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10-26 Mar 1965

Amphibious Sgdn - 1: Ex JUNGLE DRUM III Rgt

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AMPHIBIOUS SQDN-1: Exercise JUNGLE DRUM III Rpt, 10-26 Mar 1965

PhibRon-1, Report of Exercise JUNGLE DRUM III, PACFLT Rpt Symbol 3100-1,
1 Jun 65 [S&C 284 694 &279 634] 10-26 Mar 65

PacCom, Outline of a Significant Military Exercise - JUNGLE DRUM III, N/D
[S&C 272 967]

CTF-133, Operation Order 300-65, 8 Mar 1965

MESSAGES:

CinCPac, "Significant Exercise Report", 312325Z Dec 1964

CinCPacFlt, "WESTPAC Posture during Ex JUNGLE DRUM III", 270657Z Jan 1965

FMFPac, "Ex JUNGLE DRUM III", 280002Z Feb 1965

CTG 131, Press Release 1-65, 121015Z Mar 65

"	"	"	3-65	121017Z	Mar 65
"	"	"	4-65,	130813Z	Mar 65
"	"	"	5-65,	140430Z	Mar 65

"	"	"	7-65,	16-507Z	Mar 65
"	"	"	8-65,	171005Z	Mar 65

"	"	"	11-65,	211345Z	Mar 65
"	"	"	12-65,	220455Z	Mar 65

"	"	"	15-65,	250820Z	Mar 65
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7th Fleet, "Congrats", 200856Z Mar 65

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Ser: N6-0186
21 JUL 1965

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SECOND ENDORSEMENT on Commander Amphibious Squadron ONE ltr ser 070
of 1 Jun 65

From: Commander SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Report of Exercise JUNGLE DRUM III, PACFLT Report Symbol 3100-1 (U)

1. Forwarded, concurring in the basic comments, conclusions and recommendations.
2. Many of the problems which arose in this exercise resulted from the reduction in scope from a Marine Expeditionary Brigade to a Marine Expeditionary Unit exercise because of additional requirements in the RVN. This reduction in forces from those originally assigned took place throughout much of the planning phase, rather than at one time, which further compounded the problem. As a result, a certain amount of jury-rigging was required as force levels decreased.
3. However, the overall effect of this exercise is considered to have been excellent in view of the benefits derived by the Thai Navy and Marine Corps. Small as this exercise was, it was still the largest amphibious exercise in which the Thais have participated.

PAUL P. BLACKBURN, JR.

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COMLANSHIPRON NINE	1
CO, TACRON TWELVE	1
USS CANBERRA	1
USS LENAWE	1
USS WASHBURN	1
USS GUNSTON HALL	1
USS COOK	1
USS EPPING FOREST	1
USS PERCH	1
USS JOSEPH STRAUSS	1
USS SMALL	1
OIC WESTPAC DET NAVBEACHGRU ONE	1
OIC UDT 12 DET	1
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
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AUTHENTICATED:


J. WATSON
Flag Secretary

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FG1/1/31:djd
03500
Ser: 077
23 June 1965

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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on Commander Amphibious Squadron ONE ltr ser 070 dtd 1 JUN 65

From: Commander Amphibious Force U. S. SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet
Via: Commander U. S. SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Report of Exercise JUNGLE DRUM III, PACFLT Report Symbol 3100-1


1. Forwarded, concurring in the basic comments, conclusions and recommendations and with the following additional comments:

a. Restricted waterways training accomplished during the exercise enabled the amphibious force and embarked landing force to use these same methods and techniques with excellent results during the landing at Hue-Phu Bai shortly after the completion of JUNGLE DRUM III.

b. The need for a suitable shallow water river craft, adequately protected, was again demonstrated in this exercise. It is recommended that a study by the Amphibious Warfare Evaluation Board be made of this projected need.

2. Distribution of this exercise report for other than SEVENTH Fleet Commands will be delayed pending approval by CINCPACFLT.

Distribution:
In accordance with basic correspondence


D. W. WULZEN

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By Wulzen
Apr 11 1965

10-26 Nov 1965

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San Francisco, California - 96601

CPR-1:CRG:nn
3100(2)
Ser: 070
1 June 1965

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From: Commander Amphibious Squadron ONE
To: Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet
Via: (1) Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Report of Exercise JUNGLE DRUM III, PACFLT Report Symbol 3100-1

Ref: (a) COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT OPCODE 311-65, Annex X
(b) FXP-5(A) and PACFLT Supplement Number ONE

Encl: (1) Training and Test Objectives of Exercise JUNGLE DRUM III
(2) Task Organization of Forces Participating
(3) Comments and Recommendations
(4) Personnel and Material Casualties
(5) People to People Program

1. General. This report is submitted in accordance with references (a) and (b). Exercise JUNGLE DRUM III was a combined United States/Thailand amphibious exercise conducted on the southeast coast of Peninsula Thailand during the period 10-26 March 1965. The purpose of the exercise was to provide training in planning and executing an amphibious operation including quick reaction and restricted waterway operations, and to develop close working relationships and mutual understanding between U. S. and Thai forces.

Force Commanders and their Deputies were as follows:

Officer Conducting Exercise.RADM E. S. MILLER, USN
Commander Expeditionary Force.RADM E. S. MILLER, USN
Deputy Commander Expeditionary Force. . .	.RADM SATAP, RTN
Exercise Director.RADM E. S. MILLER, USN
Deputy Exercise Director.CAPT Yoth PHAGPOLGAM, RTN
Commander Amphibious Task Force.CAPT R. W. CLARK, USN
Deputy Commander Amphibious Task Force. .	.CAPT Sutep VASANTASING, RTN
Commander Landing Force.COL W. M. GRAHAM, Jr., USMC
Commander Advance Force.CAPT M. W. WOODS, USN

Specific training and test objectives for the exercise are set forth in enclosure (1). Forces that participated are listed in enclosure (2).

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2. Conduct of Exercise.

a. General. In spite of a reduction in scope and forces assigned, the broad purpose of the exercise, as stated in paragraph one above, was considered well accomplished. The exercise provided an excellent opportunity for units of the U. S. Navy and the Royal Thai Navy to operate together. Also, it provided a realistic test of the ability of a small amphibious task group to not only conduct the more traditional assault phase, but to provide the subsequent base support for the landing force by moving equipment and material directly to the using units by landing craft, making use of a river for a line of communication.

b. Loading. Embarkation and loading of U. S. forces was carried out at Buckner Bay, Okinawa in late February. Thai forces loaded aboard Thai shipping and the USS TOM GREEN COUNTY at Sattahip, Thailand on 14 March. No major difficulties in embarkation and loading were encountered. However, the constant changing of both Thai and U. S. plans regarding forces assigned created considerable difficulty in the preparation of accurate embarkation data for personnel and material loaded at Sattahip. Also, the commanding officer of the WASHBURN felt that, in general, the troops at Okinawa were poorly prepared for loading. Specific problems encountered in loading at Okinawa are outlined in items 31 through 50 in enclosure (3).

c. Advance Force/UDT/Reconnaissance.

(1) The scenario for the exercise called for a quick reaction operation which commenced with a theoretical unplanned announcement of D-Day on D-1. Therefore, no extensive advance force operations were planned. D-Day, 20 March, was announced around noon on D-1. COMINFLOT ONE, with two mine divisions, plus the HTMS LADYA, was immediately moved to the beachhead area to commence mine countermeasure operations. At first light on D-Day, the UDT Support Unit, USS COOK with attached USN and RTN UDT teams, entered the transport area and conducted a combat reconnaissance of the landing beach. During the mine countermeasure and reconnaissance operations, the Gunfire Support Unit, consisting of the CANBERRA, OKLAHOMA CITY, STRAUSS, SMALL and HTMS PIN KLAO, furnished on-call fire as required. Air superiority was assumed for the pre-D-Day operations.

(2) Pre-D-Day landings consisted of one raid company, which was landed from the USS PERCH, in the Sai Buri area on the night of D-2. The employment of the PERCH for a clandestine amphibious raid in this shallow area was not tactically sound. However, it did provide valuable indoctrination for the troops in life and operations aboard a submarine.

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3100(2)d. Movement.

(1) Transport Unit ALFA, consisting of LENAWEE, WASHBURN and GUNSTON HALL, made an opposed sortie from Subin Bay on the morning of 10 March, and was escorted by Screen Unit ALFA to the Objective Area. CANBERRA maintained station astern of the main body, keeping the two units in her missile envelope. ASW play was conducted while enroute with MENHADDEN and GREENFISH. On 15 March, Transport Unit ALFA and COOK anchored off the landing beach (RED/WHITE Beach, centered at 06 -46.4N 101 -37.7E) long enough to put the Advance Party ashore and conduct an administrative survey of the landing beach and river mouth. Upon completion, they rejoined the Screen Unit and proceeded to rendezvous with the Thai forces at 1530G on 17 March.

(2) Transport Unit BRAVO, Screen Unit BRAVO and the TOM GREEN COUNTY sortied from Sattahip, Thailand on 15 March, and proceeded to rendezvous with U. S. forces on 17 March in the southern part of the Gulf of Thailand.

(3) Mine Flotilla ONE, consisting of the USS EPPING FOREST and 8 MSC's in company with the HTMS LADYA departed Bangkok on 14 March, and proceeded to a position just north of the Assault Area. Upon arrival on 16 March, a U. S./Thai MINEX was held and completed on 18 March. On D-1, all units moved into the Assault Area, and commenced mine countermeasure operations.

(4) Pre-rehearsal movements and activities were uneventful, except for the loss of one of LENAWEE's LCVPs due to broaching while putting the Advance Party ashore on 15 March.

e. Rehearsal. The combined U. S./Thai Task Group conducted a rehearsal landing on RED/WHITE Beach on 18 March. A touchdown landing was made without incident at noon, and backloading was completed by late afternoon. At 0700 the following morning, the Group sortied for a rendezvous with TG 131.5 and underway replenishment of U. S. units.

f. Assault.

(1) The Task Group re-entered the Assault Area at dawn on D-Day, 20 March. Land the Landing Force was signalled at 0900G, and the first wave touched down on schedule at noon. Offloading proceeded without incident.

(2) At 1400G on D+1, LENAWEE, WASHBURN and COOK shifted anchorages four miles south to a position off the Sai Buri River entrance, and commenced river operations. During the planning phase, it was determined that river resupply could best be accomplished by providing support on a continuing basis. Therefore, when R-Day UDT surveys revealed that the river entrance channel would not be negotiable at all stages of the tide, it was decided to establish another beach, GREEN Beach, on the seaward side of the river mouth spit. GREEN Beach was established on D+1, and served as a transfer point for cargo being moved upriver. Boat group sections consisting of four to twelve LCVPs were stationed on the shoreward side of the river mouth spit. Cargo was moved across GREEN Beach and into the waiting craft, which, when loaded, were dispatched upriver. Boat groups were rotated daily during high water. LCMs were not generally used inside the river due to shallow depths. However, they performed the major part of the ship to shore movement at GREEN Beach.

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(3) While inside the river, all boats were under the operational control of the Landing Force Commander, and reported to his representatives for assignments. Boat group sections were used to: Ferry troops and equipment; transport raiding parties; resupply assault units established upriver, and, when tidal conditions permitted, transport troops and equipment from assault shipping directly to areas upriver. This unique phase of the exercise was most interesting, and the experience gained by those who participated should prove highly beneficial in planning and executing future operations of this nature.

(4) Excellent weather and surf conditions prevailed throughout the assault and maneuver phase. Backloading commenced at 1000G on 24 March. A Post Exercise Critique was held aboard CANBERRA on the morning of 25 March, and Thai naval units were detached from the exercise that afternoon. Backloading was completed on the morning of 26 March, and at 1500G, the last of the U. S. units departed the Exercise Area.

g. Ground Operations.

(1) Operations ashore were characterized by wide dispersion of small forces, usually operating independently of each other. Assault elements were preceded ashore by a raid company landing from a submarine on D-2. This company established a blocking position on a main artery leading into the AOA, and reconnoitered the Sai Buri River to determine its suitability as a line of communication.

(2) On D-Day, a landing force composed of one RTMC brigade (-), and one USMC BLT conducted a side by side assault over RED/WHITE Beach at Sai Buri. Commencing at H-Hour 201200G the landing force embarked, in LVTs, LCMs and an LCU, landed in lines abreast, RTMC on RED Beach, USMC on WHITE Beach. After the initial artificialities necessitated by the landing demonstration, these forces advanced rapidly inland. The USMC BLT moved south along the beach road, and established strong points for further operations in the Sai Buri River area. The RTMC moved rapidly through the area behind RED/WHITE Beach to the main highway running from Iaring to Taluban. They then moved south to the south bank of the Sai Buri River.

(3) After D-Day, USMC units operated from assigned tactical areas of responsibility (TAOR). These TAORs were deliberately large, requiring long range patrol and ambush operations. Clear and hold tactics were employed to gain and maintain control of the population centers. Key blocking positions were established to limit insurgent movement, and to keep the insurgents within the area.

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(4) Operations by the RTMC from D+1 through D+3 consisted of long range patrolling and ambush operations, with movement to successive TAORs. On the afternoon of D+3, physical link-up with Royal Thai Army forces was accomplished in the vicinity of Jingo. The remainder of the operation consisted of clearing out isolated pockets of resistance that had been previously by-passed.

(5) Coordination between RTMC forces and Landing Force Headquarters was affected through the exchange of liaison officers. Initial language problems were resolved by D+2, and operations were smooth for the remainder of the exercise.

h. Air Operations. A detachment of eight A4Cs and four KC-130Fs from the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, stationed at the Don Muang Airfield near Bangkok, provided air support for the landing and subsequent operations ashore. On D-Day, pre-H-Hour beach strikes and an inflight refueling demonstration were conducted for the observers. A total of fifty-nine sorties were scheduled; fifty for the A4Cs and nine for the KC-130Fs. Inflight refueling was utilized to increase the time on station for the A4Cs. Fifty-one close air support missions were flown; thirty-one in support of the Royal Thai Marines and the remainder in support of BLT 2/3. Control of air in the objective area remained afloat throughout the exercise. Requests for close air support were submitted directly from the forward air controllers to the TACC aboard LENAWE. Communication circuits were limited to a combination TAC/TAR net, a TAO net and a TATC/IFN net. A detachment from 1st ANGLICO provided the Royal Thai Marines with an air control capability. The air control system worked well under the circumstances, and air operations were considered highly successful. Planned air-sea rescue facilities did not materialize during the exercise. No substitute facilities were available. No pyrotechnics were allowed for target marking.

i. Supporting Arms. Except for close air support activities very little worthwhile training was achieved in supporting arms coordination. Units assigned for gunfire support were not available much of the time due to overriding requirements placed on them late in the exercise. Only one NGF mission was fired on D-Day, and three on D+2.

j. Anti-Submarine Warfare.

(1) During the sortie from Subic Bay and the movement to the Objective Area, screening units encountered submarine opposition nine times. Outstanding coordination was achieved between the screen and VP aircraft in detecting and simulating attacks on submarine contacts. Units continued ASW interplay after each attempt by the submarines to attack the Movement Group, thereby gaining much valuable contact time. Although simulated torpedo attacks on screen units and on MATTAPONI and CANBERRA were evaluated successful, it appeared that no successful attacks were achieved on the amphibious units throughout the exercise.

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(2) Combined screening operations were considered to have provided excellent tactical experience for the Thai units. Unfortunately, however, the Thais received no actual submarine contact time during the exercise.

k. Anti-Air Warfare. For all practical purposes, AAW was nonexistent throughout the exercise.

l. Communications.

(1) Navy Units: After U. S. and Thai Navy units joined up, the majority of Administrative traffic was passed visually, and most tactical maneuvers were signalled by radio. Voice procedure over the tactical nets was considered satisfactory. The major difficulty encountered was feedback produced by transmitting stations. The RTN units were particularly plagued with this problem. Another difficulty encountered was operators speaking too rapidly for effective recording.

(2) Landing Force: Due to the nature of the terrain, and deployment of forces, radio was the primary means of communications used within the landing force. The use of the new USMC portable radio equipment proved to be highly successful; the AN/PRC-47 provided reliable voice communications between widely separated units in the jungle terrain. The AN/PRC-41 proved to be far superior to the MAY for communications with aircraft. Communications between U. S. and Royal Thai Marines were provided by a U. S. Communication/Crypto Liaison Team attached to the Thai BLT. Landing force communications proved to be satisfactory for the short period that the exercise lasted. However, alternate means of communications such as wire, radio relay and messenger service would be necessary for prolonged operations in an area like southern Thailand.

(3) Electronic Interference: None.

m. Intelligence. The requirement for an exercise intelligence center was cancelled late in the planning period due to the reduced scope of the exercise. CATF was directed to supplement the general and special situation with current intelligence to add realism to the play of the exercise. This was accomplished by issuing daily intelligence summaries, spot intelligence reports and action reports to participating units.

n. Medical.

(1) Casualties during the exercise were mostly limited to minor cuts and abrasions, with a few cases of heat exhaustion. The most serious U. S. casualty was a broken ankle. One Thai officer was killed in an automotive accident while on an administrative run not part of the problem.

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(2) The treatment of Thai civilians was initially limited to emergencies only. However, in keeping with the "people to people" program, this policy was altered and approximately 800-1000 civilian personnel from the area were treated in the U. S. and Thai field hospitals. Treatment ranged from minor surgery and dental treatment to dispensing of vitamins. Most of the problems were dermatological with second degree infection.

o. CIB/Public Information.

(1) The Command Information Bureau (CIB) was established at the Capitol Hotel, Bangkok, Thailand on 9 March 1965, and functioned until 25 March. A sub-CIB was established in the objective area on 18 March, and functioned until 22 March.

(2) The U. S. Navy provided a Commander, a Lieutenant Commander, a Lieutenant and a Journalist for the CIB staff. In addition, the U.S. Navy provided a mobile photo unit consisting of one officer and four enlisted. The U. S. Marine Corps provided a Lieutenant Colonel, a Major, a Captain, a First Lieutenant, a Sergeant, and two Corporals. The Royal Thai Navy was represented by five officers and two yeomen.

(3) The CIB accomplished all the missions assigned it. All local news media gave the exercise board and favorable coverage. 15 news releases were prepared and filed. Observers and newsmen were safely and expeditiously moved to and from the Objective Area.

3. Due to the unsettled situation which currently exists in Southeast Asia, the JUNGLE DRUM III executed in March 1965 bore little resemblance to the JUNGLE DRUM III envisioned in the early stages of planning. Numerous changes and counter-changes by mail, message and courier were issued, making it extremely difficult for those involved to maintain a detailed grasp of the exercise orders, and the overall operation plan. That JUNGLE DRUM III was conducted as successfully as it was is a tribute to the flexibility and resourcefulness of the U. S. and Thai Naval and Marine commanders who salvaged, tailored and embellished their plans to meet and cope with these constant changes.


R. W. CLARK

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Training and Test Objectives

of

JUNGLE DRUM III

1. Navy Training Objectives

a. Training Objective: To provide training in planning and conducting a combined amphibious operation with the Royal Thailand Navy (RTN), including utilization of combined staffs at the amphibious task force level.

Comment: Only partially accomplished. Due to the reduced scope of the exercise and forces involved, it was necessary to make many late changes without the benefit of combined planning.

b. Training Objective: To gain area familiarization and operating experience in the gulf of Thailand for participating naval forces.

Comment: Accomplished. Particular note was made of the vast extent of mineable waters; the impracticability of employing submarines for conducting surreptitious amphibious raids; the need for revision of ASW torpedo depth settings; the lack of bottom reverberation problems with the SQS 23 sonar and the rapid manner in which the foreshore and nearshore bottom characteristics changed under average surf conditions.

c. Training Objective: To provide training for the defense of naval forces against air, submarine, mine, swimmer and ground weapon attack during movement to and in an amphibious objective area.

Comment: Partially accomplished. Aggressor air was eliminated in the final phases of planning due to the limited number of aircraft available. Also, no aggressor ground weapons were employed against the ships in the objective area. Therefore, no training was accomplished in these two categories.

d. Training Objective: To provide training in planning and execution of underway replenishment.

Comment: Accomplished for U. S. forces.

e. Training Objective: To provide training in maneuvering and positioning of an amphibious task force and supporting forces enroute to a landing area.

Comment: Accomplished.

f. Training Objective: To provide training and perfect techniques to enhance the ability of Amphibious Force SEVENTH Fleet to conduct naval aspect of quick response operations.

Comment: Accomplished.

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2. Troop Training Objectives

a. Training Objective: To provide training in planning and execution of an amphibious operation to include coordination and utilization of artillery, air and naval gunfire; communication techniques; and logistic support.

Comment: Initial planning was accomplished by joint staffs of the THAI and U.S. Forces. The training accomplished during this phase was good. The final landing operation plan was not done by a combined staff, and, consequently, training was limited to a few of the U.S. Staff who were available to write this plan.

The fact that air support and naval gunfire support were unexpectedly made available at the last minute added realism to the training in exercising the landing force staff.

b. Training Objective: To provide training in planning and execution of counterinsurgency operations in unfamiliar jungle terrain.

Comment: Counterinsurgency operations were planned and executed in unfamiliar jungle terrain in a highly satisfactory manner. Wide dispersion of small forces necessitated these forces to operate independently of each other as would be required in many counterinsurgency operations.

c. Training Objective: To familiarize THAI Forces with Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGILICO) capabilities.

Comment: THAI Forces were familiarized with ANGILICO's capabilities. The ANGILICO detachment was used extensively by the THAI battalion. The results of this employment were highly satisfactory to both THAI and USMC units.

d. Training Objective: To develop flight planning for long-range strikes utilizing flight refueling capability.

Comment: Highly satisfactory - Don Muang air field near Bangkok (over 350 miles from Amphibious Objective Area) made it necessary for inflight refueling to permit on station air support.

e. Training Objective: To provide training in conducting a combined exercise with Royal THAI Navy (RTN) and Royal THAI Marine Corps (RTMC) Forces, including utilization of Combined Landing Force Staff insofar as facilities permit.

Comment: Circumstances prevented RTMC Forces from providing any more than one liaison officer to the Landing Force for the final planning of the operation. The exercise phase provided good training for a combined staff.

3. Test and Evaluation Objectives

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a. Build-up ashore in terms of number of troops and weight of supplies as compared with planned rates.

Comment: No build-up ashore (troops nor supplies) in that supplies were taken right from floating dumps to the using units by boat. Troops cleared the beach area promptly.

4. Restricted Waterways Training Objectives (Comments by CLF)

a. Training Objective: To develop mine detection and clearance techniques for inland waterways.

Comment: Not accomplished.

b. Training Objective: To gain experience in small boat operation in restricted waterways in support of landing force units.

Comment: Three types of waterborne means LVT, LCVP and local river boats were utilized to support operations by moving across, up and down rivers. LVT's were phased out of waterborne operations due to their high consumption of fuel. Within the rivers and under BLT control, 6 LCVP's and 7 local river boats would satisfy the needs of a BLT.

LCVP

The LCVP was a highly efficient transit craft with its relatively shallow draft, capability to extract itself off sand bars and economic fuel consumption. In areas where sand bars were prevalent, 20 men, or two (2) tons was a good load, 8 MPH an average speed. In deep water areas, 35 men were carried and speed increased. The craft does not afford much protection. LCVP is an excellent craft for resupply and personnel movement inside the beaches where waterways are available.

The ideal craft needed for restricted waterways operations, based on the BLT's experience, is a craft of the size of an LCVP with a similar power-plant. The craft should be very shallow draft, afford small arm protection for passengers and crew, and mount an automatic weapon to react against ambush. The twin twenty millimeter AA gun would be excellent.

Local River Boats

Four (4) local river boats were provided for experimental purposes from 0730 to 1930 daily. Cost of this contracted assistance was \$9.00 per day per boat, this included the services of the boat owner. The boats were 18-20 feet long, with a 4 foot beam and had a draft of 2½ feet fully loaded. Each boat could carry 12-14 men or a load of approximately one (1) ton.

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They were powered by an inboard gasoline engine and could move at an average rate of about 6 MPH with a full load. These boats were used for resupply missions and for movement of a quick reaction platoon. They were not capable of hauling vehicles. They could however go to many points up the river and its tributaries which were inaccessible to LCVP's. They offered a great flexibility of use, but were highly vulnerable to ambush, the smallest of which could wipe them out. Due to widespread employment of units and the density of vegetation, it would be difficult to send a reaction rescue force in time.

LVT's. Though noisy and tending to "belly up" on soft sand bottoms, were effective in the initial stages of the operation in affording an immediate capability to move up the waterways. LVT's should travel in groups of no less than three (3). When an LVT "bellies up" it requires two other LVT's to retrieve it. The LVT could not negotiate the smaller streams. It offered a high degree of protection for embarked troops and has a firepower reaction capability against an ambush. Moving in the river at dusk, they were very difficult to see and were easily concealed along a riverbank under the trees. In deep rivers, with a sufficient resupply of fuel, the LVT is an excellent vehicle for river operations where threat of ambush exists.

River Operations

In narrow, winding waterways boats should travel far enough apart so that two would not be caught in an ambush killing zone, but yet travel close enough as to be able to support one another when required.

If one or two boats are caught in ambush, the remaining boats should immediately make for the bank from where enemy fire is coming. Troops should be landed and commence a rapid envelopment of the ambushing force.

Boats should move with a separating distance of approximately 150-200 yards.

LCVP's and native craft should be preceded by a well armed boat clearing the way.

c. Training Objective: To develop principles for the application of Marine Corps tactics in restricted waterways/river delta terrain in a counterinsurgency environment.

Comment:

General Findings

As was anticipated, tanks were not landed; trucks larger than $\frac{1}{2}$ ton were not landed; and the two Ontos which were landed, quickly became entrapped by deep sands. Helicopters are essential in this type of operation and terrain.

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A reaction plan, whereby non-engaged units would be rapidly transported to support units heavily engaged, was tested and appears promising of success.

When traversing a bend in a river the bank area of the turn is usually the deepest water, recommend that boats stay close to banks when negotiating such turns.

A lot of study is necessary to evaluate the need for and effects of CAS and NGF in a truly jungle terrain.

Casualty Evacuation would have been difficult except by helicopter. Boats and land vehicles would be too slow.

Communications

PRC-47's. Employed one with each company (on the Battalion TAC Net) provided excellent communications.

PRC-10's. Very satisfactory for performance when employed as communications for the Company TAC Net.

Communications in a far flung operation such as this are stretched to the limit, and the use of personnel and equipment must be carefully planned and evaluated.

Long wire treetop antennas and RC-292 antennas were tested with varying degrees of success.

Work with alternate means of communications should be considered in future operations, selected personnel could be trained in use of semaphor and "light" signalling.

Navigation

More attention should be given to celestial navigation.

Certain star patterns in areas of operations should be published for night usage as a supplement to current methods for night orientation.

Night river navigation is best performed without attempting the use of lighting devices as an aid.

Maps (AMS series of a scale of 1:50,000), are required by the Landing Force for optimum planning and operations ashore.

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Supporting Arms

Generally speaking, 81's, flame-throwers and 106's, had great difficulty in moving through the terrain. These weapons to an extent inhibited the movement of rifle companies. It was learned that these weapons would best not be attached to rifle companies as readily as under other circumstances; that they be retained under battalion control and only after very careful consideration of intents concerning the movement of companies and company needs, be thus attached. 81's were used to cover patrol movements and for H & I (harassment and interdiction) fires; further used for support of platoons and as part of the C. P. defense system.

When the 106's found accessible roads they were able to be successfully employed, their participation, however, was limited.

Flame-throwers were not employed.

d. Training Objective: To exercise unit Commanders in the selection of coastal and riverside strong points, helicopter landing sites and control points.

Comment:

Unit Commanders were required to select sites for a variety of usages. Primarily, daily rendezvous points were selected and operated, wherefrom supply replenishments would be unloaded for further transport to unit's TAOR's.

Strong points and control points were selected and manned. Manning of strong points is only partial protection against an ambush. Additional methods should be considered and tested to more adequately support this mode of entry.

Though there was no helicopter participation in Jungle Drum III, Unit Commanders were instructed to be always aware of the terrain. Should helicopters have been suddenly introduced, in short order an abundance of adequate sites could have been made known.

e. Training Objective: To develop procedures for establishing water-borne bases to serve as supply points, helicopter landing sites and control points.

Comment:

Through the use of landing craft, LVT's, motor transport, local craft and back-pack methods, logistics support of units ashore was by unit distribution on a daily basis. Special emphasis was placed upon the tailoring of supply levels to satisfy immediate needs and to avoid interference, by logistics, with the tactical conduct of the exercise.

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In this operation, the initial intent was to try to supply front line units (Companies) in their TAOR's directly from ship by waterway. It was anticipated that a supply request from a Company should be passed back to the ships offshore, and the supplies loaded in a LCVP and ferried to the company, directly by waterways. However, the shifting sand bars at the mouth of the Sai Buri River precluded entrance of LCVP's except at high tide, and thus a BSA had to be established on the sand bar separating the Sai Buri River from the ocean. At this location a 24 hour level of supplies was maintained, replenished daily by LCM-6 from the ships, and distribution made to using units by LCVP, LVT, local river boats, and land vehicles. Close scrutiny of this operation indicates that direct supply from ship to using units is going to be uncertain unless the physical terrain circumstances are more favorable. Thus operations of this type should consider the establishment of a limited BSA to act as a link between forward units and the supplies afloat. Maintaining only a small level of supplies makes a less lucrative enemy target, and permits a mobility to the BSA.

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TASK ORGANIZATION AND FORCES PARTICIPATING1. TF 131 JUNGLE DRUM III Expeditionary ForceRADM E. S. MILLER, USN
(COMCRUDESFLT SEVEN)

Deputy CEF

RADM SATAP, RTNa. TG 131.1 Movement GroupRADM E. S. MILLER, USN
(COMCRUDESFLT SEVEN)TU 131.1.1 Transport Unit ALFACAPT R. W. CLARK, USN
(COMPHIBRON ONE)LENAWEE (APA 195)
WASHBURN (AKA 108)
GUNSTON HALL (LSD 5)1 APA
1 AKA
1 LSDTU 131.1.2 Transport Unit BRAVOCAPT SUTEP VASANTASING, RTN
(C/S RTN SERVON)ANTONG (LST 1)
CHANG (LST 2)
KRAM (LSM 3)
PRAP (LCI 1)
SATAKUT (LCI 2)
SICHANG (A-1)2 LST
1 LSM
2 LCI
1 AKTU 131.1.3 Screen Unit ALFACAPT D. E. BERGIN, USN
(COMDESRON THREE)USS SMALL (DDR 838) FF
USS STRAUSS (DDG 16)
USS COOK (APD 130)
USS FLORIKAN (ASR 9)1 DD
1 DDG
1 APD
1 ASRTU 131.1.4 Screen Unit BRAVOCDR AMNUAY LAMSURG, RTN
(CO, PIN KLAO)PIN KLAO (DE 3)
TACHIN (PF 1)
LIU LOM (PC 7)
LONG LOM (PC 8)
TONG PLIU (PC 6)1 DE (RTN)
1 PF (RTN)
3 PCTU 131.1.5 Heavy Support UnitCAPT M. W. WOODS, USN
(CO, CANBERRA)

USS CANBERRA (CAG 2) FFF

1 CAG

b. TG 131.2 ASW GroupCAPT D. E. BERGIN, USN
(COMDESRON THREE)Enclosure (2)
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TU 131.2.1 ASW Unit ALFA

USS SMALL (DDR 838) FF
 USS STRAUSS (DDG 16)
 USS COOK (APD 130)
 USS FLORIKAN (ASR 9)

TU 131.2.2 ASW Unit BRAVO

PIN KLAO (DE 3)
 TACHIN (PF 1)
 LIU LOM (PC 7)
 LONG LOM (PC 8)
 TONG PLIU (PC 6)

c. TG 131.3 Surface Action Group

USS CANBERRA (CAG 2) FFF
 USS JOSEPH STRAUSS (DDG 16)
 USS ERNEST G. SMALL (DDR 838) FF

d. TG 131.4 Patrol Aircraft Group

VP NINE

e. TG 131.5 Logistic Support Group

USS MATTAPONI (AO 41)
 USS POLLUX (AKS 4)
 USS ALUDRA (AF 55)

f. TG 131.0 Command Information Bureau2. TF 132 Amphibious Task Force

Deputy CATF

a. TF 133 Landing Forceb. TG 132.0 Command Group

CAPT D. E. BERGIN, USN
(COMDESRON THREE)

1 DD
 1 DDG
 1 APD
 1 ASR

CDR AMNUAY LAMSURG, RTN
(CO, PIN KLAO)

1 DE (RTN)
 1 PF (RTN)
 3 PC

CAPT M. W. WOODS, USN
(CO, CANBERRA)

1 CAG
 1 DDG
 1 DD

CDR R. A. DUNNING, USN
(CO, PATRON NINE)

VPRON

1 AO
 1 AKS
 1 AF

CDR R. M. McCOOL, USN
(STAFF, COMNAVFORJAPAN)

CAPT R. W. CLARK, USN
(COMPHIBRON ONE)

CAPT SUTEP VASANTASING, RTN
(C/S RTN SERVON)

COL W. M. GRAHAM, USMC

CAPT R. W. CLARK, USN
(COMPHIBRON ONE)

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c. TU 132.0.2 Tactical Air Command Unit

TACRON TWELVE DET

d. TU 132.0.3 Reconnaissance and UDT Support Unit

Deputy Reconnaissance and UDT Support Unit

COOK (APD 130)
SICHANG (A- 1)
UDT TWELVE DET
RTN UDT DET
FLORIKAN (ASR 9)

e. TE 132.0.3.1 Reconnaissance and Demolition Element ALFA

UDT TWELVE DET

f. TE 132.0.3.2 Reconnaissance and Demolition Element BRAVO

RTN UDT DET

g. TU 132.0.5 Naval Gunfire Support Unit

CANBERRA (CAG 2) FFF
STRAUSS (DDG 16) FF
SMALL (DDR 838)
PIN KLAO (DE 3)

h. TG 132.1 Advance Force and Transport Area Defense Group

i. TU 132.1.1 RED/WHITE Beach Support Unit

j. TE 132.1.1.1 RED/WHITE Beach Naval Gunfire Element

CANBERRA (CAG 2) FFF
STRAUSS (DDG 16) FF
SMALL (DDR 838)
PIN KLAO (DE 3)

k. TE 132.1.1.2 RED/WHITE Beach RECON and UDT Element

LT H. A. STAFFORD, USN
(OIC TACRON TWELVE DET)

1 TACRON DET

LCDR J. R. GRIFFIN, USN
(CO, USS COOK)

LT CHIRD RUNG UTHAI, RTN
(CO, SICHANG)

1 APD
1 AK
2 UDT DET

1 ASR

LT H. E. WHITE, USN
(OIC UDT TWELVE DET)

1 UDT DET

LT PAYONE SAWASDIBUTA, RTN
(OIC RTN UDT)

1 UDT DET

CAPT M. W. WOODS, USN
(CO, CANBERRA)

1 CAG
1 DDG
1 DD
1 DE

CAPT M. W. WOODS, USN
(CO, CANBERRA)

CAPT M. W. WOODS, USN
(CO, CANBERRA)

CAPT D. E. BERGIN, USN
(COMDESRON THREE)

1 CAG
1 DDG
1 DD
1 DE

LCDR J. R. GRIFFIN, USN
(CO, COOK)

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Deputy

COOK (APD 130)
 SICHANG (A-1)
 UDT TWELVE DET
 RTN UDT DET
 FLORIKAN (ASR 9)

LT CHIRD RUNG UTHAI, RTN
(CO, SICHANG)

1 APD
 1 AK
 2 UDT DET
 1 ASR

1. TU 132.1.2 Flycatcher Control

CAPT A. M. SAVAGE, USN
(COMINFLOT ONE)

m. TU 132.1.3 MCM Unit

CAPT A. M. SAVAGE, USN
(COMINFLOT ONE)

EPPING FORREST (MCS 7) FF
 LADYA (MSC 5) (RTN)
 PEACOCK (MSC 198)
 PHOEBE (MSC 199)
 VIREO (MSC 205)
 WIDGEON (MSC 208)
 WARBLER (MSC 206)
 WHIPPORWILL (MSC 207)
 WOODPECKER (MSC 209)
 GANNET (MSC 290)

1 MCS
 9 MSC

2. TG 132.2 Movement Group

CAPT R. W. CLARK, USN
(COMPHIBRON ONE)

Deputy

CAPT SUTEP VASANTASING, RTN
(C/S RTN SERVON)

c. TU 132.2.1 Movement Unit ALFA

CAPT R. W. CLARK, USN
(COMPHIBRON ONE)

LENAWEE (APA 195) FF
 WASHBURN (AKA 108)
 GUNSTON HALL (LSD 5)
 TOM GREEN COUNTY (LST 1159)

1 APA
 1 AKA
 1 LSD
 1 LST

p. TU 132.2.2 Movement Unit BRAVO

CAPT SUTEP VASANTASING, RTN
(C/S RTN SERVON)

ANTONG (LST 1)
 CHANG (LST 2)
 KRAM (LSM 3)
 PRAP (LCI 1)
 SATAKUT (LCI 2)
 SICHANG (A-1)

2 LST
 1 LSM
 2 LCI
 1 AK

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- q. TU 132.2.5 Movement Escort Unit
CAPT M. W. WOODS, USN
(CO, CANBERRA)
- r. TE 132.2.5.1 Movement Escort Element ALFA
CANBERRA (CAG 2) FFF
STRAUSS (DDG 16) FF
SMALL (DDR 838)
CAPT D. E. BERGIN, USN
(COMDESRON THREE)
1 CAG
1 DDG
1 DD
- s. TE 132.2.5.2 Movement Escort Element BRAVO
PIN KLAO (DE 3)
TACHIN (PF 1)
LIU LOM (PC 7)
LONG LOM (PC 8)
TONG PLIU (PC 6)
CDR AMNUAY LAMSURG, RTN
(CO, PIN KLAO)
1 DE
1 PF
3 PC
- t. TG 132.3 Transport/Control Group
Deputy
CAPT R. W. CLARK, USN
(COMPHIERON ONE)
CAPT SUTEP VASANTASING, RTN
(C/S RTN SERVON)
- u. TU 132.3.1 Transport Unit WHITE
LENAAWEE (APA 195) FF
WASHBURN (AKA 108)
GUNSTON HALL (LSD 5)
COOK (APD 130)
TOM GREEN COUNTY (LST 1159)
CAPT R. W. CLARK, USN
(COMPHIERON ONE)
1 APA
1 AKA
1 LSD
1 APD
1 LST
- x. TU 132.3.2 Transport Unit RED
ANTONG (LST 1)
CHANG (LST 2)
KRAM (LSM 3)
PRAP (LCI 1)
SATAKUT (LCI 2)
SICHANG (A-1)
CAPT SUTEP VASANTASING, RTN
(C/S RTN SERVON)
2 LST
1 LSM
2 LCI
1 AK
- y. TU 132.3.3 Control Unit (PCO)
COOK (APD 130)
Primary Control Ship
GUNSTON HALL (LSD 5)
Secondary Control Ship
LCDR J. R. GRIFFIN, USN
(CO, COOK)

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z. <u>TU Beachmaster Unit</u>	<u>LCDR L. GIERON, USN</u> (OIC BMU ONE DET)
WESTPAC DET BMU 1	1 BMU DET
aa. <u>TU 132.3.6 Submarine Raid Unit</u>	<u>LCDR J. L. LLOYD, USN</u> (CO, PERCH)
PERCH (APSS 313)	
ab. <u>TG 132.4 Loading and Backloading Group</u>	<u>CAPT R. W. CLARK, USN</u> (COMPHIBRON ONE)
Deputy	<u>CAPT SUTEP VASANTASING, RTN</u> (C/S RTN SERVON)
ac. <u>TU 132.4.1 Loading and Backloading Unit ALFA</u>	<u>CAPT R. W. CLARK, USN</u> (COMPHIBRON ONE)
LENAWEE (APA 195)	1 APA
WASHBURN (AKA 108)	1 AKA
GUNSTON HALL (LSD 5)	1 LSD
COOK (APD 130)	1 APD
TOM GREEN COUNTY (LST 1159)	1 LST
ad. <u>TU 132.4.4 Loading and Backloading Unit BRAVO</u>	<u>CAPT SUTEP VASANTASING, RTN</u> (C/S RTN SERVON)
ANTONG (LST 1)	2 LST
CHANG (LST 2)	
KRAM (LSM 3)	1 LSM
PRAP (LCI 1)	2 LCI
SATAKUT (LCI 2)	
SICHANG (A-1)	1 AK
3. <u>CTF 133 Landing Force</u>	<u>COL W. M. GRAHAM, JR., USMC</u> (CLF/TEC)
a. <u>TG 133.1 Landing Force Headquarters</u>	<u>COL W. M. GRAHAM, JR., USMC</u> (CLF/TEC)
DET 1stMAW	
DET CommCo, HqBn	
DET 3dITT, FMF	
Coll & Clear Plat Co A 3dMedBn	
DET Fiscal Sec	
DET PIO	
b. <u>TG 133.2 BLT 2/3</u>	<u>LCOL D. A. CLEMENT, USMC</u> (CO, BLT 2/3)
2ndBn 3dMar	

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Btry B (Rein) 1stBn, 12thMar
 2ndPlat (Rein) Co A 3dBn
 2ndPlat Co A 3dATBn
 2ndPlat Co B 3d ReconBn
 2ndPlat (Rein) Co A 3dEngrBn
 DET Shore Pty Bn
 2ndPlat (Rein) Co D 9thMTBn
 DET Coll Plat Co A 3dMedBn
 DET 3dDentCo FMF
 DET HqBn
 DET MedPlat H&S Co
 Plat (Rein) Co E (Demonstration Aggressors)
 4thPlat Co A 1stAmTracBn

c. TG 133.3 RTMC Brigade

CAPT JARONG, RTMC
(CO, RTCMBRIGADE)

Brig Hqtrs
 LVT Co
 Recon Team
 Surg Field Hosp
 Comm Unit
 Shore Pty
 DET ANGLICO FMF
 DET 3dITT FMF
 3dInfBn
 MedPlat
 ArtyBtry
 MedDet
 EngrPlat
 UDT
 DET USMC (Liaison)

d. TG 133.4 Raid Force

Co H(-) (Rein) 2ndBn 3dMar

AIR

DET VMA-225
 DET VMGR-152

8 A4C's
 4 KC130's

4. Aggressor Submarine Units

MENHADDER (SS 377)
 GREENFISH (SS 351)

2 SS

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COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONSA. Adequacy of forces assigned(1) Comment By Landing Force Commander

The lack of operating space and communications facilities aboard the USS LENAWEE restricted certain functions normally centered on a command ship, i.e., the TACC and SACC, normally in close proximity to each other, operated from different ships; a covered RATT was not available between the ship and the Landing Force ashore. These limitations were recognized from the start and are mentioned here only to explain the necessity for certain unorthodox procedures employed throughout the problem.

(2) Recommendation By Landing Force Commander

To permit full exercise of tactical doctrine and established control procedures, it is recommended that proper command ships be utilized in future exercises.

(3) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE:

Do not concur. We must be able to operate with what we have. Control procedures developed for this exercise, though unorthodox, were workable.

(4) Comment By COMDESRON THREE

The four screen units assigned as Screen Unit ALFA were considered numerically inadequate for the protection of Transport Unit ALFA with the given submarine threat in spite of the fine performance of the screen units throughout the exercise. During the two UNREPS 14 and 19 March often no effective screen was available because of alongside scheduling and lifeguard requirements.

(5) Recommendation By COMDESRON THREE

The necessity for reduced forces in this exercise because of real requirements elsewhere is understood; however every opportunity for better formation protection should be exploited. In the case of the 19 March UNREP, better protection might have been available if the formation had been consolidated with Transport and Screen Units BRAVO. Thailand units operated independently in the vicinity of Point GREEN at this time.

(6) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE:

Do not concur. Various factors were considered in the planning phases concerning the combined opposed UNREP. This Command did not have control of the UNREP but believe that with the unfamiliarity of ASW techniques/doctrine between THAI and US forces, an unnecessary risk would have existed by combining both forces. Combining the main bodies and the screen would not necessarily have increased the protection factor.

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(7) Conclusion By COMPHIBRON ONE

Each Transport Unit with its respective screen unit should be assigned a submarine for ASW play thus giving each separate group sufficient training. Combined force training can normally be accomplished only after practice and then in gradual increments.

(8) Comment By CO, USS CANBERRA

An AGC was needed to control and coordinate communications and to assume SACC and TACC responsibilities.

(9) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Do not concur. It should be noted that air was controlled adequately on a relatively austere frequency plan with adequate safety factors provided for the number of aircraft involved. A PHIBRON flagship could have provided the necessary communication and control facilities as should any ship with adequate air control facilities and CIC trained in GFS.

(10) Conclusion By COMPHIBRON ONE

AGC facilities are nice to have but are only required for larger than RUT size landings.

(11) Recommendation By COMPHIBRON ONE

All ships with Air Control and GFS capabilities should be trained to assume SACC and TACC functions.

B. Planning(12) Comment By Commander Landing Force

The final planning for JUNGIE DRUM III and the associated major changes in unit assignment dictated a situation wherein the ground maneuver units were not given the opportunity to indicate air requirements predicated upon the ground scheme of maneuver, consequently the air schedule was developed upon availability rather than upon ground requirements.

(13) Recommendation By Commander Landing Force

That availability or non-availability (of air) be decided as early as possible and that this decision be made known to ground elements for their planning. If air support has not been planned for it should not be added at the last minute as very little is gained as far as air/ground training.

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(14) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Air operations could have been eliminated from the exercise but were not because of the request of Commander Landing Force to have them even though optimum and doctrinally correct control requirements could not be met. Aircraft had to be scheduled on an availability basis due to the distance of the base of operation, Don Muang which was over 350 miles away, and the limited number of aircraft available from Iwakuni due to operational commitments being met in other areas.

(15) Comment By COMDESRON THREE

As late as R Day much needed detail of expected operations was still not forthcoming. Particularly, no night intentions to allow planning for detachment of advance force units and retention of maximum screen capabilities were received from the OTC on the eve of D Day.

(16) Recommendation By COMDESRON THREE

When rapid change in forces and in assignment of responsibilities results from necessity, making complex OPORD's incomplete or inadequate, brief message descriptions of the next day's operations issued daily by the OTC can assist in clarifying the picture.

(17) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

The information was available in the OPORDER. (Schedule of Events and Task Organization Changes).

(18) Conclusion By COMPHIBRON ONE

Many and late changes in command acting as Advance Force Commander apparently confused the picture.

(19) Recommendation By COMPHIBRON ONE

If last minute requirements force a change in the assignment of key functions, every effort should be made to conduct a briefing conference.

(20) Comment By OIC WESTPAC DET BMU-1

No USMC OPORDERS nor plans were received by Naval Beach Group Units. One (1) copy of the BLT OPORDER was temporarily borrowed from the Marine Shore Party.

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(21) Recommendation By OIC WESTPAC DET BMU-1

That as long as Naval Beach Group Units are attached to the Marines for operational control, they should receive a minimum of three (3) copies of each applicable Marine Operation Order or plan. They presently are not on the Marine distribution list.

(22) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Concur. Beach Party Teams are organizationally part of the Landing Force and failure to account for this in distribution of OPORDERS and in planning for activities always creates difficulties.

(23) Conclusion By COMPHIBRON ONE

OPORDERS are required by units having a mission. The failure to include Beach Party Teams on the distribution list is only symptomatic of a larger problem, that is, failure to assign them a mission and include their activities in the initial planning.

(24) Recommendation By COMPHIBRON ONE

Landing Force Commanders should account for the activities of Beach Party Teams as derived from Amphibious Task Force OPORDERS instead of relying on SOP from NWIP 22-5.

C. Embarkation and combat landing(25) Comment By Commander Landing Force

The limited shipping available dictated other than combat loading in some instances. This would have materially effected off-loading of BLT 2/3 in a contingency operation.

(26) Recommendation By Commander Landing Force

That sufficient shipping be provided to permit combat loading of all participating units.

(27) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

With limited shipping available this was not possible. If a contingency landing had been ordered the plan was to jettison TEC equipment that could not be restowed.

(28) Conclusion By COMPHIBRON ONE

Load did not materially effect contingency readiness.

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(29) Comment By DEPUTY CATF (C/S RTN SERVON)

Lack of cargo handling equipment in most of the THAI Amphibious Ships prolonged the time of embarkation and combat loading.

(30) Recommendation By DEPUTY CATF (C/S RTN SERVON)

Cargo handling equipment should be provided by MAP for these ships especially a crane for the HTMS ANTONG.

(31) Comment By CO, USS WASHBURN

A ship's platoon was not provided.

(32) Recommendation By CO, USS WASHBURN

A ship's platoon be provided for in future operations.

(33) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Concur. This has been a recurrent problem with rapid reaction load-outs. The need for adequate forces to work each ship must be strongly emphasized early and repeatedly through the planning/loading phases to insure their being available when the unit sails.

(34) Conclusion By COMPHIBRON ONE

The Landing Force must provide for working parties early in their planning.

(35) Comment By CO, USS WASHBURN

Exhaust fording snorkel of the M-35s and M-54s were in place on arrival. Loading delays occurred while snorkels were lowered.

(36) Recommendation By CO, USS WASHBURN

Fording snorkels be lowered prior to loading.

(37) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Concur.

(38) Comment By CO, USS WASHBURN

Vehicle drivers did not remain with vehicles and were difficult to locate. This contributed to loading delays.

(39) Recommendation By CO, USS WASHBURN

Tag steering wheel of vehicle with the driver's name and organization.

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(40) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Concur.

(41) Comment By CO, USS WASHBURN

Ninth Motor Battalion vehicles were loaded too high. M-35s were loaded higher than the seven feet two inch clearance of the cargo holds. Boats had to be held alongside for long periods while the trucks were unloaded to permit stowage.

(42) Recommendation By CO, USS WASHBURN

Load vehicles no higher than seven feet.

(43) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

As not all holds have this height limitation, it would be unwise to make a blanket restriction of a given height. The Embarkation Officer must insure that the vehicles for a given hold do not exceed the height limitation.

(44) Conclusion By COMPHIBRON ONE

Combat Cargo Officers and Embarkation Officers must establish early and continuous liaison.

(45) Comment By CO, USS WASHBURN

Vehicles were not marked and properly staged. This resulted in confusion in determining the destination and order of loading for each vehicle.

(46) Recommendation By CO, USS WASHBURN

Mark vehicle with the priority and destination.

(47) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Concur. This is the normal procedure.

(48) Comment By CO, USS WASHBURN

The loading plan did not identify properly the location of mobile loaded cargo. Space limitations prevented an inventory once on board. A correct ship's loading plan was therefore never obtained.

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(49) Recommendation By CO, USS WASHBURN

A complete manifest be maintained and taped to windshield or door of each vehicle.

(50) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Do not concur. It would be practically an impossibility to display a manifest for each vehicle, unless there was a generous allowance of time to plan the load. If this were the case however, the loading plan would be complete and the manifest would serve little purpose. The means are not available to provide all the "nice to have" items for a tactical load-out.

(51) Comment By OIC WESTPAC DET BMU-1

Embarkation - Naval Beach Group Units embarked USS GUNSTON HALL (LSD 5) on 25 February 1965 at Buckner Bay, Okinawa after being encamped at White Beach for fifteen days without material support. Personnel remained on this ship until debarkation in the objective area on D-Day, 20 March 1965. UP & T tables, vehicle priority and serials assigned were correct. Beachmaster support gear was not available on the beach until very late afternoon on D-Day.

(52) Recommendation By OIC WESTPAC DET BMU-1

Every attempt should be made to pre-load all Beachmaster gear on the assigned LCU if possible.

(53) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Do not concur. The vehicles in question were a 2 1/2 ton truck and trailer, and 1 LCU cannot hold all the Beachmaster gear as well as essential Shore Party gear. The Beachmaster should load any essential items on those vehicles going ashore early (DUKW, jeep trailer), to allow the orderly unloading of all other priority equipment prior to landing support equipment.

D. Movement to Objective Area(54) Comment By CO, USS COOK

On the morning of D-Day, COOK and FLORIKAN were unable to make contact with the minesweeping force and were required to transit the swept channel unescorted. Coordinates of the swept channel were not confirmed until after COOK had almost completed the transit.

(55) Recommendation By CO, USS COOK

Establish and maintain closer liaison and coordination between the advance force unit and minesweeping units.

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(56) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Concur.

Re. Air Ops(57) Comment By Commander Landing Force

The wide spread location of the forward units, plus their continued rapid displacement hampered the control of the air and associated integration with other supporting arms. Lack of communication equipment necessitated passage of the aircraft directly to the FAC's from the TACC. This circumvented the normal control procedures. Target description and location was passed to the aircraft by the FAC nullifying any training for the Supporting Arms Control Center. By circumventing the normal control procedures, the THAI unit may have received a false impression of the ease of air coordination, which in actuality is an involved process.

(58) Recommendation By Commander Landing Force

In future exercises if air is to be used, that no short cuts or "jury rig" systems be utilized for control. If a full control system cannot be activated then the air portion should operate only on a pre-planned beyond the bomblines type of mission.

(59) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Concur in comment of Commander Landing Force to adhere to strict guidelines laid down in current doctrine. The deployment and control of air during this exercise was far from that required by doctrine due to the factors listed in the comment. However, it should be remembered that air, almost right up to D-Day, was an off-again on-again requirement and was not cancelled because Commander Landing Force requested that it be left in the exercise for the limited amount of training that the THAI/US ANGLICO FACs would receive.

(60) Conclusion By COMPHIBRON ONE

The "jury rig" had to be made or air could not be controlled and would have necessarily been dropped from the exercise for safety reasons. Additionally, had the air been operated on a pre-planned beyond the bomblines type of mission no value at all would have been gained in joint training.

(61) Comment By Commander Landing Force

The densely covered terrain in the objective area limited the ability of the FAC's to accurately mark the target for the aircraft. Pyrotechnics were banned, consequently most of the aircraft sorties were utilized for reconnaissance and observation.

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(62) Recommendation By Commander Landing Force

That in future exercises pyrotechnics be considered a necessity of the FAC.

(63) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Concur.

F. Supporting Arms(64) Comment By COMDESRON THREE

On D-Day SACC was in USS E. G. SMALL and TACC was in USS LENAWEE. This separation was made because of space and personnel limitations. Although no untoward occurrences resulted, this arrangement did not appear to facilitate the rapid coordination of supporting arms.

(65) Recommendation By COMDESRON THREE

Wherever possible place the functions of SACC and TACC in the same unit.

(66) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Concur. However due to lack of facilities in any one ship of the task force this separation was considered necessary.

(67) Comment By COMDESRON THREE

The late assignment on 15 March of COMDESRON THREE as Supporting Arms Coordinator was unavoidable; however no practice was furnished to SACC on R-Day to assist in improving performance on D-Day.

(68) Recommendation By COMDESRON THREE

When such late assignments of duties are necessary, R-Day should include a test of abilities to perform the task with a constructive critique furnished.

(69) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Concur.

(70) Comment By COMDESRON THREE

Placing the responsibility of Supporting Arms Coordinator with the Destroyer Squadron Commander gave valuable appreciation of the Naval Gunfire Support mission to the Squadron Staff and to the ship in which embarked. Although little spotting took place on D-Day prior to DESRON THREE units departing for Bangkok, ships gained valuable training by placing themselves in ready status for gunfire support missions.

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(71) Recommendation By COMDESRON THREE

If the exercise scope permits in the future, once again assign a destroyer as SACC for training purposes. Make assignment early enough so necessary study can be accomplished to make efforts worth-while.

(72) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Concur in desirability of training. However, if a ship with a SACC is available it would not be feasible to assign SACC to a destroyer.

(73) Conclusion By COMPHIBRON ONE

When a SACC equipped ship is not available assign these duties to a destroyer to provide training.

(74) Comment By COMDESRON THREE

As Supporting Arms Coordinator, COMDESRON THREE flagship was required to guard eight HF nets. These were:

- (1) Pri Gunnery Control Net
- (2) Pri Gunnery Support Net
- (3) USS E. G. SMALL Pri Spot
- (4) Task Group Orestes
- (5) Sec Tac
- (6) Sec CI
- (7) Overload Circuit of Control Net
- (8) Tacron Net (8531 kcs)

Although it is realized that the original intent of the exercise was not to have a destroyer assume duties of SACC, it was, nevertheless impossible for a destroyer to provide the necessary equipment for all required circuits with only 4 HF transmitters.

(75) Recommendation By COMDESRON THREE

When the scope of an amphibious exercise is reduced in the future and SACC assignment again is given to a destroyer, circuits should be reduced to manageable numbers for more cohesive control of a small number of units.

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(76) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Comments by COMDESRON THREE well taken and ship's limitations should be considered by the CATF in assigning guard assignments. However, as stated in paragraph 1.d of Annex N to CTF 132 OPOD 312-65, each ship should notify CATF of their communication guard problems prior to the commencement of the exercise so that remedial action can be taken by CATF.

(77) Conclusion By COMPHIBRON ONE

CATF should reduce frequency guard requirements to acceptable limits when a reduction in forces is directed, and each ship/command should notify their superior of their guard limitations prior to commencement of the exercise.

G. Ship to Shore Movement(78) Comment By Commander Landing Force

During the actual exercise the Landing Force was operating over two beaches. A boat, controlled by a specific PCS controlling entry onto a specific beach, being required to land on another beach, had to physically report to and request permission from the PCS exercising entry control onto that other beach.

(79) Recommendation By Commander Landing Force

That a boat having to go from a ship assigned to one beach across to the opposite beach, be checked out by radio or some other form of ship-to-shore communications instead of having to physically report to the Primary Control Ship assigned to another beach.

(80) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Position control by a PCS is required. It can be done by radio. In this exercise an unplanned beach was opened by the Landing Force without authority. In order to regain control, and as time was not critical, boats were ordered to physically report to the PCS. Attempts by the Landing Force to control boats can only lead to dangerous situations.

(81) Conclusion By COMPHIBRON ONE

Standard control procedures must be adhered to.

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(82) Comment By Deputy CATF (C/S RTN SERVON)

1. HTMS ANTONG has an old model radar which has too low resolution for the control of landing craft.
2. There is an insufficient number of suitable type lifejackets for landing force personnel on board THAI amphibious ships.

(83) Recommendation By Deputy CATF (C/S RTN SERVON)

Replace radar equipment on board HTMS ANTONG with a higher resolution radar suitable for use in landing craft control, and provide sufficient troop life jackets for THAI amphibious ships through MAP.

(84) Comment By CO, USS WASHBURN

There were only ten LCMs and one LCU available for heavy lighterage. There were about 24 LCVPs available, far more than could be gainfully employed. This imbalance will always exist when the APA is of the HASKELL class. Three LCM-8s in the LSD vice the one LCU would have provided greater flexibility and a greater safety factor in the group's heavy lift resources.

(85) Recommendation By CO, USS WASHBURN

Increase the heavy lift capability in similarly constituted task groups by substituting three LCM-8s for the LCU normally carried by the LSD.

(86) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Do not concur. It is true that there is greater flexibility in preloading equipment with several LCM-8s over 1 LCU, however 3 LCM-8 cannot carry the equivalent of 1 LCU when unloading heavy vehicles. In addition, LCM-8s are not as reliable materialwise and are seldom available in sufficient number to assign 3 or more to each task group. A mix of 1 LCU and 2 LCM-8s has normally proven to be the most advantageous when the load permits. It should also be noted that, except for heavy weather conditions, heavy lift capability is seldom the determining factor in the speed of offloading but rather the cargo capacity of the beach which is determined by the number of cranes, forklifts and personnel.

H. Logistics(87) Comment By OIC WESTPAC DET BMU-1

Except for three (3) men provided by GUNSTON HALL for the life jacket party, the party designated by the OPORDER absented themselves from the beach during the entire operation period with the exception of D-Day.

(88) Recommendation By OIC WESTPAC DET BMU-1

A responsible officer should be placed in charge of the life jacket party to aid the beachmaster in recovery in view of the high cost of replacement.

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(89) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

The OPORDER specifically provided for three (3) men each from LENAWEE (APA 195), WASHBURN (AKA 108), GUNSTON HALL (LSD 5) and one officer from WASHBURN to be in charge. This recovery party was to be landed with Beach Party Team to report to the Beachmaster.

(90) Conclusion By COMPHIBRON ONE

Beachmaster did not exercise his prerogative to retain life jacket recovery party until completion of ship to shore movement.

(91) Recommendation By COMPHIBRON ONE

In future exercise/operations make provisions for periodic life jacket reports from participating units until completion of backloading.

I. Communications(92) Comment By COMDESRON THREE

Visual communications for tactical signalling was only sparsely used. Radio equipment performance during the exercise was considered poor for both U. S. and Thailand forces. Loud squeals, excessive background noises and missed transmissions were the norm during voice radio tactical signalling. In this connection with the myriad of two letter groups used for command and unit calls with which neither U. S. nor Thailand forces were familiar, made recognition of stations calling and addresses even more difficult. Thailand forces appeared to stop guarding their two tactical circuits periodically, most noticeably after entering the anchorage area during the rehearsal.

(93) Recommendation By COMDESRON THREE

In all future exercises emphasize the use of visual signalling wherever possible. Cut back on the number of calls assigned if the exercise scope permits and use distinctive names instead of letters for voice calls. Establish a mutual understanding of standard communications procedures of both nations in combined exercises to ensure constant communications among all units.

(94) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Concur in part. No call signs, other than the two letter call signs used, are authorized for joint exercises. Once all stations become familiar with the calls there is no reason why the two letter calls should not prove superior in combined operations. The current phonetic alphabet was specifically developed for ease of use between people with different language backgrounds.

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(95) Conclusion By COMPHIBRON ONE

Intensive individual ship training should be scheduled to negate the problem of unfamiliar voice calls in combined exercises.

(96) Comment By CO, USS LENAWE

Communications between boats and landing force ashore while transiting the river was non-existent. Frequencies assigned boat sections and the landing force were different and equipment was not compatible. Only one boat per section was equipped with radios due to limited availability of equipment, and it frequently operated out of range of the parent or control ship. In many instances individual boats of a section were utilized in separate operations with no means of communications.

(97) Recommendation By CO, USS LENAWE

That units of the landing force and boat group sections be provided with radios having similar capabilities in order to provide a continuous means of communications between the two organizations as necessary. Further, that each boat be provided with one radio for intra-section communications and each boat group section commander's boat be provided with an additional radio (such as a portable TCS) capable of operating at greater ranges to allow for communications with the parent or control ship.

(98) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

It is recognized that there was some lack of compatibility between Landing Force communications equipment and shipboard/boat mounted equipment. This shortcoming could not be corrected prior to the start of the exercise.

(99) Recommendation By COMPHIBRON ONE

Landing Force communications personnel attempt to find compatible equipment with Navy communications equipment (ie, TCS for long range communications) for use during operations beyond the limits of normal boat communications (VHF range). Ships should also have access to a loan of a TCS for mounting in various boats, so that these boats can maintain continuous communications with both their parent ship and the landing force.

J. Intelligence(100) Comment By Commander Landing Force

The U. S. Forces were not aggressed during the conduct of the exercise. Having aggressor support is the only way to realistically interject Intelligence play into an exercise.

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(101) Recommendation By Commander Landing Force

That, even if relatively small in size, Aggressor Forces be provided for in all future exercises.

(102) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Concur.

(103) Comment By CO, USS LENAWE

This operation was conducted with a minimum of river intelligence. Survey charts of the river entrance constructed several months prior to the exercise proved to be invalid due to changing sand bar conditions. A limited survey conducted six days prior to execution of the plan helped provide more current, but incomplete information. Air reconnaissance by helicopter 21 March provided an additional means of collecting valuable information for briefing boat group section officers and coxswains.

(104) Recommendation By CO, USS LENAWE

That survey teams obtain all possible current information and be available to brief units directly involved in river operations. Further, that air reconnaissance services, if available, be utilized to provide supplemental intelligence.

(105) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Concur. Initial surveys of RED/WHITE Beach and the Sai Buri River were conducted around D-60. Subsequent check surveys were conducted on D-5, D-2 and D-Day. Each survey showed significant changes in the size and location of nearshore sandbars. Also, these surveys revealed that the river mouth shifted 200 yards south and deepened considerably between D-5 and D-2.

(106) Conclusion By COMPHIBRON ONE

Beach and river survey information acquired in the initial stages of an Amphibious operation is useful and necessary for planning. However, it should be regarded as precursory information and a check survey should always be carried out. Preferably the check survey should be scheduled sufficiently close to D-Day to give an indication of the beach/river conditions that will exist on D-Day, yet early enough to allow a change in plans if conditions should require it. The policy of depending solely on a D-Day combat survey to confirm beach conditions determined weeks before could prove disastrous.

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K. Medical

(107) Comment By Commander Landing Force

During the planning phase no decision as to medical evacuation was reached for actual casualties. Not until the troops had been ashore was a system, and not a very adequate one arranged.

(108) Recommendation By Commander Landing Force

In future operations of this type, that a helicopter be available on a permanent basis for evacuation, and if long distance evacuation is necessary, that further necessary transportation be readily available.

(109) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Medical evacuation was planned in detail. What was missing was a helo on standby. With only one helo available Landing Force plans should have been based on the primary plan - boat evacuation to the hospital ship.

(110) Comment By Commander Landing Force

At an early stage of the planning it was recognized that poisonous snakes in the area might pose a danger. Negotiations for anti-venom, though timely, did not however, result in the anti-venom being available when needed.

(111) Recommendation By Commander Landing Force

Medical units should have a knowledge of any medications required within any country wherein we may have contingency interests. When it is fully decided that an operation will take place a "package" of all medical supplies should be formulated.

(112) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Concur.

(113) Comment By CO, USS WASHBURN

There were no simulated casualties provided the CECCO.

(114) Recommendation By CO, USS WASHBURN

In the fortuitous absence of actual casualties, arrangements should be made to provide simulated casualties in order to exercise the medical evacuation procedures.

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(115) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Concur that simulated casualty play should be effected by the Commander Landing Force, and by the Commander Shore Party.

(116) Recommendation By COMPHIBRON ONE

That Operation Orders for exercises provide for a token number of simulated casualties by the Commander Landing Force, and Shore Party to effectively evaluate the medical plan.

L. Public Information(117) Comment By Commander Landing Force

Centralization of the releasing authority in the CIB was an efficient method of operation. On the surface it would seem that most of the releases could have been written from the operation plan and eliminated the requirements for a PIO with the Landing Force. This is not the case. The Landing Force/TEC Staff does not have the time nor facilities to host visitors, newsmen and photographers, except for presenting tactical briefings. Also a still photographer is required by Landing Force Headquarters for use by the PIO.

(118) Recommendation By Commander Landing Force

A PIO and a still photographer always be assigned to the Landing Force and/or TEC Headquarters.

M. Anti-Submarine Warfare(119) Comment By COMDESRON THREE

The Exercise Rules of Engagement and Out of Action Procedures placed the burden of determining their own out-of-action status on the submarines. Implicit in the exercise rules was the determination of out-of-action status of surface units by the submarine as well.

(120) Recommendation By COMDESRON THREE

To prevent doubts as to out-of-action status as sometimes occurred during the Movement, it is recommended that future exercise ASW play utilize the dice throwing procedures as outlined in Annex S to COMASWFORPAC OPORD 201-62.

(121) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Concur.

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(122) Comment By COMDESRON THREE

On the 19 March UNREP, the three replenishment units were placed in one service line of Formation 62 with all but one of four screening units scheduled for UNREP and lifeguard duties.

(123) Recommendation By COMDESRON THREE

With so few screening units (4) available a broad front formation should not be signalled. With one of the UNREP units stationed in a second service line of Formation 62 better ASW coverage could have been furnished the formation.

(124) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Concur.

(125) Comment By COMDESRON THREE

USS FLORIKAN (ASR 9) was assigned to the ASW screen during the transit to the objective area. Even without anti-submarine weapons, her detection capabilities (plus the exceptionally aggressive attitude manifested toward the challenge of ASW) made her a valuable asset in a very sparse screen; however inherent speed limitations allowed neither rapid reorientation, nor timely regaining of station after a contact, nor a truly vigorous patrol of an assigned screen sector.

(126) Recommendation By COMDESRON THREE

In future exercises in which an ASR is involved, such a ships submarine detection capabilities should be exploited, particularly in conjunction with a slow movement group where her limited speed capabilities may not be overwhelming.

(127) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Concur in part.

(128) Conclusion By COMPHIBRON ONE

The ASR has good detection capabilities but slow speed and no offensive capabilities limit her effectiveness. However when screen ships are few, limited effectiveness is better than none.

(129) Recommendation By COMPHIBRON ONE

When feasible, the ASR's capability as an ASW screening ship should be exploited with emphasis placed on screening slow movement groups particularly those involving LSTs.

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N. Restricted Waterways Operations(130) Comment By Commander Landing Force

The resupply of units by boat using available waterways as a MSR eliminated the necessity for a build-up of supplies ashore. This is satisfactory if operating in friendly controlled areas. Under other conditions the boats might be susceptible to attack or to mines.

(131) Recommendation By Commander Landing Force

That resupply by boat not be considered until the surrounding terrain is regarded safe or the banks and water have been cleared.

(132) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Concur.

(133) Comment By CO, USS LENAWEE

Indigenous personnel and their craft were available to landing forces ashore for use on a contract basis, but were not available to the boat group sections. The craft, although limited in capacity and protection, were able to navigate farther upriver than LCVP, due to shallow draft characteristics. The personnel were familiar with the river and could have been of value in providing guidance to the boat group sections.

(134) Recommendation By CO, USS LENAWEE

That, if possible, indigenous personnel and their craft be made available to boat group sections to provide guidance and assistance in river operations.

(135) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Concur, however it must be borne in mind that in an amphibious assault, or the early stages of any operation, it is difficult to determine the reliability of indigenous personnel or obtain their services.

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(136) Comment By CO, USS LENAWEE

An LCM was used on one occasion on a trial basis only. This craft was able to transport heavy equipment and personnel beyond the capability of the LCVP. Although use of the LCM for river transit may be limited due to craft's deeper draft, it is less vulnerable to small arms fire and minor river obstructions. It can be well armed to combat harassing fire and ambush.

(137) Recommendation By CO, USS LENAWEE

That, where practicable, use of LCM be fully explored in future river operations.

(138) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Concur. This was extensively evaluated later.

(139) Comment By CO, USS LENAWEE

Supplies and equipment were landed over GREEN Beach, then transported or carried over a short distance to the logistic support base of operations at a river beach. As a result, support was continuous. Without this method of operation, logistic support would have been limited to periods of high water when the river entrance was navigable. Additionally, this beach, although not sheltered, was used as a haven for boats not in use. Security was provided by landing forces ashore.

(140) Recommendation By CO, USS LENAWEE

That, in river operations where the entrance is navigable during a limited period of time, a suitable area for stockpiling be established inside the river. Security must be provided by the landing force.

(141) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Concur. Noted for future planning.

(142) Comment By CO, USS WASHBURN

Operations in rivers and waterways through an unsecured hinterland exposes the boats to dangers of ambush. The boat crews are afforded little protection from this danger due to the requirement to maintain a sharp lookout for navigational hazards. The best defense against an ambush may be the threat of instant and effective counteraction by the boats themselves.

(143) Recommendation By CO, USS WASHBURN

Provide a marine fire team for each boat and rig an LCM or LCVP as a monitor or gun boat to accompany each boat unit as it traverses the waterway.

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(144) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Concur in part. There are not normally enough marines to assign fire teams to each boat.

(145) Conclusion By COMPHIBRON ONE

When boats are traveling in groups sufficient fire teams should be assigned to provide adequate protection for the convoy as a whole. Whenever a boat is required to operate independently a fire team should always be assigned to it.

O. Miscellaneous(146) Comment By Commander Landing Force

The linguistic support for the exercise was supplied by 1st Interrogation-Translation Team, Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. It was composed of two MALAYAN and two THAI speaking linguists. These linguists were assigned to the Landing Force Headquarters and were employed as interpreters/translators. In addition to USMC ITT personnel utilized during Exercise JUNGLE DRUM III, the RTMC furnished this Headquarters with two MALAY speaking THAI civilians. These two gentlemen were of invaluable aid to the Landing Force Headquarters.

(147) Recommendation By Commander Landing Force

An effort should be made in all future exercises to augment ITT personnel with natives of the country familiar with the varying dialects that may be spoken in the particular area of operations.

(148) Comment By COMPHIBRON ONE

Concur.

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Personnel and Material Casualties1. Naval Forcea. Personnel Casualties: Noneb. Material Casualties:

(1) USS E. G. SMALL sonar casualty to both hull mounted and VDS systems limited screen ASW capability on 11 March. Hull mounted sonar was repaired 12 March, but VDS remained inoperative throughout the remainder of the exercise. This did not appreciably limit screen capabilities because of the restriction on VDS usage west of 110° E longitude.

(2) USS E. G. SMALL lost her port bower anchor on departure from the rehearsal anchorage 14 March due to failure of the detachable link. The anchor was recovered on 20 March with the assistance of COMINFLOT ONE personnel.

(3) USS LENAWEE LCVP-4 broached while retracting from RED/WHITE Beach on 15 March 1965, and subsequently flooded. Repeated attempts to refloat the craft were hampered by a combination of treacherous surf, a steep foreshore gradient, soft sand and salvage equipment limitations. Eventually when it became apparent that salvage was no longer practical due to hull damages sustained in the surf, the craft was pulled up above the high water line by two LVTTP-5's in tandem and its engine, ramp and hull fittings were removed and returned to the LENAWEE.

2. Landing Forcea. Personnel Casualties:

(1) One THAI marine officer was killed in a motor vehicle accident while on a non-tactical run.

(2) One U.S. Marine PFC suffered a broken ankle.

(3) One U.S. Marine PFC suffered a strained knee.

b. Material Casualties:

(1) One M38A1 radio jeep was damaged while being offloaded from the USS LENAWEE in the transport area.

3. None of the casualties listed above had any significant effect on planned or scheduled operations.

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Landing ForcePeople-to-People Program

1. The seemingly primitive way of life of the indigenous personnel indicated that an all-hands program would render the best results. Accordingly, no restrictions were levied against natives entering bivouac areas. They were given rides in our vehicles and often one could see Sailors and Marines letting them sample their rations. This treatment "broke the ice" with natives noted for their stand-off shyness and made possible the development of a subsequent successful program outlined in succeeding paragraphs. Success of the program is indicated by the fact that there was not one unfavorable incident between military and civilians; and, as of the conclusion of the exercise, no legal claims had been made against the U.S. Government.
2. Eleven cartons of medical supplies were donated to the Christian Missionary Hospital at Sai Buri. The doctors and nurses of this hospital were given conducted tours of the U.S. and Thai field medical and water purification facilities and were hosted by the wardroom of the USS WASHBURN for supper and a tour of the ship. The Battalion dentist of BLT 2/3 worked for four days and nights correcting dental deficiencies of this hospital staff. Many of them had had no dental attention for ten years.
3. Local indigenous personnel were treated at the rate of approximately 150 per day at the U.S. and Thai field hospitals.
4. Indigenous personnel were permitted to watch movies. Approximately 300 were in the audience each night. Movies were highly enjoyed especially those requiring little understanding of our language and of a "slap-stick" nature.
5. The Thai Engineer Company built one timber bridge. The U.S. Engineer Platoon built another timber bridge and one concrete culvert with materials furnished by the RTMC and the native populace. This effort enhanced egress from the landing beach to the main road and permitted larger motor vehicles into the area.
6. Project Handclasp supplies were distributed as follows:
 - a. 215 dolls were given to children of the surrounding villages.
 - b. 300 ash trays were distributed among local officials.
 - c. 3000 balloons were distributed among Marines who gave them to children wherever they stopped to rest or bivouac. These were excellent "ice-breakers".
 - d. 2000 ball point pens were given to local officials, visitors to the camp area, and to school teachers.
 - e. 250 sewing kits were distributed to the women of the surrounding villages.

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7. Recommendations for future programs:

a. Include more balloons and fewer ash-trays. Most natives did not know what the ash-trays were and had no use for them if they did not know. Balloons were the best gifts because they were easier to carry and consequently the distribution was enhanced.

b. Include school supplies in future programs. Pencils and paper primarily.

c. Exclusive use of transportation, an interpreter and a skilled photographer should be planned for this program.

8. If another exercise is held in the same area, the best people-to-people project would be to resurface the egress road from the beach, a distance of 10 miles.

Enclosure (5)

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PACIFIC COMMAND

OUTLINE OF A SIGNIFICANT
MILITARY EXERCISE
(Revised)

1. Name of Exercise. JUNGLE DRUM III
2. Type. Combined US/Thai Marine Expeditionary Unit Amphibious Landing Exercise.
3. Aims
 - a. To assist Chief, Joint US Military Advisory Group, Thailand (CHJUSMAGTHAI), in training participating Royal Thai Navy and Marine Corps units in conduct of amphibious operations in a counterinsurgency environment.
 - b. To demonstrate the ability of the US Seventh Fleet to conduct an amphibious operation in a counterinsurgency environment in defense of Thailand.
4. Dates
 - a. Preparatory phase: 3-7 March 1965 - Embarked US forces proceed from Okinawa and Japan to Subic Bay, Philippines.
 - b. Active phase: 12-25 March 1965
 - 12 March -- US amphibious forces sortie from Subic Bay and execute an opposed movement to the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA).
 - 14 March -- Aggressor forces and troop exercise coordinator's staff preposition in AOA.
 - 14 March -- Royal Thai Marine Corps forces embark in Thailand.
 - 17 March -- Thailand elements of the amphibious task force and landing force rendezvous with the US amphibious force.

GROUP 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

272 967

CONFIDENTIAL*Outline of a Significant Military Exercise - THUSCATE Seventh**2/8*

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18 March -- US/Thai forces conduct exercise rehearsal, critique, and opposed sortie of amphibious task force from the rehearsal area.

19 March -- Amphibious task force make opposed movement toward objective area and conduct underway replenishment.

21-24 March -- Operations ashore in the AOA.

25 March -- Exercise ceases and landing force executes administrative reembarkation.

c. Terminal phase: 26 March - 8 April 1965

26 March -- Conduct critique; release Thai forces to national control; depart exercise area.

28 March - 1 April -- US forces make port visits at Bangkok, Singapore, Hong Kong and Manila.

7-8 April -- US forces disembark at Okinawa and Japan.

5. Critical or limiting date for Presidential decision to cancel exercise. From various standpoints as follows:

- a. 20 February 1965, to minimize adverse political effects. This is the date for the initial press release.
- b. 3 March 1965, in interest of economy. This is the date when US Marine Corps force embark in Okinawa and Japan.
- c. 19 March 1965, to avoid pull back of forces once committed. This is the date when the amphibious task force makes its final movement to the landing beaches.

6. Political Implications

- a. US commitment to Allies for conduct of the exercise:
US commitments to the Royal Thai Armed Forces include all arrangements for US forces to participate and for one attack transport to lift the Royal Thai Marine Corps forces.
- b. Date commitment was made:
17 March 1964, CINCPAC approved conducting the exercise in Thailand. 26-29 November 1964, final force commitments were made at the Exercise Director's Conference in Thailand.

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- c. Other political implications: A temporary increase in Chinese Communist propaganda may be expected, as in past exercises of this nature. In addition, Indonesia may accuse the United States of attempted intimidation as a result of Indonesia's confrontation policy against Malaysia.
7. Geographical Area. Southern part of the Malay Peninsula area of Thailand.
- a. The amphibious objective area is the area within a 100 nautical mile radius centered on Sai Buri, Thailand, exclusive of territory and coastal waters of Malaysia.
 - b. The Sea Area of operations will be designated by the Officer Conducting the exercise, as approved by the Royal Thai Government.
 - c. The Ground Maneuver Area extends from Nong Chick (five miles west of Pattani), south eleven miles along road to railroad crossing, thence southeast along railroad track to Yala, Ruso and Rangae, thence northeast along road to Narathiwat.
8. Brief Outline. The execution of JUNGLE DRUM III will include the prepositioning of aggressor and supporting exercise forces; reconnaissance and beach preparation operations; rehearsal and rehearsal critique; opposed movement to the objective area; opposed limited underway replenishment; amphibious assault landing; five days of operations ashore to include restricted waterway operations; defense of the amphibious task force in the amphibious objective area; administrative withdrawal of the landing force; and critique. The exercise will be played by the following scenario:

The aggressor nation, operating from constructive bases, has infiltrated the Pattani - Narathiwat - Yala area of Thailand with sufficient strength to require outside assistance for the defending forces. The aggressor has organized forces in control of the area, and an amphibious assault is required to confront them. While not actually at war, aggressor naval and air forces will engage Seventh Fleet and Thai forces throughout the operation. As the counterinsurgency situation in Thailand deteriorates, US and

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Thai forces will proceed to a higher alert status including deploying forces on request of the Royal Thai Government. The Commander Seventh Fleet will direct a quick reaction assault and establishment of control over the Pattani - Narathiwat - Yala area; will defend it against the aggressor; return control to the Fifth Military Circle of the Royal Thai Government; and then resume a normal alert posture.

9. Directing Headquarters

- a. Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet, is the officer Scheduling the Exercise.
 - b. Commander Seventh Fleet has overall responsibility for execution of the exercise.
 - c. Commander Amphibious Squadron One is the Exercise Director, Commander Task Force (CTF) 191, and Commander Amphibious Task Force, CTF 132.
 - d. Commander Cruiser/Destroyer Flotilla Seven is Commander Expeditionary Force and Officer Conducting the Exercise, CTF 131.
 - e. Colonel W. M. Graham, Jr., USMC, is the Commander Landing Force, CTF 133.
 - f. Rear Admiral Satap, Royal Thai Navy, is the Deputy Exercise Director.
 - g. Staffs will be combined at the Exercise Director/ Amphibious Task Force/Landing Force levels.
10. Participating Commands, Headquarters and Forces

a. US

US Navy commands and units as follows:

CTG 70.5, with 1 mine counter measures support ship (MCS) and 15 minesweeping ships (MSC/MSL).

CTG 70.8, with 1 guided missile heavy cruiser (CAG).

CTG 70.9, with 2 submarines (SS), 1 submarine transport (APSS), and one submarine rescue ship (ASR).

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Commander Task Force (CTF) 72, with 1 patrol squadron (VPRON).

CTF 73, with 1 each Oiler (AO), stores ship (AF) and stores issue ship (AKS), as required.

CTF 76 with 1 each high speed transport (APD), attack transport (APA), attack cargo ship (AKA), dock landing ship (LSD), tactical air control squadron (TACRON) detachment, plus underwater demolition team (UDT) detachment and beach support detachments.

US Marine Corps commands and units as follows:

CTF 79, with Troop Exercise Coordinator/Troop Maneuver Director/Landing Force Headquarters and battalion landing team with supporting attack, transport and helicopter air units and landing support units.

Fleet Marine Force, US Pacific Fleet (FMFPAC) will provide an Air-Naval Gunfire Support Liaison Company (ANGLICO) and an Interrogation Translation Team (ITT).

b. Allied

The Royal Thai Navy will participate with 1 escort ship (DE), 2 tank landing ships (LST), 2 medium landing ships (LSM), 2 infantry landing craft (LCI), 1 transport, 1 refrigerator ship, 3-4 patrol craft, and an underwater demolition team.

The Royal Thai Marine Corps will participate with a brigade, less 1 battalion landing team (BLT).

The Royal Thai Army will participate with a battalion combat team (BCT).

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11. Scope of participation anticipated from:
- a. Other unified or specified commands. None in direct participation. One US Army special forces detachment will be operating in the same general area within the Royal Thai Army Fifth Military Circle as part of Exercise KITTI 08, but should not become involved in JUNGLE DRUM III.
 - b. Unassigned forces of the US Military Services. None.
 - c. Other Federal agencies or departments. No direct participation, but see paragraph 13 below for outline of coordination and support requested.
 - d. Allied Nations. Royal Thai forces as cited in paragraph 10 b above. Two Royal Thai Army special forces detachments and one guerrilla unit will be operating within the Royal Thai Army Fifth Military Circle as part of Exercise KITTI 08, but should not become involved in JUNGLE DRUM III.
12. Simulated use of nuclear weapons. None; however, defensive nuclear, biological and chemical weapon considerations will be taken into account in planning.
13. Coordination effected with other unified, specified or Service commands, government departments, or agencies, or representatives thereof. The American Ambassadors Vientiane, Saigon, Manila, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Djakarta and Rangoon have been informed of the details of the exercise. Chief, Joint US Military Advisory Group, Thailand, has been requested to support the exercise as follows:
- a. Provide liaison and coordination as required.
 - b. Assist the Officer Conducting the Exercise (OCE) in investigation of possible claims against the United States which may arise from the exercise.
 - c. Advise and assist the OCE in establishing necessary liaison and coordination to ensure non-interference in air defense of Thailand and for security of necessary air reservation space.
 - d. Assist OCE in acquiring necessary clearance for exercise communications (frequencies) requirements.

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- e. Assist OCE in establishment and operation of a Combat Information Bureau (CIB) by providing working space, telephone communications, transportation and limited personnel support.
 - f. Arrange with the Royal Thai Government for use of the selected maneuver area, landing beaches and the sea and air approaches thereto.
14. Recommended general policy to be followed as to public information -- both within and outside the United States -- security restrictions, propaganda and/or other unusual elements.
- a. The general public information policy will place emphasis on the strategic mobility of Seventh Fleet forces, with focus on US Navy/Marine Corps ability to move rapidly in force to any area, transporting all their own equipment and supplies, to assist a treaty ally.
 - b. The only unusual element which might generate a major public information requirement is the possibility of the King's presence. Representatives of the Chief, Joint US Military Advisory Group, Thailand, (CHJUSMAGTHAI) have suggested further the possibility of Department of Defense interest in extending the scope of the public information activity from its routine exercise nature to a substantial public information effort.
 - c. The Officer Conducting the Exercise (OCE) has prepared an initial press release which is being coordinated with CHJUSMAGTHAI, who in turn is to coordinate with the Royal Thai Government and the American Ambassador, Bangkok, prior to submission by Commander Seventh Fleet for approval. It is planned that the release will be made simultaneously by the Chief of Information, Navy Department; Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet; Commander Seventh Fleet; Chief, Joint US Military Advisory Group, Thailand; and the Royal Thai Government at 0500Z, 20 February 1965. When the press release is approved by the American Ambassador, Bangkok, and the Royal Thai Government, it will be forwarded to CINCPAC for approval.
 - d. Subsequent press release will be made by the OCE through his Combat Information Bureau (CIB). Methods of release

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will be through normal channels as major events of the exercise occur, with necessary coordination to be accomplished at the CIB level by representatives of all commands concerned.

15. Additional remarks


Commander Task Forces 76 (Amphibious Task Force) and 79 (Marine Expeditionary Brigade) will maintain currently prescribed contingency readiness for their forces throughout the exercise. Operation orders will be written to permit withdrawal of any portion of the expeditionary force during any phase of the exercise, in the event withdrawal is dictated by events external to the exercise.

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COMBINED EXERCISE

JUNGLE DRUM III

DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR
INTERVIEW: DECLASSIFIED
AFTER 12 YEARS: DOD DIR
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CTF 133
OPERATION PLAN
300-65

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Copy _____ of _____ Copies
 Landing Force (TF-133)
 USS LENAWEE APA-195
 081200H March 1965
 ABS-90

OPERATION PLAN 300-65

Reference: (a) Maps: Annex L (Maps and Charts)

Time Zone: G

1. SITUATIONa. Enemy Forces

- (1) Annex B (Intelligence).
- (2) Current ISUMS.

b. Friendly Forces

(1) ATF (TF-132) conducts amphibious operation to establish Landing Force ashore in order to:

(a) Seize, occupy and defend a beachhead in the Southern Thai Peninsula Area.

(b) Destroy insurgent Forces therein.

(c) Establish a lodgement from which further operations can be conducted to assist in the liberation of the area restoration to the Royal Thai Government.

(2) Royal Thai Army Battalion Combat Team is currently opposing insurgents in the objective area.

(3) Boat Group - DS for landing force operations (Inland waterways).

c. Attachments and Detachments. Annex A (Task Organization)d. Assumptions

(1) Aggressor will not substantially reinforce units in the objective area prior to D-Day.

(2) Weather conditions will allow conduct of Surface Landings on D-Day.

(3) Nucleus of the local Government structure is present in the objective area.

(4) Local boats will be available for use.

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(5) Beach conditions will be satisfactory for the conduct of the Surface Landing.

2. MISSION. Commencing at H-Hour on D-Day, Landing Force (TF-133) conducts surface assault in SAI BURI River area of the Southern Thai Peninsula, to seize, occupy and defend a Force Beachhead; destroy insurgent forces therein; control lines of Communications and Population Centers in order to assist in restoring political control to the Royal Thai Government.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations. Annex C (Concept of Operations)

b. BLT 2/3

(1) Commencing at H-Hour, D-Day land over Beach White.

(2) Establish control in assigned TAOR.

(3) Be prepared to execute fast reaction operations and/or quick response raids by land or sea.

(4) Be prepared to conduct river operations utilizing native boats, Amphibian Vehicles and/or landing craft.

(5) Provide company size raid unit for raid missions from submarine.

c. RTMC Brigade (-)

(1) Commencing at H-Hour on D-Day land over Beach Red.

(2) Establish control over assigned TAOR.

(3) Be prepared to execute rapid reaction operations by Surface means.

(4) On order, move to positions South of SAI BURI River. Clear and control main road and establish contact with Royal Thai Army BCT from 5th Military circle.

d. Coordinating Instructions

(1) D-Day 20 March 1965 (Tentative)

(2) H-Hour is 1200 D-Day.

(3) Annex F (Operations overlay)

(4) Annex G (Air operations)

(5) Annex H (Command Relationships)

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(6) Annex J (Rehearsal Plan)

(7) Annex M (Naval Gunfire)

(8) This operation plan effective for planning upon receipt and for execution upon order.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Administrative Plan 300-65.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

a. Annex I (Communications-Electronics)

b. Command Posts

(1) Afloat

Amphibious Task Force	(TF 132)	LENAWEE APA-195
Landing Force	(TF 133)	LENAWEE APA-195
BLT 2/3	(TG 133.2)	LENAWEE APA-195
RTMC	(TG 133.3)	CHANG LST-2
Landing Force Raid Unit	(TG 133.4)	PERCH APSS-313

(2) Ashore

(a) Landing Force Vicinity of White Beach initially
 Vicinity of TALUBAN ultimately

(3) UNITS REPORT CP LOCATIONS WHEN ESTABLISHED.

c. Command Relationships. Annex H (Command Relationships)

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

[Signature]
W. M. GRAHAM
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

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OPERATION PLAN 300-65 (Continued)

ANNEXES:

- A - Task Organization
- B - Intelligence
- C - Concept of Operations
- D - Landing Plan
- E - Raid Plan
- F - Operation Overlay
- G - Air Operations
- H - Command Relationships
- I - Communications-Electronics
- J - Rehearsal Plan
- K - Reports
- L - Maps and Charts
- M - Naval Gunfire
- Z - Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 300-65

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Landing Force (TF-133)
USS LENAWEE APA-195
081200H March 1965

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Plan 300-65

Reference: None

Time Zone: G

(All attachments effective 141200H March 1965)

Landing Force (TF-133)

Colonel GRAHAM

Landing Force Headquarters (TG-133.1)

Det 1stMAW
Det CommCo HqBn
Det 3dITT FMF
Coll & Clear Plat Co A 3dMedBn
Det Fiscal Sec
Det. PIO

BLT 2/3 (TG-133.2)

Lieutenant Colonel CLEMENT

2dBn, 3dMar
Btry B (Rein) 1stBn 12thMar
2dPlat (Rein) Co A 3dTankBn
2dPlat Co A 3dATBn
2dPlat Co B 3dReconBn
2dPlat (Rein) Co A 3dEngrBn
Det Shore Pty Bn
2dPlat (Rein) Co D 9thMTBn
Det Coll Plat Co A 3dMedBn
Det 3dDntCo. FMF
Det HqBn
Det MedPlat 4&SCo
Plat. (rein) Co E. (Demonstration Aggressors)
4thPlat Co A 1stAmTracBn

RTMC Brigade (TG-133.3)

Captain JARONG

Brig Hqtrs
LVT Co
Recon Team
Surg Field Hosp
Comm Unit
Shore Pty
Det ANGLICO FMF

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RTMC Brigade (TG-133.3) (Continued)

Det 3dITT FMF
3dInfBn
MedPlat
ArtyBtry
MedDet
EngrPlat
UDT
Det USMC (Liaison)

RAID FORCE (TG-133.4)

Captain MARTIN

Co H (-) (Rein) 2dBn 3dMar

W. M. Graham
W. M. GRAHAM
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

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Landing Force (TF-133)
 USS LENAWEE APA-195
 081200H March 1965

Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 300-65

- Reference: (a) Maps: AMS Series L501; 1:253,440 Sheets B47L
 (b) Maps: AMS Series L707; 1:63,360 Sheets: 2F1, 2F2, 2F3, 2F6, 2F7, 2F8, 2F9, 2F10, 2F11, 2F12
 (c) Maps: Jet Navigation Chart (JN): 1:2,000,000 Sheet JN54
 (d) Maps: Operational Navigation Chart (ONC); 1:1,000,000 Sheets K-9 and L-10
 (e) Maps: Available Aeronautical Approach Charts (AC 1:250,000) coverage of the objective area
 (f) 3rd MARINE DIVISION ORDER P3800.0, SOP Intelligence

Time Zone: C

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

a. The insurgent forces now operating in Thailand are supported by Aggressor Nation located to the north of Thailand. These forces are attempting to establish a base of operations within Thailand in order to conduct aggressive actions against Government Forces. The Aggressor supported insurgents are presently strongest in the Pattani-Yala-Narathiwat area. To date the insurgents have been successful in preventing the Government from regaining control of the area.

b. The Aggressor Nation has declared its intent to "intervene directly" if the Western Forces are employed in support of Thai military against the "peoples liberation war in Thailand". There is little doubt the Aggressor Nation can reinforce the insurgents with Ground, Naval and Air Forces. These units would probably be in keeping with past Aggressor support, i.e. "A Volunteer Force".

c. INTSUMs and PERINTREPs as issued by S-2, Landing Force.

2. MISSION. Commencing at H-Hour on D-Day. Landing Force conducts a surface assault in Pattani-Narathiwat area of Southern Thailand to seize, occupy and defend a force beachhead; destroy insurgent forces located therein; control lines of communication and population centers in order to assist in restoring political control to the Royal Thai Government.

3. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

a. Determine the strength, combat efficiency and status of training of the insurgent forces within the Pattani-Yala-Narathiwat area.

b. Determine if Aggressor Nation will reinforce the insurgent forces with regular "Volunteer" Forces. If so when, where and in what strength.

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- c. Determine the size and proportion of the civil population likely to engage in, or support the insurgent activities.
- d. Determine those areas which the insurgents are using for camps, assembly and rendezvous points.
- e. Determine during the month of March the channel width, depth and characteristics of the banks of the Sai Buri River, at high and low water.
- f. Determine the crosscountry trafficability within the maneuver area during the month of March.
- g. Determine the number and caliber of arms and armament available to the insurgent forces.
- h. Determine the availability of food and water, to include sanitary precautions and domestic consumption.
- i. Determine any unusual climatic or atmospheric conditions prevailing in the objective area that would effect communications.
- j. Determine the availability of terrain within the immediate landing area suitable for development of a landing strip.

4. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONSa. Orders to Subordinate Units

(1) Conduct reconnaissance as required within assigned area of responsibility. Particular attention to:

- (a) Roads and Trails leading into the objective area.
- (b) Rivers leading into the objective area.
- (c) Insurgent arms and supply caches.

(2) Establish surveillance over assigned area of responsibility to detect any insurgent buildup that might threaten the landing force.

(3) Be prepared to provide reconnaissance elements to maintain surveillance over enemy avenues of approach into the Landing Force maneuver area.

(4) Report information as obtained on EEI.

b. Request to Higher Adjacent and Supporting Units

(1) Commander Amphibious Task Force (CTF 132).

- (a) Provide current and predicted weather data.

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(b) Provide information as obtained on beach and surf conditions.

(c) Provide information as obtained on insurgent forces within the objective area.

(d) Provide information as obtained on movement of additional forces into the objective area.

c. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Maximum use of reconnaissance patrolling by all units in order to protect the landing force base of operations against insurgent attacks.

(2) Report first enemy contact as rapidly as possible.

5. MAPS, CHARTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS. Annex L (Maps and Charts).

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Appendix 3 (Counterintelligence Plan).


7. RELIEFS

a. Emergency ground activity-upon occurrence.

b. Emergency air activity - upon occurrence.

c. Suspected or actual compromise of countersign - upon occurrence.

d. INTSUMs as of 0800, to this Headquarters by 1000, and as of 2000, to this Headquarters by 2400.


W. M. GRAHAM
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

APPENDICES:

- 1 - Intelligence Estimate
- 2 - Area Study
- 3 - Counterintelligence Plan

DISTRIBUTION: ANNEX Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 300-65

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Landing Force (TF 133)
USS LENAWEE APA-195
081200H March 1965

Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 300-65

Reference: (a) Maps: Annex L (Maps and Charts)

Time Zone: G

1. MISSION

a. Basic Mission. Commencing at H-Hour on D-Day. Landing Force conducts surface assault in Pattani-Narathiwat area of Southern Thailand to seize, occupy and defend a force beachhead; destroy insurgent forces located therein; control lines of communication and population centers in order to assist in restoring political control to the Royal Thai Government.

b. Purpose of the Estimate. To develop the intelligence necessary to conduct operations ashore.

2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS. Appendix 2 (Area Study).

3. ENEMY SITUATION

a. General

(1) Aggressor Nation, a large country to the north of Thailand, has been attempting to gain control over the democratic governments of various nations by covert actions of the members of the Circle Trigon party, Aggressor's international political arm. Operations conducted by the Circle Trigon Party are primarily non-violent but may involve individual or small group violence such as assassination, sabotage, bombing or riots. As the ultimate aim of these operations, the Circle Trigon Party will attempt to establish a coup d'etat or instigate a war of national uprising.

(2) A large insurgent force, supported by Aggressor Nation is operating in various areas of Thailand, especially in the vicinity of Udon, Chiang Rai, Prachin Buri and the Malay Peninsula. This insurgent force, supplied out of the country, has established a guerrilla force in the Pattani-Narathiwat-Yala area.

(3) Aggressor Nation is preparing to reinforce the insurgents with additional guerrillas and/or organized troops disguised as "volunteers". The Circle Trigon Party's long established doctrine of domination by exploitation and subversion from within target countries indicate that Aggressor Nation's massive ground forces will not be committed except for defense of the homeland or involvement in a general war.

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(4) While some uncertainty has been indicated over any future course of action which Aggressor Nation might take, Radio Angalop, on 1 March 1965, broadcast a warning to all "imperialist governments not to interfere in the People's Liberation War in Thailand." The communique said the Aggressor Government viewed with serious concern any "acts of intervention in the struggle for freedom within Thailand," and that it would employ its air and naval forces to "prevent any imperialistic aggression."

b. Special

(1) In the attempt to secure the Pattani-Narathiwat area of Thailand, Aggressor cadres controlling the insurgents have launched into the third stage of insurgency. To carry out the "Peoples Liberation War of Thailand," Aggressor has mustered approximately 500 insurgents, loosely organized into a battalion of four companies. The companies are composed of four platoons of 3 squads each. These organizations, while effective when led by their Aggressor cadre, are incapable of extended combat without the strong professional leadership currently supplied by Aggressor's General Staff for Partisan Operations.

(2) The insurgents have cut the major routes of communication, both river and road, terrorized the farmers in the area and now completely control the villages of Ma Yau (QU 290285) and Bantap (QU 160332). Recent intelligence reports indicate that the insurgents are planning operations against the cities of Pattani and Tan Lu Ban (Sai Buri). The main insurgent base is located at QU 329292 in the mountains about 10 miles southeast of Pattani. Small organized groups of insurgents, platoon and company size, are located throughout the Pattani-Yala-Narathiwat area.

(3) The government of Thailand has appealed, under the terms of a bilateral treaty to the United States for assistance in eliminating the aggressor sponsored insurgency and in restoring control of the area to the Government of Thailand.

(4) Commander SEVENTH Fleet's estimate of the situation reveals that the combined efforts of a US/THAI force would be of sufficient combat power to be decisive in the destruction insurgent forces, to eliminate the remainder of the insurgent forces and to return control of the area to the Royal Thai Government.

c. Composition

(1) Ground. Aggressor ground strength is estimated at 19 Motorized Rifle Divisions, 5 Tank Divisions, 10 Breakthrough Artillery Divisions, and 21 Guerrilla Divisions. Total personnel strength is about 528,000. These regular troops are deployed in the 5 Corps Areas into which Aggressor Nations is divided. In addition to regular forces, there are presently about 20,000 trained persons formed into political action committees which are capable of conducting terrorist activities such as sabotage, kidnapping, and assassination.

(2) Air. Air Force strength is composed of approximately 399 aircraft of which 91 are jet interceptors, 39 are jet attack and 76 are propeller attack types. There are also 61 heavy jet bombers included in

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this total. The remaining aircraft are propeller driven patrol craft, transports, amphibians, small helicopters and liaison aircraft. The majority of the air force strength is located at Angalap.

(3) Naval. There are a total of 115 combatant ships included in Aggressor Nation Order of Battle. These include 26 submarines and 20 destroyers. Most of these naval units are home ported in the port of Angalap. In addition, Aggressor Nation has about 69 small patrol craft which operate extensively from naval bases to the south. The remainder of the naval forces consists of junks, armed merchant ships and auxiliaries, including 2 AO and 1 AR.

d. STRENGTH AND COMBAT EFFICIENCY

(1) Locally Available

(a) Ground. To carry out the "Peoples Liberation War of Thailand" Aggressor Nation has infiltrated approximately 500 to 600 loosely organized insurgents in a battalion of four companies. The companies are composed of four platoons of 3 squads each. These organizations, while effective when lead by their Aggressor cadre, are incapable of extended combat without the strong professional leadership currently supplied by Aggressor's General Staff for Partisan Operations.

(b) Air. There are no known Aggressor Air Force units in the Pattani-Yala-Narathiwat area of Thailand.

(c) Naval. There are no known Aggressor Naval units in the Pattani-Yala-Narathiwat area of Thailand.

(2) Reinforcements. With sufficient preparation Aggressor Nation is capable of reinforcement with any of the units from the homeland.

(3) Combat Efficiency. Combat efficiency of enemy forces is assumed to be excellent. The Aggressor Divisions are presently believed to be at 80% strength in troops and equipment.

e. DISPOSITIONS. Aggressor forces are disposed into 5 Corps Areas. The three (3) southern Corps Areas contain a preponderance of Rifle and Guerrilla Divisions. The Aggressor dispositions at this time are designed primarily to maintain a strong military posture and training bases.

f. Arms and Armament

Number

Heavy Tanks	475
Medium Tanks	5,544
Amphibious Tanks	528
Howitzers, 152mm	342
Howitzers, 122mm	342
Anti-Aircraft Guns 57mm	1,206
Anti-Aircraft Guns 14.5mm (Dual)	1,733
Mortars 160mm	342
Mortars 82mm	1,386
Machine Gun, 12.7mm	1,425
Launcher, Rocket, 140mm	342
Launcher, Rocket, 200mm	90

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- (1) With available sources, hold and control present positions and areas.
- (2) Intensify guerrilla operations in the area.
- (3) Conduct air reconnaissance.
- (4) With continued support by Aggressor Nation, reinforce and expand area of control.

b. Analysis and discussion

(1) Capability (1): With available sources hold and control present positions and areas. Adoption of this capability is indicated by current successful operations on the part of the insurgents and the Aggressor doctrine of exploitation and subversion from within target countries. There are no indications militating against adoption of this capability.

(2) Capability (2): Intensify guerrilla operations in the area. Indications pointing to the adoption of this capability are Aggressor's doctrine of subversion and take over through wars of national uprising. Indications militating against adoption of this capability is Aggressor's failure to recruit additional insurgents in the Pattani-Yala-Narathiwat Area and his reluctance to use his own regular troops in the "Peoples Liberation War in Thailand".

(3) Capability (3): Conduct air reconnaissance. Aggressor's previous actions in wars of national uprising militate against his use of air reconnaissance and close air support.

(4) Capability (4): With continued support by Aggressor Nation, reinforce and expand area of control. That Aggressor will not reinforce the insurgents and expand the area of control is indicated by Aggressor Nations reluctance to commit his regular large scale land forces except for the defense of the homeland or involvement in a general war, and the inability to recruit additional insurgents in the Pattani-Yala-Narathiwat area.

5. CONCLUSIONS

a. It is considered most probable that the enemy will adopt a defensive status. Attempting to hold and control present positions and areas with his available forces.

b. It is considered less probable that the enemy will attempt to intensify guerrilla operations in the objective area unless his forces enjoy a numerical superiority.

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Landing Force (TF 133)
USS LENAWEE APA-195
081200H March 1965

Appendix 2 (Area Study) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 300-65

Reference: None

Time Zone: G

1. Maps

- a. AMS Series L501; 1:253,440 Sheet: B47L
- b. AMS Series L707; 1:63,360 Sheets: 2F1, 2F2, 2F3, 2F5, 2F6, 2F7, 2F8, 2F9, 2F10, 2F11, and 2F12
- c. Jet Navigation Chart (JN); 1:2,000,000 Sheet JN54
- d. Operational Navigation Chart (ONC); 1:1,000,000 Sheets K-9 and L-10
- e. Available Aeronautical Approach Charts (AC 1:250,000) coverage of the objective area.

2. WEATHER AND CLIMATE

a. General. The feasibility of conducting amphibious operations in Thailand is determined to a large extent by the degree of exposure of the coasts and landing beaches to the monsoons. In general, the characteristic climatic features of this area are copious rainfall (particularly on the West Coast of the peninsula) monsoonal winds which may give rise to unacceptable sea, swell, and surf conditions on fully exposed beaches, and oppressive temperatures and humidity conditions.

b. Suitability for Amphibious Operations. Along the western shores of the Gulf of Thailand, the weather is more favorable for amphibious operations from May through September and less favorable, although by no means impossible, from November through February. Along the eastern shores of the Gulf, the reverse holds true. Sea swell, and surf conditions may be somewhat less desirable when the windflow is onshore on the east coast than when it is onshore along other beaches in the area. The northern shores of the Gulf are relatively well protected from both monsoonal flows. Along the west coast of the peninsula, bordering the Andaman Sea and the Strait of Malacca, the northeast monsoon season (November to February) is the most favorable period for amphibious operations. Of the two transition periods between the monsoon season, the spring intermonsoon period (mid-March to mid-May) is generally more favorable for amphibious operations than the autumn intermonsoon period (October).

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CONFIDENTIALc. Weather Factors Pertinent to Amphibious Operations

(1) By mid-February the northeast monsoon diminishes in force, and the wind direction frequently shifts to southerly over the northern part of Thailand and to easterly over the Southern part of the Gulf. This condition continues through most of March.

(2) Sea and Swell Conditions. Sea and swell conditions favorable for conducting amphibious operations (sea less than three feet, swell less than six feet) occur about 86 percent of the time. The most favorable months for slight sea and low swell depend upon the orientation of the coast with respect to the monsoonal flow; onshore flow usually produces higher sea and swell conditions. During March, sea and swell conditions along the Kra Isthmus should be favorable for amphibious operations over 90 percent of the time.

(3) Cloudiness and Rainfall. During March, at 0700 LST, the mean cloudiness at Surat Thani is 65 percent while at Songkhla it is 70 percent. Except along the coasts of the peninsula, the southwest monsoon is the rainy season. During March at Surat Thani there are five days with precipitation greater than 0.004 inch, while at Songkhla there are eight days.

(4) Visibility. With the exception of visibility, the weather factors are most favorable for conducting amphibious operations at night or during the early morning hours. Visibility is usually good at sea. In the vicinity of river mouths frequent restrictions to visibility occur in the mornings.

(5) Air Operations. The extensive mountain systems within Thailand complicate all air operations. They are physical hazards, frequently obscured by clouds, particularly along their windward slopes. Over and near these mountains air operations must be carried out at fairly high levels. Along the coast and over the lowlands, air operations are usually possible at many levels although clouds frequently complicate visual reconnaissance and photographic missions. Air operations over Thailand are also affected by turbulence, particularly that associated with thunderstorm activity. The hazard of aircraft icing is not unusually severe. Conditions may occasionally be encountered.

d. Temperature and Humidity. The mean annual temperature is slightly above 80 degrees F; in Thailand. During March, the mean maximum temperature at Surat Thani is 95 degrees F; the mean minimum 70 degrees F; with the extremes ranging from 60 degrees F to 101 degrees F. At Songkhla, the mean daily range in temperature is from 75 degrees F to 89 degrees F with the absolute extremes ranging from 64 degrees F to 95 degrees F. The relative humidity at Surat Thani ranges from 56 to 97 percent in March while at Songkhla the range is from 69 to 92 percent. The sea water temperature varies little from winter to summer, the mean being slightly above 80 degrees F.

CONFIDENTIAL3. BEACHES. Tab C (Beach Study).

4. MILITARY GEOGRAPHY. Generally, the terrain within the objective area consists of forested plains, hills and mountains. There are usable landing beaches in the area (Tab C (Beach Study)). The weather during the month of March can be considered good for amphibious operations.

a. Topography. The objective area is essentially a flat poorly drained coastal plain, dissected by three prominent rivers (Pattani, Sai Buri, and Bang Nara) with hills gradually rising to as much as 1300 feet. The vegetation along the flanks of the rivers varies from low scrub to flooded mangrove and grassy swamps. Much of this area is broken by cultivation (rice, coconut, rubber) which alters the natural vegetation pattern measurably. Very little of the area is open dry grass land. The combination of natural vegetation and local cultivation creates a distinctly sectorized pattern with more land continually being turned to cultivation of crops. Generally only the mangrove swamp areas have a high density and overhead canopy. The surface material is generally sandy soil with traces of clay. The soils on the river flanks is sandy silt and that in the extreme low lands is sand with a high decomposed vegetation content. Inland 10 to 20 miles from the coast an area of rugged jungle covered mountains rises to heights of 3000 feet. There are two main corridors running generally North and South through the FBH which correspond to the valleys formed by the Pattani and Sai Buri Rivers.

b. Natural Obstacles and Hazards. There are numerous types of natural obstacles within the maneuver area; these include jungle, secondary jungle rice paddies, coconut groves, rubber plantations, mangrove swamps, palms, thorny and woody vines, broad leaf evergreen vegetation and extremely soft sand. Hazards include (Water Buffalo), snakes and crocodiles.

c. State of the Ground

(1) January through April the ground is usually moist, with an occasional area that is thoroughly wet. Some areas are dry for the most part but even these are wet and moist periodically during this period.

(2) Airfield construction is possible in the area but is restricted by poor natural surface material, hill masses and swamps. There are major problems in road construction throughout the area because of soil and drainage conditions. Most of the coastal and interior plains areas are unsuited for tunnel type construction but are rated poor to good for bunker type construction. Some low hills are good for bunker construction with the more rugged mountains being fair to very good for tunnel type construction. Small-scale amphibious landings by Japanese at Song Klha and Pattani in December 1941 were accomplished by movement across dry sandy clay plains to the near-by coastal towns and airfields.

d. Rivers

(1) Sai Buri. (Mouth at TALUBAN QU 568277) this river is a fairly wide relatively shallow river running from Southwest to Northeast emptying into the Gulf of Thailand through a sandbar enclosed inlet. The section of

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river in the FBH varies in width from 200 to 250 feet. The river bottom is sandy mixed with clay. Only during the rainy seasons does the Southern branch connect with the main stream. The tidal range at the mouth is two feet. LCVP and LCPR can negotiate the river mouth sandbar at high tide only.

(2) Po Ni. (Mouth west of Yaring QU 2248) This river is a coastal stream traveling a circular route closing on itself and emptying into the Gulf of Thailand, creating an alluvial fan. The average depth of the river is 10 to 15 feet with a depth at the mouth of 5 feet. The river has heavily vegetated banks and at some point is as narrow as 6 feet.

e. Ports - Pattani

(1) Location and Terrain. Pattani is located on the eastern shore of the Malay Peninsula in South Thailand at latitude 06°-52' North and longitude 101°-15' East. It is about 4 kilometers from the mouth of the Pattani River, which discharges almost due north into the Gulf of Thailand. One section of the southern border of Thailand lies about 60 kilometers to the south. By sea, Songkhla is 80 kilometers to the northwest, Bangkok 780 kilometers to the north and Singapore 880 kilometers to the south. The terrain around Pattani is relatively flat. There are large areas of coconut, rubber plantations and rice fields in the vicinity.

(2) Climate. The weather statistics for Pattani are as follows:

Annual rainfall, 30 years average. 2207.5 cm. or 87 inches
 Average number of days of rainfall. (1 mm. or more). . . 165
 Mean annual temperature. 27.5° C. (81.5° F)
 Minimum mean annual temperature. 23.7° C. (74.6° F)
 Maximum mean annual temperature. 31.5° C. (89° F)
 Mean relative humidity. 79%

Most of the rain occurs during the winter months or northeast monsoon season from October to January. Maximum monthly temperatures range from 30° C; 86.5° F. to 36° C; 97.1° F. Minimum monthly temperature range from about 20° C; 68° F. to 22.5° C; 72.5° F.

(3) Tides, Currents, Winds. Tidal stages are as follows:

Lowest low water - 00.0 meters (reference datum)
 Mean Low Water - Plus 0.69 meters
 Mean Tide Level - Plus 0.88 meters
 Mean High Water - Plus 1.12 meters
 Highest High Water - Plus 2.00 meters

f. Facilities

(1) Anchorage. Coastal ships anchor in the area southwest of the peninsula of Laem Tachi. This protects them from the east and northeast monsoon winds. They rest on the bottom at low tide but with no apparent damage as the bottom is silty and soft. During the southwest monsoon period the sea is calm in this area. Ocean-going or deep draft ships anchor farther out, about 10 kilometers from the mouth of the river, at latitude 6°59'15" N and Longitude 101°13'00" E. They call only during the southwest monsoon period, April to September, when the sea is calm.

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(2) Channel. The channel into the port of Pattani, shifts from year to year, between 1920 and 1961 the mouth of the river has moved 1500 meters in a northerly direction, the shore line has extended in the same direction about 500 to 1000 meters and the tongue of the land of Laem Tachi has extended in a southwesterly direction about 1500 meters. Silting appears to be substantial and this may be aggravated somewhat by tailings from tin mines. These however, are some 110 kilometers from the mouth of the river. The channel is marked by palm logs sunken in the mud.

(3) Depth of Water. The depths of water are as follows: The minimum being about 0.3 meters at lowest low water in the channel outside the mouth of the river. In the river through the city and along the private piers the depth is about 1.8 meters at low water and this has changed very little in the last 10 years according to the memory of personnel of the local lighter companies. They report a silting up of only about 1 foot or about 0.3 meters during this period. In the channel outside the river mouth a greater depth is reported now than that of 10 years ago. This is attributed by the local companies to blowing out of the silt by propellers of the launches. As the lighters have a draft of 0.38 meters empty and 1.07 meters loaded there is some waiting on the tide. Draft of the launches is 0.56 meters. The lighters are loaded in advance and anchored in groups close to the ship's anchorage area. The reverse procedure is employed on unloading. This saves ship's time, though of course more lighters and tugs or launches are needed.

(4) Aids to Navigation, Pilotage. Spar buoy markers consisting of palm logs mark the channel outside the river mouth. They have distinctive markings for each side of the channel, are shifted each year as the channel shifts, and navigation at night is accomplished by playing a searchlight on them. There is no pilots' organization. Each launch operator has his own pilot.

(5) Berths. Berths are all privately owned and are constructed of wood with untreated wood piles. The latter are subject to marine borer attack in the salt water and have a life expectancy of about three years. There are three berths owned by the lighter companies although there are several places where lighters can tie up. The piers or berths consist of timber reinforced bridges which extend out to a depth of approximately 1.8 meters of water. They are capable of sustaining loaded trucks and can probably support a load of about 250 pounds per square feet.

g. Major Roads

(1) Pattani to Yaring (GC 2545)

- (a) All weather bituminous surface
- (b) Width 22 feet
- (c) Horizontal clearance 21 feet, vertical clearance unlimited
- (d) No restrictive curves or grades
- (e) Will support vehicles of 5 ton capacity

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(2) Yaring to Pak Narek (GC 3945)

- (a) Fair weather waterbound macadam
- (b) Width 20 feet shoulders 1 to 2 feet
- (c) Horizontal clearance 20 feet, vertical clearance unlimited
- (d) No restrictive grades; sharp curves at GC 2945 and GC 394444
- (e) Will support vehicles of 2½ ton capacity

(3) Yaring to Ta Lu Ban (Sir Buri) (GC 550259)

- (a) All weather bituminous surface to GC 4327, remainder water-bound macadam
- (b) Width 18 to 22 feet
- (c) Horizontal clearance 20 feet, vertical clearance unlimited
- (d) No restrictive curves or grades
- (e) Will support vehicles of 5 ton capacity

(4) Ta Lu Ban (Sai Buri) to Jingo (GC 649903)

- (a) Primarily waterbound macadam with sections of bituminous surface
- (b) Width 22 feet, shoulders 1 to 3 feet with drainage ditches
- (c) Horizontal clearance 21 feet, vertical clearance unlimited
- (d) No restrictive curves or grades
- (e) Will support vehicles of 5 ton capacity

h. Telecommunications. Telecommunications in Thailand are still highly inadequate. To alleviate this problem, several private systems have been licensed to conduct legitimate business communications internally and with other South-east Asia Countries; however, much illegal and clandestine traffic is carried on.

i. Air Facilities - Pattani

(1) Location - GEO. coord - 06° 46'38"N 101° 09'26"E

(2) Elevation - 20 ft

(3) Runway Data

Length - 3600'

Magnetic orientation - 080°/260°

Width - 150'

Surface - macadam, in good condition

Capacity - C-130

Obstructions - None

(4) Taxiways - none

(5) Parking - no aprons/hardstands. General field area available.

(6) Facilities and POL storage - none

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a. Cross Country Movement. Movement by foot is greatly restricted by flooded rice paddies, swamps and jungle. Foot trails abound but generally parallel streams and rivers or connect villages. In cultivated rubber, coconut and banana tree sections, as well as dry rice paddies, cross-country movement is easy. Movement of wheeled vehicles cross-country is impossible in all but a few isolated rubber and coconut groves.

b. Cover and concealment. Concealment is abundant in all parts of the objective area. Only the beaches and recently planted rice paddies do not afford adequate concealment for small units. However, large troop movements across even mature rice paddy areas would be discernable in the immediate vicinity. Some cover is afforded in the cultivated plains by the rice paddy dikes and by the roads in the area which frequently rise several feet above the surrounding terrain. Cover is plentiful in the more mountainous areas.

c. Observation. Observation is generally poor throughout the coastal plain, except across open rice paddies. The native procedure of climbing a coconut tree is the logical alternative.

d. Avenues of Approach. The Pattani, Sai Buri and Bang Nara Rivers with adjacent and generally parallel roads and trails are the primary North-South avenues of approach. Certain areas of the landing beaches provide entrance from the sea with beach exits to the hinterland indicated in Tab C (Beach Study).

e. Key Terrain Features.

(1) Pattani. Port facility and urban area. Location: QU 110460 (Center)

(2) Hill mass running generally North-South 3 miles east of Pak Narek, location from QU 445339 to QU 441441.

(3) Hill 1588, location: QU 4253 11

(4) Hill mass in general center of objective area. Hill 1037 is the predominant feature. Location: QU 448215 to QU 325307 to QU 319208.

(5) Hill mass west of Blue Beach; predominant features Hills 2559, 2723 Location: QU 515084 (Hill 2559), QU 506037 (Hill 2723) QZ 569849, QZ 448885.

f. River Navigability(1) Pattani River

(a) River mouth navigable at any state of tide by LCPR, LCVP or LVTP-5. LCM-8 may navigate the river at high tide only.

(b) Pattani River Bridge at GC109453 precludes upriver navigation by LCM-8.

(c) Banks of river are 1 to 3 feet high upriver as far as GC125365

(d) Landing (egress) from the river is possible at the following points:

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GC 107449 to SE
 GC 102447 to East
 GC 108443 to East
 GC 103443 to North
 GC 109415 to East
 GC 101399 to East and West
 GC 126345 to East and West

(e) Small floating resupply points may be utilized at following coordinates:

GC 102447
 GC 107437
 GC 105421

(2) Sai Buri River

- (a) The mouth of the river is navigable at any state of the tide by LVTP-5.
 (b) Mouth presently navigable at high tide only LCPR and LCVP
 (c) Banks of the river are from 1 to 4 feet in height
 (d) Landing (egress) from the river is possible at the following points.

GC 445131
 GC 404118
 GC 336996 (Ferry w/3/4 ton limit).
 GC 509195

(e) Floating resupply points may be positioned anywhere north of GC 440120.

6. MEDICAL INFORMATION

a. There are 2 types of fatally poisonous snakes in the area, Cobra and Pit Viper. None are commonly seen. The flooded rice paddies abound with water snakes and crabs.

b. Water buffalo and monkeys present the most common animal threat in the area. All animals must be considered to carry rabies. All animal bites to be reported to medical personnel for proper treatment.

c. ~~Malaria~~ and dysentery are the most serious common diseases.

d. Untreated drinking water is not considered fit for consumption.

e. Crocodiles have been reported in the river mouth areas but are infrequently observed.


7. THE PEOPLE

a. Siamese Thais. The population of the objective area is marked Malay and Siamese Thai. Siamese Thai is the official language of the friendly people, who have developed a keen interest in trade and in the economic status of their country. It is a society generally free of pressing problems which face the southeast Asian peoples, which contributes to the harmonious outlook of the Thais. The Buddhist faith which predominates among the Siamese Thais, also contributes to this general serenity. The Thais are intensely nationalistic and justifiably proud of their country and of the King and Queen.

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b. Malays. The Malays, although actually under Thai sovereignty for over 600 years, form a distinct ethnic group. They are more closely a kin to the Federation of Malaya than to Thailand. Most of them live in small self-sufficient villages devoted to wet rice farming or fishing. The Malay in Thailand are devout Moslems and therefore have religious, social and cultural interests entirely foreign to the Buddhist Thais. Many Malay consider Thai essentially a Buddhist language and therefore refuse to learn or teach their children Thai because it may promote infidelity to Islam. Malay for these people is the accepted language. In some areas the Malay have accepted the Thai culture and language, while adhering to the Moslem Religion.


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TABS:

- A - HIGHWAY BRIDGES
- B - ROAD DISTANCES IN MILES
- C - LANDING BEACHES
- D - TIDE TABLES
- E - ASTRONOMICAL DATA

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Tab A (Highway Bridges) to Appendix 2 (Area Study) to Annex B (Intelligence)
 to Operation Plan 300-65

Reference: None

Time Zone: G

HIGHWAY 11

<u>LOC BRIDGE NO.</u>	<u>LOCATION & OBSTACLE</u>	<u>LENGTH METERS</u>	<u>CAPACITY</u>
36	QU2643 Stream	11.6	30 T
37	QU2642 Stream	11.7	30 T
38	QU2741 Stream	11.7	30 T
39	QU2840 Stream	12	30 T
40	QU3039 Khleng Tan Yong	12.5	CL 12
41	QU3237 Stream	12	30 T
42	QU3733 Stream	23.6	30 T
43	QU3832 Stream	24	30 T
44	QU3932 Stream	11.6	30 T
45	QU4228 Stream	11.6	30 T
46	QU4327 Stream	11.5	30 T
47	QU4524 Stream	11.6	30 T

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<u>LOC BRIDGE NO.</u>	<u>LOCATION & OBSTACLE</u>	<u>LENGTH METERS</u>	<u>CAPACITY</u>
48	QU4825	18	30 T
49	QU4825 Stream	18	30 T
63	QU5612 Stream	24	
64	QU5612 Stream	15	
65	QU5708 Stream	20	
66	QU5708 Stream	13.2	
67	QU5708 Stream	14.7	
68	QU5707 Stream	30	
69	QU5706 Stream	9.6	
70	QU5805 Stream	13.8	
71	QU5804 Stream	15	
72	QU5804 Hua1 Son Pi	30.6	
73	QU5902 Stream	25.2	
74	QU5901 Stream	6.8	
75	QU5901 Hua1 Pa Cho	40	30 T

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Tab B (Road Distance in Miles) to Appendix 2 (Area Study) to Annex B
 (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 300-65

Reference: None

Time Zone: G

	JINGO	KAMPONG NAM BAN	NARATHIWAT	PAK NAREK	PATTANI	RANGEK	TA LU BAN	TAN YAN MAT PR JUNCTION	YALA	YARING
JINGO	-	82	10	41	52	8	21	9	85	44
KAMPONG NAM BAN	82	-	92	7	25	51	22	52	129	16
NARATHIWAT	10	92	-	52	62	14	31	11	88	54
PAK NAREK	41	7	52	-	18	49	20	50	40	9
PATTANI	52	25	62	18	-	60	31	61	23	8
RANGEK	8	51	14	59	60	-	29	1	78	52
TA LU BAN	21	22	31	20	31	29	-	30	53	23
TAU YAN MAT PR JUNCTION	9	52	11	50	61	1	30	-	77	53
YALA	86	129	88	40	23	78	53	77	-	31
YARING	44	16	54	9	8	52	23	53	31	0

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Tab C (Landing Beaches) to Appendix 2 (Area Study) to Annex B (Intelligence)
 to Operation Plan 300-65

Reference: None

Time Zone: G

1. RED BEACH

a. Limits. Left Flank GC 523352
 Center GC 522353
 Right Flank GC 522355

b. Identification and Usable Length. Red Beach is a straight beach 350 yards long. The left flank is marked by a lone pine tree 100 ft high and 75 yards inland.

c. Width. LW - 15 to 25 yards
 HW - 0 yards (Vegetation grows to berm)

d. Gradients. Foreshore - 1:15
 Backshore - level (berm is 1 to 2 feet high)

e. Beach Material and Trafficability. Sand; the trafficability is fair. There are no obstacles and egress to the hinterland is possible the entire length of the beach.

f. Hinterland. The hinterland (starting at the HWL) is level and grassy with a sparse covering of coconut palms. The palms are spaced far enough apart to allow helo landing or vehicle staging. An unimproved dirt road parallels the beach 50 yards inland. A swamp parallels the entire length of the beach 300 to 400 yards inland.

g. Beach Exits. The primary exit inland is SW from RJ 527343. This route is limited to 1/4 ton vehicles by a crevasse at GC 499335. An alternate route inland, via KAMPONG NA BAU, and SW to GC 456354, is also limited to 1/4 ton traffic.

h. Remarks. There is one sandbar 100 yards from the HWL, extending from the left flank 150 yards. Additionally, matting may be required on the steep foreshore after the initial vehicles have crossed the beach.

2. WHITE BEACH

a. Limits. Left Flank GC 525349
 Center GC 524350
 Right Flank GC 523352

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b. Identification and Usable Length. White Beach is a straight beach 350 yards long. The right flank is marked by the skeleton of a boat at the berm line.

c. Width. LW - 15 to 25 yards
HW - 0 yards (Vegetation grows to berm)

d. Gradients. Foreshore - 1:15
Backshore - level (berm is 1 to 2 feet high)

e. Beach Material and Trafficability. Sand; the trafficability is fair. There are no obstacles and egress to the hinterland is possible the entire length of the beach.

f. Hinterland. The hinterland (starting at the HWL) is level and grassy with a sparse covering of coconut palms. The palms are spaced far enough apart to allow helo landing or vehicle staging. A unimproved dirt road parallels the beach 50 yards inland. A swamp parallels the entire length of the beach 200 to 300 yards inland.

g. Beach Exits. The primary exit inland is SW from RJ 527343. This route is limited to 1/4 ton vehicles by a crevasse at GC 499335. An alternate route inland, via KAMPONG NA BAU, and SW to 456354, is also limited to 1/4 ton vehicles.

h. Remarks. There is one sandbar 100 yards from the HWL extending north 200 yards from the left flank. Additionally, matting may be required on the steep foreshore after the initial vehicles have crossed the beach.

3. BLUE BEACH

a. Limits. Left Flank - GC 708055
Center - GC 705058
Right Flank - GC 703061

b. Identification and Usable Length. Blue Beach is straight, 700 yards long. The left flank is approximately one mile south of the town of BAN THAUR. Two rows of vertical poles, the remains of a canoe shelter and red roofed hut 150 yards inland marks the left flank.

c. Width. LW - 70 yards
HW - 40 yards

d. Gradients. Foreshore - 1:10
Backshore - 1:50

e. Beach Material and Trafficability. Coarse sand; Foreshore and backshore trafficability is poor, and made more difficult by a gently sloping berm.

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f. Hinterland. The immediate hinterland is a coconut grove and dwelling area associated with BAN THAUP. It occupies the area 75 to 100 yards landward of the HWL. A dirt road 25 yards landward from the HWL, parallels the beach into BAN THAUP. Behind the coconut grove and dwelling area, a mangrove swamp 20 to 25 yards deep exists. The depth of water is 2 to 4 feet and extends the entire length of the beach.

g. Beach Exits. There is only one exit from Blue Beach, located at GC 696067. The road is passable for all traffic to RJ 688965. Only the route SE from the RJ will provide heavy vehicle egress to the main JINGO - SAI BURI HIGHWAY.

h. Remarks. Matting may be required on the steep foreshore. Engineer work will be required to support vehicle traffic on alternate routes from RJ 688965 to the main highway.



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Landing Force (TF 133)
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081200H March 1965

Tab D (Tide Table - 7°13'N 100°36'E) to Appendix 2 (Area Study) to Annex B
(Intelligence) to Operation Plan 300-65

Reference: None

Time Zone: G

<u>TIDES 7°13'N 100°36'E</u>								
<u>MARCH</u>	<u>FIRST</u>	<u>HIGH</u>	<u>FIRST</u>	<u>LOW</u>	<u>SECOND</u>	<u>HIGH</u>	<u>SECOND</u>	<u>LOW</u>
17	1000	4.5	0404	2.7	2306	4.2	1647	2.0
18	1044	4.6	0443	2.5	2334	4.3	1725	2.0
19	1127	4.5	0524	2.4	2359	4.3	1800	2.2
20	1210	4.4	0604	2.3	----	---	1834	2.3
21	0025	4.3	0644	2.2	1252	4.3	1905	2.5
22	0052	4.3	0724	2.2	1334	4.1	1936	2.6
23	0120	4.2	0804	2.2	1417	3.9	2007	2.8
24	0151	4.1	0848	2.3	1507	3.6	2044	3.0
25	0226	4.0	0939	2.2	1614	3.4	2139	3.2
26	0308	3.8	1048	2.5	1927	3.4	2308	3.3

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 USS LENAWEE APA-195
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Tab E (Astronomical Table) to Appendix 2 (Area Study) to Annex B (Intelligence)
 to Operation Plan 300-65

Reference: None

Time Zone: G

	SUN		MOON		PHASE
MARCH	RISE	SET	RISE	SET	
17	0619	1823	1831	0613	Full
18	0619	1823	1923	0648	Full
19	0618	1823	2013	0745	Waning
20	0617	1823	2102	0827	Waning
21	0617	1822	2148	0912	Waning
22	0616	1822	2243	0956	Waning
23	0616	1822	2331	1043	Waning
24	0615	1822	0024	1131	Waning
25	0615	1822	0024	1219	Waning
26	0614	1822	0114	1310	Waning



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Appendix 3 (Counterintelligence) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 300-65

Reference: (a) FMFPac Order P3800.1E (SOP for Intelligence)
 (b) FMFSEVENTHFLT Order 3800.1 (SOP for Intelligence)
 (c) LFM 3 (Landing Force Intelligence)
 (d) OPNAVINST 5510.1B (USN Security Manual for Classified Information)

Time Zone: G

1. GENERAL. References (a) through (c) provide guidelines and instructions for the conduct of counterintelligence operations.

2. MILITARY SECURITY.

a. Planning Area.

(1) The LF Headquarters and each subordinate headquarters will select and appropriate area where all Jungle Drum III planning will be conducted.

(2) Planning personnel will be briefed on the need for stringent security in connection with operations.

b. Safeguarding Classified Material.

(1) All section heads will ensure that the degree of security clearance required is stipulated in all requests for augmentation personnel for the Landing Force Headquarters.

(2) The LF S-2 will be designated as the Classified Material Control Officer and will grant access to classified material to members of the LF Headquarters as required.

(3) U.S. classified material will be safeguarded in accordance with reference (d). Maximum effort will be extended to give at least equal protection to classified material originated by units of the Royal Thai Government.

(4) Emergency destruction plans will be prepared and posted in accordance with instructions contained in references (b) and (d).

(5) Classified material will not be carried forward of the Battalion CP's or carried in aircraft over enemy controlled areas, without prior approval of the appropriate commander.

(6) Suspected or actual loss, capture, compromise or disclosure of classified material will be reported to the LF Headquarters (ATTN: S-2), by the most expeditious means.

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(7) Commanders will insure that upon displacement of the organizational Headquarters, a thorough inspection is conducted for classified material which may have been left adrift. In addition, counterintelligence personnel will conduct security checks and searches, as prescribed by reference (c). Security violations will be reported to this Headquarters (Attn: S-2) by the most expeditious and secure means.

c. Security of Troop Movements and Concentrations

(1) Security surveys of ports of embarkation will be conducted by counterintelligence personnel prior to embarkation. (Constructive)

(2) On order, all leave and liberty will be cancelled for units. (Constructive)

(3) On order, all telephone service to and from the ports of embarkation will be terminated except for official telephone service. (Constructive)

(4) Immunization of troops will be carried out so as not to identify the area of operation for which the immunization is being given.

(5) Tactical markings on equipment and vehicles will be covered with masking tape or water soluble paint until after the landing has been effected. (Constructive)

d. Password and Countersign. Tab A (Challenge and Passwords)

e. Individual responsibility in communication security will be emphasized. Special attention will be given to not passing classified or sensitive information via telephone. All reports of communication security violations will be reported to the LF Headquarters (Attn: S-2) by the most expeditious means.

f. Secrecy Discipline and Training. Intensive security training will be accomplished by all units of the LF during the planning phase, with particular emphasis on:

(1) The individual Marines' part in the security of troop movements, troop concentrations, staging areas, and organizations.

(2) Safeguarding of equipment, especially those items of equipment which might compromise the area of operations or mission of the Landing Force.

(3) Suppression of rumors.

(4) Proper use of passwords, countersigns, shackles, enciphers, decipherers, and other methods or devices.

CONFIDENTIALg. Counter Espionage

(1) Access to classified material will be on a "NEED TO KNOW" basis only.

(2) Photography or sketches of weapons, equipment, defenses, restricted areas and key personnel will not be permitted, unless authorized by this Headquarters.

(3) Any individual observed in violation of this restriction will be immediately apprehended and delivered with camera and or sketches intact, to nearest S-2 Section for processing and disposition.

(4) Personnel will not keep diaries, carry post cards, letters, photographs, unit leader notebooks or any other matter on their persons which would be of intelligence or coercive value to an enemy in the event of capture. Unit intelligence officers will insure widest dissemination of this restriction.

(5) Indigenous personnel will not be employed in any capacity, regardless of age or sex, until cleared by counterintelligence screening.

(6) Indigenous personnel will not be permitted to see or handle classified material unless specifically authorized in writing by the S-2.

(7) Any unauthorized persons attempting to gain information on Landing Force units or activities will be apprehended and held for interrogation by intelligence personnel.

h. Counter Sabotage

(1) Local dissident forces may resort to overt and covert tactics against installations, communications and equipment. Therefore, maximum security will be instituted immediately after landing by all units.

(2) Any targeted public/private installations in a units zone of operations, whose continued operation is considered essential or beneficial to friendly forces, will be secured and properly safeguarded against sabotage and destruction.

(3) Actual or suspected acts of sabotage will be brought to the attention of the LF S-2 (Attn: Counterintelligence), by the most rapid means possible. In addition, all questionable personnel, particularly indigenous personnel in the area, will be apprehended and detained pending arrival of counterintelligence personnel. The senior person present will assume control of the area and ensure that unauthorized personnel are barred from the area, and that the area is unmolested until such time as he is relieved by Counterintelligence personnel or other competent authority.

i. Counter Subversion

(1) Acts of a subversion nature, such as radio broadcasts, distribution of propaganda documents or other similar subversion activities will be reported to this Headquarters (Attn: S-2)

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(2) Persons engaged in, or suspected of engaging in acts of subversion against either Landing Force personnel or local populace, within the objective area, will be apprehended and delivered to S-2 personnel for interrogation and disposition.

j. Visitor Control

(1) All units will comply with references (b) for control over visitors in their areas of responsibility.

(2) Dissemination of information to visitors will be subject to the restrictions and criteria prescribed in reference (d).

(3) The accrediting of all news media personnel will be accomplished by this or higher headquarters.

(4) Requests for news release information will be referred to this Headquarters.

k. Protection of Commanders and Key Personnel

(1) All units will establish positive guard procedures to insure the safety of commanders.

(2) Personnel performing critical duties or possessing sensitive information will not be allowed to participate in operations in areas under enemy control unless under positive, constant, armed protection and/or in cases of operational necessity when approved by this Headquarters.

m. Camouflage Discipline

(1) All units will enforce camouflage discipline. Emphasis will be placed on concealment in order to deny the enemy vital target information.

(2) Signs, directional and unit, will be kept to a absolute minimum. In no instance will personal names be included on any sign.

3. CIVIL SECURITY

a. Liaison. Command Information Bureau personnel will maintain liaison with Military Police, indigenous police, public officials and appropriate commanders on all civil security matters.

b. Civilian Circulation Control

(1) Military security interests have precedence over the welfare of the civilian populace. (Constructive)

(2) The S-2 will establish check points, as appropriate, in the objective area for the purpose of screening refugees.

(3) Civilians apprehended or arrested will not be released prior to searching and screening. Under no circumstances will persons apprehended be removed from the point of apprehension without an immediate search for hidden documents or weapons.

CONFIDENTIALc. Curfew

(1) Curfew will normally be established during the hours of darkness, or between the hours of 2000 to 0500, during which time only those civilians with a properly authorized and signed pass will be permitted to leave their place or residence. (Constructive)

(2) If curfew restrictions are applied in the LF Zone, only those civilians whose assistance or duties are deemed essential, such as doctors, nurses, midwives and police will be issued passes for movement during curfew hours. All passes must be signed by the S-1. (Constructive)

4. CENSORSHIP. When directed by this Headquarters, censorship will be imposed as prescribed in reference (e).

5. REPORTS.

a. Spot Report. Immediate reports will be made to this Headquarters (Attn: S-2), on all sabotage, espionage, subversive and guerrilla activity. (Actual or suspected).

b. Agent Report. A report will be made and forwarded to this Headquarters (Attn: S-2), on all persons screened who are of counterintelligence interest.

c. Periodic Reports. (On request or on occurrence).

(1) Screening. Number, type, reason and disposition of all individuals screened.

(2) Liaison. Area, contacts, trends of civilian populace and brief resume of counterintelligence information obtained.

(3) Security surveys and inspections. Type; unit requested or directed; results.

(4) Sabotage. Number of actual or suspected sabotage acts within area of responsibility. Resume to include time, number of saboteurs, target methods of operation, equipment used, degree of success and/or method used by tactical unit to thwart attempt.

(5) Espionage. Name, type, where apprehended and target (if known) of each espionage agent captured within area of responsibility.

(6) Guerrilla Activity. Number involved, time, location, equipment and known or suspected target (Installation, equipment or personnel) for each incident.

6. MISCELLANEOUS


a. Prior to landing in the objective area, time permitting, all troops will be intensively instructed on security, combat intelligence, order of battle and counterintelligence. Emphasis will be placed on their mission and the

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value of immediately reporting information collected, and surrendering of weapons and equipment captured or collected by troops in the objective area. In addition, stress will be placed on the following matters:

- (1) Code of Conduct
- (2) Proper handling of POWs
- (3) Conduct and behavior while on liberty, to include cautioning on large numbers of military personnel congregating in local bars, theaters or other places of amusement and entertainment.
- (4) Briefing on possible terrorist activities, to include acts of assassination, kidnapping and bombings directed against LF personnel. Personnel will be cautioned against going on liberty alone, entering off limits, restricted, poorly or unlit areas and getting involved with large crowds, gatherings or demonstrations of indigenous personnel.


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TABS:

A - CHALLENGE AND PASSWORDS

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Tab A (Challenge and Password) to Appendix 3 (Counterintelligence) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Plan

Reference: None

Time Zone: G

1. GENERAL. The primary challenge and password and the alternate challenge and password will be provided by this Headquarters on a daily basis covering a 24 hour period from 1201 to 1200.

2. CHALLENGE AND PASSWORD

	<u>PRIMARY</u>		<u>ALTERNATE</u>	
<u>CODE</u>	<u>CHALLENGE</u>	<u>PASSWORD</u>	<u>CHALLENGE</u>	<u>PASSWORD</u>
20	WHERE	GATE	SEIZE	KNOWN
49	WISE	CHANGE	MORALE	RUMOR
14	REACH	PARTY	BROAD	DUMB
68	BOX	ABOUT	LOSS	SHOW
37	LOCATE	PORTION	PART	CONTROL
24	AMONG	NEXT	FILE	CAKE
56	TOTAL	BAT	BLUE	DOG
86	FACT	MAY	GIRL	GOOSE
31	LEVEL	TOM	TIGER	RED
63	MADE	PAST	JACK	HAIR
29	PIGEON	BAIT	TOLL	LETTER
44	BRASS	STREAM	BRIGHT	JOY
51	BLACK	JEWEL	NUMBER	WATCH
79	TOY	MATCH	JADE	MONEY
99	GAME	JINGLE	INFANT	KEG

3. DISSEMINATION. The challenge and password will be disseminated by message to all commands prior to 1200 each day.

Sample message:

CODE 20 CHALLENGE AND PASSWORD EFFECTIVE 091201G

(The primary challenge would be WHERE and the password would be GATE; the alternate challenge would be SEIZE and the password would be KNOWN.)

4. COMPROMISE. In the event of a compromise or suspected compromise, the command having knowledge of such, will notify this Headquarters immediately. The reporting command will place the alternate into effect. This headquarters will notify all commands.

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5. CHALLENGING. Personnel will be instructed on the procedures of challenging.

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Landing Force (TF-133)
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 081200H March 1965

Annex C (Concept of Operations) to Operation Plan 300-65

Reference:: Maps: Annex L (Maps and Charts)

Time Zone: G

1. MISSION. Commencing at H-Hour on D-Day, Landing Force conducts surface assault in KAMPONG NAMBAU-SAI BURI area of SOUTHERN THAI PENINSULA to seize, occupy, and defend the southern portion of the force beachhead, destroy insurgent forces located therein; control lines of communications and population centers in order to assist in restoring political control to the Royal Thai Government.

2. CONCEPT

a. On D-Day, Landing Force composed of one RTMC Brigade (-) and one USMC BLT conducts a surface assault in KAMPONG NAMBAU-SAI BURI SOUTHERN THAI PENINSULA.

b. Commencing at H-Hour the Landing Force, embarked in LVTs and LCVPs, lands with two BLTs abreast over designated beaches, advances rapidly inland, destroys insurgent forces in zone, secures and controls assigned areas, and establishes key blocking positions to limit insurgent movement and keep the insurgents in the objective area.

c. Units will be assigned large tactical areas of responsibility requiring aggressive, long range patrol and ambush operations. Patrols will be conducted from advanced strong points and supplied by landing craft and river boats. Clear and hold tactics will be used to gain and maintain control.

d. Landing craft and all types of usable native craft will support the tactical, logistical and administrative areas during the entire operation. Flexibility must be maintained at all levels to be able to react quickly.


e. Infantry units will be employed to conduct raids by submarine at mouth of SAI-BURI at H-10 hrs. (Annex E (Raids)). Each BLT will maintain a quick-reaction unit of platoon size prepared for immediate employment for expeditious movement of troops to eliminate located insurgent elements.

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f. Logistic Support for this operation will include employment of landing craft for forward supply activities. Waterborne boat refueling and control points will be established. Engineer support will be primarily provided by the engineer units attached to the BLTs.

g. The Amphibious Task Force will make organic landing craft available for direct support of the Landing Force in its conduct of operations in restricted waterways.

h. Other raids or secondary landings will be made from Submarines or assault shipping throughout the period D-Day to D+4.


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APPENDIX:

1 - Sequence of events

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 USS LENAWEE APA-195
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Appendix 1 (Sequence of Events) to Annex C (Concept of Operations) to
 Operation Plan 300-65

Reference: None

Time Zone: G

1. GENERAL

a. The following resume is a chronological listing of events as presently anticipated within the JUNGLE DRUM III (JD-III) exercise time frame. It is prepared to assist higher, lateral and subordinate commands in understanding the CLF's proposed method of accomplishing stated exercise objectives. Many of the exercise events are scheduled on a specific day or night for emphasis even though they will take place throughout the exercise in order to maximize free controller input. Some examples of unscheduled free play are: Failure of communication equipment either real or simulated, actual or constructive casualties with the related requirement for evacuation from an undetermined place at an undetermined time, the exchange of interpreter/liaison personnel between RTMC and USMC, and counterintelligence play. Conversely H-Hour events are minutely scheduled to present as complete a picture as possible of amphibious assault techniques within the limited time available for observer viewing. Final exact timing will be determined after rehearsal. Compression of actual areas is required to present the events in proximity to viewers. A major consideration in scheduling is maintaining the ability to react rapidly to contingency commitments without degradation of exercise play.

b. The sequence is based on one USMC BLT and one THAI Bn ashore. Availability of personnel, equipment and/or supplies might somewhat alter the events listed.

c. Due to the restrictions prohibiting the use of live ordnance (NGF and CAS) maximum use will be made of explosives which simulate these fires. Even with the preplaced explosives numerous lulls can be expected in the ship-to-shore movement. Special demonstrations such as air-to-air refueling, and demonstration of platoon tactics by BLT 2/3 will be conducted to fill the gaps.

15 MARCH. Landing Force Headquarters with its' support elements, moves ashore administratively to prepare for demonstration. The assault element of 2/3 ("G" Company) moves ashore to conduct detailed training for the demonstration. Those personnel of 2/3 acting as aggressors move ashore and construct defensive positions and begin rehearsing D-Day events. Preparation of bleacher area and demolition pits commences.

18 MARCH. R-Day. Landing elements of "G" Company backloads and conducts full rehearsal of demonstration landing. The RTMC units participating in the demon-

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stration D-Day are also prepared at this time to conduct full rehearsal of an assault of a fortified beach position(s).

D-Day (Demonstration Phase)

H-100. Spectators arrive by aircraft at PATTANI AIRFIELD and are transported by CIB to the bleacher area on the landing beach. NOTE: "Hold Harmless" agreements should be executed by CIB prior to departure from BANGKOK. Upon arrival at the bleacher area, spectators, awaiting the landing to commence, will have an opportunity to view a static display of both THAI and U.S. infantry weapons. U.S. and THAI personnel will be available to answer questions. A refreshment stand and head unit will be established in the vicinity by TEC.

H-55. King of Thailand and party arrive (tentative).

H-50. During the landing demonstration a running commentary will be presented in both Thai and English by Captain PRACHAR, RTMC, and by Colonel GRAHAM, USMC.

H-43. Explanation of the Navy/Marine Corps Team, its history and developments. (Related to US/THAI - Navy/MC team and cooperation among the two)

H-40. CATF orders "Land the Landing Force".

General and Special situations presentation using briefing aids to orient observers.

H-20. NGF beach bombardment as assault wave of boats are inbound. (Preplaced TNT charges explode on beach initially and work inland)

H-15. In flight refueling of A4C aircraft by KC-130.

H-10. As NGF lifts, air strikes on beach (more TNT preplaced) commences.

H-0.5. As assault wave is about to cross the beach, air strikes move inland.

H-Hour. Air strikes lift, boats ground.

H+5. Troops crossing the beach are halted by fire. One or two fortified positions on both the U.S. and THAI beaches are attacked and reduced by 3.5 RL fire simulated by prepared demolitions.

H+10. One marine simulated casualty staggers towards stands and exposes a wound moulage; is treated by a corpsman and evacuated.

H+12. Mechanical mules with 106mm RR aboard pass in front of stands and continue inland.

H+15. CAS mission is called in by FAC. Air/ground communication broadcast over PA System. Engineers lay short span of beach matting in front of stands.

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
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H+25. ONTOS and Tanks pass in front of stands. As tanks pass they fire two blank rounds with intermittent MG Fire thereafter.

H+45. ANGLICO Detachment comes ashore with the RTMC Bn and sets up in view of the stands to support the Thais. An "on call" USN CAS mission responds to the Thai Commanders request and proceeds to destroy the target. Pre-positioned TNT detonated for realism.

D-DAY EVENTS NOT NECESSARILY VIEWED BY OVSERVERS.

1. In-flight refueling of USMC A4c aircraft by KC-130's
2. Raid in southern portion of force beachhead.


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ANNEX D (Landing Plan) to Operation Plan ³⁰⁰~~300~~-65

Reference: (a) CTF 132 OPORD 312-65
(b) LFM 01
(c) LFM 28

Time Zone: G

1. GENERAL. This plan provides for the landing of BLT 2/3 over BEACH WHITE and RTMC Brigade (-) over BEACH RED.

- a. BLT 2/3. Lands by landing craft and LVTs over BEACH WHITE.
- b. THAI BRIGADE (-). Lands by landing craft and LVTs over BEACH RED.
- c. LANDING FORCE RAID UNIT. Lands from PERCH in accordance with Annex E (Raid Plan).

2. SHIP-TO-SHORE CONTROL. Tac-Log groups will be established by individual BLTs. BLT 2/3 Tac-Log will be prepared by H+5 hours to transfer to LSD-5 to operate in vicinity of SAI BURI RIVER landing area.

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APPENDICES:

- 1 - Landing Sequence Table (To Be Issued)
- 2 - Assault Schedule
- 3 - Serial Assignment Table (To Be Issued)
- 4 - Landing Craft Availability Table

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Landing Force (TF-133)
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Appendix 2 (Assault Schedule) to Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation Plan ³⁰⁰~~312-65~~

Reference: None

Time Zone: G

BEACH WHITE (US)			BEACH RED (THAI)		
WAVE	TIME	CRAFT/VEH UNIT SERIAL	WAVE	TIME	CRAFT/VEH UNIT SERIAL
1	H-Hour	5 LVT	1	H-Hour	8 LVT
2	H + 5	5 LVT	2	H + 5	6 LVT
3	H + 10	7 LCVP	3	H + 8	4 LVT
4	H + 20	1 LCU 2 LCM			

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Appendix 4 (Landing Craft Availability Table) to Annex D
 (Landing Plan) to Operation Order ~~300-65~~

Reference: None

Time Zone: G

SHIP	LCPR	LCPL	LCVP	LCM(3)	LCM(6)	LCU
LENAWEE (APA 195)	1	2	19		2	
WASHBURN (AKA 108)		2	6	2	6	
GUNSTON HALL (LSD 5)		1	1			1
COOK (APD 130)	1	2	1			
ANTONG (LST 1)			2			
CHANG (LST 2)			2			
TOM GREEN COUNTY (LST 1159)			SEE BELOW			
TOTAL AVAILABLE	2	7	31	2	8	1
LESS SPARES 10%			3		1	
NAVAL USE	2	7	6	2	0	0
AVAILABLE FOR LANDING FORCE AND BEACHMASTER	0	0	22	0	7	1

NOTE: If TOM GREEN COUNTY participates add 1 LCPL, 3 LCVP.
 LCPL will be a spare, but LCVP increase to 34 and 25.

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Landing Force (TF-133)
 USS LENAWEE (APA 195)
 081200H March 1965

Annex E (Raid) to Operation Plan 300-65

Reference: None

Time Zone: G

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces

(1) Annex B (Intelligence)

(2) Current ISUMS

b. Friendly Forces. USS PERCH (APSS-313) transports Raid Force to objective area; delivers and recovers force as directed.

2. MISSION. Commencing 200030 March, Raid Force lands vicinity Sai Buri River mouth to conduct diversionary raid.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operation. Raid Force lands vicinity GS 5624 by rubber boat from APSS-313 to seize the bridge at 557276. Raid Force destroys any guerrilla units within objective area, blocking movement north along the beach road and controls by fire the exit from and egress into the Sai Buri River raid area. Raid Force effects a juncture of forces with BLT units moving south on the beach road the afternoon of D-Day.

b. Co H (-) (Rein)

(1) Commencing 200030 March, land vicinity 564284 and establish control of bridge at 557276.

(2) Set ambush and establish blocking positions in GS 5428 and GS 5528.

(3) Destroy any guerrilla forces attempting to enter or leave the Sai Buri River raid area.

(4) Determine if landing beach utilized will support subsequent LCVP and LCM traffic.

(5) Be prepared to juncture with BLT armored column moving south on beach road after H-Hour.

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c. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Upon juncture with forces of BLT 2/3 revert to operational control of BLT Commander.

(2) Be prepared to conduct additional raids, as may be directed.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Administrative Plan 300-65.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS/ELECTRONICS

a. Annex I (Communication-Electronics).

b. Radio silence until lifted by CATF.

c. Report CP location when established.

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Landing Force (TF-133)
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Annex G (Air Operations) to Operation Plan 300-65

Reference: (a) Annex H (Air Operations) to Commander Amphibious Task Force (CTF-132) Operation Order 312-65

Time Zone: G

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence)

b. Friendly Forces

(1) Basic Plan

(2) Annex A (Task Organization)

(3) Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF 132) will provide for control of air in the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA). (Reference (a).)

2. MISSION. Detachments of 1st MAW conduct operations in support of the Landing Force.

a. Detachment VMA-225, MAG-12 provides close air support for the assault landing and subsequent operations ashore.

b. Detachments VMGR-152, MWSG-17 provides in-flight refueling and navigational assistance for attack aircraft.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of operations. Annex C (Concept of Operations).

b. Detachments 1st MAW

(1) Detachment VMA-225. Eight A4Cs execute Appendix 1 (Air Schedules).

(2) Detachment VMGR 152. Four KC-130 support Appendix 1 (Air Schedules) plus other LFA logistics requirements.

c. Coordination Instructions

(1) Maps. For all air operations in the objective area the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid reference system

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will be used for target location.

(2) Tactical Air Request Form. The Standard form will be used.

(3) Air Space

(a) Boundaries of the AOA are an arc with 100 NM radius about the mouth of the ~~Sal~~ Buri River exclusive of the territory and coastal waters of MALAYSIA. Aircraft will not approach within 10 NM of the territory of MALAYSIA.

(b) Flight operations in the AOA will normally be conducted under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) and are unrestricted under those conditions. Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) limitations and other specific instructions are contained in reference (a).

(4) Control of Air

(a) The Commander Amphibious Task Force will control all air in the AOA.

(b) TACC will remain afloat and all aircraft entering or departing AOA will RIO with TACC.

(c) Control of direct air support aircraft in the objective area will be passed directly from the TACC to the designated TACP and will remain under control of the TACP until released. Landing Force Headquarters will monitor all close requests for air from subordinate units and on occasion may indicate to the TACC priorities.

(5) Rules of the Engagement. All aircraft will comply with reference (a).

(6) Armament Code. Appendix 2 (Armament Code).

(7) Search and Rescue. Reference (a) (Part Orange)

4. COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

(1) Annex I (Communication-Electronics).

(2) Authentication

(3) Air Navigation Aids, Appendix 3 (Air Navigation Aids).

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APPENDIX:

- 1-Air Schedules
- 2-Armament Code
- 3-Air Navigation Aids

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Landing Force (TF-133)
 USS LENAWEE APA-195
 081200H March 1965

Appendix 1 (Air Schedules) to Annex G (Air Operations) to Operation
 Plan 300-65

1. Air Schedules

a. D-2 (R-Day)

EVENT NO	MISSION	PROVIDED	NO & CLASS A/C	TIME ON STATION	ARMA-MENT	REPORT TO ON NET	ENTRY POINT	REMARKS
* 89	Tanker	Det VMGR	1/KC-130	H-60 to complete	N/A	IcePack TATC	Beth	Note 1,4 and 5
* 12	Beach Strafe	Det VMA	4/A-4	H-35 to complete	Load 2,3	IcePack TATC	Beth	Note 3,5 and 6
* 66	SAR	RTN	Albatross	H-60 to 1600	N/A	IcePack TAC	N/A	Note 1 Orbit vic KOPHANGAN

b. D-Day

EVENT NO	MISSION	PROVIDED	NO & CLASS A/C	TIME ON STATION	ARMA-MENT	REPORT TO ON NET	ENTRY POINT	REMARKS
* 66	SAR	RTN	Albatross	A-60 to 1730	N/A	IcePack TAC	N/A	Note 1 orbit vic KOPHANGAN
* 89	Tanker	LFA	1/KC-130	As Req'd	N/A	IcePack TATC	Beth	Note 1,4 and 5
* 12	Beach Strafe	LFA	4/A-4	H-35 to complete	Load 1,3 TBA	IcePack TATC	Beth	Note 3,5 and 6
* 21	CAS	LFA	2/A-4	H+60 to 1700	Load 1,3 TBA	IcePack TATC	Beth	Note 1,6

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c. D+1 through D+4

EVENT NO.	MISSION	PROVIDED BY	NO & CLASS A/C	TIME ON STATION	ARMA-MENT	REPORT TO ON NET	ENTRY POINT	REMARKS
21	CAS	LFA	2/A-4	1000-1830	Load 1,4	IcePack TATC	Beth	Note 1,6
66	SAR	RTN	Albatross	0900-1930	N/A	IcePack TATC	N/A	Note 1 orbit vic KOPHANGAN
89	Tanker	LFA	1/KC-130	As Req'd	N/A	IcePack TATC	Beth	Note 1,4
60	SAR	TBA	TBA	As Req'd	N/A	IcePack TATC	N/A	Condition 3 0630-1830
85	Resupply	LFA	1/KC-130	As Req'd	N/A	IcePack TATC	Beth	Condition 5
22	CAS	LFA	2/A-4	1300-1700	Load 1,3	IcePack TATC	Beth	Note 1,6

NOTES:


1. Relieve on station if necessary.
2. If SAR helo available, station is over port beach at boat lane.
3. Beach coordinates are from 521355 to 525348. Beach strafe from H-10 to H-Hour. A-4s will provide prebriefed CAS for demonstration purposes at H+15 and H+45.
4. Tanker will relay to TACC the following information for A-4 flights:
 - a. Call sign of flight leader
 - b. Approach point and altitude
 - c. Number and type of aircraft
 - d. Ordnance (simulated)
 - e. ETD for home plate.
5. Tanker and A-4 aircraft in event 12 on D-2 and D-Day will remain hooked up and pass over white beach at H-20 at 500 feet AGL, weather permitting. After crossing beach, A-4's will disengage and provide beach strafe according to schedule.
6. The following ordnance loads include maximum Sandpiper (FAMMO) for each aircraft.
 - a. 12 Drakes
 - b. 2 Vultures
 - c. 2 Pheasants
 - d. 4 Woodchucks

Sections and divisions of aircraft will carry (constructive) mixed loads.

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Appendix 1 (Air Schedules) to Annex G (Air Operations) to Operation Plan
300-65 (Continued)



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Landing Force (TF-133)
 USS LENAWEE APA 195
 081200H March 1965

Appendix 2 (Armament Code) to Annex G (Air Operations) to
 Operation Plan 300-65

Reference: None

Time Zone: G

Bombs

2000 GP
 1000 GP
 500 GP
 250 GP
 220/260 FRAG
 Snakeye (General)
 Snakeye I (MK 81)
 Snakeye I (MK 82)
 MK 77 Firebomb
 MK 79 Firebomb

Code

TURKEY
 CHICKEN
 ROOSTER
 DRAKE
 PEACOCK
 ROAD RUNNER
 ROAD RUNNER ALFA
 ROAD RUNNER BRAVO
 BUZZARD
 VULTURE

Rockets

2.75 FFAR (LAU-32A)
 2.75 FFAR (LAU-3A)
 Zuni (LAU 10A)
 Zuni (LAU 33/35)
 HVAR (General)
 HVAR GP
 HVAR Heat
 HVAR Smoke
 HVAR VT
 HVAR ASW

GROUSE
 PHEASANT
 WOODCHUCK
 DOVE
 BOBWHITE
 BOBWHITE ALFA
 BOBWHITE BRAVO
 BOBWHITE CHARLIE
 BOBWHITE DELTA
 BOBWHITE ECHO

Ammo

20 MM (General)
 20 MM Warload
 20 MM API
 20 MM HEI
 20 MM APT
 20 MM INC

SANPIPER
 SANPIPER ALFA
 SANPIPER BRAVO
 SANPIPER CHARLIE
 SANPIPER DELTA
 SANPIPER ECHO

ASM

BULLPUP (General)
 Bullpup A
 Bullpup B
 Shrike

WOODPECKER
 WOODPECKER ALFA
 WOODPECKER BRAVO
 FIREBIRD

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AAM

Sparrow
Sidewinder

HAWK
BALD EAGLE

Operation Order
COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT/CTF 76 312-65

JUNGLE DRUM III CATF

Miscellaneous

CBU-1A/A	ORIOLE
CBU-2A/A	PARAKEET
Aero 14A Smoke Tank	MOCKINGBIRD
Aero 14B Spray Tank	REDBIRD
MK 6 Paraflame	ALBATROSS
MK 12 Mod O Chemical Tank	BLUE JAY
MK 13 Smoke Signal	SEA GULL
Photographic cartridge	COWBIRD
MK 44 Cluster (Lazy Dog)	SWALLOW
MK 44 Cluster (Butterfly)	CATBIRD
Aero 7E (Lazy Dog)	ROBIN
Sadeye	STORK
Walleye	FALCON

Fuzing. (To follow immediately after the appropriate ordnance code word, if desired.)

Instantaneous	FOXTROT
Delay (indicate)	GOLF
VT	HOTEL
Anti Disturbance	INDIA

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Landing Force (TF-133)
 USS LENAWEE APA 195
 081200H March 1965

Appendix 3 (Air Navigation Aids) to Annex G (Air Operations)
 to Operation Plan 300-65

Reference: Annex H (Air Operations) to CTF 132 OPOD 312-65

Time Zone: G

1. Fixed Aids to Air Navigation

<u>STATION</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>ID</u>	<u>TYPE</u>
Don Muang	13 55'N-100 36'E	Channel 49	MRL	TACAN
Don Muang	14 00'N-100 9'E	113.1	BAO	VORW, BEACON
Don Muang	13 43'N-100 33'E	345	BKK	LF/BEACON
Don Muang	13 59'N-100 39'E	365	RS	LF/BEACON
Kota Bahru	06 10'N-102 17'E	368	KB	LF/BEACON
SONGKHLA	07 11'N-100 37'E	117 0.4 to FIELD 390	SK	LF/BEACON

2. Mobile Aids to Air Navigation

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>TACAN</u>	<u>MF HOMER (KCS)</u>	<u>UHF HOMER (MCS)</u>	<u>ID</u>
USS CANBERRA (CAG)	CHAN 3	CH 3	NONE	AC
USS STRAUSS (DDG 16)	CHAN 60	NONE	NONE	PC

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
Landing Force (TF-133)
 USS LENAWEE APA-195
 081200H March 1965

Annex H (Command Relationships) to Operation Plan 300-65


Reference: (a) LFM 01

Time Zone: G

1. PLANNING PHASE



2. OPERATIONS PHASE



H-1

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Annex H (Command Relationship) to Operation Plan 300-65 (Continued)

NOTES:

1. CINCPACFLT (OSE)
2. COMGRUDESFLT SEVEN (OCE) IS CTF-131, CTF-191
3. COMPHIBRON ONE IS CTF-132
4. BLT 2/3 COMES UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF CTF 133 FROM 15-30 MARCH 1965.

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Landing Force (TF 133)
 USS LENAWEE APA-195
 081200H March 1965

Annex I (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Plan 300-65

Reference: (a) CTF 132 OPORD 312-65

Time Zone: G

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces

- (1) Annex B (Intelligence) and ISUMs as issued.
- (2) Insurgent forces will not have the capability to conduct active ECM.

b. Friendly Forces

- (1) Annex A (Task Organization).
- (2) Amphibious Task Force (TF 132) provides communication and crypto guard for the Landing Force during movement to the objective and subsequent operations ashore.

(3) Command Posts

(a) Afloat

Amphibious Task Force (TF 132)	LENAWEE (APA195)
Landing Force (TF 133)	LENAWEE (APA195)
BIT 2/3 (TG 133.2)	LENAWEE (APA195)
RTMC Brigade (TG 133.3)	CHANG (LST 2)
Landing Force Raid Unit (TG 133.4)	PERCH (APSS313)

(b) Ashore

Landing Force (TF 133) via TULABAN

- (c) Subordinate units report CP location when established.

2. MISSION. Commencing on order, Communication-Electronics elements of the Landing Force install operate and maintain communication-electronics systems to support the landing and subsequent operations ashore.

3. EXECUTION

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a. Det. Communication Company

(1) On order, install operate and maintain communications for the Landing Force Headquarters.

(2) Be prepared to provide a communication/crypto liaison team to the RTMC Brigade.

b. BLT 2/3

(1) Install, Operate and maintain communications in accordance with this annex and normal operating procedures.

(2) Provide communications for BLT 2/3 TACLOG group.

c. RTMC Brigade.

(1) Install, operate and maintain communications in accordance with this annex and normal operating procedures.

(2) On order, establish radio communications with the Royal Thai Army Battalion Combat Team from the Fifth Military Circle.

(3) Provide communications for RTMC Brigade TACLOG Group.

d. Landing Force Raid Unit

(1) Establish communications with this Headquarters on the Landing Force Tactical Net when established ashore.

(2) Provide internal communications as required.

e. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Reference (a)

(2) Communication Center

(a) Use ZULU time for all message date-time-groups. Local time may be used within the message text.

(b) All exercise messages, except those transmitted over functional nets, shall include phrase EXERCISE JUNGLE DRUM III immediately after the classification. In off-line encrypted messages the phrase shall be included before the encrypted text. Exercise messages shall not be addressed to non-participating forces.

(c) Actual messages shall be identified by the word ACTUAL immediately after the classification.

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(d) Flash (Z) precedence shall not be used for exercise messages.

(3) Messenger. Special messenger service shall be established as required.

(4) Radio

(a) Monitor assigned nets at H-4. Left radio silence on order.

(b) Appendix 1 (Radio Plan).

(c) Appendix 2 (Call Signs).

(5) Wire. Wire will be employed for local security and within command posts according to unit SOPs.

(6) Visual, Sound and Warning. Appendix 3 (Visual, Sound and Warning).

(7) Cryptographic.

(a) Authentication. Authentication in accordance with JUNGLE DRUM III Authentication System. (issued separately).

(b) Numerical Code. Numerical Code in accordance with JUNGLE DRUM III Numerical Code. (issued separately).

(c) Cryptographic Systems

(1) US cryptographic systems shall be employed in accordance with US instructions.

(2) Thai cryptographic systems shall be employed in accordance with Thai instructions.

(8) Air Communications. Annex G (Air Operations) and Appendix 1 (Radio Plan).

(9) Naval Gunfire Communications. Annex M (Naval Gunfire) and Appendix 1 (Radio Plan).

(10) Emergency Stop Exercise. The phrase EMERGENCY STOP EXERCISE received by any means of communication means to clear all communication channels and stand by to process traffic concerning the emergency. Resumption of the exercise will be directed by this Headquarters.

(11) Report the employment of active ECM by insurgent forces to this Headquarters by the most rapid secure means

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available.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Administrative Plan 300-65
- b. BLT 2/3 provide electronics maintenance support for Landing Force Headquarters.

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APPENDIXES:

- 1-Radio Plan
- 2-Call Signs
- 3-Visual, Sound and Warning

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Landing Force (TF 133)
 USS LENAWEE APA0195
 081200H March 1965

Appendix 1 (Radio Plan) to Annex I (Communication - Electronics)
 to Operation Plan 300-65

Reference (a) ACP 124
 (b) ACP 125
 (c) ACP 126

Time Zone: G

1. GENERAL Radiocommunications shall be in accordance with this appendix procedures.

2. PROCEDURES

- a. Radiotelegraph procedures in accordance with reference (a).
- b. Radiotelephone procedure in accordance with reference (b).
- c. Radioteletype procedure in accordance with reference (c).

3. LANDING FORCE RADIO NETS

- a. Landing Force Command. This is a HF/SSB, KW-7 covered half-duplex RATT circuit which will provide the CLF with a secure means for the transmission command and administrative messages within the LF.
- b. Landing Force Tactical. This is a HF/SSB voice circuit which will provide the CLF with a long range voice channel to his subordinate commanders.

4. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

- a. Initial contact on-line RATT circuits shall be USB voice. Shift to on-line RATT when directed NCS.
- b. Use USB only on SSB radio circuits.
- c. Net Control Stations enforce strict circuit discipline.

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Appendix 1 (Radio Plan) to Annex I (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Plan 300-65 (Continued)

TABS:

A-Radio Frequency Plan
B-Radio Frequency Chart

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Landing Force (TF 133)
 USS LST-1117 APA-195
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Tab A (Radio Frequency Plan) to Appendix 1 (Radio Plan) to
 Annex I (Communication - Electronics) to Operation Plan 300-65

Reference: (a) CTF 132 OPORD 312-65

Time Zone: G

1. LANDING FORCE HEADQUARTERS

<u>DESIG</u>	<u>CIRCUIT</u>	<u>EMISSION</u>	<u>POWER</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>
M-1	LF Command (P)	1.08F1	500	5094(5092)
M-2	LF Command (S)	1.08F1	500	12029(12027)
M-3	LF Tactical (P)	3A3J	500	10521.5(10520)
M-4	LF Tactical (S)	3A3J	500	2011.5(2010)

2. BLT 2/3

<u>DESIG</u>	<u>CIRCUIT</u>	<u>EMISSION</u>	<u>POWER</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>
M-5	Tac 1 (P)	3A3J	500	2251.5(2250)
M-6	Tac 1 (S)	3A3J	500	6680.5(6679)
M-7	Tac 2 (P)	36F3	16	42.4
M-8	Tac 2 (S)	36F3	16	53.1
M-9	CoTac	36F3	1	51.2
M-10	CoTac	36F3	1	52.2
M-11	CoTac	36F3	1	53.2
M-12	CoTac	36F3	1	53.4
M-13	Mortar	36F3	16	41.3
M-14	TACP Local	36F3	1	53.6
M-15	SFCP Local	36F3	16	52.4
M-16	ARTY C/F (P)	36F3	16	33.5
M-17	ARTY C/F (S)	36F3	16	31.9
M-18	TANK PLAT CMD	36F3	16	22.6
M-19	AT PLAT CMD	36F3	16	21.3
M-20	AMTRAC PLAT CMD	36F3	16	43.4
M-21	ENGR LOCAL	36F3	16	54.4
M-22	MT PLAT CMD	36F3	16	52.9
M-23	SHORE PARTY CONTROL	36F3	16	41.0
M-24	SHORE PARTY CMD	3A3J	500	2211.5(2210)
M-25	SHORE PARTY LOCAL	36F3	1	42.9

3. RTMC BRIGADE

<u>DESIG</u>	<u>CIRCUIT</u>	<u>EMISSION</u>	<u>POWER</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>
M-26	BRIG CMD (P)	0.1A1	50	5270
M-27	BRIG CMD (S)	0.1A1	50	3215
M-28	BRIG TAC (P)	36F3	16	38.8
M-29	BRIG TAC (S)	36F3	16	38.1

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<u>DESIG</u>	<u>CIRCUIT</u>	<u>EMISSION</u>	<u>POWER</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>
M-30	BN TAG	36F3	16	40.7
M-31	BN TAG	36F3	16	45.3
M-32	RECON CMD	36F3	16	50.8
M-33	LVT CO CMD	36F3	16	32.5
M-34	ARTY CMD	36F3	16	33.6
M-35	ARTY FIRE D/S	36F3	16	32.6
M-36	SFCF D/S	6A3	500	3770
M-37	SFCF D/S	6A3	500	4770
M-38	SFCF LOCAL	36F3	16	51.8
M-39	TAR	6A3	50	4999
M-40	RAD	6A3	25	126.18
M-41	TACP LOCAL	36F3	16	39.2
M-42	SHORE PARTY CMD/CONTROL	36F3	16	43.5
M-43	SHORE PARTY LOCAL	36F3	16	46.2

4. LANDING FORCE AVIATION

<u>DESIG</u>	<u>CIRCUIT</u>	<u>EMISSION</u>	<u>POWER</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>
M-44	DIF VMA 225 TAG	6A3	100	225.1
M-45	DIF VMGR 152 TAG	6A3	100	238.1

5. LANDING FORCE SPARES

<u>DESIG</u>	<u>CIRCUIT</u>	<u>EMISSION</u>	<u>POWER</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>
M-46		6A9B	500	2085
M-47		6A9B	500	6745
M-48		6A9B	500	8710
M-49		6A9B	500	10725
M-50		36F3	16	21.8
M-51		36F3	16	22.5
M-52		36F3	16	33.4
M-53		36F3	16	33.9
M-54		36F3	16	51.6
M-55		36F3	16	52.0
M-56		36F3	16	52.5
M-57		36F3	16	53.2
M-58		36F3	16	54.8
M-59		6A3	100	248.2
M-60		6A3	100	271.4

6. ATF/LF AIR FREQUENCIES

<u>DESIG</u>	<u>CIRCUIT</u>	<u>EMISSION</u>	<u>POWER</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>
H-1	TAG/TAR	3A3J	500	8532.5(8531)
H-5	TATC/IFR RED	6A3	100	317.0
H-14	TAD BLACK	6A3	100	233.8
H-37	GUARD	6A3	100	243.0

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<u>DESIG</u>	<u>CIRCUIT</u>	<u>EMISSION</u>	<u>POWER</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>
N-50	NGF CONTROL	6A3	500	2085
N-51	NGF CONTROL (S)	6A3	500	8692
N-52	NGF AIRSPOT 1 AMBER	6A3	10	250.6
N-53	NGF AIRSPOT 2 CORAL	6A3	10	258.6
N-54	SFCP SPOT 1 (S)	6A3	500	2173
N-56	SFCP SPOT 1 (P)	6A3	500	10725
N-58	SFCP SPOT 2 (P)	6A3	500	6979
N-60	SFCP SPOT 2 (S)	6A3	500	2077



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Landing Forceo (TF 133)
 USS LENDRUM APA-195
 081200H March 1965

Tab B (Radio Frequency Chart) to Appendix 1 (Radio Plan) to
 Annex I (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Plan 300-65

Reference: (a) CTF 132 OPORD 312-65

Time Zone: G

LEGEND:

C-CONTROL

X-GUARD

W-WHEN DIRECTED

A-AS REQUIRED

EMISSION CODE:

1-1.081M

2-3A3J (USB ONLY)

3-6A3

TASK ORGANIZATION	CALL	NET	FREQ	DESIG	EMISS
CLF	AE	LF CND (P)	12027	M-1	1
BLT 2/3	HJ	LF CND (S)	5092	M-2	1
TRCP	TL	LF TAC (P)	10520	M-3	2
SPCP	26	LF TAC (S)	2010	M-4	2
RTMC	BL	TAC/TAR	8531	M-1	2
TACP	TL	TAC	233.8	M-14	3
SPCP	26	TAC/TPR	317.0	M-5	3
TACC	%	TACCON (T)	2085	M-50	3
AOC	BP	NGCON (S)	8692	M-51	3
VA A/C	#	SPOT 1 (T)	10725	M-56	3
NGF SUPPORT GROUP (SACC)	PJ	SPOT 1 (S)	2173	M-54	3
USS SMITH DDG-838	ON	SPOT 2 (T)	6979	M-58	3
USS STRAUSS DDG-16	EY	SPOT 2 (S)	2077	M-60	3
USS CANBERRA CHG-3	BJ	SPOT 2 (S)	230.6	M-32	3
RTN 1 IN KLAO DE-3	LO	SPOT 2 (S)	230.6	M-32	3
NGF AIR SPOTTER	ID	SPOT 2 (S)	230.6	M-32	3
LF RAID UNIT	TO	SPOT 2 (S)	230.6	M-32	3

NOTES: % - ICE PACK
 #- EVENT NUMBER

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Landing Force (TF 133)
 USS LHA-195
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Appendix 2 (Call Signs) to Annex I (Communication - Electronics)
 to Operation Plan 300-65

Reference: None

Time Zone: G

1. GENERAL Call signs used on Landing Force circuits shall be in accordance with this appendix.

a. The call signs contained herein may be expanded by the addition of letter or number suffixes as required.

b. Tactical Call Signs (CW) shall be used as routing indicators on Landing Force Teletype circuits.

c. Voice Call Signs shall be used for Telephone Directory Names.

d. Additional call signs will be provided upon request to this Headquarters.

2. CALL SIGNS

ENCODE

a. Unit Call Signs.

UNIT OR ACTIVITY

Amphibious Task Force (Coll)

Amphibious Task Force

Landing Force

Landing Force (Coll)

BLT 2/3

Co E, 2d Bn, 3d Mar

Co F, 2d Bn, 3d Mar

Co G, 2d Bn, 3d Mar

Co H, 2d Bn, 3d Mar

Btry B, 1st Bn, 12th Mar

2d Plat, Co A, 3d Tank Bn

2d Plat, Co A, 3d AT Bn

2d Plat, Co A, 3d Recon Bn

2d Plat (Rein), Co A, 3d Engr Bn

2d Plat (Rein), Co D, 9th MT Bn

4th Plat, Co A, 1st Am Trac Bn

Shore Party

VOICE

CHARLIE GOLF

ALFA FOXTROT

ALFA ECHO

ALFA HOTEL

HOTEL JULIET

BRAVO SIERRA

CHARLIE PAPA

NOVEMBER ALFA

TANGO OSCAR

ECHO LIMA

XRAY HOTEL

FOXTROT CHARLIE

HOTEL QUEBEC

TANGO CHARLIE

DELTA NOVEMBER

KILO VICTOR

LUCKY BAG WHITE

TACTICAL (CW)

CG

AF

AE

AH

HJ

BS

CP

NA

TO

EL

XH

FC

HQ

TC

DN

KV

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<u>UNIT OR ACTIVITY</u>	<u>VOICE</u>	<u>TACTICAL (CW)</u>
RTMC Brigade	BRAVO LIMA	BL
RTMC Brigade (Coll)	BRAVO TANGO	BT
3d Inf Bn	FOXTROT OSCAR	FO
ArtyBtry	GOLF MIKE	GM
LVT Co	CHARLIE FOXTROT	CF
Engr Plat	XRAY PAPA	XP
Mod Plat	LIMA YANKIEE	LY
Recon	GOLF ROMEO	GR
UDT	XRAY ALFA	XA
Shore Party	LUCKY BAG RED	
Landing Force Aviation	JULIET ALFA	JA
Det VMA-225	HOTEL UNIFORM	HU
Det VMGR-152	HOTEL WHISKEY	HV
TACC	ICE PACK	
ROC	BRAVO PAPA	BP
NGF Support Group	PAPA JULIET	PJ
NGF Support Group (Coll)	INDIA WHISKEY	IW
USS Small (DDR-838)	OSCAR NOVEMBER	ON
USS Strauss (DDG-16)	ECHO YANKIEE	EY
USS Gamborra (CAG-3)	BRAVO JULIET	BJ
RTN Pin Kiao (DE-3)	LIMA OSCAR	LO
NET CALL SIGN	KILO PAPA	KP

b. Conjunctive Call Signs. Call signs for units or activities not otherwise assigned may be formed by adding the appropriate conjunctive call sign from the following list to the basic unit call sign.

<u>MEANING</u>	<u>VOICE</u>
TACLOG Group	PRODUCT
NGF Spotter	TWO SIX CHARLIE
NGF LHO	TWO SIX OSCAR
NGF Air Spotter	INDIA DELTA
TACP - AirLNO	ONE FOUR
FACP-A	ONE FOUR ALFA
FACP-B	ONE FOUR BRAVO
Advance CP Echolon	XRAY
FSCC	BAILEY
Rear CP Echolon	REAR

DECODE

<u>VOICE</u>	<u>TACTICAL (CW)</u>	<u>UNIT OR ACTIVITY</u>
ALFA ECHO	AE	Landing Force
ALFA FOXTROT	AF	Amphibious Task Force
ALFA HOTEL	AH	Landing Force (Coll)
BAILEY		FSCC
BRAVO JULIET	BJ	USS Gamborra (CAG-3)

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<u>VOICE</u>	<u>TACTICAL (CW)</u>	<u>UNIT OR ACTIVITY</u>
BRAVO LIMA	DL	RTMC Brigade
BRAVO PAPA	DP	AOC
BRAVO SIERRA	DS	CoE, 2dBn, 3dMar
BRAVO TANGO	DT	RTMC Brigade (Coll)
CHARLIE FOXTROT	CF	LVT Co (RTMC)
CHARLIE PAPA	CP	CoF, 2dBn, 3dMar
CHARLIE GOLF	CG	Amphibious Task Force (Coll)
DELTA NOVEMBER	DN	2dPlat (Rein), CoD, 9thMTBn
ECHO LIMA	EL	BtryB, 1stBn, 12thMar
ECHO YANKKEE	EY	USS Strauss (DDG-16)
FOXTROT CHARLIE	FC	2dPlat, CoA, 3dAmTracBn
FOXTROT OSCAR	FO	3dInfBn (RTMC)
GOLF MIKE	GM	ArtyBtry (RTMC)
GOLF ROMEO	GR	Recon (RTMC)
HOTEL JULIET	HJ	BLT 2/3
HOTEL QUEBEC	HQ	2dPlat, CoA, 3dReconBn
HOTEL UNIFORM	HU	Det VMA-225
HOTEL WHISKEY	HW	Det VMA-152
ICE PACK		TACC
INDIA DELTA		NGF Air Spotter
INDIA WHISKEY	IW	NGF Support Group (Coll)
JULIET ALFA	JA	Landing Force Aviation
KILO PAPA	KP	Not Call Sign
KILO VICTOR	KV	4thPlat, CoA 1stAmTrac
LIMA OSCAR	LO	RTN Pin Kiao (DE-3)
LUCKY BAG RED		SHORE PARTY (RTMC)
LUCKY BAG WHITE		SHORE PARTY (BLT 2/3)
LIMA YANKKEE	LY	Mod Plat (RTMC)
NOVEMBER ALFA	NA	CoG, 2dBn, 3dMar
ONE FOUR		TACF Air LNO
ONE FOUR ALFA		FACP-A
ONE FOUR BRAVO		FACP-B
OSCAR NOVEMBER	ON	USS Small (DDR-838)
PAPA JULIET	PJ	NGF Support Group
PRODUCT		TACLOG Group
REAR		Rear CP Echelon
TANGO CHARLIE	TC	2dPlat (Rein) 3dEngrBn
TANGO OSCAR	TO	CoH, 2dBn, 3dMar
TWO SIX CHARLIE		NGF Spotter
TWO SIX OSCAR		NGF LNO
XRAY		Advance CP Echelon
XRAY ALFA	XA	UDT (RTMC)
XRAY HOTEL	XH	2dPlat CoA 3dAmTracBn
XRAY PAPA	XP	Engr Plat (RTMC)



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Landing Force (TF-133)
 USS LENAWEE APA 195
 081200H March 1965

Appendix 3 (Visual, Sound, and Warning) to Annex I (Communication-Electronics) to Operation Plan 300-65

Reference: None

Time Zone: G

1. GENERAL

a. Visual signals are a supplementary means of communications and are transmitted by panels, flashing lights, signal flags and pyrotechnics.

b. Unit tactical call signs (CW) shall be used on all visual circuits.

2. WARNING AND ALERT SIGNALS

<u>SIGNAL</u>	<u>MEANING</u>	<u>HOW DISSEMINATED</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Air Defense Warning "RED"	Air attack imminent or taking place	Flash message, short repeated sound of sirens or word of mouth	Sirens will not be used for any other signal within objective area
"YELLOW"	Air attack is probable	Message, word of mouth	None
"WHITE"	Air attack is improbable	Message, telephone, word of mouth	May be declared before or after air defense warning "YELLOW" or RED"

3. VISUAL SIGNALS

a. Smoke signals. Smoke signals displayed by ground troops.

(1) <u>COLOR</u>	<u>MEANING</u>
RED	Friendly troops
GREEN	Need aid
YELLOW	This is a friendly front line
VIOLET	Available for local assignments

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(2) One or more white phosphorous shells fired on a target indicates an assigned target.

b. Pyrotechnics signals

(1) Meanings assigned to pyrotechnics signals shall not be altered.

(2) Meanings may be assigned to signals not specifically assigned by higher authority provided coordination with interested commander is effected.

(3) Any red pyrotechnic light displayed singly or in succession is an international signal meaning aircraft in distress.

(4) The below listed pyrotechnics signals with assigned meanings are standard within the Landing Force when fired by ground troops.

<u>SIGNAL</u>	<u>MEANING</u>
White star, parachute	Reserved for illumination
White star, cluster	Reserved for illumination
Amber star, parachute	*Assault waves have landed
Amber star, cluster	*Objective taken (mission completed)
Green star, parachute	*Friendly fire falling in own lines
Green star, cluster	*Friendly fire falling in own lines
Red star, parachute	*Emergency
Red star, cluster	*Emergency

*Will be repeated at least once.

c. Panels


(1) Panels are employed by ground forces as a means of recognition and identification. The panel sets VS-4/U and VS-6/U are normally used to identify vehicles and mark front lines.

(2) Use VS-4/U (RED) panels to mark front lines and to identify vehicles and armor in forward areas on odd dates. Use VS-6/U (YELLOW) panels on even dates.

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4. SOUND. Sound signals shall be used in accordance with unit SOPs.



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Landing Force (TF-133)
USS LENAWEE APA-195
081200H March 1965

Annex J (Rehearsal) to Operation Plan 300-65

Reference (a) CTF 131 Operation Order 311-65

Time Zone: G

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence) and current ISUMS.

b. Friendly Forces

(1) Amphibious Task Force (TF 132)

(a) Exercises overall coordination and control of the Ship-to-shore movement.

(b) Plans and conducts a touchdown and turn around rehearsal of the Landing Plan (Annex D).

2. MISSION. Commencing at R-Hour on R-Day, the Landing Force participates in an amphibious assault rehearsal in the communications, control procedures, and effectiveness of the landing plan..

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept. Landing Force (TF-133) exercises troops in the scheduled surface waves; activates all communication facilities and nets possible and exercises all staffs.

b. BLT 2/3. Provide troops and equipment for all scheduled surface waves.

c. RTMC Brigade. Provide troops and equipment for all scheduled surface waves.

d. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Training and setting up for demonstration 16 March 1965.

(2) R-Day: 18 March 1965.

(3) R-Hour: Time of surface landing.

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- (4) Activate all communications nets.
- (5) Waves 1, 2, and 3 will debark troops, wave 4 will turn away.
- (6) Distances to beaches will be identical to those for actual assault.
- (7) Aircraft control procedures in accordance with Annex G (Air Operations).
- (8) All injuries to personnel or damage to equipment will be reported immediately.
- (9) All problems encountered with recommended remedial action will be submitted at the rehearsal critique which will be held immediately after the rehearsal. (Annex K (Reports)).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. The following officers will attend the rehearsal critique on board the USS LENAWEA on 18 March 1965:

- (1) CLF, C/S and staff, Landing Force
- (2) CO, and S-3 BLT 2/3
- (3) CO, and G-3 RTMC Brigade
- (4) CO, S-3 THAI Battalion

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS. Annex I (Communications-Electronics).

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 USS LENAWEE APA-195
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Annex K (Reports) to Operation Plan 300-65


Reference: (a) CTF 131 Operation Order
 (b) MCO 3480.1

Time Zone: G

1. PURPOSE: This annex contains instructions for the preparation of reports required by reference (a), the rehearsal report required by Commander Landing Force and for the operational reports to be submitted daily during the conduct of operations ashore.
2. GENERAL: This Headquarters is required to prepare the following reports:
 - a. A brief summary written report for the Exercise Director's critique scheduled 26 March 1965.
 - b. Operational data and recommendations for the post exercise report to be drafted at the Post Exercise Conference in Subic Bay, on 12 April 1965.
3. ACTION: Task Groups listed in Annex A (Task Organization) will submit the following:
 - a. Rehearsal Report
 - (1) A report on the conduct of the rehearsal will be made immediately upon its conclusion. Appendix 1 (Rehearsal Report) to Annex J lists the subjects to be considered in this report.
 - (2) Reports will be submitted in message form.
 - b. Operations Summary. Submit to Landing Force Headquarters daily at 2200 as of 2000.
 - c. Summary Post Exercise Report
 - (1) This written report should briefly discuss the overall operation and include items considered of interest to the Landing Force Commander. This will include a discussion of problem areas, recommended solutions and areas in which particular success or failure was noted during any phase of the exercise.
 - (2) This summary will be submitted to LF Headquarters prior to the critique scheduled for 26 March 1965.
 - d. Post Exercise Report
 - (1) Appendix 2 (Post Exercise Report Content and Format).

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(2) To facilitate the preparation of this report, a Report Committee will be formed for a short period following conclusion of the exercise. Task group commanders will nominate two representatives as members of the Reports Committee. The Committee will meet at a time and place to be announced for a period of approximately two days to complete the written draft of the Post Exercise Report. These representatives should be fully prepared to present and discuss the subjects outlined in Appendix 2 relative to their respective task groups.


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APPENDIXES:

- 1 - Rehearsal Report
- 2 - Post Exercise Report Content and Format
- 3 - Required Reports

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Appendix 1 (Rehearsal Report) to Annex K (Reports) to Operation Plan 300-65

Reference: None

Time Zone: G

1. This report will be submitted by Commanding Officers of Landing Force Units by 1000, 19 March 1965.


2. Format (Omit paragraphs not pertinent)

a. Reports will be written in narrative form.

(1) General. Include scope of participation and overall results of the rehearsal.

- (a) Forces Assigned
- (b) Debarkation
- (c) Ship to Shore Movement
- (d) Timing
- (e) Embarkation
- (f) Control
- (g) Air Operations
- (h) Communications
- (i) Logistics/Medical/Admin

b. Comments, conclusions and recommendations for improvement of the exercise or discussion of any facet of the rehearsal will be included.


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Appendix 2 (Post Exercise Report) to Annex K (Reports) to Operation Plan
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Reference: (a) CTF 131 Operation Plan 300-65
(b) MCO 3480.1

Time Zone: G

1. FORMAT. (Omit paragraphs not pertinent)

a. Introduction. Essential facts as to the purpose and general nature of the exercise, the forces involved, the locale and periods of time covered by the exercise.

b. Conduct of the Exercise

(1) Adequacy of forces assigned

- (a) Landing Force
- (b) Amphibious Task Force
- (c) Supporting ships, units, and aircraft

(2) Planning. Comment on occurrences during planning phase, of significant interest to the Commanding General or of a nature meriting analysis or action by higher authority.

(3) Embarkation and loading

(4) Movement to Objective Area

(5) Rehearsal

(6) Establishment of Landing Force Ashore

- (a) Assault
- (b) Ground Operations
- (c) Air Operations
- (d) Command, Communications and Control

(7) Communications

(8) Supporting Arms


(9) Transportation

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- (10) Logistics
- (11) Intelligence
- (12) Personnel
- (13) Medical
- (14) Public Information
- (15) Shipboard procedures
- (16) Restricted Waterways Operations
 - (a) Mine detection and clearance
 - (b) Small boat operations
 - (c) Landing Force tactics
 - (d) Establishment of waterborne bases
 - (e) Equipment used/needed
- (17) Retraction and back loading
- (18) Personnel or material casualties

2. The task organization of the organization making the report shall be included as an enclosure.


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Appendix 3 (Required Reports) to Annex K (Reports) to Operation Plan 300-65

Reference: None

Time Zone: B

1. The following is a schedule of required reports for Exercise JUNGLE DRUM III:

<u>REPORT</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TIME DUE</u>
SITREP	All task groups	Beginning 1800 D-Day and every 6 hours thereafter through D+5
ISUM	RTMC Brigade BLT 2/3 Landing Force Raid Unit	Twice daily at <u>1000</u> as of 0800 and <u>2400</u> as of 2000
PERINTREP (Periodic Intelligence Reports)	Landing Force	As Required
OPSUM	All Task Groups	Daily at <u>2200</u> as of 2000

2. Additional reports required upon occurrence are detailed in Annex B (Intelligence) and Appendix 3 (Counterintelligence) to Annex B.

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Annex L (Maps and Charts) to Operation Plan 300-65

Reference: None

Time Zone: G

1. The following maps and charts are required to conduct operations in support of Operation Plan 300-65:

MAPS AND CHARTS:

AMS MAP CATALOGS ASIA, AUSTRALIA
 and PACIFIC MEDIUM & LARGE SCALE
 AIR NAVIGATION OFFICE AERONAUTICAL
 CATALOG

1. AMS Series L707, 1:63,360
 Sheets 2F1, 2F2, 2F3, 2F4, 2F5,
 2F6, 2F7&8, 2F9, 2F10, 2F11,
 2F12
2. AMS Series 501, 1:253,440
 Sheet B47L
3. Operational Navigation Chart,
 1:1,000,000 K-9, L-10, J-10
4. USAF Jet Navigation Chart,
 1:2,000,000 JN-54

LF Hq	BLT 2/3	Thai Brig
10	35	35
10	35	35
10	1	2
10	1	2

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Landing Force (TF-133)
 USS LENAWEE APA-195
 081200H March 1965

ANNEX M (Naval Gunfire) to Operation Plan 300-65

Reference: (a) Maps: Annex L (Maps and charts)
 (b) NWLP 22-2
 (c) TF 132 Operation Order 300-65

Time Zone: G

TASK ORGANIZATION:

a. CTU 132.045 (Fire Support Group)

CAG-2	1 CAG
DDR-838	1 DDR
DDG-16	1 DDG
DE-3	1 DE

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. See Appendix 1 (NGF Support Operations overlay)

b. Friendly Forces. Annex A (Task Organization) and Fire Support Ships.

2. MISSION. On order, the Fire Support Group supports the landing and operations ashore for the Landing Force (TF-133).

3. EXECUTION

a. CAG-2 General support/Direct support of BLT 2/3 after 20 March

b. DDR-838 Direct Support RTMC through 20 March

c. DDG-16 Direct Support BLT 2/3 through 20 March

d. DE-3 Protect transport area and be prepared to support the landing Force. ASSUME DIRECT SUPPORT OF RTMC ON ORDER.

e. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Gunfire support ship Fire Support Areas (FSA) will be assigned by CTF-131.

(2) Target Area assignments and Zones of Responsibility will be initially assigned by CTF-132.

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- (3) All fires will be on call fires.
- (4) Gunfire Support Ships will remain underway while delivering fires, unless otherwise directed.
- (5) Use Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid reference system and required map sheet numbers for target locations.
- (6) Smoke and illumination missions close to another units boundary or Zone of Action must be coordinated by the FSCC having coordination responsibility for the units affected.
- (7) Routine and situation reports as occurring, in accordance with Appendix 3.
- (8) Fire Support ships will request friendly front line reports from Supported SFCPs every hour, and report them to FSCC.
- (9) In conducting call fire mission, VT and MTF Fuses not set on SAFE will NOT be fired over the heads or within 300 yards (laterally) of friendly troops, ships or landing craft, unless specifically requested by the supported unit.
- (10) Safety limits for placement of unobserved fires will be in accordance with reference (b).
- (11) The following message format will be used for reporting and/or assigning new targets.
 - (a) Each target will be described in separate paragraphs within the message. The designation of the ship to fire on the target, when assigned, will be indicated following the paragraph number. The following sub-paragraph will be used, as required to give essential target data:
 - ALFA: Target Number
 - BRAVO: Target Description
 - CHARLIE: Coordinates of target
 - DELTA: Width or radius of Target in meters
(omit for point targets)
 - ECHO: Height in meters
 - FOXTROT: Type, caliber and number of rounds of ammunition (i.e., 1 Rickenbacker 8); Fuse type (if other than point detonating or machanical time set on SAFE).
 - GOLF: Time firing is to commence
 - HOTEL: Time firing is to stop
 - INDIA: Other information as required


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(12) Equipment for NGF teams as provided by units concerned.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

a. See Annex I (Communications-Electronics) to Operation plan 300-65.



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APPENDIX:

- 1-NGF Support Operations Overlay
- 2-Target list for schedule of fires
- 3-Reports

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Landing Force (TF 133)
 USS LENAWEE APA-195
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Appendix 2 to Annex M (Target List for Schedule of Fires) (To be fired on call only)

Reference: None

Time Zone: G

1. BLT 2/3

CONCENT #	COORDINATES	PRIORITY	ELEV IN FT	CALIBER GUN	NO. OF ROUNDS	REMARKS
1	319531	C	10 ft	5"	10	
2	305538	C	10 ft	5"	10	
3	282558	C	10 ft	5"	10	
4	264578	C	05 ft	5"	10	
5	266577	C	05 ft	5"	10	
6	278559	C	10 ft	5"	10	
7	276555	C	10 ft	5"	10	
8	263559	C	10 ft	5"	10	
9	263555	C	10 ft	5"	10	
10	269551	C	400 ft	5"	10	GP A
11	259559	C	400 ft	5"	10	GP A
12	259557	C	400 ft	5"	10	GP A
13	258539	C	300 ft	5"	10	
14	255538	C	300 ft	5"	10	
15	232509	C	05 ft	8"	3	GP B
16	230509	C	05 ft	8"	3	GP B
17	231508	C	05 ft	8"	3	GP B
18	759456	C	375 ft	8"	3	GP C
19	759454	C	375 ft	8"	3	GP C
20	756455	C	375 ft	8"	3	GP C
21	302460	C	350 ft	8"	3	GP D
22	300460	C	350 ft	8"	3	GP D
23	309453	C	350 ft	8"	3	GP D
24	309457	C	350 ft	8"	3	GP D
25	336470	C	250 ft	8"	3	GP E
26	334470	C	250 ft	8"	3	GP E
27	331470	C	250 ft	8"	3	GP E
28	329469	C	250 ft	8"	3	GP E

2. RTMC

1	353514	C	20 ft	5"	10
2	365509	C	35 ft	5"	10
3	372502	C	35 ft	5"	10
4	372505	C	35 ft	5"	10
5	377477	C	250 ft	5"	10

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CONCEPT #	COORDINATES	PRIORITY	ELEV IN FT	CALIBER GUN	NO. OF ROUNDS	REMARKS
6	375473	C	240 ft	5"	10	
7	361477	C	300 ft	5"	10	
8	369467	C	300 ft	5"	10	
9	366469	C	300 ft	5"	10	
10	365469	C	375 ft	5"	10	
11	357457	C	375 ft	8"	3	GP A
12	356454	C	400 ft	8"	3	GP A
13	355455	C	400 ft	8"	3	GP A
14	378458	C	390 ft	8"	3	GP B
15	375459	C	380 ft	8"	3	GP B
16	383450	C	800 ft	8"	3	GP B
17	363449	C	400 ft	8"	3	GP C
18	374440	C	400 ft	8"	3	GP C
19	371440	C	380 ft	8"	3	GP C
20	370441	C	380 ft	8"	3	GP C
21	353427	C	400 ft	8"	3	
22	322449	C	350 ft	8"	3	GP D
23	339431	C	200 ft	8"	3	GP D
24	331441	C	200 ft	8"	3	GP D
25	349412	C	150 ft	8"	3	GP E
26	347412	C	150 ft	8"	3	GP E
27	348414	C	150 ft	8"	3	GP E

W. M. GRAHAM
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

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Landing Force (TF 133)
 USS LENAWEE APA-195
 081200H March 1965

APPENDIX 3 (reports) TO ANNEX M (NAVAL GUNFIRE) TO OPERATION
 PLAN 300-65

1. ROUTINE AND SITUATION REPORTS. Naval gunfire support ships shall make the following reports to SACC and to FSCC, after control is passed ashore:

a. Fire Missions. (Code word CANDY). Transmitted over the Naval Gunfire Control Net. Made at first opportunity before, during or after each non-scheduled fire mission and numbered consecutively beginning at 0001 local time daily by the fire ship. The report is not a request for permission to fire, and a fire mission will not be delayed for transmission of this report.

b. Current Target Damage Assessment. (Code word SUGAR). Transmitted over the Naval Gunfire Control Net. Made upon the completion of each nonscheduled fire mission. Numbered consecutively by each fire support ship to correspond to the CANDY report which it complements.

c. Newly Discovered Targets. (Code word HONEY). Transmitted over the Naval Gunfire Control Net. Made as occurring to include new targets discovered but not fired on, and corrected locations of targets previously listed that have been found in error. Make CANDY report for targets fired on.

d. Current Ammunition Report. (Code word SPICE). Transmitted over the Naval Gunfire Control Net. Made when fire support ship reports on station, and again when requested.

e. Ammunition Summary. (Code word PEPPER). Made to Shore Fire Control Party, Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer or air spotter over the assigned spotting net upon establishing communications initially, or when requested. Ammunition is to be reported by type, caliber and amount.

f. Unfired Targets. (Code word PICKLE). Transmitted over the Naval Gunfire Control Net. Made when a scheduled target cannot be fired on, or is fired on with a probable effectiveness of less than 50%. The ship concerned will notify SACC or FSCC immediately, giving the target number, description and reason for failure to accomplish mission.

2. FORM OF REPORTS

a. Utilizing the Report Form, Tab A, reports will be

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drafted and transmitted as in the following ~~example~~:

(1) CANNONBALL, THIS IS SHORTSTOP. 291300G, CANDY
11. ALFA: CALL FIRE: BRAVO: MIKE 11; COORDINATES 502605;
CHARLIE: MORTARS; DELTA: MAIN; OVER

(2) CANNONBALL, THIS IS SHORTSTOP. 291305G, SUGAR
11; ECHO: ACTOR TWO SIX CHARLIE; FOXTROT: DESTROYED; GOLF:
1 RICKENBACKER TWO ZERO; OVER

b. The Ammunition Reporting Code listed in Tab A will be
used in all ammunition reports.

3. CANDY and SUGAR reports will NOT be made on targets fired
on, in accordance with the D-day Schedule of Fires, if any.

W. M. Graham
W. M. GRAHAM
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

TAB:

A-Report Form

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Landing Force (TF-133)
USS LENAWEE APA-195
081200H March 1965

TAB A (REPORT FORM) TO APPENDIX 3 (Reports) TO ANNEX M (NAVAL GUNFIRE) OF OPERATION PLAN 300-65

UNIT CALL SIGN

DATE/TIME GROUP

NUMBER	INCLUDES	WHEN MADE
CANDY ()	ALFA, BRAVO, CHARLIE, DELTA	MISSION BEGINS
SUGAR ()	ECHO, FOXTROT, GOLF	MISSION ENDS
HONEY ()	ALFA, BRAVO, CHARLIE, KILO	NEW TARGET SIGHTED
SPICE ()	HOTEL	AMMO REDUCED BY 20%
PICKIE ()	BRAVO, FOXTROT, INDIA	TGT SHOULD HAVE BEEN FIRED
PEPPER ()	JULIETT	AS REQUESTED
ALFA	(TYPE MISSION-call fire, Target of Opportunity, etc)	
BRAVO	(TARGET NUMBER and GRID COORDINATES)	
CHARLIE	(TARGET DESCRIPTION-Tanks, Troops in Open, Mortars in woods, etc.)	
DELTA	(BATTERY FIRING -MAIN OR SECONDARY)	
ECHO	(AGENCY CONTROLLING FIRE-Voice Call)	
FOXTROT	(TGT DAMAGE ASSESSMENT-Destroyed, Neutralized; Details)	
GOLF	(AMMO EXPENDED THIS MISSION- Use Ammunition Reporting Code)	
HOTEL	(PERCENT OF BOMBARDMENT AMMO REMAINING)	
INDIA	(REASON TARGET NOT FIRED- Fouled Range, Smoke, etc.	
JULIETT	(TYPE, CALIBER, AMOUNT OF EACH TYPE BOMBARDMENT AMMO REMAINING, USING AMMUNITION REPORTING CODE)	
KILO	(ACTION TAKEN OR CONTEMPLATED)	

M-3-A-1

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AMMUNITION REPORTING CODE

CALIBER

CODE WORD/NUMBER

3"50
5"38
5"54
6"47

TUCKER
RICKENBACKER
MARMON
DURANT

TYPE

AAC
AP
COMM
ILLUM
VT
VT (NON FRAG)
WP

1
2
5
7
8
9
11

CHARGE

REDUCED

MERCEDES

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Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
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Landing Force (TF-133)
USS LENAWEE APA-195
081200H March 1965

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Time Zone: G

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CTF 79	2
CG 3dMARDIV	4
CG 1stMAW	4
COMPHIBRON I	10
CG 1stMARBRIG	1
COMUSMACTHAI	2
CG LFTUFAC	1
CG 3dMAW	1
COMPHIBGRU I	3
RTMC BRIG	15
ANGLICO	2
LFA	2
CMCS	3
CINCUSARPAC	1
VMA-225	3
VMGR-152	3
TACRON 12	5
DET 1st FORRECON	1
CIB	2
ALUSNA BANGKOK	1
FILE	10
COMPHIBFORPAC	2

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CS013/31TH
PHP309VV PAF525
RR RUEKDA RUEPWZ
DE RUHLHQ 3077 31/2211Z
R 312325Z
FM CINCPAC
TO AIG 929
RUMBC/CHJUSMAG THAILAND
RUABFB/CGUSARYIS
INFO RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
RUHLHS/CINCUSARPAC
RUHLKM/CINCPACAF
RUEKDA/OASD/PA
RUMBC/COMUSMACHTAI
BT

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

1 0 1 0 1 2 9 2

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SIGNIFICANT EXERCISE REPORT (U)

A. MJCS 78-62 OF 26 MAR 62

FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT EXERCISE REPORT SUBMITTED IAW
FORMAT PRESCRIBED IN REF A:

1.. KITTI 08

2. FTX

3. TO PROVIDE US/RTA TRAINING IN PLANNING AND CONDUCT-
ING COMBINED UW AND CI OPERATIONS; TO FAMILIARIZE SPECIAL
FORCES PERSONNEL WITH AN AREA OF POSSIBLE OPERATIONS.
LATER PHASES TO BE CONDUCTED IN COORDINATION AND IN CON-
JUNCTION WITH EXERCISE JUNGLE DRUM III. OTHER AIMS: TO
INTEGRATE ACTIVITIES OF SELECTED ELEMENTS OF THE THAI
VOLUNTEER DEFENSE CORPS (VDC) AND BORDER PATROL POLICE
(BPP) WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS UNDER OPCON OF APPROPRIATE
MILITARY COMMANDERS AND TO PROVIDE ENVIRONMENTAL TRAINING
FOR ALL US PARTICIPANTS.

4. COMBINED US/RTA SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONAL BASE
(CSFOB) WILL BE ESTABLISHED FROM WHICH US AND THAI SF
OPERATIONAL DETS WILL BE INFILTRATED BY AIR AND SEA INTO
TWELVE DESIGNATED GUERRILLA WARFARE OPERATIONAL AREAS (GWOA)

ACT.....J3-6

CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-3 J1-3 J4-2 J52 J6-3 SACSA-5 DIA-24 NMCC-2
SAMAA-1 SECDEF-5 ISA-9 PA-1 CSA-2 CSAF-2 CNO-2 CMC-10 FILE-1(87)
JMT/JPR

PAGE 1 OF 2

312325Z DEC 64

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IN FOUR MAJOR REGIONS OF THAILAND. THROUGH ORGANIZATION, TRAINING AND DIRECTION, SPECIAL FORCES DETS WILL DEVELOP RELATIVELY INACTIVE BANDS INTO COORDINATED GUERRILLA FORCES IN EACH GWOA. RESPONDING TO PHASE III INSURGENCY CONDITION, COUNTERINSURGENCY FORCES COMPOSED OF ONE REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM (RCT) IN EACH OF FOUR MAJOR REGIONS CONDUCTS MILITARY OPERATIONS AND CIVIC ACTION IN CONJUNCTION WITH LOCAL PARAMILITARY VDC AND BPP ELEMENTS.

L 5. FOUR AREAS OF THAILAND: CHIENG RAI, UDON, PRACHIN BURI AND ROYAL THAI ARMY 5TH MILITARY CIRCLE.

6. 17 FEB - 25 MAR 65.

7. COMBINED US/THAI EXERCISE HQS (JUSMAG THAILAND).

8. A. JUSMAG THAI; 315TH ADIV; 1ST SFG (ABN), 1ST SF;

B. ROYAL THAI ARMY, NAVY, AF, BPP.

9. A. 1SST SFG (ABN), 1ST SF (APPROX 130 PERS).

B & C NONE.

D. THAI MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ORGANIZES A CI OPNS CTR, COMBINED SFOB, PROVIDES GUERRILLA FORCES, AND CI FORCES. PROVIDES ELEMENTS OF RTAF IN SUPPORT OF CI EFFORT.

10. A. TO CONDUCT EXERCISE AS OUTLINED IN PARAS 1 THROUGH 9 ABOVE.

B. MAY 1964.

C. 5 JAN 65 IN ORDER TO AVOID EMBARRASSMENT NOT CONSIDERED.

D. NONE OTHER THAN POSSIBLE USUAL COMMUNIST PRO-PAGANDA REACTION.

11. NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL NOT BE PLAYED.

12. EXERCISE APPROVED BY CINCPAC. COORDINATION EFFECTED WITH JUSMAG AND RTA. CHJUSMAG THAI REQUESTED TO ADVISE AMEMB BANGKOK OF THIS EXERCISE IF NOT ALREADY ACCOMPLISHED.

13. ALL PRESS RELEASES CONCERNING NATIONAL FORCES WILL BE CLEARED WITH RTG AUTHORITY OR CHJUSMAG THAI, AS APPROPRIATE. FOR CGUSARYIS: REQUEST SOONEST TEXT PROPOSED NEWS RELEASE AND RELEASE DATE AND TIME.

14. SF WILL BE RETAINED UNDER NATIONAL CONTROL.

GP-4

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RR RUECEM

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FM CG FMFPAC

INFO RUECEM/CMC

R 270657Z

FM ADMIN CINCPACFLT

TO COMSEVENTHFLT

INFO CG FMFPAC

CINCPAC

CTF SEVEN SIX

CTF SEVEN SEVEN

CTF SEVEN NINE

FOCCPAC

CINCPAC ADVANCE

POLO JAPAN

BT

~~SECRET~~

WESTPAC POSTURE DURING EXERCISE JUNGLE DRUM III (U)

1. CURRENTLY REQUIRED POSTURE INCLUDES INTER ALIA: TWO

CVAS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA WITH A THIRD CVA COVERING

077A STATION; TWO READY AMPHIBIOUS GROUPS ON 6 HOURS

REACTION TIME (ONE GROUP POSITIONED OFF VUNG TAU AND

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*LCI Kliebth -
Note reduction of BLT's
in Jungle Drum III
4 to 2.*

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CWC	AD

Cin Pac 011

*What posture during
Jungle Drum III*

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ONE GROUP OFF DANANG).

2. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE THEN EXISTING READINESS POSTURE WILL PERMIT, AND UNODIR CINCPAC, THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS BY COMSEVENTHFLT ARE AUTHORIZED IN PLANNING PACFLT PARTICIPATION IN EXERCISE JUNGLE DRUM.

A. HANCOCK TRANSIT BASHI CHANNEL SOUTHBOUND 14 MAR. THIS WILL RESULT IN THREE CVAS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND CONSEQUENT DEGRADATION OF 077A/077B FOR THE FIVE DAY PERIOD UNTIL RANGER TRANSITS BASHI CHANNEL NORTHBOUND ON 19 MAR ENR YOKO. HANCOCK WILL THEREBY BE PERMITTED TO PARTICIPATE IN EXERCISE JUNGLE DRUM REHEARSAL 18 MAR.

B. LIMIT AMPHIBIOUS PARTICIPATION TO NO MORE THAN TWO ELTS, ONE OF WHICH MAY BE THE SLF.

3. THE ABOVE ACTIONS SHOULD PERMIT EMPLOYMENT OF SUFFICIENT FORCES TO MEET THE EXERCISE OBJECTIVES. AT THE SAME TIME, FORCES WILL REMAIN READILY AVAILABLE FOR CONTINGENCIES DURING THIS PERIOD.

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EMA 397

RR RUECEM

DE RUHPG 2822 280002Z

R 280002Z

FM CG FMFPAC

TO RUECEM/CMC

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

EXERCISE JUNGLE DRUM III (U)

1. EXERCISE JUNGLE DRUM III IS A COMBINED US/THAI MARINE
AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISE SCHEDULED TO BE CONDUCTED DURING THE PERIOD
3-25MAR65.

2. THE SCENARIO FOR THE

EXERCISE ENVISIONS US/THAI FORCES
ASSUMING A HIGHER ALERT STATUS AT THE REQUEST OF THE THAI
GOVERNMENT. CAUSE ON THE ALERT STATUS IS AGGRESSOR
INSURGENCY ACTIVITY IN THE PATTANI-NARATHIWAT-YALA AREA OF
SOUTHERN THAILAND. AGGRESSOR ACTIVITY INCREASES TO THE POINT

ACTION COPY

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PAGE 2 RUHPGIG2822 C O N F I D E N T I A L

WHERE COMSEVENTHFLT IS REQUIRED TO DIRECT A QUICK REACTION ASSAULT. OBJECTIVES OF THE ASSAULT ARE TO ESTABLISH CONTROL OVER THS0-55-,8-NARATHIWAT-YALA AREA, DEFEND IT AGAINST AGGRESSOR AND RETURN IT TO THAI CONTROL WHEN FEASIBLE. UPON COMPLETION OF THE OPERATION U. S. FORCES RESUME ALERT STATUS.

3. EXECUTION: EXERCISE JUNGLE DRUM III INCLUDES:

- A. PREPOSITIONING OF AGGRESSOR AND SUPPORTING EXERCISE FORCES.
- B. RECON AND BEACH PREPARATION OPERATIONS.
- C. REHEARSAL AND CRITIQUE.
- D. OPPOSED MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE AREA.
- E. OPPOSED UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT.
- F. ASSAULT TVFDING AND FIVE DAYS OF OPERATIOXVS ASHORE, TO INCLUDE RESTRICTED WATERWAY OPERATIONS.
- G. DEFENSE OF THE ATF IN THE AOA.
- H. ADMIN WITHDRAWAL OF LANDING FORCE.
- I. CRITIQUE.

4. GEOGRAPHICAL AREA

- A. AOA WITHIN 100 NAUTICAL MILE RWSIUS CENTERED ON SAI BURI, THAILAND EXCLUSIVE OF TERRITORY AND COASTAL WATERS OF MALAYSIA.
- B. GROUND MANEUVER ARTSEA FROM NONG CHIK (FIVE MILES WEST OF

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PAGE 3 RUHPG 2822 C O N F I D E N T I A L

PATTANI), SOUTH ELEVEN MILES ALONG ROAD TO RAILROAD CROSSING,
THENCE, SE ALONG RAILROAD TRACKS TO YALA, RUSSO AND RANGAE,
THEN NE ALONG ROAD TO NARATHIWAT.

5. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

3-7 MAR EMBARK U.S. FORCES OKINAWA/JAPAN.

6 MAR PREPOSITION AGGRESSOR FORCES AND TECH STAFF IN AOA.

12 MAR U.S. AMPHIBIOUS FORCES SORTIE SUBIC AND
EXECUTE OPPOSED MOVEMENT TO AOA.

14 MAR EMBARK RIMC FORCES THAILAND.

17 MAR THAILAND ELEMENTS ATF AND LF RENDEZVOUS WITH U.S.
AMPHIBIOUS FORCES.

18 MAR US/THAI EXERCISE REHEARSAL, CRITIQUE AND OPPOSED
SORTIE OF ATF FROM REHEARSAL AREA.

19 MAR OPPOSED MOVEMENT AND UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT.

20 MAR D-DAY.

21-24MAR OPERATIONS ASHORE AND IN AOA.

25 MAR EXERCISE CEASES, LF EXECUTES ADMIN REEMBARKATION.

26 MAR CRITIQUE; RELEASE THAI FORCES TO NATIONAL CONTROL;
DEPART EXERCISE AREA.

28MAR-1APR LIBERTY PORTS BANGKOK/SINGAPORE/HONG KONG/MANILA.

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PAGE 4 RUHPG 2822 C O N F I D E N T I A L

7-8APR DEBARK U. S. FORCES OKINAWA/JAPAN.

6. CINCPACFLT IS OFFICER SCHEDULING THE EXERCISE. COMSEVENTHFLT HAS OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR EXECUTION OF EXERCISE.

COMPHIBRON ONE IS EXERCISE DIRECTOR, CTF-191 AND CATF, CTF-132. COMCRUDESFLT SEVEN IS COMMANDER EXPEDITIONARY FORCE/OCE, CTF-131. COL W. M. GRAHAM, JR. USMC, DESIGNATED CLF WITH TASK DESIGNATOR CTF-133.

7. US/THAI MARINE PARTICIPATING FORCES AS FOLLOWS:

A. USMC - TEC/TMD/LFHQ, BLT 2/3, DET VMA-225 (8-12A4C), DET VMGR-152 (4 KC-130F), DET FIRST ANGLICO AND DET FIRST ITT.

B. RTMC-BRIGADE HQ, SERVICE CO, ONE INF BN COMPOSED OF AN H&SCO AND THREE RIFLE COMPANIES, ONE ARTY BTRY, AND TWO ENGINEER PLATOONS.

8. BLT 2/3 EMBARKED IN TG 76.6 SHIPPING (ONE APA, ONE AKA, ONE LSD), IS ENROUTE TO EXERCISE AREA. RTMC FORCES WILL BE OFFERED THE SERVICES OF ONE LST FOR THE LANDING.

9. UNIQUE NAVY/MARINE RESTRICTED WATERWAY TRAINING OBJECTIVES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. TO DEVELOP DETECTION AND CLEARANCE TECHNIQUES FOR INLAND WATERWAYS.

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B. TO GAIN EXPERIENCE IN SMALL BOAT OPERATIONS IN RESTRICTED WATERWAYS IN SUPPORT OF LF UNITS.

C. TO DEVELOP PRINCIPLES FOR THE APPLICATION OF USMC TACTICS TO RESTRICTED WATERWAYS/RIVER DELTA TERRAIN IN A CI ENVIRONMENT.

D. TO EXERCISE UNIT COMMANDERS IN THE SELECTION OF COASTAL AND RIVER-SIDE STRONG POINTS FROM WHICH CLEAR AND HOLD OPERATIONS CAN BE LAUNCHED.

E. TO DEVELOP PROCEDURES FOR ESTABLISHING WATERBORNE BASES TO SERVE AS SUPPLY POINTS, HELICOPTER LANDING SITES AND CONTROL POINTS.

10. OP PLANS WERE WRITTEN TO PERMIT WITHDRAWAL OF ANY PORTION OF EXPEDITIONARY ELEMENT DURING ANY PHASE OF THE EXERCISE, IN THE EVENT WITHDRAWAL IS DICTATED BY EXTERNAL EVENTS.

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RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT

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RUMBC/USIS BANGKOK

RUMBC/CHJUSMAGTHAI

RUWDG/COMCRUDESPAC SDIEGO CALIF

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUMFOR/TF 131

RUMFOR/TF 133

RUMFOR/TF 132

RUMFOR/TF 191

RUWPAM/COMPHIBPAC CORAET CALIF

RUMBC/ALUSNA BANGKOK

RUMGE/CG 3RD MARDIV OKI

RUMGE/3RD MARDIV ISO OKI

BT

UNCLAS

JUNGLE DRUM III PRESREL 1-65

BANGKOK, MARCH 12 -- SOME 39 SHIPS, WOT THAI AND 24 US ARE PARTICIPATION IN EXERCISE JUNGLE DRUM III, A COMBINED AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISE BEING JOINTLY CONDUCTED BY THAILAND AND THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 10 - 26.

INCLUDED ARE TRANSPORTS, CARGO SHIPS, REPLENISHMENT SHIPS, SUBMARINES, MINE SWEEPERS, DESTROYERS, AND A VARIETY OF LANDING SHIPS SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS. ALL HAVE SIGNIFICANT ROLE TO PLAY IN THE EXERCISE.

COMM CENTER

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Chief Release 1-65

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PAN RUMBAJ 19C UNCLAS

A KEY OLE WILL BE PLAYED BY THE CRUISER, USS CANBERRA, AS FLAGSHIP OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE COMMANDER, REAR ADMIRAL EDWIN S. MILLER, THE DEPUTY EXPEDITIONARY FORCE COMMANDER, REAR ADMIRAL SATAP KEYANON, ROYAL THAI NAVY WILL ALSO EMBARK IN CANBERRA. THE SHIP IS UNDER THE COMMAND OF

CAPTAIN MARK W. WOODS, USN.

USS CANBERRA WAS LAUNCHED IN APRIL, 1943, AT QUINCY, MASSACHUSETTS. AT THE PERSONAL REQUEST OF PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, SHE WAS NAMED FOR AN AUSTRALIAN SHIP LOST IN THE FIRST BATTLE OF SAVO ISLAND, IN 1942.

HAVING JOINED THE FLEET IN JAN 1944, SHE PARTICIPATED IN FOUR PACIFIC CAMPAIGNS OF WORLD WAR II. TWENTY-THREE OF HER CREWMEMBERS PERISHED IN OCTOBER 1944. WHEN SHE WAS HIT BY AN AERIAL TORPEDO OFF FORMOSA.

LESS THAN SIX WEEKS AFTER BEING INACTIVATED IN JULY 1946. CANBERRA ALONG WITH THE USS BOSTON, WAS SELECTED FOR MODERNIZATION AND WAS RECOMMISSIONED IN JUNE 1956.

CANBERRA'S LENGTH IS 673 FEET, HER BEAM IS 70 FEET, AND SHE DRAWS 26 FEET OF WATER, DISPLACING 16,700 TONS.

JUNGLE DRUM III PRESREL 1-65

ADD 2-2-2

THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM OF CANBERRA, FED OVER 27,500,000 FEET OF WIRE. COULD SUPPLY POWER FOR A CITY OF 50,000 PEOPLE. HER ENGINES CAN DEVELOP 120,000 HORSEPOWER AND SHE IS CAPABLE OF SPEEDS IN EXCESS OF 30 KNOTS.

HER REFRIGERATION AND STORAGE SPACES ASSURE ADEQUATE PROVISIONS FOR A CREW OF 75 OFFICERS AND 1200 CREW MEMBERS FOR 45 DAYS, FOOD STORES INCLUDE 16,000 POUNDS OF SUGAR, 6200 POUNDS OF BUTTER, 4000 POUNDS OF COFFEE, AND 60,000 POUNDS OF MEAT.

CANBERRA, WITH ITS POTENT FIRE POWER AND ABILITY TO REMAIN AT SEA FOR PROLONGED PERIODS OF TIME, CONTRIBUTES SIGNIFICANTLY IN THE SEVENTH FLEET'S MOBILITY, FLEXIBILITY, AND READINESS TO COUNTER AGGRESSION.

BT

A	AD	AO1	AO2	AO3	AO4	AA	AB	AF	AG	AP	AQ	AS	AT	AX	AZ	CH	D	DF	DG	DH	DK	DL	DM	DN	DP	DS	MC	HQ	DO	BN		

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UNCLAS

JUNGLE DRUM III PRESREL 3-65

BANGKOK, MARCH 13-- "TRIAM KARN YOK POL KUSN BOKI" IS UNFAMILIAR TO MOST U.S. MARINES, BUT THIS THAI PHRASE MAY BE HEARD ECHOING ACROSS THE WATER FROM SHIPS OF THE ROYAL THAI NAVY. THE SAME COMMAND "LAND THE LANDING FORCE" IS GIVEN IN ENGLISH ABOARD SHIPS OF THE U. S. SEVENTH FLEET.

THE THIRD BATTALION OF THE ROYAL THAI MARINE CORPS WILL JOIN FORCES WITH THE U.S. MARINE CORPS BATTALION LANDING TEAM 2/3 ON MARCH 20 AS THEY HIT THE BEACH SIMULTANEOUSLY IN A COMBINED AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT TITLED EXERCISE JUNGLE DRUM III.

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UNCLAS

JUNGLE DRUM III PRESREL 4-65

SINCE GETTING UNDERWAY TO PARTICIPATE IN EXERCISE JUNGLE DRUM III, A COMBINED THAI-U.S. AMPHIBIOUS ASSUALT EXERCISE, MARC H 10-26, SHIPS OF THE TWO NATIONS HAVE BEEN UNDERGOING SIMULATED ATTACKS BY AGGRESSOR SUBMARINES.

PLAYING A MOST IMPORTANT ROLE IN ASSURING THAT ALL SHIPS REACH THE OBJECTIVE AREA ARE FOUR SHIP--TWO DESTROYERS, USS SMALL AND USS JOSEPH R. STRAUSS, A HIGH-SPEED TRANSPORT, USS COOK, AND A SUBMARINE RESCUR SHIP, USS FLORIKAN. THE FOUR SHIPS COMPRISE THE ANTI-SUMBARINE WAREFARE UNIT DURING JUNGLE DRUM IIU.

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THE UNITED STATES SUBMARINES, USS GREENWICH AND USS WENGLER, ARE PROVIDING SERVICES AS ATTACKING AGGRESSOR SUBMARINES. THE FOUR SHIPS ARE BEING AIDED IN ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES BY U.S. NAVY PATROL AIRCRAFT FROM SANGLEY POINT, PHILIPPINES. TOGETHER, THE AIRCRAFT AND SHIPS MAKE A HIGHLY-TRAINED, CLOSELY-KNIT TEAM OF ANTI-SUBMARINE SPECIALISTS CAPABLE OF DETECTING, LOCALIZING, AND DESTROYING SUBMARINES WHICH THREATEN THE AMPHIBIOUS TASKFORCE.

THE SHIPS PROVIDING THE ANTI-SUBMARINE SCREEN HAVE ALREADY DEMONSTRATED THEIR PROFICIENCY AS ONE AGGRESSOR SUBMARINE HAS BEEN ADJUDGED "SUNK" BY THE GROUP. WHEN THE SUBMARINE WAS DETECTED LAST NIGHT, THE USS STRAUSS WAS SENT TO INVESTIGATE. SHORTLY AFTERWARD, THE SUBMARINE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IT HAD BEEN ATTACKED SUCCESSFULLY, AND WAS DECLARED OUT OF ACTION. AS THE TASK FORCE DRAWS CLOSER TO THE OBJECTIVE AREA, IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE SUBMARINE ATTACKS WILL INCREASE.

THE U.S. AND ROYAL THAI NAVY SHIPS ARE SCHEDULED TO REDEZVOUS NEXT WEEK IN THE GULF OF THAILAND WITH MORE THAN 10,000 NAVY AND MARINE PERSONNEL FROM BOTH COUNTRIES TAKING PART.

IN OVERALL COMMAND OF THE EXERCISE IS REAR ADMIRAL EDWIN S. MILLER, COMMANDER, CRUISER-DESTROYER GROUP, U. S. SEVENTH FLEET, WITH REAR ADMIRAL SATAP KEYANON, COMMANDER, ANTI-SUBMARINE SQUADRON, ROYAL THAI NAVY, SERVING AS DEPUTY EXPEDITIONARY FORCE COMMANDER.

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UNCLAS JUNGLE DRUM PRESREL 5-65
 ROYAL THAI MARINES LOAD FOR EXERCISE JUNGLE DRUM IIE
 SOME 1,300 ROYAL THAI MARINES, PLUS THEIR EQUIPMENT AND
 SUPPLIES, WERE LOADED ABOARD EIGHT ROYAL THAI NAVY SHIPS AND
 ONE U. S. SHIP TODAY AT THE SATTANEP NAVAL BASE TO GET
 UNDERWAY FOR EXERCISE JUNGLE DRUM IIE, A COMBINED AMPHIBIOUS
 ASSIST EXERCISE BEING CONDUCTED BY THAILAND AND THE UNITED
 STATES, MARCH 10-26.

UNDER THE COMMAND OF COMMANDER KOMES SUNPRASITH, THE
 TROOP AND MEMBERS OF THE THIRD BATTALION, ROYAL THAI MARINES
 CORPS.

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THE ROYAL THAI FORCE WILL RENDEZVOUS IN THE GULF OF THAILAND WITH A U. S. FORCE ON MARCH 17. A REHEARSAL OF ALL PLANS WILL BE CONDUCTED THE NEXT DAY. ON MARCH 20, THE COMBINED FORCE OF NEARLY 3,000 ROYAL THAI AND U.S. MARINES WILL ASS

ULT THE BEACHES OF SOUTHERN THAILAND IN A DEMONSTRATION WHICH WILL DRAMATIZE ONE OF THE MOST COMPLEX OPERATIONS IN MODERN WARFARE.

THERE ARE SIX DISTINCT PHASES OF AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION. FIRST IS THE PLANNING AND TRAINING PHASE WHICH MAY INVOLVE WEEKS OF DETAILED PREPARATION. SECOND IS THE LOADING PHASE WITH CAREFUL REGARD FOR THE ORDER AND PRIORITY OF NEEDS IN THE ASSAULT.

THE SEA MOVEMENT TO THE ASSAULT AREA IS THE THIRD PHASE, AND THE FOURTH IS THE PRE-ASSAULT PREPARATION OF THE LANDING SITE. AIRCRAFT AND UNDERWATER DEMOLITION TEAMS (UDT) RECONNOITER THE AREA, BOMBARDMENT OF DEFENSES BY SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT BEGINS, BEACH OBSTACLES ARE DESTROYED, AND MINES ARE SWEEPED FROM THE ASSAULT AREA.

THE FIFTH PHASE IS THE BEACH ASSAULT WHEN MEN AND EQUIPMENT ARE MOVED ASHORE. THE FINAL PHASE IS THE FIGHTING TO ESTABLISH A BEACHHEAD. THIS IS CONDUCTED BY THE FORCES PUT ASHORE, SUPPORTED BY NAVAL GUNFIRE AND AIRCRAFT.

THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AS SUCH ENDS WHEN A FIRM BEACHHEAD IS ESTABLISHED. THIS NORMALLY OCCURS A FEW DAYS AFTER THE INITIAL ASSAULT.

COMMANDING THE AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE OF JUNGLE DRUM III IS U. S. NAVY CAPTAIN ROBERT W. POWELL. CAPTAIN SUTHEB VASANTASINHA, ROYAL THAI NAVY, COMMANDING THE THAI AMPHIBIOUS TASK GROUP. COMMANDER OF THE LANDING FORCE IS U. S. MARINE COLONEL WILLIAM M. GRAHAM, JR.

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UNCLAS JUNGLE DRUM III PRESREL 7-65

A TROOP-CARRYING SUBMARINE, THE USS PERCH (SS-313), WITH
SPECIALIZED RAIDING UNITS EMBARKED, WUSL CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE
AND DEMOLITION MISSIONS AGAINST AGGRESSOR INSTALLATIONS IN
SOUTHERN THAILANDARWWDIW MUDQ

SP

ROGZWN

KT OF EXERCISE JUNGLE
DRUM III.

THE EXERCISE, A COMBINED AMPHIBIOUS ASSULT OPERATION, IS
BEING JOINTLY CONDUCTED BY THAILAND AND THE UNITED STATES IN
CLOSE COORDINATION WITH KITTI 08, A NATIONWIDE THAI EXERCISE IN
COUNTERINSURGENCY REPRESENTING A UNIFIED EFFORT ON THE PART OF

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ALL HAI FORCES.

TAKING PART IN THE TWO EXERCISES ARE UNITS OF THE NAVY, MARINE CORPS, ARMY, VOLUNTEER DEFENSE CORPS, AND BORDER POLICE, IN ADDITION TO ELEMENTS OF THE U. S. SEVENTH FLEET. SOME 130 MEMBERS OF THE U.S. ARMY'S 1ST SPECIAL FORCESGROUP, BASED AT OKINAWA, ARE ALSO PARTICIPATING.

RAIDS BY THE PERCH WILL BE MADE UNDER THE COVER OF DARKNESS USING STEALTH TECHNIQUES IN ORDER TO EFFECT SURPRISE. ITS ABILITY TO MAKE SNEAK ATTACKS IS ONE OF THE NATURAL ADVANTAGES OF A SUBMARINE.

UNDERWATER DEMOLITION TEAM UDT) AND MARINE RAIDE

KUNITS
LAND FROM THE PERCH BY RUBBER BOAT; OR THEY CAN LEAVE THE SUBMARINE WHILE IT IS STPJT SUBMERGED, SWIN IN, AND ACCOMPLISH THEIR MISSION WITHOUT EVER COMING TO THE SURFACE.

THE PERCH IS A VETERAN OF THE PACIFIC CAMPAIGN OF WORLD WAR II. ORIGINALLY A "FLEET TYPE" BOAT, SOX OF HER MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT WERE LATER REMOVED TO PROVIDE TROOP-CARRYING SPACES.

COMMANDING THE PERCH ISNMIDJTENANRWCOMMANDER JAMES L. LLOYD, U.S. NAVY. THE SUBMARINE TRAINS REGULARLY WITH ROYAL THAI

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UNDERWATER DEMOLITION TEAM UDT) AND RECONNAISSANCE UNITS. HOME-PORTED AT SUBIC BAY, PHILIPPINES, THE PERCH IS THE ONLY SUBMARINE OF ITS KIND PRESENTLY ASSIGNED TO THE U.S. SEVENTH FLEET FORCES IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC.

JUNGLE DRUM III IS THE TMMRD AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISE TO BE CONDUCTED X THAILAND AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE PAST FOUR YEARS. THE TRAINING AND EXCHANGE OF IDEAS PROVIDED BY THESE REALISTIC OPERATIONS HELP BUILD AND MAINTAIN THE STRONG DEFENSE POSTURE OF THE FREE WORLD.

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

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UNCLAS

JUNGLE DRUM III PRESREL 8-65

BANGKOK, MARCH 10-26. A SOME 39 ROYAL THAI AND UNITED STATES
NAVY SHIPS, WITH ROYAL THAI AND U. S. MARINES EMBARKED, RENDEZVOUSED
TODAY IN THE GULF OF THAILAND IN PREPARATION FOR A COMBINED AMPHIBIOUS
TRAINING ASSAULT ON THE BEACHES OF SUTHERN THAILAND MARCH 20.

THE EXERCISE, NICKNAMED JUNGLE DRUM III, IS BEING CONDUCTED
JOINTLY BY THAILAND AND THE UNITED STATES MARCH 10-26. ITS

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

PURPOSE IS TO TRAIN MILITARY UNITS IN THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF A COMBINED AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION WHILE AFFORDING THEM AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEVELOP CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH ONE ANOTHER.

THE NAVAL AND MARINE PERSONNEL OF BOTH COUNTRIES WILL CONDUCT A REHEARSAL OF ALL PLANS ON MARCH 18. ON MARCH 20, THE COMBINED LANDING FORCE OF NEARLY 3,000 ROYAL THAI AND U. S. MARINES WILL STORM ASHORE TO ESTABLISH A BEACHHEAD. ONCE THIS IS ACHIEVED, THEY WILL CONDUCT COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN THE MANEUVER AREA.

THE EXERCISE ENVISIONS A SITUATION WHEREIN AN INSURGENT FORCE, SUPPORTED BY A HYPOTHETICAL AGGRESSOR NATION, IS OPERATING IN THAILAND. THE ROYAL THAI ARMED FORCES HAVE MANAGED TO NEUTRALIZE THE INOUYTKUQQ IN SOUTHERN (PENINSULA) THAILAND WHERE AT F HEGANIZED AGGRESSOR FORCE IS ENGAGED. MEKHCTBPVDGE AND DESTROY THE AGGRESSORS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. THAILAND ASKS ITS TREATY ALLY, THE UNITED STATES, TO COOPERATE.

IN OVERALL COMMAND OF THE EXERCISE IS REAR ADMIRAL EDWIN S. MILLER, USN, COMMANDER CRUISER-DESTROYER GROUP, U. S. SEVENTH FLEET. RRDEP HY COMMANDER IS REAR ADMIRAL SATAP KEYANON RTN, COMMANDER ANTI-SUBMARINE SQUADRON, THAI, WHO WILL JOIN ADMIRAL MILLER IN HIS FLAGSHIP, THE USS CANBERRA.

AS THE COMBINED TASK FORCE STEAMS IN FORMATION, IT WILL BE ENGAGED BY AGGRESSOR SEA AND AIR FORCES. U.S. SHIPS OF THE TASK FORCE HAVE BEEN UNDER PERIODIC "ATTACK" BY SUBMARINES SINCE DEPARTING SUBIC BAY, PHILIPINES MARCH 10.

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED AS AGGRESSORS WERE PLACED ASHORE EARLIER THIS WEEK AND WILL OPPOSE THE THAI AND U. S. MARINES AS THEY MAKE THEIR LANDING. THE AGGRESSOR UNITS WILL CREATE A NOTE OF REALISM TO THE EXERCISE AND ALLOW THE SMALL UNITS LEADERS AN OPPORTUNITY TO APPLY TRAINING THEY HAVE RECEIVED.

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UNCLAS

JUNGLE DRUM III PRESREL 11-65

EXERCISE JUNGLE DRUM III REACHED ITS CLIMACTIC POINT DAY IN A SPECTACULAR DISPLAY OF PRECISION TEAMWORK AS ROYAL THAI WD U.S. MARINES HIT THE BEACHES OF SOUTHERN THAILAND. THE EXERCISE IS A JOINT ENDEAVOR BY THAILAND AND THE UNITED STATES.

ON HAND TO WITNESS TODAY'S BEACH DEMONSTRATION WAS HIS EXCELLENCY FIELD MARSHAL THANOM KITTIKACHORN, PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THAILAND. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY

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VICE ADMIRAL PAUL P. BLACKBURN, JR., COMMANDER U.S. SEVENTH
FLEET.

AS ASSAULT WAVES NEARED THE SHORE, A SERIES OF EXPLOSIONS
RACKED THE BEACH SIMULATING LAST MINUTE INTENSIFICATION OF
NAVAL GUNFIRE AND CLOSE AIR SUPPORT.

U.S. MARINE JET ATTACK AIRCRAFT MADE THEIR LAST STRAFING RUNS
SWOOPING LOW OVER THE BEACH TO TAKE OUT AGGRESSOR OPPOSITION.
IN THE FINAL MINUTES OF THE AIR STRIKE, ENEMY BUNKERS WHICH
CONTROLLED THE BEACH WERE WIPED OUT.

AS THE FIRST TROOPS CHARGED FROM THEIR TRACKED LANDING
CRAFT (LVT'S), ONE AGGRESSOR PILLBOX AND MANY AGGRESSOR RIFLEMEN
WERE STILL PROVIDING STIFF OPPOSITION.

DURING THE BEACH ACTION, SEVERAL OF THE ATTACKING MARINES
SIMULATED WOUNDS AND WERE CARED FOR ON THE SPOT BY NAVY HOSPITAL
CORPSMEN ATTACHED TO THE ASSAULT UNITS.

BY THE TIME THE SECOND WAVE OF ATTACKERS HAD ADVANCED
50 YARDS INLAND, MOST OF THE AGGRESSORS HAD BEEN KILLED OR

WERE WITHDRAWING INTO THE PROTECTIVE COVER OF THE JUNGLE
AND GRASS BEHIND THE BEACH.

WITH A BEACHHEAD FIRMLY ESTABLISHED, ROYAL TH

I MARINES

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ALL NOW MOVE INLAND TO PARTICIPATE IN A NATION-WIDE
COUNTERINSURGENCY EXERCISE TITLED KITT 08. U.S. MARINES
WILL COMMENCE RIVER OPERATIONS, SECURING THE SAI BURI RIVER
FOR COMMUNICATIONS USE AND TO SUPPLY UNITS OPERATING IN THE
FIELD.

IN ADDITION TO THE BEACH DEMONSTRATION, THE THOUSAND
OR MORE VIEWERS SAW AN IMPRESSIVE EXHIBITION OF AIR-REFUELING
AS TANKER AND JET AIRCRAFT PASSED LOW OVER THE BEACH.
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JUNGLE DRUM III PRESREL 12-65

U.S. MARINES, TAKING PART IN EXERCISE JUNGLE DRUM III,
 PENETRATED SEVERAL MILES UP THE SAI BURI RIVER OF SOUTHERN
 THAILAND TODAY TO CUT OFF AGGRESSOR FORCES FROM BEHIND.
 MEANWHILE, ROYAL THAI MARINES ARE MOVING SWIFTLY TO TAKE THEIR
 HIGH-GROUND OBJECTIVE.

ROYAL THAI AND U.S. MARINES HIT THE BEACHES OF THAILAND PENINSULA
 ON M

ROH 20 IN AN IMPRESSIVE DISPLAY OF WELL-COORDINATED
 AMPHIBIOUS TACTICS. REAR ADMIRAL EDWIN S. MILLER, USN, COMMANDER

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OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, TERMED THE LANDING A DEFINITE
SUCCESS. WEATHER WAS FAVORABLE, AND THERE WERE NO CASUALTIES
OR DAMAGE.

THE AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISE, WHICH WILL CONTINUE FOR SEVERAL DAYS,
IS A JOINT ENDEAVOR BY THAILAND AND THE UNITED STATES AIMED AT
IMPROVING MILITARY PROFICIENCY WHILE INCREASING THE ALREADY
HIGH LEVEL OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

PLAYING A VITAL ROLE IN THE EXERCISE IS VINE FLOTILLA ONE,
THE U.S. SEVENTH FLEET'S MINE COUNTERMEASURES GROUP COMMANDED
BY CAPTAIN ARTHUR M. SAVAGE.

IN ADDITION TO THE FLAGSHIP, USS EPPING FOREST (MSC-7), THE
GROUP INCLUDES TWO COASTAL MINESWEEPERS USS HOEBE (MSKTAQOOLN
USS WIDGEON (MSC-208), USS WOODPECKER (MSC-209), USS WHIPPOORWILL
(MSC-207), USS GANNET (MSC-290), USS VIREO (MSC-205), USS PEACOCK
(MSC-198), AND USS WARBLER (MSC-206), PLUS THE MINESWEEPING
LAUNCHES OF MINE DIVISION THIRTY-THREE, MOBILE INSHORE UNDERSEA
WARFARE SURVEILLANCE UNIT ELEVEN, AND EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DEMOLITION
UNIT ONE.

THE ROYAL THAI COASTAL MINESWEEPER, LADYA (MSC-5), HAS JOINED
THE MINE COUNTERMEASURES GROUP FOR THE EXERCISE. TO FURTHER

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ENHANCE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING, COOPERATION AND TEAMWORK OF
THE JOINT FORCES, COM

UNDER DHAKLEO SRISAMRIT, REPEAT DHAKLEO
SRISAMRIT) AND OTHER ROYAL THAI NAVAL OFFICERS HAVE EMBARKED IN
VARIOUS UNITS OF THE MINE COUNTERMEASURES GROUP FOR THE DURATION
OF THE EXERCISE.

TO THE MINE COUNTERMEASURES GROUP, COMPRISED OF THE SMALLEST
SHIPS IN THE U.S. SEVENTH FLEET, GOES ONE OF THE LARGEST
RESPONSIBILITIES--THAT OF CLEARING THE WATERWAYS AND CHANNELS
OF SEA-MINES WHICH POSE AN IMMINENT THREAT TO THE "BIG BOYS"--
THE CRUISERS, DESTROYERS, CARGO SHIPS, TRANSPORTS, AND
REPLENISHMENT SHIPS ENGAGED IN THE OPERATION.

THE SEVENTH FLEET'S MINE COUNTERMEASURES GROUP IMPROVES ITS
CAPABILITY TO SEEK OUT AND DESTROY DEADLY SEA-MINES OF ALL TYPES
THROUGH FREQUENT PARTICIPATION IN FLEET EXERCISES SUCH AS
JUNGLE DRUM III WHICH PROVIDE REALISTIC SITUATIONS. IN EXERCISE
JUNGLE DRUM III, THE GROUP HAS AGAIN DEMONSTRATED THE LOGIC OF
ITS MOTTO, "WHERE THE FLEET GOES, WE'VE BEEN!"

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 RUMBC/USIS BANGKOK
 RUMBC/CHJUSMAGTHAI
 RUWDED/COMCRUDESPAC SDIEGO CALIF
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
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 RUMFCR/TF 132
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 RUABAE/THIRD MAR DIV ISO OJI
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JUNGLE DRUM III PROCEEDS 15-65
 EXERCISE JUNGLE DRUM III CONCLUDES
 BANGKOK, MARCH 25 - JUNGLE DRUM III, AN AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISE JOINTLY
 CONDUCTED BY THAILAND AND THE UNITED STATES, ENDS MARCH 26 WHEN THE
 DELICATE TASK OF BACKLOADING TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT FROM BEACH TO SHIPS
 IS COMPLETED.

THE SP IRITED TEAM EFFOR DISPLAYED BY ROYAL NAVY-U.S. NAVY AND
 MARINE PARTICIPANTS HAS WON A EARTY "WELL DONE!" FROM REAR ADMIRAL
 EDWIN S. MILLER,
 U. S. NAVY, OVERALL COMMANDER OF THE COMBINED EXERCISE. "MONTHS OF
 PLANNING." HE SAID, "HAVE PAID OFF HANDSOMELY IN TERMS OF TRAINING

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RESULTS; AND THE
BENEFITS TO HAI-U.S. RELATIONS WERE OUTSTANDING."

THE EXERCISE SCRIPT CALLED FOR A SITUATION IN WHICH AN INSURGENT FORCE, SUPPORTED BY A HYPOTHEITICAL AGGRESSOR NATION, WAS OPERATING IN THAILAND. THE ROYAL THAI ARMED FORCES HAD NEUTRALIZED THE INSURGENTS EXCEPT IN THE PENINSULAR AREA WHERE AN ORGANIZED AGGRESSOR FORCE WAS ENGAGED.

DETOAST DESTROY THE AGGRESSORS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, THAILAND ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED THE COOPERATION OF ITS TREATY ALLY, THE U.S. SEVENTH FLEET WAS ORDERED TO EXECUTE EXERCISE JUNGLE DRUM III.

TAKING PART IN THE EXERCISE WAS A COMBINED AMPHIBIOUS EXPEDITIONARY FORCE CONSISTING OF UNITS OF THE ROYAL THAI NAVY AND MARINE CORPS AND THE U.S. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS. MANY ELEMENTS NORMAL TO A FULL-SCALE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION WERE EMPLOYED.

INCLUDED WERE AN AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE, A MARINE LANDING FORCE, SEVENTH FLEET AIRCRAFT, NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT SHIPS, SUBMARINES, MINE COUNTERMEASURES SHIPS AND A LOGISTIC SUPPORT GROUP. THE FORCE RELIED ENTIRELY ON ITS SEA

AND AIR TRANSPORT ABILITY FOR MOVEMENT OF NECESSARY WEAPONS, EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.

COMMANDING THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE WAS ADMIRAL WILLIAM WIT BEAR ADMIRAL SATAP KEMAR, ROYAL THAI NAVY, SERVING AS DEPUTY EXPEDITION-

ARY FORCE COMMANDER.

CAPTAIN ROBERT W. CRARK, U. S. NAVY, COMMANDED THE AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE; AND COLONEL WILLIAM M. GRAHAM JR., U.S. MARINE CORPS, COMMANDED THE LANDING FORCE. THEIR THAI COUNTERPARTS WERE CAPTAIN SUTHEB VASANTAHINHA (REPEAT VASANTASINHA), ROYAL THAI NAVY, AND CAPTAIN SOBHON SUYARNSESTAKORN (REPEAT SUYARNSESTAKOUN), ROYAL THAI MARINE CORPS, RESPECTIVELY.

THE EXERCISE ACTUALLY GOT UNDERWAY WITH THE SORTIE OF U. S. SHIPS FROM SUBIC BAY, PHILIPPINES ON MARCH 20. THEY WERE TO JOIN UP WITH ROYAL THAI AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS IN THE GULF OF THAILAND ON MARCH 17. THE THAI SHIPS AND ONE U. S. AMPHIBIOUS SHIP, WITH ROYAL THAI MARINES EMBARKED, SAILED FROM THE SATTAPHU NAVAL BASE IN THAILAND ON MARCH 15 TO MEET THE APPOINTED RENDEZVOUS.

A FULL SCALE REHEARSAL WAS HELD ON MARCH 18 WITH ROYAL THAI AND U. S. MARINES HITTING THE BEACHES OF SOUTHERN THAILAND SIDE BY SIDE. THE REHEARSAL WENT WELL BUT FOR MINOR PROBLEMS CAUSED BY A HEAVY SURF.

BY D-DAY MARCH 20, HOWEVER, THE SEAS WERE CALM. AND A PERFECT DAY WAS IN THE OFFING. "THE SPLIT-SECOND TIMING AND TRULY PROFESSIONAL ADMIRAL MILLER, "WERE A MARVEL TO SEE." EXTENSIVE PLANS AND PREPARATIONS CAME TO A SUDDEN, NOISY, SALTY AND DUSTY CLIMAX AT 11-HOUR WHEN THE FIRST ASSAULT WAVE HIT THE BEACH.

IN THE WORDS OF ADMIRAL MILLER. "IT WAS A GREAT SHOW; AND MORE THAN THAT, A CHANCE FOR TWO CLOSE ALLIES TO EXERCISE TOGETHER AND TO REINFORCE THE CAMARADERIES THAT ALREADY EXIST IN FULL MEASURE

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BETWEEN THE THAI AND U.S. FORCES."

ON HAND TO WITNESS THE LANDING, ALONG WITH A HOST OF OTHER OBSERVERS, WAS HIS EXCELLENCY FIELD MARSHAL THANOM KITTAKACHORN, PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THAILAND. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY VICE ADMIRAL PAUL P. BLACKBURN JR., COMMANDER OF THE U.S. SEVENTH FLEET.

ONCE A BEACHHEAD WAS ESTABLISHED, WITH HELP FROM NAVAL GUNFIRE AND MARINE AIR STRIKES, THE U.S. MARINES COMMENCED OPERATIONS TO SECURE THE SAI BURI RIVER AS A MEANS OF CUTTING OFF THE AGGRESSORS FROM BEHIND.

ROYAL THAI MARINES PROCEEDED TO TAKE THEIR HIGH-GROUND OBJECTIVE. AFTER HE MOPPING UP OPERATIONS WERE COMPLETED, THEY JOINED OTHER THAI FORCES TAKING PART IN A NATION-WIDE COUNTERINSURGENCY EXERCISE TITLED KITTI 08.

SOME 39 SHIPS, 24 U.S. AND 15 THAI, ALONG WITH 1,600 U.S. AND 1,300 ROYAL THAI MARINES PARTICIPATED IN THE EXERCISE. ALTOGETHER, SOME 10,000 NAVAL AND MARINE PERSONNEL OF THE TWO COUNTRIES TOOK PART. EXERCISE JUNGLE DRUM III HAS ALREADY YIELDED VALUABLE LESSONS IN TERMS OF AMPHIBIOUS AND COANTERINSURGENCY TACTICS, TECHNIQUES

A

ND DOCTRINES. IT HAS ALSO DEMONSTRATED THE ABILITY OF THE

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UNITED STATES AND THAILAND TO RESPOND QUICKLY AND POWERFULLY TO AGGRESSION.

NAVYMEN FROM EIGHT OF THE U.S. SHIPS AND U.S. MARINES OF BATALION LANDING TEAM 2/3 WILL ENJOY LIBERTY IN BANGKOK BEFORE RETURNING TO THEIR NORMAL DUTIES.

END

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 CONGRATULATIONS ON THE OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE OF YOUR SAILORS AND
 MARINES DURING THE JUNGLE DRUM III LANDINGS. PLEASE EXTEND TO ALL
 MEMBERS OF YOUR COMMANDS A HEARTY WELL DONE. VICE ADMIRAL PAUL P.
 BLACKBURN, JR.
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