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Operation Order 1-67 (Operation COCHISE)

Copy ___ of ___ copies
 Task Force XRAY
 DANANG, Republic of Vietnam
 090800 August 1967

Ref: (a) Maps: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014. Sheets 6740 III;
 6739 IV; 6639 I, IV; 6640 II, III.
 (b) First MarDiv OpOrd 93-67 (Operation COCHISE)
 (c) CG First MarDiv ltr 3:OP:tgp over 3010 of 8Aug67 (Notal)
 (d) CG First MarDiv 040851Z Aug67.

Time Zone: H

Task Organization. Annex A (Task Organization)

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence)b. Friendly Forces.

(1) Reference (b)

(2) CG First Marine Division (Rein) conducts operations within its area of responsibility to capture or destroy enemy forces therein, protect the vitalbase area, support the Revolutionary Development program, and assist in the extension of GVN influence.

c. Attachments. Annex A (Task Organization).

(1) For planning purposes, DIRLAUTH all units.

(2) Attachments effective by 1000H on D-2 except as otherwise noted.

2. MISSION. Commencing L Hour, D-day, Task Force XRAY, in coordination with the Second ARVN Division and TG 79.4 conducts a search and destroy operation in the THANG BINH - TAM KY - HIEP DUC triangle to capture, destroy or dislodge enemy forces in the hill mass north of TIEN PHUOC and capture or destroy the personnel, equipment and facilities of the Second NVA Division and its support forces in the vicinity of HIEP DUC.

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TAB-A

3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Operation. Phase I: Commencing on or about 11 August Fifth Mar (-) (Rein) in coordination with an ARVN Task Force, enters the hill mass south of NUI LAC SON by foot and sweeps eastward to the coastal plain where BLT 1/3 and two battalions of the 2d ARVN Infantry Division have established blocking positions. Phase II: On conclusion of Phase I Fifth Mar (-) (Rein), BLT 1/3 and three ARVN battalions execute a phased helicopterborne envelopment of HIEP DUC and the Headquarters area of the 2d NVA Division, conduct a detailed search of the area to discover and destroy enemy forces, supplies and facilities in the area. Phase III: On completion of S&D of the HIEP DUC area, Fifth Mar (-) conducts S&D operation along the valley from HIEP DUC northeastward to QUE SON.
- b. Fifth Mar (-) (Rein)
- (1) Be prepared on order to execute Operation COCHISE in accordance with reference (b).
 - (2) Designate a command group and one rifle company as Task Force reserve. The rifle company so designated is not to be committed without authorization from this Headquarters. Designation of another rifle company as Task Force reserve will be included in such request.
- c. BLT 1/3
- (1) On D-day execute helilift from positions in Operation Beacon Gate AO to area west of hill 29 and assume blocking positions, in accordance with Annex C (Operation Overlay).
 - (2) Be prepared on order to execute a helilift to LZ's to be determined in the vicinity of HIEP DUC in order to conduct a detailed search and destroy operation into the base area of the 2d NVA Division.
 - (3) Be prepared on order to terminate participation in Operation COCHISE and conduct helilift from area of operation.
 - (4) On chop to Task Force XRAY, be prepared on order to chop organic 105mm howitzer battery to Second Battalion Group, Eleventh Marines for employment in direct support of Task Force XRAY.

(5) 4.2" mortar battery remains attached.

(6) Establish BLT CP (Rear) at Hill 29 with administrative personnel as required at Hill 63.

(7) Maintain one rifle company in battalion reserve, to be committed only on authority of this Headquarters.

d. Second Battalion Group, Eleventh Mar

(1) On order provide artillery fires in support of Operation COCHISE, displacing as required.

(2) Be prepared on order to take OPCON of BLT organic 105mm howitzer battery for employment in direct support of Task Force XRAY.

(3) No later than D-1 establish a coordinated FSCC with Second ARVN Infantry Division fire support personnel for control of supporting arms in support of Operation COCHISE. Effect necessary coordination with DASC as established by First Marine Aircraft Wing at Hill 29.

e. Detachment Hq Bn. Establish and maintain a command post at Hill 29 for Phase I of Operation COCHISE, thereafter as directed. Personnel and equipment will be restricted to that necessary for operations under field conditions. Reference (c) applies.

f. Det 1st Recon Bn. Commencing D-1 conduct operations in support of Operation COCHISE in accordance with reference (b).

g. Task Force Reserve, Fifth Marines.

(1) Designate a command group and one rifle company as Task Force reserve in accordance with paragraph 3.c.(2) above.

(2) Prepare necessary plans for commitment as Task Force Reserve in support of Division, Task Force XRAY or ARVN forces as required.

(3) Be prepared on order to take OPCON of one company from BLT 1/3.

(4) Be prepared to commit the Task Force reserve or a portion thereof as directed.

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h. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Reference (b) as applicable.
- (2) Task Force XRAY activated by reference (d).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. References (b) and (d) pertain.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

a. Communications-Electronics

- (1) See Annex F (Communication-Electronics) of reference (b).
- (2) Task Force XRAY Reserve

Call Sign: FAST REWARD
 Frequency: 57.5 MC
 M-Designator: M-332

Be prepared to guard TF XRAY Cmd/Coord Net on order and others as required.

b. Command Posts

- (1) Task Force XRAY: Hill 29
- (2) Subordinate units report as established.

Foster C. LaHue
 FOSTER C. LAHUE
 Brigadier General
 Commanding

ANNEXES:

- A - Task Organization
- B - Intelligence (to be issued)
- C - Operation Overlay
- D - Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Annex D (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-67

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DANANG, Republic of Vietnam
090800 August 1967

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 1-67

Time Zone: H

(All attachments effective 1000H D-2 except as noted).

Task Force XRAY

BGen F. C. LAHUE

Det Hq Bn

Det Hq Co
Comm Co (-) (Rein), 7th Comm Bn
Det, Comm Co

5th Mar (-) (Rein)

Col DAVIS

Hq Co (-)
1st Bn (-) (Rein)

LCol HILGARTNER

2 Co's
1 Co, 1st Mar
Plat, 1st Engr Bn
Plat, 1st SP Bn

3d Bn (-) (Rein)

LCol WEBSTER

2 Co's
1 Co, 1st Mar
Plat, 1st Engr Bn
Plat, 1st SP Bn

*BLT 1/3

LCol THOMAS

1st Bn 3d Mar
3d Plat, Co C, 3d Tk Bn
Btry W, 2d Bn 12th Mar
1st Plat (Rein), Co B, 3d Recon Bn
Engr Plat (Rein), Co A, 3d Engr Plat

2d Bn Group, 11th Mar

LCol HUNTER

2d Bn (DS)
Plat, 3d 8" How Btry (GSR)
Plat, 3d 155mm Gun Btry (GSR)

*Btry A, 1st Bn, 12th Mar

Det, 1st Recon Bn

Capt DIXON

Task Force Reserve (activated on order)

Cmd grp, 5th Mar
Co __, 5th Mar
Co __, BLT 1/3

Note:

* Upon chop to Task Force XRAY

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FOSTER C. LAHUE
Brigadier General
Commanding

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 DANANG, Republic of Vietnam
 090800 August 1967

Annex D (Distribution) to Operation Order 1-67

Time Zone: H

1. Distribution of this order is as follows:

CG 1st MarDiv	30	G-3	2
CG 1st MAW	10	G-4	2
CG FLC/FSR	2	CEO	2
CTG 79.4	6	FSCC	2
CTG 76.4	2	AirO	1
CTG 70.8	2	Hq Cmdt	1
Task Force Oregon	2	Comm Co, 7th Comm Bn	2
SA 2d ARVN Div	2	Fifth Mar (-) (Rein)	5
Task Force XRAY:		BLT 1/3	3
CG	2	2d Bn Grp, 11th Mar	3
G-1	12	Det, 1st Recon Bn	2
G-2	2	Total	97

Foster C. Lachue
 FOSTER C. LACHUE
 Brigadier General
 Commanding

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D-1

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

3:DNB:kgb
3480.1
Ser: 00438-67
25 OCT 1967

SECRET — Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1)

From: Commanding General
To: Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Attn: MACJ
343) APO, U.S. Forces 96222
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
Subj: Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation SWIFT
Ref: (a) MACV Dir No. 335-8
(b) FMFPacO 3000.4
Encl: (1) Subject Report

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) enclosure (1) is forwarded herewith.
2. Operation SWIFT was a search and destroy operation which commenced on 4 September 1967 in the northern portion of QUANG TIN Province. The 5th Marines (-) (Rein) were initially employed as the operating force. As the operation progressed Task Force KHAY was activated and assumed operational command on 7 September 1967.
3. Operation SWIFT was a successful operation characterized by vigorous initial contact between a small Marine force and a large enemy organization. Reinforcement of the battle field was quickly and effectively achieved, and what could have been a costly enemy victory was turned into the eventual route and dispersion of the Second NVA Division.
4. Of interest is the use of CS as noted in the 5th Marines report appended to enclosure (1).
5. The recommendations contained in paragraph 4 of the basic report, and paragraph 16 of enclosure (1) to the basic report are concurred in.

FOSTER C. LAHUE
Acting

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HEADQUARTERS
Task Force XRAY
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

Encl (1) only

3/AJP/trl
3480
Ser: 00442-67
26 Oct 1967

[REDACTED]
From: Commanding General
To: Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
(Attn: MACJ 343), APO, U. S. Forces, 96222
Via: (1) Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
(2) Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SWIFT (RCS:
MACJ-32) (K-1)

Ref: (a) MACV Dir 335-8 of 1 Sep 1967

Encl: (1) Task Force XRAY After Action Report ✓
(2) Task Force XRAY Overlays
(3) Recapitulation of Supplies Issued
~~(4) 5th Marines After Action Report~~
(5) 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines, After Action Report

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HEADQUARTERS
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF
67 4312
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1. Enclosure (1) contains the subject report of Commanding General Task Force XRAY for Operation SWIFT. Enclosures (2) through (5) amplify enclosure (1).

2. Operation SWIFT commenced on 4 Sep 1967. Task Force XRAY was ordered into the field on 6 Sep 1967 and assumed operational command of forces already committed on 7 Sep 1967. As a result, enclosure (1) will reflect only that period between 7 and 15 Sep 1967, although at times referring to the preceding three days while enclosure (4) and (5) will reflect the entire period of Operation SWIFT.

3. It should also be noted that the Army of the Republic of Vietnam had forces committed to a companion operation, LIEN KET 116. This operation especially during the latter stages of Operation SWIFT had a very definite and profound impact on U. S. forces involved in Operation SWIFT. Although LIEN KET 116 and SWIFT are considered separate operations for reporting purposes, they should be examined together as mutually supporting and coordinated operations.

4. The recommendations contained in paragraph 15 of enclosure (4) are concurred in. Internal action has been initiated in response to the recommendation contained in paragraph 15d.

Foster C. Lahue
FOSTER C. LAHUE

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TASK FORCE XRAY AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation SWIFT (Search and Destroy)
2. DATES OF OPERATION: 040500H-151600H Sep 1967. (This report will address the period from 071200H only).
3. LOCATION: THANG BINH District of QUANG TIN Province and QUE SON District of QUANG NAM Province.

4. CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

040500H-071159H Sep 1967 - Fifth Marines

071200H-151600H Sep 1967 - Task Force XRAY

5. REPORTING OFFICER

CG TF XRAY

BGen Foster C. LAHUE, USMC

CO, 5th Marines (-) (Rein)

Col Stanley DAVIS, USMC

CO, 1st Battalion (Rein), 5th Marines

LtCol Peter L. HILGARTNER, USMC

CO, 3d Battalion (Rein), 5th Marines

LtCol Charles B. WEBSTER, USMC
(4-8 Sep 1967)LtCol William K. ROCKEY, USMC
(8-15 Sep 1967)

CO, 2d Battalion Group, 11th Marines

LtCol Robert B. HUNTER, Jr., USMC

6. TASK ORGANIZATIONa. 4-7 Sep 1967. 5th Marines (-) (Rein). See Enclosure (4).b. 7-15 Sep 1967. Task Force XRAYTask Force XRAY

Hq, TF XRAY

Det, Hq Bn, 1stMarDiv

Det, 7th Comm Bn, FMF

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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5th Marines (-) (Rein)

Hq Co, 5th Mar

1st Bn (Rein), 5th Mar

1st Bn

Companies B and D, 1st Mar

Det, Co B, 1st SP Bn

Det, Co B, 1st Engr Bn

3d Bn (Rein), 5th Mar

3d Bn

Co H, 5th Mar

Det, Co B, 1st SP Bn

Det, Co B, 1st Engr Bn

2d Bn Group, 11th Marines

Hq Btry (-)

Btry D

Btry F

Provisional 155 How Btry (-)

2d Plat, 5th 155mm Gun Btry (SP), FMF

7. SUPPORTING FORCES

a. Artillery

(1) Initially artillery of the 2d Bn Group, 11th Marines were positioned to provide close continuous fire support to all participating units: Btry D, at QUE SON, was in direct support of the 1st Bn, 5th Mar (1/5), Btry F (less a detachment at TIEN PHUOC), at Hill 63 was in direct support of the 3d Bn, 5th Mar (3/5). The remaining elements of the 2d Bn Group at QUE SON, TIEN PHUOC and Hill 63 were in general support.

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(2) On the afternoon of 11 September, the Provisional 155 Howitzer Battery was displaced from Hill 63 to THANG BINH (BT165415) and was placed in direct support of 3/5.

(3) Battery F, was thereby relieved and placed in general support of 5th Marines, and was later displaced, on 12 September, to positions in the vicinity of Hill 29 (BT230316) and placed in direct support of 1/5.

(4) Battery D, thus relieved, reverted to a general support role.

(5) Following the helicopter displacement to the north, of infantry units on the evening of 13 September, artillery missions were modified. The Provisional 155 Howitzer Battery was placed in direct support of 1/5 and Btry F placed in direct support of 3/5. On the 14th, Btry D and Btry F exchanged missions and Btry F displaced to its original position on Hill 63 (BT130446). On 15 September, the Provisional 155 Howitzer Battery also returned to Hill 63 positions.

(6) The 2d Bn Group, 11th Marines expended a total of 12,389 on 1,203 missions between 4 September and 15 September accounting for 34 confirmed and 65 probable enemy killed in action (KIA).

(7) The 2d Bn Group, 11th Marines, fired in support of both Task Force XRAY units, ARVN units participating in Operation LIEN KET 116, and U. S. Army units participating in Operation WHEELER. There were no major problems encountered in the delivery or coordination of artillery fires throughout the operation. Artillery fires provided were responsive to requirements of both U. S. and ARVN units and were delivered in a timely manner.

b. Air

(1) General

(a) Marine TACA/AO flights were used throughout the operation for reconnaissance missions and control of air strikes.

(b) A Direct Air Support Center (DASC) was collocated with Task Force XRAY for the operation. The DASC provided fixed wing and helicopter control and artillery coordination.

(c) Air support was not generally restricted by weather.

(2) Fixed Wing Support. All close air support missions for Marine and ARVN units involved in the mutually supporting Operation LIEN KET 116 were conducted by the First Marine Aircraft Wing. Fixed wing aircraft flew 535 sorties delivering 887.5 tons of ordnance during the

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period. These strikes accounted for 48 confirmed and 169 probable enemy killed by air (KBA), 517 structures, 46 bunkers and 9 automatic weapons positions destroyed and 31 secondary explosions.

(3) Rotary Wing Support

(a) All rotary wing support for Marine units was provided by the First Marine Aircraft Wing. Helicopters also provided resupply, medical evacuation, command and control and reconnaissance capabilities throughout the operation.

(b) Helicopters flew 2,142 sorties, lifting 2,009 troops and delivering 72.1 tons of supplies.

(c) Rotary wing support was restricted during normal operation to use of the UH-34 and CH-53 type helicopters. However, on the night of 13 September, because of the critical situation reported by the 1st Ranger Task Force, an emergency was declared by CG, 1stMarDiv, on the advice of CG, Task Force XRAY, and a night tactical helicopter displacement by CH-46 aircraft was executed by a reinforced battalion from their field location. The first wave took fire going out of the landing zone and the zone was relocated and a different battalion was used to provide the remainder of the forces. This redeployment of forces, although complicated by the enemy fire and the hazard of night operations by a large number of helicopters, was completed without further incident almost on a routine basis.

(4) Summary. Aside from the restriction imposed by the non-availability of the CH-46, except for the one emergency night tactical lift, no significant problems were encountered with air support during Operation SWIFT.

c. Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC)

(1) The Task Force XRAY FSCC for operation SWIFT was deployed to the field without major incident. Collocated with the FSCC was the Liaison Officer from the U. S. ARMY 2/320th Artillery, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. The Task Force XRAY Air Officer operated with the Air Liaison Section at the 5th Marines, since air-ground coordination was accomplished directly between the DASC and 5th Mar FSCC. No major problems were encountered. Fire support coordination between supporting arms of the Marines, ARVN and U. S. ARMY and the maneuver units was accomplished without difficulty.

(2) Use of helicopter approach and retirement lanes to and from landing zones reduced the necessity for check fire during the assault to a minimum. Initial problems were encountered when the DASC imposed check fire on artillery missions during pre-assault preparations due to

ENCLOSURE (1)

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aircraft in the area. This was resolved on the spot and thereafter air-ground coordination was effected at the 5th Marines FSCC. As initially set up the DASC area of responsibility was only that of the SWIFT operation area, which would have resulted in excessive and time consuming passing of Sav-A-Planes between DASC's. This problem was resolved immediately by extending the area of responsibility of the DASC to include the entire 5th Marine TAOR plus the Operation WHEELER area.

(3) There were no problems encountered in coordinating artillery fire. In one instance Army artillery was used to fire a preassault preparation for a Marine unit and Marine artillery (Battery D) was employed to prepare a landing zone prior to an Army helicopter assault. Fires in both cases were timely and adequate.

(4) Communications were adequate and responsive. FSCC had hot lines to 1st Marine Division FSCC and to Task Force OREGON FSCC. The Army liaison team had a VRC-46 radio on the 2/320th Artillery conduct of fire net. If more extensive ARVN participation had been anticipated, it would have been highly desirable to have an ARVN Liaison Officer in FSCC along with his communications.

(5) It was discovered that U. S. Army and Marine units utilize differing shackle systems. This resulted in some delays in transmitting information from one unit to another while personnel at the FSCC translated shackles from one system to another. Had Operation SWIFT continued for a longer period of time it would have been necessary to adopt a common shackle system for Operation SWIFT and WHEELER.

d. Engineer

(1) Company B, 1st Engineer Bn, in direct support of 5th Mar was engaged in the construction of ammunition revetments in the landing support area (LSA). A platoon of this company was attached to each battalion. Explosive ordnance demolitions teams for disposal of unexploded ordnance were also furnished by Company B.

(2) Company A, 9th Engineer Bn completed the construction of a helicopter landing pad in the LSA at Hill 63.

(3) Daily road sweeps were conducted by both engineer companies.

e. Shore Party

(1) Company B, 1st Shore Party Bn, (3 officers 52 enlisted) in direct support of the 5th Mar, operated the helicopter support team (HST) from the LSA at Hill 63. The HST maintained continuous communications with each battalion command group and with HST's at the rifle company level.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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(2) Approximately 200 tons of supplies were processed by the LSA. 378 medical evacuations were conducted during operation SWIFT (266 USMC, 13 USN, 99 ARVN, civilians and detainees), 127 KIA's were evacuated and 440 passengers were moved by helicopter.

(3) Logistical requests were transmitted over the HST Logistics Net. Communication with helicopters was maintained on the Landing Zone Control Net.

(4) Due to the stand down of CH-46 helicopters and the resulting heavy commitments of remaining helicopter assets, helicopter availability was barely adequate. All resupply and medical evacuation missions however, were completed satisfactorily.

(5) Helicopter resupply sorties under control of the HST during the operation were as follows: 199 H-34, 40 CH-53.

8. INTELLIGENCE

a. Estimate of enemy strength, location and disposition in the objective area.

(1) Forces anticipated in the immediate objective area:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Tactical Disposition</u>
1st VC Regt	BT 0828	1,400	Unknown
3d NVA Regt	BT 1534	1,300	Unknown
21st NVA Regt	BT 1731	1,600	Unknown

(2) Locations of units in the area were based on usually reliable sources. Confirmation of the presence in the area of elements of the 1st VC Regt and 3d NVA Regt was provided by PW's. Locations of battalions of the three regiments were unknown but assumed to be in the general vicinity of their respective regimental headquarters. Strength estimates were based on the OOB for these units as adjusted for losses.

b. Enemy strength and situation encountered.

(1) From 071200H Sep until 151600H Sep, the largest enemy forces contacted were enemy companies encountered on two occasions. During the night of 10-11 Sep a platoon combat patrol from H/2/5 came under heavy fire from an estimated enemy company located in the vicinity of (BT129324). M/3/5 came under fire from the same enemy force when it was maneuvering into position to assist the platoon of Company H. No unit identification of

ENCLOSURE (1)

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this enemy force was made. A second contact with an enemy company sized force was made on the night of 11-12 Sep when the COP of the 3/5 CP was attacked. A prisoner captured during this engagement identified his unit as the 4th Company, 2d Bn, 64th Regt (AKA of 3d NVA Regt).

(2) Although no larger contacts than those referred to in Par 8b(1) above were made, information from ARVN, DOICC and usually reliable sources continued to indicate the presence of elements of the 3d NVA and 21st NVA Regts in the area of operations. Interrogation of a Chieu Hoi from the 90th Bn, 1st VC Regt and information from usually reliable sources indicated that the 1st VC Regt withdrew to the southwest during the period 11-15 Sep. The Chieu Hoi further indicated that the 40th and 60th Bns of the 1st VC Regt had taken part in the early phases of Operation SWIFT. In addition, PW's captured earlier in the operation identified the 70th (Independent) Bn and 3d Bn, 3d NVA Regt as having taken part in the initial contacts.

(3) The most significant contacts made during the operation involved an ARVN Ranger TF operating in coordination with TF XRAY in operation LIEN KET 116. On the night of 10-11 Sep the 37th Ranger Bn was struck by an estimated enemy battalion in the vicinity of (BT1436) and suffered sufficient casualties that it was replaced by the 21st Ranger Bn on 11 Sep. On the evening of 13 September the Ranger TF was attacked in the vicinity of (BT1534) by an estimated two enemy battalions attacking from the northwest and south. Although there was no positive unit identification in either instance, there were indications that the enemy forces were elements of the 3d NVA Regt.

c. Significant intelligence gained.

(1) Units identified

40th Bn, 1st VC Regt

60th Bn, 1st VC Regt

90th Bn, 1st VC Regt

70th (Independent) Bn - Subordinate to 2d NVA Div

2d Bn, 3d NVA Regt

3d Bn, 3d NVA Regt

(2) Ammunition captured during the course of the operation included a number of RPG-7 rocket rounds. This type of rocket had not previously been encountered in this area.

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(3) Interrogation of PW's indicated that units had received gas training. A number of gas masks were also captured during the course of the operation.

(4) A notebook and a map were found on the body of an NVA KIA early in the operation. Translation of the notebook revealed a series of alternate plans to be followed by elements of the 1st VC Regt and 3d NVA Regt, the options depending on the action taken by friendly forces. The initial action of SWIFT indicated that enemy tactics had conformed to these plans. The captured map contained sketches on the reverse side outlining the defenses of a Bn of the 1st VC, including company positions, mortar positions, routes of egress, etc. This information was passed to 1/5 while it was in contact, and the map readout provided a definite tactical advantage.

d. Terrain

(1) The terrain in the immediate objective area consists principally of flat cultivated areas, mostly rice paddies, with small hamlets interspersed throughout. Heavy foliage and bamboo clusters around hamlets and hedgerows throughout the area provided the enemy excellent cover and concealment. To the south of the immediate objective area are rolling hills heavily foliated.

(2) The objective area contained numerous well camouflaged fortified areas, particularly in the hedgerows and vicinity of hamlets. Defensive positions consisted of trenches averaging four feet in depth, caves, spider holes, and earth bunkers.

(3) Although the operation was for the most part conducted on the low ground, several critical terrain features are located in and around the objective area. These include the following:

Hill 407 (BT077277)

Hill 43 (BT123321)

Hill 330 (BT112276)

Hill 62 (BT130302)

Hill 63 (BT083325)

Hill 34 (BT174313)

Hill 48 (BT113325)

Hill 56 (BT189308)

(4) Observation from the critical terrain cited above is excellent except where impeded by foliage on the hills themselves; this applies principally to the hills to the south of the objective area. Short range observation on the flat ground is excellent, but long range observation is impeded by hamlets, hedgerows and foliage of various types.

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(5) Numerous paths and trails, particularly in the hills, offer many avenues of approach for small units.

(6) Numerous streams and the rice paddy dikes constituted obstacles to cross country vehicular movement but did not impede movement of troops on foot.

(7) The weather during the period was as follows:

Avg High Temp 92 Total Precipitation 1.60

Avg Low Temp 76 No. days of precipitation 4

Avg Humidity 75% Average visibility 7-10 miles

e. Evaluation of operation from intelligence standpoint.

(1) The adequacy of intelligence available was never really tested. Commencement of large scale operations was delayed almost five days awaiting arrival of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne. The enemy was given ample time to redispense his forces to avoid contact. In addition, the numerical inferiority of friendly forces combined with the critical shortage of helicopters available for troop lift made the exploitation of available intelligence all but impossible.

(2) The satelliting of the XRAY command group on 5th Marine COC facilities proved satisfactory for the duration of the operation. However, if the operation had either extended over a longer period of time or involved an appreciably larger number of contacts, it is doubtful if the satellite approach would have proven satisfactory, due in part to space limitations but due mostly to overloading of available communications means.

9. MISSION. Task Force XRAY, utilizing forces already in contact, continues to exert maximum effort to fix 2d NVA Division in present position. Conduct coordinated operations against 2d NVA Division upon arrival of brigade of 101st Airborne Division (USA) in assigned area of operations. Be prepared on order to assume operational control of additional forces.

10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

a. Phase I. (071200H-120829H Sep 1967) Task Force XRAY consolidates and adjusts present positions, maintains contact with engaged enemy forces and prepares for further offensive operations to the east.

b. Phase II. (120830H-131800H Sep 1967) Commencing 120830H, following air and artillery preparation, Task Force XRAY attacks to the east to seize objective 1 (BT145309-156287). On order seize objective

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2 (BT1831-1929). On order be prepared to commence deliberate search and destroy operations as directed.

c. Phase III. (131800H-150500H Sep 1967) Task Force XRAY conducts immediate tactical helicopter lift of one battalion to landing zones in the vicinity of BT158388 and reinforces and/or restores ARVN Ranger Task Force positions. On restoration of Ranger Task Force positions, Task Force XRAY attacks to the west to seek out and destroy elements of the 2d NVA Division in the SWIFT area of operations.

d. Phase IV. (150500H-151600H Sep 1967) Task Force XRAY moves units to secure landing zones vicinity of BT158388 and conducts helicopter lifts and motor march of units back to bases.

e. It should be noted that Phase III was not a pre-planned phase but the result of the urgent requirement to come to the assistance of the ARVN Ranger Task Force on the evening of 13 September 1967. As a consequence of this movement, Task Force XRAY units were positioned in a different area. Although not specified as a separate phase at the time, this portion of the operation was a separate and distinct phase, and is best understood in this context.

f. Overriding commitments of the First Marine Division required transfer of forces from Operation SWIFT and resulted in its early conclusion. Thus the final phase (Phase IV) was necessitated in order to rapidly extract units from the field.

11. EXECUTION

a. Operation SWIFT commenced at 040500H Sep 1967 under control of Headquarters, 5th Mar. Task Force XRAY was not ordered to assume operational control (OPCON) until 071200 September 1967. For events leading up to 071200H Sep, see Enclosure (4), the After Action Report of the 5th Marines, which includes this portion.

b. 7 Sep 1967

(1) Task Force XRAY assumed OPCON of Operation SWIFT at 071200H. At that time the 1st Bn, 5th Marines (1/5) was positioned in the vicinity of BT1030 and the 3d Bn, 5th Marines (3/5) at BT1235. All elements were either consolidating their positions, evacuating casualties and equipment, or conducting patrols in the vicinity of their position. At the conclusion of repositioning of these units the task organization of the 5th Marines was as follows; 1/5 consisted of its organic companies A and B and companies D and I of the 1st Marines. 3/5 maintained all four of its organic companies in the field plus Company H of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines.

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(2) During the afternoon 1/5 and 3/5 linked up and established night positions and at nightfall conducted combat and reconnaissance patrols.

c. 8 Sep 1967. At 080905H one UH-34 med-evac helicopter crashed in the 1/5 landing zone (LZ) as it was making its approach. The helicopter sustained extensive damage, but there were no casualties. Word was later received from 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (FMAW) to destroy the aircraft in place. At 081015H a platoon combat patrol from M/3/5 (BT123320) spotted enemy personnel in a tree line observing movement of two Marine companies. The patrol contacted an aerial observer (AO) who controlled an air strike on the tree line. A search of the area revealed 10 KIA and evidence of one probable KIA (P). At 081225H element of M/3/5 found three graves with one NVA body in each. Task Force XRAY units conducted search and destroy (S & D) operations throughout the day and because of sniper fire in the LZ the planned exchange of B/1/5 for C/1/5 was cancelled for the remainder of the day. Totals for the day were 15 NVA KIA.

d. 9 Sep 1967. The extraction of B/1/5 and commitment of C/1/5 by helicopter was completed. At 090846H, elements of A/1/5 found two caves (BT104300-104294) containing 40 cases of 7.62mm ammo (28,800 rds), 14 cases of 12.7mm MG tracer (1,190 rds), 13 cases of 60mm (152 rds), 18 cases of 81mm (59 rds), six cases 75mm (19 rds), 12 cases 57mm R/R (36 rds), 10 cases Chinese grenades (258), and six cases B-40 AT (18 rds). A platoon combat patrol (BT13323) received automatic weapons fire at 091235H from an estimated 10 enemy. The patrol returned fire with small arms and 60mm mortars. An assault was made on the position and one enemy body was found. That evening the units moved to and established new positions for the night, conducted normal security patrols, ambushes and listening post (LP) activities.

e. 10 Sep 1967

(1) Early in the morning, M/3/5 defensive position (BT138322) observed eight enemy in green uniforms (BT135325). Enemy were taken under fire, two fell and a third was hit as he was dragging them away. Search of the area found evidence of three NVA KIA. Shortly later, 100800H, an H/2/5 patrol found a complete 60mm mortar in a trench line (BT133325). Through the day patrol operations were carried out by both battalions with light contact. However, at 101150H a platoon combat patrol (BT141321) from M/3/5, received fire from a village (BT149322). The patrol returned fire and conducted an 81mm mortar mission. An AO observed 25-30 enemy fleeing from the village and moving to the northeast. The enemy split up in groups of three and four and each group was carrying bodies. Because of the patrol's mission it could not search the village, and has estimated that there were 10 NVA KIA (P).

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(2) Task Force XRAY assumed OPCON of 1st Bn, 14th Infantry at 101600H. 1/4 was deployed in the vic of Hill 29 (BT226318).

(3) 1/5 established new combat bases in the vicinity of BT1330 and 3/5 moved to BT1331.

(4) At 101600H an H/2/5 platoon combat patrol came under heavy fire from an unknown number of enemy (BT129324). The patrol at (BT127325) returned small arms and mortar fire. An AO on station called for and conducted fixed wing air strikes. The remainder of H/2/5 and one platoon of M/3/5 were dispatched as a reaction force. As this force was maneuvering to link-up and ease the pressure on the engaged platoon patrol, it too came under heavy fire, and sustained casualties. Link-up was not accomplished until about 102400H. Contact ended with the enemy force about 110200H and the units completed consolidation of positions, and evacuation of casualties. Complete extraction of the combat patrol and medical evacuation was not completed until 110400H. Air strikes were called on enemy positions at daylight. Total losses during this engagement as follows: 9 USMC KIA, 20 USMC WIA (MED EVAC), 3 USMC WIA (MINOR), 40 NVA KIA, 37 NVA KIA (P).

f. 11 Sep 1967. Platoon size combat patrols were conducted from combat bases by all units. No contact was made with the enemy. At 111000H the 1st Bn, 14th Inf chopped to Task Force OREGON. FMAW and 1st Recon Bn reported 12 NVA killed by air and artillery missions during the day.

g. 12 Sep 1967

(1) At 120230H security elements for the 3/5 CP perimeter defense (BT128309) observed enemy movement from west to east, and at the same time received fire from the southwest. This was followed up by an NVA company size attack on the CP perimeter defense. This attack continued until about 0700H when the enemy broke contact and fled west and southwest, with a much smaller group fleeing to the east. Results: 4 USMC KIA, 20 USMC WIA (MED EVAC), 2 USMC WIA (MINOR), 35 NVA KIA, 20 NVA KIA (P), 2 NVA PW'S (one later died of wounds). Captured weapons: one heavy machinegun, six AK-47, seven rifles, assorted NVA clothing and gear, and one medical field service kit.

(2) At 120830H, 1/5 and 3/5, crossed the line of departure, attacking to the east, with battalions attacking abreast, to secure objective 1 (BT145309-BT156287). The southern half was secured by 1/5 about 121430H and this unit began a deliberate search of the objective area. At 121722H, lead element of 3/5 entered the northern half of the objective area. The entire objective was secured about 1800H. During the attack to the objective area, A/1/5 apprehended one VN male at (BT145286) and at 121645H uncovered one NVA body (BT156290).

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(3) At 121700H, I/3/1 apprehended one small VN boy and one VN male hiding in a cave. The VN male tried to escape and was shot in the leg. At 121800H, D/1/1 was establishing their defensive positions and apprehended two VN males that approached the position. Both battalions established night defensive positions and conducted extensive patrols.

h. 13 Sep 1967

(1) At 130700H artillery and air preparations commenced on objective 2 (BT1831-BT1929). At 130830H, both battalions attacked to the east and secured objective 2 at 131420H with no contact being made with the enemy.

(2) At 131705H the ARVN 1st Ranger Task group came under heavy attack and 3/5 was alerted for a possible helicopter lift as a relief force at 131800H. At 131855H, 1/5 was ordered to proceed to Hill 29 (BT227319) and be prepared for a helicopter lift following 3/5. At 131920H tanks were dispatched from Hill 63 to secure an LZ at (BT158388) and at 132054H, the first elements of 3/5 were lifted into the LZ. During the pick-up, the LZ received small arms fire and it was decided to secure further lifts from that position and to resume it from Hill 29 with units of 1/5. The remaining units of 3/5 were then ordered to proceed to Hill 29 and prepare for further offensive operations. At 132335H companies A and C were lifted into the LZ from Hill 29 and linked up with I/3/5. I/3/5 then chopped to 1/5. At 132359H, 3/5 commenced overland movement to Hill 29.

i. 14 September 1967

(1) By 140105H, all 1/5 elements had completed the air lift and by 140500H were at the following positions. 1/5 CP (BT156374), Co's A and C (BT155365), I/3/1 with one platoon of H/2/5 (BT153371) and I/3/5 (BT158388). No contact with the enemy had been made and a link-up was effected with the ARVN Ranger Task group. By 141200H all 3/5 units were lifted in from Hill 29 and were positioned at (BT130366). D/1/1 formerly under OPCON of 1/5 was chopped to the First Marines at 140945H Sep 1967.

(2) At 141200H, 1/5 jumped off in the attack to the west towards Phase Line Jeep (BT050352-082380). At 141500H 1/5 reported finding five fresh graves with an NVA body in each at (BT134344) and at 141600H, A/1/5 observed an estimated 20 NVA fleeing (BT110352). 60mm and 81mm mortars were fired on the fleeing enemy. A search of the area was made, but no evidence of enemy casualties was found. At 141640H, 3/5 was ordered to attack west and seize Regimental Objective D (BT114375). Regimental Objective C (BT111360) was secured at 141750H and a deliberate search of the area was conducted. 3/5 continued to attack and secure Regimental Objective D at 141840H. By nightfall both battalions were in defensive positions. At 142230H, I/3/5 reported that one of their LP's had killed a fleeing VC after he had been challenged and failed to halt.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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j. 15 Sep 1967. At first light all units were moved to a LZ (BT 158387) to be returned to their normal combat bases. At 151155H, I/3/1 chopped from 1/5 to First Marines. H/2/5 chopped from 3/5 to 2/5 at 151250H. 1/5 had returned to QUE SON by helicopter at 151355H and 3/5 had returned to their normal combat base at Hill 63 by foot and motor march by 151355H. Operation SWIFT terminated at 151600H. 5th Marines (-) (Rein), and 2d Bn, 11th Marine Group chopped to 1st Marine Division at that time. Task Force XRAY CP was closed at 151600H.

12. RESULTS

	040500H- 071200H	071200H- 151600H	TOTAL
a. Enemy Personnel			
NVA KIA (C)	366	176	542
VC KIA (C)	0	29	29
NVA KIA (P)	415	69	484
VC KIA (P)	0	45	45
NVA PW	7	1	8
VC PW	0	0	0
Detainees	32	26	58
b. Enemy weapons and equipment captured			
(1) Weapons			
AK 47 Rifles	31	7	38
AK 44 Rifles	5	0	5
SKS Rifles	10	0	10
AK 56 Rifles	3	0	3
Unknown Type Rifles	0	7	7
60mm Mortar	2	2	4
M-79 Grenade Launcher	1	0	1
M-1 Carbine	1	0	1
Rocket Launcher	1	1	2

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RPD Light Machinegun	6	0	6
Heavy Machinegun (unknown type)	0	1	1
Browning Automatic Rifle	1	0	1
M-16 Rifle	2	0	2
.45 Cal Pistol	1	0	1
Chicom Carbine	0	1	1

(2) Ammunition and Ordnance captured and destroyed

Chicom Grenades	68	458	526
Magazines	192	4	196
Rocket rounds	10	0	10
M-79 Rounds	41	0	41
Claymore Mine	1	0	1
Small arms ammo	6,000	29,990	35,990
B-40 Rocket Rounds	3	45	48
60mm Mortar Rounds	8	152	160
82mm Mortar Rounds	0	59	59
75mm Mortar Rounds	0	19	19
57mm Mortar Rounds	0	36	36

(3) Equipment Captured

Cartridge belts	53	8	61
Canteens	4	0	4
Poncho	2	0	2
Entrenching tools	12	0	12
Assorted tools	4	1	5

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Uniforms	12	0	12
Fieldglasses	2	0	2
Fieldphone	1	0	1
Packs	49	2	51
Medical kit	1	1	2
Gas mask	5	1	6
c. Casualties			
KIA	100	27	127
WIA (Med Evac)	275	49	324
WIA (Minor)	8	10	18
d. Weapons and equipment lost			
M-60 MG	2		
PRC 25 Radio Set	2		
M-16 Rifle	4		

e. Areas where air strikes were conducted were searched, however, in some cases this was after a lapse of as much as 24 hours because of enemy action.

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

a. Supply

(1) The primary LSA was established at Hill 63 with an alternate LSA at AN HOA. Resupply to all units, except for artillery units positioned at Hill 63, was effected by helicopters and controlled by HST's provided by the 1st Shore Party Battalion.

(2) Supply support was provided from the LSA operated by Force Logistic Command (FLC).

(3) Artillery ammunition resupply for the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines, except for units at Hill 63, was flown directly from ASP #1, Division Administrative Helo Pad (LZ 401), and FLC (LZ 23). 378,988 lbs of supplies were drawn from the LSA to support the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines units at Hill 63.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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(4) Resupply of the LSA was conducted with difficulty due to the loss of the SONG CAU LAU Bridge. A ferry was in operation and limited truck convoys were run, subject to river tides. Helicopters were also used to transport supplies from FLC to the LSA to maintain dump levels.

(5) Many incidents of grade 3 ammunition being delivered to the LSA were evidenced. This ammunition had to be immediately returned. In essence trucks and helicopters delivering this type of ammunition were wasted.

(6) A recapitulation of supplies issued by FLC is attached as enclosure (3).

b. Maintenance

(1) Normal maintenance was conducted by units on vehicles and equipment utilized in the operation.

(2) Replacement of defective parts/equipment was accomplished through the LSA and organic battalion supply sections.

(3) A maintenance float for communications-electronics and ordnance items was made available.

c. Evacuation and Hospitalization

(1) A Clearing Platoon (-) from the 1st Medical Battalion was positioned in the vicinity of the 5th Marines landing zone at Hill 63. The platoon consisted of two Officers, 21 Hospital Corpsmen and three Marines.

(2) One helicopter for emergency medical evacuation was available daily from 0700-1800. Other helicopters were made available as necessary by the HST in the LSA.

(3) Initially, spot casualties were evacuated directly to medical facilities. Upon establishment of the clearing platoon all casualties were brought in to the clearing platoon position. Serious casualties received emergency treatment prior to further evacuation. Other casualties were screened by a doctor who then decided the casualty's ultimate disposition.

(4) Medical facilities utilized for evacuation beyond the clearing platoon were, 1st Medical Battalion, 1st Hospital Company and NAS Marble Mountain.

(5) Casualty Report Control Center representatives were located at Hill 63, 1st Medical Battalion and 1st Hospital Company.

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(6) Resupply of medical items was successfully accomplished by placing needed items on outgoing medical evacuation helicopters which had brought casualties to the 1st Medical Battalion. These helicopters then returned to Hill 63 for more casualties and dropped off the medical supplies.

(7) Mass casualty evacuation conducted on 6-7 September was highly successful. A total of 161 casualties were treated and evacuated during this period. Success of the evacuation is attributed to the mobility and rapid insertion of the clearing platoon at 2300 on 6 September, the availability of an adequate medical supply block and the high rate of helicopter availability. During this period a total of six doctors (two from 1st Med Bn, four from 5th Marines), and 20 Hospital Corpsmen were employed to provide medical treatment and evacuation.

d. Transportation

(1) The 5th Marine Regiment moved to assembly areas by foot, vehicle and helicopters. Headquarters Task Force XRAY was moved to the CH at Hill 63 by helicopter.

(2) Transportation utilized during the operation for resupply missions, medical evacuations, and inserts and extractions for reconnaissance units was provided by helicopter. The 2d Battalion, 11th Marines units located at and in the vicinity of Hill 63 resupplied by the use of organic transportation.

e. Communications

(1) As a result of being satellited on a regimental headquarters, communication requirements in support of Task Force XRAY headquarters were decreased to a major extent. Minimum augmentation, consisting of 20 communication personnel with limited radio and radio relay equipment, was sufficient to integrate with the regimental communication platoon and provide the necessary additional reliable communications requirements.

(2) In a rapidly developing situation, such as Operation SHIFT, and whenever the tactical situation permits, satelliting on another headquarters where existing communication facilities are established, offers a decided advantage in the most economical and efficient use of communication personnel and equipment.

14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES

a. The use of wire aerial delivery slings to transport supplies, by external loads, particularly artillery ammunition, provides rapid loading and unloading time for CH-53 helicopters. This resulted in

ENCLOSURE (1)

less helicopter ground time and consequently increased the total number of helicopter lifts that could be conducted. A shortage of slings, however, reduced the potential lift capability that could have been realized. More extensive use of this technique should be employed.

b. The delivery of ammunition directly from the ASP or FLC helicopter pads to QUE SON avoided the double handling of ammunition in the ISA. This procedure proved effective, provided helicopter assets were available. The situation was compounded however by deliveries from the ASP to incorrect locations and deliveries of the wrong types of ammunition. This procedure should be utilized in emergency situations. Close coordination is required between ASP and ISA personnel to ensure delivery of proper types of ammunition and between ASP personnel, HST personnel at the ASP, and helicopter pilots to ensure delivery to the proper location.

15. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS

a. Operation SWIFT grew out of a hard contact with elements of the 2d NVA Division. Prior to the commitment of Task Force XRAY to this Operation, the 5th Marines utilized elements of two battalions to counter the NVA challenge. Although badly outnumbered, the 5th Marines units fought effectively and obviously badly mauled the enemy (366 counted enemy KIA) while at the same time taking heavy casualties themselves (100 KIA, 275 WIA).

b. On 7 Sep 1967, when Task Force XRAY took to the field, the 1st ARVN Ranger Task Group was also put in the field on Operation LIEN KET 116, an operation designed to mutually support Operation SWIFT. At the same time plans were put in motion to commit U. S. Army forces to the south of the Operation SWIFT AO in Operation WHEELER. By this time intelligence had relatively reliably located and identified the presence of the majority of the 2d NVA Division.

(1) The combined forces of Operation SWIFT and LIEN KET 116 were tasked to seek and maintain contact with enemy forces in the area. In the meantime Operation WHEELER forces were extracted from another operation already being conducted and moved into their new AO. This unfortunately required a delay of some five days. This period was used to good advantage by Task Force XRAY to reorganize and reinforce units in contact. Contact was maintained through the next three days with the enemy. On the second day (9 September) a rash of enemy mines caused several friendly casualties. On 10 September in the morning hours of daylight and during darkness, the enemy again hit hard at both elements of Task Force XRAY and the 1st Ranger Task Group.

(2) As was suspected at the time, and was later born out by events, the enemy's action on the evening of 10 September was essentially

ENCLOSURE (1)

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a disengagement in order to slip certain elements to the north and west of the encircling forces, while others evaded to the south and west. Contact over the next few days was light to non-existent, although several caches of enemy supplies and weapons were discovered and either evacuated or destroyed.

(3) With the arrival of Operation WHEELER units beginning about 12 September, the combined forces of Operation SWIFT and LIEN KET 116 began to move eastward. Realizing that the enemy had slipped away, as was mentioned, ~~on~~ the afternoon of 13 September, plans were drawn up to seek out the enemy to the northwest. That evening, however, the enemy seized the initiative and descended upon the 1st Ranger Task Group from the west. During that night, Marine and additional ARVN units were helo lifted and moved by truck and on foot to the assistance of the Ranger Task Group. By dawn, the enemy had broken contact and again evaded, this time probably to the west.

(4) Pursuit by the allied forces was attempted, but before contact could be regained, overriding considerations required the recall of both Marine and ARVN units from the field to carry out other pressing requirements.

c. Essentially the failure of greater success stemmed from the delay necessary to position sufficient forces in the field. While this time was well used by friendly forces, it also permitted the enemy to regroup and evade. With the limited forces available during this period, insufficient pressure was capable of being exerted against the enemy to fix him in place. As in Operation COCHISEL, the calculated risk in committing additional units from the already reduced forces within the First Marine Division TAOR, was outweighed by the need to maintain minimally sufficient forces to protect the DA NANG vital area. This same factor played a role in the decision to terminate Operation SWIFT; forces committed were vitally needed elsewhere.

d. Operation SWIFT and the harmonious Operations LIEN KET 116 and WHEELER, did serve to scatter elements of the 2d NVA Division. These elements are, however, still intact, although a few have been badly hurt. Nevertheless, the 2d NVA Division still has the capability of massing its elements in the QUE SON Valley and of operating there, unless continued pressure is brought to bear by FVMAF and ARVN units. Until such time as friendly units are available to operate for extended periods, the QUE SON Valley will be subject to periodic campaigns when the 2d NVA Division so chooses.

ENCLOSURE (1)

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
CLASS I

ITEMISSUED

MCI
Heat
Sundry Packs

UNCLASSIFIED

66,312
68,862
174

CLASS II

Trousers	823
Jackets	469
T-Shirts	336
Drawers	20
Socks	1,121
Boots	186
Caps utility	2
Webb Belt	1
BA 30	602
BA 386	807
BA 200	40
Halizone tabs	2,832
Insect Repellent	1,214
Rifle Oil	280
Poncho	61
Grease Pencil (black)	120
Rifle Patches	7,000
Lined Tablets	1
Pens, Ball Point	30
Grenade Pouch	6
First Aid Kit	7
WD-40	4
Friction Tape	3
.45 Cal Holster	4
Tape Antenna Base	1
Casualty Cards	2
Shoulder Pads	4
Helmet	1
Helmet Cover	1
Jungle Kit	1
Haversack	4
Field Med Tags	6
Shoulder Straps	12
Entrenching Tool Cover	30
Message Books	4
Cleaning Solvent	20
Bore Brush f/M-14	7
Chamber Brush f/M-14	1
Foot powder	72

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ENCLOSURE (3)

SECRET

CLASS IIIISSUED

Mogas	5,032
Diesel	5,191
OE 10	318
OE 30	477
OE 50	159
Hydraulic Fluid	159

CLASS IV

Sandbags	453
Concertina Wire	316
Barbed Wire 330'	177
Barbed Wire 1300'	10
Metal Stakes 24"	650
Metal Stakes 32"	200
Metal Stakes 5'	1,425
Metal Stakes 8'	325

CLASS V

A011	240
A066	22,896
A068	2,880
A127/A131	111,600
A130/A122	20,280
A475	900
A574	7,320
B568	3,372
B610	1
B626/B632	350
B630	52
C222/C246	2,751
C230/C249	231
C226	246
C651	128
C805	25
C890	2,088
C895	335
C900	56
C924	385
C930	23
C935	50
C940	242
C945	578
C950	176
C963	16

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ENCLOSURE (3)

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SECRET

CLASS V (CON'T)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>ISSUED</u>
H555	231
H600	9
H602	22
K43	58
L306	118
L312	142
L314	283
L323	51
L324	154
L495	74
M131	250
M670	1,200
M756	17
M766	50

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE (3)

DECLASSIFIED