

003A283-67.

UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
 3d Battalion, 26th Marines
 3d Marine Division(Rein), P.M.
 FPO San Francisco 96602

10F10

498167

3/10/211
 3750
 003A28367
 10000000667

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code 1050), Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington, D. C.
 Via: (1) Commanding General, FIF PAG
 (2) Commanding General, III IAF
 (3) Commanding General, Third MarDiv(Rein)

Subj: Command Chronology

Ref: (a) 100 5720.2a
 (b) P.M.Fac0 5750.8
 (c) 3d MarDiv Q 5750.1a

Incl: ✓ (1) Command Chronology for period 1-30 September, 1967 (U)

1. In compliance with the provisions of references (a), (b), and (c) enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. Downgraded at 3 year intervals. Declassified after 12 years IAW DOD Instruction 5200.10.

M. L. 14 Oct. 67

DISPOSITION:

CG, 3d MarDiv	(1)
CO, 26th Mar	(1)
S-3 3/26	(1)
File	(1)

UNCLASSIFIEDCOPY OF COPIES

Sep 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
3d Battalion, 26th Marines
3d Marine Division, (Rein), FIF
FPO San Francisco 96602

COALAND CHRONOLOGY

1 September to 30 September 1967

INDEX

PART I - ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

PART II - NARRATIVE SUMMARY

PART III - SUPPLEMENTAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

- A - Combat Missions Assigned and Significant Operations Conducted
- B - Casualties
- C - Command Relations
- D - Communications-Electronics
- E - Fire Support
- F - Air Support
- G - Administration
- H - Personnel
- I - Intelligence
- J - Civil Affairs
- K - Psychological Warfare
- L - Logistics
- M - Medical-Dental
- N - Training

PART IV - SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE 1

UNCLASSIFIED

PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. DESIGNATIONS

3d Battalion, 26th Marines

COMMANDER

LtCol H. L. ALDRICHAN (1-30Sep67)

SUBORDINATE UNITS

H&S Company

1stLt C. F. KIRKBY (1-3Sep67)
 Capt J. M. DIBBLEY (4-15Sep67)
 2ndLt C. C. CHALMERS (16-30Sep67)
 Capt J. F. COOKE (1-7Sep67)
 1stLt R. M. SCHAFFER (8Sep67)
 Capt L. P. GAULFIELD (9-15Sep67)
 1stLt J. V. COOKE (15-22Sep67)
 1stLt T. A. BARTLEY (23-30Sep67)
 1stLt R. A. DOBLES (1-3Sep67)
 Capt J. R. BROWN JR (4-30Sep67)
 Capt R. D. CAMP JR (1-30Sep67)
 Capt A. D. DODD (1-14Sep67)
 Capt J. H. DASHLEY (15-30Sep67)

Company I

Company K

Company L
Company M2. STAFF OFFICERS

Executive Officer

Maj C. M. MURPHY JR. (1-8Sep67)
 Maj J. H. LOUGHREAN (9-30Sep67)
 1stLt R. D. MCNAUL (1-10Sep67)
 2ndLt R. POST (19-30Sep67)
 2ndLt J. L. KLOX (1-30Sep67)
 1stLt T. A. BARTLEY (1-16Sep67)
 1stLt J. F. KIRKBY (17-30Sep67)
 Capt J. R. MULPITT (1-9Sep67)
 Maj C. M. MURPHY JR. (10-30Sep67)
 Capt A. LAROJABAL JR (1-30Sep67)
 Capt J. L. MULPITT (1-30Sep67)
 2ndLt J. M. SCHLADE (1-30Sep67)
 1stLt J. G. MUSKILL (1-30Sep67)
 Lt R. J. MULPITT, USA (1-7Sep67)

S-1/Adjutant

Personnel Officer

S-2

S-3

S-4

Comm Officer

Supply Officer

Motor Transport Officer

Medical Officer

3. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

USMC	USN	OTHER			
Off 30	Enl 1020	Off 2	Enl 42	Off 1	Enl 1

UNCLASSIFIED

PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

The narrative summary contains only the highlights of activity for the Battalion, particularly the period of 7 to 11 September, when the Battalion was engaged with the enemy during Operation AR 81-1 R. The daily summary of significant events is contained in the After Action Reports of Operation AR 81-1 R and Operation AR 81-2 R and in Operation PULAWI, for which a report will be completed following the termination of that operation.

At the beginning of September, Co's I and L and the "B" Command Group were under the operational control of the 26th Arvines in the KHE SANH area of HUONG HOA District, QUANG TRI Province. Co's K and L and the "A" Command Group were under the operational control of the 9th Arvines in the LAM KI area of CAI LO District, QUANG TRI Province.

On 5 Sep, Co's I and L and the "B" Command Group were helilifted to Camp Carroll and dropped operational control to the 9th Arvines.

On 6 Sep, Co's I, K, and L relieved 2 companies of 1/3 in a defensive perimeter 3000 meters south of the IAB in vic (YD 120668) assuming operational control of a light section of C-103 and a heavy section of tanks at that position.

7 September 1967

At 1150H, while operating west of the Battalion perimeter, the lead elements of Company I's two platoon patrol began receiving small arms fire from 3 sides by an unknown number of enemy vic (YD 110670). The initial fire resulted in 3 USMC WIA. A base of fire was established using small arms fire, M-60, and M-79, and the company attempted to move forward but received 2 USMC KIA. The intense enemy fire prevented the recovery of 1 KIA in a bomb crater, but the remainder of the casualties were recovered. An AO sighted 6 IVA in fighting holes, one with an automatic weapon, and one IVA in a bunker. The AO called for fixed wing and Co I(-) formed a perimeter, recovering the KIA at 1310H as the enemy moved south and then southwest through hedgerows.

At 1320H, all USMC WIA's were med-evacued and at 1325H the AO directed fixed wing airstrikes resulting in 4 IVA KIA(C). At 1400H, he sighted a squad of IVA vic (YD 106674) and called an artillery mission on them with unknown results. He also reported a new foot trail vic (YD 093669) with much evidence of recent movement, and many new bunkers vic (YD 094665).

Company K, with tanks attached, left the perimeter and moved to link up with Co I(-) in order to sweep the area of contact. At 1700H, the companies had joined vic (YD 110670), and Co K began to lead Co I(-) back towards the perimeter. Co I(-) assumed the operational control of the tanks in order to carry out their two USMC KIA's.

At 1720H, the returning Co's received approximately 50 rounds of 140mm rocket as they were moving across rice paddies approximately 500 meters west of the Battalion's perimeter. At the same time, the IVA in estimated Battalion strength, began a coordinated attack of the perimeter, supported by 140mm rockets, artillery, mortars, and .50 cal MG's.

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED] UNCLASSIFIED

Co K continued into the perimeter, but as Co I(-) attempted to continue forward they were hit by another volley of 140mm rockets from the west, and then 82mm mortars from the north. This was followed by extremely heavy .50 cal MG fire and small arms fire. The Co(-) was temporarily split into two perimeters approximately 100 meters apart. At this time, Co I(-) had 7 USMC KIA and 20 USMC WIA. At 1735H, one squad was assaulted by 15 NVA supported by mortar fire, but they were repulsed, resulting in 7 NVA KIA(C) and 3 NVA KIA(P), and the squad rejoined the perimeter. The two perimeters consolidated into one with the tanks, and one tank received a direct hit by an RPG rendering it non-operational.

From 1740H to 1745H, the Battalion perimeter received 3 volleys of assorted rocket, artillery, and mortar fire, numbering approximately 60 rounds of 140mm rocket and 70 rounds of 82mm mortar. Intense small arms and automatic weapons fire were also received, and the Battalion returned fire with all organic weapons. In addition, counter-battery fires were delivered on suspected enemy rocket and mortar positions. During this period, Hqs Co received 2 KIA and 16 WIA, Co L received 6 WIA, and Co K, which had just reentered the perimeter, received 1 KIA and 3 WIA.

At 1755H, I-1 fired RPG's, machine guns, and small arms fire at 3 NVA they sighted in vic (ID 122667).

From 1745H to 1805H, the Battalion tightened its perimeter during a short lull in the fighting. Co K moved into its positions on the perimeter, and I-2 moved from vic (ID 121667) to vic (ID 118667) to reinforce I-3 which was manning all of Co I's sector of the perimeter.

At 1805H, I-3 repulsed a strong assault by an undetermined number of NVA resulting in 1 USMC KIA (Platoon Commander), 5 USMC WIA, 7 NVA KIA(C), 4 NVA KIA(P), and 1 POW. At 1820H, Co K received an unknown number of artillery rounds, resulting in 6 USMC WIA.

At 1830H, fixed wing air arrived on station and conducted an airstrike on an NVA Company in the open, which had been reported by the AO. I-1 also saw mortars and two .50 cal machine guns 200 meters north of Co I(-)'s position. The airstrikes ceased the mortar fire and resulted in one NVA Company KIA(P). A second airstrike eliminated one of the .50 cal machine guns. From that point on the NVA activity near Co I(-)'s position consisted mainly of probes, and the tanks fired穿甲弹 rounds at all NVA movement.

At 1830H, Co I-1 received RPG's and small arms fire which resulted in 7 USMC WIA. Fire was returned by Co K with unknown results.

At 1832H, the Battalion perimeter received coordinated attacks with rockets, artillery, mortars, RPG's, and infantry. The attacks were repulsed with organic weapons, artillery, and fixed wing aircraft which strafed and dropped napalm and 250 lb bombs within 100 meters of the perimeter.

At 1838H, the Battalion perimeter received an unknown number of rocket, artillery, and mortar rounds, and at 1910H more rounds were received in addition to infantry probes on three sides. I-3 repulsed 15 NVA using RPG's, machine guns, and small arms fire, when they attempted to penetrate I-3's sector of the perimeter. The resulting casualties were; 1 USMC KIA, 2 NVA KIA (C), and 5 NVA KIA (P).

-4-

ENCLOSURE (1)

[REDACTED] UNCLASSIFIED

At 1910H, 1-1 moved form vic (YD 121667) to vic (YD 120667) to tighten the perimeter. While moving they came under heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire which they returned, inflicting 3 LVA KIA(P).

At 1945H, the enemy offensive activity decreased greatly as they began to drag away their casualties. At 2015H, a mini-gunship and flare-ship arrived on station and began to support both the Battalion and Co I (-) perimeters with illumination and well directed fire.

From 2030H to 2300H, the Battalion perimeter received sporadic probes with small arms fire and ChiCom hand grenades. Small arms fire, 81mm mortars and M-79's were returned with unknown results.

By 2300H, the enemy activity had slackened, both perimeters had been well consolidated, and helicopters landed at both locations to evacuate casualties and provide a resupply of ammunition. At this time, Co I (-) reported 13 KIA, but it was determined that 6 of them had returned to the Battalion perimeter.

8 September 1967

At 0010H, I-3 received small arms fire and grenades from an unknown number of LVA. Small arms fire and grenades were returned and the enemy broke contact with unknown results.

At 0030H, Co I received a probe by an unknown number of LVA firing small arms and RPG's, and returned fire immediately. The enemy broke contact with unknown results.

At 0100H, Co I (-) received a probe by an unknown number of NVA firing small arms and RPG's, and throwing ChiCom grenades. Fire was returned and the enemy broke contact. Results were: 9 USMC WIA, 3 NVA KIA (C), and 9 NVA KIA (P).

From 0300H to 0400H, both perimeters received sporadic small arms fire which resulted in no friendly casualties. The fire was returned with unknown results.

At 0645H, Co I (-) and Co K began searching the areas of their contacts for KIA's and enemy casualties. Co K moved to assist Co I (-) in their search and evacuation of casualties.

Co M found 1 NVA POW vic (YD 119669), who was evacuated to the 9th Marines POW compound. 16 NVA KIA (C) were found, and blood pools and drag marks evidencing 8 NVA KIA(P) were also found. The following equipment was captured: 1 SKS rifle, light, machine gun with 4 drum magazines and ammunition, 1 heavy machine gun mount, 8 ChiCom grenades, 500 rounds of linked ammunition, and 30 pounds of assorted equipment.

I-3 founded RPG in a large blood pool, 1 SKS rifle with brain fragments on the stock, 8 ChiCom grenades, and 10 pounds of assorted equipment.

Co K, while moving to link up with Co I (-) located 7 NVA KIA's from the previous. Six were USMC KIA's and one was WIA. One friendly KIA had been stripped of everything except his trousers. In addition, 7 NVA KIA(C) were found.

A search of the Co I (-) contact area produced 10 KVA KIA (C) and 20 NVA KIA(P) as evidenced by blood pools, flesh fragments, and drag marks.

(5)

ENCLOSURE (1)
UNCLASSIFIED

(retyped on 4-24-84)

UNCLASSIFIED

At 1910H, I-1 moved from vic (YD 121667) to vic (YD 120667) to tighten the perimeter. While moving, they came under heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire which they returned, inflicting 3 NVA KIA(P).

At 1945H, the enemy offensive activity decreased greatly as they began to drag away their casualties. At 2015H, a mini-ship and flareship arrived on station and began to support both the Battalion and Co I(-) perimeters with illumination and well directed fire.

From 2030H to 2300H, the Battalion perimeter received sporadic probes with small arms fire and Chicom hand grenades. Small arms fire, 82mm mortars and M-79's were returned with unknown results.

By 2300H, the enemy activity had slackened, both perimeters had been well consolidated, and helicopters landed at both locations to evacuate casualties and provide a resupply of ammunition. At this time, Co I(-) reported 13 KIA, but it was determined that 6 of them had returned to the Battalion perimeter.

2 September 1967

At 0010H, I-3 received small arms fire and grenades from an unknown number of NVA. Small arms fire and grenades were returned and the enemy broke contact with unknown results.

At 0030H, Co I received a probe by an unknown number of NVA firing small arms and RPG's, and returned fire immediately. The enemy broke contact with unknown results.

At 0100H, Co I(-) received a probe by an unknown number of NVA firing small arms and RPG's, and throwing Chicom grenades. Fire was returned and the enemy broke contact. Results were: 9 USMC KIA, 3 NVA KIA (C), and 9 NVA KIA(P).

From 0300H to 0400H, both perimeters received sporadic small arms fire which resulted in no friendly casualties. The fire was returned with unknown results.

At 0645H, Co I(-) and Co I began searching the areas of their contacts for KIA's and enemy casualties. Co K moved to assist Co I(-) in their search and evacuation of casualties.

Co I found 1 NVA POW vic (YD 119669), who was evacuated to the 9th Marines POW compound. 16 NVA KIA (C) were found, and blood pools and drag marks evidencing 8 NVA KIA(P) were also found. The following equipment was captured: 1 SKS rifle, 1 light machine gun with 4 drum magazines and ammunition, 1 heavy machine gun mount, 8 Chicom grenades, 500 rounds of linked ammunition, and 30 pounds of assorted equipment.

I-3 found 1 RPG in a large blood pool, 1 SKS rifle with brain fragments on the stock, 8 Chicom grenades, and 10 pounds of assorted equipment.

Co K, while moving to link up with Co I(-) located 7 KIA's from the previous. Six were USMC KIA's and one was KIA. One friendly KIA had been stripped of everything except his trousers. In addition, 7 NVA KIA (C) were found.

A search of the Co I(-) contact area produced 10 NVA KIA(C) and 20 NVA KIA(P) as evidenced by blood pools, flesh fragments, and drag marks.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

At 0930H, Co K and Co I(=) returned to the Battalion perimeter with all personnel and equipment.

By 1000H, all remaining emergency med-evacs were completed although 1 helicopter had crashed on take off. Co K(=) moved with the tanks and remaining friendly WIA's to the MSR to evacuate casualties and equipment and meet Co L on the resupply convoy.

At 1120H, the Command Group, Co K, and Co I departed south for a new operating base, while Co L remained behind to provide security for the downed helicopter.

At 1150H, Co L arrived with the resupply convoy. While debarking from the trucks, Co L received 20 rounds of 140mm rocket which resulted in 1 USMC KIA and 28 USMC WIA.

After the completion of the resupply, Co K(=) and Co L returned to link up with the remainder of the Battalion, which was establishing a night time position on an unnumbered hill vic (YD 113659).

At 2215H, Co I received one round of an unknown size artillery resulting in 1 USMC KIA.

9 September 1967

During the day, Co L and Co I conducted local patrols to the south and southeast.

At 1600H, the Battalion moved to Hill 48 vic (YD 113652) where it established a CP and night defensive positions.

10 September 1967

At 0720H, Company L began a sweep along the ridgeline to vic (YD 108645), while the remainder of the Battalion remained at the CP and perimeter until it was resupplied at 1300H.

At 1330H, Co I began moving west, passing Co L and moving towards the Battalion objective in vic (YD 101643). At 1500H, I-3 while moving up towards an unnumbered hill in vic (YD 093643) came under intense small arms fire from close range, supplemented with ChiComgrenades. Two USMC were wounded, and I-3 returned small arms fire and I-79 while organizing and pulling back towards the Company perimeter. 60mm mortars were fired on the enemy positions, and an AC in the area began directing fixed wing air strikes.

At 1520H, Co I began forming a defensive perimeter in vic (YD 102644) in order to call in med-evacs. Co L with one gun tank and one flame tank moved forward to link up with Co I.

At 1545H, a med-evac helicopter evacuated Co I's WIA.

At 1555H, Co's I and L began receiving small arms fire and 60mm mortars, and the tanks moved in to reinforce the perimeter.

At 1615H, Co L and Co K, with the Battalion CP group received an estimated 60 rounds of 140mm rockets followed by a coordinated attack by NVA wearing USMC flight jackets and helmets. A defensive perimeter was immediately formed in vic (YD 1122648).

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

At 1630H, Co I and Co L also came under attack by NVA wearing USMC equipment and supported by 60mm mortars.

At 1637H, Co K and Co M received 12 rounds of 140mm rockets followed by 12 rounds at 1645H.

At 1655H, Co I and Co L came under an extremely heavy assault from the north and west sides of their perimeter by an estimated NVA Battalion. Fixed wing air, which was on station, began making strikes immediately, and napalm consistently fell 50 to 75 meters from the friendly lines. The flame tank and gun tank took direct hits from RPG's fired from approximately 75 meters. The flame tank was destroyed and burned the remainder of the night, and the gun tank was rendered useless and rolled into a draw in vic (ID 103643). The crews of both the tanks withdrew into the defensive perimeter.

At 1700H, the tank supporting Co K fired on 107 NVA in front of their lines with unknown results.

From 1705H to 1754H, each company reported numerous sightings of NVA in various sized units maneuvering around both defensive perimeters.

At 1755H, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines reported a reaction company (rein) on standby to reinforce 3/26 from the east, and 3d Battalion, 9th Marines had a reaction company on standby at the artillery position at C-2.

At 1800H, 3/4 reported Co I and Co M on standby.

At 1815H, Helicopters began coming in to evacuate wounded and resupply the perimeters.

At 1816H, the CP had established a tight 360 degree perimeter and Co M was attempting to pull into the perimeter on the north and west sides. Tactical air, artillery, and continuous illumination for the night was requested.

At 1825H, the CP received heavy incoming rocket and mortar fire and the NVA appeared to be massing for an attack.

At 1832H, gunships and flareships were on the way and fixed wing was on station.

At 1846H, Co K began receiving heavy mortar fire, and Co I and Co L continued to receive heavy small arms fire and mortars.

At 1852H, I-1 was pinned down in a bomb crater 70 meters west of the CP.

At 1900H, Co L pulled back towards the CP to consolidate the lines and was forced to abandon a disabled tank.

At 1905H, an emergency resupply was attempted to Co I and Co L and although suppressive fires were delivered, the enemy fire was too intense and the helicopter could not land.

At 1950H, a flareship arrived on station. Co K and Co M had formed a tight perimeter around the CP and were boxed in with well aimed artillery.

At 2030H, the enemy ground attack ceased although 60mm mortars were still being received by Co I and Co L.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

A. COMBAT MISSIONS ASSIGNED AND SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS CONDUCTED.

At the beginning of September, 3d Battalion, Twenty-Sixth Marines was, in effect, two Battalions(-), each with separate missions in separate areas under separate regiments. Command Group "A", Company K and Company L were participating in Operation KINGFISHER under the operational control of the Ninth Marines in the DONG HA area. Command Group "B", Company I, and Company H were participating in Operation ANDORRE under the operational control of the Twenty-Sixth Marines in the YEN SAM area.

At DONG HA, the Battalion missions were assigned by the Ninth Marines. These missions included Battalion(-) sized operations in designated areas of the KINGFISHER AO, Sparrow Hawk, convoy security, election security, and local patrolling near the DONG HA Combat Base.

From 1 September to 3 September, Company L participated in Operation LIBERTY, operating in the area south of CAP-P2.

During this period Company K and the CP were at DONG HA, where Company K provided the Sparrow Hawk.

On 6 and 7 September, Co I provided security for Rough Riders between DONG HA and Camp Evans.

At YEN SAM, the Battalion(-) was responsible for a portion of Gray Sector on the KHL SAM perimeter, conducted local patrols, ambushes, and listening posts, provided security for convoys and minesweeps, provided the Regimental Reserve Company, and conducted Company sized operations in designated portions of the ANDORRE AO.

On 1 September, Company H, which was operating in the area southeast of the YANG TRI - DA K'ONG river junction, returned to YEN SAM when the Battalion(-) was placed on standby for Operation KINGFISHER. The Battalion(-) was helilifted to Camp Carroll on 5 September and on 6 September it linked up with Company K and Command Group "A" and moved by vehicle to an area south of CAI THIEN, where the three companies were joined by Company L on 8 September and continued to operate in this area until 11 September.

In two battles against the 812th NVA Regiment on 7 and 10 September, this Battalion was engaged in the hardest fighting it had encountered since arriving in Vietnam. The Battalion inflicted over 500 NVA casualties in this five-day operation.

On 11 September, the Battalion relieved 3/4 of the defense of C-2 and CAI LO. Co I, Co H, and the Command Group were relieved at C-2 by two Companies and the Command Group of 2/4 and moved by convoy to Camp Evans, where they dropped operational control to the Fourth Marines for Operation FREE GIFT. Co K and Co L were relieved at C-2 by two companies from 2/4 on 14 September and moved by convoy to join the remainder of the Battalion in Operation FREE GIFT. While at Camp Evans, Co L assumed responsibility for the perimeter defense, Co L came under the operational control of 2/26, and Co's K and I assumed patrolling, minesweeping, and security responsibilities within the 4th Marines OA.

ENCLOSURE (1)

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

B. CASUALTIES

Friendly Casualties

KIA	55
WIA	434
TOTAL	489

Enemy Casualties

KIA(C)	191
KIA(P)	376
POW	1
TOTAL	568

C. COMMAND RELATIONS

1. With Higher Units. Command Group "B", with Company I and Company L was under the operational control of the Twenty-Sixth Marines at KHE SANH until 5 September, when they were helilifted to Camp Carroll and dropped operational control to the Ninth Marines at 1800H. The entire Battalion operated under the Ninth Marines until 12 September, when the Command Group with Company I and Company L moved to the Fourth Marines. On 14 September Co's K and L moved to Camp Evans to join the remainder of the Battalion, under the operational control of the Fourth Marines.

2. With other Marine Units.

a. Close liaison was maintained with infantry Battalions operating in adjacent areas.

b. At KHE SANH and Camp Evans, boundaries and liaison were established with 1/26 and 1/4 to coordinate all local activities, patrol routes, and fire support. In the CO. TOWER - GAL LO area, direct liaison was maintained with 3/9 and 3/4 concerning reinforcement and fire support.

c. At several times during the month, Companies from this Battalion operated under other units: Company K and Company L under 2/4 at C-2 from 12 to 14 September, and Company L under 2/26 at HAI HOA from 18 September until the end of the month.

d. For matters pertaining to perimeter defense at KHE SANH, the Battalion had operational control of Company A, 3d Anti-Tank Battalion, which was responsible for Red Sector.

3. With ARVN/PF/RF Units.

a. While at KHE SANH, the Twenty-Sixth Marines were responsible for relations with Vietnamese Forces in the area, but the Battalion worked only indirectly with the Vietnamese.

b. At DONG HA, the Battalion operated in support of CAP-P2.

c. At Camp Evans, the Fourth Marines were responsible for relations with the Vietnamese Forces in the area, and the Battalion was authorized direct liaison with the various District Headquarters.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

D. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

1. Message Center. Message traffic was picked up and delivered from the Twenty-Sixth Marines Message Center for the 3/26 Command Group "B" at KHE SANH. Message traffic was picked up and delivered from the DONG HA Combat Base Message Center for the 3/26 Command Group "A". Message traffic was picked up and delivered from the Division Comm Center for the 3/26 Admin rear at PHU BAI. Upon arrival at Camp Evans on 12 September, guard for the Battalion was taken by the 4th Marines.

2. Radio. All operational nets at KHE SANH terminated in the COC. All operational nets at the DONG HA Combat Base terminated in the COC. For contact with operating elements at both KHE SANH and DONG HA the radio retransmission site on Hill 950 at KHE SANH was invaluable. All nets at Camp Evans terminate in the COC and contact is made possible with operating units by use of a radio retransmission site on Hill 674.

3. Wire. Normal intra-Battalion wire facilities were installed at KHE SANH. Two trunks were laid to the Regimental switchboard, one hot line to the 26th Marines COC from 3/26 COC, and one hot line to 1/26 COC from 3/26 COC. At DONG HA Combat Base no internal wire was laid, locals to COC and the CO were from the 9th Marines switchboard, one hot line was laid from 9th Marines COC to 3/26 COC. While operating in the COI THIEN area, Battalion wire consisted of hot lines from the CP to the perimeter Companies CP's providing excess distance did not cancel the effectiveness of the TA-1. At Camp Evans normal intra-Battalion wire facilities were installed. Two trunks were laid to the Regimental switchboard and one was laid to the 1/4 switchboard. One hot line was laid from 3/26 COC to 4th Marines COC, one hot line was laid from 3/26 COC to the 81mm mortar FDC, and one hot line was laid from 3/26 COC to 4th Marines COC for artillery data.

4. General. On the recent operation in the COI THIEN area it was found a relay was necessary or field expedient antennas were used to enable communications with higher headquarters at DONG HA Combat Base. Recommended antennas are the vertical, half rhombic and long wire types. Communications were adequate in all respects.

ENCLOSURE (1)

-11-

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~CLASSIFIED~~

a. FIRE SUPPORT

1. THE SAUH. From 1 to 4 September Command Group "B" consisting of the 81mm mortar Platoon Commander, Operations Chief, radio operators, and necessary equipment carried out the normal functions of the FSCC.

2. DOING HA. Command Group "A" of the FSCC was located at DOING HA Combat Base from 1 to 5 September. On 6 September, Command Group "A" and Command Group "B" linked up south of CON THIEN and conducted a sweep from 6 to 11 September. During this period, significant contact with the enemy occurred twice. The enemy used rockets, mortars, and artillery, followed by a ground attack. On both occasions counter battery/mortar fire was fired at suspected enemy positions with unknown results. Friendly artillery and mortar fire was effective on the enemy ground troops. It did not break up their assault, but slowed them down and confused them. When a flare ship was not available during the two contacts, artillery/mortar illumination was fired. On 11 September the Battalion withdrew under artillery fire to artillery position C-2. On 12 September the FSCC with two companies proceeded to Camp Evans.

3. Camp Evans. From 13 to 30 September, the FSCC conducted normal operations. R&I's were fired based on 3-2 intelligence and map reconnaissance. During this period there were numerous fire missions against the VC. On 23 September, Company K's FO fired a mission which resulted in 2 confirmed VC kills. There were no more confirmed kills by artillery during this period.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

-12-

ENCLOSURE (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

F. AIR SUPPORT

1. Air Defense. No enemy aerial activity was encountered during the month of September.

2. Air Support.

a. Med-evacs. A total of 18 Med-evacs were flown during the month of September on these missions, 213 WIA, 52 KIA, and 7 NBC were evacuated.

b. Resupply and Troop Lift. A total of 16 resupply and 7 troop lifts were conducted during September.

c. Fixed Wing. 12 flights of fixed wing flew missions with excellent coverage. Negative surveillance of BDA.

d. Aerial Observer Flights. 6 aerial observers were used to both control fixed wing and check areas for Company Commanders.

e. Flareships. 5 flights of flareships were used on Operation KINGFISH R. 3 on 7 September, 2 on 10 September.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED**G. ADMINISTRATION**

1. No major administrative difficulties were encountered during the period covered by this report. Battalion level personnel accounting proved to be very effective with the organization split into a Forward Command Group and a Rear Command Group. On 16 September, the Administration Rear was moved from PHU BAI to Camp Evans to rejoin the Battalion with no major difficulties.

H. PERSONNEL

1. During the month of September, the Battalion joined 8 Officers and 257 Enlisted personnel while 1 Officer and 26 Enlisted personnel were transferred to COMUS. 4 Officers and 85 Enlisted personnel were reassigned out of country by service records as a result of medical evacuation.

ENCLOSURE (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

I. INTELLIGENCE

1. DONG HA AO (1-13 September)

a. Summary

(1) 3/26 operated in two distinct areas during the reporting period: south of DOG HA in the CAP-P2 AO, where contact was light and in the area south of COM THIEN where contact was the heaviest yet encountered by this Battalion.

(2) During the reporting period the weather was influenced by the Southwest monsoon. The maximum daily temperatures ranged between 85 and 90 degrees. Minimum temperatures range was between 70 and 75 degrees. Total precipitation was approximately 5 inches. The humidity was high, averaging 85%. Visibility was between 2-5 miles, decreasing as cloud cover and precipitation increased. Winds were generally from the west at speeds from 5-10 knots.

(3) Terrain south of COM THIEN was characterized by low slope with banked intermittent streams which stayed wet during this period. The built up area in GS (YD 1166) was found to be in ruins and overgrown. Vegetation consists of extremely dense brush from 5 to 10 feet high broken in low areas by previously cultivated rice paddies. Trails were numerous. The area provides very good cover and concealment.

(4) There are no barriers which could channelize approach into the operating areas, GS (YD 1165) and (YD 1166). Any avenues of approach from the east however, could be observed by the USMC position at C-2 via (YD 134655).

b. Enemy Situation

(1) The enemy in the CAP-P2 area is continuing to harass friendly troop movements possibly operating as a screen for larger NVA elements harboring in the HAI LANG forest. The ridgeline via (YD 2554) is being used as an F0 position. The area is well booby trapped but there are no other indications of increased enemy activity.

(2) The enemy encountered south of COM THIEN was a well disciplined, experienced, and equipped NVA unit. Each company was equipped with a radio and each squad had (1) RPG which was used as an anti-tank and anti-personnel weapon. Artillery/rockets/mortar fires were judged to be well coordinated with infantry "human wave" assaults. In two separate contacts, the enemy attempted to encircle and overrun our defensive positions.

c. Incidents

(1) At 071700H, our defensive position at (YD 119667) began receiving incoming 60mm and 82mm mortars, 140mm rockets, and artillery. At the same time a well coordinated enemy force estimated at two companies attacked the perimeter with AK's, 1G's, SAW's, grenades, and RPG fires. Contact resulted in 51 NVA KIA (C), 61 NVA KIA (P), 1 NVA Captive and 4 weapons captured.

(2) At 101600H, our defensive perimeter at (YD 113652) again came under assault by an NVA force estimated at a Battalion (X). The attack was well coordinated with supporting 50 cal 1G's, 82mm mortars, and 140mm rockets. The ground attack ceased about 2030H, but probes continued during the night. Contact resulted in 140 NVA KIA (C), 315 NVA KIA (P) and 5 weapons captured.

UNCLASSIFIED

d. Cumulative Totals

(1) Enemy Personnel Losses

KIA(C)	191
KIA(P)	376
POW	1

(2) Enemy Equipment Losses

IND WPNS	9
CS WPNS	1
TOT WPNS	10
Clothing and Web Gear (Lbs) 500	

2. CAMP EVANS AO (14-30 September)

a. Summary

(1) During the period 14-30 September, the Battalion effort was characterized as a period of reorganization. There was no significant intelligence gathered physically by the Battalion in the Camp Evans area, although there has been significant intelligence information processed and disseminated from within the immediate area.

(2) Weather. During September, Vietnam was still under the influence of the Southwest Monsoon. In the Camp Evans area, the maximum temperatures were between 85 to 90 degrees. The minimum was between 74 and 78 degrees. The relative humidity was 85%. The rainfall was approximately 4 inches. Visibility was generally 1-7 miles. Winds were generally 5 to 10 knots from the southwest. Tractionability was good, but decreased as the month progressed.

(3) Terrain. The area is characterized by coastal lowland plains, which consists primarily of poorly drained level areas of rice cultivation. Elevation in this area rarely exceeds 35 meters. Vegetation if any consists of brush 3-5 feet high. The map of the area is very accurate. Proceeding inland the elevation ranges from 500 to 700 feet. The vegetation consists of dense forests and jungles, with one to two canopies.

(4) Avenues of Approach.

- (a) The SUNG PO river from (YD 531047) to (YD 751288)
- (b) The SUNG DLAU river from (YD 465419) to (YD 393428)
- (c) The ROCK MY CHANH (YD 340320) to (YD 465408)
- (d) The CO BI THACH LAM Valley via (YD 5229) to (YD 5223) to (YD 6123) to (YD 6129).
- (e) The HOA MY Trail (YD 486275) to (YD 500327)

b. Enemy Situation

(1) The enemy is maintaining sporadic incidents of harassment, mining and mortar attacks. A heavy infiltration throughout the area exists with emphasis on rice gathering and transporting to the mountain areas.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

c. Incidents

(1) There were numerous sightings, contacts and mining incidents throughout the area. The sightings primarily consisted of sighting 3 to 5 people. The contacts were sporadic harassing fires and the mining and booby trapping were directed at primary avenues of approach and normal patrolling areas.

d. Cumulative Totals

(1) Enemy Personnel Losses

KIA(C)	5
KIA(P)	4
DNM (IV)	6

(2) Enemy Equipment Losses

END WGS	1
TOTAL WGS	1

-17-

ENCLOSURE (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

J. CIVIL AFFAIRS

1. Due to operational commitments, no civil affair programs were initiated. However, normal liaison has been established and preparations have been made for future operations in the civil affairs for the Camp Evans area. Also classes have begun for the purpose of familiarizing the personnel on Vietnam's customs, religions, and it's history.

K. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. The unit has not initiated any PsyOps activities due to operational commitments in the Camp Evans area. However, the unit is preparing to exploit the use of the Kit Carson Scouts for broad events. Also, an extensive civil affairs program is planned.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

b. LOGISTICS

1. General. Logistics support was satisfactory during September. There were no major problems obtaining supplies, transportation, or food services.

2. General Supplies. General supplies were adequate except for a shortage of sandbags and 7.62 gear.

3. Transportation.

a. Transportation was provided by both the 26th Marines Regiment and 9th Motor Transport Battalion thru the 9th Marines S-4 at DONG HA. Service was excellent. At Camp Evans transportation was provided by 3d Motor Transport Battalion thru the 4th Marines S-4. Service was excellent.

b. Command Group "A" and two rifle companies moved by convoy from DONG HA to Camp Evans. The move was effected without any major problems.

c. Due to the overall tactical commitments of the Battalion, tactical runs were frequent. Administrative runs with organic vehicles were held to a minimum.

4. Resupply. At both DONG HA and Camp Evans, resupply was accomplished both by truck convoy and helicopters.

5. Ordnance. Ordnance support was provided by FLSU-1, DONG HA, and FLSU-A, PHU BAI, and LSA at Camp Evans.

6. Maintenance Support. Maintenance support was furnished by FLSU-1, DONG HA, and FLSU-A, PHU BAI, service was satisfactory.

7. Food Service. This unit ate in 9th Marines mess hall at DONG HA. Food was satisfactory in quality. A field mess hall was operated by this unit at Camp Evans. There were adequate quantities of food and supplies, and food was satisfactory in quality. Throughout the month, the field mess hall at Camp Evans served two full meals at breakfast and supper with hot soup and sandwiches at lunch.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

3. MEDICAL/MILITARY

1. Personnel. The BAS consisted of 41 personnel at the end of the month. This included 40 hospital corpsmen and one medical officer.

2. Capabilites. The BAS was capable of treating all minor medical and surgical problems. At KHE SANH, one GP tent was utilized as a holding ward with a capacity for 12-16 patients. Patients requiring more extensive care were transferred to the 3d Medical Battalion at PHU BAI. During the operations in DONG HA the BAS utilized one GP tent for sick call routines and emergencies. All patients requiring extensive care were evacuated to D Med at DONG HA. At the end of the month the BAS moved into tropical hardbacks in Camp Evans, and was utilizing one for sick call and minor surgery and administration. Another hardback was used for the ward and doctors' office and a third for corpsmen quarters. One GP tent was utilized for the supply storage.

3. Dental. There were no facilities for dental care at BAS. In KHE SANH dental patients were referred to Sub-Unit Five for limited care. At DONG HA they were referred to D Med facilities. At Camp Evans, they are being referred to the Regimental Aid Station (4th Battalion) for treatment. All patients requiring extensive dental care were evacuated to 3rd Medical Battalion at PHU BAI.

4. Sanitation. Daily sanitation inspections were made throughout the month.

5. Statistics. The following statistics for the period ending 1 Oct 67, from 1 Sep 67:

DIAGNOSIS	H&S	I	K	L	M	OTHER BN	TOTAL
BURNS	2	0	1	0	0	1	4
INFECTIONS	26	54	47	6	62	18	254
DIARRHEA	7	1	3	6	1	5	23
LACERATIONS	2	4	0	1	1	2	10
FUO	2	1	2	0	1	3	9
COLDS	8	6	8	4	2	4	32
DENTAL	3	2	14	10	7	0	36
RASH	10	14	8	12	6	14	64
STOMACH DISORDERS	6	5	6	8	2	4	31
MIGRAINES	3	5	8	7	8	10	41
EEYES	4	8	9	4	3	0	28
FOOT DISORDERS	6	14	8	18	6	9	61
OTHERS	30	68	18	26	15	23	165
TOTAL	105	192	132	159	13	93	794
KIA	11	21	10	7	6		55
WIA	89	113	74	78	30		434

UNCLASSIFIED

2. TRAINING

The following training was conducted during September.

1. Orientation. Personnel joined as replacements during the month received an orientation to Vietnam, from the Commanding Officer. Upon being assigned to a Company, they received orientations from their respective Company Commanders.

2. Familiarization and Zero Firing of Personal Weapons. All personnel joining the Battalion in September, fired at least 120 rds of familiarization if they carried M-16's. In addition, all personnel who had not previously zeroed their weapons were required to do so. The Camp Evans range was used for zeroing, fan-firing, and test firing weapons. Personnel issued .45 cal pistols were also required to fire their weapons.

3. Because of the large number of new replacements who joined the Battalion in the last half of the month, the Battalion introduced a complete training program shortly after arriving at Camp Evans. The following subjects were to be included:

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>PERSONS TO BE TAUGHT</u>	<u>INSTRUCTOR</u>
Mines and Booby Traps	All Personnel	
Nature of the Enemy	All Personnel	S-2
VN History, Culture, and Religion	All Personnel	Chaplain
BuddyAid/First Aid	All Personnel	Company Corporals
Convoy Security and Immediate action	All Personnel	Company Level
Supporting Arms (Air, Arty, S1's)	Unit Leaders	A1O/FAC's/ FSC
Reporting	Unit Leaders	FO's
Demolitions	O351 Personnel	Company Level
		Company Level

4. In addition to these required subjects, all Companies conducted their own independent training. Special emphasis was placed on scouting and patrolling techniques, fire discipline, individual movement, noise and light discipline, and ambush techniques. The variations to the "school" techniques that have been adapted because of the nature of terrain and the enemy were stressed.

5. Hospital corpsmen received on the job training under the supervision of the Medical Officer and the Chief Hospital Corpsmen. The classes emphasized field medical techniques and diagnostic care.

UNCLASSIFIED

PART IV

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS/NFF

1. The following messages and orders governed the activity of the Battalion during the months:

- a. Ninth Marines 020945HSep67
- b. Third Bn, Twenty-Sixth Marines Frag 0 9-67
- c. Ninth Marines 031530ZSep67 (Planning Message)
- d. Fourth Marines 111445ZSep67 (Movement of 2/4 and 3/26 by Rough Rider 101/67 and 102/67)
- e. Fourth Marines 160351ZSep67 (Frag 0 45-67 for Operation FRENCH)
- f. CG Third MarDiv 170430ZSep67 (MAK HOA Rock Crusher/Bridge Security)
- g. Fourth Marines 200830ZSep67
- h. Fourth Marines 270230ZSep67 (Frag 0 47-67 for Operation FRENCH)
- i. Fourth Marines 250545ZSep67

-22-

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (1)