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003A01664  
20 Jan 1964

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on CTE 79.3.3.6 ltr 3:ADG:jrf over 5213 Ser: 003A33663  
dtd 2 Dec 1963


From: Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps

Subj: Command Diary; submission of (U)

1. Forwarded.
2. This endorsement may be downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED upon removal from the basic correspondence.

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CTE 79.3.3.6

*C. E. Walker*  
C. E. WALKER  
By direction



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TE-79.3.3.6

CMD DIARY

18 July-31 Oct 1963

0165-64

3:HFJ:jfk  
5213  
Ser: 0031-64  
JAN 11 1963

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SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CTE 79.3.3.6 ltr 3:ADG:jrf over 5213, Ser:  
003A33663 of 2 December 1963

From: Commanding General, First Marine Aircraft Wing  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps  
Via: Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Diary, submission of

1. Forwarded.
2. Additional information on the reported deficiency in motor transport test equipment mentioned on page 39 of the basic correspondence has been requested of CTE 79.3.3.6. A recommended change in QM-6 will be forwarded if required.
3. This letter is downgraded to unclassified upon removal of the basic correspondence.

*A. J. Armstrong*  
A. J. ARMSTRONG  
By direction

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Ser: 003A36063  
26 December 1963

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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CTE 79.3.3.6 ltr 3:ADG:jlf over 5213, serial:  
003A33663 of 2 December 1963

From: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 16  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps  
Via: (1) Commanding General, First Marine Aircraft Wing  
(2) Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Diary, submission of

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2. This letter is downgraded to unclassified upon removal of the  
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*W. R. Nozier*  
W. R. NOZIER  
By direction

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*To Wing*  
HEADQUARTERS

Task Element 79.3.3.6

Marine Aircraft Group 16

1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Aircraft, FMF, Pacific  
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

3:ADG:jrf  
5213  
Ser: 003A33663  
2 December 1963

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From: Commander  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps, Washington 25, D. C.  
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 16  
(2) Commanding General, First Marine Aircraft Wing  
(3) Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Diary; submission of

Ref: (a) CMC msg 261735Z SEP 1962

Encl: (1) Command Diary for the Period 18 July to 31 October 1963

1. In accordance with the instructions contained in reference (a), enclosure (1) is hereby submitted.

2. This letter is downgraded to unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1).

*P. D. Gomez*  
A. D. GOMEZ

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Task Element 79.3.3.6

Marine Aircraft Group 16

1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Aircraft, FMF, Pacific  
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

COMMAND DIARY

18 JULY 1963 - 31 OCTOBER 1963

Colonel A. D. GOMEZ  
Commander

Enclosure (1)

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Enclosure (1)

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PART A.

Organizational Data Sheet

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~~SECRET~~ORGANIZATIONAL DATA SHEET

1. Reporting Unit: Task Element 79.3.3.6
2. Period Covered: 18 July 1963 to 31 October 1963
3. Date Submitted: 2 December 1963 → 23 Jan HQMC
4. Commander: Colonel A. D. GOMEZ, USMC
5. Location: DaNang, Republic of Vietnam
6. Subordinate Units:
  - a. Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 261  
LtCol Frank A. SHOOK, USMC, Commanding  
(18 July 1963 - 1 October 1963)
  - b. Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 361  
LtCol Thomas J. ROSS, USMC, Commanding  
(1 October 1963 - 31 October 1963)
  - c. Sub Unit #2, Marine Air Base Squadron 16  
LtCol Earl W. CASSIDY, USMC, Commanding  
(18 July 1963 - 31 October 1963)

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PART B.

Narrative Summary

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**SECRET**SECRETNARRATIVE SUMMARY

18 July 1963 - 1 WIA from Viet An (BT 030-280) evac to Danang Hosp.  
 2 WIA's from Tarau (YC 862-848) evac to Danang Hosp.

The C-117D made trip to Saigon for commissary supplies and returned the same day.

19 July 1963 - 1 UH-34D rec'd 1 hit in tail rotor blade at LZ (BT 118-223). 7 WIA's and 4 KIA's from LZ (BT 001-227) evac to Danang Hosp. 2 WIA's from Tramy (BS 015-970) evac to Danang Hosp. 10 KIA's and 1 Ill ARVN from LZ (YC 831-602) evac to Hatan (ZC 135-538).

The C-117D made trip to Hong Kong and returned the same day.

20 July 1963 - Routine Admin/Supply missions flown this date.

The C-117D made trip to Saigon for commissary supplies and returned the same day.

21 July 1963 - 1 WIA from LZ (YC 760-639) evac to Danang Hosp.  
 1 UH-34D rec'd small arms fire from Hill 240° 3 clicks from LZ (YC 760-639). No hits rec'd.

22 July 1963 - Routine Admin/Supply missions flown this date.

The Marine KC-130 arrived with supplies.

The C-117D made trip to Saigon for commissary supplies and returned the same day.

23 July 1963 - 3 WIA's from Tramy (BS 015-970) evac to Danang Hosp.  
 1 KIA and 1 WIA from Phuoc Cam (BT 095-210) evac to Danang Hosp.  
 1 Ill ARVN from Ashau (YC 522-815) evac to Danang Hosp. 3 WIA's from Viet An (BT 018-270) evac to Danang Hosp.

The C-117D made trip to Hong Kong.

24 July 1963 - 18 UH-34D's lifted 415 troops with 4700 lbs of cargo into LZ Yankee (YC 737-615) on a strike mission. 1 WIA from Phuoc Cam (BT 095-210) evac to Danang Hosp. 4 WIA's from (BT 219-229) evac to Danang Hosp.

The C-117D returned to Danang and then went to Saigon and returned

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Remarks - LtCol H. F. BROWN, Commander Task Element 79.3.3.6 was relieved by Col M. D. GOMEZ on 18 July 1963.

MGen F. C. THARIN, CG, 1st MLN arrived at Task Element 79.3.3.6 on inspection tour on 30 July. He departed on 31 July.

25 July 1963 - 1 Ill ARVN from Phuoc Son #2 (AT 854-207) evac to Danang Hosp.

The Marine KC-130 arrived with supplies.

The C-117D made trip to Saigon for commissary supplies and returned the same day.

26 July 1963 - 18 UH-34D's lifted 490 ARVN troops and 3600 lbs of cargo into LZ Yankee (YC 737-615). 1 UH-34D rec'd one hit at (YC 830-621). Hit was in right tire passing in cabin door and out left side of fuselage. 1 WIA from (YC 678-595) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 Ill ARVN and 1 WIA from Tamky (BT 307-187) evac to Danang Hosp.

The C-117D made trip to Saigon for commissary supplies and returned the same day.

27 July 1963 - 2 WIA from (YC 662-635) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 WIA from (YC 720-630) evac to Danang Hosp.

The C-117D made trip to Saigon for commissary supplies and returned the same day.

28 July 1963 - 16 UH-34D's lifted 547 ARVN troops into 2 LZ's. LZ "Z" (YC 678-595) and LZ "Y" (YC 806-625).

The C-117D made trip to Futema, Okinawa.

29 July 1963 - 1 WIA from LZ (YC 360-940) evac to Tabat (YC 423-918).

The Marine KC-130 arrived with supplies.

30 July 1963 - 1 Ill ARVN from Ben Giang (YC 976-366) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 Ill ARVN from Tramy (BT 015-970) evac to Danang Hosp.

31 July 1963 - 1 KIA and 4 WIA from (YC 360-935) evac to Danang Hosp.

The C-117D returned to Danang.

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\* 1 Aug 1963 - One Marine involved in a vehicle accident at Danang, evac to the U. S. Army hospital at NHA TRANG in the C-117D.

1 Ill ARVN from Viet An (BT 018-270) evac to Danang Hosp.

12 UH-34D's and 2 O-1B's launched on a rescue mission of a downed L-19 at (YC 813-517) crew of downed aircraft were picked up and returned to Danang.

The Marine KC-130 arrived with supplies.

The C-117D made trip to Saigon and returned the same day.

2 Aug 1963 - 4 Ill ARVN from Hatan (ZC 135-538) evac to Danang Hosp.

2 Ill ARVN from Phuoc Son #2 (AT 845-217) evac to Danang Hosp.

6 Ill ARVN and 2 WIA from (YC 666-632) evac to Danang Hosp.

The C-117D made trip to Saigon and returned the same day.

3 Aug 1963 - The C-117D made trip to Hong Kong.

4 Aug 1963 - Routine Admin/Supply missions flown this date.

The C-117D returned from Hong Kong.

5 Aug 1963 - Routine Admin/Supply missions flown this date.

The Marine KC-130 arrived with supplies

The C-117D made trip to Saigon and returned the same day.

6 Aug 1963 - 6 UH-34D's lifted 204 ARVN troops from LZ "Z" (YC 678-598) to LZ "H" (YC 653-552) on a strike mission. On same mission 1 UH-34D was diverted to a medical evac at (YC 653-252), rec'd 2 hits, one in main fuel cell and 1 in main rotor. 13 WIA from LZ "H" evac to Danang Hosp. 1 Ill ARVN from (YC 865-840) evac to Hue Hosp. 1 WIA from (AT 847-240) and 1 WIA from (AT 854-234) evac to Danang Hosp. 2 Ill ARVN from (ZC 036-107) evac to Danang Hosp. 2 Ill ARVN from (YC 658-552) evac to Danang Hosp.

The C-117D made trip to Saigon and returned the same day.

7 Aug 1963 - 3 WIA from Viet An (BT 018-270) evac to Danang Hosp.

3 Ill ARVN from (YC 664-558) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 Ill ARVN from Tarau (YC 310-890) evac to Danang Hosp.

The C-117D made trip to Hong Kong and returned the same day.

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8 Aug 1963 - 2 KIA from (BT 152-265) evac to Tamky (BT 307-187).  
2 ILL ARVN and 3 WIA from LZ "Z" (YC 675-595) evac to Danang Hosp.

The Marine KC-130 arrived with supplies.  
The C-117D made trip to Saigon and returned the same day.

9 Aug 1963 - On a resupply mission 5 UH-34D's received small arms fire from a ridge 500 meters north of (BT 075-226), no hits rec'd. Lifted 1 VC POW from Phuoc Son #1 (BT 075-226) to Tamky. 9 WIA from (AT 974-249) and 1 WIA from (AT 935-687) evac to Danang Hosp.

10 Aug 1963 - 6 UH-34D's launched to (YC 832-348) to pickup 25 Special Forces including 9 WIA. The WIA's were evac to Danang Hosp. While in LZ one UH-34D rec'd three hits, one in the main servo, one in the rotor blade and one left side aft of pilot cabin. 3 ILL VN young ladies from (BT 060-760) evac to Danang Hosp.

11 Aug 1963 - 2 ILL ARVN from (YC 865-838) evac to Danang Hosp.

12 Aug 1963 - 8 ILL ARVN from (YC 675-595) evac to Danang Hosp.  
24 WIA and KIA from (YC 652-857) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 KIA from Phuoc Cam (BT 096-200) evac to Danang Hosp.

The Marine KC-130 arrived with supplies.

13 Aug - 1 WIA from Bolchehin (ZC 006-656) evac to Danang Hosp.  
1 ILL U.S. Advisor from Phuoc Son #2 (AT 854-207) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 WIA from LZ "Z" (YC 663-559) evac to Danang Hosp.

The C-117D made trip to Saigon and returned the same day.

14 Aug 1963 - 73 ILL ARVN from LZ "Z" (YC 675-595) evac to Hatan (ZC 135-538). 20 ILL ARVN, 1 WIA and 1 KIA from LZ "Z" evac to Danang Hosp. 6 WIA and 1 KIA from (BT 095-210) evac to Danang Hosp.

15 Aug 1963 - 17 UH-34D's lifted 346 ARVN troops and 3570 lbs of cargo from LZ "H" (YC 663-599) to Hatan (ZC 135-538). 1 ILL ARVN from LZ "H" evac to Danang Hosp. 1 WIA from LZ "Z" (YC 675-595) evac to Danang Hosp.

The Marine KC-130 arrived with supplies.  
The C-117D made trip to Saigon and returned the same day.

16 Aug 1963 - 15 UH-34D's lifted 518 ARVN troops and 10,420 lbs of cargo from LZ "Z" (YC 675-595) to Hatan (ZC 135-538). 1 WIA from Phuoc Son #2 (AT 854-207) evac to Danang Hosp. 5 UH-34D's launched on SAR of a downed USAF B-26 located at (BS 594-242), but services of USMC aircraft were not required.

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17 Aug 1963 - 21 UH-34D's lifted 441 ARVN troops and 7200 lbs of cargo from LZ "Z" (YC 675-595) to Hatan (ZC 135-538). 1 UH-34D rec'd small arms fire when leaving LZ "Z". No hits rec'd.

The C-117D made trip to Hong Kong.

18 Aug 1963 - 1 WIA from Phuoc Cam (BT 095-210) evac to Danang Hosp.

The C-117D returned from Hong Kong.

19 Aug 1963 - 1 sick American picked up at Phuoc Son (AT 854-217) evac to Danang Hosp. 4 WIA from LZ (BT 079-236) evac to Danang Hosp. 2 UH-34D's rec'd automatic weapons fire at (XD 670-620), no hits rec'd.

The Marine KC-130 arrived with supplies.

20 Aug 1963 - Routine Admin/Supply missions flown this date.

The C-117D made trip to Saigon and returned the same day.

21 Aug 1963 - Routine Admin/Supply missions flown this date.

The C-117D made trip to Hong Kong and returned the same day.

22 Aug 1963 - 10 WIA from An Trang (BT 002-226) evac to Danang Hosp. 2 WIA from An Trang and 2 WIA and 1 KIA from Viet An (BT 015-270) evac to Danang Hosp.

The Marine KC-130 arrived with supplies.

The C-117D made trip to Saigon and returned the same day.

23 Aug 1963 - 8 UH-34D's lifted 62 reenforcement troops to Bolohein (ZC 006-656). 2 WIA from Bolohein evac to Danang Hosp.

24 Aug 1963 - 6 UH-34D's lifted 108 troops to An Diem (ZC 085-572) and Bolohein (ZC 006-656). 2 WIA from Phuoc Son #2 (AT 854-217) evac to Danang Hosp.

25 Aug 1963 - 1 KIA from Phuoc Son #1 (BT 073-266) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 KIA from Phuoc Son #2 (AT 854-217) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 WIA from Phuoc Cam (BT 096-200) evac to Danang Hosp.

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\* 26 Aug 1963 - 2 WIA from (AT 952-229) evac to Danang Hosp.  
 2, UH-34D's fired on by automatic wps at (AT 950-220), no hits  
 rec'd. 1 evac from New RO (ZC 042-233) evac to Danang Hosp.  
 1, UH-34D forced down at (ZC 133-517) with engine trouble, 1, UH-34D  
 landed to evac crew of downed aircraft, both aircraft received  
 fire from (ZC 135-525), no hits rec'd. Downed aircraft secured  
 by ARVN patrol 40 minutes after landing.

The Marine KC-130 arrived with supplies.  
 The C-117D made trip to Cubi Pt.

27 Aug 1963 - Routine Admin/Supply missions flown this date.  
 Aircraft returned from (ZC 133-517).

The C-117D returned from Cubi Pt. and made trip to Saigon and  
 returned the same day.

28 Aug 1963 - 1 WIA from (ZC 963-665) evac to Danang Hosp. 1,  
 UH-34D rec'd small arms fire 300 yds from (YC 963-665), no hits rec'd.

29 Aug 1963 - Routine Admin/Supply missions flown this date.

The Marine KC-130 arrived with supplies.  
 The C-117D made trip to Saigon and returned the same day.

30 Aug 1963 - While on a recon mission one O-1B rec'd small arms  
 fire at (AT 930-135), no hits rec'd. 2 WIA from LZ (YD 326-066)  
 evac to Hue Hosp. 5 WIA from Tien Phuoc (BT 114-137) evac to  
 Danang Hosp.

31 Aug 1963 - 18, UH-34D's lifted 214 reenforcement troops from  
 An Diem (ZC 078-572) to Bolohein (ZC 001-660), and 133 troops from  
 Bolohein to An Diem.

1 Sep 1963 - 2 WIA from (BT 070-720) evac to Danang Hosp.

2 Sep 1963 - 1 KIA from (YB 951-985) evac to Danang Hosp. 1  
 American, 4 ARVN WIA's from (YC 840-847), evac American to Danang  
 Marine Dispensary, 4 ARVN's to Danang Hosp.

→ The Marine C-54 arrived with supplies.

3 Sep 1963 - 4 WIA from (AT 972-182) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 WIA  
 and 1 KIA from (BT 095-210) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 WIA and 1 KIA  
 from Bolohein (ZC 006-656) evac to Danang Hosp. 1, O-1B rec'd  
 small arms fire at (AT 925-055), no hits rec'd. 3, UH-34D's rec'd  
 automatic wps fire at (ZC 080-260), no hits rec'd. 4 WIA from  
 (AT 972-182) evac to Danang Hosp. 6 WIA from (AT 970-160) evac to  
 Danang Hosp. 7, UH-34D's and 2, O-1B's joined in search for missing  
 B-26.

The C-117D made trip to Saigon and returned the same day.

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4 Sep 1963 - 8 UH-34D's and 2 O-1B's joined search for missing USAF B-26. 2 UH-34D's rec'd small arms fire at (ZC 050-417), no hits rec'd. 1 WIA from (AT 976-183) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 WIA from Viet An (BT 019-270) evac to Danang Hosp.

5 Sep 1963 - 4 UH-34D's and 2 O-1B's joined in search for missing USAF B-26. 2 WIA from (AT 965-140) evac to Danang Hosp. 6 WIA from Ro (ZC 057-287) evac to Danang Hosp.

The Marine KC-130 arrived with supplies.

The C-117D made trip to Saigon and returned the same day.

6 Sep 1963 - 2 O-1B's joined in search for missing USAF B-26. 10 WIA and 1 KIA from Phuoc Son #2 (AT 850-207) evac to Danang Hosp. Rec'd automatic wpns fire on approach to Phuoc Son #2, no hits rec'd. 3 WIA from Ro (ZC 042-233) evac to Danang Hosp. 12 UH-34D's lifted 699 reenforcement troops to (AT 970-162) and (AT 944-113) and Phuoc Chau (BT 005-095), 3 UH-34D's rec'd a total of 4 hits at (AT 957-120) and (AT 964-107). 1 UH-34D rec'd one hit in tail pylon, 1 UH-34D rec'd one hit on rib inside aircraft pylon, 1 UH-34D rec'd 2 hits, 1 through pylon and 1 in after fuselage section.

7 Sep 1963 - 3 Ill ARVN from Tarau (YC 865-840) evac to Danang Hosp. 6 WIA from LZ (AT 944-113) evac to Danang Hosp.

The C-117D made trip to Hong Kong.

8 Sep 1963 - 1 UH-34D rec'd one hit in main rotor blade at (AT 833-095) 2 WIA from (BT 055-239) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 WIA from Viet An (BT 020-070) evac to Danang Hosp.

The C-117D returned from Hong Kong.

9 Sep 1963 - 2 WIA and 2 Ill ARVN from Bolchein (ZC 002-650) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 WIA from Tamky (BT 307-216) evac to Danang Hosp. 2 WIA from LZ (AT 910-452) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 KIA from LZ (AT 870-094) evac to Danang Hosp. 4 WIA and 2 KIA from LZ (AT 910-452) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 WIA from Tien Phuoc (BT 113-137) evac to Danang Hosp. 2 WIA from LZ (AT 854-217) evac to Danang Hosp.

The Marine KC-130 arrived with supplies.

10 Sep 1963 - 1 WIA from Tien Phuoc (BT 113-137) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 Ill ARVN from Ro (ZC 045-235) evac to Danang Hosp. 4 WIA and 1 KIA including 1 VC POW WIA from LZ (AT 864-120) evac to Danang Hosp. 2 UH-34D's rec'd small arms fire SW of (AT 864-120), no hits rec'd.

The C-117D made trip to Saigon and returned the same day.

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11 Sep 1963 - 6 WIA and 3 KIA from (AT 935-450) evac to Danang Hosp.  
 2 WIA from (BT 095-217) evac to Tamky AF (BT 307-187). 1 WIA  
 and 1 ILL ARVN from Phuoc Son #2 (AT 845-211) evac to Danang Hosp.  
 2 UH-34D's landed at Viet An (BT 015-270) and were down for parts.  
 2 UH-34D's flew maint crew and parts to downed aircraft and downed  
 aircraft returned to Danang. 2 WIA and 1 KIA from (AT 854-217)  
 night evac to Danang Hosp.

The C-117D made trip to Hong Kong and returned the same day.

12 Sep 1963 - 1 WIA from Phuoc Cam (BT 096-200) evac to Danang Hosp.  
 2 WIA from Phuoc Son #1 (BT 073-266) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 WIA  
 from Terau (YC 910-890) evac to Danang Hosp.

The Marine KC-130 arrived with supplies.

The C-117D made trip to Saigon and returned the same day.

13 Sep 1963 - 1 UH-34D down at An Diem (ZC 078-572) for parts.  
 Aircraft will be returned to Danang on 14 Sept 63.

14 Sep 1963 - 1 WIA from (ZC 001-660) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 WIA  
 from (BT 103-229) evac to Danang Hosp. UH-34D that was down at  
 An Diem was returned to Danang.

15 Sep 1963 - 1 WIA from Phuoc Cam (BT 104-201) evac to Danang Hosp.  
 1 ILL ARVN from (YD 315-085) evac to Danang Hosp. 18 UH-34D's  
 on a strike mission lifted 387 troops and 19,125 lbs of cargo  
 from Aloui (YC 380-996) to (YD 315-085). 1 UH-34D crashed at  
(YD 315-085).

The C-117D made trip to Cubi Pt and returned the same day.

16 Sep 1963 - 1 WIA from Phuoc Son #1 (BT 073-266) evac to Danang  
 Hosp. 3 ILL ARVN from Phuoc Son #2 (AT 554-217) evac to Danang  
 Hosp. 2 UH-34D's with demolition team went to (YD 315-085) and  
destroyed downed UH-34D. Aircraft has been stripped.

The Marine KC-130 arrived with supplies.

17 Sep 1963 - 1 O-1B rec'd small arms fire from (BS 155-990), no  
 hits rec'd. 1 ILL ARVN from An Diem (ZC 080-574) evac to Danang  
 Hosp.

The C-117D made trip to Saigon and returned the same day.

18 Sep 1963 - 2 WIA and 1 VC POW from (BT 073-766) evac to Danang  
 Hosp. VC POW to ARVN. While on a recon mission 2 O-1B's rec'd  
 small arms fire from (BT 140-003), no hits rec'd. While on a  
 recon mission 1 O-1B rec'd small arms fire from (BT 085-038) and  
 (BT 160-000), no hits rec'd. 1 KIA from (AT 854-217) evac to  
 Danang Hosp.

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19 Sep 1963 - 3 WIA and 3 KIA from Phuoc Chau (BT 005-095) evac to Danang Hosp. 4 Ill ARVN from Bolohbin (ZC 006-656) evac to An Diem.

The Marine KC-130 arrived with supplies.

20 Sep 1963 - 1 WIA from Ro (ZC 042-233) evac to Danang Hosp. 2 WIA from Phuoc Lam (BT 073-061) evac to Danang Hosp. 6 UH-34D's rec'd small arms fire at (ZC 050-250), no hits rec'd.

The C-117D made trip to Saigon and returned the same day.

21 Sep 1963 - 1 Ill ARVN from Tarau (YC 866-850) evac to Danang Hosp. 13 WIA and 6 KIA from LZ (AT 911-442) evac to Danang Hosp.

22 Sep 1963 - No flights this date.

23 Sep 1963 - 1 Ill ARVN from Ben Giang (YC 976-366) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 WIA from Phuoc Son #2 (AT 854-207) evac to Danang Hosp.

The Marine KC-130 arrived with supplies.

The C-117D made trip to Saigon and returned the same day.

24 Sep 1963 - 1 KIA from Phuoc Son #2 (AT 854-217) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 WIA from Hiep Duc (AT 916-246) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 WIA from Tamky (BT 307-187) evac to Danang Hosp. 8 WIA from LZ (YD 282-106) evac to Danang Hosp. 2 UH-34D's and 2 O-1B's joined in search for Army L-19. Aircraft found at (AT 997-278), 2 Ameri WIA evac to Danang Hosp.

25 Sep 1963 - 18 UH-34D's lifted 411 assault troops into LZ "H" (BT 104-016) and LZ "Y" (BS 200-990) on a strike mission. 5 UH-34D's rec'd small arms fire at LZ "Y" (BS 200-990), no hits rec'd.

26 Sep 1963 - 3 WIA from Phuoc Son #1 (BT 073-266) evac to Danang Hosp.

The Marine KC-130 arrived with supplies.

The C-117D made trip to Saigon and returned the same day.

27 Sep 1963 - 1 WIA from Phuoc Cam (BT 096-200) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 UH-34D rec'd one hit in door at (BT 112-312).

28 Sep 1963 - 8 WIA and 2 Ill ARVN from Tramy (BS 015-970) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 O-1B rec'd 2 hits in bottom of aircraft at (BS 030-111). 2 WIA from Tien Phuoc (BT 113-137) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 Ill ARVN from Tramy (BS 015-970) and 2 Ill ARVN from Tien Phuoc (BT 113-137) evac to Danang Hosp.

The C-117D made trip to Saigon and returned the same day.

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29 Sep 1963 - 1 WIA from Tarau (YC 882-930) evac to Danang Hosp.  
 2, O-1B's rec'd small arms fire at (BS 393-997), no hits rec'd.  
 6, UH-34D's rec'd small arms fire at (YC 282-106), no hits rec'd.

30 Sep 1963 - No flights this date.

The Marine KC-130 arrived with supplies.

The C-117D made trip to Saigon and returned the same day.

1 Oct 1963 - 1 WIA from Phuoc Son #1 (BT 073-266) evac to Danang Hosp. HMM-261 relieved by HMM-361 this date.

2 Oct 1963 - 12 WIA and 3 KIA from (BT 410-015) evac to Danang Hosp. UTT's provided air cover for this mission. One UTT was hit by small arms fire and one crew member was wounded. Evac crew member to Danang Marine Dispensary. 2, UH-34D's also rec'd fire entering and departing same LZ. No hits rec'd. 1 WIA from (BT 103-226) evac to Danang Hosp. 6 Ill ARVN and one VC POW from (BT 160-000) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 WIA from (BS 215-992) evac to Danang Hosp.

The C-117D made trip to Hong Kong.

3 Oct 1963 - 1 WIA and 2 Ill ARVN from Phuoc Son #2 (AT 855-210) evac to Danang Hosp.

The Marine KC-130 arrived with supplies.

The C-117D returned from Hong Kong and made trip to Saigon and returned the same day.

4 Oct 1963 - No flights this date.

The C-117D made trip to Saigon and returned the same day.

5 Oct 1963 - 2 ARVN WIA and 1 U.S. Special Forces WIA from (AT 820-241) evac to Danang Hosp. 6, UH-34D's rec'd small arms fire at LZ's (YD 192-106) and (YD 220-124), no hits rec'd.

The C-117D made trip to Hong Kong.

6 Oct 1963 - 1 WIA and 1 Ill ARVN from Tarau (YC 910-890) evac to Danang Hosp. 8 WIA and 2 KIA from (YD 207-101) evac to Danang Hosp.

The C-117D returned from Hong Kong.

7 Oct 1963 - 1 WIA from (BT 104-026) evac to Danang Hosp.

The Marine KC-130 arrived with supplies.

The C-117D made trip to Saigon and returned the same day.

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\* 8 Oct 1963 - 1 I11 ARVN from Ro (ZC 045-235) evac to Danang Hosp.  
 1 I11 Special Forces Capt from Phuoc Cam (BT 096-200) evac to Danang Hosp. At 1820H 2 UH-34D's with 5 Officers and 7 Enlisted (U.S.) departed Danang to (YC 745-370), the site of a USAF T-28 crash at 1745H. The aircraft were sighted by and contacted by an Army L-19 at approximately 1935H. This was the last visual or radio contact. At 2018H a communications search was commenced utilizing both ARVN and U. S. comm nets contacting all air and ground facilities and outposts in the area. At 2218H, 1 C-117D and 1, O-1B aircraft were launched to continue comm and initiate visual search in the last known area of operation. Both aircraft returned to Danang with negative results.

The C-117D made trip to Saigon and returned the same day.

9 Oct 1963 - The 2 UH-34D's were located at (YC 756-365), (YC 764-357) the T-28 at (YC 745-374). 254 ARVN, 785 lbs of cargo were lifted to the crash area. UH-34D's received extensive resistance, receiving 9 hits on 5 aircraft, 3 pilots WIA, 1 ARVN KIA and 1 ARVN WIA.

10 Oct 1963 - 3 UH-34D's, 3 UTT's and 2, T-28's launched at 1330H for crash site (YC 756-365) to recover the remains of seven bodies. Maintenance inspection team was on board. Maintenance team was put into LZ without incident. Aircraft were sent to Talon (YC 886-325) to await pickup time of approx. 45 minutes. Aircraft remained at Talon for approx. 35 minutes when enemy fire forced them to depart. Returned to crash site to pick up bodies and rec'd automatic wpns fire, no hits rec'd. 7 U.S. KIA were evac to Danang Marine Dispensary. 1 O-1B rec'd small arms fire at (YC 760-356), no hits rec'd.

The Marine KC-130 arrived with supplies.  
 The C-117D made trip to Saigon.

11 Oct 1963 - 1 WIA and 1 KIA from Phuoc Chau (BT 005-095) evac to Danang Hosp. 2 I11 ARVN from Phuoc Cam (BT 096-200) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 UH-34D rec'd 2 hits in engine and one in left strut while on the ground at (YC 772-353), aircraft down in landing zone. 1 WIA from Aloui (YC 380-996) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 WIA from (BT 125-280) evac to Danang Hosp. 2 WIA from (BT 073-244) evac to Danang Hosp. 2 UH-34D lifted 3 U.S. KIA from (YC 772-353) to Danang Marine Dispensary and rec'd automatic wpns fire on departure from zone, no hits rec'd. 1 O-1B rec'd small arms fire at (YC 822-332), no hits rec'd.

C-117D returned from Saigon.

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12 Oct 1963 - Maint. Inspection team lifted to (YC 772-353) to determine whether downed aircraft needs engine replacement. 2 WIA and 2 KIA from Tien Phuoc (BT 113-137) evac to Danang Hosp.

\* 13 Oct 1963 - 10 UH-34D's, 3 UTT's and 2 T-28's lifted 120 troops into LZ (YC 772-353). 8 UH-34D's lifted new engine and maint. crew into LZ (YC 772-353) to replace engine on downed UH-34D. Downed aircraft flown back to Danang.

14 Oct 1963 - 1 O-1B rec'd small arms fire at (YC 855-325), no hits rec'd.

The Marine KC-130 arrived with supplies.

The C-117D made trip to Saigon and returned the same day.

15 Oct 1963 - 1 American WIA from LZ (YD 262-081) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 UH-34D rec'd small arms fire at (YD 262-081), no hits rec'd. 1 WIA and 1 KIA from (YD 545-183) evac to Aloui (YC 380-996). 4 WIA from Phuoc Cam (BT 096-200) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 WIA and 1 Ill ARVN from (BT 098-258) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 UH-34D rec'd one hit in cargo compartment at (YD 229-074).

The C-117D made trip to Saigon and returned the same day.

16 Oct 1963 - 1 WIA from Tien Phuoc (BT 113-137) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 O-1B rec'd small arms fire at (YC 420-720), no hits rec'd. 2 Ill ARVN from (BT 294-083) evac to Danang Hosp. 2 WIA and 1 female POW from (YC 758-363) evac to Danang. 2 UH-34D's rec'd small arms fire at (YC 758-363), no hits rec'd.

The C-117D made trip to Hong Kong and returned the same day.

17 Oct 1963 - 2 WIA from Phuoc Son #1 (BT 073-226) evac to Danang Hosp.

The Marine KC-130 arrived with supplies.

The C-117D made trip to Saigon and returned the same day.

18 Oct 1963 - No flights this date.

19 Oct 1963 - Routine Admin/Supply missions flown this date.

The C-117D made trip to Hong Kong.

20 Oct 1963 - Routine Admin/Supply missions flown this date.

The C-117D returned from Hong Kong.

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21 Oct 1963 - 1 Ill ARVN from Tarau (YC 865-840) evac to Danang Hosp.

The Marine KC-130 arrived with supplies.

The C-117D made trip to Saigon and returned the same day.

22 Oct 1963 - Weather recon flights only, flown this date.

23 Oct 1963 - Weather recon and Admin flights only, flown this date.

The C-117D made trip to Saigon.

24 Oct 1963 - 2 WIA from Hue (YD 754-233) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 WIA from LZ (YC 810-336) evac to Danang Hosp. 5 WIA from (YC 801-355) evac to Danang Hosp. 3 UH-34D's rec'd one hit each in tail section at LZ (YD 229-074).

The Marine KC-130 arrived with supplies.

The C-117D returned from Saigon.

25 Oct 1963 - Routine Admin/Supply missions flown this date.

26 Oct 1963 - Routine Admin/Supply missions flown this date.

27 Oct 1963 - 1 WIA from LZ (YC 829-343) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 WIA from Ben Giang (YC 976-366) evac to Danang Hosp.

28 Oct 1963 - 1 KIA from (AT 932-136) evac to Danang Hosp. 1 WIA from Tarau (YC 865-840) evac to Danang Hosp. 4 WIA from Phuoc Lam (BT 073-061) evac to Danang Hosp. 6 WIA from Phuoc Cam (BT 096-200) evac to Danang Hosp. 4 WIA from Phuoc Son (BT 074-224) evac to Danang Hosp. 2 UH-34D's rec'd small arms fire at (AT 920-140), no hits rec'd.

The Marine KC-130 arrived with supplies.

29 Oct 1963 - Routine Admin/Supply missions flown this date.

The C-117D made trip to Saigon and returned the same day.

30 Oct 1963 - Weather recon missions only, flown this date.

31 Oct 1963 - 4 UH-34D's rec'd small arms fire from (BT 307-187) and (AT 973-093), no hits rec'd. 6 UH-34D's rec'd small arms fire from (BT 006-097), 1 UH-34D rec'd one hit at (BT 006-097).

The C-117D made trip to Saigon and returned the same day.

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S-2 During Period 18 July - 31 October 1963

During the period 18 July to 30 August 1963 there was no intelligence officer on the Task Element staff and the duties normally handled by the S-2 of the Task Element were assumed by the S-2 section of HMM-261. On 30 August 1963 an officer was assigned as S-2 of the Task Element which permitted the squadron intelligence section to resume its normal operation of basic aviation combat intelligence functions.

Normally the Task Element S-2 makes daily visits to I Corps Headquarters and is now a regular participant at the Tactical Operations Center in the planning of aviation missions. The Task Element S-2 has made two liaison visits to the J-2 section of MACV Headquarters and other agencies within the intelligence community in Saigon. Continuous liaison is maintained with all members of the intelligence community of the I Corps tactical zone and a spirit of mutual assistance and cooperation currently exists among the many intelligence agencies.

The photographic laboratory personnel have continued during this period to perform outstanding service in support of the intelligence effort. Completing 160 photographic job orders, they frequently work through the night to finish high priority reconnaissance photography. On 10 October 1963 a Sergeant reported for duty as an API man TAD from the 1ST MAW G-2 section. He has not only done an outstanding job in his API work but in many other phases of intelligence work. He is currently acting as intelligence chief since no intelligence chief is provided by the Task Element TO. It is hoped that an API man can be retained on a permanent basis.

Enemy anti-aircraft activity has picked up considerably during this period, although there are no known hits from weapons heavier than .30 caliber in this tactical area. The frequency of aircraft being fired upon has increased, and the enemy technique of fire appears to be constantly improving. The enemy has significantly increased his ground fire efforts against O-1B aircraft on reconnaissance missions which previously have been fired upon only on infrequent occasions. However, there have been only two hits sustained to date by Marine O-1B aircraft.

The tenant HMM squadron S-2 or assistant S-2 briefs all flights and debriefs all flights to obtain intelligence sightings. If intelligence is obtained from the pilots or AO's, ISUM's are immediately prepared and disseminated to all interested parties.

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Situation maps are kept current on a day-to-day basis at the HMM squadron level and Task Element level. The situation maps kept by the HMM squadron contain current Order of Battle data extracted from ISUMS and reports from pilots as they complete combat support missions. The situation maps which are monitored by the Task Element S-2 are much broader in scope and include OB data on all VC units as well as the current friendly situation. These maps are very comprehensive in scope and include all data necessary for the thorough briefing of the many visitors and dignitaries who visit the Task Element as well as all new key personnel reporting to this command for duty. Before the arrival of the Task Element S-2 officer it was necessary to take all visitors, dignitaries and newly arriving personnel to I Corps Headquarters and the orientation briefings were conducted by the Corps G-2 and G-3 advisory staffs. Now the Task Element S-2 includes all current ground operations as a regular part of his briefings in addition to intelligence matters.

Special mention should be made of the fact that during this period much closer liaison and stronger coordination and cooperation exists with all other members of the intelligence community. A much closer relationship now exists between the Task Element and such organizations as U. S. Combined Studies Division, U. S. Air Force Intelligence, U. S. Army Special Forces and other similar organizations which are in a position to enhance the operational as well as the intelligence effort of the task element. The Task Element S-2 has acted as liaison officer to these organizations and makes frequent visits to their local facilities as well as those which are located on outposts in the field. This closer personal relationship has greatly facilitated the more rapid and efficient planning of combat support operations which involve other U. S. Forces in the area.

The O-1B aircraft has continued to be a most valuable asset to the task element mission accomplishment. It has proved invaluable as a weather reconnaissance aircraft. Prior to all H-34 support missions an O-1B is launched to the proposed area of operations to determine the suitability of the weather. Frequently the O-1B weather aircraft disclose inoperable weather conditions negating the launching of the H-34 thus saving hundreds of unnecessary flying hours. The weather service provided by the O-1B is of equal value to other aviation units operating in the tactical zone. The O-1B is also extremely valuable as a communication relay aircraft during strikes or routine combat support missions. Another valuable function of this aircraft is its employment in pathfinder missions in which landing zones and targets are identified for other aircraft.

*Note: Missions are aborted because of We then need for cannot take as much as necessary only for a small portion of the day. This is a situation which is not a result of a lack of aircraft. It is a result of a lack of fuel. The effect is to abort missions.*  
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Still another function of the O-1B which has been highly successful is its photographic capability. The Aerial Observers and pilots have earned a great deal of respect throughout the Corps zone and their services are always very much in demand by all organizations who operate in the tactical zone. Their services have also been frequently employed in the support of requirements generated by 1ST MAW, Task Force 79, and 3RD MARDIV. These organizations have been highly complimentary of the photographic support provided by the O-1B as well as other missions in which the task element intelligence section has provided these units.

Weather throughout the period was generally excellent for flying although a noticeable deterioration began to take place toward the end of September as the monsoon season approached. A further deterioration in weather is expected during the next 3 months and it is not unlikely that at least one typhoon could penetrate the area.

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PART C.

Summary of Aircraft Statistics

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FLIGHT OPERATIONS STATISTICSROTARY WING

A/C MODEL  
 UH-34D

NO. OF A/C  
 24

	<u>18-31 JULY</u>	<u>AUGUST</u>	<u>SEPTEMBER</u>	<u>OCTOBER</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
TOTAL HOURS	692.2	1329.8	1223.3	1290.5	4525.8
PERSONNEL TRANSPORTED	3099	5518	5674	3929	18,220
CARGO TRANSPORTED, TONS	148	165	186	255	754
COMBAT SORTIES	511	821	515	583	2430
COMBAT HOURS	210.3	343.8	191.7	338.7	1084.5
ADMIN/SUPPLY SORTIES	884	1399	1713	1472	5468
ADMIN/SUPPLY HOURS	406.5	756.4	883.4	819.2	2865.5

MEDICAL EVACUATION BY UH-34D

	<u>WOUNDED IN ACTION</u>	<u>KILLED IN ACTION</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
18-31 JULY	32	8	15	55
AUGUST	113	13	142	270
SEPTEMBER	136	27	31	194
OCTOBER	75	14	24	113

FIXED WING

A/C MODEL  
 C-117D  
 C-1B

NO. OF A/C  
 1  
 3

	<u>18-31 JULY</u>	<u>AUGUST</u>	<u>SEPTEMBER</u>	<u>OCTOBER</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
TOTAL HOURS	228.2	339.5	323.3	361.4	1252.4
PERSONNEL TRANSPORTED	133	147	146	128	554
CARGO TRANSPORTED, TONS	36	39	42	38	155
COMBAT SORTIES	80	109	123	119	431
COMBAT HOURS	137.1	230.3	234.7	269.7	871.8
ADMIN/SUPPLY SORTIES	27	40	29	31	127
ADMIN/SUPPLY HOURS	87.5	100.5	88.1	86.8	362.9

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**SECRET**SECRETAIRCRAFT HITS FOR PERIOD 18-31 JULY 1963

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TYPE AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>NO. OF HITS</u>	<u>PLACE OF HITS</u>
19 July	UH-34D	1	Tail rotor blade
26 July	UH-34D	1	Rt. tire up thru cabin
Total Hits		2	

AIRCRAFT HITS FOR MONTH OF AUGUST 1963

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TYPE AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>NO. OF HITS</u>	<u>PLACE OF HITS</u>
6 Aug	UH-34D	2	Main fuel cell, rotor blade
10 Aug	UH-34D	3	Rotor blade, left side cabin
Total Hits		5	

AIRCRAFT HITS FOR MONTH OF SEPTEMBER 1963

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TYPE AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>NO. OF HITS</u>	<u>PLACE OF HITS</u>
6 Sep	UH-34D	4	Tail pylon, A/C pylon, rotor blade, aft fuselage
14 Sep	UH-34D	1	Main rotor blade
27 Sep	UH-34D	1	Thru door & fuel cell
28 Sep	O-1B	2	Bottom of cockpit
Total Hits		8	

AIRCRAFT HITS FOR MONTH OF OCTOBER 1963

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TYPE AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>NO. OF HITS</u>	<u>PLACE OF HITS</u>
9 Oct	UH-34D	3	Rt. front window, main rotor blade, cabin section
9 Oct	UH-34D	1	Engine section
9 Oct	UH-34D	1	Electronics section
9 Oct	UH-34D	1	Air intake screen
10 Oct	UH-34D	3	Engine section
10 Oct	UH-34D	1	Cargo hatch
14 Oct	UH-34D	3	Tail section
14 Oct	UH-34D	3	Aft fuselage section
Total Hits		16	

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PART D.

Narrative Summary of Supporting Activity

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**SECRET**SECRETSUB UNIT #2, MLBS-16

## Personnel assigned

PERIOD	MARINE				NAVY			
	Officer		Enlisted		Officer		Enlisted	
	Join/Transfer		Join/Transfer		Join/Transfer		Join/Transfer	
18-31 July	2	5	16	26			1	
Aug			27	26			1	1
Sep			37	38			1	4
Oct	1	1	15	30	1		9	1

PERIOD	MARINES				NAVY			
	Officer		Enlisted		Officer		Enlisted	
	Attach/Detach		Attach/Detach		Attach/Detach		Attach/Detach	
18-31 July	1	1	3	6			1	1
Aug			18	14			1	
Sep	1		21	20				
Oct	3		18	14				

Total strength as of 31 October 1963:

Marine Officers.....12  
 Marine Officers Attached.....6  
 Navy Officers.....2  
 Navy Officers Attached.....1  
 Marine Enlisted.....162  
 Marine Enlisted Attached.....55  
 Navy Enlisted.....4  
 Navy Enlisted Attached.....20

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**SECRET**SECRETCAMP MAINTENANCE FOR PERIOD 18-31 JULY 1963

In the water supply section, 782,100 gallons of water was processed, using 27 lbs of HTH and twenty-five and one half fifty pound bags of diatomaceous earth. The plumbing section put in 59 hours on general maintenance and repair of camp facilities. A gasoline line was installed at the bakery in preparation of putting in new ovens. The shower unit at BOQ was torn down and cleaned out for quarterly P.M. and all drains in the laundry were cleared for better service. Materials used by the plumbing crew include: 15' of 3/4" pipe, 5 elbows 3/4", 2 unions 3/4", 2 tees 3/4" and 5 faucets.

The refrigeration shop reported general P.M. to all refrigeration units in the camp. No major break downs were reported.

The electric section installed fans in HMM-261 Squadron Office, STE Office, Transient BOQ, HMM-261 Ready Room, Post Office, Sub Unit M.LBS Squadron Office, supply and security barracks and 261 E-5 barracks. A total of nineteen fans installed. The Transient BOQ was wired for lighting and power. Two 40 watt lights were installed at the EM club. Four fluorescent lights installed in 261 ready room. Lighting in the mess hall was improved with the installation of five new fixtures. Lights at comm center, the hangar and shop spaces were repaired. A double throw, triple pole switch was installed as a service entrance switch on the 60 cycle power lines to the hangar. A field exciter generator was replaced on a 75KW generator at generator bank #1.

The laundry reported it laundered 2,300 sheets, 342 pillow cases and 27 mattress covers. Mess table cloths amounted to a total of 26, flight gear 73 pieces, barber shop 300 pieces, medical 62 pieces and individual bundles amounted to 433 bundles with 200 pieces of pressing gear included. During this time the dryer was down two days for repair, the washer out 1/2 day with drain trouble and the entire laundry down one day while repairs to the water tower were made by contractors.

The heavy equipment section dug ditches in the BOQ area, PX area and bakery area and leveled road area between MABS heads. Three hours of other road and ditch clearing were performed on roads under our responsibility. A 42 inch culvert was installed with two head walls at the entrance to camp area near the 261 Squadron office. Grading at An Diem outpost is still underway, with a completion date estimated around the 15th of August. The equipment mechanics made hydraulic repairs to the D-4 tractor at An Diem. Generators at Banks #1 and #2 were P.M. ed with repairs engines being made to two units. Batteries were replaced in 75KW generator at Bank #1.

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One water pump and two of the purification equipment engines had valve jobs and magneto repairs made with one engine completely overhauled. An engine overhaul was done on the cement mixer and returned to service. The mud-hog pump had some repairs completed, but is still deadlined with magneto troubles.

Construction section completed roof repairs to HMM-261, CTE, Sickbay, MABS, Special Services and Mess Hall roofs. An entrance concrete slab was completed at Transient BOQ. Forms for extension on supply 20' X 40' and a trash house 10' X 10' for EM club were put in. We expect to pour all concrete during the week of 5 August. Framing and roof structure is done on the transient enlisted barracks with completion expected by 6 August. Signs were completed and hung for CTE with repairs to Colonel Gomez's desk and a rostrum being completed. Repairs to screen doors were made throughout the camp and a napkin holder was made for the officers mess. Rain brows were constructed at the generator bank #1 to protect the power bus from exposure to rain. A security screen was constructed for supply at the hangar area. Benches and locker doors completed for 261 line shack. clothes cabinets are about 50 percent completed for transient BOQ.

#### CAMP MAINTENANCE FOR MONTH OF AUGUST 1963

The combat engineer section completed work on the new EM barracks a twenty foot by sixty foot tropical building with transite roof. An extension, 10' X 16' was completed on the laundry building. This included pouring a concrete extension and completing a tropical building type structure. A 20' X 60' concrete slab was poured to support a new guard shack at the flight line. So far frames have been laid and studs pre-cut for this structure. A cabinet was completed in the mess office for security of supplies. A small cabinet was also constructed at the photo lab and a counter at supply was completed. Camp maintenance included repairs to screening throughout camp, as well as replacement of broken roof tiles on the buildings in this camp. Maintenance on the airfield side of the camp included repairs to 261 ready room screening.

The water point reports it processed 749,000 gallons of water for camp use. The processing required the use of 20, 50 pound bags of diatomaceous earth and 9, 1½ pound cans of HTH. The machinery used 825 gallons of gasoline and 25 gallons of lube oil.

The plumbing shop completed installation of one bake oven in the bakery and one in the galley. To these ovens was connected outside gas tanks and necessary piping to the ovens. New hose and shower units to senior BOQ hot water system was installed.

Drainage system for the laundry unit was repaired and improved.

Approximately 43 hours have been put in so far clearing, mapping and improving the sewage system throughout the camp area.

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Our laundry processed linen in the amount of 2,300 sheets and 720 pillow cases. 182 individual bundles were done along with 47 pieces of flight gear. 73 pieces for the barber shop, 36 pieces for the mess hall and 26 pieces for the clubs are also included in the processing. Gasoline consumed by the laundry units amounted to 38 gallons.

The refrigeration shop performed normal P.M. to all refrigeration equipment in the camp. Two air conditioners were repaired, one 400 cycle for avionics and the one at comm center. An attempt to repair the air conditioner in the photo lab was made but not completed due to lack of parts.

The electric shop re-run power lines in the area adjacent to S-4 office on insulators and installed a service entrance switch to the hangar. In the hangar itself, service wires to a lathe in the 261 metal shop were installed. Wiring in the paraloft were repaired and a light switch was also repaired. In the supply offices the lighting system was repaired and two overhead fans were installed. Temporary lighting around the basketball court was installed for entertainment purposes and removed following entertainment. New lights were installed on the EM club patio. Flood lights for night volleyball were installed around the volleyball courts and lights were installed in the new weight lifting room. The electric shop also repaired and installed new speakers in the movie theatre and tried out the sound system for possible outside movies. The new EM barracks was completed for lights and electric receptacles. The poles by the Danang Air Terminal which support wiring from generator bank #2 to the hangar were painted with yellow and red striping for safety purposes. At the utilities shop the mobile dewalt saw was hooked up to the electrical system so that we can use it even though it's generator is V.O.C.P. for parts. At generator bank #1 the bus circuits were rearranged to permit parallel generator operation. Paralleling has been accomplished and to date is operating satisfactorily.

Engineer equipment mechanics completed normal P.M. to all generators in service. They overhauled the engine on a 55 GPM pump and made repairs to engine section on purification unit at the water point. Our cement mixer was put back into service after an engine overhaul. Gear mechanism on the laundry unit was adjusted by this shop. Service checks were made to generators received from FSR and the 30KW generator on the airfield side of the camp was put back into service with the replacement of fuel injectors. Repairs to heavy equipment include clutch adjustment on D-4 tractor and the D-4 front end loader was restored to service and the repair of track pins and bushings.

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A complete PM was held on this equipment also. Heavy equipment operators put in seven hours on road maintenance including the repairs made to culvert and head wall near 261 squadron office. Our D-4 tractor spent two hours clearing the dump area adjacent to our camp and five hours operating to the rear of the utilities building leveling the area in which the sewage pits had existed. The front end loader loaded out approximately 16 yards of fill dirt for the sewage area and road repairs.

Camp Maintenance for the period 16-31 August 1963:

The refrigeration mechanic accomplished regular PM checks on all refrigeration equipment in the camp area, along with repair of two household units in BOQ area and repair to one air conditioner in radio repair shop, in the hangar area.

The electric shop installed new wiring and lights and outlets in the disbursing office, VMO line shack and the new guard shack. In the mess hall, a meat slicer was installed and the toaster in the EM mess was repaired. Minor repairs to wiring and lighting were made in the hangar and barracks area. New lights were also installed in 261 heads over the mirrors. A circuit breaker was repaired on the 400 cycle generator serving avionics and necessary changes to generator hook up in generator bank #1 were made to ease the power load on generators serving the main camp. In the movie theatre, our electricians relocated and installed new speakers to improve the sound of the movies and reduce echo effect. Rewiring in the officers lounge is underway and completion is expected in the next reporting period.

Our Combat Engineer section completed construction on the guard house and a trash house for the EM club with the exception of doors, which are being made by our Vietnamese carpenters. The space between Sub Unit #2 squadron office and IRO was rebuilt to accomodate the disbursing office. This amounted to steel doors, a counter and a stand to secure the safe. A bulletin board was also made for disbursing. In the Post Office, a cabinet was built and installed for security of postal monies and documents and a stand was installed for the safes. In the CTE offices, a stand for charts was made. Swab racks for the BOQ area were made and distributed. Repairs to the BOQ's themselves include the locks on all rooms, hasps on some of the doors, the blinds, general screen repairs and realignment of doors. In the messhall, general screen and door repairs were accomplished and small utility tables were completed for the officer and staff messes. Screen doors on the SNCO lounge were refitted and adjusted to close automatically. Blinds were rehung as necessary on barracks with rescreening being in progress at this time.

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At the movie theatre, the projection screen was moved back and up for the betterment of viewing by those in attendance. Blankets were hung about the theatre to deaden the effect of echo. Parachutes were hung on the overhead for the same purpose. A cage was built in the hangar for the supply section and repairs to the roof of generator bank #2 were accomplished.

The laundry during this period, processed 2600 sheets, 564 pillow cases, and 32 mattress covers for officer and EM linen. For the messhall, 48 tablecloths and 27 napkins were done, with 50 pieces done for the clubs in the area. The sickbay required 200 pieces of laundry, and the barber shop 470 items. Personal gear amounted to 263 individual bundles, 83 flight suits and 400 press and starch. Gasoline consumption amounted to approx 160 gallons and oil three qts.

The heavy equipment operators spent some fourteen hours securing the old dump area and preparing a new dump. Several days, including two Sundays were spent cutting, loading and hauling ladderite for road surfacing. The road from the stop sign near main camp to the hard top road has been resurfaced as a result of this effort. Normal road scraping was done following the rain that has fallen during this period. PM completed on all equipment under our responsibility. Repairs on equipment by our mechanics was accomplished on five (5) gasoline engines, at the waterpoint a 400 cycle generator at bank #2 and a 75KW generator at bank #1. Repairs were also made to the hydraulic system on the D-4 tractor.

Our water supply section reports it processed 926,800 gallons of water during this period. 426,800 gallons of the total amt. was pumped on a 24 hr day water consumption basis for five (5) days beginning on 26Aug63. To process this water, a total of 1600 lbs of diatomaceous earth, and 27 lbs of HTH was used. Gasoline required to run equipment was 880 gallons total and lube oil amounted to 25 gallons.

The plumbing section, besides routine preventive maintenance in camp, cleared the sewage drains in the camp area and improved the leeching beds to the rear of the utilities building. At the same time, the fresh water system as well as sewage system was charted on a map. This is being transfered to an overlay of the main camp which will show all utilities distribution systems, when completed. A tunnel was dug under the Sr. BOQ so that an underground hot water system could be installed to the head in that quarters. Completion of this job is held up awaiting fittings. Spigots on drink dispensers at the messhall were also installed as suggested in sanitation report.

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Our Vietnamese carpenters have completed screen doors on one of the 261 heads and are presently constructing doors for the remainder of the area heads. At the same time, work in the officers club is being done by these same workers. Fly exclusion fans will be gotten for the messhall as soon as money is available to purchase them. Chutes for the ice flake machines are being constructed by 261 metal shop. This last paragraph pertains, for the most part, to discrepancies marked down in the Doctors Sanitation Reports.

Camp Maintenance for the period of 1-15 September 1963:

The plumbing shop during this period has carried out routine maintenance in the camp area, such as leaky faucets, etc. The only major maintenance was the unplugging of the 261 area heads, sewer system and the replacement of two broken camodes in the MABS heads. New installation completed was that of a sink and running water system in the sickbay laboratory. Water traps were installed on gasoline supply systems to the bakery and messhall over.

The water supply section produced 908,600 gallons of purified water during this period. To accomplish this, 27 pounds of HTH (Chlorine), 25 pounds of soda ash, 50 pounds of alum, 4 pounds of activated carbon and 30 bags of diatomaceous earth were used in the processing. The equipment required 850 gallons of gasoline and 25 gallons of 30 SAE lubricating oil.

The laundry section processed the following items: 2200 sheets, 100 pillow cases, 33 mattress covers, 50 pieces for the combined clubs, towels, etc. For the sickbay 150 pieces and dental 60 pieces. The messhall had 100 pieces laundered and the barber shop had 300 pieces finished. Individual bundles amounted to 320 bundles, 70 flight suits and 350 items of starch and press gear. Gasoline used by the equipment was 60 gallons and 1 quart of 30 SAE lubricating oil.

The construction section improved sickbay with the installation of shelves for SAR gear and drying racks for X-Ray negatives. In the messhall they performed normal maintenance to doors and screening. Refrigerator door was rehung to keep the cold inside the box. Covers were placed around the SNCO mess and the EM messline was repaired. Shelves were also built for food storage and a partition built in the mess office. The guard shack has been rebuilt to house communications. To accomplish this, a partition was relocated and pallets built to raise the radio gear off the deck was constructed. The area in which the radio gear was placed was enclosed to protect it from weather.

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Brows were placed around the rest of the window areas as protection against the weather. Work benches and personal gear shelves were also constructed. Bamboo curtains have been ordered as a further protector against the weather. In the Post Office a window for the money order booth was installed for stamps and envelopes to be kept in. A new mail box was also built and placed at the entrance of the EM mess. Miscellaneous construction and repair included two blackboards for the night schools, pull-up bars for the PRT and a chain of command board for the CO, Sub Unit #2 office. The motor transport duty room was reroofed. Approx. 3,360 board feet of lumber was issued to HMM-261 squadron for making load out boxes. 1,688 board feet of lumber was issued to Special Services for construction of a judo mat at the recreation room.

Our heavy equipment section spent twenty-two (22) hours grading and repairing roads under our responsibility. General PM to all equipment was accomplished during this period. Our equipment mechanics have spent approx. four (4) hours daily keeping water point equipment operating. This has included overhaul to pumping units, mag adjustments, rings, valves, etc. With the exception of two fan belt replacements and repairs to an oil sending unit on a 30 KW generator, the generators have required little else than normal PM.

The refrigeration section performed normal PM to all refrigeration equipment in the camp area. Repairs were made to the air conditioner at the crypto center.

The electrical section has made the usual repairs to light switches and outlets and fuses. A popcorn machine has been hooked up at the messhall. Switches were installed on lighting circuits in utilities barracks and in the CTE office to facilitate turning off the unneeded lights when not in use. Power lines were run to the well rig for night operation on the well project. Relocation of electrical lights and outlets is being accomplished at the new comm building.

Camp Maintenance for the period 16-30 September 1963:

The laundry section was out of service for approximately one week during this period, due to break down of the dryer and extractor. The complete set of laundry units have since been replaced by new equipment. The laundry did process 115 individual bundles, 2200 sheets and 600 pillow cases, along with 30 mattress covers, 78 pieces of flight gear, 100 messhall pieces, 170 items from the barber shop, 207 items were pressed. Expendables used in processing amounted to 3 gallons of gasoline, 1 quart lube oil, 7 gallons of bleach and 10 pounds of soap.

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The water point processed 816,000 gallons of water during this period raising the total amount of water processed for the month of September to 1,724,700 gallons. Expendables used for processing amounted to 21 pounds of HTH (Chlorine), 1250 pounds of diatomaceous earth, 850 gallons of gasoline and 15 gallons of lube oil.

The plumbing shop accomplished routine maintenance throughout the camp area as well as normal PM to shower units. The water tank serving the MABS shower unit was drained and cleaned and the fire boxes on the shower units were cleaned also. Sewer lines were serviced and seepage pits were pumped down as needed.

The refrigeration section completed all normal PM to all camp refrigeration equipment. A new MQ-51E unit and box was set up for messhall use. Repairs by this section included the ice cream machine at the messhall, two household refrigerators in the BOQ and an air conditioner for special services.

The electrical section, besides normal camp maintenance ran power to the well rig for night drilling operation. Repairs were made to electrical wiring and appliances in the comm center, hangar area, and supply barracks. New lights and outlets were installed in the mess office and a new outlet for the meat slicer was also installed. Power lines in the MT area were raised so that the buses could pass under them safely.

Our equipment mechanics performed normal PM to all diesel and gasoline operated equipment in the area. Pumps and purification equipment was repaired at the water point. This included valves and rings replacement to two pumps, fuel line and magneto repairs to the purification units. The new 20 KW generator for comm was checked out for service and repairs in the nature of new fuel injectors, valve adjustments and bleeding of the fuel system were made. All utilities stand-by generators were started and run every third day to charge batteries and check out operation. The equipment operators worked the roads and ditches as weather would allow. Several vehicles were pulled out of ditches and marsh areas by our equipment.

The construction section built shelters for the mess line and a shelter over the mess gear washing area to protect the troops from rain. A shelter was also built at bulk fuel to house certain open drum fuels, the usual repairs to screen and door upkeep on the buildings progressed as usual. A number of miscellaneous projects were also completed. These projects included load out boxes for WMI-261, crates for pumps, music stand for Chaplain, tables for hall, two signs, one for SNCO lounge and one for Security, bulletin board was moved inside the messhall and clothes lines set up between the BOQ's for laundry.

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The sleeping quarters at the MT office were secured against rain and brows were added to the comm building for the same purpose. Construction on the laundry building was started to house the new laundry units. These units will be left trailer mounted for easy mount out if the need arises.

Camp Maintenance for the period 1-15 October 1963:

The heavy equipment operators continued grading and filling in roads in repair from rain damage. Rock waste was moved into the MABS camp area and spread to curb erosion by water around the EM club. The equipment mechanics performed normal PM on all gasoline and diesel fuel equipment. The laundry units and shower unit that were to be sent back for repairs were prepared for shipment. At the water point three (3) water purification unit engines were overhauled and the units put back into service. Our insecticide fog machine was operated by this section twice weekly, weather permitting.

The carpenters during this period completed construction of a shelter for bulk fuel and built an addition on the laundry building. Not yet completed is a breeze way between the Sr BOQ and O Mess. Several miscellaneous items were completed, such as laundry cash box, boxes for comm center, store room pallets for mess hall, tables for EM club and PX and shelves for refrigerators. Normal camp maintenance was performed to screens, doors, and roofs throughout the camp. Screen covers were made for the ice flake machines for fly protection.

The refrigeration mechanic performed normal PM to all MQ-51E, ME-10, ice flake and ice cream units in the camp area. The only repair made was in the nature of belt replacement on the ice cream machine and a condenser fan motor on a flake ice machine.

At the water point 770,200 gallons of water was processed. To accomplish this 1150 lbs of diatomaceous earth, 15 lbs of HTH, 25 lbs of soda ash and 50 lbs of alum was the amount of processing agents expended. 800 gallons of gasoline and 25 gallons of oil were used to run the equipment.

The plumbing shop carried out routine maintenance to plumbing facilities throughout the camp. This shop also worked on drainage ditches and filled in around the EM club with sand bags to stop water erosion around the club patio.

The electric shop made normal repairs to electrical fixtures such as replacement of switches, outlets and light bulbs. The electrical connections to the laundry units were done and the equipment itself wired electrically.

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Our laundry's output amounted to 1500 sheets and 750 pillow cases, 50 items of messhall gear, 240 items from sickbay and 275 barber shop items. Individual items amounted to 440 bundles and 96 flight suits. Laundry agents expended were 20 lbs of soap and 4 lbs of bleach. The equipment used 310 gallons of gasoline and 5 gallons of oil.

Camp Maintenance for the period of 16-31 October 1963:

The only new construction done by the construction section was a breeze way between the Sr BOQ and officers mess. Work of a minor nature included shelves and a door for Motor Transport, modifications on the back bar of the Staff NCO lounge, shelves, a table and cigarette dispenser for the PX, shelves for the laundry and general repairs to doors and screens throughout the camp area. Signs were also made for Security section, photo lab, laundry and the heads.

The equipment mechanics completed engine overhauls on three water purification units and put them back in operation at the water point. Upon receipt of a new shower unit for 361 head, an overhaul was done on the engine of said machine. General PM's were performed to all diesel and gasoline run equipment, and general repairs such as belts, fans, radiator hoses, etc. were performed on two 75KW generators. Roads were graded in between periods of rain and fill rock waste was hauled into the camp area to help bolster road areas against washout by rain.

The electrical section aside from installing four new toasters in the general mess did no new installation work. Repairs to fans and electrical fixtures as well as light bulb replacement occupied the sections time during the period covered in this report.

The refrigeration section performed normal PM's to all refrigeration equipment. The air conditioner on the avionics van was repaired and put into service. A drive belt was also changed on one of the messhall MQ-51E refrigerators.

The laundry processed 865 pillow cases and 1085 sheets for barracks and BOQ personnel. Mess hall gear amounted to 62 pieces, while sickbay and dental totaled 55 articles. The barber shop had 15 pieces of gear laundered. Individual bundles totaled 401. The equipment to accomplish this work consumed 222 gallons of gasoline and 2 gallons of oil. Expendable laundry items used were 42 lbs of soap, 24 oz bleach, and 5 lbs of soda ash. During the period covered the drying unit was out of operation for five days.

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The plumbing shop installed a new field shower unit at 361 head and put it into operation. PM was held on all shower units and general maintenance was held on all plumbing facilities throughout the camp area. A pump was also installed at an old well at the hangar for the purpose of washing helicopters.

The water point processed 781,000 gallons of water for camp use this brings the monthly total to 1,508,000 gallons of water, a daily average of 48,644 gallons. Gasoline used for the period covered by this report to run equipment was 880 gallons and 20 gallons of oil was used for PM. Chemicals used were 800 lbs of diatomaceous earth and 18 lbs of HTH.

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SECRETCOMMUNICATIONS FOR THE PERIOD 18-31 JULY 1963

Message traffic for this period has averaged fifty-three (53) incoming and eighteen (18) outgoing which is a slight decrease of incoming traffic from the previous report. However, on a day to day basis, traffic fluctuates from thirty (30) to sixty-five (65) incoming messages.

Wire communications is still being worked on for improvements. An excess amount of current originating from the local switching central has hampered transmitting efficiency.

Communications with Okinawa and Japan via radio, AN/TRC-75, have been fair to good. Two (2) frequencies, which are utilized on the wing liaison net, have been interfering with the signals of the contingency package. To remedy this, a new radio site is being considered. On 25 July 1963, "Jamming" by an unknown station was reported. It consisted of a call sign being repeated every fourteen seconds and lasted only for about one half hour.

The maintenance section continue in their efforts to repair the communications equipment which are inoperative. Ten (10) telephones and three (3) radios are presently down.

Communications for the period of 1-15 August 1963:

As of this period there are eight (8) message center men manning the communications center. The watch schedules are still on a twelve-on twelve-off basis.

Message traffic for this period has increased very slightly, averaging approximately fifty-five (55) incoming messages per day.

Telephones, EE-8 and TA-312/PT, within the command post have been converted from common battery to local battery operation in an effort to improve transmission efficiency. The twenty-six (26) pair cable running behind the motor transport area had to be re-routed due to construction work on the runway. There were no major failures in our land line communications.

Radio communications with Okinawa have been fair to good. At the present time we are utilizing one frequency, for point to point communications with Okinawa. Okinawa has been designated as net control station for this frequency. For communications with Japan, Okinawa must relay to Danang who then enters the net.

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The below is a portion of comm-elect officer's 1st MAW letter on 5 August 1963.

"Following phone patch procedure will be effective 092300Z August 1963.

A. The Station (Danang or Iwakuni) originating the phone patch will attempt to make contact on any wing liaison net frequency which is known to be in use by the other station.

B. If difficulty is experienced in determining the frequency to be employed the station (Danang or Iwakuni) originating the phone patch will call the other station on the CINCPACFLT HICOM Net and advise them that the phone patch traffic is pending. At this time the Wing Headquarters station will designate a wing liaison net frequency to be used to pass the phone patch traffic."

The maintenance section made their periodic checks on the radios, AN/PRC-10 and AN/PRC-6, which are used for internal security. The results of a recent alert drill proved to be unsatisfactory in that the radios, AN/PRC-10, malfunctioned and contact could not be maintained. The PRC-6's proved to be the only reliable means of radio communications within the CP area. The radio technicians are making all efforts to correct the deficiencies found in the PRC-10's.

Communications for the period of 16-31 August 1963:

As of this period there are eleven (11) communications center personnel manning the center on a twelve-on, twelve-off watch schedule. A change to a three (3) section watch is contemplated after the new personnel are thoroughly indoctrinated on the operation of the communications center.

Message traffic for this period has decreased, averaging approximately forty-five (45) incoming and seventeen (17) outgoing per day.

Radio communications with Okinawa continues to be fair to good. For radio contact with Japan, Okinawa relays to Japan who in turn designates the frequency to be used for radio traffic between this station and Japan.

The radio section erected and has been testing a 45 foot long wire and a quarter-wave length antenna in an effort to improve communications. The results show that our present long wire antenna, 300 foot, provides the best possible communications.

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There were no major break-downs in our wire communications for this period. The Air Force Communications Officer estimated that it would take approximately sixty (60) days before the dial telephone system will be available to this command.

The maintenance personnel held a check on the radios, AN/PRC-6 and AN/PRC-10, used for internal security and found them to be operative. Repair of equipment that is down is still paramount.

Due to humidity and lack of proper storage space, the shelf-life of batteries have been far below normal. A large percentage of unused batteries disposed of recently were tested and found to be weak and unsatisfactory for use. To alleviate this problem in the future, batteries will be stored in a field refrigeration unit.

Communications for the period of 1-15 September 1963:

Message traffic for this period averaged approximately forty-one (41) incoming and thirteen(13) outgoing messages per day. This is a slight decrease from the last reporting period.

The wire section has been installing new cables to be tied in to the Air Force dial telephone system. The installation should be completed within a week. CTE, S-3, S-4, and Squadron Commanders will have access to the dial telephone system. There will be two trunk lines to the Air Force switching central for the local subscribers.

Radio communications with Okinawa has been fair to good for this period. Our efficiency in communications with Japan depends largely on the antenna utilized, the frequency, and atmospheric conditions. Three types of antennas have been installed and used depending on conditions. The antennas are a 300 ft. long wire, a half-wave, and a whip. An 800 ft. long wire antenna is now being tested.

Communications for the period of 16-30 September 1963:

Telephone communications with other local exchanges has been impaired by inclement weather and the airfield construction.

Communications for the period of 1-15 October 1963:

After the "Minimize" condition, 11 Oct 1963, was cancelled, the communications center processed a record of 106 incoming and 51 outgoing messages in one day. For the period 1-15 Oct however, message traffic has been averaging approximately twenty-five (25) incoming and twelve (12) outgoing messages daily.

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The overall operations of the communications section has been efficient under present conditions. The manning level of the communications center is drastically low with a total of nine (9) men operating on a twelve-on, twelve-off watch schedule. The wire section is up to strength and likewise is the radio section.

Repairs on the contingency package have been completed and normal operations continue. No loss in communications was encountered during repairs.

Communications for the period of 16-31 October 1963:

For this reporting period, no major incidents occurred within the communications system of this command. All systems have been operating fair to good.

Despite heavy rainfall, the wire section has been able to maintain efficient telephone communications within the compound and between commands.

The flow of message traffic this reporting period has been normal with an average of forty-five (45) incoming and twelve (12) outgoing per day. The manning level of the communications center remains at nine.

Communications during the security drill held 29 October 1963 was satisfactory. Telephone communications had no failures while only one (1) radio, AN/PRC-10, encountered difficulty in transmission. Corrective measures are being taken.

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## MOTOR TRANSPORT FOR PERIOD 18 JULY - 31 OCTOBER 1963

During this period our vehicles traveled 80,000 miles (Approx. 2,000 miles per vehicle) and used 58,000 gallons of gasoline. We have had to replace an average of one tire per vehicle.

On 10 September 1963 the new Motor Transport Officer reported for duty, and on 16 September the new Motor Transport NCO reported in.

Two commercial passenger busses have been surveyed and replaced with tactical passenger trailers which are used to shuttle personnel from the barracks to the working area.

There have been no particular breakdown or parts problems with tactical vehicles, but the C120 cargo 1 ton 4X4 International trucks do not hold up well in this area. Plans are now being made to replace them with truck, cargo 3/4 ton 4X4 M-37's which better suit the needs and the prevailing road conditions of the area. It is recommended that no commercial type vehicles be sent here, the situation is ideal for tactical vehicles.

In the past, the rain, mud, and water supply presented a serious cleaning problem. To alleviate the situation, a washrack utilizing a 4000 gallon water tank, a 55 gpm pump, and a steam trailer has been set up. This has almost completely eliminated rust, and has cut down the number of gas tanks that have had to be flushed.

A system to set up usage data and reorder points on parts and to set up the parts room by a cardex inventory system has been instituted.

A follow up system to all our requisitions has been instituted and has greatly reduced our vehicle deadline.

As of the beginning of this period there was more utilization of the services of MWSG-17. Previously only new replacement parts were being ordered. Now the defective part or assembly is rebuilt at a monetary saving, and very satisfactory results obtained.

A MABS unit in the field is not provided with tactical engine and ignition test equipment in its T. A. allowance.

In this area, with its inclement weather, dust, and marginal facilities, tactical Marine Corps type test equipment is better suited to conditions than the more exotic standard type which is furnished.

*They almost had a hissy to get those damned Comm. cattle cars and now all of a sudden they realize that tactical veh. would've been better all along - J.W.*

*glad to see they help someone.*

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**SECRET**SECRETMEDICAL AND DENTAL FOR PERIOD 18-31 JULY 1963MEDICAL

	<u>MARINE/NAVY</u>	<u>ARMY/AIR FORCE</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
Number of Outpatients	312	17	35
Physical Examinations	19	0	0
Air Evacuations	2	3	0
Patients on Ward	1	1	0

DENTAL

	<u>MARINE/NAVY</u>	<u>ARMY/AIR FORCE</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
Operative Procedures	47	23	8
Periodontal Procedures	26	10	0
Surgical Procedures	5	5	2
Miscellaneous Procedures	23	18	10
Total Patients	44	19	11

Total Procedures - 178

Total Patients - 74

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MEDICAL AND DENTAL FOR THE MONTH OF AUGUST 1963

MEDICAL

	<u>NAVY/MARINES</u>	<u>ARMY/AIR FORCE</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
Patients Receiving Treatment	715	37	41
Physical Examinations	18	0	6
X-Rays	21	15	6
Laboratory Procedures	184	52	14
Immunizations	255	0	21
Admissions	7	6	0

DENTAL

	<u>NAVY/MARINES</u>	<u>ARMY/AIR FORCE</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
Total Sitzings	65	32	9
Operative Procedures	108	15	10
Surgical Procedures	0	11	1
Peridental Procedures	50	23	4
Miscellaneous Procedures	37	32	9
Total Procedures	195	81	24

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MEDICAL AND DENTAL FOR MONTH OF SEPTEMBER 1963

MEDICAL

	<u>NAVY/MARINE</u>	<u>ARMY/AIR FORCE</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
Patients Receiving Treatment	458	41	69
Physical Examinations	23	0	15
X-Rays	15	3	6
Laboratory Procedures	298	25	33
Immunizations	422	0	16

DENTAL

	<u>NAVY/MARINE</u>	<u>ARMY/AIR FORCE</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
Total Sitzings	53	38	22
Operative Procedures	12	23	20
Peridental Procedures	53	14	5
Surgical Procedures	9	3	15
Radiodontic Procedures	5	5	6
X-Rays	9	9	6
Miscellaneous Procedures	14	19	8
Total Procedures	102	73	60

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**SECRET**MEDICAL AND DENTAL FOR MONTH OF OCTOBER 1963MEDICAL

	<u>NAVY/MARINE</u>	<u>ARMY/AIR FORCE</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
Patients Receiving Treatment	386	20	34
Physical Examinations	42	1	3
X-Rays	64	7	16
Laboratory Procedures	222	192	26
Immunizations	575	10	0

A total of fifteen (15) Sanitation Inspections were conducted of various camp facilities.

Two Venereal Disease Educational Lectures were presented to members of the command.

Five Hospital Corpsmen and two Doctors received training in Search and Rescue techniques, including repelling.

The remains of eight deceased service members of HMM-361 and two members of Sub Unit #2, MABS-16, were recovered from crash sites on 9 and 10 October, tentative identification was established, the remains were processed and sent to the Air Force Mortuary, Tan Son Nhut AB, Saigon, RVN.

On 9 October 1963 three Marine pilots were treated for wounds resulting from enemy ground fire. During this period two Army personnel were also treated for wounds resulting from enemy ground fire.

The beaches utilized by members of this command for recreation purposes were surveyed for safety and sanitary conditions.

Spanish Beach: Bacteriological examination of the water revealed gross contamination with harmful bacteria. This condition is caused by surface runoff created by the present rainy season. It has been recommended that this beach be restricted for recreational purposes until at such time the contamination source decreases.

China Beach: Bacteriological examination revealed the water of China Beach to be relatively free from harmful bacteria. However, personnel utilizing this beach should be cautioned of the strong under current at certain tide stages.

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**SECRET**SECRETDENTAL DEPARTMENT FOR OCTOBER 1963

	<u>NAVY/MARINES</u>	<u>ARMY/AIR FORCE</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
Total Sitting	89	31	3
Operative Procedures	20	17	0
Periodontal Procedures	56	23	0
Surgical Procedures	0	3	1
Miscellaneous Procedures	35	10	2
Total Procedures	110	53	3

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SECRETCHAPLAIN FOR PERIOD 18-31 JULY 1963

The following activities were performed by the Protestant and Catholic Chaplain during this period:

a. Red Cross cases 4  
 b. Men Checking in (Interviewed) 12  
 c. Men Checking Out (Interviewed) 18  
 d. General Interviews 4  
 e. Catholic Rosaries Issued 3  
 f. New Testaments Issued 8  
 g. Sunday Services (Protestant) (4) 51  
 h. Sunday Mass (2) 72 (Cath. Chaplain)  
 i. Daily Mass (9) 99 (Cath. Chaplain)  
 j. Cath. Instruction Class (1) 4 (Cath. Lay Leader)  
 k. Protestant Inst. Class (1) 3  
 l. Patients visited in Dispensary 1

CHAPLAIN FOR MONTH OF AUGUST 1963

The following activities were performed by the Protestant and Catholic Chaplain during this period:

a. Counseling cases 29  
 b. Red Cross cases 4  
 c. Letters written to families 3  
 d. Men checking in 41  
 e. Men checking out 33  
 f. Men interviewed (general) 31  
 g. Catholic Rosaries issued 11  
 h. New Testaments Issued 24  
 i. Sunday Protestant Services (4) 139  
 j. Sunday Mass (4) 147  
 k. Daily Mass (5) 84  
 l. Protestant Rel. Inst. Class (2) 11  
 m. Catholic Inst. Class (5) 17  
 n. Patients visited Dispensary 7  
 o. Character Ed. Lectures (2) 163  
 p. Staff Conferences 5

The program for the Christmas Season is being planned and will be submitted to the Commanding Officer for approval.

A camera club as well as a model car and airplane club have been formed. It is hoped that guided conducted tours will be available in the near future for the men.

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CHAPLAIN FOR THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER 1963

The following activities were performed by the Protestant and Catholic Chaplain during this period:

a. Counseling cases	20	
b. Red Cross cases	8	
c. Letters written to families	3	
d. Men checking in	53	
e. Men checking out	211	
f. Men interviewed (general)	38	
g. Catholic Rosaries issued	19	
h. New Testaments issued	21	
i. Sunday Protestant Services (4)	179	
j. Sunday Mass (5)	193	(Cath. CHC AF & MAG-16)
k. Daily Mass (4)	44	(Cath. CHC MAG-16)
l. Prot. Rel. Inst. Class (2)	5	
m. Catholic Inst. Class (2)	4	(Cath. Lay Leader)
n. Character Ed. Lectures	0	
o. Patients visited Dispensary	2	
p. Staff Conferences	4	

CHAPLAIN FOR MONTH OF OCTOBER 1963

a. Counseling cases	14	
b. Red Cross cases	7	
c. Letters to Families	14	
d. Men checking in	146	
e. Men checking out	56	
f. Men interviewed (general)	60	
g. Catholic medals issued	48	
h. New Testaments issued	64	
i. Protestant Services Sunday (4)	137	
j. Sunday Mass (4)	149	(AF & MAG-16 Chaplains)
k. Patients visited Dispensary	3	
l. Character Ed. Lectures (1)	18	

On 12 October 1963 a Memorial Service was held in the theatre for the 12 men who perished in the helicopter crash. Attendance for the joint Catholic-Protestant Service was over 400.

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**SECRET**SECRETMESS SECTION FOR PERIOD 18-31 JULY 1963

Major General THARIN and party toured the Food Service establishment during this period. A Candle light supper was held in honor of Colonel GOMEZ and LtCol BROWN. Equipment received during this period includes eight (8) new M1937 field burners, twenty-eight (28) sheet pans, two (2) molding tables, folding; two (2) fermentations cans, two (2) bread racks (unserviceable) and thirty-two (32) pie tins. All of this equipment is being utilized to the best interests of this command. Utilities section installed two M1942 field ovens. Efforts were coordinated with the utilities section to arrange for spraying the mess hall on Monday, Wednesday and Friday of each week. The utilities section also repaired the leaks in the bakery roof and the storeroom roof. The Food Service section has operated normally during this period feeding approximately 27,000 meals or 9,000 rations.

MESS SECTION FOR MONTH OF AUGUST 1963

During the period 1-15 August 1963 the Food Services section operated normally feeding approximately 22,500 meals or 7,500 rations with a Food Service strength of twenty-one (21) men. (15 days)

During the period of 16-31 August 1963 all non-perishable subsistence items were delivered by LST in lieu of the C-117D. This created some problems on the first two deliveries however, these should be corrected with receipt of the next shipment.

This section is operating with a shortage of 6 OF 33 and 36 personnel at this time and we are expected to lose 2 more in the month of September.

Other than as noted above, the Food services program of this command operated normally, serving an average of 550 rations per day with a combined food service strength of 22 cooks, bakers and stewards.

MESS SECTION FOR MONTH OF SEPTEMBER 1963

During the period 1-15 September 1963 two cooks were transferred, and one cook reported in as a replacement. Three stewards were transferred, and two stewards reported in as replacements.

Other than as noted above, the Food Services program of this command operated normally, serving an average of 550 rations per day with a combined food service strength of 21 cooks, bakers and stewards.

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During the period of 16-30 September 1963, one additional field refrigerator was installed. The Food Services program of this command operated normally, serving an average of 550 rations per day with a combined food service strength of 22 cooks, bakers and stewards.

MESS SECTION FOR MONTH OF OCTOBER 1963

During the period 1-15 October 1963, still experiencing some difficulty with dry stores shipped by LST. The main problem, being that an 18 day lead time is required from the time the requisition supply clerk in Saigon receives the requisition and the time the supplies are loaded on the LST. Another 6-10 days before the LST arrives in Danang. This cycle requires at least 30 days before supplies are received. Closer liaison is being worked out with the Navy Support Activity so that copies of the requisition are being forwarded to us prior to shipping dates so that requisitions for items not in stock can be resubmitted.

Other than as noted above, the Food Service program of this command operated normally, serving an average of 550 rations per day with a combined food service strength of 22 cooks, bakers and stewards.

During the period of 16-31 October 1963 the Food Service program of this command operated normally, serving an average of 550 rations per day with a combined food services strength of 22 cooks, bakers and stewards.

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**SECRET**SECRETPOSTAL SERVICE FOR PERIOD 18-31 JULY 1963

Mail was received from Iwakuni and Futema by KC-130 four (4) times during this period. Registered mail from APO-143 was picked up Monday thru Saturday at APO-137. Mail was dispatched Monday thru Saturday via APO-137. Starting on 19 July 1963 we began receiving mail on a day-to-day basis from APO-137. The Post Office was inspected and audited on 18 July 1963 by the Wing Postal Officer.

POSTAL SECTION FOR MONTH OF AUGUST 1963

During the period of 1-15 August 1963, mail was received from Iwakuni and Futema by KC-130 four (4) times during this period. Registered mail and regular mail from APO-143 was picked up Monday thru Saturday at APO-137. Mail was dispatched Monday thru Saturday via APO-137. Beginning on 14 August 1963 mail call will be held during the afternoon instead of the morning. Also, the Post Office will now be open on Sundays for mail call only. There were no changes of the Money Order business during this period. The Post Office was inspected and audited on 12 August 1963 by the Wing Postal Officer.

During the period of 16-31 August 1963, mail was received from Iwakuni and Futema by KC-130 four (4) times during this period. Registered mail and Air Mail was picked up Monday thru Sunday at APO-137. Mail was dispatched Monday thru Saturday via APO-137. The new hours for Money Order business are 0800 thru 1600.

POSTAL SECTION FOR MONTH OF SEPTEMBER 1963

During the period of 1-15 September 1963, mail was received from Iwakuni and Futema by KC-130 four (4) times during this period. Registered mail and Air Mail from APO-143 was picked up Monday thru Sunday at APO-137. Mail was dispatched Monday thru Saturday via APO-137. There were no changes in mail operation or Money Order business during this period. The Post Office was inspected and audited by the Wing Postal Officer on 5 September 1963.

During the period of 16-30 September 1963, mail was received from Iwakuni and Futema by KC-130 four (4) times during this period. Registered mail and air mail from APO-143 was picked up Monday thru Sunday at APO-137. Mail was dispatched Monday thru Saturday via APO-137. There were no changes in mail operation or Money Order business during this period. HMM-361 relieved HMM-261 during this period and received their first mail from the States on 29 Sept 63.

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**SECRET**SECRETPOSTAL SECTION FOR MONTH OF OCTOBER 1963

During the period of 1-15 October 1963, mail was received from Iwakuni and Futema by KC-130 four (4) times during this period. Registered mail and air mail from APO-143 was picked up Monday thru Sunday at APO-137. Mail was dispatched Monday thru Saturday via APO-137. There were no changes in mail operation or money order business during this period.

During the period of 16-31 October 1963, mail was received from Iwakuni and Futema by KC-130 five (5) times during this period. Registered mail and air mail from APO-143 was picked up Monday thru Sunday at APO-137. Mail was dispatched Monday thru Saturday via APO-137. CWO-4 L. P. WALLIS, Postal Officer, 1st Marine Air Wing, inspected and audited the Post Office on 23 October 1963. There were no changes in mail operation or money order business during this period.

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SECRETBULK FUEL FOR PERIOD OF 18-31 JULY 1963

The fuel dispensing units at Danang, Tamky and Hue were in good operating condition throughout this period. A total of 71,631 gallons of AvGas was issued.

BULK FUEL FOR THE MONTH OF AUGUST 1963

During the period of 1-15 August 1963, a total of 54,683 gallons of 115/145 AvGas was issued at Danang, Tamky and Hue.

At Danang a total of 5670 gallons of MoGas was issued for this period and a total of 4111 gallons of diesel was issued.

On 5 August, HMM-261 found an excessive amount of sediment on fuel strainers of two planes which had previously refueled at Tamky. The probable cause was the nozzles being out in the open catching large quantities of dust created by the helicopters approach. This situation has been remedied by placing covers over the nozzles.

On 6 August a 115/145 sample was sent to Saigon of the Danang product for lab testing. On 8 August a 115/145 sample was sent to Saigon of the Tamky product for lab testing.

During the period of 16-31 August 1963, a total of 77,071 gallon of 115/145 AvGas was issued at Danang, Tamky and Hue. An additional 8,982 gallons was received and issued at Hatan.

At Danang a total of 7,600 gallons of MoGas and 5,565 gallons of diesel in bulk was issued during this period.

On 16 August, 3 men with a 10,000 gallon system deployed to airstrip at Hatan for support of HMM-261 operation which lasted through 17 August 1963. On 20 August all gear at Hatan returned to Danang.

On 19 August a report was received from the testing laboratory at Saigon stating that the fuel at Tamky did not meet the requirements for issue. Operation of Tamky was secured and the fuel returned to the distributor. It is not intended to re-open the dispensing station at Tamky.

BULK FUEL FOR THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER 1963

During the period of 1-15 September 1963, a total of 64,034 gallons of 115/145 AvGas was issued at Danang and Hue.

At Danang a total of 6,780 gallons of MoGas and 4,815 gallons of diesel fuel was dispensed.

On 12 September, with a borrowed 5,000 gallon tanker from the Air Force, the first load of contaminated AvGas was brought from Tamky's outpost. On 13 September another 5,000 gallons was returned to Danang. The contaminated fuel was traded to the Air Force for 4000 lbs, the AvGas to be used for Napalm. The fuel dispensing equipment at Tamky was returned to Danang.

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During the period of 16-30 September 1963, a total of 75,518 gallons of 115/145 AvGas was issued at Danang and Hue.

At Danang a total of 7,850 gallons of MoGas and 5,744 gallons of diesel fuel was issued.

During the week of 23 September all tanks at both Danang and Hue were pumped completely dry in order to check for possible water in bottom of tanks. This operation indicated that there is no water in the fuel at the present time. In view of the rainy season beginning to start, this unit will make similar checks at least once every 15 days besides monthly samples to Saigon.

#### BULK FUEL FOR MONTH OF OCTOBER 1963

During the period of 1-15 October 1963, a total of 78,024 gallons of 115/145 AvGas was issued at Danang and Hue.

At Danang a total of 8,581 gallons of MoGas and 5,614 gallons of diesel was issued.

During the week of 7 October through 13 October, all 115/145 AvGas tanks were drained and checked for water in bottom of the tanks. No water discovered in any of the tanks.

On 7 October a 115/145 AvGas sample was sent to Saigon for quality test.

During the period of 16-31 October 1963, a total of 44,350 gallons of 115/145 AvGas was issued at Danang and Hue.

At Danang a total of 7,676 gallons of MoGas and 5,560 gallons of diesel was issued.

On 16 October word was received from Hue that Army L-19 aircraft were having trouble, to which they believe the fuel to be at fault. All refueling at Hue was stopped and an emergency sample was sent to Saigon for testing on the 17th of October. Results were received the same day that the fuel was on specification. Refueling at Hue was resumed.

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SECRETMARINE EXCHANGE FOR PERIOD 18-31 JULY 1963

The exchange during this period had an outstanding business, up \$7,000.00 over the month of June. During this month a new record of business \$20,815.99, was set for a month period. A good supply of radios, cameras and watches were on hand at all times during the month.

MARINE EXCHANGE FOR MONTH OF AUGUST 1963

During the period of 1-15 August 1963 the Marine Exchange operation was normal and receipt of supplies was satisfactory.

During the period of 16-31 August 1963, the Exchange did \$7,855.26 in business making a total of \$16,426.18 for the month of August 1963.

MARINE EXCHANGE FOR MONTH OF SEPTEMBER 1963

During the period of 1-15 September 1963, the Exchange operated normally, doing a gross business of \$8,585.17.

During the period of 16-30 September 1963, the Exchange did \$8,884.31 business which brings a total of \$17,469.48 for the month of September 1963.

MARINE EXCHANGE FOR MONTH OF OCTOBER 1963

During the period of 1-15 October 1963, the Exchange did \$5,765.17 cash sales.

During the period of 16-31 October 1963, sales receipts were \$7,259.55. The Exchange is well stocked with necessities, and has many luxuries in addition. It is very popular with local personnel and members of other services in the area.

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SPECIAL SERVICES FOR MONTH OF AUGUST 1963

During the period of 1-15 August 1963, movies were shown nightly — except for 19 Aug when we were treated to an excellent USO show.

The Ski boat was run to Spanish Beach 3 & 4 August, 10 & 11 and 17 & 18 August. The Army fishing boat was used by the MABS Staff NCO's on 4, 11 and 18 August for parties. Another Army fishing boat was used by Motor Transport section for a party on 18 August 1963.

Six-Hundred pocket books were received, compliments of the 3rd Marine Division. We received 3 cartons of playing cards, compliments of L&M Tobacco company.

During the period of 16-31 August 1963, movies were shown every night, with double features shown on 17, 21 and 31 August.

There was water skiing on 18 and 25 August at Spanish Beach.

SPECIAL SERVICES FOR MONTH OF SEPTEMBER 1963

During the period of 1-15 September 1963, movies were shown every night, with double features on 7 and 14 September.

Water skiing was available at Spanish Beach on 1, 8 and 15 September. The fishing boat went out 1, 8 and 15 September.

We received a shipment of special service equipment from Saigon and Marine Aircraft Group 16.

During the period of 16-30 September 1963, movies were shown nightly. The Staff NCO's had the fishing boat 15, 22 and 29 September for parties. We received a shipment of equipment from Saigon, Army Special Services on 25 September.

SPECIAL SERVICES FOR MONTH OF OCTOBER 1963

During the period of 1-15 October 1963, movies were shown every night except 5 October. We had a band that night which provided entertainment for the HMM-361 welcoming party.

The Staff NCO's had the fishing boat for a party Sunday, 12 October. On 13 October a group went on the fishing boat for the purpose of skin diving.

During the period of 16-31 October 1963, Special Services was open every day from 0800-2200. Movies were shown every night with a double feature on the nights of 19 and 26 October.

A formal inventory was held on 29 October 1963.

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PART E.

General Comments

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GENERAL COMMENTS FOR PERIOD 18 JULY - 31 OCTOBER 1963

On 18 July 1963 command of TE 79.3.3.6 was assumed. In accordance with Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, (COMUSMACV) directives, the additional responsibility of Commander, Aviation Headquarters, I Corps Area was also accepted. The purpose of this headquarters is to plan, direct, and control the employment of all U.S. Army and Marine Corps Aviation Units in support of First Corps operations, and to coordinate these air activities with those of the USAF/VNAF Air Support Operations Center.

During the last part of July and early August "LAMSON XII" an assault mission was conducted by ARVN forces with the purpose of securing VC infiltration routes, the destruction of way stations, VC supplies and crops, in an area close to the Laotian border, accessible only by helicopter. Consequently, the main efforts during this period were in support of the operation. The maneuver was successful both from air and ground standpoints. One of the greater problems encountered was the retrograde operation at the completion of the mission's objective. Deep in VC held territory, it was readily recognized that only through sound tactics, thorough planning, and complete coordination of all air and ground units could the withdrawal of over a thousand troops be safely accomplished. Document (3), Section F, gives a summary of this phase of the operation.

During the latter portion of July we had the pleasure of a short visit by CTG 79.3, Major General F. C. THURIN, at which time he was briefed on all aspects of this command. In addition the Commanding General's monthly conference was attended by CTE 79.3.3.1 at Iwakuni, Japan.

The religious disturbances in Vietnam during the latter part of August concerning the Buddhist/Catholic problems caused little interference with normal operations. Although, it did necessitate a closer screening of all missions to assure that U.S. Forces were utilized only against the Viet Cong and in no way become involved with civil actions. Base security was strengthened and all liberty was curtailed during the period of this conflict.

The fast reaction time mandatory in anti-guerilla operations was further emphasized. Bolohien, a Special Forces Patrol Base located in VC territory, was subjected to heavy attack just prior to dusk, and immediate reinforcements were requested. At approximately sunset eight UH-34D's (troop transport), two armed UH-1B's (escort), and 2 O-1B's (observation) aircraft were launched. The aircraft were able to transport 64 reinforcement troops into the base, although this required night landings in a unlighted zone.

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The fast reaction time of the tenant HMM squadron possibly saved this base from being completely overrun. The following day additional reinforcements were flown into the zone and casualties were evacuated from outside the base perimeter.

In September Major Generals KRULAK and WEEDE, USMC, visited the Danang airfield where they were met by CTE 79.3.3.6 and briefed on current activities of this command.

Assault operations in this area, where aircraft from four different services of two different countries are being utilized requires the ultimate in planning and coordination. A report of such an operation conducted during September is contained in Document (2), Section F.

The tenant HMM-261 squadron was rotated during the month of October. The decrease in operations during this period is not a reflection upon this rotation, but is the result of the normal monsoon season in this area. Low clouds and rain with extensive ground fog in the valleys has curtailed flight operations since the first of October.

Reviewing the statistics in Section C, a decrease in Medical Evacuations both WLA and KLA will be noted. This is the result of a greater participation of the VMLF helicopters in this type of flight. As more Vietnamese helicopter crews reach a satisfactory proficiency of training, our policy is for them to assume a more varied participation in local operations.

The crash of two UH-34D's, brought forth in the S-3 summary, Section B, has been determined by subsequent investigation to have been caused either by direct or indirect enemy action. This is based on evidence found in the aircraft, the condition and location of the aircraft, and autopsy of remains of crews. This area was heavily infested with Viet Cong, as was emphasized by the heavy ground fire occurring during rescue operations.

In general it is felt that the U.S. Helicopter support in Vietnam is one of the greatest assets in helping to defeat the Viet Cong in this area. Due to the terrain and poor road communications in the northern mountainous area the helicopter makes counterinsurgency operations possible in areas that would otherwise be inaccessible to the Republic of Vietnam Forces.

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PART F.

Substantiating Documents

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**SECRET**SECRETLIST OF SUBSTANTIATING DOCUMENTS

- ✓1. CTE 79.3.3.6 ltr 3:ADG:jrf over 5213 Ser: 003A28863 dtd 15 October 1963: Evaluation of Helicopter Tactics and Techniques Report.
- ✓2. CTE 79.3.3.6 ltr 3:ADG:jrf Ser: 03A30763 dtd 2 November 1963: Summary of a Heli-Borne Assault Operation Occurring in September 1963 in I Corps Area, Viet Nam.
- ✓3. CTE 79.3.3.6 ltr 1:DLA:jtr Ser: 01A29663 dtd 23 October 1963: Narrative Account of Helicopter-Borne Retrograde Operation Conducted during August 1963 in the Republic of Vietnam.
- ✓4. CTE 79.3.3.6 ltr 1:ADG:dks Ser: 01A29463 dtd 22 October 1963: Use of Fixed Wing Aircraft in Providing Fire Support during Heli-Borne Operations, as practiced in the I Corps Area of Viet Nam.
- ✓5. Aviation Headquarters Operations Center (AHOC), SOP.

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## HEADQUARTERS

Task Element 79.3.3.6

Marine Aircraft Group 16

1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Aircraft, FMF, Pacific  
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

3:ADG:jrf

5213

003A28863

15 October 1963

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From: Commander

To: Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Viet Nam

Subj: Evaluation of Helicopter Tactics and Techniques Report  
(RCS 6-J3 (T)(C))

Ref: (a) COMUSMACV Directive Number 9-62

Encl: (1) Listing of Small Arms Hits on Aircraft by Enemy Ground Fire

1. Marine Task Element 79.3.3.6

2. Twenty-four (24) UH-34D, three (3) O-1B and one (1) C-117D.

3. a. Number of aircraft hours flown during preceding quarter  
(1 July - 30 September 1963):

- (1) UH-34D = 4298.2
- (2) O-1B = 775.6
- (3) C-117D = 227.8

b. Number of sorties flown during preceding quarter:

	UH-34D	O-1B	C-117D	Total
(1) Tactical support of ARVN	3063	389	0	3452
(2) Logistical support of ARVN	2719	10	0	2729
(3) Admin and/or Maintenance	2700	0	114	2814
Totals	8482	399	114	8995

4. The operating area of Task Element 79.3.3.6 is the Annam Coastal Plain and the Annam Cordillera, described in the previous Evaluation of Helicopter Tactics and Techniques Reports. Operations are normally limited to the I Corps area, but occasionally are conducted in the northern fringe of the II Corps area.

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## 5. Brief summary of major tactical operations:

<u>DATE</u> <u>1963</u>	<u>UNIT</u> <u>SUPPORTED</u>	<u>LANDING ZONE</u> <u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>NUMBER</u> <u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>NUMBER</u> <u>SORTIES</u>	<u>RMKS</u>
6 July	2nd Division	YC 67 59 YC 73 61	21, UH-34D	92	STK
10 July	2nd Division	BT 37 01	18, UH-34D	174	STK
17 July	2nd Division	YC 82 62	16, UH-34D	10	STK
24 July	2nd Division	YC 73 61	18, UH-34D	149	STK
28 July	2nd Division	YC 67 59 YC 80 62	16, UH-34D	210	STK
6 Aug	2nd Division	YC 67 98 YC 65 52	6, UH-34D	75	STK
8 Aug	2nd Division	YC 83 34	6, UH-34D	14	STK
15 Aug	I Corps	YC 66 59	17, UH-34D/ 2, O-1B	161	UD
16 Aug	I Corps	YC 67 59	11, UH-34D/ 3, O-1B	213	UD
17 Aug	I Corps	YC 67 59	21, UH-34D/ 2, O-1B	156	UD
6 Sep	I Corps	AT 97 16 AT 94 11	12, UH-34D	190	STK
15 Sep	1st Division	YD 31 08 YC 83 99	18, UH-34D	194	STK
25 Sep	I Corps	BT 10 01 BS 20 99	18, UH-34D	158	STK
29 Sep	1st Division	YD 21 13	6, UH-34D	55	UD

## 6. Evaluation of current U. S. Doctrine for Employment of Helicopters.

a. Although contour flying is not an accepted procedure in this squadron, the weather during the Autumn Transitional Monsoon requires that pilots fly lower than desirable over most terrain. Thus far it has not resulted in an appreciable increase in the number of hits received, although an increase in the tempo of enemy fire has been noted.

b. Selection and reconnaissance of landing zones:  
O-1B photography continues to be excellent and contributes significantly to the helicopter flight leader's evaluation of the LZ and surrounding terrain. American advisors and ARVN ground commanders should accompany the squadron commander on all reconnaissance flights in order to obtain an appreciation of obstacles in the helicopter approach and retirement routes as well as the clearing of the landing zone itself when time and tactics permit.

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## c. Evaluation of scheme of maneuver:

(1) The <sup>evacuation</sup>~~evaluation~~ of WIA's utilizing T-28's for high cover and UTT's for low level escort is considered to have been instrumental in reducing the number of hits sustained by helicopters during these missions.

(2) Three successful night evacuations have been conducted at established outposts under fire. Pilots must use no lights and the outpost should have the landing pad dimly outlined. Sometimes in their anxiety to assist the landing helicopters the outpost will light the pad with vehicle lights resulting in a high glare and a source of potential hazard to the pilot.

## d. Evaluation of available suppressive fire capabilities to include air cover and/or artillery:

(1) To date artillery has not been used as a suppressive fire means due to the distance of the landing zones to the nearest artillery positions.

(2) The UTT's and T-28's, particularly those that are flown by USAF pilots, have proven to be the best neutralization/suppressive fire means when used in concert. This combination has been most effective when the T-28's pre-strike the areas adjacent to the LZ and the UTT's escort the transport helicopters into the LZ suppressing enemy fire adjacent to the LZ and along the approach and retirement routes.

(3) The most desirable air support within this area of operations is considered to be:

- (a) AD's with Marine or U. S. pilots.
- (b) T-28's with Marine or U. S. pilots.
- (c) Either (a) or (b) in conjunction with UTT armed helicopters.

## e. Established tactics and techniques which have been tried and rejected:

None.

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f. New tactics and techniques which have been developed and accepted:

While the use of TAC(A) is not new, it is different in the composition of personnel involved. It consists of a U. S. Marine on the CTE 79.3.3.6 staff, a senior Air Force advisor, a VNAF pilot/observer and an Air Force pilot in an L-28. This has proven extremely effective in coordinating the use of support and escort aircraft in and around the landing zone and yet remaining within the parameters encompassing the Rules of Engagement. As a result the reaction time between requests for and the execution of air strikes has been minimized.

g. New requirements to be considered:

(1) Security of the landing zone, particularly if it is surrounded by high terrain, still presents a problem during resupply and evacuation missions. Continuing emphasis should be placed on this aspect by American advisors to their ARVN counterparts.

(2) The necessity to provide trained pathfinder personnel in the clearance of landing zones and to provide terminal guidance is a continuing requirement which should be met in order to more fully exploit the heli-borne concept.

(3) There is still evidence of improper troop training concerning the loading and unloading of transport helicopters. ARVN troops, on occasion, leave loose hand grenades in the aircraft and also board the aircraft with loaded hand-held weapons. Continuity of heli-borne troop training in this area should be stressed.

(4) A 300 foot hydraulic hoist capability remains a paramount requirement for the safety and protection of personnel, from an SAR stand point.

h. Lessons Learned:

(1) The utilization of a TAC(A), or airborne Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) as it is now referred to, is considered to have contributed significantly to the success of recent heli-borne strike operations through the ability of this medium to provide effective control of support and escort aircraft in the objective area.

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(2) Night evacuation missions to designated outposts in the coastal and piedmont area have proved successful, however, ~~though~~ *thorough* pre-planning is considered a requisite to the success of these missions on a continuing basis.

/s/ A. D. GOMEZ

A. D. GOMEZ

Copy to:

CMNDT MAR COR SCHLS

CG, 1ST MAW

SR, ADV, I CORPS

CO, MAG-16

CO, MAG-26 NEW RIVER

CO, MAG-36

HMM-361

TE S-3

FILE

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SECRETLISTING OF SMALL ARMS HITS ON AIRCRAFT BY ENEMY GROUND FIRE

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NO. OF HITS</u>	<u>PLACE OF HITS</u>
6 July	1	Center fuel tank
9 July	1	Cabin
10 July	1	Right stabilizer
10 July	1	Right side main gear box
19 July	1	Tail rotor blade
26 July	1	Right tire up thru cabin
6 Aug	2	Main fuel cell, rotor blade
10 Aug	3	Rotor blade, left side pilot cabin
6 Sep	1	Tail pylon
6 Sep	1	Aircraft pylon
6 Sep	2	Rotor blade, aircraft pylon
8 Sep	1	Main rotor blade
27 Sep	1	Thru door
28 Sep	2	Bottom of cockpit

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HEADQUARTERS

Task Element 79.3.3.6

Marine Aircraft Group 16

1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Aircraft, FMP, Pacific  
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

3:ADG:jrf  
03A30763  
2 November 1963

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From: Commander  
Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 16  
To: Coordinator, Marine Corps Landing Force Development Activities,  
Quantico, Virginia  
Via: (1) Commanding General, First Marine Aircraft Wing  
(2) Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
(3) Commandant of the Marine Corps  
Subj: Summary of a Heli-Borne Assault Operation Occurring in  
September 1963 in I Corps Area, Viet Nam  
Encl: ✓(1) Subject Narrative Account

1. Enclosure (1) is submitted for the purpose of keeping appropriate commands informed of TE 79.3.3.6 helicopter operations in direct support of an ARVN Corps. In this respect, it is planned to prepare operational summaries on all future commitments where some procedure used in the planning and execution phase may prove beneficial in the assessment and possible adoption of these tactics and techniques for subsequent Marine Corps use in similar situations.

2. For the most part it has been found that standard Marine Corps doctrine and operational procedures can be satisfactorily applied to situations in our tactical zone of responsibility. Nevertheless, as brought out in the narrative, there are many problems in coordination, control and communications that can arise in a USMC, USA, USAF, ARVN and VNAF combined operation. As previously reported in a narrative account of a retrograde action the value of detailed planning between all participants, the use of armed helicopters and employment of an airborne Air Support Operations Center, (TAC(A)), for coordinating the multi-service air support effort has been proved under circumstances involving an unsophisticated enemy in the predominately mountainous terrain of I Corps.

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3. It is not suggested that we should reorganize or re-equip our Corps, or radically change our doctrine based upon operations unique to this area, but it is recommended that we be flexible in our tactical concepts, procedures, and material configurations in order to readily respond should circumstances in the future demand it. It is toward this end that these reports are directed. \*

/s/ A. D. GOMEZ

A. D. GOMEZ

Copy to:

CMCS

MCLEDC

CG, FMFPAC

CG, FMFLANT

COMUSMACV

I CORPS

MAG-16

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SUMMARY OF A HELI-BORNE ASSAULT OPERATION OCCURRING IN  
SEPTEMBER 1963 IN I CORPS AREA VIET NAM

The purpose of this report is to describe, from an aviation standpoint, the planning and execution of a particular helicopter-borne assault operation.

TE 79.3.3.6 first became involved in the planning for this operation when I Corps G-2 requested that Marine observation aircraft fly a reconnaissance mission in a particular area to look for and photograph potential helicopter landing zones. This mission resulted in photographs of several satisfactory landing zones. These photographs were then marked with the grid coordinates and given to the I Corps G-2 along with comments as to the suitability of each landing zone.

During the next few days a CTE representative conferred frequently with the I Corps G-3 section, advising on aviation time and space factors, as well as aviation supportability of various schemes of maneuver under consideration. Once a ground scheme of maneuver was decided on, CTE was advised of the number of troops to be lifted, location of the pick-up point, the helicopter landing zones to be used and the sequence of the lift. The lift was to consist of slightly over two hundred men to each of two landing zones. The landing zones were toward opposite ends of the same valley and each located approximately 15 miles from the pick-up point.

With this information, Marine, Army, USAF and Vietnamese Air Force aviators joined in conference to discuss requirements and capabilities for pre-assault attack aircraft (fighter) strikes, helicopter escort and air coordination and control during the execution of the mission. It was decided that the troop lift would be made by 14 Marine and 4 VNAF H-34 helicopters. Starting twenty minutes prior to each "H" hour, a pre-assault strike would be conducted around each landing zone. USAF would use vertical photographs of the LZ's to brief the USAF and VNAF fighter pilots of the targets to be hit. The pre-assault strike was to continue until the helicopters approached the LZ. At that time the FAC was to visually coordinate the fighter strafing runs with the approaching helicopters and lift the fighters as late as safely possible before the helicopters reached the LZ. (It was planned to use USAF pilots in this role to minimize language and communication difficulties). The transport helicopters were to be led into the zone by 3 army armed helicopters (UTT); two more UTT's were to flank the lead transport helicopter division. If the helicopters were fired on during their approach, the H-34's were to wave off and the UTT's to engage the fire. Once the source of fire was located by the fighters, the UTT's were to pull up and fighters, with heavier ordnance, were to attack the target.

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To coordinate this activity an airborne ASOC (Air Support Operations Center) was planned. The job of the airborne ASOC is similar to the TAC(A), but because of the multi-service, two nation environment its composition and equipment is somewhat different. The requirement is to control the various air components on the appropriate frequency, in an understandable language, and within mutually acceptable chains of command. This necessitates representatives from USMC, USAF, and VNAF in the same plane and all able to transmit and receive on UHF, VHF and FM. In the past a USAF L-28 has been used for this with reasonable success. For this mission the L-28 was not available, so a L-20 was to be tried. The L-20 did not have UHF, and to monitor VHF and FM simultaneously a PRC-10 was placed in the back seat. There was sufficient space in the aircraft for the required representatives. In case this make-shift airborne ASOC failed to function properly, an experienced pilot in a Marine O-1B was to function as a HC(A) and coordinate traffic with a VNAF L-19 flown by an experienced USAF pilot acting as FAC. The VNAF observer in the L-19 would be able to talk to the troops on the ground. Because the numbers of each type of fixed and rotary wing aircraft to be used in the operation were limited, refueling and turn-around times for the helicopters had to be coordinated with turn-around times for the fighters and observation aircraft.

The completed aviation plan was then coordinated with G-3, ARVN I Corps to confirm suitability of lift time, rate, and air support.

The morning before the operation, representatives of all participating units attended the briefing for the I Corps Commander. During the briefing the VNAF ASOC representatives raised questions concerning courses of action to be taken, should transport helicopters be shot down during various stages of the landing. The Corps Commander stated that in an area of heavy VC activity some casualties should be expected. Should this situation occur, every effort should be made to destroy the enemy source of fire; however, in all but extreme conditions the landing of troops should continue. The Corps Commander would make the decision on whether the landings should continue or be halted. CTE 79.3.3.6 replied that he was very satisfied with the sound tactical plan, and particularly pleased with the tactical application of helicopters for envelopment. He could not, however, subscribe to a course of action which virtually assured failure of the helicopter assault portion of the plan, i.e., the destruction of helicopters with embarked troops. The decision as to the possibility of safely landing the embarked troops could best be made by the transport helicopter commander based on his immediate evaluation of the situation at the time. Further, CTE 79.3.3.6 would be flying in the lead helicopter during the operation. The I Corps Commander then agreed to these conditions. "H" hour was to be established on one hour prior notice the following morning, depending on weather conditions. A Marine O-1B would report existing weather in the target area every thirty minutes, commencing at 0730.

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At 0730, the morning of the operation, an all-pilots briefing was held. Here the overall air and ground plan was explained, followed by the flight leaders briefing. At this time it was discovered that the VNAF H-34 pilots were not present; they had been committed to another mission. The USAF ASOC advisor immediately proceeded to the Air Support Operations Center and the VNAF H-34s were recommitted to this operation. Shortly thereafter the VNAF pilots reported for the briefing. Following this, the pilots returned to their respective ready rooms awaiting the announcement of "H" hour. At 0950 I Corps CP set "H" hour for 1100. According to the plans this meant that the pre-assault strike would go on LZ "Hotel" at 1040; first landing on "Hotel" at 1100; "Hotel" lift complete at 1130. The pre-assault strike on LZ "Yankee" would commence at 1310; first landing on "Yankee" at 1330; and lift completed at "Yankee" at 1430. Both helicopters and fighters would refuel between the assault on "Hotel" and "Yankee".

The pre-assault strike on "Hotel" commenced on schedule. Shortly thereafter, it was found that the communications in the airborne ASOC were not working satisfactorily. The Marine O-1B, backup HC(A), was delayed because of radio trouble; it would be necessary for the USAF FAC to coordinate air traffic. The helicopters checked in five minutes out from the landing zone and the FAC set the fighters up in a "daisy chain", strafing parallel to the helicopter approach route. As the helicopters closed on the LZ the FAC lifted the fighters; the lead UTT's commenced firing into and around the zone. The transport helicopters landed in flights of three, commencing at 1100; their landing was unopposed. Shortly after the transport helicopters completed their first lift the UTT's received, and engaged, enemy fire from an area a few hundred yards from the LZ. Their ordnance expended, they marked the area from which the fire had been received with red smoke and departed to rearm. The proximity of the red smoke to the zone caused some confusion, as some of the participants thought that red smoke indicated enemy positions, and others thought that it would only be used to indicate that the zone was under fire. The troops on the ground immediately put out green smoke on the ground to indicate that the LZ was not under fire. (This represents just one more point of confusion that can, and does, arise in a five service operation. Each operation indicates such points, and we try to eliminate them on the next). At 1130 the second lift of transport helicopters returned to the LZ, unsorted by the UTTs which were rearming. Fighters were over the zone, however, and the lift was completed unopposed.

The pre-assault strike on "Yankee" commenced at 1310 as scheduled. This strike was conducted by VNAF AD-6 aircraft, with excellent coverage of the area immediately surrounding the landing zone. While communications in the airborne ASOC had improved to some extent, it was still not possible to monitor both VHF and FM simultaneously, therefore the helicopter/fighter coordination had to be passed to the HC(A) and FAC.

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The AD's pulled up from their last strafing run just prior to the approach of the helicopters. Some 400 meters short of the LZ, the lead UTT's reported automatic weapons fire and the H-34's climbed and orbited away from the immediate area. While engaging the first source of fire, a second source was located further from the LZ but still along the approach route. As in "Hotel" the UTT's expended their ammunition and marked both locations. The location furthest from the LZ was ignored and USAF T-28's expended their ordnance on the enemy position closest to the landing zone. Following this, the FAC flew low over the area without either drawing fire or observing any enemy activity. During this period the airborne ASOC climbed to altitude and radioed back to home base to scramble the ground alert of two more USAF T-28's. The H-34's returned to the area, altering course to avoid the known enemy positions, and covered by T-28's dropped their troops in the LZ. During the drop some enemy fire was received in the zone but neither helicopters nor friendly troops were hit. While the H-34's were returning for their second load of troops, the airborne ASOC told the ground commander the location of the enemy fire, and asked him to send troops to the area. The ground commander advised that he was occupying high ground in the area of the LZ and was not able to send troops to the area requested; he was in communication with the VNAF observer in the L-19 and was not receiving any enemy fire.

Between the first and second lift the USAF T-28's continued to work the immediate area at low altitude in an attempt to observe enemy activity or draw fire. The second lift of H-34's, escorted by UTT's commenced. Again poor communication prevented effective coordination and it was two or three minutes before the T-28's could be lifted to sufficient altitude so they would not interfere with the UTT operations. (For our operations here at this time, until we get a suitable airframe/communications platform for the airborne ASOC this problem will require careful attention). The second lift landed without opposition. During this lift the CP advised that although a third lift had been scheduled, the second lift had picked up all the remaining troops to be carried into "Yankee". (It is not unusual for troop numbers and/or cargo weights to be changed between request and execution of a mission. Having performed assault landings at two LZs in approximately three hours, the news that the lift was completed was not unwelcome). The only hit received on any of the friendly troops, aircraft, or helicopters during the two landings was on one UTT. (Armed HU-1B). It had been hit in the tail by a shotgun.

There are many aspects of this operation that might be considered typical of operations in this area; and might also be expected to be typical of other multi-service, bi-nation operations.

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Any point "assumed" during the planning can arise to become a "problem" during the execution. Even among U. S. services, there is not a mutual common understanding of air control means and responsibilities. For example, the airborne ASOC is a jury-rigged agency to replace the TAC(A) we Marines are familiar with. Critical control agencies must be backed with experienced officers who, recognizing a foul up, can quickly step into the breach, (such as ASOC/TAC(A) functions temporarily assumed by HC(A) and/or FAC). If the operation goes exactly as planned there has been a waste of talent, but life insurance is never free. In I Corps, Viet Nam, the composition of forces continually changes. Were we to have repeated this same operation two weeks later, the participants in key positions would, in many cases, have changed. Those involved in planning and briefing must treat each operation separately, just as if it were the first time something of this type was to be accomplished. Detailed planning and thorough briefing for each and every operation takes time, but unless this is done the opportunity for failure abounds.

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## HEADQUARTERS

Task Element 79.3.3.6

Marine Aircraft Group 16

1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Aircraft, FMF, Pacific  
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California1:DLA:jtr  
01A29663  
23 Oct 1963**SECRET**  
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From: Commander  
Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 16

To: Coordinator, Marine Corps Landing Force Development Activities,  
Quantico, Virginia

Via: (1) Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing  
(2) Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
(3) Commandant of the Marine Corps

Subj: Narrative Account of Helicopter-Borne Retrograde Operation  
Conducted during August 1963 in the Republic of Vietnam

Encl: ✓(1) Copy of Subject Narrative

1. Enclosure (1) is submitted as an interesting and somewhat unique account of helicopter operations planning, tactics and techniques in this area. Time permitting, the essential elements of planning and execution contained in enclosure (1) will continue to act as a guide for future execution of similar operations.

2. The thoroughness of this planning sequence and the ultimate effectiveness of the execution of this comparatively large retrograde operation are a tribute to the cooperation and combined efforts of all services to effectively pursue combat support operations in this tactical area of responsibility.

/s/ A. D. GOMEZ

A. D. GOMEZ

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CG, FMFLANT  
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CORPS  
MAC-16

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RETROGRADE

I INTRODUCTION

This is a description of a three day helicopter-borne retrograde operation that took place in the I Corps area of Viet Nam in August 1963. The purpose of this report is to describe the methods and means by which such an operation was accomplished in a multi-service, bi-nation, combat environment. The participants of this operation were not all Marines. They did not have similar military backgrounds and training. They did not speak the same language.

The requirements for the successful completion of this operation are similar to those of any heli-borne retrograde operation. Of more significance is the manner by which such requirements were met in a military environment such as this.

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## II THE MISSION

The overall mission was to lift 1,300 troops with artillery, equipment and supplies from two landing zones to a base 30 miles away. The land, with the exception of the immediate area of the Landing Zones was enemy held. On the completion of the lift even the LZs would revert to enemy control.

Wednesday morning, at a planning conference the concept of the operation was presented: Commencing Friday morning approximately 500 ARVN soldiers were to be lifted from LZ "Hotel". At the same time two 105s were to be heli-lifted from LZ "Zulu". Following the Hotel lift, 200 more soldiers were to be lifted from Zulu. On Saturday the lift was to be completed.

Landing Zone Hotel, like many others in this area was in the bottom of a steep valley. Approach required some 1000 feet of descent between ridge lines within 1200 meters of one another. The slopes converged downward to the edge of the river. The landing zone was at the rivers edge wide enough for one helicopter, long enough for three, and a jungle covered slope bordered the other side of the zone. As this was a box canyon the retirement route was necessarily that used for the approach. Take off required flying within 100 yards of a nose before the helicopter had 10 knots; within 300 yards of another before 50 knots was reached. During a full retrograde operation there would be no capability of occupying or covering these slopes by friendly infantry fire. For this reason it was recommended that the plan be modified to leave a sufficient number of troops in Hotel to secure the LZ and cover the approaches. The covering force then to proceed on foot to LZ "Zulu".

This modification in the plan was accepted providing the "Hotel" lift could be accomplished on Thursday. Take-off time was but twenty hours away and there was lots of work to be done.

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## III REQUIREMENTS AND MEANS

The success of the mission depended on many requirements being fulfilled in the next twenty hours. Among these was a detailed Aviation and Ground Plan, transport helicopters, anti-helicopter fire suppression plans and means, and air-ground communication for coordination and control.

To perform the lift, the Marine HMM planned on using 20, UH-34D's. 18 would be assigned to the troop lift and the other two to SAR and maintenance. The Air Support Operations Center advised that three Vietnamese Air Force H-34's would augment the troop lift; two VNAF T-28's, one USAF B-26 and one VNAF L-19 with a forward air controller would be continuously on station for escort and fire suppression. Two U. S. Army HU-1B's would be available to make the external lifts required to move the 105s, and two U. S. Army armed HU-1B's would be on station to provide close in fire suppression. A Marine O-1B would provide a pre-launch weather recon. and remain between the base and LZ to act as radio relay.

There was now sufficient information to formulate an air plan and schedule. To advise the respective ground commanders of this information and assure correlation of the air and ground plan it would be necessary to fly to each of the LZs for an on-site conference.

In order to coordinate the multi-service, bi-lingual air effort a TAC(A) would be required. The coordination problem was further aggravated. VNAF L-19s used FM and VHF; Marine H-34s and O-1Bs had FM and UHF; VNAF T-28s VHF and UHF; and USAF B-26s UHF and VHF. Some of the VNAF crews spoke english and some did not, none of the U. S. crews spoke Vietnamese. The anticipated time on station for the TAC(A) was approximately six hours. The mission of the TAC(A) was standard but the means of execution had to be jury rigged to meet the peculiar requirements; these in turn had to be compatible with an available air-frame.

The USAF was able to provide an L-28. This is a four place observation aircraft with over eight hours fuel and fortunately FM, VHF and UHF radios. Occupying the seats would be the pilot, the Marine Task Element 79.3.3.6, S-3 and both USAF and VNAF Air Support Operation Center representatives. We called this combination an Airborne ASOC.

There remained a requirement for the airborne ASOC to communicate with someone on the ground in order to continually know the status of the LZ and the progress of the ground operation. To provide this capability the USAF I Corps Air Liaison Officer volunteered to go into the LZ on the first flight each morning and remain through the days operation.

The distance from home base to the LZs was approximately 50 miles. From the troop staging area to the LZs about 30 miles. To speed up the operation it was decided to stage a TAFDS at the troop staging area. The TAFDS could be flown in by an Army Caribou, but arrangements had to be made for the civilian contractor to deliver fuel, and provide his fuel trucks protection along the route.

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## IV PREPARATION

Wednesday morning when the plan thus far discussed was being evolved the affected ground commanders were at the Landing Zones, (about five miles from the Laotian border). Before planning could proceed further these commanders must be included. To accomplish this, representatives from participating units were flown to the LZs. This representation included the I Corps G-3 and his U. S. Army advisor; the USAF I Corps Air Liaison Officer; and the Marine T.E. Operations Officer.

On arrival at landing zone "Hotel" the ground commander there was advised of the change in plan, i.e., his troops would be lifted Thursday instead of Friday and that a covering force would be left behind to provide security for the LZ. Following a walk around the LZ the ground commander was taken for a helicopter reconnaissance of the area. During this flight he was shown terrain along the helicopter approach and retirement route that must be occupied or covered by fire to prevent an ambush of the transport helicopters during the lift. On return to the LZ the plans for the "Hotel" lift were completed. His covering force would consist of approximately 125 troops. Their positions and front line markings were agreed upon. Troops in the covering force were to engage any enemy fire directed against the helicopters. The USAF ALO was to be in the LZ during the lift to aid in coordinating the air-ground plan with the ground commander and the airborne ASOC. The transport helicopters were to be in flights of three with a five minute interval between flights. U. S. Army armed helicopters were to escort each flight in and out of the LZ, VNAF T-28s and a USAF B-26 were to be over the LZ and approach routes to provide fire suppression if required. Coordination of the overall air effort, and coordination between air and ground would be accomplished by the airborne ASOC.

The I Corps G-3 and his party then flew to LZ "Zulu" to repeat the planning process with the ground commander there. The "Zulu" lift was to start on Friday and be completed on Saturday. Landing zone "Zulu" can be described as being located in the bottom of a bowl. During the last 500 feet of descent and the first 500 feet of climb the helicopters would be circling below the rim of the bowl and within range of direct observed small arms fire. Obviously the security of the LZ itself depended on who was occupying the rim of the bowl and its slopes. Planning time was short. To make the most of it the ground commander, I Corps G-3 and T.E. S-3 moved to a location in the zone where the surrounding terrain could be seen. Here sticks were used to draw maps in the dirt, indicating thereon helicopter routes, friendly positions, directions of friendly patrols, inner and outer perimeter defense lines, and locations of friendly mortars and automatic weapons. With a stick, a map, a compass, and a smooth patch of dirt a mutually agreeable plan was evolved.

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On Friday the operation was to start with the U. S. Army HU-1B's externally lifting the two 105s. Prior to breaking down these weapons, all remaining 105 ammunition would be removed from the LZ through the tubes. Following the external lifts the troop lift would commence, and proceed in the same manner as the "Hotel" lift. On Friday the ARVN troops would occupy the rim of the bowl and patrol out for another two to three kilometers. For this reason any anti-helicopter fire received within 3000 meters of the LZ could not be engaged by T-28s or armed helicopters without prior coordination with the troops on the ground. In effect we had a circular bomb line six kilometers in diameter. Again the USAF ALO would be in the LZ to work with the airborne ASOC in coordinating the air-ground activity.

Saturday would complete the retrograde operation with all friendly troops being removed from the LZ. The start of Saturday's lift would be similar to Friday's operation except there would be no friendlies beyond the outer perimeter. Again friendly positions were to be marked with panels or smoke. Prior to the withdrawal of the outer perimeter, the inner perimeter, (approximately 100 meters in diameter), was to be occupied and armed, with a preponderance of automatic weapons. Manning the inner perimeter before the outer was withdrawn required pulling the outer perimeter nearly an hour sooner than if the outer perimeter troops were only to fall back to the inner positions. This was a recognized weakness in the plan, but accepted on the insistence of the ground commander who intended to personally see that this last line was properly manned and the troops knew exactly what they were to do and in what sequence. The withdrawal of the outer perimeter would start when the seventh flight of three transport helicopters cleared the LZ. Once all friendly troops were inside the inner perimeter the "free kill area" would be moved to 300 meters from the LZ. This would permit armed helicopters and fighters to engage enemy fire received from the rim of the bowl and its inward slope.

The lift was to start with flights of three at five minute intervals. Once all but the inner perimeter troops were withdrawn the lift would cease, to permit all the transport helicopters to mass. The final lift would then be accomplished with as close a landing interval as possible, permitting a fully manned defense position for as long as possible and then provide for its complete withdrawal within five minutes. During the interval while the transport helicopters were massing, all aircraft and helicopters could be pulled back five miles from the LZ; the remaining mortar ammunition would then be expended to cover known or potential enemy positions along the ridge and its slopes. This fire plan was not nearly as detailed as it should have been, but time was running out and the use of mortars, closely coordinated with air, was strange to the ground troops, therefore a more conservative approach was required to insure the safety of the aircraft and helicopters.

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Ways and means to coordinate the timing and execution of this last portion of the retrograde operation had to be figured out and agreed upon. The procedure decided upon was as follows: The inner perimeter was to be occupied by approximately 100 men with mortars and machine guns. When the lift progressed to the point where these troops plus 100 more were remaining in the zone the ALO would radio "Lotto" to the airborne ASOC. Following this each helicopter was to advise the airborne ASOC of any deviation from his preplanned load. In this manner the airborne ASOC could monitor the inbound flow of helicopters and "short stop" flights not required. This would save fuel and permit a more rapid massing for the final lift. Once the LZ was occupied only by its final perimeter, the ALO would confirm with a "Bingo". "Bingo" would be passed to the helicopter flight leader as a signal to start joining up his flight for the last lift. Airborne ASOC would then clear the immediate area of the LZ of all other aircraft and when done advise the ALO. The sky would then belong to the ground commander and he would commence his mortar preparation. When the last flight was inbound, the airborne ASOC would get a confirmation from the ALO that the air was clear of friendly high trajectory fire. The airborne ASOC would then clear the fighters back into the area, have the armed helicopters rendezvous with the transport helicopters and the final lift would commence. It was recognized that there would be many items of information of value to the enemy that would pass back and forth by air-ground voice radio. To provide some measure of security, code words would be used for anticipated communications. For that information not covered by code words, American slang would be used. As the ALO and members of the airborne ASOC were personal friends, no problem of misunderstanding these transmissions was anticipated. (There are some advantages in operating in a bi-lingual environment).

The plan for both days of the "Zulu" retrograde having been agreed upon by representatives of both the air and ground commanders, the I Corps G-3 and his party got back in their helicopter and returned to home base.

Wednesday night working arrangements within the airborne ASOC had to be decided. Only one of its members had any experience with the functioning of a TAC(A), which the airborne ASOC was to replace. In Viet Nam there are four services flying aircraft, each of these services has certain areas of responsibility for air coordination and control, and these areas of responsibility overlap. Before tasks within the airborne ASOC could be decided, the members first had to agree on areas of responsibility and authority. In reaching these agreements the immediate concern was the job to be done and the ways and means available to do it. As Army aviation in I Corps is under OpCon of the Marine CTE, his representative would coordinate all the helicopter traffic. It was recognized that VNAF helicopters would also be used but as they were to be integrated into the transport helicopter flight they would be subject to the same control as the rest of the helicopters.

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USAF B-26s and VNAF T-28s would be controlled by the USAF and VNAF ASOC representatives and as all would be in the same aircraft, coordination among one another could be quickly accomplished. At 2200 the L-28 arrived from Saigon. The pilot of the plane had to be briefed on its mission, and he in turn brief the other members on the aircraft and its communications. At 2300 time had run out, in eight hours the "all pilots" briefing would be held and the operation commence.

## V EXECUTION

During the Thursday morning briefing all the participating pilots were advised of the detailed plans for that days operation, i.e., the troop lift from LZ "Hotel".

During the briefing we were told of a B-26 crash and asked to assist in search and rescue operations. One flight of Marine transport helicopters was diverted from the lift; this would increase the lift time, but not prohibitively. As the cause of the crash was thought to be structural failure, other B-26s were grounded and would not be available to participate in the operation.

Following a weather reconnaissance "H Hour" was confirmed and all assigned aircraft proceeded to the operating area. On arrival, the troops on the ground put up smoke to indicate their positions; so far things were going as planned. Throughout the next four hours the lift was unopposed. Armed helicopters on two occasions drew and engaged enemy fire to the side of the approach and retirement route. By monitoring the transport helicopter flight path to prevent their flying over the locations of the fire the lift was continued without interruption. It had gone off as planned and provided a rehearsal for the use of airborne ASOC.

Friday's operation started in the same fashion as Thursday's. On arrival at LZ "Zulu" the friendly troops marked their positions, and as at "Hotel" they were occupying the positions previously agreed upon. The transport helicopters arrived just as the Army was completing the last external lift of the 105s.

The lift proceeded normally for about three hours, then one of the departing flights reported fire from a ridge about five kilometers from the LZ. Armed helicopters immediately proceeded to search out the source of fire and the airborne ASOC asked the incoming transport helicopter flight to report when ten miles out. The armed helicopters drew fire from the same ridge line and marked the target. While fighters were being called in to provide fire suppression, a transport helicopter flight reported ten miles out. They were cleared to continue by the airborne ASOC, but advised not to proceed within five miles of the LZ without further clearance. The fighters were set up to fire from south to north and from their flight path it appeared that the transport helicopters could continue. On reporting five miles, the transport helicopters were cleared to the LZ and advised to stay south of the river during the remainder of their approach.

The value of the airborne ASOC in this type of traffic control can better be appreciated by the fact that transmissions to the transport helicopters were in English on UHF, and transmissions to the fighters were in Vietnamese on VHF).

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After five hours of lift the ALO advised that the security troops from "Hotel" had arrived at "Zulu" and the ground commander would like them added to today's lift. This would increase the time for today's lift but reduce the time tomorrow, and tomorrow landing zone security would be much closer in. The additional lift was agreed to and after seven hours from its start the day's operation was completed.

Saturday was to complete the retrograde operation. On arrival at the landing zone the troops again marked their positions indicating that the outer perimeter, (along the rim of the bowl), was occupied by friendlies. After two hours the ALO advised that the outer perimeter had been withdrawn and all friendly troops were at the LZ. About this time a departing flight reported fire from the same location as yesterday. Again the route was moved south of the river and the fire engaged by fighter aircraft. Shortly after the ALO reported "Lotto", (perimeter security plus 100 remaining), home base reported that a helicopter had landed with a rough running engine. Fuel strainers indicated fuel contamination and all helicopters should be checked on their next landing at the staging area. Just at the time the tempo of the lift should be increasing it was going to slow. With approximately 150 troops remaining in the LZ the ALO advised that enemy troops had been observed on the west slope about 500 meters out; if the airborne ASOC would keep all aircraft east of the zone the ground troops would mark the position. Using a 60mm mortar for direct fire the approximate position was marked. The airborne FAC in an F-19 was called over the position, talked to a position in relation to the mortar round and asked to mark for a fighter strike. He made several passes over the area and advised that his VNAF observer wouldn't mark the target without approval from the ground. The ground commander would not approve as he thought he could not use air support within 3000 meters. This change to 3000 meters from the 300 meters previously agreed upon came as a very untimely surprise. The location of these enemy troops could not be avoided; if the transport helicopters were to land in the LZ, they had to be removed. Armed helicopters were called in to strafe the area and their fire was corrected by the ALO through the airborne ASOC. (Required because of incompatible radio sets). Once on target two armed helicopters expended their rockets into the area and the enemy activity was no longer observed.

Fuel strainer problems and hillside enemy taken care of for the time being, the lift continued to "Bingo". (The only troops in the LZ were those manning the inner perimeter). The transport helicopter flight leader started getting his interval closed in preparation for the final lift, armed helicopters and fighters were pulled away from the LZ, and the ALO advised that it was the "4th of July" and he could start his "celebration". Shortly thereafter the perimeter troops started their mortar preparation of the surrounding slopes.

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When the transport helicopter flight leader reported he had his "birds in a flock", he was cleared to proceed inbound and report five miles. The airborne ASOC requested the ALO to confirm the "5th of July". On receiving this confirmation the lift was cleared to continue. As the helicopters approached the LZ, the ALO reported that the perimeter troops were engaging enemy fire to the south and east of the zone. These positions were again marked with direct fire from 60mm mortars. Transport helicopters continued their landings using a right hand pattern and the armed helicopters flew a concentric pattern, firing on the offending positions as they passed. The traffic was too closely congested to be able to use fighters without stopping the lift and the number of troops remaining too few to protect the zone from an attack of any size. Even with a fighter strike against jungle covered slopes, there could be no assurance of destroying the enemy; the best we could hope for was to suppress his fire while the lift continued. Less than five minutes later, as a flight of three helicopters took off from the zone, troops in each helicopter threw purple smoke on the zone. The next flight waved off the lift was completed.

#### VI CONCLUSION

The operation had been a complete success, not one helicopter or man hit during the entire execution.

As far as is known this was the first time the Marine procedure of a TAC (ALO and ALO, (or a substitute therefore), had been tried in this area. The requirements for agencies to coordinate air-ground plans are even more important in a multi-service operation than in a single service operation.

This was also the first time in our experience that a helicopter borne withdrawal had been treated as a retrograde operation rather than an administrative lift. Without a sound retrograde plan the operation might well have failed.

The complete success of the operation proved the requirement of sound plan. The plan should have been in greater detail, for example the timing and duration of the mortar preparation. At least key elements of the plan should be reduced to writing and given wide dissemination. (The reason for the confusion or change in the location of the bomb line is still undetermined). It is also recognized that more detailed planning and greater dissemination required more time than was available. Any time you hurry into a joint operation the opportunity for confusion increases. We continually stress this as a result aviation is being brought into the ground planning earlier than it was before.

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There were many reasons for the success of this operation. They start with command guidance as to operating procedures and the composition of a tactical air package. Inter-service cooperation was excellent. The various service representatives continued to explore the various service concepts to find common meeting points for the support of the operation. Even though this operation was small in size, the wide range of participation indicated the value of the professional military officer; officers with broad professional knowledge and experience, and an attitude that the mission will be successfully accomplished in a sound tactical manner.

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HEADQUARTERS

Task Element 79.3.3.6

Marine Aircraft Group 16

1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Aircraft, FMF, Pacific  
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

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01A29463  
22 Oct 1963

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From: Commander  
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Subj: Use of fixed wing aircraft in providing fire support during  
heli-borne operations, as practiced in the I Corps area of  
Viet Nam

Encl: ✓(1) Subject report

1. There seems to be considerable confusion in the minds of many people stationed in and visiting the I Corps area of Viet Nam concerning fixed wing fire support. An oft stated opinion is that we use obsolete, propeller driven aircraft because our current inventory of jet attack aircraft cannot do the job.

2. In an effort to dispel this belief, the enclosed report has been prepared describing the actual use that is made of the available fighter/attack aircraft, the requirements for fixed wing support of heli-borne operations, and the methods by which these requirements are met in this tactical area of responsibility.

/s/ A. D. GOMEZ

A. D. GOMEZ

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MAG-16

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## USE OF FIXED WING AIRCRAFT IN PROVIDING FIRE SUPPORT DURING HELI-BORNE OPERATIONS, AS PRACTICED IN THE I CORPS AREA OF VIET NAM.

The objective of fire support during a helicopter-borne operation is to provide the approach routes, retirement routes, and the landing zone, freedom from enemy direct observed fire.

The aircraft used for this have been T-28's, AD-6's and B-26's. T-28's are flown by both VNAF and USAF, AD's by VNAF and B-26's by USAF. All of these types have been used for pre-assault strikes, however the limited ordnance capability of the T-28 makes it the least desirable of the three for this purpose. Pre-assault strikes are against areas providing cover and concealment rather than specific targets; therefore, ordnance volume and radius of effect are important considerations. \*

Once the transport helicopters commence their landing approach the problem changes. Any fire received by the transport helicopters is obviously coming from sources previously unlocated and neither suppressed nor destroyed by pre-assault strikes. This source of fire must be quickly located engaged, and either destroyed or suppressed. Failing in this the landing must cease, at least temporarily. (There is no value in delivering friendly casualties to LZ).

Prior to and during the assault landing, the only means of acquiring the sources of enemy fire in this area, are air-borne, and all available means are used. During the pre-assault strike the observation aircraft with the FAC, and the fighters, fly low over the zone and its approaches attempting to see or even draw enemy fire. As the helicopters approach the zone, fighters make strafing runs along the approaches and on the zone. Armed helicopters lead the transport flight into the zone and also flank the lead division. Any source of fire located during this period is immediately engaged, first by the pilot acquiring the fire, followed as rapidly as possible by the best weapon immediately available. Depending on the location of this fire, the helicopter route may be altered and the lift continued, or the transport helicopters pulled clear of the area so the fire suppression means can neutralize the enemy fire.

Once friendly troops are on the landing zone, enemy incoming fire can best be acquired and most quickly engaged by these troops. If air-ground ordnance could be effectively used in this fire suppression it would become a normal ground controlled close air support mission. The situation in this area of Viet Nam is considerably different. ARVN troops we have been landing do not have FAC with them.

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Air-ground communication must be prearranged, if it is to exist at all. Determining location of enemy weapons from friendly troops on the ground, or even that such weapons are firing in to the zone, is at best a "some times" thing. Lacking the air-infantry training of our Marines, even after the first wave has landed its troops, we must continue to depend on airborne means of acquiring and suppressing enemy fire on the transport helicopters.

The ease, or even the capability, of determining the source and/or location of the enemy fire varies widely. In some cases the immediate areas for concealing weapons are limited, and a broad area can quickly be narrowed down perhaps to a group of huts or point of woods. (Seldom if ever is the particular weapon actually seen, but its location can be narrowed down to an area the size of a football field). In other cases the cover is limitless, a large woods or jungle covered mountain. When this is the case the effort must be halted and the offending source of fire searched out. (Naturally if the area can be avoided it will be, but in mountainous terrain the low approach and retirement is often channelized). Fire immediately adjacent to the landing zone must of course be neutralized.

Since the armed helicopters are flying close to the transport helicopters, they are often aware of fire being received by the transports and in a position to quickly engage. Once this fire is engaged, its location is thereby indicated to fighters and the armed helicopters are pulled off the target; AD's and T-28's carry more effective ordnance for destroying an unseen target. When this change from armed helicopters to fighters can be quickly made, the armed helicopters retain some of their ammunition to use escorting the transport helicopters for their next run into the landing zone.

Basically, the armed helicopter and the fighter are used to complement one another in anti-helicopter fire suppression. The armed helicopters stay close to the transport helicopters and act as a body guard. The attack aircraft provide the heavy kill capability. In this application of attack aircraft, the choice of airframes is primarily a choice of the volume and variety of ordnance it can deliver, (assuming comparable accuracy). In this respect the A-4's presently used in our VMA squadrons would do a much better job than the T-28's being used in Viet Nam.

One of the arguments oft presented for using low performance aircraft vs jets, in guerrilla operations, is the difficulty the jet pilot would have in locating a target on the ground. This difficulty is only a matter of degree; in Viet Nam observation aircraft are used to locate and mark targets for the fighters, including T-28's.

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In heli-borne operations, we are looking for maximum area neutralization and suppressive means for direct observed fire, rather than specific targets to engage. If we are successful in suppressing fire against our helicopters, the landed ground forces can effectively engage specific targets.

Another argument against jets and in favor of low performance aircraft has to do with the ability to work under low ceilings, particularly in mountainous terrain. There is certainly a point at which the A-4's might not be used as safely as T-28's. Experience in recent operations indicate that this point is very close to the limit of operations of the T-28. In marginal conditions perhaps the T-28's could work with 1,000 feet less ceiling than A-4's. (The only weapon platform that can perform under the same minimum weather conditions as the transport helicopter is an armed helicopter)

As a basis of comparison, T-28's operating in this area carry a maximum load of two .50 caliber machine gun pods, two 500 pound general purpose bombs and two 120 pound fragmentation cluster bombs. Their maximum mission time is approximately three hours. The A-4's can carry up to six 500 pound bombs and twelve 250 pound general purpose bombs in addition to the 20mm cannons, or many other combinations of rockets, bombs and napalm. Their mission time varies widely with combinations of ordnance and external fuel, however "on station time" can approximate that of the T-28, while exceeding its ordnance delivery capability.

Indications, based on recent operations here in Viet Nam, are that the present VMA aircraft, used in conjunction with Marine forward air controllers, could do a much better job in pre-assault neutralization and suppressive fire than is now being done.

AMEN

*If it is determined that we will be fighting wars of this nature for the next 10 years, then it would be wise to introduce some marine doctrine and tactics in the conduct of the operation in Viet Nam. Why should the Army have the last word. For example maybe we should encourage the country we are supporting to train and use FAC's.*

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AVIATION HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONS CENTER (AHOC), SOP

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I. MISSION.

In accordance with existing COMUSMACV Directives an Aviation Headquarters is established with the following missions:

A. To plan, direct and control the employment of all Army and Marine Corps Aviation Units and aircraft operating in direct support of I Corps.

B. To participate in, and provide assistance to operational planning and the coordination of employment of USA/USMC Aviation with VNAF/USAF tactical air.

C. To insure the accomplishment of these missions, the Commander of the Aviation Headquarters has established an Aviation Headquarters Operations Center (AHOC). The AHOC will operate in accordance with this Standard Operating Procedure.

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II. ORGANIZATION.

A. The Director of the Aviation Headquarters Operations Center is the Commander TE 79.3.3.6. Represented in the AHOC is a Senior Army Representative, a Senior Marine representative, and an Operations Section.

1. The Senior Representatives advise the Director concerning their respective aviation capabilities, review mission requests, and carry out the policies established by the Director. During the absence of the Director, the senior officer present acts in his stead.

2. The Operations Section receives mission requests and processes these mission requests in accordance with established policies and instructions from the Senior Representatives.

B. The aviation assets under the operational control of the Aviation Headquarters include the following:

1. USMC, H-34 Helicopters
2. USA Aircraft and Helicopters
  - a. UH-1B Helicopters
  - b. Armed UH-1B Helicopters
  - c. U-1A Helicopters
  - d. CV-2 Aircraft

Although organizations, detachments, numbers and types of aircraft may change from time to time, their replacements will operate under the operational control of the Aviation Headquarters. Such changes will not alter the procedures established by this SOP.

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### III. POLICY FOR THE OPERATION OF THE AVIATION HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONS CENTER

Assignment of aircraft to particular missions will be in accordance with sound operational tactics and efficient utilization of resources. (It is recognized that the combat exigencies might cause this, or higher headquarters to make temporary and/or minor deviations). Accordingly, the following policy guidance is promulgated:

#### A. Mission Assignments.

Mission assignment will be on the basis of the best aircraft available to do the job, regardless of service or unit. (If the mission is more suitable to heavier transport aircraft, (C-123), the ARVN TOC will be so advised and asked to submit the request to ASOC). Where possible, fixed wing aircraft will be assigned in preference to helicopters for heavy lifts. U.S. Army and Marine Aviation will not be utilized until it has been determined that VNAF is unable to support the mission within its own resources.

#### B. Protection of Transport Helicopters.

1. The mission of the transport helicopter is to safely move troops and supplies to and from landing zones. The destruction of the helicopter by enemy fire causes both the failure of this mission and the loss of helicopter and crew. In order that these missions may have the best chance for success, transport helicopters will not be scheduled into landing zones under known or anticipated enemy fire without also planning for their protection in the zone, also during the approach and retirement. Anti-helicopter fire suppression available to this headquarters includes both armed helicopters and fighter/attack type aircraft. Again the means to be used will depend on the requirements of the mission, without regard to the service providing this support. In accordance with basic military doctrine during major troop lifts it is anticipated that all means of fire suppression may well be required.

2. Protection of transport helicopters in close terrain may be impossible to achieve by air effort alone. For this reason it is incumbent on the Aviation Headquarters to evaluate requested landing zones and advise on the desirability of their use as either secure or unsecure zones. In the case of a determination that a particular zone is unsuitable for use when not secured by ground forces, the appropriate ground commander will be so advised, and transport helicopters will not be scheduled to operate without a specific directive to the contrary by proper authority.

*Handwritten notes:*  
 Note - Not landed on the objective but in a landing zone  
 Good sound tactical thinking  
 Good rule of thumb would be - whenever VC utilize primary 130 cal weapons it would be wise to land as far as possible outside the effective range of this weapon, landing 300 meters from any buildings or tree lines, places of concealment would be used.

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C. Mission Priorities.

The purpose of mission priorities is to assure that the more important missions are the ones accomplished, when mission requests for a given period exceed the means available for that period. Missions will be accomplished in accordance with the following priorities:

1. Operational Troop Movement: This includes all troop movements in support of a ground operation, assault, troop reenforcement and retrograde. The mission may be in support of ARVN, Special Forces, or others as required.

2. Medical Evacuation: Medical evacuations under this priority are those dictated by the seriousness of patients condition. Naturally cases where the life or full recovery of the individual is at issue are included. On the other hand, minor illness or ailments evacuated under this priority might well be a detriment to the war effort by reducing the means available to meet more important missions. Should this occur, the offending unit will be advised immediately in the hope that they might become properly educated. Even the most minor medical case will be evacuated when helicopter space is available,

3. Operational Resupply: Operational resupply is that required to support an operational combat mission. Within this priority ammunition, medical supplies and food will take precedence in accordance with their respective needs. Troop reenforcement and emergency resupply fall under Priority #1. Sub-priorities within this group, if required, are the prerogative of the supported ground commander.

4. Civic Action: This applies where such action is directly related to military operations. In assigning this priority particular care must be taken to comply with U.S. policy as interpreted and directed by COMUSMACV.

5. Training: This applies to both aviation and ground training. Training often suffers during combat due to the temporary lack of diversification of missions. For this reason training must continue, even in a combat environment, in order that a change in tactics may be operationally supported.

6. Administrative Cargo and Troop Lifts, Staff Visits, etc. This, being the lowest priority will apply to all other missions, not here-to-fore mentioned. Since our mission is to provide aviation support for I Corps, an appropriate ground commander must be called upon to establish relative priorities in cases where the support requests exceed the means. VIP's will be integrated into the above priorities on an individual basis depending on importance of mission and availability of aircraft.

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D. Modifying Instructions.

As previously stated, the peculiarities of the situation may require deviation from the above instructions. Accordingly, the following guidance is provided to be considered in conjunction with preceeding policy and priorities.

1. Support of MAC Advisors: Americans are in Viet Nam in both a support and advisory capacity. In order to insure that they are able to discharge their duties in a rapid and effective manner within their purview of responsibility, it is necessary that helicopter transportation be furnished when other means cannot be used. For this purpose, the transport UH-1B will normally be assigned in order to preserve the tactical mission integrity of the H-34D/UTT element.

2. Special Forces Support: Special Forces will be supported by one helicopter and one fixed wing aircraft per day. This is not a limitation, as additional support will be provided in accordance with the above priorities. Should these priorities indicate a temporary denial of Special Forces support, Special Forces will be so advised. Should the Special Forces not agree to the temporary withdrawal of this aviation support, the Aviation Commander will be so advised prior to the assignment, or refusal of aviation support.

3. Organic Aircraft: Observation aircraft are aircraft most directly related to the commanders missions and functions. For this reason observation aircraft are considered to be organic to the supported commands and outside the purview of this SOP. This specifically applies to Army L-19 and Marine O-1B aircraft which will be assigned missions in accordance with other directives.

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IV. PROCEDURES FOR THE OPERATION OF THE AHOC.

Consistency in operation is dependent on established procedures. Accordingly, the following will guide the operation of the AHOC in carrying out the stated policies in Section III of this SOP.

A. Mission Requests:

Aviation support of I Corps is basically the fulfillment of requests for this support. These requests may originate in a variety of ways.

1. Vietnamese Army Requests: These requests originate with units in the field and are passed to the Tactical Operations Center. Here a mission request form is prepared and delivered to the AHOC, after determining through ASOC that VNAF cannot support the request.

2. U. S. Advisor Requests: Requests from U.S. sources for air support of U.S. personnel are received directly by the Operations Section, either by phone or on a mission request form.

3. Special Missions: Special missions and/or those requiring large numbers of aircraft/helicopters usually originate during a planning conference. At this time coordination is also accomplished with the ASOC to assure an integration of Army/Marine air effort with that of USAF/VNAF.

4. Emergency Missions: Emergency missions are those requiring immediate response. These are received through either ARVN or U.S. sources. Coordination with ASOC is accomplished verbally and the participating units notified by phone. In these cases, paper work will be accomplished after the mission is underway.

B. Administrative Procedures.

The purpose of administrative procedures is to provide a consistency in operation and a source of record.

1. Mission Request Preparation: Mission requests to Army and Marine Aviation Units will be prepared by the Operations Section on a Mission Request Form, (Annex A). One copy will be retained by the operations section. The number of copies furnished the aviation units will depend on their requirements. On requests for Army aircraft/helicopters one copy will be furnished ASOC. Marine flight schedules and frag orders will be delivered by the Marines to the CRP, in place of copies of the mission requests.

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2. Coordination with VNAF/USAF: Coordination of all aircraft operations in Viet Nam is the responsibility of the Air Operations Center. This coordination in I Corps is through the I Corps Air Support Operations Center.

a. Air Force Support Requirements - Many missions appropriate for Army and Marine Aviation may require support by VNAF and USAF Aviation. When the Army/Marine mission indicates a requirement for this support the ASOC will be advised verbally as soon as practical. Following this the AHOC Operations Section will advise the ARVN TOC of the details of the requirements. TOC will then initiate the necessary paper work to obtain this support. Close, continuous, personal liaison is required between U.S. personnel in both AHOC and ASOC.

b. Coordination with ASOC - In order for ASOC to accomplish the air coordination for which they are responsible, all Army and Marine flights must be brought to their attention. For pre-planned missions this is accomplished by the procedures in para IV B 1. above. Emergency missions, and other changes to the flight schedule must be furnished the ASOC or CRP prior to initiation of the flight. When the flight is originated by the accomplishing unit, that unit will be responsible for this notification. If the mission is passed to an Army or Marine unit by the AHOC, the AHOC operations section will advise ASOC.

C. Daily Planning Conference.

In order to continuously insure the best possible Aviation Support to I Corps, a daily planning conference will be held in the Aviation Headquarters Operations Center. Required attendees are Army and Marine AHOC representatives. Invited attendees are ARVN TOC, VNAF ASOC, and USAF representatives. In addition, representatives of any other unit or organization, providing or requiring aviation support may attend as they desire. The purpose of this conference is three-fold:

1. Aviation Headquarters Commander's Briefing - The Aviation Headquarters Commander will be briefed on the plans for the following days operations, known or anticipated subsequent operations, and other Army/Marine aviation matters that fall within his responsibility or interest.

2. AHOC Guidance - Should the Aviation Headquarters Commander have planning or policy guidance concerning the operations of the AHOC or other aviation matters within his field of interest, this guidance will normally be provided during the daily planning conference.

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3. Open Forum - The daily planning conference also serves the purpose for representatives of all aviation assets to gather. For this reason it is an appropriate sounding board on aviation matters of common interest. In addition, supported I Corps units are invited to discuss any matter that will improve aviation support of their units and/or make known any anticipated support requirements. When appropriate, specific mission requests may be generated at this time.

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AHOC AIR SUPPORT REQUEST

MSN NO \_\_\_\_\_

Aircraft to depart DaNang (DTG) \_\_\_\_\_

Reason for request \_\_\_\_\_

Unit Supporting: \_\_\_\_\_

ARVN Men Number or

Requesting Officer: \_\_\_\_\_

Phone \_\_\_\_\_

Location of this person

Person in charge of loading

At time of loading

or person in charge of Pax \_\_\_\_\_

Type of Aircraft \_\_\_\_\_

ETR at DaNang \_\_\_\_\_

From	W/Lbs of cargo W/Lbs of Pax	To	Grid Coordinates	Ground Time
DaNang				

Tact Air support requested:

Special remarks about the mission: \_\_\_\_\_

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