

HEADQUARTERS

3d Battalion, 26th Marines 332667  
FPO San Francisco 96602

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003A19167  
10 Jul 1967From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF

Subj: Command Chronology

Ref: (a) FMFPacO 5750.8  
(b) 3dMarDivO 5750.1A

Encl: Command Chronology for period 1-30 June 1967 (U)

1. In compliance with the provisions of references (a) and (b),  
enclosure (1) is submitted.*K L Hoch*  
K. L. HOCH

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## PART I

## ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. DESIGNATIONS

3d Battalion, 26th Marines

COMMANDER

LtCol K. L. HOCH (1-30Jun67)

SUBORDINATE UNITSECS Company  
Company ICompany K  
Company LCompany M  
Company G, 2/9  
Scout Sniper Squad, RL-26  
CAC-A  
CAC-H

Capt J. R. CLICKNER (1-30Jun67)  
 Capt R. L. MALLARD (1-6Jun67)  
 Capt H. F. COUNTER (7-30Jun67)  
 Capt H. R. WILDPRETT (1-30Jun67)  
 Capt F. D. BYNUM (1-27Jun67) *BYNUM*  
 1stLt J. AULIK (28-29Jun67)  
 Capt R. D. CAMP Jr. (30Jun67)  
 Capt A. D. DEBORA (1-30Jun67)  
 Capt R. B. MCGOWAN (1-4Jun67)  
 Sgt R. DOOLEY (15-30June67)  
 1stLt E. D. HAINES (1-8Jun67)  
 1stLt L. D. RICHARD (1-8Jun67)

2. For matters pertaining to the defense of the Phu Bai vital area perimeter and Gia Le Encampment area. The following units fall under the operational control of the battalion.

1AG-16 B  
 HqBn  
 3dLTBn  
 MCE-62  
 4thBn, 12thMar  
 E&S 2/4  
 E&S 1/26  
 E&S 2/26  
 FLSG  
 D/1/44  
 3d Ingr Bn

Sector Commanders as designated.  
 (1-8Jun67)

3. STAFF OFFICERS:

Executive Officer  
 S-1/Adjutant  
 Personnel Officer  
 S-2  
 S-3  
 S-3A  
 S-4  
 Comm Officer  
 Supply Officer  
 Motor Transport Officer  
 Medical Officer  
 Chaplain

Maj W. E. FOGO (1-30Jun67)  
 2dLt R. D. SPENCER (1-30Jun67)  
 2dLt E. L. KNOX (1-30Jun67)  
 1stLt T. A. BAILLY (1-30Jun67)  
 Maj W. E. FOGO (1-16Jun67)  
 Maj C. T. MURPHY (17-30Jun67)  
 Capt C. C. RAYFOLDS Jr. (1-30Jun67)  
 Capt H. A. KING Jr. (1-30Jun67)  
 Capt T. M. EARLY (1-30Jun67)  
 Capt G. A. RADNIECKI (1-30Jun67)  
 2dLt W. J. RUSSELL (1-30Jun67)  
 Lt J. F. IPOLITTI (1-7Jun67)  
 Lt J. F. LALLY (8-30Jun67)  
 Lt B. MATTIGNY (1-30Jun67)

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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HEADQUARTERS

3d Battalion, 26th Marines  
APO San Francisco 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 June to 30 June 1967

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## PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

At the beginning of June, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines was responsible for the PHU BAI TAOR, the mission it had assumed on 9 March 1967. The material covered in this part of the Command Chronology is a continuation of Part II, Narrative Summary to the Command Chronology for 1 May-31 May 1967.

1 June 1967

I-1 continued as Sparrow Hawk and I-2 and I-3 continued on Sparrow Hawk/Rough Rider Reserve. I-2 squad provided security for minesweep from CAC-H8 to CAC-H5. Co K continued Operation GOLDEN FLEECE I. Co L (-) continued operating in the CAC-A6 and A7 Areas. L-2 continued on Sparrow Hawk/Rough Rider Reserve. Co M continued to operate in PHU LOC Area. G/2/9 continued to operate in NAM HOA Area. The 106 Plt continued to man combat outposts on Hill 180 and Hill 230 and manned a portion of Sector F on the Vital Area Perimeter. The 81 Mortar Platoon provided squads on Hill 180, Hill 230, and Coloco Beach, two sections on the perimeter, and one section each with Co K and Co M. D/1/44 continued in direct support of 3/26 with 4 M-55's and 10 M-42's.

At 1705H, M-2 listening post received 8-10 rds AWF from 1 VC walking down trail vic (ZD 009011) resulting in 1 USMC WIA. M-2 returned 20 rds SAF with unknown results.

At 2000H, 2 USMC vehicles moving south towards PHU BAI were ambushed by unknown number of VC vic (YD 825186). Both vehicles ran through the ambush, breaking contact and suffering no casualties. An ARVN detachment fired on the ambush and a L-2 ambush fired on 2 VC, apparently fleeing the ambush position, who were crossing a nearby rice paddy. The VC fled north into a treeline.

2 June 1967

I-2 relieved I-1 as Sparrow Hawk at 1700H, and I-1 assumed Sparrow Hawk/Rough Rider Reserve. I-3 squad provided security for minesweep from CAC-H8 to CAC-H3. L-1 squad moved to HUE at 1400H to provide security for HUE Ramp. All other units continued with assigned missions.

At 1915H, M-3 listening post spotted 2 VC, one of which carried an automatic weapon, walking down a trail vic (ZD 002010). The listening post fired 10 rds at 1 VC at a range of 10 feet and received 3 rds return fire from a third VC. Search of area revealed blood, but no bodies. 1 VC KIA (P).

At 2250H, CAC-H7 vic (ZD 201011) received 10-15 rds SAF from vic (ZD 201009). CAC-H7 returned 30 rds M-60 and 15 hand illum flares with negative results. A CAC-H7 patrol moved into position as blocking force but no further contact was made.

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4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STAFFING

USMC		USN		OTHER	
Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
37	1094	2	51	0	0

OTHER

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3 June 1967

I-2 relieved of Sparrow Hawk and Co I relieved Co K on Operation GOLDEN FLEECE I at 1130H. K-1 and K-3 assumed Sparrow Hawk/Rough Rider Reserve, and K-2 assumed Sparrow Hawk. G/2/9 was relieved in NAM HOA Area by C/1/4 and assumed Sparrow Hawk/Rough Rider Reserve. All other units continued with assigned missions.

At 0105H, CAC-H7 patrol vic (ZD 203009) fired 20 rds M-16 at 1 VC walking along railroad tracks vic (ZD 203009). Negative results.

At 0730H, CAC-H7 reported that the village chief of BUI MAU vic (ZD 203012) was assassinated by being shot in the head twice by VC while making a head call on the outskirts of his village.

At 1030H, L-2 apprehended 1 detainee who was subsequently determined not to be a VC and released.

At 1135H, L-2 patrol discovered 1 Chi Com mine vic (YD 820167) placed two feet off trail and rigged with green nylon trip wire across trail. Patrol disarmed mine and returned it to CP for examination.

At 1452H, M-3 vic (ZD 013018) found and destroyed two 2.75 inch rocket rds, believed to have been dropped by VC in previous night's contact (see 021915H entry above). Also found additional bloodstains.

At 1815H, M-3 vic (ZD 002010) received 4 rds SAF from an unknown number of VC. Co M returned SAF with unknown results.

At 2000H, CAC-H5 reported that 20 VC shot and killed one 68-year old VC civilian and stole one water buffalo. CAC-H5 patrol searched area and found 2 pieces of VC literature.

At 2135H, CAC-H1 patrol fired on 1 VC vic (YD 927092) moving towards patrol from west with 75 rds SAF, 1 M-26 grenade, and 3 WP grenades. VC fled to east. Patrol searched area with negative results.

At 2340H, PF's on bridge vic (ZD 197010) received a heavy volume of SAF. PF's called in artillery and the enemy broke contact.

4 June 1967

L-1 squad provided security for minesweep from CAC-H8 to CAC-H5. Co M and attached mortar section returned from PHU LOC Area at 0800H and assumed Sparrow Hawk/Rough Rider Reserve. G/2/9 chopped Operational Control to 2/9 at 0900H. All other units continued with assigned missions.

At 2155H, CAC-H6 patrol vic (ZC 144993) fired on 1 VC walking along trail vic (ZC 144994). Searched area with negative results.

At 1930H, a Vietnamese cab driver and 3 Koreans were kidnapped by 20 VC dressed in civilian clothes with concealed weapons vic (YD 828178). The VC forced the 4 persons to go with them on foot, but they proceeded into L-2 ambush vic (YD 823166) at 2230H. L-2 ambush fired on the 20 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA (C), 2 VC KIA (P), and 1 wpn captured (carbine). VC fled to east and west. The cab driver fled in the confusion and hid in village until the next morning when he reported the incident to CAC-A. The following morning L-2 found 1 Vietnamese boy who was wounded by a stray M-79 round while sleeping in his house. Boy was evacuated to HUE.

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5 June 1967

K-2 relieved K-1 as Sparrow Hawk at 0800H, and K-1 provided security for investigation of F-8 that crashed vic (YD 7711). Co L (-) returned from CAC-A6 and A7 and assumed Sparrow Hawk/Rough Rider Reserve. M-1 squad provided security for minesweep from CAC-H8 to CAC-H5. All other units continued with assigned missions.

At 0010H, the Sparrow Hawk cordoned off the village vic (YD 896145) while National Police, CIT's and MP's conducted search for the persons who fled into village after taking pictures of the airstrip that afternoon. \$139 in MPC and \$7 in US currency were confiscated from one civilian, and a camera was found in one of the huts. One unauthorized Vietnamese male civilian who admitted he had been on the airstrip was detained.

At 0130H, CAC-H7 patrol vic (AU 805008) fired on two squads of VC who were setting up an ambush vic (AU 805009) resulting in 1 VC KIA (P).

At 1100H, a water buffalo detonated a mine vic (ZD 078009). Co M found and destroyed another mine at the same location.

At 2030H, CAC-A6 patrol was moving east into a VC ambush site vic (YD 830166) when the point man spotted 1 VC who stood up to stretch. The point opened fire and observed VC fall to his knees. Patrol received return fire from at least two AK-47's before the enemy broke contact and fled in a southerly direction. Results: 1 VC KIA (P), 1 wpn captured (M-1 carbine).

6 June 1967

I-1 was relieved as Sparrow Hawk at 1500H, and assumed Sparrow Hawk/Rough Rider Reserve. L-1 squad provided security for minesweep from CAC-H8 to CAC-H5. Co M participated in a parade in HUE, and M-1 relieved I-1 as Sparrow Hawk at 1500H. All other units continued with assigned missions.

At 2135H, CAC-H7 received 10 rds SAF from an unknown number of VC vic (ZD 201013). CAC-H7 returned fire with negative results.

7 June 1967

Co K with one 81mm mortar section attached chopped Operational Control to the 4th Marines at 0600H, and was helilifted northeast to participate in Operation COLGATE. L-1 squad returned from HUE Ramp at 0900H. M-3 relieved M-1 as Sparrow Hawk at 1000H, and M-1 assumed Sparrow Hawk/Rough Rider Reserve. M-2 squad provided security for minesweep from CAC-H8 to CAC-H5. All other units continued with assigned missions.

At 0115H, CAC-H6 patrol fired on 1 VC who was believed to be a sentry for a larger force and was sleeping along side of trail vic (ZD 142002) but woke up on approach of patrol and attempted to fire. 1 VC KI: (C), 1 wpn captured (AK-47).

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At 2130H, CAC-H4 patrol received 2 rds 60mm mortar and 2 rds SAF from an unknown number of VC vic (ZD 020015). The CAC-H4 compound received SAF from the same area, resulting in 1 USMC WIA. CAC-H4 returned SAF and called artillery. Subsequent search of area revealed bloodstains. PF's said that VC came by boat from PHU. TU.

At 2145H, MCB-62 (Sector D) fired SAF at 1 VC vic (YD 903137) with negative results.

At 2357H, MCB-62 (Sector D) fired M-79 at 1 VC vic (YD 903137) with unknown results.

8 June 1967

At 0800H, H&S/2/26 relieved the 106 Platoon of combat outposts on Hill 180 and Hill 230 and relieved the 81mm Mortar Platoon of the commitments on Hill 180, Hill 230, Colco Beach, the Perimeter, and the airstrip. At 1000H, 2/26 relieved M-3 as Sparrow Hawk. At 1200H, 2/26 relieved the Battalion of responsibility for the PHU BAI TAOR. The Battalion continued to provide personnel for a portion of Sector F on the Vital Area Perimeter. The 106 Platoon was relieved of this requirement by personnel from Battalion Supply and S-1, who were to remain in the rear when the remainder of the Battalion moved to Khe Sanh.

Co I moved by foot from the GOLDEN FLEECE AO to vic (YD 955055) in preparation for the following day's operation

9 June 1967

Co M, H&S Co and Co L moved by motor march from the PHU BAI Vital Area south on Highway #1 and southwest on Highway #545 to vic (YD 931060), where a Battalion CP was established with H&S Company, and C/1/13 and 2 M-42's from D/1/44 established firing positions. Co M and Co L dismounted the vehicles and moved by foot, Co M to a blocking position on the level ground vic (YD 9200 and 9300) and Co L to an attack position along the stream vic (YL 9100). Co I had moved by foot to a blocking position to the east, vic (YD 9402, 9501 and 9500). At 1000H, Co L commenced a sweep to the north.

At 1221H, Co M vic (YC 902995) received 15 rds AWF from vic (YC 903995). Co M suffered 1 USMC WIA when a marine tripped a booby-trapped grenade as he moved off trail. Co M returned 150 rds M-16, 100 rds M-60, 4 rds M-79, and 2 LAAs with unknown results.

At 1245H, Co M tripped a booby-trapped Chi Com grenade vic (YC 905994) resulting in 1 USMC WIA.

At 1315, 3/26 Battalion Tactical Net was jammed with a high squealing noise, the Secondary Tactical Frequency was jammed with Vietnamese speaking, and the medevac frequency was also jammed.

At 1348H, Co K returned to PHU BAI Area and chopped operational control to 3/26.

At 1505H, point men of Co M vic (YC 918982) received 2 rds SAF resulting in 1 USMC WIA. Subsequently the entire column received sporadic sniperfire, M Co returned fire and searched area with negative results.

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At 1515H, rear element of Co M vic (YC 912982) received sniper fire resulting in 1 USMC WIA.

At 1520H, point man of Co L from 3rd Engr Bn tripped a booby-trapped Chi Com grenade vic (YD 904033) resulting in 1 USMC WIA.

10 June 1967

Co L completed sweep to north and Co M began sweep to north upon completion of Co L's sweep. Co I remained in its original blocking position.

At 0707H, Co M vic (YC 902980) received sniper fire from vic (YC 901980) resulting in 1 USMC WIA.

At 0900H, L-3 found 1 house, 3 huts, 2 fighting holes, and 2 covered bunkers along a three-foot wide trail running north to south vic (YC 909992). Huts were surrounded with 1 ft by 2 ft punji pits and huts contained beds. Searched area and found 1 expended 57mm RR cartridge and 1 BA-287. Destroyed huts, houses, and bunkers.

At 0855H, L-2 fired 20 rds SAF on 1 VC wearing green utilities on trail vic (YC 914991). VC returned 8-10 rds carbine fire and fled east into underbrush.

At 1000H, Co L located a network of frequently used trails heading north and northwest vic (YC 910990). Co L (-) followed trail northwest to Highway #545, then north along road to vic (YD 903014), then southeast to link up with L-3. L-3 moved north on trail to vic (YD 915005) and received 1 rd SAF. Returned fire and continued to move along trail to link with the remainder of the company.

At 1025H, M-3 found a blood-stained pack, various cooking utensils, 10 sleeping positions estimated as being 1 day old, and a large pool of blood, also estimated as 1 day old, vic (YC 899978). Also found fresh foot prints and barbed wire across road at same position. 1 VC KIA (P).

At 1330H, Co M vic (YC 906986) received 4 rds SAF from vic (YC 909987). Co M returned 20 rds M-16 and 4 rds M-79, and searched area with negative results.

At 1940H, M-3 tripped a booby-trapped Chi Com grenade vic (YC 887987) while moving to night ambush site, resulting in 2 USMC WIA.

11 June 1967

At 0700H, Co M tripped 1 booby-trapped Chi Com grenade vic (YC 889984), resulting in 3 USMC WIA.

At 0940H, Co M found 1 sprung bear trap vic (YC 895998) and 1 dud M-26 grenade vic (YC 894999). Blew grenade in place and returned bear trap to CP.

At 1130H, the Battalion (-) returned to the PHU BAI Perimeter by vehicle convoy. The remainder of the day was spent in preparation for the move to KHE SANH.

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12 June 1967

At 0800H, the entire Battalion minus a rear of two officers and 38 enlisted, departed PHU BAI aboard a convoy of 111 vehicles. The convoy was run by 3d Motor Transport Battalion, and the order of march of Co M, Co I, H&S Co, Co L, C Battery, Co K. Four M-55's from D/1/44 provided fire support, and a bridge team from 3d Engineers was also attached.

At 1235H, the convoy passed DONG HA, and Co K and C Battery proceeded into DONG HA for the night. The remainder of the convoy was scheduled to proceed on to Khe Sanh, but enroute it received information that Highway #9 was impassable because of a blown bridge vic (XD 913403), and it did not proceed past the Rockpile. Co I, Co L, and Co M established night time positions on Hills near the 3/3 CP, vic (XD 970540), (XD 988551), and (XD 975536), respectively, and H&S Co spent the night at Camp Carroll vic (YD C654).

13 June 1967

At 1100H, the convoy reformed and departed the Rockpile area. When the convoy reached KHE CA LU vic (YD 003453), the Engineers were still working on the bridge. Both the Division Commander and the Assistant Division Commander flew into KHE CA LU while the Battalion and Convoy Commanders were there and it was decided to helilift both Co M and Co I directly into KHE SANH. The bridge was completed at 1400H, and Co L and H&S Co departed KHE CA LU by convoy at that time, arriving in KHE SANH at 1630H. The Battalion chopped operational control to the 26th Marines at 1815H. At 1600H, Co K and C Battery left DONG HA and arrived at Camp Carroll at 1800H, where they remained for the night. Co L, Co I and Co M established night time positions just outside the west end of the KHE SANH perimeter vic (XD 838418), (XD 838420), and (XD 842424) respectively, and the Battalion CP was established vic (XD 842422).

14 June 1967

C Battery and Co E departed Camp Carroll at 0800H, and arrived at KHE SANH at 1300H. C Battery established a firing position vic (XD 852415) and Co K assumed the role of Regimental Reserve Company vic (XD 843418). All units spent the daylight hours improving their positions. At night, H&S company provided 28 Marines to 1/26 to man LP's and a portion of 1/26's lines.

15 June 1967

At 0510H, a Marine from Co I was wounded by a grenade or satchel charge when he left his position to investigate a noise to his front. Co I returned 20 rds SAF with unknown results. Size of enemy force unknown. 1 USMC WIA.

L-1 provided security for return of 3d MT Bn convoy to PHU BAI arriving in PHU BAI about 1930H.

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At 0800H, L-3 departed on a mechanized patrol with 2 M-42's and 2 M-50's, covering the area between the Khe Sanh perimeter and Hill 861. The patrol reached Hill 861 at 1030H and returned to the perimeter at 1320H. No contact was made at any time.

At 1310H, Co I left on a four-day patrol to cover the area to the northeast of Hill 950. No enemy contact was made the first day. 20 Montagnards were found living vic (XD 827432). The company established night-time positions on Hill 558 vic (XD 820451).

16 June 1967

At 1030H, Co L (-) departed on a three-day patrol around the edge of the valley containing LANG TA TUC vic (XD 803422). No contact was made during the day. Nighttime ambushes were established vic (XD 825405) and (XD 827404) by L-2 and L-3 respectively. Co I continued its patrol, moving northwest to vic (XD 808463) where it established its night-time position. Three squad-sized ambushes were established on key avenues of approach to the company's position. No contact was made during the day and progress was very slow due to heavy vegetation.

At 2230H, Co I CP vic (XD 808463) received 1 incoming grenade resulting in 2 USMC WIA. Co I returned 3 M-26 grenades and 50 rds SAF. Enemy casualties, size and route of withdrawal were unknown. During the day the Battalion CP was moved inside the KHE SANH perimeter to vic (XD 861417). Co M assumed Co L's portion of the outer perimeter.

17 June 1967

L-1 provided security for Rough Rider from Phu Bai to Khe Sanh, arriving at 1300H. Co I moved to the north and east. During the day, 2 old bunkers of Trench construction were found vic (XD 809464) with standard double apron wire surrounding them. There were no indications of recent use. A 500 lb bomb was also found vic (XD 816471). The company established night time positions on an unnumbered hill vic (XD 815473).

Co L searched HILL 860 area vic (XD 803408) and Hill 756 area vic (XD 783433) before setting up for night. L-2 established an ambush vic (XD 785429) and L-3 established an ambush vic (XD 785426). No enemy contact was made at any time.

18 June 1967

L-1 provided security for Rough Rider from Khe Sanh to Phu Bai, arriving at 1845H. Co I continued to move north and at 1027H discovered a trail system leading north from vic (XD 812482) and east from (XD 818495). One squad of Co I was helolifted to vic (XD 816471) to destroy the 500 lb bomb found at that location the previous day. I-1, I-2 with I-6, and I-3 established ambushes at (XD 835486), (XD 827483), and (XD 818485) respectively.

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Co L moved east through valley and L-2, L-3, and L-6 established night-time positions at (XD 802419), (XD 801423), and (XD 804421) respectively. No enemy contact was made at any time.

19 June 1967

At 0445H, I-3 vic (XD 824485) received one rd SAF from an unknown number of enemy vic (XD 824486). I-3 returned 50 rds SAF, 10 M-26 grenades, 14 60mm illum rds, 2 60mm H.E. rds, and 2 4.2 illum rds. Enemy broke contact and withdrew to the north. I-3 received no casualties. Search of area following morning revealed no evidence of enemy casualties.

L-1 flew from Phu Bai to Dong Ha, where they spent the night.

Co L (-) moved east through valley and returned to the Battalion Area at 0900H.

Co I moved south through grid square (XD 8247). I-1 found 25 bunkers vic (XD 821469). Bunkers were 1-2 weeks old and were 4 ft wide and 3-5 ft deep and were covered with bamboo poles and 2 ft of dirt. Appeared to be a harboring site, since one had been used as a galley. I-1 and I-3 established night ambushes at (XD 820466), and I-2 with I-6 at (XD 824464).

At 2355H, I-3 vic (XD 822467) received one incoming artillery/mortar round, resulting in 3 WIA.

20 June 1967

Co I destroyed the two French bunkers it had found vic (XD 809464) at 171215H, and then continued moving south, arriving in the Battalion area at 1500H.

L-2 and L-3 established night ambushes vic (XD 831422) and (XD 833427) respectively.

21 June 1967

L-1 returned to KHE SANH from DONG HA by Rough Rider.

Listening posts and 2 squad-sized ambushes were established around the Battalion area.

22 June 1967

Two Companies and a command group began an operation in the south-eastern portion of the Operation CROCKETT AO. At 0815H artillery began prepping LZ's for troop lift, and air prepped the LZ from 0830H-0900H. At 0845H, the first lift began, and at 0910H, Co K began landing vic (XD 948348). Co M was lifted to vic (XD 952352) by 1155H, and moved to vic (XD 950348) where it established a blocking position. Co K and the CP group completed their lift at 1207H and began sweep towards Co M's block. At 1915H, Co K and Co M linked up and established night time positions vic (XD 950348).

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No contact was made during the day and movement was extremely slow because of poor terrain consisting of steep slopes covered with 15 foot elephant grass or canopy. In addition, numerous fires started by pyrotechnics and air caused units to move by extremely circuitous routes and to backtrack in several instances.

23 June 1967

At 0432H, M-3 received 1 incoming grenade vic (XD 950348) resulting in 3 USMC WIA.

From 0850H to 0955H, Co K and the CP group were helilifted to vic (XD 948358) to block and at 0930H Co M began sweeping north from the previous night's position. The movement of both companies was hindered by fires, and at 1230H, the fires were so close that both companies had to be helilifted out of the area. Co K with the CP group was lifted from vic (XD 950362) from 1230H to 1330H, and Co M was helilifted from (XD 950348) from 1245H to 1345H. Both companies landed on Hill 642 vic (XD 910335), and Co M moved to vic (XD 901323) and Co K to (XD 920325) to establish night-time positions.

At 1200H, Co L moved by motor march to vic (XD 858386) and dismounted at that location to begin a search and destroy operation through the area to the southwest. Co L searched HUONG HOA vic (XD 865375), finding evidence of recent movement along an east-west axis and evidence of recent fire fights. The Company established platoon-sized nighttime ambushes south of HUONG HOA vic (XD 864374).

24 June 1967

Co L moved southeast along stream to TA RI vic (XD 876353), and then began move north, the company made a thorough reconnaissance of the area in this vicinity and found no evidence of trails or movement for the past six months. Heavy vegetation, including 15 ft elephant grass, greatly hindered movement. The company established nighttime positions vic (XD 881359).

Co K conducted a reconnaissance of the area to the east of Hill 642 and Co M conducted a reconnaissance of the area to the west of Hill 642. Terrain in both areas was steep with heavy canopy. No trails existed in the area although the stream network was good. At night several platoon-sized ambushes were established throughout the area.

At 1025H, Co M found a platoon-sized harbor site vic (XD 907324) consisting of eight lean-to style huts. The area had last been used about two weeks previously. M-3 established an ambush at this position for the night, and destroyed all huts the following morning.

25 June 1967

Co L reached Hill 549 vic (XD 885362) at 1100H, and continued to move north to vic (XD 883382) where the company established night-time positions.

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At 1245H, Co K found an uncharted stream vic (XD 922323) which showed signs of movement of 3-5 people to the south within past 10-20 minutes. Searched area with negative results. Also found 4 charred rocks used as a stove and some coconut husks about one week old vic (XD 922325).

Co K with the CP group moved to vic (XD 925325) and began a sweep towards the village of LANG TAL KOL TA vic (XD 937331), which was found to be destroyed. Co K established platoon sized ambushes along the stream vic (XD 935328) at night.

Co M moved to vic (XD 921325) and conducted a thorough reconnaissance of the area in that vicinity. Platoon sized ambushes were established in the southern portion of GS (XD 9232) at night.

At 0925H, the Commanding Officer of the 26th Marines visited the 3/26 CP.

At 1010H, Co K found 4 old lean-to huts vic (XD 925326). Also found blackened rocks used for cooking and chopped bamboo. Estimate area was last used a month before.

At 1550H, Co M found and destroyed 4 fighting holes estimated as being 2-3 weeks old vic (XD 926326).

At 1745H, Co M found and destroyed 35 two-man fighting holes in a hasty circular defense on hill vic (XD 926323).

26 June 1967

Co K with the CP group moved from LANG KOL TA KU northeast along trail through GS (XD 9233) to vic (XD 922342), where they linked with Co M. Previously Co M had moved from previous nights positions north along trail through GS (XD 9132) and (XD 9133) to LANG HUC COC GIANG vic (XD 915343). Co M searched this village, finding no signs of recent activity, and then moved east to link with Co K vic (XD 922342) where both companies established night positions.

Co L maintained last night's position vic (XD 883382) as a screening element. L-1 remained on the Hill as an OP to maintain surveillance over the AO, and L-2 and L-3 conducted recon patrols to the north and southeast, respectively.

27 June 1967

At 0035H, the KHE SANH base received approximately 50 rds of 82mm mortar fire from the southwest. Fifteen rds landed in the Battalion area with BAS, and Battalion supply receiving direct hits. The remainder of the rounds landed in the 1/26 and A Battery areas. All artillery units returned counter-mortar fire with unknown results. Battalion casualties were 1 USN KIA, 1 ARVN KIA, 10 USN WIA, and 22 USMC WIA. Subsequently, one of the USMC WIA's died of wounds.

At 0105H, I-1 vic (XD 818412) received 2 incoming mortar/artillery rounds, resulting in 8 USMC WIA and 1 USMC KIA.

At 0135H, the CH-34 that was medevacing I-1's casualties was downed by mechanical difficulties vic (XD 818412). Another helicopter completed the medevac, and I-1 provided security for the downed helicopter for the remainder of the night.

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At 0525H, KHE SANH received 50 rds 102mm rockets. All artillery units in the KHE SANH perimeter saturated the base of Hill 1015 vic (XD 857445), where Hill 950 reported enemy firing position. S-1 suffered 2 USMC WIA.

At 0830H, Co M, Co K, and the CP group began helilift back to KHE SANH.

Co L moved to vic (XD 883398) on Highway #9, where it embarked on trucks, and returned to KHE SANH at 1215H.

I-2 and the Co I CP group moved to vic (XD 818412) and linked with I-1. From that position Co I (-) moved towards Hill 689 vic (XD 803408) to search for enemy mortar position.

I-3 was helilifted to vic (XD 875435) to conduct search for possible enemy rocket sites on Hill 1015 vic (XD 854454).

At 1230H, a CAC O patrol searching for the enemy mortar positions on Hill 689 received intense SAF from an unknown number of VC on the crest of the Hill. The patrol was driven off the Hill, leaving 2 USMC MIA and 1 PF MIA on the Hill. Co I (-) continued towards Hill 689 to aid the CAC patrol.

At 1615H, Co I (-) had moved to vic (XD 801410) where it held position while an AO conducted an airstrike on enemy on Hill 689 vic (XD 803409).

At 1722H, Co I reached Hill 689 and began searching for the CAC casualties. Received 2 USMC WIA from an unknown type of booby trap.

At 1740H, Co I (-) continued to move towards crest of Hill 689. I-2 moved to vic (XD 799412) where it encountered extensive AP mines and booby-trapped Chi Com grenades and received SAF from vic (XD 998412). I-1 moved to vic (XD 804409) where they received heavy SAF from vic (XD 809408). I-2 suffered 25 USMC WIA. I-1 suffered 8 USMC KIA (including the platoon commander) and 10 USMC WIA. Both platoons returned SAF, M-79, 3.5, and LAAW's. The enemy consisted of isolated units of squad and platoon size, who fought from well-camouflaged spider holes and several heavily-fortified bunkers. The area was heavily mined and booby-trapped.

At 1810H, L-3 and L-6 landed vic (XD 801405) by helicopter and began moving northeast to Hill 689 where Co I was receiving fire. While in LZ Co L received SAF from vic (XD 806909), and began maneuvering to that position, where Co I established a blocking force. L-3 moved on left front, L-2 on right front, and L-1 provided security in LZ. L-1 sighted 2 NVA squads vic (XD 801404) advancing towards rear of Co L. L-3 reached crest of Hill 689 and encountered extensive AP mines and booby-trapped Chi Com grenades. Upon advancing across crest, L-3 received sniper fire from 8-9 well camouflaged spider holes. Co L returned fire and destroyed all enemy resistance by 1935H. The spider holes were destroyed with grenades, all casualties were returned to the LZ and evacuated, and Co L consolidated with Co I. Results: (including the company commander) USMC: 14 KIA, 15 WIA. Enemy: 5 KIA (C), 7 KIA (P). 7 wpns captured (AK-47's, 1 Chi Com carbine with scope, 1 RPG). Also recovered 2 rds 82mm mortar, 4 booby-trapped Chi Com grenades, 6 AP mines. Co L also found and evacuated the 2 USMC MIA from the CAC-O patrol. Both were KIA. The enemy force was estimated as being 2 NVA (Rein) Companies. Final estimate of enemy casualties was 25 KIA (C); 66 KIA (P).

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At 2000H, Co L found a 20 ft by 6 ft bomb crater vic (XD 802409). Found 2 bunkers and a tunnel, AP mines, booby traps, grenades, and 82mm mortar rds.

At dusk while flare ships and artillery fired illumination to aid in evacuation of casualties and consolidation of positions, Co L linked with Co I, and both companies established night positions on Hill 689. Extensive H&I fires were conducted on the avenues of approach to the west used by the NVA units.

At 1900H, Co I and Co L received incoming mortar rounds of an unknown caliber from the northwest. The 4.2 Battery on Hill 881 south returned counter-mortar fire and the enemy ceased firing at 1910H.

At 2045H, Co L received 2 incoming 60mm mortar rds from the southeast. No casualties.

28 June 1967

At 0625H, artillery began prepping the Hill 689 area in preparation for a thorough search of the area. Air prepped the area from 0900H to 0930H.

At 0730H, I-3 was helilifted from Hill 1015 to KHE SANH in preparation for rejoining the remainder of the company on Hill 689. The lift was completed at 0752H.

At 0755H, Co I, the district chief and an AO reported a large body of enemy troops in GS (XD 8042). At 0820H, Co I called in artillery with unknown results.

At 0955H, Co I and Co L began a thorough search of the battlefield to destroy enemy bunkers, mines, and booby traps; and to determine the extent of enemy casualties.

At 1006H, Co L found 1 NVA KIA (C) with a round in his head vic (XD 803408). A grappling hook had been used to drag the body.

At 1015H, Co I found 1 NVA KIA (C) vic (XD 803407). NVA wore olive drab uniform and soft jungle cover and had large amount of 782 gear. Also found 1 PF KIA at same location. At 1130H Co I found 1 AK-47 vic (XD 820420).

At 1235H, the forward CP group, Co M, 81mm mortar platoon and I-3 were helilifted to the Hill 689 area. The lift was completed at 1330H.

At 1530H, Co M called an airstrike on 2 VC running vic (XD 795406), resulting in 2 NVA KIA (P).

At 1600H, Co M fired 60mm mortars and called an airstrike on 10 VC at (XD 794406) resulting in 1 NVA KIA (C) and 7 NVA KIA (P).

At 1620H, an AO called an airstrike on 2 enemy bunkers vic (XD 786405), destroying both bunkers.

At 1700H, Co M sighted 3 VC in the open vic (XD 798406) and an AO reported bunkers in the same area. An airstrike was conducted, resulting in 1 NVA KIA (C), 9 NVA KIA (P), 8 enemy bunkers destroyed, damaged, and 1 secondary explosion.

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At 1700H, Co M called 81mm mortars on 3 VC in open vic (XD 782408) resulting in 1 NVA KIA (C).

Nighttime positions were established along the ridgeline running northwest from Hill 689. Co L at (XD 803409), the CP at (XD 802411), the 81mm Plt (-) at (XD 801411), Co I at (XD 799413), and Co M at (XD 798411).

At 1900H, Co I called artillery on 3 NVA vic (XD 798416) with negative results.

At 1740H, Co I found 2 NVA KIA and 1 NVA WIA (PW) and 3 wpns (2 AK-47's and 1 SKS with a bayonet) vic (XD 797413). Weapons were returned to S-2. Also found 2 field rucksacks, 10 Chi Com grenade's 1 AP mine, and assorted food and documents.

At 1940H, Co I received 2 WIA's at west end of airstrip during rocket attack on Khe Sanh. Approximately 25 102mm rockets were fired, nearly all of which landed outside the perimeter, with six falling in Co K's area, but inflicting no casualties, all units in the Hill 689 area observed the enemy firing site vic (XD 7841) and C Battery fired 401 rds, and A Battery 398 rounds of counter-battery fire at that location. The enemy fire ceased at 1955H.

At 1955H, Co M fired 81mm mortars on 10 NVA vic (XD 802407) resulting in 2 NVA KIA (P).

29 June 1967

Co M and Co I swept northwest along ridgeline towards Hill 758. Air and artillery prepped area thoroughly.

At 0715H, Co M found 1 NVA KIA (C) and 1 wpn (AK-47) vic (XD 798409). KIA had 2 Chi Com grenades, brown uniform, tennis shoes, unit ID card, and 782 gear.

At 0800H, Co I found 2 NVA KIA (C) vic (XD 798409).

At 1330H, Co M sighted 10 NVA on ridgeline vic (XD 786425). Called in 105's, 81's, and fired 106's from B/1/26 and D/1/26. Employed sniper team and a gunship. AO also reported 3 bunkers in area. Results: 9 NVA KIA (P), 1 bunker destroyed, 1 secondary explosion.

At 1900H, Co L called artillery on 3 NVA vic (XD 798446) with negative results.

30 June 1967

K-3 provided security for a section of tanks and a section of Ontos that were intended to move to Co L's position on Hill 689. The tanks were unable to ford a stream running through the valley between KHE SANH and Hill 689 and returned to KHE SANH with K-3 at 1530H.

Co L conducted a patrol to vic (XD 827385) and returned to Hill 689.

At 1330H, Co L observed 1 NVA KIA (C) vic (XD 796402).

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PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

**A. COMBAT MISSIONS ASSIGNED AND SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS CONDUCTED:**

At the beginning of June, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines continued with the responsibility for the PHU BAI TAOR. As the Vital Area Defense Battalion, the Battalion's mission was to defend the PHU BAI Vital Area and provide security for the TAOR; ensure that adequate surveillance and security were maintained on the perimeter; maintain a reserve/counter-attack force during the hours of darkness; maintain combat outposts on Hill 180 and Hill 230; provide personnel for 81mm mortar section at Colco Beach; maintain a reinforced platoon (Sparrow Hawk/Reaction Force) on five-minute alert; maintain one company (Sparrow Hawk/Rough Rider Reserve) on two-hour alert; assume Operational Control of Combined Action Companies A and H; conduct extensive patrolling in assigned AO; provide security for Rough Riders to DONG HA and DANANG; and provide Officer/Staff NCO and Forward Observer for Road Runners to Operation CHOCTAW AO.

In addition to the routine requirements listed above the Battalion conducted several company-sized operations in the TAOR and adjacent areas.

From 1-5 June, Co L (-) operated within the CAC-A6 and CAC-A7 Areas.

Co K participated in Operation GOLDEN FLEECE I from 1-3 June. On 3 June, Co K was relieved by Co I and Co I completed Operation GOLDEN FLEECE I on 8 June.

Co M conducted search and destroy operations in the PHU LOC Area from 1-4 June.

G/2/9 operated in the NAM HOA Area from 1-3 June.

On 8 June 2/26 relieved 3/26 of responsibility for the PHU BAI TAOR. The following day 3/26 (-) (Rein) moved by motor march to the TRUOI area, where it conducted a three-day search and destroy operation. The Battalion returned to the PHU BAI Vital Area on 11 June.

On 12 June, the Battalion departed PHU BAI by motor march and arrived in Khe Sanh on 13 June, chopping operational control to the 26th Marines upon arrival.

While at Khe Sanh, the Battalion was responsible for a portion of the Khe Sanh perimeter; conducted ambushes, patrols, and listening posts; provided security for convoys; and when designated, provided the Regimental Reserve Company. In addition, the Battalion conducted operations in various portions of the Operation CROCKETT AO.

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Co I conducted a search and destroy operation through the area to the north of Hill 950 from 15 to 20 June.

Co L (-) conducted a search and destroy operation around the valley to the south of Hill 861 and Hill 881 from 16 to 19 June.

On 22 June, Co M, Co K, and the Battalion CP group were helolifted into the southern portion of the Operation CROCKETT AO to conduct operations in that area. On 23 June, Co L moved by vehicle to HUONG HOA and operated to the west of the other three companies until 27 June when all three companies returned to Khe Sanh.

On 27 June, Co I (-) moved to the Hill 689 area to search for the mortar and rocket positions used by the NVA in the previous nights mortar attack on Khe Sanh. Late in the afternoon Co L was helilifted to the same area to reinforce the Co I (-). Because of the heavy contact made in the area, Co M and the Battalion CP group were helilifted to the same area and the three companies operated in this area for the remainder of the month.

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## B. RESUME OF ACTIVITIES WHILE IN PHU BAI

1. Sparrow Hawk. The Battalion maintained a reinforced rifle platoon numbering 60 personnel on five-minute alert throughout the period the Battalion was in PHU BAI. The units that provided the Sparrow Hawk are listed in the table below.

<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Unit</u>
010001	021700	I-1	050800	061500	K-1
021700	031000	I-2	061500	071000	M-1
031000	050800	K-2	071000	081000	M-3

2. Combat Outposts. The 106 Platoon maintained combat outposts on Hill 180 and Hill 230.

3. Minesweep of Highway #1. The Battalion provided one reinforced rifle squad for a daily minesweep of Highway #1 from CAC-H8 to CAC-H5. The platoons that provided these squads are listed below.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Unit</u>
1	I-2	4	L-1	7	M-2
2	I-3	5	M-1		
3	I-3	6	L-1		

4. Road Runners. 3d MT Bn conducted a road runner to the CHOCTAW AO every morning. This Battalion provided an Officer/Staff NCO platoon commander and an artillery forward observer for all such convoys. The companies providing these personnel are listed below.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Plt Cndr/FO</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Plt Cndr /FO</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Plt Cndr/FO</u>
1	I	4	L	7	M
2	I	5	M		
3	H&S	6	L		

5. Operations Conducted. The Battalion conducted platoon or company sized operations throughout the TAOR and in the adjacent PHU LOC and NAM HOA Areas. All such operations are listed below:

1-3 June: Co K conducted Operation GOLDEN FLEECE I.

1-5 June: Co L (-) operated in CAC-A6 and CAC-A7 area.

1-3 June: Co G (2/9) operated in NAM HOA area.

1-4 June: Co M operated in PHU LOC area.

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3-8 June: Co I conducted Operation GOLDEN FLEECE I.

6. Miscellaneous Assignments. In addition to the commitments listed in the previous paragraphs, the Battalion was assigned various other tasks. All such assignments are listed below:

<u>Dates</u>	<u>Mission:</u>	<u>Unit Providing</u>	<u>Location</u>
2 June	Security for Hue Ramp	L-1 Squad	Hue
5 June	Investigation of F-8 Crash	K-2	XD 7711
6 June	Parade	Co M (-)	Hue

7. Small Unit Operations. In addition to the company-sized operations listed in the preceding paragraph, over five hundred small-unit operations were conducted during the eight days the Battalion had responsibility for the Phu Bai TAOR. The vast majority of these patrols were conducted by units from Combined Action Companies A and H. Although these operations were rarely larger than squad-size and the patrol routes were usually short, these operations were very valuable in providing security for the villagers living with each CAC unit. In addition, they disrupted enemy movement to village areas and were a good source of information on enemy movements. Although it is not possible to give individual attention to each patrol, the following table gives the daily totals for the various small unit operations that were conducted during this period.

<u>Date</u>	<u>LP's</u>	<u>OP's</u>	<u>Night Ambushes</u>	<u>Night Security Patrols</u>	<u>Day Security Patrols</u>
1	6	4	33	17	17
2	6	4	28	15	16
3	6	4	30	17	15
4	6	4	25	17	15
5	6	4	22	16	16
6	6	4	24	16	14
7	4	4	25	19	17
8	4	4	25	19	17
Total	44	32	212	136	127

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## 1. Friendly Casualties (1-30 Jun67)

Killed	13
Died of Wounds	1
Wounded	95
TOTAL	109

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## D. COMMAND RELATIONS

1. With Higher Units: From 1-13 June, during the period it was in PHU BAI and during the period it was enroute by convoy to the KHE SANH, the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines was under the operational and administrative control of the Third Marine Division. At 131815H, shortly after arriving in KHE SANH, the Battalion chopped operational control to the 26th Marines. In both PHU BAI and KHE SANH, the superior unit was located in close physical proximity to the Battalion. Close liaison was maintained with both units and relations were good throughout the month.

2. With Other Marine Units.

a. While the Battalion was responsible for the defense of the PHU BAI Vital Area, it had Operational Control of all units assigned sectors of the Vital Area perimeter for all matters concerning perimeter defense. Each unit provided a sector commander who was responsible to the Battalion Perimeter Defense Officer, who coordinated all matters pertaining to the perimeter. No problems were encountered in this area, and relations with units on the perimeter were good.

b. From 1-4 June, the Battalion had operational control of G/2/9. The company operated in the NAM HOA Area until 3 June, when it was relieved by C/1/4. On 4 June, the company departed PHU BAI and chopped operational control to 2/9.

3. With ARVN/PF/RF Units.

## a. Phu Bai

1. Direct liaison was maintained with HUONG THUY and PHU LOC Districts through frequent visits to both District Headquarters by the Commanding Officer and the Operations Officer.

2. Indirect liaison with Vietnamese units was accomplished through the 3d MarDiv, which supplied the Battalion with a continuous flow of information regarding ARVN operations in the area and intelligence information that was reported by ARVN units.

3. Liaison was also maintained through Combined Action Companies A and H, both of which were under the Operational Control of the Battalion. The two companies maintained CAC units in the villages along Hwy #1 that were in or near the PHU BAI TAOR. The former operated in the northern and central section of the TAOR (HUONG THUY DISTRICT); the latter in the extreme southern section and along the stretch of Hwy #1 east of the TAOR (PHU LOC DISTRICT). Much of the information the Battalion received from HUONG THUY and PHU LOC Districts was relayed through CAC A and H, respectively.

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## b. Khe Sanh

1. While in Khe Sanh, the 26th Marines were responsible for relations with the Vietnamese in the Area, and the Battalion usually worked only indirectly with Vietnamese.

2. The Battalions ARVN Liaison Officer maintained close liaison with District until he was killed in a mortar attack on 27 June.

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## E. COMMUNICATION ELECTRONICS

1. Message Center. Message traffic is picked up and delivered to the 26th Marines Message Center. Distribution has not changed.
2. Radio. All battalion nets and the regimental tac net terminate in the 3/26 COC bunker. Contact with operating elements is made possible through the use of a relay station on Hill 950.
3. Wire. Normal intra-battalion wire facilities were installed. In addition two trunk lines were laid to the regimental switchboard, and one hot line was laid from the 3/26 COC to the 26th Marines COC.
4. General. On recent operations in the area it was found that normal antenna accessories were not capable of transmitting from the low land and valley areas. Recommended antennas are the vertical, half rhombic, and long wire types employing field wire. Communications were adequate in all respects.

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F. FIRE SUPPORT

While the Battalion was responsible for PHU BAI, the primary functions of the FSCC were to clear all artillery fire missions in the PHU BAI TAOR and to provide fire planning for the perimeter defense. During this period C Battery, L Battery, and the 1st 155 Gun Battery provided fire support for the Battalion.

On 9 July, the Battalion (-) displaced to the Truoi area for a three-day operation. C Battery displaced with the Battalion and the FSCC cleared all fire missions during the operation.

From 12-14 July, the Battalion moved by convoy to KHE SANH. The regular fire support available to all Rough Rider convoys was available during the move to KHE SANH. At KHE SANH, the first few days were spent in establishing adequate communications in the new area. The Battalion had C Battery operating in direct support, with A Battery reinforcing. In addition a 4.2 inch mortar battery, with sections located on Hill 861 and Hill 881 south, four 155 Howitzers (TD) available in KHE SANH, and the 175 Guns at Camp Carroll were capable of supporting the Operation CROCKETT AO. The primary mission of the FSCC was to clear all Battalion fire missions in the Regimental TAOR. Final clearance was given by the Regimental FSCC.

At KHE SANH the Battalion conducted two operations in which the FSCC moved into the field and had complete control of all fire missions, controlling artillery fires among friendly units and providing fire planning for the Battalion.

From 22-27 June, the Battalion (-) operated in the southeastern portion of the Operation CROCKETT AO. C Battery displaced to vic (XD 894406) to support the operation.

From 28 June until the end of the month the Battalion operated in the Hill 689-Hill 758 area.

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## G. AIR SUPPORT

I. Air Defense. No enemy aerial activity of any type was encountered in either PHU B-I or KHE SANH.

II. Air Support.

a. Medevacs. A total of 41 medevacs were flown during June. Twelve USMC KIA, 49 USMC WIA, 2 VN WIA, and 41 NBC's were evacuated.

b. Fixed Wing. Seventeen fixed wing airstrikes were flown, resulting in 3 KBA(C) and 15 KBA(P). The strikes were 90 per cent on target with 75 per cent coverage.

c. Aerial Observer Flights. Three O1E flights were flown during June.

d. Command and Control. Eight UH-1E flights were made by this command for reconnaissance purposes. These flights were extremely valuable in familiarizing unit commanders with the KHE SANH area.

e. Resupply and Troop Lifts. A total of 135,090 lbs were flown on resupply missions. Eight troop lifts were made by helicopter during the month.

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## H. ARMY ARTILLERY SUPPORT

1. Phu Bai Period. During the period the Battalion had responsibility for the PHU BAI TAOR, D/1/44 operated in direct support of the Battalion. The Battery's weapons were employed as follows:

a. Quad-50. The four M-55's in the battery were used primarily to provide security for convoys originating from PHU BAI. A secondary mission of the Quad-50's was to provide a mobile reserve force that would be able to reinforce any sector of the perimeter in the event of attack during the hours of darkness.

b. Twin-40's. Six of the 8 M-42's under the Battalion's control were stationed permanently at key locations on the perimeter. The other 2 were assigned to the Perimeter Reaction Force during the hours of darkness. The Twin-40's had the additional mission of firing H&I fires from 2130 to 0500 daily.

c. Spotlight. A 20-inch spotlight from G/23, was positioned on Hill 180 and provided illumination on call for the western half of the perimeter.

2. Khe Sanh Period.

a. The Second Battalion, 26th Marines relieved the Battalion of responsibility for the Phu Bai TAOR on 8 June, consequently from 8-11 June the Battalion had no army units operating in their support.

b. On 12 June, the Battalion departed PHU BAI for KHE SANH. Four M-55's accompanied the convoy and returned to PHU BAI on 15 June with the security unit composed of L-1.

c. On 15 June, 2 M-42's were attached to L-3 for a mechanized patrol through the area south of Hill 861. No enemy contact was made.

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I. ADMINISTRATION

1. No major administrative difficulties were encountered during the period covered by this report. Battalion level personnel accounting has proven to be most effective with the organization split into forward and rear areas.

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J. PERSONNEL

1. During the month of June, this battalion joined 9 officers and 44 enlisted personnel while 2 officers and 67 enlisted were reassigned to other units within RVN. 1 officer and 11 enlisted personnel were reassigned out of country by service records as a result of medical evacuation.

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R. INTELLIGENCE

# 1. ENEMY SITUATION 1-11 JUNE

a. From 1-11 June, 1967, the battalion continued in the defense of the PHU BAI TAOR. There were no significant changes in the composition or disposition of the enemy forces during this period. Intelligence data for this period is therefore the same as that reported in the Command Chronology for the period 1-31 May.

## (1) Statistics for period 1-11 June 67.

KIA(C)	2
KIA(P)	6
Detainees	22
Ind Wpns Capt	3
Grenades Capt	2
Booby traps	2
Rocket rds Capt	2

b. The remainder of this section deals exclusively with the period when 3/26 was operating in the KHE SANH area since 14 June 67.

# 2. THE KHE SANH AREA OF OPERATION

a. Terrain. The KHE SANH area is thinly populated, rugged and mountainous. Heights over 500 meters are common throughout the area. Terrain is severely dissected and thickly vegetated with dense undergrowth, broadleaf evergreen forests and bamboo thickets. Trail networks are plentiful but trafficability to vehicles is almost uniformly restricted to National Route 9. KHE SANH Valley is aligned on a northwest-southeast axis and joins the QUANG TRI and DA KRONG River valleys at a common juncture in GS (XD 9240). From this juncture, the QUANG TRI Valley extends northeast to exit at (YD0045). The DA KRONG Valley runs in a meandering path toward the southeast and exits at (YD 0036). Most drainage runoff is transported by the RAO QUAN River which conveys the entire KHE SANH Valley drainage flow and exits the southeastern border at (XD 9040). This river joins the QUANG TRI River and eventually empties into the Gulf of Tonkin. All other drainage flows into the SE PONE River (XD7834) which flows northwest as the Vietnam-Laos border before turning west. This river charges the MEKONG system.

## (1) Vegetation.

(a) The valleys are generally covered with elephant grass six to twenty feet in height and low brush. Small areas in the immediate vicinity of villages are utilized for rice and garden crops.

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The southern portion of KHE SANH Valley supports a rubber plantation (XD 859395). A broad band of elephant grass crosses from (XD 8446) to (XD 8630). In addition, interwoven bamboo thickets are prevalent along with dense jungle in the southwest corner of the area.

(b) The mountains are covered by a dense broadleaf evergreen forest with smaller areas of pine and deciduous trees interspersed. Tree height increases with increased elevation. Tallest trees are 75 to 90 feet high, with some ranging to 150 feet. Canopy is generally continuous with more than 25 percent of the ground covered by 2 to 4 layers of canopy. Trees have shallow roots. Trunks are commonly straight and average 0.3 meters in diameter, increasing somewhat in the higher elevations. Trees are commonly 2 to 3 meters apart. In inaccessible areas of heavy canopy, the sun rarely reaches the undergrowth which becomes more grassy at higher elevations. In areas formerly cleared, shifting cultivation growing for 3-5 years and the discontinuance of the canopy has permitted the development of a much thicker undergrowth than would be expected deeper in the forest. Spiny rattans, full bushes, vines and briars generally are interwound around trees or between bushes.

(c) The thick primary forest is normally not susceptible to conflagration, however extensive defoliation spraying and the relatively dry period of the southwest monsoon season should produce scattered areas of jungle and elephant grasslands highly susceptible to conflagration.

## (2) Avenues of Approach

(a) The major avenue of approach is Route 9 which enters the KHE SANH area from the east and west.

(b) The four major rivers, the DA KRONG, QUANG TRI, RAO QUAN, and the SE PONE, afford avenues of approach.

(c) The floor system of the KHE SANH Valley and the KHE GIANG THOAN (XD 8951) afford the most easily traversed avenues of approach into the heartland.

b. Enemy Situation. 3/26 had operated in three specific areas of the KHE SANH AO. A discussion of the enemy situation, findings, and characteristics of each AO is summarized below.

(1) I Co operating in area bounded by XD 8049, 8449, 8245, 8046, had no enemy contact or sightings. The village vic (XD 820440) was the only area found to be inhabited. A cement bunker at (XD 809464) was destroyed. At (XD 802468) a series of partially destroyed trenches was found and at (XD 823467) 25 covered

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1-man fighting holes were found and suspected of being a harboring site.

(2) K,M and the "A" command group operated 22-27 June in the area bounded by XD 9135, 9132, 9432, 9536. No sightings or enemy contacts were made. The only sign of recent enemy movement was found at (XD 922323) on 26 June on an uncharted stream up a draw to the south, probably 3-5 persons. The hill at (XD 926323) has approximately 35-2 man foxholes in a circular hasty defense not used for 3-4 weeks. There was a trail leading SE off the crest of this hill. Old harboring sites were found at XD 907324, XD 926326, and XD 926323. Throughout the area no prominent trails were located. Travel was channelized to the streambeds and trafficability cross country was at a rate of less than 100 meters per hour.

(5) The battle of Hill 689 which commenced 271130H when I Co began movement toward the hill at XD 805409 was prefaced by two separate attacks on KHE SANH base. On 270045H 3/26 CP at (XD 840422) received 25-30 82mm mortar rounds. At 270530H, the perimeter was again hit by 102mm rockets which were believed to have been fired from vic (XD 783409), later confirmed by I and L companies. As a result of this battle and the subsequent 3/26 (-) operation in the area which continued into July, the following was found:

(a) On 27 June it was estimated that an NVA company was engaged. However as a result of the discovery of harboring sites vic (XD 782399, 778409, 771407, 770407) well used trails leading into two rocket sites at (XD 789405) and (XD 776405), fighting holes in vicinity of each rocket site and the bunker complex vic (XD 789405), it is estimated that at least 2 NVA companies were engaged. Documents indicate that there was also an element of the 29th Regiment -- a rocket/artillery regiment -- involved.

(b) It is suspected that the enemy withdrew south of the ridgeline running due west and northwest from Hill 689 (XD802409).

(c) All equipment and weapons found on Hill 689 and in the vicinity of harboring and rocket sites was discarded or abandoned. Nothing was found concealed.

(d) The prisoner captured 28 June was extremely uncooperative and volunteered no information.

(e) The enemy rocket attack on KHE SANH on the evening of 28 June was directed entirely on the base with no enemy rounds being directed toward 3/26 (-) on Hill 689. This attack originated from the vicinity of the rocket sites found on the days following.

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is characterized by elephant grass 4 to 10 feet high on the slopes and crests of the hills and dense undergrowth with single overhead canopy and trees 40-60 feet tall in the draws. The enemy routes definitely correspond to the trace of available fresh water -- in the draws and stream beds concealed by the dense overhead canopy.

(g) L-00 on 15-19 June has thoroughly patrolled Hill 689 and vicinity and found no indications of fresh bunkers. Therefore, the enemy prepared his positions on Hill 689 between 20 and 27 June.

### 3. STATISTICS FOR PERIOD 14-30 JUNE.

#### a. Enemy Personnel Losses.

KIA(C)	30
KIA(P)	82
PW/NVA	1

#### b. Enemy Equipment Losses.

Total weapons	11
B-40	2
LMG Type 56	2
Type 56 Carbine	2
Type 56 Assault rifle	4
M1891/30 rifle	1
Chicom Grenades	50
82mm Mortar Rounds	24
Rounds 7.62 mm	800
Rounds assorted web gear,	
food, clothing, and	
equipment	300
Chicom AT Mines	3
B-40 Rocket Rounds	4
Muses for B-40 Rocket	7

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L. CIVIL AFFAIRS

1. From 1-8 June liaison was made with 2/26 to maintain continuity on the projects in progress in LOC BON(V), PHU LOC(D). To enhance this effort, the 3/26 civil affairs NCO was transferred to 2/26 to provide continuity of personnel.

2. During the present operations in the KHE SANH area liaison has been made with the Civil Affairs Officer, 26th Mar. Because of our tactical commitment in non-populated areas, no projects have been initiated to date. 3/26 MedCap supplies were provided to 26 for direct support of CAG-O MedCaps being conducted.

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M. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

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1. During the month of June this unit initiated no PsyOps projects in the KHE SANH TACR. Liaison has been made with the PsyOps SNCO of 26th RLT.

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## N. LOGISTICS

1. General. Logistics support was satisfactory during June. There were no major problems in obtaining supplies, transportation, or food services.

2. General Supplies. General supplies were adequate except for a shortage of jungle trousers.

3. Transportation.

a. Transportation was provided by 3d Motor Transport Battalion from 1-13 June, with excellent service. During the remainder of the month the Battalion was supported by the 26th Marine Regiment for all logistics requirements.

b. The Battalion deployed from PHU BAI to KHE SANH on 12 June 67 with the first serial arriving at Camp Carroll the first day and the second serial spending the night in Dong Ha. On 13 June the first serial arrived at Khe Ca Lu where two rifle companies were helolifted to KHE SANH. The empty trucks were returned to Phu Bai. The remainder of the first serial proceeded to Khe Sanh arriving that afternoon, and the second serial arrived at KHE SANH on 14 June 67. Transportation was provided for the convoy by the 3d Motor Transport Battalion.

c. Due to the overall tactical commitments of the battalion, tactical runs with organic vehicles were frequent. Administrative runs with organic vehicles were held to a minimum.

4. Resupply. Resupply was accomplished by helicopter or vehicle convoy while the Battalion was in PHU BAI. Helicopters were used in resupply while in KHE SANH.

5. Ordnance. Ordnance support was provided by FLSG-A at PHU BAI, and an LSU at KHE SANH.

6. Food Service. This unit operated a mess hall in Cantonment Two, PHU BAI, from 1-10 June, serving three hot meals a day. At KHE SANH, a field mess was established. Full meals were served for breakfast and dinner and hot soup was served at noon. There were adequate quantities of food and supplies, and food was of satisfactory quality throughout the month.

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## 0. MEDICAL DETAIL

1. Personnel. The Battalion Aid Station has a total of 56 personnel. This consists of 55 Hospital Corpsmen and 1 Medical Officer.
2. Capabilities. The Battalion Aid Station is capable of treating all minor medical and surgical problems. Patients requiring more extensive care are evacuated to the 3d Medical Battalion at Phu Bai.
3. Supply. Medical Supplies are obtained from FISC-1 at Phu Bai. There is no deficit of supplies at this time.
4. Training. Hospital Corpsmen receive on the job training under the supervision of the Medical Officer and the Chief Hospital Corpsman.
5. Dental. There are no facilities for dental care at the B.S. Patients requiring such care are evacuated to the 3d Medical Battalion.
6. Malaria Prophylaxis. Chloroquine-Primaquine tablets are to be taken once a week on Sunday, preferably with a meal. Further preventive measures consist of spraying living spaces with mosquito repellent and screening of all living spaces.
7. Sanitation. Daily sanitation inspections are made by the medical officer or one of his representatives.
8. Statistics. The following are the statistics for the period 1-30 June 1967.

Diagnosis	W/S	I	K	I	I	Other Bn	TOTAL
Burns	2	0	0	0	3	1	9
Infection	30	26	45	46	40	51	238
Diarrhea	18	7	4	2	9	18	54
Lacerations	10	1	1	1	2	4	19
Colds	30	14	12	18	16	37	127
Dental	21	10	16	15	23	19	104
Rash	35	6	8	3	8	29	89
Stomach Disorder	10	5	3	7	5	12	47
T	33	42	3	15	18	0	111
HL	3	9	0	3	1	0	16
Headaches	5	2	3	2	1	8	21
Eye	10	3	6	5	3	0	27
Foot Disorder	1	1	0	3	1	8	14
Others	5	2	1	0	3	0	11
	213	128	107	120	132	187	687

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## P. TRAINING

The following training was accomplished while the Battalion was in PHU BAI during the first week of June.

1. Orientation. Personnel joined as replacements during the month received an orientation from the Commanding Officer. Upon being assigned to a company, they received orientations from their respective Company Commanders.
2. Landmine Warfare. During June, 28 of the small-unit leaders in the Battalion attended the three day Landmine Warfare School conducted by the 3d Engineer Battalion at the DONG DA Training Center.
3. Personal Response. Three persons attended a one day personal response class presented by instructors from Division G-2 in PHU BAI.
4. Test Firing of M-16. All personnel armed with the M-16 in Companies H&S and K fired 400 rds to test their weapons for defects, on June 1 and 2 respectively.
5. Vietnamese Religion and Customs. Approximately 50 Marines from all five companies attended a one-hour lecture by the Battalion Chaplain on the religion and customs of the Vietnamese people.
6. Company-Level Training. In addition to the above mentioned training, all companies conducted their own formal training when they were in the Battalion Area. Concurrent training was conducted when the companies were operating in the field. The following subjects were stressed: counterinsurgency operations, counter guerrilla operations, anti-guerrilla operations, civic-action operations, ambush and counter-ambush techniques, tactical trends and training tips, countermeasures against mines and booby traps, safety regulations for individual weapons and grenades, security of information and material, and first aid.

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CHAPLAIN SUPPORT

1. Phu Bai Period. Until 9 June, the Chaplain was in Phu Bai with the Battalion. Every weekday at 1730, he conducted Catholic Mass at the 3/26 Chapel. In addition, services were held for the units listed below on the designated dates:

- 2 June: Masses at HMM-163, CAC-H8, H-3, H-2, A-3, and A-1.
- 4 June: Protestant Services at 3/26 Chapel, Catholic Services at 3/26 Chapel and 8th RRFS.
- 5 June: Mass on Hill 230.
- 6 June: Mass at 3/26 Chapel for 2/26 personnel arriving from Operation HICKORY.
- 10 June: Protestant Services at 3/26 Chapel.

2. Khe Sanh Period. On 9 June the Chaplain flew to Khe Sanh with the advance party. While at Khe Sanh, the Chaplain conducted a daily Mass at the Khe Sanh Base Mess at 1930. In addition, services were held at the locations listed below on the designated dates:

- 10 June: Mass at 1/26 CP.
- 11 June: Mass at 1/26 Base Mess, 1/26 Field Mess, and Khe Sanh Base Mess.
- 12 June: Mass on Hill 881 S.
- 13 June: Mass on Hill 861.
- 14 June: Mass on Hill 950.
- 18 June: Protestant Services at 3/26; Catholic Services at C Battery, 1/26 Field Mess, 3/26 Field Mess, A Battery, and Khe Sanh Base Mess.
- 19 June: Mass on Hill 881.
- 20 June: Mass at 3/26 Field Mess.
- 22 June: Mass at 3/26 Field Mess.
- 23 June: Masses on Hill 950 and 3/26 Field Mess.
- 25 June: Protestant Services at 3/26 and Co I; Catholic Services at 1/26 Field Mess, 1/26 Base Mess, 3/26 Field Mess, A Battery and Khe Sanh Base Mess.
- 26 June: Mass at 3/26 Field Mess. Chaplain met with Division Forward Chaplain at Dong Ha.
- 27 June: Chaplain assisted medevacs who were flown into Dong Ha from Khe Sanh mortar attack; Mass at 3/26 Field Mess. At night, Chaplain assisted wounded and administered to the dead from Battle of Hill 689.
- 29 June: Mass on Hill 861.

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## PART IV

## SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS / NFF

1. The following messages and orders from the 3d Marine Division, the Fourth Marines, and the Twenty-Sixth Marines governed the activity of the Battalion during June.
  - a. CG 3d MarDiv 270654Z May 67 (Redeployment of Units)
  - b. Fourth Marines Frag O 23-67 (Operations CHOCTAW, CUMBERLUND, and COLGATE)
  - c. CG 3d MarDiv O 081137Z June 67 (Rough Rider/Unit Redeployment)
  - d. Twenty-Sixth Marines 120900Z June 67 (Operation CROCKETT Frag O 4-67)
  - e. Twenty-Sixth Marines 181415Z June 67 (Operation CROCKETT Frag O 5-67)
  - f. Twenty-Sixth Marines 201420Z June 67 (D-Day and L-Hour Operation CROCKETT Frag O 5-67)
  - g. Twenty-Sixth Marines 210635Z June 67 (Change to Operation CROCKETT Frag O 5-67)
2. The following 3d Battalion, 26th Marines Operation Orders governed the activity of the Battalion during June.
  - a. Operation Order 1-67 (Defense of PHU BAI)
  - b. Frag Order 4-67
  - c. Frag Order 5-67
  - d. Commanding Officer's Letter, Serial 0041156-67 (Rough Rider; information concerning)

✓(c) A/ARPT (Opw GOLDEN FLEECE)

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## HEADQUARTERS

3d Battalion, 26th Marines  
FPO San Francisco 96602

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Ser: 003 A20767

26 July 1967

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division  
 Via: Commanding Officer, 26th Marines

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Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report (U)

- Ref: (a) Map: VIETNAM, Series L7014, 1:50,000, Sheet 6442 II, III.  
 (b) Third Mar Div EOI (U) 1-67  
 (c) Third Mar Div O PO 2000.2E (COI)  
 (d) Third Mar Div O P 2000.4C (Com SOP)  
 (e) Third Mar Div O 3100.1C (Operation Reports)  
 (f) CG Third Mar Div 270645Z May 67 (Redeployment of Units)  
 (g) CG Third Mar Div 081137Z Jun 67 (Rough Riders/Unit Redeployment)  
 (h) Commanding Officer's Letter, Serial 0041156-67 (Rough Riders; information concerning)  
 (i) Twenty-Sixth Marines 120900Z Jun 67 (Operation CROCKETT Frag O 4-67)  
 (j) Twenty-Sixth Marines 181415Z Jun 67 (Operation CROCKETT Frag O 5-67)  
 (k) Twenty-Sixth Marines 201420Z Jun 67 (D-day and 1-hour Operation CROCKETT Frag O 5-67)  
 (l) Twenty-Sixth Marines 210635Z Jun 67 (Change to Operation CROCKETT Frag O 5-67)  
 (m) 3d Bn, 26th Marines Frag O 6-67  
 (n) CG Third Mar Div 160635Z Jul 67 (Termination of Operation CROCKETT).

1. Code Name. Operation CROCKETT, a Search and Destroy operation.
2. Dates of Operation. 131815H June 1967-162400H July 1967.
3. Location. Huong Hoa District, Quang Tri Province, RVN.
4. Task Organization.

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TAB-G

3/26 MAR

A/Rpt (Opn CROCKETT)

13 JUNE - 16 JULY 1967

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Unit DesignationCommander

3d Battalion, 26th Marines

Lt Col K. L. HOCH  
(13 Jun-16 Jul 67)

H&amp;S Company

Capt. J. R. CLICKENER  
(13 Jun-16 Jul 67)

Company I

Capt W. F. COULTER  
(13 Jun-16 Jul 67)

Company K

Capt. W. R. WILDERETT  
(13 Jun-16 Jul 67)

Company L

Capt. F. D. BYNUM  
(13 Jun-27 Jun 67)1st Lt. J. AULIK  
(28 Jun-29 Jun 67)Capt. R. D. CAMP JR.  
(30 Jun-16 July 67)

Company M

Capt. A. D. DEBONA  
(13 Jun-16 Jul 67)5. Supporting Forces.a. Artillery Support.

1. During Operation CROCKETT, the 26th Marines had operational control of 3/26 and all artillery units supporting the Operation. Consequently, all calls for fire, except those for the Battalion's own 81mm mortars, were cleared at the 26th Marines FSOC. The Battalion's own FSOC acted primarily as a monitoring station, except when the Battalion Command Group displaced to the field. When the Battalion operated in the south-eastern portion of the AO, C Battery displaced and the FSOC cleared all fire missions directly.

2. Two 105mm Howitzer batteries (A/1/13 and C/1/13) each with a platoon of 155mm Howitzers attached, located at the KHE SANH base, and a 4.2 inch mortar battery (W/1/13) with Sections located on Hill 861 and Hill 861 South provided artillery support for 3/26. All artillery units operated in general support of the Battalion, except in one instance when C Battery displaced and operated in direct support. In addition to these units the 175mm Guns at Camp Carroll (Battery B, 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery), were also capable of supporting the Operation CROCKETT AO.

3. Artillery was employed against observed enemy personnel, enemy bunkers, and tunnel complexes, and suspected enemy positions. Preparatory fires were employed to cover enemy troop movements. In such cases, both the primary and alternate zones would be prepped in order to deceive the enemy as to the actual area of movement. At night, H&I fires were delivered on likely enemy routes and assembly areas. Illumination was available whenever requested.

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On each of the three instances in which the KHE SANH base received enemy mortar/rocket fire, counter-battery fire was returned and in at least one case proved to have had extremely effective coverage of the enemy firing positions.

b. Tracked Vehicle Support.

1. On several occasions during Operation CROCKETT, ONTOS, tanks and twin-40's operated in support of the Battalion on mechanized platoon and company sized patrols. These operations were restricted to daylight patrols of ranges from 12,000 to 20,000 meters. They were able to cover larger portions of terrain than infantry patrols, but were somewhat restricted by several impassable streams in the area.

2. Co A, 3d AT Bn provided anti-tank support for the Battalion during Operation CROCKETT.

3. The 3d Plt, Co B, 3d TK Bn provided tank support for the Battalion.

4. A light section from A/1/44 (USA) was employed on one mechanized patrol.

c. Engineer Support. On several occasions engineer teams from 1st Plt, Co C, 3d Engr Battalion were attached to 3/26 units operating in the field to aid in disarming mines, destroying dud ordnance, and destroying enemy fortifications.

d. Air Support.

1. Air support was requested by the ALO and FAC through the 26th Marines ALO. The majority of the air support was preplanned, however on two occasions the Battalion requested immediate air support. All necessary air support was received from the helicopters fringed in direct support of the 26th Marines.

2. A total of 90 medevacs were lifted from the field by rotary wing. Of these 33 were KIA'S, 45 were WIA'S, 27 were NBC'S, 4 were KIA'S, and 1 POW (NVA). Flights were flown despite inclement weather and LZ's located in adverse terrain. In no case was a medevac refused or an emergency medevac postponed. Three of the emergency medevacs subsequently died of wounds. A total of 15 resupply missions were flown during Operation CROCKETT, including one emergency resupply at night.

3. Ten command and control missions were flown. These flights proved to be quite helpful in terrain familiarization of the unit commanders.

4. Aerial observers were used extensively by the unit commanders in the field to control air, adjust artillery, and maintain surveillance of the AO.

5. A total of 17 fixed wing flights were controlled by 3/26 ground FAC teams. Fixed wing has proven extremely effective against various NVA targets.

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6. Intelligence

a. Enemy situation prior to operation as estimated by G-2, 3d Marine Division.

1. "Despite heavy casualties suffered at hills 861 and 881 north and south, the enemy had not withdrawn from positions previously occupied except where driven out by physical force. Observations and contacts with enemy forces in the area have become more frequent during the latter half of May and indicated that he is reinforcing his forces already in the area. Evidence of enemy activity is found in all directions around KHE SANH, not just to the northwest. The continued construction of bunkers, emplacement of additional anti-aircraft weapons and appearance of anti-helicopter devices at possible HLZ's would indicate that the enemy intends to remain in the area. The current build up in the KHE SANH area could be either: A. defensive in nature, with the mission of protecting enemy infiltration routes that bypass the base or B. offensive in nature, with the intention of initiating direct action against KHE SANH itself." This is a summary of the enemy situation prior to 3d Battalion, 26th Marines' arrival to KHE SANH on 12 June 1967, produced by the 3d Marine Division's G-2 section.

b. Enemy situation actually found as operation was conducted: 3d Battalion 26th Marines operated in three specific areas of the KHE SANH AOR. A discussion of the enemy situation, findings, and characteristics of each area of operation is summarized below:

1. I Company operating in area bounded by XD 8049, 8449, 8245, 8346, had no enemy contact or sightings. The village vicinity XD 820446 was the only area found to be inhabited. A cement bunker at XD 802464 was destroyed. At XD 802468 a series of partially destroyed trenches was found and at XD 823467 25 covered 1-man fighting holes were found and suspected of being a harboring site.

2. K, M and the "A" command group operated 22-27 June in the area bounded by XD 9135, 9132, 9432, 9536. No sightings or enemy contacts were made. The only sign of recent enemy movement was found at XD 922323 on 26 June in an uncharted stream up a draw to the south, probably 3-5 persons. The hill at XD 926323 had approximately 35 3-man foxholes in a circular hasty defense not used for 3-4 weeks. There was a trail leading south east off the crest of this hill. Old harboring sites were found at XD 907324, 926326, and XD 926323. Throughout the area prominent trails were located. Travel was channelized to the stream beds and trafficability cross-country was at a rate of less than 100 meters per hour.

3. The battle of Hill 689 which commenced 271130H when I Company began movement up the hill at XD 805409, was prefaced by two separate attacks on the KHE SANH base. On 270045H 3d Battalion,

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25th Marines Command Post at XD 840922 received 25-30 82mm mortar rounds. At 270530H the KHE SANH perimeter was again hit by 102mm rockets which were believed to have been fired from vicinity XD 783 409, later confirmed by I and L Companies. As a result of this battle and the subsequent 5/26(-) operation in the area which continued into July, the following was found:

(a) On 27 June it was estimated that an NVA company was engaged. However as a result of the discovery of harboring sites vicinity XD 782399, 778409, 771407, 770407, well used trails leading into rocket sites at XD 789405 and XD 776405, fighting holes in vicinity of each rocket site, and the bunker complex vicinity XD 789405, it is estimated that at least two NVA companies were engaged. Documents indicate that there was also an element of the 29th Regiment, a rocket/artillery regiment, involved.

(b) It is suspected that the enemy withdrew south of the ridgeline running due west and northwest from Hill 689 in vicinity XD 802409.

(c) All equipment and weapons found on Hill 689 and in the vicinity of harboring and rocket sites was discarded or abandoned. Nothing was found concealed.

(d) The prisoner captured 28 June was extremely uncooperative and volunteered no information at first, but after intensive interrogation he produced the following:

(1) Captive was a member of the 1st squad, 1st Platoon, 5th Company, K-8 or 8th Battalion of the 29th Regiment. (This information is confirmed by documents found throughout the area.)

(2) The 8th Battalion has 4 companies, the C-4, 5, 6, and 7th. The 7th is a fire support company.

(3) There are 3 platoons per company, with 3 squads per platoon.

(4) The battalion commander of the 8th battalion is MUEN, the company commander of the 5th Company was HANH or VINH.

(e) Several documents were captured on Hill 689 and vicinity. Valuable information was derived from these documents as follows:

(1) I Company on 291530H at XD 797412 found a diary dated from 16 February to 18 June 1967 on one of the KIA. The diary provided the following information:

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- (A) E E signifies that unit is subordinate to a regiment. 5/8BN means 5th Company of the 8th Battalion.

- (B) Diary gives a general picture of the NVA training, morale, one previous contact, and infiltration route.

(f) The enemy rocket attack on KHE SANH on the evening of 23 June was directed entirely on the base with no enemy rounds being directed toward 3/26(-) on Hill 689. This attack originated from the vicinity of XD 785406 and XD 776405.

(g) The terrain is characterized by elephant grass undergrowth with single overhead canopy and trees 40-60 feet tall in the draws. The enemy routes definitely correspond to the trace of available fresh water, in the draws and stream beds concealed by the dense overhead canopy.

(h) L Company on 15-19 June had thoroughly patrolled Hill 689 and vicinity and found no indications of fresh bunkers. Therefore, the enemy prepared his positions on Hill 689 between 20 and 27 June.

(i) As a result of the contact on Hill 689 on 27 June, the rocket attack on KHE SANH on 28 June and the follow up search of the area which turned up a quantity of enemy gear on Hill 689, fighting holes and series of tunnels on hill vicinity XD 788405, the nose and fuse assembly of an enemy rocket at XD 788404, aiming stakes and possible rocket firing positions vicinity XD 784404, and a harboring site in the machine just south of the rocket site, the following observations are made:

(1) The enemy was definitely using Hill 689 as an FO position to direct fires on KHE SANH combat base. The bunkers were the familiar "B" shaped, 2-man covered bunkers flush with the deck. The overhead cover was made of logs about 3" in diameter covered with two feet of dirt and well camouflaged. The majority of casualties were taken from well aimed sniper fire from these bunkers and spider holes at close range. A walk of the battlefield indicates that there was only a limited use by the enemy of mines and boobytraps --- only one DH-10 was found in place on the morning of 21 June. However, the grenades and mines that were placed by the enemy were effective in cases of approach and took maximum casualties.

(2) 22x82mm mortar rds were found staged by the enemy on Hill 689 which indicates that they probably would have fired these on the base shortly before the rocket attack. The quantity of gear

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including approximately 40 C-100 grenades and the abandoned bodies found after the fight indicates that the enemy moved out rapidly.

(3) Because of the extensive prepared positions at XD788405 and the harboring site at XD785400, the enemy probably moved in trace of the trail going southwest from hill 689 in GS XD784, 7940. They would have to move to water and to food. The haste of their retreat was indicated by the gear found in disarray along this route including one new sniper rifle with scope which was abandoned on top of hill at XD782398 where many used bandages were found as well as 10 C-100 grenades, 2x22mm Bertram rounds, and a small quantity of web gear. The harboring site had 8 well camouflaged positions on the sides of the stream bed including 1 cooking bunker.

The rocket site at which the 102mm rocket nose was found (XD785406) consisted of six individual arrangements of stakes with the center axis of these arrangements pointing on azimuths of 180 to 1200 mils—directly toward NVA 312 combat base. The area was recently bombed by heavy ordnance. Some puns had been destroyed by artillery fire probably during the counter mortar fire on the puns. There were no indications of back blast and only one hole 10' in diameter and 4' deep was found in close proximity. This hole was dug at an angle and could have been a launch site. The route to the harboring site had foot puns dug in the side of the hill to enhance movement up the extremely steep grade. Because of the damage to the area by friendly ordnance little could be determined except that the trail was on a path of prepared puns between the harboring site and Hill 689, that there was a minimum of 6 and probably 10-11 aiming stake/rocket positions.

If the positions on Hill 689, the positions on the Hill at XD789405, and the harboring site and rocket site were manned simultaneously by the enemy, the enemy force in the area probably exceeded 150 men. This is assuming a minimum of security at the harboring site, completely manned rocket positions and proper security on Hill 689 and at XD78405. No firm evidence has been found to indicate that a large force made a retreat directly west of Hill 689 toward Hill 758.

(4) On 5 July 1968 found a rocket launching site on the eastern face of one of the hills at XD776405. There were 22 holes—1 group of 10 and a second group of 12 about 30 meters to the right flank of the first group, all in line. Three 102 rocket rounds partially rusted were found scattered in the vicinity. The holes were 12-18" deep and 10-12" in diameter. There was no evidence of rockets having been fired from the positions. Many aiming stakes were found.

(5) On 14 July 1968 observed 4 plumes of smoke rising from the canyon at XD782405, 755408, 755411 and 755415 as cloud cover lifted. Night was good in area like the night before. Artillery fired, results unknown. On 15 July 1968 heard heavy SA fire from XD742401 from east 20-30 kilometers/10 miles and produced 4 MI (C), 6 KIA (C), 3 bunkers damaged and 1 secondary fire. On the 14 of July 1968 heard SA fire from XD75420. The frequency of activity in this area is significant.

#### b. Terrain:

The NVA 312 area is thinly populated, rugged and mountainous. Hills over 500 meters are common throughout the area. Terrain is severely dissected and thickly vegetated with dense, tangled, broadleaf evergreen for 30-40 meters thickets. Trail network is plentiful.

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but trafficability to vehicles is almost uniformly restricted to national Route 9. The SAM valley is aligned on a northwest-southwest axis and joins the DANG TRI and DA KONG river valleys at a common juncture in GR (X19240). From this juncture, the DANG TRI valley extends northeast to exit at (YD0046). The DA KONG valley runs in a meandering path toward the southeast and exits at (YD0036). Most drainage runoff is transported by the DANG TRI river which conveys the entire KHE SAM valley drainage flow and exits the southeastern bunker at (XD9040). This river joins the DANG TRI river and eventually empties into the GIANG OF KONG. All other drainage flows into the DANG TRI river (X17034) which flows northwest as the VIET-LAOS border before turning west. This river charges the DANG TRI system.

(1) VEGETATION

(a) The valleys are generally covered with elephant grass six to twenty feet in height and low brush. Small areas in the immediate vicinity of villages are utilized for river and garden crops. The southern portion of KHE SAM valley supports a rubber plantation (X1859395). A broad band of elephant grass crosses from (X16446) to (X18630). In addition, interwoven bamboo thickets are prevalent along with dense jungle in the southwest corner of the area.

(b) The mountains are covered by a dense broadleaf evergreen forest with smaller areas of pine and deciduous trees interspersed. Tree height increases with increased elevation. Tallest trees are 75 to 90 feet high, with some ranging to 150 feet. Canopy is generally continuous with more than 25 percent of the ground covered by 2 to 4 layers of canopy. Trees have shallow roots. Trunks are generally straight and average 0.3 meters apart. In inaccessible areas of heavy canopy, the sun rarely reaches the undergrowth, which harbors more grass. At higher elevations in areas formerly cleared, shifting cultivation growing for 3-5 years and the discontinuance of the canopy has permitted the development of a much thicker undergrowth than could be expected deeper in the forest. Spiny rattans, fall bushes, vines and briars generally are interwound around trees or between bushes.

(c) The thick primary forest is normally not susceptible to conflagration, however extensive defoliation spraying and the relatively dry period of the southwest monsoon season should produce scattered areas of jungle and elephant grasslands highly susceptible to conflagration.

(2) Avenues of approach:

(a) the major avenue of approach is Route 9 which enters the KHE SAM area from the east and west.

(b) the four major rivers, the DA KONG, DANG TRI, R O DANG and the SAM, afford avenues of approach.

(c) the floor system of the KHE SAM valley and the KHE SAM RIVER (X18394) afford the most easily traversed avenues of approach into the area.

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(c) The conclusion of the conclusion of (a) and beginning of OPH AID (PH) in as follows:

(1) West & Northwest of KIE SAMH

(a) Before OPH AID and now, there exists a concentrated effort on the part of the enemy to reinforce and defend this area. V2 men's constantly reveal new fortifications and movement. Aircraft received heavy small arms fire throughout the area.

(2) North

(a) A recon team was inserted 12 July and extracted on 13 July and provided information that indicated a company size unit in the general area of XD8448 (LB) and XD8750 (UR). At XD860489 to XD863489 P-1 found 2 mortar men's, 2 machine gun men's and 30x2 men fighting holes approx 2-7 days old. 18 July K Co operating in area f and a large bunker complex in excess of 75 bunkers, 50 hootches and fighting holes at XD868495 approximately 72 hours old.

(3) Northeast and east

(a) 2 agent reports have been received for this area. One was received on 13 July from JT D. Informant stated that a heavy weapons Co was located at XD945483. Its men was to attack KIE SAMH air base. AO checked out area and received small arms fire from XD92947 on 13 July. V2 over area indicated lights moving in a southerly direction.

Another agent reported an enemy battalion was located at XD10413 on 12 July. On 14 July AO observed 70 lights. 40 men fired with unknown results. 23 lights were noted 160130H and at 160445 AO observed 5 lights. 23 with spotlight were observed many people going up the ridges that surrounded the valley. The discovery of company size harboring sites 10 km north of KIE SAMH and the agent reports confirmed by 40 sightings of company size company and battalion size to the northeast and east of area. 9 have a definite correlation. Increased enemy activity from this direction can be expected.

(4) South, Southeast

(a) Activity throughout this area has been sparse with some activity on nights. There exists much recent trail activity. Lights were observed at XD995305, smoke was observed at XD995426 and some found 20 men harbor site. All these incidents were observed on 15 July.

(5) South-southwest

(a) Much activity throughout the area is being reported by agents and V2. On 4 July JTAD reported 2 battalions, the 3d and the 82d Battalion of the 10 Reg't, at XD814212. Another reliable source has reported 2 unidentified battalions at XD7230 on 12 July. There are several known locations where enemy crosses K. FORM river providing easy access into the area in this area. The terrain provides excellent water supply, cover and concealment for enemy movement and harboring units.

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7. Mission. While at KHE SANH, the Battalion was responsible for a portion of the KHE SANH Base perimeter; conducted ambushes, patrols, and listening posts; provided security for convoys; and when designated, provided the Regimental Reserve Company. In addition, the Battalion conducted operations throughout the Operation CROCKETT AO.

8. Concept of Operations.

a. General: The Battalion was under the operational control of the 26th Marines throughout the period it was on Operation CROCKETT, and consequently its general concept of operations during the operation varied according to the requirements assigned by Regiment.

b. Employment of the Companies. The sector of the KHE SANH Base Perimeter for which the Battalion was responsible was manned by personnel from H&S Company throughout Operation CROCKETT. The four rifle companies were employed on either battalion (-) operations in designated areas within the AO; or occupied positions just outside the west end of KHE SANH perimeter from which they would conduct squad or platoon sized ambushes and local patrols, or provide the Regimental Reserve Company.

c. Employment of Supporting Units.

1. General. All supporting units operated in general support of the Regiment. Elements of the various units were assigned to the Battalion whenever the Battalion had need of their services.

2. Fire Support. Throughout Operation CROCKETT, A/1/13 (Main), C/1/13 (Main), and W/1/13 operated in general support of the Battalion. Artillery missions were requested, cleared, and assigned through the 26th Marines ESCJ. The Battalion's own 81mm mortars augmented this artillery support. Sections of 81mm mortars were frequently assigned to companies that were operating in the field in order to insure that they would have a readily-available means of fire support. Throughout the operation, fire planning was closely synchronized with all movements by Battalion units. Landing zones and other areas in which units entered for the first time were prepped; patrol routes were boxed in, and defensive fires were registered at night. On-call concentrations were regularly planned at likely enemy positions and ambush sites.

3. Air Support. Airstrikes were employed to prep landing zones and destroy enemy positions. Air was requested for strikes against selected enemy personnel and fortifications.

4. Tracked Vehicle Support. When terrain permitted their employment, tanks, Gators, or twin-40's were employed on mechanized patrols to cover a designated portion of terrain with speed and additional available firepower.

9. Execution. The Battalion began planning for Operation CROCKETT with the receipt of CG Field Mar Div 270645Z May 67 which

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warned the Battalion that on 96 hours notice it should be prepared to be relieved of the PHU BAI TAOR by 2d Battalion, 26th Marines and to chop operational control to the 26th Marines for expended Operation CROCKETT. CG Third Mar Div 081137Z Jun 67 stated that the Battalion and C Battery were to deploy by Rough Rider convoy from PHU BAI to KHE SANH on 12 June 67 and chop operational control to the 26th Marines upon arrival at KHE SANH.

The Battalion (Rein) departed PHU BAI at 0800H on 12 June. H&S Company, Co I, Co L, and Co M arrived at KHE SANH in the late afternoon of 13 June. The Battalion chopped operational control to the 26th Marines at 1815H, and at that time it began participating in Operation CROCKETT. That night, Co L, Co I, and Co M established positions just outside the west end of the KHE SANH perimeter vic (XD 838418), (XD 838420), and (XD 842424) respectively, and the Battalion CP was established vic (XD 842422).

14 June 1967

C Battery and Co K arrived at KHE SANH at 1300H. C Battery established a firing position vic (XD 852415) and Co K assumed the role of Regimental Reserve Company vic (XD 843318). All units spent the daylight hours improving their positions. At night, H&S Company provided 28 Marines to 1/26 to man LP's and a portion of 1/26's lines.

15 June 1967

At 0510H, a Marine from Co I was wounded by a grenade or satchel charge when he left his position to investigate a noise to his front. Co I returned 20 rds SAF with unknown results. Size of enemy force unknown. 1 USMC WIA.

L-1 provided security for return of 3d MT Bn. convoy to PHU BAI arriving in PHU BAI about 1930H.

At 0800H, L-3 departed on a mechanized patrol with 2 M-42's and 2 M-50's, covering the area between the KHE SANH perimeter and Hill 861. The patrol reached Hill 861 at 1030H and returned to the perimeter at 1320H. No contact was made at any time.

At 1310H, Co I left on a four-day patrol to cover the area to the northeast of Hill 950. No enemy contact was made the first day. 20 Montagnards were found living vic (XD 827432). The company established night-time positions on Hill 558 vic (XD 820451).

16 June 1967

At 1030H, Co L (-) departed on a three-day patrol around the edge of the valley containing LANG TA TUC vic (XD 803422). No contact was made during the day. Nighttime ambushes were established vic (XD 825405), and (XD 827404) by L-2 and L-3 respectively. Co I continued its patrol, moving northwest to vic (XD 808463) where it established its night-time position. Three squad-sized ambushes were established on key avenues of approach to the company position. No contact was made during the day and progress was very slow due to heavy vegetation.

At 2230H, Co I CP vic (XD 808463) received 1 incoming grenade resulting in 2 USMC WIA. Co I returned 3 M-26 grenades and 50 rds

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SAF. Enemy casualties, size and route of withdrawal were unknown. During the day the Battalion CP was moved inside the KHE SANH perimeter to vic (XD 861417). Co M assumed Co L's portion of the outer perimeter.

17 June 1967

L-1 provided security for Rough Rider from PHU BAI to KHE SANH, arriving at 1800H. Co I moved to the north and east. During the day 2 old bunkers of French construction were found vic (XD 809464) with standard double apron wire surrounding them. There were no indications of recent use. A dud 500 lb bomb was also found vic (XD 816471). The company established night-time positions on an unnumbered hill vic (XD 815473).

Co L searched Hill 689 area vic (XD 803408) and Hill 758 area vic (XD 783433) before setting up for night. L-2 established an ambush vic (XD 785429) and L-3 established an ambush vic (XD 785426). No enemy contact was made at any time.

18 June 1967

L-1 provided security for Rough Rider from KHE SANH to PHU BAI, arriving at 1845H. Co I continued to move north and at 1027H discovered a trail system leading north from vic (XD 812482) and east for vic (XD 818495). One squad of Co I was helolifted to vic (XD 816471) to destroy the 500 lb bomb found at that location the previous day. I-1, I-2 with I-6, and I-3 established ambushes at (XD 835486), (XD 827483), and (XD 818485) respectively.

Co L moved east through valley and L-2, L-3, and L-6 established night-time positions at (XD 802419), (XD 801423), and (XD 804421) respectively. No enemy contact was made at any time.

19 June 1967

At 0445H, I-3 vic (XD 824485) received one rd SAF from an unknown number of enemy vic (XD 824486). I-3 returned 50 rds SAF, 10 M-26 grenades, 14 60mm illum rds, 2 60mm HE rds, and 2 4.2 illum rds. Enemy broke contact and withdrew to the north. I-3 received no casualties. Search of area following morning revealed no evidence of enemy casualties.

L-1 flew from PHU BAI to DONG HA, where they spent the night.

Co L (-) moved east through valley and returned to the Battalion Area at 0900H.

Co I moved south through grid square (XD 8247). I-1 found 25 bunkers vic (XD 821463). Bunkers were 1-2 weeks old and were 4 ft wide and 3-5 ft deep and were covered with bamboo poles and 2 ft of dirt. Appeared to be a harboring site, since one had been used as a galley. I-1 and I-3 established night ambush at (XD 820466), and I-2 with I-6 at (XD 824464).

At 2355H, I-3 vic (XD 822467) received one incoming artillery/mortar round, resulting in 3 WIA.

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20 June 1967

Co I destroyed the two French burkas it had found vic (XD 809464) at 171215H, and then continued moving south, arriving in the Battalion Area at 1800H.

L-2 and L-3 established night ambushes vic (XD 831422) and (XD 853427) respectively.

21 June 1967

L-1 returned to KHE SANH from DONG HA by Rough Rider.

Listening posts and 2 squad-sized ambushes were established around the Battalion area.

22 June 1967

Two Companies and a command group began an operation in the southeastern portion of the Operation CROCKETT AO. At 0815H artillery began prepping LZ's for troop lift, and air prepped the LZ from 0830H-0900H. At 0845H, the first lift began, and at 0910H, Co K began landing vic (XD 948358). Co M was lifted to vic (XD 952352) by 0915H, and moved to vic (XD 950348) where it established a blocking position. Co K and the CP group completed their lift at 1207H and began sweep towards Co M's block. At 1915H, Co K and Co M linked up and established night-time positions vic (XD 950348).

No contact was made during the day and movement was extremely slow because of poor terrain consisting of steep slopes covered with dense elephant grass or canopy. In addition, numerous fires sparked by pyrotechnics and air caused units to move by extremely circuitous routes and to backtrack in several instances.

23 June 1967

At 0430H, L-3 received 1 incoming grenade vic (XD 950348) resulting in 3 SMC KIA.

From 0800H to 1100H, Co K and the CP group were helolifted to vic (XD 948358) to block and at 0930H Co M began sweeping north from the previous night's position. The movement of both companies was hindered by fires, and at 1230H, the fires were so close that both companies had to be helolifted out of the area. Co K with the CP group was lifted from vic (XD 950362) from 1230H to 1330H, and Co M was helolifted from vic (XD 940355), and Co M moved to vic (XD 903324) and Co K to (XD 920325) to establish night-time positions.

At 1800H, Co L moved by motor march to vic (XD 858386) and dispersed at that location to begin a search and destroy operation through the area to the southwest. Co L searched HUONG HOA vic (XD 863373), finding evidence of recent movement along an east-west axis and evidence of recent fire fights. The Company established 1 platoon-sized night-time ambushes south of HUONG HOA vic (XD 864374).

24 June 1967

Co L reached Hill 549 vic (XD 883382) at 1100H and continued to move north to vic (XD 883382) where the company established night-

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time positions.

At 1245H, Co K found an uncharted stream vic (XD 922323) which showed signs of movement of 3-5 people to the south within past 10-20 minutes. Searched area with negative results. Also found 4 charmed rocks used as a stove and some coconut husks about one week old vic (XD 922323).

Co K with the CP group moved to vic (XD 925325) and began a sweep towards the village of LANG TAMOL TA vic (XD 937331), which was found to be destroyed. Co K established platoon sized ambushes along the stream vic (XD 935328) at night.

Co M moved to vic (XD 921325) and conducted a thorough reconnaissance of the area in that vicinity. Platoon sized ambushes were established in the southern portion of CS (XD 9232) at night.

At 0900H, The Commanding Officer of the 26th Marines visited the 5/26 CP.

At 1010H, Co L found 4 old lean-to huts vic (XD 925326). Also found blackened rocks used for cooking and chopped bamboo. Estimate area was last used a month before.

At 1550H, Co M found and destroyed 4 fighting holes estimated as being 2-3 weeks old vic (XD 926326).

At 1745H, Co M found and destroyed 35 two-man fighting holes in a hasty circular defense on hill vic (XD 926323).

26 June 1967

Co K with the CP group moved from LANG KOL TA KU northeast along road through CS (XD 9233) to vic (XD 922342), where they linked with Co E. Previously Co M had moved from previous night's positions north along trail through CS (XD 9132) and (XD 9133) to LANG HUC COC (XD 915342). Co M searched this village, finding no signs of recent activity, and then moved east to link with Co K vic (XD 922342), where both companies established night positions.

Co B maintained last night's position vic (XD 883382) as a screening element and remained on the Hill as an OP to maintain surveillance over the CP. Co B and Co C conducted recon patrols to the north and south of the hill.

27 June 1967

At 0000H, the 26th SARH Base received approximately 50 rds of mortar fire from the southwest. Fifteen rds landed in the Battalion area with B-48 and Battalion supply receiving direct hits. The remainder of the rounds landed in the 1/26 and A Battery areas. Battalion casualties were 1 VCN KIA, 1 ARVN KIA, 10 USN WIA, and 22 USMC WIA. Subsequently, one of the USMC WIA's died of wounds.

At 0300H, Co E vic (XD 913412) received 2 incoming mortar/artillery rounds, resulting in 3 USMC WIA and 1 USMC KIA.

At 0100H, the CH-54 that was medevacating I-1's casualties was downed by mechanical difficulties vic (XD 913412). Another helicopter completed the medevac, and I-1 provided security for the downed helicopter for the remainder of the night.

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At 0520H, KHE SANH received 30 rds 102mm rockets. All artillery units in the KHE SANH perimeter saturated the base of Hill 1015 vic (XD 857445). Where Hill 989 reported enemy firing positions S-1 suffered 2 USMC KIA.

At 0830H, Co M, Co K, and the CP group began helilift back to KHE SANH.

Co L moved to vic (XD 883398) on Highway #9, where it embarked on trucks, and returned to KHE SANH at 1215H.

I-2 and the Co I CP group moved to vic (XD 818412) and linked with I-1. From that position Co I (-) moved towards Hill 689 vic (XD 803408) to search for enemy mortar position.

I-3 was helilifted to vic (XD 875435) to conduct search for possible enemy rocket sites on Hill 1015 vic (XD 854454).

At 1230H, a CAC patrol searching for the enemy mortar positions on Hill 689 received intense SAF from an unknown number of VC on the crest of the Hill. The patrol was driven off the Hill, leaving 2 USMC MIA and 1 PR MIA on the Hill. Co I (-) continued towards Hill 689 to aid the CAC patrol.

At 1615H, Co I (-) had moved to vic (XD 801410) where it held position while an AO conducted an airstrike on enemy on Hill 689 vic (XD 803409).

At 1720H, Co I (-) reached Hill 689 and began searching for the CAC casualties. Received 2 USMC WIA from an unknown type of booby trap.

At 1740H, Co I (-) continued to move towards crest of Hill 689. I-2 moved to vic (XD 799412) where it encountered extensive AP mines and booby-trapped Chi Com grenades and received SAF from vic (XD 998412).

I-1 moved to vic (XD 804409) where they received heavy SAF from vic (XD 804409). I-2 suffered 25 USMC WIA. I-1 suffered 8 USMC KIA (including the platoon commander) and 10 USMC WIA. Both platoons returned SAF, M-79's, and LAWS. The enemy consisted of isolated units squad and platoon size, who fought from well-camouflaged spider holes and several well-fortified bunkers. The area was heavily mined and booby trapped.

At 1830H, L-3 and L-5 landed vic (XD 801405) by helicopter and began moving northeast to Hill 689 where Co I was receiving fire. While in LZ, L-3 received SAF from vic (XD 806909), and began maneuvering to block enemy advance. L-1 established a blocking force. L-3 moved on left flank, L-5 on right flank, and L-1 provided security in LZ.

L-3 contacted 2 Platoon squads vic (XD 801404) advancing towards rear of Co I. They reached crest of Hill 689 and encountered extensive AP mines and booby-trapped Chi Com grenades. Upon advancing across crest, L-3 received intense fire from 8-9 well-camouflaged spider holes. Co L returned fire and destroyed with grenades. All casualties were returned to the LZ and evacuated, and Co L consolidated with Co I. Results:

1 USMC KIA (including the platoon commander), 15 WIA. Enemy: 5 KIA(C), 7 MIA, 1 MIA captured (SAK -47's, 1 Chi Com carbine with scope, 1 SIG). Also recovered 2 60's 62mm mortar, 4 booby-trapped Chi Com grenades, 1 Chi Com M-79, 1 LAWS. Found and evacuated the 2 USMC MIA from the CAC O. 1 PR MIA. The enemy force was estimated as being 2 NVA (Batt. Commander). Final estimate of enemy casualties was 25 KIA (C); 7 MIA.

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At 2000H, Co L found a 20 ft by 6 ft bomb crater vic (XD 802409). Found 2 bunkers and a tunnel, AP mines, booby traps, grenades, and 82mm mortar rds.

At dusk while flame ships and artillery fired illumination to aid in evacuation of casualties and consolidation of positions, Co L linked with Co I, and both companies established night positions on Hill 689. Extensive H&I fires were conducted on avenues of approach to the west used by the NVA units.

At 1900H, Co I and Co L received incoming mortar rounds of an unknown caliber from the northwest. The 4.2 Battery on Hill 881 south returned counter-mortar fire and the enemy ceased firing at 1910H.

At 2045H, Co L received 2 incoming 60mm mortar rds from the southeast. AC destroyed.

28 June 1968

At 0625H, artillery began prepping the Hill 689 area in preparation for a thorough search of the area. Air prepped the area from 0900H to 0930H.

At 0730H, I-3 was helilifted from Hill 6015 to KHE SANH in preparation for rejoining the remainder of the company on Hill 689. The lift was completed at 0752H.

At 0755H, Co I, the district chief and an AO reported a large body of enemy troops in GS (XD 8042). At 0820H, Co I called in artillery with unknown results.

At 0830H, Co I and Co L began a thorough search of the battlefield to destroy enemy bunkers, mines, and booby traps; and to determine the extent of enemy casualties.

At 1000H, Co L found 1 NVA KIA (C) with a round in his head vic (XD 804406). A grappling hook had been used to drag the body.

At 1015H, Co I found 1 NVA KIA (C) vic (XD 803407). NVA wore olive drab uniforms and soft jungle cover and had large amount of 782 gear. Also found 1 PW KIA at same location. At 1130H, Co I found 1 AK-47 vic (XD 804406).

At 1140H, the Forward CP group, Co M, 81mm mortar platoon and I-3 were helilifted to the Hill 689 area. The lift was completed at 1330H.

At 1230H, Co M called an airstrike on 2 VC running vic (XD 795406), resulting in 2 NVA KIA (P).

At 1600H, Co M fired 60mm mortars and called an airstrike on 10 VC (XD 794406) resulting in 1 NVA KIA (C) and 7 NVA KIA (P).

At 1600H, Co AO called an airstrike on 2 enemy bunkers vic (XD 786405), destroying both bunkers.

At 1700H, Co M sighted 3 VC in the open vic (XD 798406) and an AO reported bunker in the same area. An airstrike was conducted, resulting in 1 NVA KIA (C), 9 NVA KIA (P), 8 enemy bunkers destroyed, 2 damaged, and 1 secondary explosion.

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At 1700H, Co M called 81mm mortars on 3 VC in open vic (XD 782408) resulting in 1 NVA KIA (C).

Night-time positions were established along the ridgeline running northwest from Hill 689. Co B at (XD 803409), the CP at (XD 802411), the 81mm plt (-) at (XD 801411), Co I at (XD 799413), and Co M at (XD 798411).

At 1900H, Co I called artillery on 3 NVA vic (XD 798416) with negative results.

At 1740H, Co I found 2 NVA KIA and 1 NVA WIA (PW) and 3 wpns (2 AK-47's and 1 SKS with a bayonet) vic (XD 797413). Weapons were returned to S-2. Also found 2 field rucksacks, 10 Chi Com grenade's, 1 AP mine, and assorted food and documents.

At 1940H, Co I received 2 WIA's at west end of airstrip during rocket attack on KHE SAMH. Approximately 25 102mm rockets were fired, nearly all of which landed outside the perimeter, with six falling in Co K's area, but inflicting no casualties, all units in the Hill 689 area observed the enemy firing site vic (XD 7841) and C Battery fired 401 rds, and A Battery 398 rounds of counter-battery fire at that location. The enemy fire ceased at 1955H.

At 1955H, Co M fired 81mm mortars on 10 NVA vic (XD 802407) resulting in 2 NVA KIA (P).

29 June 1967

Co M and Co I swept northwest along ridgeline towards Hill 758. Air and artillery prepped area thoroughly.

At 0845H, Co I found 2 NVA KIA (C) and 1 wpn (AK-47) vic (XD 798409). KIA had 2 Chi Com grenades, brown uniform, tennis shoes, unit ID card, and 182 gms.

At 0900H, Co I found 2 NVA KIA (C) vic (XD 798409).

At 0945H, Co I found a freshly dug 82mm mortar position vic (XD 798409). In same area, a cartridge belt with 2 lb rice bag, 2 grenade pouches, 4 Chi Com grenades, 8 loaded AK-47 magazines, and canteen were found. A bullet hole in the canteen, a pool of blood, and a bandage indicated the wound had been hit in abdomen. A carrying pole for 81mm mortars rds and a marker of elephant grass on an azimuth of 041 degrees were also found. Two soft covers, an NVA canteen, and some bloodstains were found 50 meters to the west.

At 1845H, Co M sighted 10 NVA on ridgeline vic (XD 786425). Called 100's, 81's, and fired 106's from B/1/26 and D/1/26. Deployed sniper team and a gunship. AO also reported 3 bunkers in area. Results: 9 NVA KIA (P), 1 bunker destroyed, 1 secondary explosion.

At 1900H, Co I called artillery on 3 NVA vic (XD 798446) with negative results.

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K-3 provided security for a section of tanks and a section of Ontos that were intended to move to Co L's position on Hill 689. The tanks were unable to ford a stream running through the valley between KHE SANH and Hill 689 and returned to KHE SANH with K-3 at 1530H.

Co L conducted a patrol to vic (XD 827385) and returned to Hill 689.

At 1330H, Co L observed 1 NVA KIA (C) vic (XD 796402).

Co M established night time positions on an unnumbered Hill vic (XD 791416); Co I and the Command Group vic (XD 791416), and Co L remained on Hill 689 vic (XD 813409).

1 July 67

Co I moved to search for suspected rocket site vic (XD 735412), Co L moved to vic (XD 737404), Co M moved to Hill 758 vic (XD 784423), the command group (XD 791416) displaced to vic (XD 785421) off of Hill 758. All units patrolled around these locations during the day and established positions at the given coordinates for the night.

At 1045H, Co M found an NVA helmet with bullet and shrapnel holes vic (XD 783422). 1 NVA KIA (P).

At 1100H, Co L found a dud 250 lb bomb and a possible rocket site vic (XD 792406). Site consisted of four holes dug into ground on an inclination and pointed toward the KHE SANH Base. Area behind looked like it had received backblast.

At 1300H, Co I vic (XD 785414) found and destroyed a tunnel 1 1/2 ft wide by 3 1/2 ft long by 4 ft high leading into a room 4 ft long by 6 ft wide by 3 ft high. Room had an air vent and could accommodate 2 NVA, but did not appear to have been used recently.

At 1215H, Co L found 1 bolt action sniper rifle with scope, scope cover, and rifle case vic (XD 783404). Also found 5 "L"-shaped, covered fighting holes, 2 open holes, and 5 entrenching tools and a variety of NVA web gear. Holes were on military crest of the hill protecting its principle avenue of approach.

At 1345H, Co L found and destroyed 3 fighting holes less than one week old vic (XD 785410).

At 1415H, Co L called artillery on 2 NVA moving east across stream vic (XD 778407) with good coverage but unknown results.

At 1425H, Co L found a tunnel vic (XD 788407) that had been saved in by a nearby bomb crater, except for the entrance extending down 5 ft at a 30° angle. An airstrike in this area on 29 June had triggered a secondary explosion.

At 1545H, Co L found a possible tunnel complex vic (XD 788407).

At 2100H, Co L vic (XD 788407) received 2 rds of 60mm mortar with negative results. The relay station on Hill 950 observed muzzle flash vic (XD 785393) and artillery was fired on that area with unknown results.

2 JUL 1967

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During the day Co M moved to Hill 821 vic (XD 763443), Co I (-) joined the Command Group on Hill 758 vic (XD 785422), and Co L moved to Hill 542 vic (XD 809392). I-3 remained at the rocket site vic (XD 785412) until dusk, when it joined Co L on Hill 542.

At 0810H, Co I found and destroyed four bunkers vic (XD 785400). Bunkers were all 4 ft by 3 ft by 3 ft.

At 0845H, Co M vic (XD 773427) suffered 3 WIA's from shrapnel from a friendly bomb.

At 0830H, Co M found and destroyed 17 two-man fighting holes 4 ft by 3 ft by 3 ft vic (XD 774427). Bunkers were in a 360° perimeter, but most were oriented towards the northwest and were approximately 3-4 days old.

At 0900H, Co I found 6 fighting holes and assorted NVA web gear, AK-47 magazines, and used bandages vic (XD 784399).

At 1005H, Co I found a 102mm rocket vic (XD 785406). Rocket had Chinese markings and had a deep fuze well and electric detonating device still attached. A hole 72 inches in diameter and 7 ft deep was found twenty meters from the rocket. Fragments of U.S. WP and artillery rounds were found throughout the area.

At 1440H, Co M found 8 covered fighting holes, one dud Chi Com grenade, one dud 81mm mortar rd, and 1 NVA KIA (C) vic (XD 757446). Holes and body appeared to be one month old. Destroyed holes, grenade, and mortar rd.

At 1900H, Co L fired 81mm mortars on 4 NVA in green uniforms who were walking northeast into treeline vic (XD 802396). Negative surveillance due to heavy vegetation.

I-3 remained at the rocket site vic (XD 785412) until dusk, when it joined Co L on Hill 542.

3 JUL 1968

From 0600H to 1030H, Co M was helilifted from Hill 821 back to the LRE SAN Base.

I-3 returned to Co I on Hill 758.

Co L returned to vic (XD 783405) from Hill 542 vic (XD 809391) and conducted a thorough search of the area between the two positions.

At 0230H, Co I vic (XD 784422) called 81mm mortars and artillery on one light moving east and another light moving west towards each other vic (XD 775413). The lights were extinguished.

4 JUL 1968

Co I and Co L patrolled to the west of their respective areas.

At 0740H, Co L found a well used trail with a worn tree crossing a creek vic (XD 784434).

5 JUL 1968

The Command group displaced from Hill 758 vic (XD 785422) to Co M's position vic (XD 783405). Co I and Co L patrolled to the west of their respective positions.

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At 0828H, L-3 found a hut vic (XD 778409). Hut was 4 ft by 4 ft, built into side of hill and covered with banana leaves, and estimated as being 2 days old. Also found 9 two-man bunkers with logs and dirt overhead and covered with foilage. Found NVA 782 gear, one NVA helmet, tin dishes with shrapnel holes, and bloody bandages throughout the area.

At 1200H, Co L found 22 rocket launcher sites vic (XD 772411). The positions were in groups of 6 and 7, the holes were  $1\frac{1}{2}$  ft deep and set 2 ft apart. Two stakes were set in front of each pit, one foot apart on either side and connected with a braided rope. Smaller stakes were located between the pits and the larger, stakes, which appeared to be aiming stakes. Mask clearance had been out to the front. No burned areas were found behind pits, although some bark had been stripped from trees. Also found 3 102mm rocket rounds with Chinese markings. Also found fuzes, fuze cases, and an NVA helmet. This site was apparently the position from which the KHE SANH Base was rocketed on 28 June.

At 1700H, Co L was helilifted back to the KHE SANH Combat Base.

6 July 1967

Co I patrolled to the southwest of Hill 689.

Co K patrolled to the southwest of the KHE SANH Combat Base.

At 2240H, Co K observed two objects, one red and one white, moving slowly from the northwest to the southwest across the sky beyond Hill 1015. One of the objects burst in the air. They were subsequently determined to have been an American aircraft and a SAM missile.

7 July 1967

Co I patrolled in the Hill 758 area.

M-2 escorted Ontos and Tanks to D/1/26 position vic (XD 914403).

Co K patrolled to the southeast of the KHE SANH Combat Base.

At 1400H, Co I found a dud 250 lb bomb vic (XD 787422). The bomb was destroyed in place.

At 1700H, Co I was helilifted back to the KHE SANH Combat Base. The entire battalion went on a 24-hour standby to move by helilift/vehicle convey to the Operation BUFFALO Area, if so ordered by the Division Commander.

8 July 1967

The Battalion continued on standby for Operation BUFFALO. Local patrols and ambushes were conducted in the immediate area of the KHE SANH Combat Base.

9 July 1967

The standby continued and operations were restricted to local patrols and ambushes in the immediate area of KHE SANH Combat Base.

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10 July

Co M and Co L began two day search and destroy operations in the area southwest of HUONG HOA and the Hill 832 area vic (XD 873445), respectively.

At 1400H, Co L found the following USMC 782 gear and equipment vic (XD 873442): 2 entrenching tools, 1 entrenching tool cover, 1 mess kit, 2 M-14 bayonets, assorted utilities, 1 long range ration, 1 towel, 2 helmet liners, 1 jungle boot, 2 field jackets, 1 flack jacket, 1 soft cover, 2 ponchos, 1 shelter half with tent poles and pegs, 1 burned M-14 rifle stock, 2 bandoliers, 7.62 ammunition and 1 rain jacket. All gear was helilifted back to the KHE SANH Base.

Co M established night time positions vic (XD 839345) and Co L vic (XD 874446).

11 July 1967

Co M and Co L continued their patrols, and both companies returned to KHE SANH by dusk.

12 July 1967

Co L began a three day search and destroy operation up the RAO MAN and KHE KA BAI Valleys and along the ridgeline containing Hill 527 and Hill 532. During the day it moved to vic (XD 862462) where it established night time positions.

13 July 1967

Co L was helilifted to Hill 758 vic (XD 785424) from 0905. Co L then moved on foot to Hill 689 vic (XD 803409). Both companies were to conduct search and destroy operations in the area to the south and west of Hill 689-Hill 758-Hill 821 ridgeline.

At 0800H, Co L found a harbor site used by an estimated 20 VC/BVA. Found part of USMC utility uniform covered with flies. Odor of decomposed dead body, but none found. Further search revealed empty tin cans and tunnels cut in the brush, tunnel floor was covered. Remained in area.

At 1000H, Co L destroyed 25 enemy bunkers used as a harboring site vic (XD 824462). Bunkers were all 2ft deep and 3ft square.

At 1200H, Co L found and blew in place 1 dud 250 lb bomb vic

At 1400H, Co L found remains of 1 USMC body vic (XD 804408), estimated to be 15 days old. Body decapitated and right arm missing. 1 M-14 magazine, 2 M-14 magazines with ammo, 2 M26 grenades, 1 compass, and 1 canteen found on or in the vicinity of the body. Area further searched and head located near body. No evidence of right arm or weapon found. Body returned to graves register and subsequently determined to have been a Marine from CAC-0 who had been killed on 27 June while on patrol.

Co L established night time positions on Hill 758 vic (XD 784423), Co M via (XD 786405), and Co I via (XD 813473).

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14 July 1967

At 0845H, Co K vic (XD 783409) observed four plumes of smoke rising from canopy vic (XD 752405), (XD 753408), (XD 755411), and (XD 755415). Fired 21 rds 81mm mortars, 10 rds 106mm recoilless rifles, and called 126 rds zone fire mission by two batteries on suspected enemy locations with excellent target coverage but unknown results. Estimate 2 company sized units.

At 0900H, K-1 reconed area vic (XD 783403) for possible harbor site. Found only trails with no signs of recent activity.

At 0915H, Co K observed a boat containing 11 people crossing river vic (XD 695360). Distance was too great to determine clothing, equipment, or activity.

At 1115H, I-1 found and destroyed a damaged LAAW vic (XD 807483).

At 1400H, K-2 found an old harbor site vic (XD 790405) which did not appear to have been occupied for some time. Also found 1 82mm rd in stream at same location, and pieces of bandages and clothing.

At 1530H, Co K vic (XD 770405) found and blew in place 1 dud 250 lb bomb, but the on surface and found 1 dud 500 lb bomb buried approximately 50 feet in dirt with tail assembly broken off on surface. Unable to blow 500 lb bomb, but the hole was filled in.

At 1715H, Co K vic (XD 789405) received 3 short burst of fire from a machinegun mounted on what appeared to be an S.O.C. UH-34 aircraft. Results: 1 USMC KIA.

Co I established night-time positions on Hill 632 vic (XD 828482)).

15 July 1967

At 0800H, Co K found 1 NVA KIA estimated as being 2 weeks old vic (XD 804410). Body had belt with two ChiCom grenades attached and beside the body was a pole with 2 unfused 82mm mortar rds attached with rope thongs. Ordinance was blown in place.

At 0835H, Co K found 1 ChiCom box mine at (XD 792412) camouflaged in front of a bunker. Mine was blown in place and bunker was destroyed.

Co I, 77th and Co L returned to Kham SAM before dusk.

b

06 July 1967

At 1200H, Co I moved by vehicle convoy to vic (XD 918417) to begin an operation northwest along the stream bed to vic (XD 844438). Co L established night-time position vic (XD 918418).

At 1400H, Operation CROCKETT terminated in accordance with CG 3d Marine Div 160653Z Jun 67.

16. Results.

a. Friendly Losses

b. Personnel.

Killed in Action	13
Died of Wounds	3
Wounded in Action	103

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## 2. Equipment.

(a) Three GP tents, 1 M-16E1 rifle, and 1 M-79 grenade launcher were destroyed or lost.

(b) Five portable flame tanks, 8 flame gun groups, 1 sniper scope and battery charger, 4 M-16E1 rifles, and 1 81 mm mortar tripod were damaged.

(c) All units suffered minor combat losses of individual equipment.

## b. Enemy Losses: 2

## 1. Personnel

KIA (C) 31

KIA (A) 82

PW/MIA 1

## 2. Equipment.

(a) The Battalion captured 12 weapons on Operation CROCKETT.

(b) Fifty-two Chi Com grenades, 26 82mm mortar rounds, 800 rounds of 7.62 ammunition, 3 Chi Com AP mines, 4 B-40 rocket rounds, and 7 B-40 fuzes were captured. 4 102mm rocket rounds, and approximately 550 lbs of individual equipment were captured.

(c) Areas where airstrikes and artillery missions were conducted were searched by ground troops whenever practicable, however distance and dense vegetation frequently prevented an immediate search of the target areas, and the NVA often removed bodies before Marine patrols arrived. Although ground patrols were unable to check all target areas, aerial observers checked all areas in which airstrikes were conducted, and also checked numerous artillery target areas.

(d) On 270000H June, two rusted M-16E1 rifles serial numbers 533544 and 595897 were found on Hill 689 vic (XD 802409) by personnel from Co L. These rifles were subsequently determined to have belonged to personnel from 1st Battalion, 26th Marines who had been killed in action previously. On 101400H July, Co L found a large quantity of U.S. M82 gear vic (XD 878442). No other material, food stuffs, or medicines of U.S. origin was recovered.

Administrative Matters: Administrative plans were adequate.

## a. Supply

(1) An LSU was maintained within the KHE SANH Combat Base by a detachment of FLSG-A. The water point was maintained by Sub Unit 3, Headquarters Battalion, 3d MarDiv. Supply was generally adequate.

(2) Resupply of companies operating in the field was accomplished by helicopters. 2d Plt (-), Co A, 3d SF Bn controlled the LZ within the KHE SANH perimeter.

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(3) On initially leaving the perimeter, companies frequently back-packed four days of rations and more than their basic allowance of ammunition, which allowed them to operate in an area for an extended period without the necessity of daily resupply runs. Local water and halazone tablets were also utilized.

(4) The marines carried normal T/O weapons on all operations. LAAW's were particularly popular, since they were much lighter and more easily carried than the 3.5's. Since all companies carried more than their basic allowance of ammunition for their crew-served weapons, every rifleman carried some mortar, rocket or machine-gun ammunition to lighten the load of the weapons platoon personnel. The M-16E1 rifle with its lightweight ammunition made the load of the rifleman in the Battalion several pounds less than what it had been in previous operations.

b. Maintenance

(1) First and second echelon maintenance was performed satisfactorily by Battalion units.

(2) Third echelon maintenance was accomplished promptly and effectively by LSU/FLSG-A.

c. Treatment of Casualties, Evacuation, and Hospitalization.

(1) Casualties were treated in the field by company corpsmen. Persons were either returned to duty or evacuated to C-Med. Patients requiring further treatment were evacuated to A-Med at PHU BAI, NSA at DA NANG, or the Hospital Ship Sanctuary.

(2) Helicopter medevacs were generally completed within 20 minutes. Medevacs were generally satisfactory, even though rugged terrain, bad weather, and enemy activity created extremely adverse conditions in several instances.

d. Transportation. Transportation requirements were minimal. The 26th Marine Regiment provided transportation with support from Co C 9th Motor Transport Battalion.

e. Communications.

(1) The Battalion was under operational control of the 26th Marines during Operation CROCKETT. Wire, radio (including covered voice), and messenger were all employed to higher headquarters. Hot lines were maintained from the Battalion COC to the Regimental COC and to 1st Battalion COC.

(2) Communications with Division were available through the Regimental Switchboard via TRC-97 and MRC-62 Radio Relay.

(3) Due to rugged terrain blocks and dead spaces in the area, communication stability was maintained through the use of an FM relay on Hill 950. Vertical, half-rhombic and long wire antennas had to be used to communicate from valleys to the Southeast of Khe Sanh.

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(4) The Battalion employed wire for communications with all units within Khe Sanh Base Area. A perimeter Security Net was maintained with all units on the Khe Sanh Perimeter on a 24 hour basis.

(5) Equipment failures were infrequent and repairs were effected timely. Power was obtained and stable at all times due to the use of a PU-259F/G.

(6) Overall, communications during CROCKETT were adequate.

f. Medical Evaluation.

(1) The BAS handled all routine medical problems and performed minor surgical operations. One tent, capable of holding 12-15 patients, was used as a ward for hospitalization, observation, and treatment of minor casualties.

(2) The BAS did not have the facilities for more extensive surgical procedures or for dental treatment. Consequently, all patients requiring major surgery or dental work were evacuated to A-Med at PHU BAI, NSA at DA NANG, or the U.S.S. Sanctuary.

(3) Prevention programs were maintained against malaria and heat casualties. The malaria control program consisted of one chloroquine-primaquine tablet each Sunday. Mosquito repellent and head nets were issued to all personnel. Continuous emphasis was placed on salt and water intake, and all personnel were required to take at least 8 salt tablets a day. Both programs were closely supervised by the company and small-unit leaders of the Battalion.

(4) The most common disorders treated at BAS were skin infections, cellulitis, and boils. In addition, a large number of sprains were sustained in one operation in the jungle in the southern eastern portion of the AO.

12. Special Equipment and Techniques.

a. The M-16E1 rifle, with which the Battalion had been equipped the previous month, was used throughout Operation CROCKETT. The weapon performed satisfactorily, and acceptance of the weapon increased as the men of the Battalion became more accustomed to it.

b. During Operation CROCKETT, the Battalion had its first opportunity to work with a Scout Dog Team. The team was attached out to the companies and the dogs were employed on patrols and ambushes. At night the dogs were extremely effective at detecting movement up to ranges of 200 meters, and served as an excellent early warning device. During the daylight hours, however, the dogs were adversely affected by the heat and the terrain and were more of a burden on patrols than a benefit.

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13. Commander's Analysis.

During Operation CROCKETT, companies from this Battalion operated throughout the TAOR, conducting extensive patrols during the daylight hours, and establishing ambushes at night. Although the Battalion covered a large area of ground during the operation, it only made solid contact with the enemy in one instance on Hill 689 on the afternoon following the mortar/rocket attacks on the KHE SANH Base during the morning of 27 June. In this battle, Company I and Company L encountered elements of an estimated two NVA companies in well-established positions. After heavy fighting, the two companies succeeded in driving the enemy from the hill.

The following day, the Battalion Command Group and Company M joined Company I and Company L in the Hill 689 area. For the following ten days, patrols were conducted throughout the area, but the Battalion never regained contact, as the enemy apparently fled to the west.

The remainder of the operation was uneventful. Patrols discovered several enemy bodies, rocket firing positions, bunkers, and harboring sites, but no contact was made with the enemy. On several occasions, the Battalion was placed on standby for Operation BUFFALO, but at no time were any units from the Battalion committed outside the AO.

The operation to date has proved invaluable since it has given the command extensive experience in the use and coordination of supporting arms. The Command Group was deployed to the field allowing it to regain the edge it had had during CHINOOK I and II.

Individually, Marines have been conditioned to a tougher, more elusive and determined enemy who will stay and fight. They are becoming increasingly insured to mountain and jungle operations and conditioned to the need to seek out, fix and destroy the enemy.

Unlike other areas in which this Battalion has been employed, coordination of Command with other units and through a Regimental Headquarters characterizes this TAOR. Units cannot afford to move without supporting arms or out of immediate registration range. All movements are planned as movements to contact with extensive use of supporting arms coordinated and controlled by the regimental FSCC.

There was only one instance of psychological operations during Operation CROCKETT. Shortly after the battle of Hill 689, pictures were taken of the battlefield and a leaflet was compiled for an landing on the suspected harbor site of the 8th Battalion, 29th NVA Regiment.

Civil action was minimal during Operation CROCKETT. Liaison was maintained through Regiment and the Battalion operated in direct support of CROCK.

14. Recommendations.

A. Movement. Although in certain areas, movement along the high ground appears to offer the advantages of observation, ease of movement and resupply, better tactical control and increased rate of advance, experience indicates that these apparent advantages are offset by the fact that the enemy enjoys most of these benefits and they tend to be minus factors for your own unit. Jungle search and destroy operations, designed to fix and locate the enemy, should be conducted with as much stealth and secrecy as possible. Movement to the high ground is a must to the high ground.

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to the high ground is necessary from time to time in order to get fixes to determine pinpoint locations, to accept resupply, to register defensive concentrations, to establish or re-establish communications which are marginal in the valleys and in dense canopy, to effect medevacs and, particularly in areas of known or suspected enemy concentrations, for interim defensive purposes for temporary operating bases from which patrols may operate to locate the enemy.

In most of these circumstances, defensible locations which can also serve as OP's, LZ's, etc. can be found which will satisfy the the commander's needs, including air support of all types, as long as direction of approach and retirement are rigidly controlled. This command has found that sustained movement over high ground covered with low jungle growth and 10 to 14 ft high elephant grass is extremely arduous and fatiguing, and requires enormous amounts of water to prevent heat casualties which, in turn, require inordinate water resupply by helo. These, together with the unit's movement pinpoint your location. Patrols can be sent to valleys or streambeds for water, but this slows the rate of advance unacceptably.

In short, it is recommended that, except for the reasons mentioned, movement be restricted to the routes the enemy travels -- the low ground. Here he finds shelter, water, food, remains free of observation and interdiction and enjoys an acceptable rate of movement. Caution should be exercised to insure that individuals and units remain dispersed, and tight security - particularly point security - is exercised. Stream beds will show signs of movement, trails leading therefrom must be checked and open dominating terrain must be scouted carefully. Reaction plans should be carefully formulated and rehearsed. Constant artillery H&I's should cover the movement, with occasional radical shifts to disrupt the impact patterns which might divulge a unit's course.

b. Unreliability of Maps. Maps of areas covered by heavy canopy should be suspect and should not be considered completely reliable. This unit encountered several good sized, uncharted streams in one area. Direction of flow, careful terrain analysis and thorough and continuous reconnaissance are ~~needed~~. In addition well traveled trails were not shown and one large trail no longer existed.

c. Rate of March. For planning purposes, depending on the type of canopy encountered (single or double) company sized units should calculate rate of advance at between 3000-4000 meters/day. This allows for necessary front, rear, lateral reconnaissance, and stops while OP's are utilized and resupply, etc. is accomplished. Movement along streams may be calculated at between 4000-6000 meters daily.

d. Special Equipment.

(1) Whenever possible, long range rations should be utilized particularly since most movement follow streams. Hence requisite water will be no problem. If "C" rations are used or delivered by helo resupply, insure the cardboard box container is removed and rations are delivered in sandbags. This eliminates disposal problems and precludes leaving tell-tale signs around. All waste cans should be cut out at both ends, flattened, buried and camouflaged. With a plentiful water supply, troops can do adequately on two (2) meals/day. Minimize helo resupply by planning on moving with a minimum of 4 meals per man.

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(2) Stokes Litter. It is essential that supporting helicopters be thoroughly briefed and be equipped to evacuate by use of Stokes Litter. In one instance, a Marine slipped off a cliff, broke his hip and had to be "fixed" into a "Horse Collar" in order to effect his medevac.

(3) Demolitions. It is imperative that some planning be given to the amount of demolitions a specific operation may require. Each man should carry some to insure ability to clear LZ's in canopy or for emergency use. Example this command was caught in two (2) large jungle fires. For a time it appeared that we would be trapped. Since we carried extra demolitions, it might have been necessary to blast large holes in the route of escape - a small stream bed. Luckily, we managed to fight our way to a burnt-out area. Here a hasty security force was set up, the balance of the lead company was stripped off their gear, raced back down the trail and assisted those having difficulty. However, plans had already been made for the priority in which gear and equipment would be "cached" along the stream in the hopes of later recovery. Basically the plan provided for dropping all but one meal, weapons, ammo, pyrotechnics, demo, one canteen, and radio and batteries.

(4) Ropes. Based on experience this command recommends that each man carry 10 ft of  $\frac{1}{2}$ " hemp or nylon rope loop-spliced at each end. This allows sufficient rope to ascend or descend steep, sheer cliffs, provides stretcher material, and aids in constructing hasty shelters. As a field expedient rifle slings tied together make an acceptable substitute. In addition, one small grappling hook for each two squads can often be utilized.

e. Personnel. Commanders must insure that only the very ablest and fit personnel are allowed to participate in a jungle operation. Known workhorses must be singled out because they create evacuation problems as non-battle casualties. They will not be able to keep up. Over a six-day period, weight loss per man averages 12-15 lbs.

f. Disease Prophylaxis. It is imperative that unit commanders enforce standard preventive measures to preclude future malaria problems. Whenever movement ceases, sleeves should be buttoned, head nets worn and repellent applied liberally. Needless to say, regular use of malaria pills is mandatory. In addition, to preclude intestinal disorders, strict halizone tablet discipline must be enforced.

g. Size of Unit. It is recommended that a company reinforced with additional communications personnel, scouts, and snipers be considered the maximum size to engage in jungle operations. This does not preclude the use of more than one company or command groups. Planning should be detailed and provide for positioning or moving of forces overland or by helo leap-frogging to allow unit(s) to block while a strike(s) sweeps.

In connection with equipment, basic organic company equipment with some additional machine guns is recommended.

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h. Danger of Fires. Landing zones and other areas proximate to any units should be prepped with HE or VT only--never with WP or other incendiaries. In two instances, LZ's were marked by HUEY rockets, small fires developed in the elephant grass, and by the time units were lifted into the zones, they were faced with a race with fire. Know wind direction, plan avenues of movement or escape, and insure helicopters are readily available in order to effect emergency extraction.

i. Communications. Because of dense canopy and numerous folds in the terrain, units must take all available measures to insure adequate communications, and even then they should be prepared for the possibility of operating without any radio communications. In this case, the unit should carry spare radios and have a preplanned code of pyrotechnics for emergency communication with an AO or someone located in a position to observe. Radio operators should be familiar with such field expedients as vertical, half-rhombic, and long wire antennas. In addition, when possible it is helpful to establish a relay station on the highest terrain in the area.

*K. L. Hoch*  
K. L. HOCH

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