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PACFLEX I-61

EXERCISE GREEN LIGHT, PHASE III

Final

FINAL REPORT

TF-16 Ex. GREEN LIGHT, Phase III Rpt

COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
PACIFIC FLEET

CTF 16
COMMANDER BLUE TASK FORCE
EXERCISE PHASE COMMANDER

OCT. 30 1961

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COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

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Ser: 33-0355
19 July 1961

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From: Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
To: Commander FIRST Fleet

Subj: Post Exercise Report PACFLEX 1-61, Exercise GREEN LIGHT Phase III (U)

Ref: (a) CINCPACFLT (OSE) ltr ser 34/035 of 9 JAN 61
(b) COMFIRSTFLT (OCE) ltr ser 016 of 26 JAN 61
(c) FXP-5 and PACFLT addendum thereto

Encl: (1) Items of Interest occurring during GREEN LIGHT Phase III
(2) Detailed comments and recommendations

1. This report is submitted in compliance with references (a) and (b) and in conformance with reference (c).

2. Exercise GREEN LIGHT III, the final phase of PACFLEX 1-61, was a major Fleet exercise of MARDIV/MAW scale conducted by units of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and of the Royal Canadian Navy during the period 11 May - 4 June 61 in the San Diego, San Clemente, Camp Pendleton and Twentynine Palms area of Southern California. GREEN LIGHT III was sub-divided into two phases, Phase IIIA included operations of Amphibious Task Force (TF 18) during the period 11-25 May and Phase IIIB, the operations of Landing Force (TF 19) in the Twentynine Palms area during the period 28 May - 4 June 61. VADM Howard A. YEAGER, USN, COMPHIBPAC, was the Phase OCE, Exercise Phase Commander and Commander Blue Task Force (CTF 16); RADM C.C. KIRKPATRICK, USN, COMPHIBGRU ONE was Commander Blue Amphibious Task Force (CTF 18); and MGEN S.S. JACK, USMC, CG, AIRFMFPAC, was Commander Blue Landing Force (CTF 19). TF 18 was composed of Amphibious Group ONE with Amphibious Squadrons THREE and SEVEN, Landing Ship Squadrons ONE and FIVE, supported by units from NAVAIRPAC, CRUDESPAC, SERVPAC, SUBPAC, MINPAC and CANFLAGPAC. The V Marine Expeditionary Force (TF 19) was composed of the 1st Marine Division (-)(Reinforced), Force Troops, FMFPAC and the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (-)(Reinforced). Embarkation was conducted at Port Hueneme, Long Beach, Camp Del Mar and San Diego on 11-14 May. Sortie from these ports was on 15 May with rehearsal on the Silver Strand on 16 May. A FIREX was conducted at San Clemente Island on 17-18 May. Movement to Camp Pendleton on 19 May was opposed by aggressor air and submarines. Assault landings over three beaches coupled with vertical helicopter assault inland at Camp Pendleton were made on 20 May.

3. The objectives of the exercise included improvement of Fleet readiness, doctrine, and evaluation and development of modern fleet Amphibious Warfare

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tactics; particular emphasis was placed on:

a. Improvement of amphibious techniques in the conduct of modern amphibious assault.

b. Evaluation and improvement of modern defense of an Amphibious Force from air attack using integrated SAM ships and batteries.

c. The logistical support of a Division/Wing in amphibious assault, and in extensive operations inland.

The exercise was conducted as planned. The smoothness with which the exercise progressed was most gratifying. Careful planning, command attention, and an acceptable state of training by participating forces contributed immeasurably in accomplishing all major training objectives.

4. There were no major material or critical personnel casualties.

5. Items of interest relating to Exercise GREEN LIGHT III are contained in enclosure (1).

6. The aggressive opposition provided by the submarines on 19 May allowed valuable training for the Amphibious Task Force including evasive maneuvering and tactics for the heavy amphibious types. The number of screening ships assigned were inadequate for the size of the force and the opposition generated. In addition the return of CRUDESPAC ships to normal operations on D-Day prevented the test of coordinated methods employing ship-based and shore-based SAM simultaneously. MINPAC and Royal Canadian ships provided realistic problem play of Advance Forces. Aggressor air of CVG-11 and VMT-2 provided excellent training and experience in AAW.

7. The major lessons learned or recommendations resulting from experience gained in Exercise GREEN LIGHT III are as follows:

a. An amphibious exercise should contain an adequate exercise period at sea to shake down the troops in shipboard life at sea prior to rehearsal, to provide realistic training in AAW and ASW and to allow amphibious ships to operate as an amphibious movement force. The abbreviated schedule of events created by the response to international events prevented the accomplishment of the requisite training in these areas.

b. In the immediate future, it is recommended that an amphibious AAWEX be scheduled which will provide additional training, evaluation and improvement of both afloat and shore based SAM doctrine in amphibious operations. Paucity of missile ships plus early release of constructive missile ships from the exercise precluded completion of training in this important concept.

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c. To maintain the readiness of West Coast Fleet Marine Force units gained from exercises of DIV/WING size, it is recommended that a Marine exercise with limited Amphibious Force support be scheduled in the Twenty-nine Palms area in those years that a DIV/WING LEX is not scheduled in EASTPAC.

8. Enclosure (2) contains detailed comments and recommendations which are based on the summarization of consolidated reports received from Task Force, Group and Unit Commanders. Only those comments and recommendations which are considered of interest to higher authority are included.

H. A. YEAGER

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CO USS HULL (DD 945)
CO USS ROGERS (DDR 876)
CO USS PERKINS (DDR 877)
CO USS PARSONS (DD 949)
CO USS MARSHALL (DD 676)
CO USS HALSEY POWELL (DD 686)
CO USS ASPRO (AGSS 309)
CO USS MANATEE (AO 58)
CO USS FIRE DRAKE (AE 15)
CO USS ZELIMA (AF 49)
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ITEMS OF INTEREST OCCURING DURING GREENLIGHT PHASE III

1. In Exercise GREEN LIGHT III new procedures were employed for the first time. These included: control of exercise problem play, simplified means for control of nuclear weapons, Expanded Profile Loading Plans, Para-drop from high performance carrier jet aircraft, and use of the NAVOPNET by the CLF in the field.

2. The command organization for Exercise GREEN LIGHT III permitted the CATF to function without prior knowledge of the problem as generated by the NEC, EIC and TEC. COMPHIBPAC as Phase OCE and Exercise Phase Commander was able through the EIC and NEC to generate intelligence and aggressor action to control the play of the problem. This in turn required the CATF, COMPHIBGRU ONE, to react to all new information in a realistic manner. Future exercises of this scope conducted by COMPHIBPAC will contain a similar exercise organization.

3. Simplified means were provided in this DIV/WING LEX for the control of nuclear weapons. The Landing Force and Amphibious Force gained valuable experience in planning, handling and control of weapons. The operation order provided for expenditure authority, change of allocation and sub-allocation, strike requests, denials, approvals, intents, analysis and passage of control of nuclear weapons, all by unclassified message.

4. The Expanded Profile Loading Plan, which is a consolidation of the information considered necessary above the Embarkation Team level, was tested during Exercise GREEN LIGHT III. The plan showed promise but emphasized the need for uniformity and accuracy. This will be the subject of an agenda item for the 1961 Inter-Fleet Amphibious Type Commanders Conference.

5. Successful accomplishment of para-dropped reconnaissance teams by A3D-2P aircraft is significant. This new concept of para-drop by high performance jet carrier type aircraft is directly applicable to the improvement of guerrilla/counter guerrilla warfare. The aircraft should be of the A3D/2T/2Q type, capable of dropping a 4 to 6 man reconnaissance/guerrilla team while carrier based. The range inherent in the A3D type aircraft is suitable. Further development or conversion of this type aircraft for training and operational use is indicated.

6. On-line communications were outstanding throughout the exercise. The Tantalus circuit between CATF and Radio San Francisco was invaluable for disseminating information by broadcast on both FR and FRA. After H-Hour the Python circuit with CLF ashore was almost 100% reliable as was the Romulus circuit between CLF and Radio San Diego. This was the first time that CLF entered the NAVOPNET in the field.

Enclosure (1)
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7. Exploitation of the realistic injury-moulage applied to trained actors not otherwise involved in the operation was the most extensive yet employed in any landing exercise. Unusual emphasis was placed on evacuating simulated casualties from the furtherest points of advance, back through organic medical facilities so that approximately 95% of these actually reached the intended point of definitive treatment aboard ship. Approximately 100 moulages were obtained and used repeatedly each day through D plus 3. Significant play of medical intelligence involving realistic possible problems in health hazards were accomplished through the EIC.

8. a. During the opposed movement phase, the heavy amphibious ships used three movement units dispersed in a randometric formation protected by three missile AAW ships. Ships were dispersed under the missile umbrella to allow for defense against nuclear attack. Aggressor aircraft flying at high altitudes failed to provide realistic gunnery training for the amphibious type ships. This will be rectified in future exercises by generating low level attacks by both prop and jet aircraft.

b. Protection of two of these movement units against the submarine threat was not feasible due to the austere assignment of screening ships. The AAW protection afforded the heavy movement units was adequate.

c. A special CPX damage assessment problem was held on 19 May to exercise CATF and CLF staffs in planning as a result of damage to the ATF. This controlled problem proved to be extremely beneficial and will be continued in future exercises.

9. The FIREX employing support from cruisers, destroyers, LST and Marine artillery units, provided excellent training for participating units including Marine Shore Fire Control Parties ashore. Close air support missions were canceled because of low ceilings.

10. Minesweeping operations were conducted by MINPAC and CANFLAGPAC units from D-3 onward. All minesweeping was conducted in a professional and aggressive manner, and provided realistic and valuable training to all units.

11. All heavy units of the Amphibious Task Force were replenished on 17 and 18 May from AO, AE and AF. The training received was beneficial and resulted in an increase in the readiness of Amphibious and Service Force units.

12. The Command Information Bureau and the Visitors Bureau functioned as two independent organizations. Close coordination of effort and mutual support was evident during the exercise.

13. Although the prepositioning, support, and backlift of MAG 33 and MACS-2 on San Clemente Island did not come within the scope of the exercise, it is of such significance to warrant comment.

a. The prepositioning of MAG 33 and MACS-2 at San Clemente Island was hampered by unfavorable sea and surf conditions throughout the period 1-5 May. As orginally planned, MACS-2 was to have been moved by air from El Toro to San Clemente Island, but contingency operations as a result of the LAOS crisis required that PHIBRON SEVEN ships undertake this lift. This unforeseen requirement resulted in a last minute shift of priority in unloading of MAG 33 at San Clemente Island. The scope of the positioning of MACS-2, coupled with adverse sea, resulted in extensive damage to landing craft during this period. In general, every landing craft assigned to this prepositioning operation received some damage. The preponderance of damage was to propellers and shafts, holing of the bottoms or sides from the beach or while alongside ships in the roadstead. One LSD suffered a stern gate casualty which required its return to Long Beach for repair, resulting in additional changes of schedules to effect prepositioning. No major personnel casualties occured during this period.

b. The support of MAG 33 during the exercise was accomplished without incident. JP-5 fuel deliveries to the Amphibious Assault Bulk Fuel Handling System (AABFHS) in West Cove, San Clemente Island, required close coordination with FAIRSDIEGO and NOTS PASADENA because of practice mining and research in progress.

c. The administrative return of MACS-2 and MAG 33 was accomplished without incident during the periods 31 May - 1 June and 5-9 June respectively.

DETAILED COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Anti-Air Warfare

1. Comment by CG V MEF:

No CVA's, LPH's or DDR's, actual or simulated, were available for the exercise. Although a CA and two DD's were made available as simulated missile ships, these vessels were withdrawn at H+3 on D-Day. By pre-positioning MACS-2 on San Clemente Island and utilizing the simulated missile ships, the Amphibious Task Force was able to conduct integrated AAW operations during movement to and in the objective area. The withdrawl of the simulated missile ships, coupled with the absence of the other key vessels, however, had a deleterious effect on the evaluation of integrated Navy/Marine anti-air warfare and air control system.

2. Recommendation by CG V MEF:

That in future Division/Wing amphibious exercises these types of ships be included in the Amphibious Task Force and remain assigned for a period of sufficient duration to test the wholely integrated air defense system.

3. Comment by COMPHIBGRU 1:

Defense of the Amphibious Task Force by missile ships was proved to be sound. In exercise GREEN LIGHT III one cruiser and two destroyers were utilized as simulated missile ships. In order to fully analyze the effectiveness of such a defense, actual missile ships must be entered into the problem using integrated fire control systems to actually acquire, track, and simulate firing at bogeys. The early departure of simulated missile ships (H+3 hours) prevented test of coordination methods employing simultaneously ship-based and shore-based SAM.

4. Recommendation by COMPHIBGRU 1:

That future amphibious operations be assigned sufficient AAW missile ships to provide realistic AAW coverage of the movement units. That these AAW ships remain in the area to cover the assault for minimum of two days after control of AAW is passed ashore in order to test coordination between missile ships and TAOC. (Action COMFIRSTFLT)

5. Comment by COMPHIBPAC:

If test of the fully integrated air defense system is to be an exercise objective sufficient and properly configured forces to permit accomplishment must be scheduled. Our concepts have proceeded to the point where we must test that critical area involved in integrating the ship and land based missile systems or suffer retrogression in the state of the art.

6. Recommendation by COMPHIBPAC:

That this exercise objective be a part of the next major amphibious exercise and that sufficient forces be assigned for an adequate duration to accomplish the test. In the immediate future COMFIRSTFLT schedule an AAWEX with CVA, CLG, DLG, DDG, AGC, TACRON TAOC/CAOC, MACS, MARINE TERRIER and LAAMS with the mission to test current amphibious doctrine in AAW.

7. Comment by CO TACRON 11:

During the time from the arrival of the Amphibious Task Force in the Objective Area till the Landing Force has early warning radar sites established ashore, the Amphibious Task Force has almost no advance warning of low flying enemy aircraft approaching from over land. Until such time as airborne early warning aircraft with moving target indicator-equipment radar are available, the Amphibious Task Force is unable to cope with this threat. The fact that very few raids penetrated the vital area unopposed during this exercise speaks well for the zeal and ability of the AAW forces, however, it should be realized that PURPLE aircraft made relatively few attacks from over land at low level.

8. Recommendation by CO TACRON 11:

That until the advent of AEW aircraft with MTI radar, Landing Force early warning radars be moved ashore at the earliest possible time in order to shorten, as much as possible, the period when the Task Force is blind to low level attacks from over the land mass.

9. Recommendation by COMPHIBGRU 1:

Concur with CO TACRON 11 RECOMMENDATIONS. (Action FMFPAC).

10. Comment by COMPHIBPAC:

Concur that a long range radar with MTI and an overland A/C detection capability is a requirement for the Amphibious Task Force. Present shipboard radars do not have this capability. Pre-positioning a CAOC on an offshore island is a luxury which cannot be relied upon in combat.

11. Recommendation by COMPHIBPAC:

That suitable radars be installed in AGC and ultimately in APA(F) to allow detection of low flying A/C overland at ranges of present AN/SPS 29/37 radars.

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Nuclear Weapons:

12. Comment by COMPHIBGRU 1:

The operation order for the Commander Amphibious Task Force provided for the first time in Exercise GREEN LIGHT III a simplified means for controlling nuclear weapons. In past operations because of the complexity of data pertaining to and the high classification of material associated with weapons employment, it was not uncommon for commanders to be bound by cryptographic means to make their desires known regarding weapons allocation and employment. During Exercise GREEN LIGHT III weapons employment and control messages were delivered to addressees in a matter of minutes by voice radio or unclassified CW. The coded format in the operation order provided for numerous control means to include: authority to expend, allocation and sub-allocation change, strike requests, denials, approvals, intents, analysis and passage of control; this was all possible in an unclassified manner. Because of the "nature of the beast" some originators unjustifiably continued to encrypt their messages serving only to delay delivery; however, the majority of messages originated and dispatched were in the format as called for in the operation order and, being unclassified, were dispatched in minutes or seconds.

13. Conclusion by COMPHIBGRU 1:

The procedure delineated by Annex R of COMPHIBGRU 1 OPORD 303-61 for Exercise GREEN LIGHT III proved invaluable as a practical, rapid, and simplified control system for tactical employment of nuclear weapons. We have herein established workable procedures which could well be made doctrine; because it is only in the field of strategic, pre-planned nuclear weapons employment that we have established doctrine, and the amphibious forces are not involved in strategic weapons employment.

14. Recommendation by COMPHIBGRU 1:

That COMPHIBPAC cancel COMPHIBPAC ser 3-0009 of 7 April 1958 and prepare a TACNOTE incorporating the pertinent procedures outlined in Annex R, COMPHIBGRU 1 OPORD 303-61 together with information as applicable to amphibious operations derived from the newly published CINCPAC SOP on Nuclear Weapons. If accomplished, this TACNOTE would serve as the procedure for all PHIBPAC operations in EASTPAC and WESTPAC and would preclude the necessity for commanders issuing highly classified appendices to their operation order in the future.

15. Comment by COMPHIBPAC:

Concur with COMPHIBGRU 1 recommendation. The Annex R of both COMPHIBPAC and COMPHIBGRU 1 OPORD were written with this in mind, and to test the concept

and procedures. It was originally intended that the resulting document would be placed immediately in a COMPHIBPAC INST rather than a TACNOTE. A conference with nuclear officers from PHIBGRU ONE, PHIGBRU THREE, COMPHIBTRAPAC, and COMPHIBPAC is tentatively planned for this summer to finalize this action.

Electronic Warfare

16. Comment by CO TACRON 12:

Although communications jamming was experienced on the primary and secondary Helicopter Direction nets, it proved very ineffectual in hampering the control of helicopter operations. Both nets were continuously autocatted, and although the jamming of one resulted in the jamming of the other, it was at all times possible to transmit on one net while receiving on the other. The question of whether or not control would have been possible if higher powered jammers had been employed was undetermined as no need existed to resort to alternate frequencies.

17. Recommendation by CO TACRON 12:

In future operations, higher powered jammers be employed in an attempt to force a shift to alternate frequencies. This would add a realistic approach to the communication problem by providing valuable training in circuit discipline and in stationing the airborne radio relay aircraft for optimum performance during jamming.

18. Comment by COMPHIBGRU 1:

Concur. The limited power output permitted during jamming is creating a false impression of enemy capabilities.

19. Recommendation by COMPHIBGRU 1:

That in future exercises every effort be made to obtain clearance for the use of maximum power during periods of authorized jamming. (Action COMPHIBPAC)

20. Comment by COMPHIBPAC:

Concur.

21. Recommendation by COMPHIBPAC:

In future exercises BJU be authorized and equipped to provide increased jamming power in order to test our communications capability using Auto-Cat.

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Amphibious Operations

Preliminary Operations

22. Comment by CG V MEF:

The Advance Force was neither prepared to, nor capable of participating in the destruction and neutralization of targets and the assessment of target damage. A SACC was not established and the flagship, an LST, was not capable of transmitting periodic damage assessment reports to the ATF. As a result, the MEF Target Information Officer aboard the LST could not function as planned and no targets were engaged by surface means prior to arrival of the ATF in the objective area.

23. Recommendation by CG V MEF:

That the Advance Force actively participate in the target destruction and damage assessment play of the problem. (Action COMPHIBPAC)

24. Comment by COMPHIBPAC:

If the Advance Force concept is to be used in an exercise then it must be provided with sufficient forces to employ it in a realistic manner.

25. Recommendation by COMPHIBPAC:

In future exercises employing the Advance Force concept, provide sufficient forces of the proper configuration to ensure meeting the needs of the exercise.

Embarkation

26. Comment by COMPHIBGRU 1:

Overall utilization of adjusted vehicle square available was approximately 70%. (Adjusted square referes to the figure remaining after the maximum square available has been reduced by the appropriate broken stowage factor). Transport types, less the ELDORADO, average approximately 52% of adjusted capability while landing ship types average approximately 89% of adjusted capacity.

27. Recommendation by COMPHIBGRU 1:

That the landing force continue to make every effort to utilize available vehicle stowage space to the maximum extent possible - consistent with the requirements of combat loading and the tactical play ashore.

28. Comment by COMPHIBPAC:

Maximum utilization of shipping is mandatory in all exercises if the utmost training is expected to be gained. This is especially true during present times when every effort to reduce Tempo of Operations is exerted.

29. Recommendation by COMPHIBPAC:

Troops must utilize to the maximum, space available in all assigned shipping. COMPHIBPAC will include special instructions on loading of ships in all LOI to be issued in the future to insure proper utilization of shipping.

Rehearsal

30. Comment by COMPHIBGRU 1:

The rehearsal conducted on the day following sortie was hampered by insufficient preparation at the individual ship level.

31. Recommendation by COMPHIBGRU 1:

That schedule of events permit a minimum of two days underway steaming prior to rehearsal in order to allow sufficient time for ship and landing force embarked to integrate and conduct drills preparatory to assault and unloading. (Action COMPHIBPAC)

32. Comment by COMPHIBPAC:

The reduction of the exercise time as a result of the Laos crisis caused a condensation of the period available to the ATF and the LF to conduct required training. The exercise had to be scheduled within a framework fitting the annual schedule of upkeep and other operations. For this reason sufficient time was not available to train aboard ship prior R-Day.

33. Recommendation by COMPHIBPAC:

In future exercises suitable time be scheduled for movement at sea and proper troop training prior rehearsal day.

Gunfire Support

34. Comment by CG V MEF:

Naval gunfire support was provided by two heavy cruisers (constructive) and four destroyers (actual). These ships departed the operating area at H+3.

35. Recommendation by CG V MEF:

That actual NGF support ships be assigned in future exercises and that they remain on station until at least the morning of D+3. (Action COMPHIBPAC & FMFPAC)

36. Comment by COMPHIBPAC:

The bi-annual EASTPAC DIV/WING LEX should merit priority assignment of sufficient forces of all types to support the exercise concept. While the value of retaining the NGF support ships until D+3 is open to question, they should be retained until at least D+1 in order to properly exercise the Landing Force.

37. Recommendation by COMPHIBPAC:

In future exercises, schedule sufficient actual NGF support ships to participate until completion of NGF exercise requirements.

Communications

38. Comment by CO TACRON 12:

The employment of MIDDLEMAN during the control afloat portion of the helicopter operation was considered a contributing factor to the success experienced by the HDC afloat. With the exception of the first two AD5W aircraft which experienced difficulties with their auto-cat equipment, no problems were encountered necessitating any change from the planned use of frequencies or equipments. No difficulty was experienced in maintaining continuous communications with the helicopters whether airborne or on deck.

39. Recommendation by CO TACRON 12:

Airborne radio relay be more fully exploited during future exercises. The movement phase of exercise GREEN LIGHT was considered an ideal situation for the employment of a "split-net" airborne relay (i.e. all ships transmit on one UHF frequency and receive on another) for command and/or AAW purposes. With the relay aircraft stationed at 10,000 feet midway between surface units, UHF ranges in excess of 200 miles are feasible.

40. Recommendation by COMPHIBGRU 1:

Concur, noting that the 200 mile range and the central location of the aircraft would disclose the location of the task force through enemy use of D/F equipment and traffic analysis. (Action COMPHIBPAC)

41. Comment by COMPHIBPAC:

Concur that airborne radio relay is excellent assist but altitude of aircraft should be controlled to provide only range required, in order to minimize enemy DF'ing.

42. Comment by CO TACRON 11:

Although commonly used in AAWEX operations, this is the first major PHIBLEX in which the Rapid Verification Table (RVT) has been used for authentication.

43. Conclusion by CO TACRON 11:

The RVT combines the advantages of speed, accuracy, ease of use and security to a degree unmatched by either KAA-4 or KAA-35. The RVT is especially suitable for use on air control nets.

44. Recommendation by CO TACRON 11:

That consideration be given by COMPHIBPAC to recommending the adoption of the RVT tables by CNO as a standard Navy authentication system. (Action COMPHIBPAC)

45. Comment by COMPHIBGRU 1:

Concur as to speed, accuracy and ease of use as contrasted with Triton Systems. However, security provided by the RVT is as yet unknown.

46. Recommendation by COMPHIBGRU 1:

That the security afforded by RVT, using 30 tables, be evaluated by BJU-1 in a future exercise. (Action COMPHIBPAC)

47. Comment by COMPHIBPAC:

Concur, BJU-1 will be directed to evaluate RVT tables in a future exercise. If found to be secure, a recommendation to CNO will be forthcoming.

48. Comment by CO TACRON 11:

Rapid and reliable communications continue to be a primary requirement for a successful amphibious assault. In this exercise all aircraft squadrons were operating from land based airfields, which made it imperative that TACC afloat have reliable communications with those airfields.

49. Recommendation by CO TACRON 11:

In future planning FSK RATT should be used on either the Tactical Air Administrative Net or the Tactical Air Command Net. With present flagship capability to net with Landing Force AN/MRC-32 equipment, it is apparent that excellent results even over extended ranges on a simpler basis would be realized. Ships with TACC/TADC or HDC embarked should arrange to provide the RATT control station convenient to the Supporting Arms Coordination Center. Tape perforating equipment and the capability to employ a transmitter-distributor on the circuit would expedite traffic. (Action COMPHIBPAC)

50. Comment by COMPHIBGRU 1:

Concur. The use of FSK RATT would prove to be valuable on either net and its narrow band characteristics as contrasted with a voice circuit would ease the cross modulation problem on the flagship.

51. Recommendation by COMPHIBGRU 1:

While not requiring evaluation as such, recommend that CATF of a future exercise be requested to employ FSK RATT on the TAC Net and report results. (Action COMPHIBPAC)

52. Comment by COMPHIBPAC:

Concur, CATF will be so directed in a forthcoming appropriate exercise.

53. Comment by CO USS ELDORADO:

Shackle cipher grids were changed each day at 1201T while rapid verification tables were changed at 0000T each day.

54. Recommendation by CO USS ELDORADO:

That in the future both should change at the same time for the sake of simplicity.

55. Comment by COMPHIBGRU 1:

Concur.

56. Conclusion by COMPHIBGRU 1:

Future OPORDS will specify that both shackle grids and RVT will become effective each day at 1200 local time.

57. Comment by COMPHIBPAC:

Do not concur. Simplicity noted by CO ELDORADO leads to compromise. Staggering change times of various codes adds complications to Communication analysis thus adding to security.

Medical

58. Comment by CG V MEF:

Recognizing the difficulty in achieving realism in casualty play by the standard procedure of tagging umpire assessed casualties, the Medical/Dental section investigated the possibility during the planning phase of injecting realism into the exercise by the employment of trained casualty actors not organic to the landing force who used wound-simulating moulages. In the execution of plans it is felt that an unprecedented realism in casualty play was achieved. As requested by the Amphibious Force, an average of fifty simulated casualties, both moulage and tagged, were realistically evacuated as litter cases over the beach to the ships on D+1 and D+2 and 132 cases on D+3. Employment of non-organic actors permits realistic casualty play without reducing unit strengths to a point detrimental to tactical training objectives. The response to this innovation in casualty play can be characterized as highly enthusiastic from the Task Force Commander down to the individual casualty actor. It should be pointed out that unit commanders must be aware of the actors presence so as to avoid possible non-tactical actions to insure care of a supposed actual casualty.

59. Recommendation by CG V MEF:

Success and impact of casualty play in this exercise recommends similar casualty play in future exercises.

60. Comment by COMPHIBPAC:

Realism was injected into the operation by providing an unusually large number of injury-mimicking moulages. These were fitted to special "actors" not otherwise involved in the operation and were used again under varying situations and circumstances each day. So much realism was achieved in fact that one Marine Officer on or near the beach allegedly called one of the forward Command Posts requesting that realism be reduced inasmuch as the sight of these moulaged casualties were "making certain of the troops sick"! Also there was the confirmed report of the civilian woman motorist who picked up one of the moulaged-actor-casualties and had to be convinced that he was not acutely in need of hospitilization.

61. Recommendation by COMPHIBPAC:

That in future operations the use of realistic moulaged, injured "actors", not otherwise employed in the operation, be exploited to the maximum.

Landing Force

Organization

62. Comment by CG V MEF:

GREEN LIGHT III again reaffirmed the fact that the practice of designating the TACRON Commander as the Tactical Air Commander is unsatisfactory. Neither the TACRON nor the Amphibious Group staff is organized to exercise command of the air units of the Task Force. In this exercise, all air, with minor exceptions, was provided by the 3rd MAW. The CG 3rd MAW should have been designated the Tactical Air Commander and have been provided with adequate facilities afloat to permit exercising of the air command function. Had significant actual or simulated carrier air been employed the senior Carrier Division Commander could well have performed this duty. Such an assignment would have been excellent training for the Carrier Division Staff if properly augmented by Marine air representatives.

63. Recommendation by CG V MEF:

That in future exercises the TACRON be limited to its air control function and, as appropriate, the senior Carrier Division Commander or Marine Air Commander be designated as the Tactical Air Commander.

64. Comment by COMPHIBGRU 1:

CG V MEF indicated that (1) Designation of TACRON Commander as TAC is unsatisfactory doctrine (2) Amphibious Task Force staff in AGC is not organized to command air units of Task Force and (3) that some other commander (i.e. Carrier Division Commander or Marine Air Wing Commander) be designated Tactical Air Commander.

COMPHIBGRU ONE as CATF followed doctrine as established in NWP 22, Article 735 and considers this doctrine sound. The TACRON commander was designated TAC in accordance with current practice and in consonance with mission of TACRON as defined in NWP 22. This organization functioned satisfactorily during GREEN LIGHT.

65. Recommendation by COMPHIBGRU 1:

COMPHIBGRU ONE feels that the TAC should be established in the CATF flagship and that the TAC is properly a function of the TACRON commander. It is further considered that present AGC facilities are adequate for control of air operations. With the current approved CIP, in particular installation of SPS 37 radar in ESTES, facilities will be further improved.

If there is any question of adequate air control and command facilities, this matter of course should be investigated. If found lacking, immediate improvements in facilities should be instituted. However, the TAC must be embarked in the Amphibious Force Flagship and be directly responsible to CATF.

66. Comment by COMPHIBPAC:

Concur with COMPHIBGRU 1. The TACRON is capable of accomplishing its mission in the Tactical Air Direction Center as the principal naval aviation advisor to the CATF.

Designation of a CARDIV Commander as the TAC is not in consonance with existing doctrine if the CARDIV Commander is to remain with his carrier. The Tactical Air Commander must be embarked in the CATF flagship so that the CATF will have positive and finite control of air operations in the objective area which is essential to an amphibious assault.

If the senior Marine Aviator was designated as the Tactical Air Commander, Landing Force Aviation would have to be removed from the Landing Force and treated as a separate Force (art 226, NWP 22) similar to Air Force Forces. Such an arrangement would destroy the integrity of the Marine DIV/WING Team.

67. Recommendation by COMPHIBPAC:

Concur with the recommendation of COMPHIBGRU ONE.

Preliminary Planning

68. Comment by CG V MEF:

Based on the T/O's and T/E's of the V MEF task organization, the requirements for MSTS shipping to augment the amphibious shipping assigned were computed. This requirement as submitted to CATF was expressed both in terms of ships by type (T-AP/T-AK) and requirements by personnel, cube and square feet (Vehicular). CATF in turn forwarded requirements to COMPHIBPAC who as Fleet Commander submitted these (constructively) to COMSTSPAC. However, only the number of ships required was forwarded. COMSTSPAC assigned

shipping by name (constructive). The ships as assigned did not agree with requirements for personnel spaces. As the purpose of this evolution was to exercise the procedure for requesting this type of shipping, it was not considered that any purpose would be served by resubmitting a request for additional space.

69. Recommendation by CG V MEF:

The submission of shipping requirements should be stated in terms of personnel, cube and square with remarks as to the type loading anticipated (combat) and in number of notional ships. The use of such shipping facilitates embarkation planning when constructive vessels are used.

70. Comment by COMPHIBPAC:

Concur. Recent discussions during the Fleet Loading Out Conference in San Francisco during February with representatives of CG FMFPAC and COMSTSPACAREA brought out the fact that requests for actual or constructive MSTS augmentation must be in considerable detail to permit proper assignment of available shipping.

71. Recommendation by COMPHIBPAC:

That the constructive MSTS shipping concept continue to be played in amphibious exercises.

72. Comment by CG V MEF:

Constructive employment of MSTS shipping was not conducted beyond the scope of request and assignment procedures. It is recognized that most of the inherent problems associated with the use of MSTS shipping in the objective area are peculiar to the Navy, however, the Landing Force is vitally affected. The problems involved are relatively well known and constructive play in this area would provide little benefit as compared with actual employment of such shipping which would present problems requiring realistic solutions.

73. Recommendation by CG V MEF:

That future exercises provide for actual employment of both T-AP and T-AK.

74. Comment by COMPHIBPAC:

Concur. We must continue to press forward on the problems of this concept and begin to gather some actual experience.

75. Recommendation by COMPHIBPAC:

That participation of actual MSTS T-AP and T-AK be tentatively scheduled for several major exercises in FY'64 and that funds to support these ships be requested in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 12 of CINCPACFLT INST 03120.9D.

Intelligence

76. Comment by CG V MEF:

A force Photo Scanning Center was established within VMCJ-3 for the purpose of gaining intelligence of an immediate nature and for its rapid dissemination to the Landing Force by message interpretation reports. The concept of a Photo Scanning Center is considered valid for providing intelligence not available from other sources within a reasonable length of time. An average of 2 hours was required to interpret a mission and prepare a report.

77. Recommendation by CG V MEF:

That the 70mm Roll Film Viewer, High Power Stereoscope and Variable Power Monocular Magnifier, planned for early introduction into the fleet, be obtained for issue to major FMF units to reduce the time required to produce an interpretation report.

78. Comment by COMPHIBPAC:

AGCs do not have a 70mm capability at the present time. Since both the Navy and Air Force are going to 70mm, we must either have it or get all aerial photography processed by other organizations, which will in effect greatly limit the photo interpretation capability of the Amphibious Force. COMPHIBGRU THREE has requested that USS ESTES (AGC 12) be equipped during the next yard period to handle 70mm photography.

79. Recommendation by COMPHIBPAC:

That developing, printing and scanning equipment for 70mm photography be installed in AGC's.

80. Comment by CG V MEF:

Insertion of Force Reconnaissance Company teams was accomplished by fixed-wing aircraft and underway submerged submarine. Recovery of teams was accomplished by underway submerged submarine, fixed-wing aircraft and helicopter. For the first time in a major exercise the A3D-2P model aircraft were utilized as a drop vehicle and proved to be excellent.

81. Recommendation by CG V MEF:

That a more reliable device for underwater signaling be developed to assure a more positive means of the submarine and swimmer locating each other. (Action CMC, CG FMFPAC)

82. Comment by COMPHIBPAC:

Because of technological developments within the Communist Bloc, the training of UDT and Marine Reconnaissance personnel from underway submerged submarines is absolutely vital if the amphibious forces are to have a reconnaissance capability under actual combat conditions. At present this type of training is very hard to accomplish because of the intensive training schedules of submarines and because submarines presently in the fleet are not configured to accommodate personnel for reconnaissance missions.

83. Recommendation by COMPHIBPAC:

That submarine and reconnaissance training schedules be coordinated to allow sufficient training to establish and maintain a reconnaissance capability from underway submerged submarines, and that properly configured submarines and associated equipment be obtained for the fleet for employment in UDT and Marine Reconnaissance operations.

Operations

84. Comment by CG V MEF:

Guerrilla action against rear units, support installations, control centers and unit command posts proved entirely successful, despite the fact that commands were warned prior to initiation of operations that this type of action would be emphasized.

85. Recommendation by CG V MEF:

That a detailed review of the Marine Corps capability to counter guerrilla action be accomplished at all levels.

That increased emphasis be placed on protective training against such operations.

86. Comment by COMPHIBPAC:

The problems of anti-guerrilla operations is extremely complex and magnified. It requires intensive study, beginning with the highly technical specialty of control and coordination between political, intelligence and the

military operations of divisions of the ground forces. It was in this area that the Germans failed completely in their attempts to handle the problem, and it was in the solution to this problem that the British were finally able to win the anti-guerrilla operation in Malaya.

87. Recommendation by COMPHIBPAC:

That an intensive study be made of anti-guerrilla operations as conducted to date, and of the special problems in this field that will pertain to amphibious operations; that from these studies doctrine be established, and that this doctrine be tested thoroughly in future exercises where possible. Recommend increased emphasis on guerrilla/counter guerrilla warfare including use of high performance carrier based aircraft, helos and small craft to position and recover recco units.

Communications

88. Comment by CG V MEF:

There is no single side band equipment installed in amphibious shipping specifically designated for troop use while elements of a landing force are embarked. Recent troop tests (Marine Corps Troop Test Program, Phase I) conducted by this command were based upon a proposed modernization schedule which envisages a change in the type of radios to be employed by Fleet Marine Force units. This program provides for single side band replacement of radio and radio relay equipment in the high and very high frequency ranges, the majority of such replacements to be completed by 1964. At the present time, amphibious shipping is equipped with radios compatible with current Marine Corps field equipment and specifically designated for troop use during the ship-to-shore phase of an amphibious operation. In order to effect an orderly transition from current to proposed equipment, it is mandatory that early consideration be given similar reconfiguration of shipboard installations, programmed to phase in with the schedule established by the Marine Corps.

89. Recommendation by CG V MEF:

That liaison be initiated with the appropriate Navy Department bureau to provide a program of changes to shipboard troop radio installations on a schedule compatible with that established for Fleet Marine Force units.

90. Comment by COMPHIBPAC:

Concur, COMPHIBPAC will refer this matter to the Amphibious Warfare Advisory Board presently scheduled to meet 10 OCT 61.

91. Comment by CG V MEF:

Many of the radio remote operating stations utilized by embarked troops aboard amphibious shipping employ either the RXS (barrel switch) or the RHS C-1138/HR remote unit, both configured to accommodate Plug PJ 636. In a majority of installations, these units employ a handset at the position, restricting the operator to one-hand operation at all times. The more desirable head-and-chest sets equipped with Plug PJ 636 are not available within Division units and cannot be embarked.

92. Recommendation by CG V MEF:

That all remote units at operating positions employed by embarked troops be provided with properly equipped head-and-chest sets in lieu of the currently prevalent handsets.

93. Comment by COMPHIBPAC:

Concur. BUSHIPS allowance list, part 2, shows an allowance of 20% of the total number of Radio Control sets to be the number of head and chest sets for each ship, While COMPHIBPAC concurs with the desirability of having the head and chest sets available on troop radio circuits, it is considered that the present allowance is sufficient provided the ship is up to allowance and the sets are in good repair. Action will be taken to direct ships to have on hand the required allowance of head and chest sets.

94. Comment by CG V MEF:

Upon arrival at the objective area, troops coordination via troop communication facilities becomes an immediate necessity. Radio silence was imposed by OCE commencing at 0001 on D-Day to continue until H-3 hours on D-Day. With H-Hour being 1200 and the Task Force shipping located at the objective area at 0600 on D-Day, the continued imposition of radio silence until H-3 hours was unnecessary and undesirable.

95. Recommendation by CG V MEF:

That upon arrival at the objective area radio silence be lifted.

96. Comment by COMPHIBPAC:

COMPHIBPAC considers the decision as to when to lift radio silence a matter for resolution by CATF in conjunction with Commander Landing Force.

97. Comment by CG V MEF:

Radios on the USS BAYFIELD initially allocated for Troop use were adequate. However, during the afloat phase two equipments allocated for troop use were withdrawn for TACRON use. This deprived the Wing afloat of essential equipments and prevented the establishment of key Landing Force Aviation Nets while aboard.

98. Recommendation by CG V MEF:

That ships equipment allocated for embarked units use not be withdrawn when they are essential to Landing Force communications.

99. Comment by COMPHIBPAC:

While it is agreed that communication facilities installed for use of embarked troops should normally be reserved for troop use, under certain circumstances it may be necessary to re-allocate communication facilitates within a flagship due to the exigencies of the situation. This then becomes a matter for local resolution by the embarked commander.

100. Comment by OIC BJU ONE:

During the Twentynine Palms phase of the operation it was observed that the Marine Force utilized the rapid verification tables to a greater extent than at Camp Pendleton. These RVT's are at present the best authentication system in use by the fleet, providing they are not used continuously. Checking in and out of the net, filing tactical orders, and when deception is suspected on the net are circumstances when the RVT's should be used.

101. Recommendation by OIC BJU ONE:

That continued use be made of the RVT's by the Naval and Marine Forces, and that receipting authentication be utilized more often in order that the originator may be sure the correct station is receiving the message.

102. Comment by COMPHIBRON ONE:

Concur.

103. Recommendation by COMPHIBRON ONE:

That RVT's continue to be employed by Naval and Marine Forces in future.

104. Comment by COMPHIBPAC:

See item 47.

CONFIDENTIAL

Exercise Intelligence Center

105. Comment by EIC:

During the period of operation of the Exercise Intelligence Center a total of eight enlisted personnel, both Marine and Navy were assigned to the EIC in the capacity of Yeomen/Clerks.

106. Discussion by EIC:

Of the total assigned only one had previous intelligence experience. This lack of experienced enlisted personnel coupled with the close to monthly turnover made it difficult to function administratively.

107. Recommendation by EIC:

That experienced enlisted personnel be assigned and that once assigned they remain until the conclusion of the exercise.

108. Comment by COMPHIBPAC:

During the period of time in which the EIC was active (17 JAN - 5 JUN 61) numerous personnel were changed or relieved to assume other duties in their respective commands.

109. Recommendation by COMPHIBPAC:

That all personnel assigned remain in the EIC, unless unforseen circumstances dictate their being removed, until the conclusion of the exercise.

110. Comment by EIC:

PACFLEX 1-61 as a three Phase Operation, with three separate Phase Commanders, made liaison for each Phase difficult during the planning portion of each Phase, due to the transition from one Phase to the next.

111. Discussion by EIC:

Many times problem areas in planning, as pertains to the over-all intelligence picture that the EIC is creating, could have been resolved prior to becoming full blown and mature problems, if a representative from the EIC had been at the major commands planning conferences.

112. Recommendation by EIC:

That in future operations, there is contained in the basic letter of instruction a statement that the EIC will have a representative at the initial planning conferences.

113. Comment by COMPHIBPAC:

In various exercises being planned of RLT size or larger, it is often determined later that an EIC is required. EIC personnel are therefore introduced into the problem after considerable planning is completed. This makes it difficult for EIC to create and disseminate timely intelligence due to their not having been read into the original program and planning, at inception.

114. Recommendation by COMPHIBPAC:

That the basic letter of instruction set forth requirements that EIC have a representative at the initial planning conference.

115. Comment by EIC:

The EIC is called upon to make damage assessment reports of strikes and prep-fires.

116. Discussion by EIC:

Although the EIC received copies of scheduled strikes and a scheduled prep-fires as contained in operation orders, no information was received at the EIC that the scheduled strikes and prep-fires were ever conducted, or if damage assessment was made by unit conducting the strikes or fires.

117. Recommendation by EIC:

That the EIC be fully informed on all strikes and fires conducted, and at the time made.

118. Comment by COMPHIBPAC:

Although the EIC normally receives copies of scheduled strikes and prep-fires contained in Op Orders, often the EIC is not informed when various missions abort or prep-fires were not conducted, or whether damage assessment was made by unit conducting the strikes or fires.

119. Recommendation by COMPHIBPAC:

That EIC be kept fully informed on all strikes and fires conducted, and at the time made.

120. Comment by COMPHIBPAC:

Although intelligence as a whole during exercise GREEN LIGHT was excellent, there was a noticeable amount of information that did not receive proper and complete dissemination to all participating forces in the exercise.

121. Recommendation by COMPHIBPAC:

The Amphibious Task Force Commanders insure that all ships receive certain intelligence that will keep them informed and properly alert. Such intelligence under actual conditions would be mandatory.

COMPHIBPAC will take appropriate action to correct inadequacies and implement all of the above recommendations, which were made by the EIC.

Administration

122. Comment by CIB:

In exercises of GREEN LIGHT III size outstanding opportunities are offered for favorable publicity. Results that are attainable are in direct proportion to the efforts devoted to this end. Properly qualified personnel must be assigned full-time responsibilities commensing during the planning stage. This staff must be augmented by additional trained assistants as the exercise progresses.

123. Recommendation by CIB:

The information officer should be the officer serving on the staff of the OCE. Other qualified information personnel for the CIB should be ordered to duty from participating commands as required.

124. Comment by COMPHIBPAC:

Concur.

125. Recommendation by COMPHIBPAC:

That in future exercises the CIB be established early in the exercise planning phase with augmentation of qualified information personnel as required during the pre-exercise and exercise period.