is a fire support company.
- 3 squads per platoon. There are 3 platoons per company, with
- (4) The cattalion commander of the 8th battalion is WINE, the company commander of the 5th Company was HANH or VINH.
- (e) Soveral documents were captured on Hill 699 and vicinity. Valuable information was derived from these documents as follows:
- (1) I Company on 291530H at XD 797412 found a diary dated from 16 February to 18 June 1967 on one of the KIA. The diary provided the following information:







- (A) E E signifies that unit is subordinate 5/8BN to a regiment. 5/8BN means 5th Company of the 8th Battalion.
- (E) Diary gives a general picture of the NVA training, morale, one previous contact, and infiltration route.
- (f) The enemy rocket attack on KHE SANH on the evening of 23 June was directed entirely on the base with no enemy rounds being directed toward 3/26(...) on Hill 689. This attack originated from the vicinity of XD 785406 and XD 776405.
- (g) The terrain is characterized by elephant grass undergrowth with single overhead canopy and trees 40-60 feet tall in the draws. The energy routes definitely correspond to the trace of available fresh water, in the draws and stream beds concealed by the dense overhead canopy.
- (h) I Company on 15-19 June had thoroughly patroled Hill 689 and vicinity and found no indications of fresh bunkers. Therefore, the enemy prepared his positions on Hill 689 between 20 and 27 June.
- (i) As a result of the contact on Hill 689 on 27 June, the recent attack on KHE SANH on 28 June and the follow up search of the area which turned up a quantity of enemy gear on Hill 689, flighting holes and series of tunnels on bill vicinity XD 788405, the mass and dust essembly of an enemy rocket at XD 788404, aiming stakes and possible mosket firing positions vicinity XD 784404, and a namboring sits in the masine just south of the rocket site, the following observatious are made:
- as an FO position to direct fires on KHE SANH combat base. The bunkers were the familiar "b" shaped, 2-man covered bunkers flush with the deck. The overhead cover was made of logs about 3" in diameter covered with two feet of dirt and well camouflaged. The majority of essulation were taken from well aimed sniper fire from those bunkers and spider holes at close range. A walk of the battle-fuel incideates that there was only a limited use by the enemy of mines and booby traps --- only one DH-10 was found in place on the morning
- of 21 June. However, the grandes and mines that we e-placed by the enemy was a suggestion of approach and took market or equivalence.
- (2) 22x82mm morter rds were found staged by the energy on 1923 609 which indicates that they probably would have fixed these on the rese would need with the racket attack. The quantity of gear



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including operation to be 40 CICC prenades and the abendance badies found after the first indicates that the enemy moved out rapidly.

The racket site at which the 102nm rocket nose was found (XD785-06) consisted of six individual arrangements of stakes with the center a is of these arrangements of ting on azimuths of 800 to 1200 mile-directly bound kpt and a cook to base. The area was recently bounded by heavy ordeneds. Some pane had been destroyed by artillery fire probably during the counter ment of fire on the pane. There were no indications of back blast and only one hade it in director and 4' deep was found in close reximity. This hade are dug at an engle and could have been a launch site. The route to the hardening size had fact pans dug in the side of the hill to enhance m versant up the extremely steep grade. Accounce of the damage to the way of friendly ordened little could be determined except that the side where was a minimum of 6 and probably 16-11 minimum atoms at the positions.

NOT89405, all he havering site and rocket site were manned simultane county by the energy, the energy force in the area probably exceeded 150 men. This is considered maintain of security at the harbering site, advantably a small reset positions and proper security on Will 689 and at 2076 208. To firm evidence has been found to indicate that a large force made a relegat directly west of Will 689 toward Will 758.

4) On 5 July 1. On found or rocket Leunching of the on the opetern framed on a of the Mill of MD776405. There were 22 holes—1 group of 10 and a special group of 12 about 30 motors to the right flankler the filter group, all in line. Three 402 rocket rounds partially mustod acts frum successful in the vicinity. The hales age 12:-18" dainy and 10:-12" is discussed. There was no evidence of rockets having been flood from the positions. Larry mining states were found.

(5) in 14 July 1 to obsd 4 plumes of smake rising from the common at 18752.05,755400,755411 and 755415 on cloud cover lifter.

Thights were observed in case vie the night before arty our fixed, results unknown to 15 only a meed heavy of fire from XD742401 from est 20-50 perclose / hours and produced 4 MI (0), 6 KJA (8), 3 bunkers demograded a country fixe. On the 14 of July a UDLE reed 32 fire from XD75220. The increase of activity in this are is significant.

b. Bearein:

the 10% data error is thinly populated, ranged and nountains. Hei his over 500 action are comen throughout the error. Terrain in severally discated and thickly vegetated with dente and the characteristic problem. The classical networks are benefit.





but trafficability to vehicles is almost uniformly restricted to national Route 9. THE SHEW valley is aligned on a narthwest-southwest sais and joins the TEEC ENT and D. FRANC river valleys at a common juncture in GH (MI9240). From this juncture, the WHO THE VELL ey extends zertherst to exit at (FDOC46). The Di MROTO valley runs in a meandering path toward the scatesat and exits at (YBOO36). Most drainage mucif is to neperted by the NAC WAR river which conveys the entire XHE Salm values drainage flow and exits the southeastern bunker at (M9040). This river joins the NATO Will river and eventually empties into the Graff OF ECFAIN. All other drainings flaws into the G The river (337854) which flows northwest to the VIIII 1-1.468 border befor turning west. This river charges the FINCES system.

(1) VEGRE FROM (a) The valleys are generally covered with elephant a green six to tweat: feet in height and low bruch. Small areas in the immediate vicinity of villages are utilized for river and garden crops. The southern portion of MER BARH valley subscrits of rubber plantation (XD859395). A broad band of elaphant grass crosses from (XD6446) to (XD8630). In addition, interwoven bembes thickets are prevolent clong with dence jungle in the southwest corner of the area.

- (b) The mountains are covered by a dense breakless. everymeen forest with no liter areas of pine and deciduous treas interspersed. Tree height increases with increased elevation. Tallest whees are 75 to 90 fact high, with some ranging to 150 goot. Canony is generally continuous with more than 25 percent of the groud covined by 2 to 4 layers of conony. Trees have shallow roots. Trunks are community straight and adverage 0.3 meters court. In inaccessible erest a bear remay, the our rarely reached the unders routh, which before the read grown of higher elevations in creas formerly elected, smiffling and Marchian arowing for 3-5 years and the discentinuance of the employ has published the development of a much thicker endergnersth then calld be amported deoper in the forest. Spiny rettans, full bushes, where and brieve generally are interseand arouse trees or between business
- who thick princry forcet is normally not suscepti le to confliction as however extensive defiliation spraying and the relevively day product of the southwest menseen serson should produce squitored and it from an elephant gresslands highly purceptible to comil gration.
 - $\{\Xi\}$ (Shower of appreach;
- in the rejor evenue of approach is Houte 9 which enters the NE LEV men from the enst and west.
- (b) the four major rivers, the Da NR. C, TONG TRI, R C That had the beith, afford evenues of approach.
- (a) the floor system of the ANT. SAME valley and the MAR

GARC AFORM (198951) afford the most easily traversed averues of approach into the hoods





of OPN ACTA ORD in as follows:

(1) Work & Northwest of KT: SAUH
(a) Referre Com ORGO of and now, there exists a concentrated effort on the part of the ensured reinforce and defend this area. V?
non's constantly reveal non furtifications and movement. Aircraft received heavy small come fire throughout the error.


(2) North
(c) a recon term was inserted 12 July and extracted on
13 July and provided information that indicated a company size unit in
the general erec of KD8448 (LL and KD8750 (UR). At XD860489 to XD863489
Ptl found 2 marker panis, 2 mechine gun panis and 30x2 can fighting
heles approx 2-7 days ald. 18 July M Comperating in area found a large
banker complex in excess of 75 bunkers, 50 hootehes and fighting holes
at XD868495 approximately 72 hours ald.

(3) Sortherest and east (2) from the control of this cross. Che was received on 13 July from JTD. Informant stated that a heavy weapons to was located at AD9A5483. It's men was to attack Will SAFE air base. At about a received small area fire from AD929477 on 13 July. We over area indicated lights moving in a southerly direction.

Another agent reported - chemy bettelion was located at ND 10413 on 12 May, On 14 July AC abserved 70 lights. Try men fired with unknown results. 25 lights were abled 160130H and at 160445 AC observed 5 lights. To wish sampling to be observed many people going up the ridges that marriaged are realley, the discovery of company size harboring sites 10 NA nearly of the SAMMI and the agent reports confirmed by 40 sightings of examplantias according to correct in. Increased enem, activity from this observed on the expect 6.

(4) South, condicant (a) retirity throughout this area has been sparse with some content are not eighting a. There exists much recent trail activity. Lights and absorbed at N995305, that was opserved at ND995426 and not a four 20 and harbor wite. All these incidents are observed on the same.

(5) decide continues to (6) House estimate the error is being reported by expected the factor of the 12 May JTAD reported 2 betteliens, the 3d and the 320 perturbation of the 12 Mag't, at XD814212. Another reliable source has reported 2 unidentified betteliens at XD7230 on 12 July. There are sewer to provide a characteristic energy crosses to FONA river providing every crosses, has the each in this error. The terrain provides excellent wetch supply: a very code concolment for energy movement and harboring author.







7. Mission. While at KHE SANH, the Battalion was responsible for a portion of the KHE SANH Base perimeter; conducted ambushes, patrols, and listening posts; provided security for convoys; and when designated; provided the Regimental Reserve Company. In addition, the Battalian conducted operations throughout the Operation CROCKETE AC.

8. Concept of Operations.

- a. General: The Battalion was under the operational control of the 26th Marines throughout the period it was on Operation CROCKETT, and consequently its general concept of operations during the operation varied according to the requirements assigned by Regiment.
- b. Employment of the Companies. The sector of the KHE SANH Base Perimeter for which the Battalion was responsible was manned by personnel from HAS Company throughout Operation CROCKETT. The four rifle companies were employed on either battalion (-) operations in designated areas within the AO; or occupied positions just outside the west end of KHE SANH perimeter from which they would conduct squad or platoon sized ambushes and local patrols, or provide the Regimental Reserve Company.

o. Employment of Supporting Units.

- 1. General. All supporting units operated in general support of the Regiment. Elements of the various units were assigned to the Battalian whenever the Battalian had need of their services.
- Rein Crist's (Rein), and W/1/13 operated in general support of the Redialion. Autiliery missions were requested, cleared, and assigned to through the 26th Marines ESCI. The Battalion's own 81mm mortars attanced this autility support. Sections of 81mm mortars were frequently assigned to companies that were operating in the field in order to import they would have a readily-available means of fire approximate that they would have a readily-available means of fire approximated with all movements by Battalion units. Landing names and other areas in which units entered for the first time were propped; patrol routes were boxed in, and defensive fires were assistant at right. On-call concentrations were regularly planned at likely onery positions and arbush sites.
- 3. And Surgards. Airstrikes were employed to prep landing romes and history enemy positions. Air was requested for strikes equires a secretar enemy personnel and fortifications.
- in the acceptance of the support. When terrain permitted their employment, works, Octos, or twin-40's were employed on mechanized patrols to cover a designated partion of terrain with speed and additional available firepower.
- 9. Execution. The Battelion began planning for Operation CROCKETT with the reseipt of CG Their Mar Div 270545Z May 67 which

warned the Battelier ther on of hours notice it should be prepared to be relieved of the PHU BAI TAOR by 2d Battalion, 26th Marines and to chop operational control to the 26th Marines for expended Operation CROCKETT. CG Third Mar Div 081137Z Jun 67 stated that the Battalion and C Battery were to deploy by Rough Rider convoy from PHU BAI to KHE SANH on 12 June 67 and chop operational control to the 26th Marines upon arrival at KHE SANH.

The Battalion (Rein) departed PHU BAL at 0800H on 12 June. H&S Company, Co I, Co L, and Co M arrived at KHE SANH in the late afternoon of 13 June. The Battalion chopped operational control to the 26th Marines at 1815H, and at that time it began participating in Operation CROCKETT. That night, Co L, Co I, and Co M established positions just outside the west end of the KHE SANH perimeter vio (XD 838418), (XD 838420), and (XD 842424) respectively, and the Battalion CP was established vic (XD 842422).

14 June 1967

C Battery and Co K arrived at KHE SANH at 1300H. C Battery established a firing position vic (XD 852415) and Co K assumed the role of Regimental Reserve Company vic (XD 843318). All units spent the daylight hours improving their positions. At night, H&S Company provided 28 Marines to 1/26 to man LP's and a portion of 1/26's lines.

15 June 1967

At 0510H, a Marine from Co I was wounded by a grenade or satchelcharge when he left his position to investigate a noise to his front. Go I returned 20 rds SAF with unknown results. Size of enemy force unknown. 1 USMC WIA.

L-1 provided security for return of 3d MT Bn convoy to PHU BAI

arriving in PHU BAI about 1930H.


At 0800H, L-3 departed on a mechanized patrol with 2 M-42's and 2 M-50's, covering the area between the KHE SANH perimeter and Hill 861. The patrol reached Hill 861 at 1030H and returned to the perimeter at 1320H. No contact was made at any time.

At 1310H, Co I left on a four-day patrol to cover the area to the northeast of Hill 950. No enemy contact was made the first day. 20 Montagnards were found living vic (XD 827432). The company established night-time positions on Hill 558 vic (XD 820451).

16 June 1967

At 1030H, Co I (-) departed on a three-day patrol around the edge of the valley containing LANG TA TUC vic (XD 803422). No contact was made during the day. Nightime ambushes were established vic (XD 825405), and (XD 827404) by L-2 and L-3 respectively. Co I continued its patrol, moving northwest to vic (XD 808263) where it established its nighttime position. Three squad-sized embushes were established on key avenues of approach to the company position. No contact was made during the day and progress was very slow due to heavy vegatation.

At 2230H. Co I CP vic (XD 808463) received 1 incoming grenade Co I returned 3 M-26 granades and 50 rds resulting in 2 USMC WIA.





SAF. Enemy casualties, size and route of withdrawal were unknown. During the day the Battalion CP was moved inside the KHE SANH perimeter to vic (XD 861417). Co M assumed Co It's portion of the outer perimeter. Porto Marie H

17 June 1967 The Execution of the Company of the Co

L-1 provided security for Rough Rider from THU BAI to KHE SANH, arriving at 1800H. Co I moved to the north and east. During the day 2 old bunkers of French construction were found vic (XD 809464) with standard double apron wire surrounding them. There were no indications of recent use. A dud 500 lb bomb was also found vic (XD 816471). The company established night-time positions on an unnumbered hill vic (XD 815473).

Colombia de Colombia de La Colombia de La

Co L searched Hill 689 area vic (XD 803408) and Hill 758 area vic (XD 783433) before setting up for night. L-2 established an ambush vic (XD 785429) and L-3 established an ambush vic (XD 785426). No enemy contact was made at any time.

> 1, 17

18 June 1967

L-1 provided security for Rough Rider from KHE SANH to PHU BAL, arriving at 1845H. Co I continued to move north and at 1027H discovered a trail system leading north from vic (XD 812482) and east for vic (XD 818495). One squad of Co I was helolifted to vic (XD 816471) to destroy the 500 lb bomb found at that location the previous day. I-1, I-2 with I-6, and I-3 established ambushes at (XD 835486), (XD 827483), and (XD 818485) respectively.

Do L moved east through valley and L-2, L-3, and L-6 established night-time positions at (XD 802419), (XD 801423), and (XD 804421) respectively. No enemy contact was made at any time.

19 June 1967

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At 0445H, I-3 vic (XD 824485) received one rd SAF from an unknown number of enemy vic (XD 824486). I-3 returned 50 rds SAF, 10 M-26 grenades, 14 60mm illum rds, 2 60mm HE rds, and 2 4.2 illum rds. Enemy broke contact and withdrew to the north. I-3 received no casualties. Search of area following morning revealed no evidence of enemy cisualties.

L-1 flew from PHU B I to DONG HA, where they spent the night. Co L (-) moved east through valley and returned to the Battalian Area at 0900H.

Co I moved south through grid square. (XD8247). I-1 found 25 bunkers vic (XD 821463). Bunkers were 1-2 weeks old and were 4 ft wide and 3-5 ft deep and were covered with bamboo poles and 2 ft of dirt. Appeared to be a harboring site, since one had been used as a galley. I-1 and I-3 established night ambush at (XD 820466), and I-2 with I-6 at (XD 824464).

At 2355H, I-3 vic(XD 822467) received one incoming artillery/ mortar round, resulting in 3 WIA.







Co I destrayed the two French burkers it had found vio (FD 809464) at 1712178, and then continued moving south, arriving in the Easttalian Area at 1500H.

L-2 and L-3 established night ambushes vic (XD 831422) and (XD 853427) respectively.

21 June 1967

L-1 returned to RHE SANH from DONG HA by Rough Rider. Listening posts and 2 squad-sized ambushes were established around the Batvalion area.

22 June 1967

Two Companies and a command group began an operation in the south-eastern portion of the Operation CROCKET AO. At 08:H artillery began prepping LZ's for throup lift, and air prepped the LZ from 0830H-090CH. At 0845H, the first lift began, and at 0910H, Co K began landing vic (XD 948358). Go M was lifted to vib. (KD1952552) by 1755H, and moved to vic (XD 950348) where it established a blocking position. Go K and the CP group completed their lift at 1207H and began sweep towards Co M's block. At 1915H, Co K and the M linked up and established night-time positions vic (XD 950348).

Mc contant was made during the day and movement was extremely state the contant of poor terrain consisting of steep slopes covered with 1, 1 a value phase grass or canopy. In addition, numerous fires granted by appotechnics and air caused units to move by extremely careautrous courses and to backtrack in several instances.

27 3866 5961

At 04528, MeD to convert 1 incoming grenade wic (XD 950348) re-

AS 1970AL CO E sored by motor march to vic (XD 850386) and customered an east-leastion to begin a search and destroy operation Windows, the snee to the southwert. Co I searched HUONG HOA vic (XD 8603370). Finding evidence of meant movement along an east-west and estimated of meant fire fights. The Company established Thates east-west along an east-west along east-with each established Thates east-with of HUONG ECA vic (XD 864374).

25 Marca 19.67

Co I reached Hill 545 via (AU 805382) at 1100E continued move north to via (AU 883382) where the company established night



1. . .

SECTION.

• WINLESSED

time positions.

At 1245h, So K found an uncharted stream vic (XD 922323) which showed signs of movement of 3-5 people to the south within past 10-20 minutes. Speacched acea with negative results. Also found 4: charmed rocks used as a store and some coconut husks about one week old vic (XD 922323).

Oc K with was Or group moved to via (XD 925325) and began a sweep towards the villings of LANG TANKOL TA via (XD 937331), which was found to be destroyed. Co K established platoon sized ambushes along the stream via (XD 935328) at night.

Co M moved to vio (XD 921325) and conducted a thorough reconnaissance of the axea in that vicinity. Plateon sized ambushes were established in the southern postion of CS (XD 9232) at night.

At 09294, the Commiding Officer of the 26th Marines visited the 5/26 OP.

At 1010%, Go & round 4 old lean-to have vic (XD 925326). Also found blackened rocks used for cooking and chopped bamboo. Estimate area was lost used a north before.

At 1550H, Go M found and destroyed 4 fighting holes estimated as being 2-3 weeks old via (YD 926326).

At 1745H, Go M found and destroyed 35 two-man fighting holes in a masty circular defense on hill vic (XD 926323).

26 June 1967

On R world the CP group moved from LANG KOL TA KU northeast along world broken; CS (XD 9233) to vio (XD 922542), where they linked was the Respicusity Co M had moved from previous nights positions would alone board through GS (XD 9132) and (XD 9133) to LANG AUC COC (TANG TOP (XD 915747). Co M searched this village, finding no signs of the series about the positions of the property of the companies established night positions.

Or D malabathed last night's position via (XD 883382) as a screening observed and remained on the Hill as an OP to maintain surveillance over the AL war to a and help conducted recon patrols to the north and such a tensor we weakly.

27 appa 1957

AN COMMEN, More MAN SANE Date beceived approximately 50 rds of sales received thre from the southwest. Firteen rds landed in the Battalion mass, with NAC and Battalion supply receiving direct hits. The remainder of the founds landed in the 1/26 and A Battary areas. Battalion constant for more in TGN KIA, I. ARVN KIA, 10 USN WIA, and 22 USMC WIA. Surrequested a date of the USME WIA'S died of wounds.

Hamilton and the (ND 313412) received 2 incoming mortar/artillery

www.de. rewediating in 9 USMC WIA and 1 USMC KIA.

As only in the Cart that was medevacing I-1's casualties was downed by necker and difficulties vic (XD 018412). Another helicopter completed the mediance, and I-1 provided security for the downed helicopter for the mediance of the night.

At 05250 HE SAME received 30 rds 102mm rockets. All artillery units in the KHE SAME perimeter saturated the base of Hill 1015 vic (XD 357445), where Hill 950 reported enemy fixing positions S-1 suffered 2 USNO WEA.

- A& 0870N, On W. On K. and the CP group began kelviaft back to?

Go L moved to vis (XI) 983398) on Highway #9, where it embarked on trucks, and neturned to KHE SANH at 1215H.

I-2 and the Co I CP group moved to via (XD 818412) and Rinked with I-1. From their position Co I (-) moved towards Hill689 via (XD 803408) to search for enemy nortar position.

I-3 was held ofted to via (XD 875455) to conduct search for possible

enemy rooker sites on Hill 1015 vic (XD 854454).

At 1230H, a CAS C patrol searching for the enemy mortar positions on Hill 689 machined intense SAF from an unknown number of VC on the crest of the Fill. The patrol was driven off the Fill, leaving 2 USMC MIA and 1 PR MIA on the Hill. Co I (-) continued towards HIll 689 to aid the CAS patrol.

At 1615H. Co I (-) had moved to vio (XD 801410) where it held position while an AO conducted on airstrike on enemy on Hill 689 vic (XD 803409).

At 1707H, Go I (-) reached Hill 639 and began searching for the CAC casualties. Received 2 USMC WIA from an unknown type of booby trap.

At 174(H, Co I (-) continued to move towards crest of Hill689. I-2 moved to via (XD 799412) where it encountered extensive AP mines and tooby trapped ONI Com grenades and received SAF from via (XD 998412). I-1 moved to via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy SAF from via (XD 904409) where they received heavy

Aw [19704] F Fahd 16-5 landed wio (XD 801405) by helicopter and began mayoring continuent to Hill 689 where Co I was necessing fire. While in 1. Use a continuent SAP from vio (XD 806909), and began maneuvering to the progress was a low Westablished a blocking force. L-3 moved conclude these, her on right fromt, and hel provided security in LZ. The distributed of Paragraphs onto (ND 801404) advancing towards rear of Co To They beaution crossest of Hall 689 and encountered extensive AP mines with the any eacognism ban for grenades. Upon advancing across crest, L-3 .. Detacted to the fire from 849 well camouflaged spiden holes. Co L reductions of the and destroyed with grenades, All casualties were returned while his and everyaged, and Co L consolidated with Co I. Regults: captured (5AK -47's, 1 Chi Com carbine with scope, 1 7 All 1 Common of the captured (5AK -47's, 1 Chi Common of the Call O A the server was the also found and evacuated the 2 USMC MIA from the CAC O The same Kids The energy force was estimated as being 2 NVA (Berl, Transmiss Winell estimate of enemy pagualties was 25 KIA (C); ES RIGHT IN











At 2000H, Co L found a 20 ft by 6 ft bomb crater vic (XD 802409). Found 2 bunkers and a turnel, AP mines, booby traps, grenades, and 82mm mortar rds.

At dusk while flace ships and artillery fixed illumination to aid in evacuation of casualties and consolidation of positions, Co L linked with Co I, and both companies established night positions on Hill 689. Extensive H&I fixes were conducted on avenues of approach to the west used by the NTA units.

At 1900H, Co I and Co L received incoming mortar rounds of an unknown caliber from the northwest. The 4.2 Battery on Hill 881 south returned counter-mortar fire and the enemy ceased firing at 1910H.

At 2045H, Collareceived 2 incoming 60mm mortar rds from the southeast.

28 Jane 1967

At 0625H, artillieny began prepring the Hill 689 area in preparation for a the ugh search of the area. Air prepped the area from 0900H to 0930H.

At 0730H, I-3 was helilifted from Hill 1015 to KHE SANH in preparation for rejoining the remainder of the company on Hill 689. The lift was completed at 0752H.

At 0755H; Co I, the district chief and an AO reported a large body of enemy troops in GS (XD 8042). At 0820H. Co I called in artillery with withown results.

At COSEE, Co I and Co L began a thorough search of the battlefield to describ enemy bunkers, mines, and booby traps; and to determine the extent of exemy casualties.

at 10060, Co L found 1 NVA KIA (C) with a round in his head vic (XD 8000) . grappling book had been used to drag the body.

AS ROLLE, On R found L MVA KIA (C) via (XD 803407). NVA wore olive drap unafform and soft jungle cover and had large amount of 782 gear. Also found 1 PF KIA at same location. At 1130H, Co I found 1 AK-47 via (XB S20481).

At 1250 the Convert CP group, Co M, 81mm montar platoon and I-3 were help about 1500 to the Hill 639 area. The lift was completed at 1330H.

46 Afgrid. Co is saliad an airstrike on 2 VC running vic (XD 795406), isosakking in 2 NV4 RIA (P).

At 18041, to M fired 60mm mortars and called an airstrike on 10 VC (WE 188 M94406) mesulting in 1 NVA KIA (C) and 7 NVA KIA (P).

As NOWER, and AD called an airstrike on 2 enemy bunkers vic (XD 786405), assure ying both bunkers.

At 1900m, to M sighted 3 VC in the open vic (XD 798406) and an AO representation in the same area. An airstrike was conducted, resulting in 1 NVA SEA (4), 9 NVA KYA (P), 8 enemy bunkers destroyed, 2 damaged, and 1 secondary explosion.





At 1700H, Co M called Slmm mortars on 3 VC in open vic (XD 782408) resulting in 1 NVA KIA (C).

Night-time positions were established along the ridgeline running northwest from Hill 639. Co I at (XD 803409), the CP at (XD 802411), the 81mm plt (-) at (XD 801411), Co I at (XD 799413), and Co M at (XD 798411).

At 1900H, Go I called arithlery on 3 NVA vic (XD 798416) with negative results.

At 1740H, Go I found 2 NVA KIA and 1 NVA WIA (PW) and 3 wpns (2 AK-47's and 1 SKS with a bayonet) vic (XD 797415). Weapons were returned to S-2. Also found 2 field rucksacks. 10 Chi Com grenade's, 1 AP mine, and assorted food and documents.

At 1940H, Co I received 2 WIA's at west end of airstrip during rocket attack on KHE SANH. Approximately 25 102mm rockets were fired, nearly all of which landed outside the perimeter, with six falling in Co K's area, but inflicting no casualties, all units in the Hill: 689 area observed the enemy fixing site vic (XD 7841) and C Battery fixed 401 rds, and A Battery 398 rounds of counter-battery fire at that location. The enemy fire ceased at 1955H.

At 1955H, Co M fired 81mm mortars on 10 NVA vic (XD 802407) resulting in 2 NVA KIA (P).

29 June 1967

Co M and Co I swept northwest along ridgeline towards Hill 758. Air and while the prepped abea thoroughly.

13. 636 K Co I found 2 NVA KIA (C) and 1 wpm (AK-47) vic (XD 798409).

Kik had a Com grenades, brown uniform, tennis shoes, unit ID card,


AND TOTAL TO I found 2 NVA KIA (C) wis (NO 796403);

AND TOTAL TO Some smea, a cartridge belt with 2 lb rice bag,
2 greenage now read 4 Obl Son grenades, 8 Loaded AK-47 magazines,
and capture was found. A bullet hole in the canteen, a pool of
block, as a housing addicated the weared had been hit in abdomen.
A countying pole for Sham montans rds and a marker of elephant grass
on an astronomy of Oblidegrees were also found. Two soft covers, an
NIA project. And some blocksvains were found 50 meters to the west.
At 1896F. Co Misighted 10 NVA on ridgeline vic (XD 786425).
Tables of Bell's, and fixed 106's from B/1/26 and D/1/26.
Photograf shiper team and a gunship. AO also reported 3 bunkers in
area. New its: 9 NVA KIA (P), 1 bunker destroyed, 1 secondary

expression.

15 15006 and called artillery on 3 NVA vic (XD 798446) with regulate seed like.

W Julia 390







K-3 provided security for a section of tanks and a section of Ontos that were intended to move to Go L's position on Hill 689. The tanks were unable to ford a stream running through the valley between KHE SANH and Hill 689 and returned to KHE SANH with K-3

Co L conducted a paurol to vic (XD 827385) and returned to Hill 689.

At 1330H, Co L observed 1 NVA KIA (C) vic (XD 796402).

Co M established night time positions on an unnumbered Hill vic (XD 791416); Co I and the Command Group vic (XD 791416), and Co L remained on Hill 689 vic (XD 813409).

1 July 67

Co I moved be search for suspected rocket site vic (XD 735412), Co L moved to via (XD 737404), Co M moved to Hill 758 vic (XD 784423), the command group (XD 791416) displaced to vic (XD 785421) off of Hill 758. All units patrolled around these locations during the day and established positions at the given coordinates for the night.

At 1045H, Co M found an NVA helmet with bullet and shrapnel

holes vic (XD 783422). 1 NVA KIA (P),

At 1100H, Co L found a dud 250 lb bomb and a possible rocket site vic (XD 792406). Site consisted of four holes dug into ground on an inclination and pointed toward the KHE SANH Base. Area behind locked like it had received backblast.

At 1.000H, Co I vic (XD 785414) found and destroyed a tunnel Fig. with by 3 ft long by 4 ft high leading into a room 4 ft long by with wide by 3 ft high. Room had an air vent and could accommodate

25% NVA, but did not appear to have been used recently.

At 127 H, Co I found I bolt action sniper rifle with scope, scope come; and mifte case vic (XD 788404). Also found 5 "L"shaped, covered fighting holes, 2 open holes, and 5 entrenching tools and a variety of MVA web gear. Holes were on military crest of the hall promeeting its principle avenue of approach.

At 1864A, Co I found and destroyed 3 fighting holes less than

ome week in you took 758410),

At the log do descret artillery on 2 NVA moving east across stance, vis (his 79 MOV) with good coverage but unknown results.

At 1578, 05 5 found a tunnel vic (XD 788407) that had been caved on by a nearby bomb crater, except for the entrance extending down 6 m and a 300 angle. An airstrike in this area on 29 June had uniagered a secondary explosion.

36 139 May to b found a possible tunnel complex vic (XD 788407).

at 20x2; be bale (XL 788407) received 2 rds of 60mm mortar with regarding cosmodiles. The relay station on Hill 950 observed muzzle Clambia with (21, (385393) and artillery was fired on that area with taction we resulted.

2 301, 798?



During the day of M hoved to Hill 821 vic (XD 763443), Co I (-) joined the Command Group on Hill 758 vic (XD 785422), and Co L moved to Hill 542 vic (XD 869392). I-3 remained at the rocket site vic (XD 785412) until dask, when it joined Co L on Hill 542.

At OSIOH, Go I I wind and destroyed four bunkers vic (XD 785400).

Bunkers were all 4 ft by 3 ft by 3 ft.

At 0845H, Co M vio (XD 773427) suffered 3 WIA's from shrapnel

from a friendly bomb.

At 0830H, Co M found and destroyed 17 two-man fighting holes 4 ft by 3 ft by 3 ft via (XD 774427). Bunkers were in a 360° perimeter, but most were oriented towards the northwest and were approximately 3-4 days old.

At 0900H, Co I found 6 fighting holes and assorted NVA web

gear, AK-47 magnethes, and used bandages vic (XD 784399).

At 1005H, On W Spand a 102mm rocket vic (XD 785406). Rocket had Chinese markings and had a deep fuze well and electric detonating device still attached. A hole 72 inches in diameter and 7 ft deep was found twenty meters from the rocket. Fragments of U.S. WP and artillery rounds were found throughout the area.

At 1440H, Co M fround 8 covered fighting holes, one dud Chi Comgrenade, one dud 81mm mortar rd, and 1 NVA KIA (C) vic (XD 757446). Holes and body appeared to be one month old. Destroyed holes, grenade, and mortar rd.

At 1900M, Co I fired 81mm mortans on 4 NVA in green uniforms who were walking northeast into treeline vio (XD 802396). Negative surrelilators due to heavy vegetation.

I when its joined at the rocket site vio (XD 785412) until dusk, when its joined to L on Hill 542.

3 July 394

Manager of the ACSEA, Go M was helipsowed from Hill 821 back to the SANE Base.

1 3-3 bejou a 60 I on HII. 758.

On the stronged to the (ND 733405) from Hill 542 vic (ND 809391) and ormal teach of the area between the two positions. At 10 year, to 1 vic (ND 704422) called Olimn mortans and artillery on the dight working east and exceined light moving west towards each oppor vic (ND 775413). The lights were extinguished.

3 300 100

 $\hat{Z} = \{ \phi_{i}^{(i)}, \phi_{i}^{(i)} \}$

The Madesia group displaced from Hill 758 vic (XD 785422) to Co Mis permitted vic (XD 786405). Go I and Co L patrolled to the west of them mespective positions.







At 0828H, L-3 found a mit vic (XD 778409). Hut was 4 ft by 4 ft, built into side of hill and covered with banana leaves, and estimated as being 2 days old. Also found 9 two-man bunkers with logs and dirt overhead and covered with foilage. Found NVA 782 gear, one NVA helmet, tin dishes with shrapmel holes, and bloody bandages throughtout the area.

At 1200H, Co L found 22 rocket launcher sites vic (XD Y72411). The positions were in groups of 6 and 7, the holes were $1\frac{1}{2}$ ft deep and set 2 ft apart. Two stakes were set in front of each pit, one foot apart on either side and connected with a braided rope. Smaller stakes were located between the pits and the larger, stakes, which appeared to be aiming stakes. Mask clearance had been out to the front. No burned areas were found behind pits, although some bark had been stripped from trees. Also found 3 102mm rocket rounds with Chinese markings. Also found fuzes, fuze cases, and an NVA helmet. This site was apparently the position from which the KHE SANH Base was rocketed on 28 June.

At 1700H, Co L was helilifted back to the KHE SANH Combat Base.

6 July 1967

Co I petrolled to the southwest of Hill 689.

Co K patrolled to the southwest of the KHE SANH Combat Base.

At 2240H, Co K observed two objects, one red and one white, moving slowly from the northwest to the southwest across the sky bayond Hill 1015. One of the objects burst in the air. They were subsequently determined to have been an American aircraft and a SAM missible.

7 July 1967

On I patroiled in the Hill 758 area.

M-2 escented Ontos and Tanks to D/1/26 position vic (XD 914403).

Co K patroilel to the southeast of the KHE SANH Combat Base.

At 150/H, On I found a dud 250 lb bomb vic (XD 787422). The

bomb was destroyed in place.

At 1770h. Co I was helilifted back to the KHE SANH Combat Base. The untime mattalian went on a 24-hour standby to move by helilift/ robiols servey to the Operation BUFFALO Area, if so ordered by the Division Commander.

8 July 1987

The Bashalien continued on standby for Operation BUFFALO. Local patrols and amoustes were conducted in the immediate area of the EUR SAME Combat Base.

9 350 1957

the standby continued and operations were restricted to local patrols and ambushes in the immediate area of KHE SAWH Combat Base.



SECRET



CO M and Co: I began two day search and destroy operations in the area gouthwest of MUONG HOA and the Hill 832 area vic (XD 873445), respectively.

At 1400H, Oo h found the following USMC 782 gear and equipment. vic (XD 879442); 2 entreaching tools, 1 entrenching tool cover, 1 mess kit, 2 M-14 bayonets, assorted utilities, 1 long range ration, intowel, 2 helmet liners, I jungle boot, 2 field jackets, 1 flack jacket, I soft cover 2 ponchos, I shelter half with tent poles and pegs, I burned M-14 wifte stock, 2 bandoliers 7.62 ammunition and I rain jacket. All gear was helilifted back to the KHE SANH Base.

Go M establiabed wight time positions vic (XD 839345) and Co 🔻 % vie (XD 874446).

11 July 1957

their patrols, and both companies neturned to KHE SANE by dusk. and the second of the second of the second

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12 July 1967.

o **12 July 1967** ki objekt od 1990 objekt objekt objekt og ligger. Historia gjalger og statet statet for at til en en signifikationer i blever statet og til en en en statet og b 1884 Oo E began a three day search and destroy operation up the RAO MAN and KHE KA BAI Valleys and along the midgeline containing. Hill 527 and Hill 632. During the day it moved to vic (XD 862462) whome it asuablished night time positions.

33 min 3560

of the first parametric fitted to Hill 758 vic (XD 785424) from 0905. vo 1985 March Inde Mimoved on foot to Hill 689 vic (XD 803409). Both confination, were to mondact search and destroy operations in the area in the south and weather Hill 639-Hill 758-Hill 821 ridgeline.

At POSSER From SUMAOS found, a harbor site used by an estimated 20 VO/AVA - asso frank part of USMO atility uniform covered with flies. Odor time type and locates when body, but none found. Further search servented in pay this care amon came and taxmels cut in the brush, tunnel Mico was talked. Penatred in area.

20 1000%, (to . Sestroyed 25 enemy bunkers used as a harboring site when AN Thinges in markens were all Art deep and 3ft square. Fr. 49 of May Re M found and blew in place 1 dud 250 lb bomb vic

20 2024 1 2 2 cound remains of 1 USMC body vic (XD 804408); examinated as be to days old. Body decapitited and right arm missing. It want wratter to M-14 magazines with ammo, 2 M26 grenades, 1 compass, sud I contidage talk with I conteen found on or in the vicinity of the brist. Also further searched and head located near body. No eviware - of this som or weapon found. Body returned to graves registarms to the authorized determined to have been a Marine from CAC-O who had been killed on 27 June while an patrol.

de E usbablished right bane postkalms, un Hill 758 vic (XD 784423), 35 S. vaa (X3 786405), and Co I via (X3 813473).





CTIOTAL

UNGLASSFI

14 July 1967

At 0845H, Co K vic (XD 788409) observed four plumes of smoke rising from canopy vic (XD 752405), (XD 753408), (XD 755411), and (XD 755415). Fired 21 rds 81mm mortars, 10 rds 106mm recoiless rifles, and called 126 rds zone fire mission by two batteries on suspected enemy locations with excellent target coverage but unknown results. Estimate 2 company sized units.

At 0900H, K-1 reconed area vic (XD 783403) for possible harbor site. Found only trails with no signs of recent activity.

At 0915H, Co K observed a boat containing 11 people crossing river vic (XD 695360). Distance was too great to determine clothing, equipment, or activity.

At 1115H, I-1 found and destroyed a damaged LAAW vic (XD 807483).

At 1400H, K-2 found an old harbor site vic (XD 790405) which did not appear to have been occupied for some time. Also found I 82mm rd in stream at same location, and pieces of bandages and clothing.

At 1530H, Co K vic (XD 770405) found and blew in place 1 dud 250 lb bomb, but the on surface and found 1 dud 500 lb bomb buried approximately 50 feet in dirt with tail assembly broken off on surface. Unable to blow 500 lb bomb, buy the holewas filled in.

At 1715H, Co K vic (XD 789405) received 3 short burst of fire from a machinegun mounted on what appeared to be an S.O.C. UH-34 aircraft. Results: 1 USMC WIA.

Co I established night-time positions on Hill 632 vic (XD 828482)).

15 July 1967

At 0800H, Co K found 1 NVA KIAC estimated as being 2 weeks old vic (XD 60(410), Body had belt with two ChiCom grenades attached and beside the body was a pole with 2 unfused 82mm mortar and autached with rope thongs. Ordinance was blown in place.

At 0835H, Co K found 1 ChiCom box mine at (XD 792412) camouflaged in most of a bunker. Mine was blown in place and bunker was destroyed.

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hegin as speciation northwest along the stream bed to vic (XD 918417) to begin as speciation northwest along the stream bed to vic (XD 844438). So I established night-time position vic (XD 918418).


At 1400H, Operation CROCKETT terminated in accordance with CG. 3d Max Niv 160653Z Jun 67.

10. Resuls.

a. Frandly Lesses

Personnel.

Killed in Action 13 Died of Wounds 3 Wounded in Action 103









- (a) Three GP tents, 1 M-16El rifle, and 1 M-79 grenade launcher were destroyed or lost.
- (b) Five portable flame tanks, 8 flame gun groups, 1 sniper scope and battery charger, 4 M-16L1 rifles, and 1 81 mm mortar tripod were damaged.
- (c) All units suffered minor combat losses of individual equipment.

b. Enemy Losses: 2

1. Personnol
KIA (C) 51
KIA () 82
FW/WA 1

2. Equipment.

- (a) The Battalion captured 12 weapons on Operation CROCKETT.
- (b) Fifty two Chi Com grandes, 26 82mm mortar rounds, 800 rounds of 7.62 amminition. I Chi Com AP mines, 4 B-40 rocket rounds, and 7 B-40 fuzes were captured. 4 102mm rocket rounds, and approximately 550 lbs of individual equipment were captured.
- (c) Areas where airstrikes and artillery missions were conducted were searched by ground troops whenever practicable, however distance and dense regetation frequently prevented an immediate search of the target area, and the NVA often removed bodies before Marine patrols arrayed. Although ground patrols were unable to check all target areas, acrical programmers sheeked all areas in which airstrikes were conducted, and also checked numerous artillery target areas.
- (d) On 272000H June, two rusted M-16El rifles serial numbers 533344 and 595097 were found on Hill 689 vic (XD 802409) by personmel from Co I. The r flow were subsequently determined to have belonged to person if from the Battalion, 26th Marines who had been killed in action proviously. On 101400H July, Co I found a large quantity of U.S. 782 gent via (XD 878442). No other material, food stuffs, or madeleins of U.S. erigin was recovered.

re Mainters: Administrative plans were adequate.

e. Supply

An ESU was maintained within the KHE SANH Combat Base by a declarage of FLSG-A. The water point was maintained by Sub State of Flaguarters Battalian, 3d MarDiv. Supply was generally adequate.

(4) Resupply of companies operating in the field was accomplished by helicopters. 2d Plt (-), Co A. 3d SF En controlled the LZ within the KHE SAMA perimeter.



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- (3) On initially leaving the perimeter, companies frequently back-packed four days of rations and more than their basic allowance of ammunition, which allowed them to operate in an area for an extended period without the necessity of daily resupply runs. Local water and halazone tablets were also utilized.
- (4) The marines carried normal T/O weapons on all operations. LAAW's were particularly popular, since they were much lighter and more easily carried than the 3.5's. Since all companies carried more than their basic allowance of ammunition for their crew-served weapons, every rifleman carried some mortar, rocket or machine-gun ammunition to lighten the load of the weapons platoon personnel. The M-16El rifle with its lightweight ammunition made the load of the rifleman in the Battalion several pounds less than what it had been in previous operations.

b. Maintenance

- (1) First and second echlon maintenance was performed satisfactorily by Battalion units.
- (2) Third echelon maintenance was accomplished promptly and effectively by LSU/FLSG-A.

3. Treatment of Casualties, Evacuation, and Hospitalization.

- (1) Casualties were treated in the field by company corpsmen.

 Penson were either returned to duty or evacuated to C-Med > :

 Fatheris requiring further treatment were evacuated to A-Med at PHU

 BAI, NSA at DA NANG, or the Hospital Ship Sanctuary.
- Medicopter medevacs were generally completed within 20 missibes. Medivacs were generally satisfactory, even though rugged termain, bad weather, and enemy activity created extremely adverse conditions in several instances.
- ds Transportation requirementswere minimal. The 26th Warne Registers provided transportation with support from Co 6 9th Moreov Transport Battalion.

c. Communications.

(%) The Battalion was under operational control of the 26th Marines countag Operation CROCKETT. Wire, radio (including covered

voice), and usessenger were all employed to higher headquarters. Hot lines were vaintained from the Battalion CCC to the Regimental CCC and to 1/26 Bestalion CCU.

- (a) Communications with Division were available through the Ragimontol Switchhoard via TRC-97 and MRC-62 Radio Relay.
- (3) Due to sugged terrain blocks and dead spaces in the onea, communication stability was maintained through the use of an FM relay on Hill 950. Vertical, half-rhombic and long wire antennas had to be used to communicate from valleys to the Southeast of Khe Sanh.



(4) The Battalion employed wire for communications with all units within Khe Sanh Base Area. A perimeter Security Net was maintained with all units on the Khe Sanh Perimeter on a 24 hour basis.

- (5) Equipment failures were infrequent and papairs were effected timely. Power was obtained and stable at all times due to the use of a PU-259F/G,
 - (6) Overall, communications during CROCKETT were adequate.

f. Medical Evaluation.

- (1) The BAS handled all routine medical problems and performed minor surgical operations. One tent, capable of holding 12-15 patients, was used as a ward for hospitalization, observation, and treatment of minor ensualties.
- (2) The BAS did not have the facilities for more extensive surgical procedures or for dental treatment. Consequently, all patients requiring major surgery or dental work were evacuated to A-Med at HU BAI, NSA at DA NANG, or the U.S.S. Sanctuary.
- (3) Prevention programs were maintained against malaria and heat casualties. The malaria control program consisted of one chloroquine-plainquine tablet each Sunday. Mosquito repellent and head nets were issued to all personnel. Continuous emphasis was placed as another and water intake, and all personnel were required to take at least 8 sale tablets aday. Both programs were closely supervised by the corpsmen and small-unit leaders of the Battalion.
- (4) The most common disorders treated at BAS were skin inductions, callulities, and boils. In addition, a large number of sprains were sustained in one operation in the jungle in the souther eastern position of the AO.


12. Spender Bundayient and Techniques.

who who M-1655 wifle, with which the Battalion had been equipped who provides month, was used throughout Operation CROCKETT. The weapon performed satisfactorily, and acceptance of the weapon increased as the max of the Battalion became more accustomed to it.

The Facility Commanded and the Scout Dog Team. The team was attached out to the commanded and the dogs were employed on patrols and ambushes. As with the dogs were extremely effective at detecting movement up no manager of 200 meters, and served as an excellent early warning device the daylight hours, however, the dogs were adversely afteriod by the heat and the terrain and were more of a burden on paircols. When a benefit.



CHORWI





During Operation CROCKETT, companies from this Battalion operated throughout the TAOR, conducting extensive patrols during the daylight hours, and establishing ambushes at night. Although the Battalion covered a large area of ground during the operation, it only made solid contact with the enemy in one instance in Hill 689 on the afternoon following the mortar/rocket attacks on the KHE SANH Base during the morning of 27 June. In this battle, Company I and Company L encountered elements of an estimated two NVA companies in well-established positions. After heavy fighting, the two companies succeeded in driving the enemy from the hill.

The following day, the Battalion Command Group and Company M joined Company I and Gompany L in the Hill 689 area. For the following; ten days, patrols were conducted throughout the area, but the Battalion never regained contact, as the enemy apparently fled to the west.

The remainder of the operation was uneventful. Patrols discovered several enemy bodies, rocket firing positions, bunkers, and harboring sites, but no contact was made with the enemy. On several contact was placed on standby for Operation BUFFALO, but at no time were any units from the Battalion committed outside the AO.

The operation to date has proved invaluable since it has given the command extensive experience in the use and coordination of supporting arms. The Command Group was deployed to the field allowing int to regain the edge it had had during CHINOOK I and II.

Indicionally, Marines have been conditioned to a tougher, more elasive and determined enemy who will stay and fight. They are been many amoreasingly instant to mountain and jungle operations and conditional to the need to seek out, fix and destroy the enemy.

Unlast other areas in which this Battalion has been employed, to widenation of Command with other units and through a Regimental Headquarters characterizes this TAOR. Units cannot afford to move without supporting arms or out of immediate registration range. All movements are planned as movements to contact with extensive use of supporting arms and mated and controlled by the regimental FSCC.

These was only one instance of psychological operations during Operation 0200KETT. Shortly after the battle of Hill 689, pictures were taken of the battlefield and a leaflet was compiled for an auxiliary on the suspected harbor site of the 8th Battalion, 29th NVA Regiment

Civic action was minimal during Operation CROCKETT. Liaison was maintained through Regiment and the Battalion operated in direct support of CaS-O.

14. Resourced abions.

Although in certain areas, movement along the high enough conservation for the advantages of observation, ease of newspapers to offer the advantages of observation, ease of newspapers and resupply, better tactical control and increased rate of advance, experience indicates that these apparent advantages are offset by the fact that the enemy onjoys most of these benefits and they tend to be minus factors for your own unit. Jungle search and destroy operations, designed to fix and locate the enemy, should be conducted with as much stealth and secrecy as possible. Movement

ound is necessary from time to time in order-to to the high g fixes to determine pinpoint locations, to accept resupply, to register defensive concentrations, to establish or re-establish communications which are marginal in the valleys and in dense canopy, to effect medevacs and, particularly in areas of known or suspected enemy concentrations, for interim defensive purposes for temporary operating bases from which patrols may operate to locate the enemy.

In most of these circumstances, defensible locations which can also serve as OP's, LZ's, etc. can be found which will satisfy the the commander's needs, including air support of all types, as long as direction of approach and retirement are rigidly controlled. . This command has found that sustained recvement over high ground covered with low jungle growth and 10 to 14 ft high elephant grass is extremely arduous and fatiguing, and requires enormous amounts of water to prevent heat casualties which, in turn, require inordinate water resupply by helo. These, together with the unit's movement pinpoint your location. Patrols can be sent to valleys or streambeds for water, but this slows the rate of advance unacceptably.

In short, it is recommended that, except for the reasons mentioned, movement be restricted to the routes the enemy travels -- the low ground. Here he finds shelter, water, food, remains free of observation and interdiction and enjoys an acceptable rate of movement? Caution should be exercised to insure that individuals and units remain dispersed; and tight security - particularity point security is exercised. States beds will show signs of movement, trails leading therefrom must be checked and open dominating terrain must be scouted carefully. Reaction plans should be carefully formulated and meheareed. Constant artillery H&I's should cover the movement, with occasional radical shifts to disrupt the impact patterns which might divulge a unit's course.

- b. Unicliability of Maps. Maps of areas covered by Meavync Mopy should be suspect and should not be considered completely reliable. This unit encountered several good sized, uncharted streams in one area. Direction of flow, careful terrain analysis and Yaomough and In addition well traveled continuous recommatasemerare file & . . trails were not shown and one large trail no longer existed.
- . Rate of March. For planning purposes, depending of the type of campy encountered (single or double) company sized units should calculate rate of advance at between 3000-4600 meters/day. This allers for necessary front. rear, lateral reconnictesance, and stops while OP's are utilized and resupply, etc. will accomplished. Movement along streams may be calculated at between 4000-6000 meters daily -
- Special Equipment. Whenever possible, long range rations should be utilized particularity since most movement follow streams. Hence reqisite water will be no problem. If "C" rations are used or delivered by holo mesupply, insure the cardboard box container is removed and rabicas are delivered in sandbags. This eliminates disposal puroblems and precludes leaving tell vale signs around. All waste caus should be cut out at both ends, flattened, buried and cam oulflaged. With a plentiful water supply, troops can do acequate on two (2) meals/day. Minimize helo resupply by winning on moving with a minimum of 4 meals per man-



(2) Stokes Litter. It is essential that supporting helicopters be thoroughly briefed and be equipped to evacuate by use of Stokes Litter. In one instance, a Marine slipped off a cliff, broke his hip and had to be find into a "Horse Collar" in order to effect his medevac.

given to the amount of demolitions a specific operation may require. Each man should carry some to insure ability to clear LZ's in canopy or for emergency use. Example this command was caught in two (2) large jungle fires. For a time it appeared that we would be trapped. Since we carried extra demolitions, it might have been necessary to blast large holes in the route of escape -a small stream bed. Luckily, we managed to fight our way to a burnt out area. Here a hasty security force was set up, the balance of the lead company a stripped off thear gear, raced back down the trail and assisted those having difficulty. However, plans had already been made for the priority in which gear and equipment would be "cached" along the stream in the hopes of later recovery. Basically the plan provided for dropping all but one meal, weapons, ammo, pyrotechnics, demo, one canteen, and radio and batteries.

(4) Ropes. Based on experience this command recommends that each man carry 10 ft of $\frac{1}{2}$ " hemp or nylon rope loop-spliced at each end. This allows sufficient rope to ascend or descend steep, sheer cliffs, provides strecher material, and aids in constructing hasty shelters. As a field expedient rifle slings tied together make an acceptable substitute. In addition, one small grappling hook for each two sauds can often be utilized.

- e. Personnel. Commanders must insure that only the very ablest and fit personnel are allowed to participate in a jungle operation. Known weaklings must be singled out because they create evacuation problems as non-battle casualties. They will not be able to keep up. Over a six-day period, weight loss per man averages 12-15 lbs.
- f. Discuss Prophylaxis. It is imperative that unit commanders enforce standard preventive measures to preclude future malaria problems. Measures no easet ceases, sleeves should be buttoned, head nets worm and repollent coulied liberally. Needless to say, regular use of malaria pills is mandatory. In addition, to preclude intestinal discovers, strict habizone tablet discipline must be enforced.
- with additional communications personnellscouts, and snipers be considered the maximum size to engage in jungle operations. This does not pecchine the use of more than one company or command groups. Planning should be detailed and provide for positioning or moving of forces dynaland or by help leap-frogging to allow unit (s) to block while a sold (s) sweeps.

the Commention with equipment, basic ? - organic company equipments will some additional machine guns is recommended.



sanding zones and other areas proximate to Danger of Pires any units should be prepped with HE or VT only-never with WP or other incendiaries. In two instances, LZ's were marked by HUEY rockets, small fires developed in the elephant grass, and by the time units were lifted into the zones, they were faced with a race with

fire. Know wind direction, plan avenues of movement or escape; and insure helicopters are readilly available in order to effect emergency

extraction.

i. Communications. Because of dense canopy and numerous folds in the terrain, units must take all available measures to insure adequate communications, and even then they should be prepared for the possibility of operating without any radio communications. In this case, the unit should carry spare radios and have a preplanned code of pyrotechnics for emergency communication with an AO or someone located in a position to observe. Radio operators should be familiar with such field expedients as vertical, helf-rhombic, and long wire antennas. In addition, when possible it is helpful to establish a relay station on the highest terrain in the area.

K. L. HOCH

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