

HEADQUARTERS

Task Force Yankee
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

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Ser: 0079-69
20 Mar 1969

From: Commanding General,
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation Taylor Common)
Ref: (a) 1st Marine Division Operation Order 301-yr
(b) CG 1stMarDiv FragO 448-68
(c) CG TF Yankee FragO 1-68
(d) TF Yankee Operation Order 1-69
(e) Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000 AMS; Series L7014; Sheets 6540 I, II, III, IV; 6640 III, IV

Encl: See index of enclosures, pages i-ii

1. (U) Nickname: Operation Taylor Common (Search and Destroy)
2. (U) Dates of Operation: 070001H Dec 1968 - 080800H Mar 1969
3. (U) Location: Quang Nam Province, Republic of Vietnam
4. (U) Control/Command Headquarters: Task Force Yankee
5. (C) Reporting Officer:
CG, Task Force Yankee
BGen Ross T. DWYER, Jr.
(27Nov68-14Feb69)
BGen Samuel JASKILKA
(15Feb69-8Mar69)
6. (S) Task Organization:
Task Force Yankee
BGen Ross T. DWYER, Jr.
(27Nov68-14Feb69)
BGen Samuel JASKILKA
(15Feb69-8Mar69)

Det, Hq Bn (Cmd Group)

Det, 7th Comm Bn

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Det, Hq Bn (TACP)

13th ITT

Det, 3d ITT

Det, 3d CIT

3d Marines (-)(Rein)

Colonel SPARK
(9Dec68-15Jan69)
Colonel LAFOND
(16Jan69-17Feb69)

Hq Co (-) 3d Marines

Det, Hq Btry, 1st Bn, 12th Marines

Sub Unit, ITT, Hq Bn, 3d MarDiv

Interpreters (Indigenous), Hq Bn, 3d MarDiv

Sect, Comm Co, Hq Bn, 3d MarDiv

PIIU Team, Hq Bn, 3d MarDiv

HSG-D

Co B (-)(Rein), 3d Engr Bn

Co D (-), 3d SF Bn

1st Bn (-)(Rein), 3d Mar

Lieutenant Colonel TWOHEY
(13Dec68-6Feb69)
Lieutenant Colonel KYLE
(7Feb69-21Feb69)

1st Bn (-)(Rein), 3d Mar

Plt, Co B, 3d Engr Bn

Det, 3d SP Bn (HST)

Det, A Btry, 1st Bn, 12th Mar

Det, 3d MP Bn (Scout Dog Teams)

3d Bn (-)(Rein), 3d Mar

Lieutenant Colonel SCHULZE

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~~3d Bn (-)(Rein), 3d Mar~~

Plt Co B, 3d Engr Bn

Det, 3d SP Bn (HST)

Det, 3d MP Bn (Scout Dog Teams)

Det, C Btry, 1st Bn, 12th Mar

5th Marines (-)(Rein)

Colonel ORD

HqCo, 5th Mar

1st Bn, 5th Mar (Rein)

Lieutenant Colonel DALY

1st Bn, 5th Mar

B/1/1 (30Dec68-12Jan69)

D/1/1 (2Jan69-23Jan69)

K/3/1 (12Jan69-12Feb69)

C/1/1 (23Jan69-21Feb69)

Det, D Btry, 2d Bn, 11th Mar

Det, Co B, 1st Engr Bn

Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)

Det, 3d MP Bn (Scout Dog Teams)

2d Bn, 5th Mar (Rein)

Lieutenant Colonel STEPLE

(OPCON 3d Mar 13Dec68-17Feb69)

2d Bn, 5th Mar

Det, E Btry, 2d Bn, 11th Mar

Det, Co B, 1st Engr Bn

Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)

Det, 3d MP Bn (Scout Dog Teams)

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3d Bn, 5th Mar (Rein)

Lieutenant Colonel ATKINSON

(OPCON 3d Mar 11Dec68-17Feb69)
 (OPCON Task Force Yankee 18Feb69-7Mar69)

3d Bn, 5th Mar

Det, Co B, 1st Engr Bn

Det, 1st SP Bn (HST)

Det, F Btry, 2d Bn, 11th Mar

Det, 3d MP Bn (Scout Dog Teams)

BLT 2/7 (7Dec68-26Dec68)

Lieutenant Colonel NELSON

BLT 2/26 (7Feb69-12Feb69)

Lieutenant Colonel SPARKS

BLT 3/26 (10Feb69-8Mar69)

Lieutenant Colonel ROBERTSON
 (7Feb69-3Mar69)
 Lieutenant Colonel SNELLING
 14Mar69-8Mar69)

First Force Recon Co

Major SIMMONS

1st For Recon Co

2d Plt, Co E, 1st Recon Bn (10Jan69-22Feb69)

1st Plt, Co A, 5th Recon Bn

7. (S) Supporting Forces

a. Forces supporting Operation Taylor Common were:

1st FAG

Lieutenant Colonel INGRANDO

2d Bn, 11th Mar

Lieutenant Colonel JAMESON

1st Bn(=)(Rein), 12th Mar

Lieutenant Colonel WHISMAN
 (9Dec68-15Jan69)
 Lieutenant Colonel MOSS
 (16Jan69-17Feb69)

Plt A, 3d 8" How Btry

Plt A, 3d 155 Gun Btry

Plt A, 1st 175 Gun Btry

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Det, Btry B, 8th Bn, 4th Arty Corps

K Btry, 4th Bn, 13th Mar

Tm #3, CMR Sect.

Co B (Rein), 1st Tk Bn

4th Plt, Co A, 3d AmTrac Bn

3d Plt, Co A, 1st MT Bn

Co B, 1st SP Bn

Co B (Rein), 1st Engr Bn

Det, Hq Co, Hq Bn

Det, MP Co, Hq Bn

C & C Plt, Co A, 1st Med Bn

Det, 1st Dental Co

FLSG-A, FLC

Sub-Unit #1 (Rein), MAG-16

MATCU-67A, MAG-12

Det, 15th Aerial Port, USAF

Det, CBMU-301

Det, MCB-3

Det, 7th Engr Bn

DASC, 1st MAW

ASRT "B", 1st MAW

b. Artillery/FSCC

(1) At the inception of Task Force Yankee, Artillery Support for forces committed to Operation Taylor Common was to be provided by 2d Battalion, 11th Marines (Rein), 1st Battalion, 12th Marines (-) and elements of Force Artillery Batteries located at An Hoa. Thus, the supporting artillery batteries were organized under a Field Artillery

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Group structure to parallel the organizational structure of Task Force Yankee. This organizational structure provided for flexibility and balance in command and coordinating relationships.

(2) On 10 December 1968, 1st Field Artillery Group assumed operational control of all artillery units in the Taylor Common AO. The Artillery Organization for Combat was essentially as follows:

1st Field Artillery Group	G/S Task Force Yankee
2d Bn, 11th Marines (Rein)	D/S 5th Marines (Rein)
1st Bn, 12th Marines (-)(Rein)	D/S 3d Marines (-)
Plt A, 3d 8" How Btry	G/S Task Force Yankee
Plt A, 3d 155 Gun Btry	G/S Task Force Yankee
Plt A, 1st 175 Gun Btry	G/S Task Force Yankee
Det. Btry B, 8th Bn, 4th Arty Corps	G/S Task Force Yankee
K Btry, 4th Bn, 13th Marines	G/S Task Force Yankee

(3) 1st Field Artillery Group in addition to the mission of General Support of Task Force Yankee discharged the responsibility for the Counter Rocket/Battery program in the Task Force AO and for artillery support for the Southern Reconnaissance Sectors, i.e., support of 1st Marine Division Reconnaissance Inserts south of the 60 E-W Gridline.

(4) The 1st Field Artillery Group, Task Organized for support of Operation Taylor Common was as follows:

1st Field Artillery Group	(4Dec-8Mar)
2d Bn, 11th Marines	(7Dec-8Mar)
D/2/11	(5-105 How) (7Dec-8Mar)
E/2/11	(5-105 How) (7Dec-8Mar)
F/2/11	(4-105 How) (7Dec-8Mar)
W/2/11	(4-4.242-Howtar) (7Dec-8Mar)
T/2/11	(4-155 How TD) (7Dec-8Mar)
X/2/11	(4-105 How) (26Dec-8Mar)
W/3/11	(6-Howtar) (7Dec-7Mar)
H/3/11	(6-105 How) (7Dec-8Mar)
B/1/13	(6-105 How) (7Feb-12Feb)
W/1/13	(6-4.2) (10Feb-8Mar)
C/1/13	(6-105 How) (10Feb-8Mar)
W/1/12	(6-4.2) (7Feb-12Feb)
1st Bn, 12th Marines	(9Dec-17Feb)
A/1/12	(6-105 How) (13Dec-21Feb)
C/1/12	(6-105 How) (14Dec-17Feb)
2d Prov 1/12	(4-155 How TD) (13Dec-17Feb)
1st Plt, 1st Searchlights	(4-Lights) (14Dec-16Feb)
LY/4/11	(4-155 How TD) (15Dec-7Mar)
X/4/13 (SP)	(6-155 How SP) (7Dec-8Mar)

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Plt A, 3d 8" How (SP)	(2-8" How SP)	(7Dec-8Mar)
Plt A, 3d 155 Gun (SP)	(2-155 Gun SP)	(7Dec-8Mar)
Det, Btry B, 8thBn, 4thArtyCorps	(2-175 Gun SP)	(10Dec-6Mar)
Plt A, 1st 175 Guns	(2-175 Guns SP)	(5Mar-8Mar)
Team #3, CMR Sec.	(1-MPQ-10)	(11Jan-8Mar)

(5) The maximum density of artillery tubes by caliber supporting Operation Taylor Common was as follows:

4.2" Mortars	14
4.2" Howtars	6
105MM How TD	48
155MM How TD	12
155MM How SP	6
155MM Gun SP	2
8" How SP	2
175 Gun SP	4
TOTAL	94

(6) Disposition of Artillery Support in Base Area 112 followed the natural progression of the tactical situation and development of the Combat Operational Bases (COB's) and Fire Support Bases (FSB's). The FSB's were selected and developed in such a manner that they were mutually supportable and gave the greatest degree of depth in supporting the ground gaining units and organic reconnaissance teams operating in BA 112. The Artillery positions located on the FSB's were pre-selected and well developed prior to battery company. Artillery liaison personnel coordinating with the engineer construction effort produced exacting position refinements. Gun pits were constructed with mini-dozers to provide sufficient berm protection from enemy action. Steel planked decking was laid for solid, level traversing of the 105 MM How TD and in addition a small reinforced platform was constructed for the 155MM How TD's "speed-jack" enabling them to rotate 360 degrees in any firing direction. Trees were thinned and topped where possible to develop fields of fire for both direct and indirect fire missions. Ammunition storage berms were erected for isolation of munitions and for protection of personnel and equipment.

(7) The following chronological data indicates the pattern of FSB development; the specific batteries that were tactically positioned for direct support; and the location and tube density of the selected FSB's.

101320H Dec- K/4/13(-) Fm (An Hoa) to (Name) AT 84304190
(4)-155MM How SP

121700H Dec- F/2/11(-) Fm (An Hoa) to (Lance) AT 79674061
(4)-105MM How TD

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141800H Dec- T/2/11 Fm (An Hoa) to (Lance) AT 79674061
(4)-155MM How TD

141800H Dec- 2d Prov 1/12 Fm (An Hoa) to (Pike) ZC 19204560
(4)-155MM How TD

161905H Dec- A/1/12 Fm (An Hoa) to (Pike) ZC 19304500
(6)-105MM How TD

201300H Dec- C/1/12 Fm (An Hoa) to (Spear) ZC 18414014
(6)-105MM How TD

261200H Dec- 1st Plt, 1st Searchlight Btry displaced one light
to (Lance) AT 79304010, (Pike) ZC 19204540, (Spear)
ZC 18404010 and (Dagger) ZC 16603650
(4)-Searchlights

301630H Dec- F/2/11(-) Fm (Lance) AT 79674061 to (Cutlass)
ZC 13383565
(4)-105MM How TD

311730H Dec- L/4/11 Fm (An Hoa) to (Cutlass) ZC 13383568
(4)-155MM How TD

011400H Jan- W/3/11 (Det.) Fm (An Hoa) to (Dagger) ZC 14374098
(2)-Howtar

011700H Jan- T/2/11 Fm (Lance) AT 79314061 to (Liberty Bridge)
(4)-155MM How TD

201600H Jan- C/1/12 Fm (Spear) ZC 18414014 to (Maxwell)
ZC 09744192
(6)-105MM How TD

211830H Jan- D/2/11(-) Fm (An Hoa) to (Dart) ZC 14832813
(4)-105MM How TD

291315H Jan- W/3/11(Det.) Fm (Dagger) ZC 14374098 to (Hill 327)
ZC 09404670
(2)-Howtar

011400H Feb- A/1/12 Fm (Pike) ZC 19304500 to (Tomahawk)
ZC 01824104
(6)-105MM How TD

021620H Feb- 2d Prov 1/12 Fm (Pike) ZC 19204560 to (Tomahawk)
ZC 01664177
(4)-155MM How TD

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041800H Feb- F/2/11(-) Fm (Cutlass) ZC 13383565 to (Bolo)
 ZC 08222719
 (4)-105MM How TD

041800H Feb- W/3/11 (Det.) Fm (Hill 327) ZC 09404670 to COB
 (Battle Axe) ZC 09133021
 (3)-Howtar

051700H Feb- LY/4/11 Fm (Cutlass) ZC 13383568 to (Bolo)
 ZC 08222717
 (4)-155MM How TD

091800H Feb- D/2/11(-) Fm (Dart) ZC 14832813 to (Saber)
 ZC 02343450
 (4)-105MM How TD

151030H Feb- 1st Plt, 1st Searchlight Btry Fm (Lance), (Pike),
 (Spear) and (Dagger) to (An Hoa)
 (4)-Searchlights

152040H Feb- LY/4/11(-) Fm (Bolo) ZC 08222717 to (Maxwell)
 ZC 09774177
 (2)-155MM How TD

161045H Feb- A/4/12 Fm (Tomahawk) ZC 01824104 to (An Hoa)
 (6)-105MM How TD

161200H Feb- 2d Prov 1/12 Fm (Tomahawk) ZC 01664177 to (An Hoa)
 (4)-155MM How TD

161440H Feb- LY/4/11(-) Fm (Bolo) ZC 08222717 to (Tomahawk)
 ZC 01664177
 (2)-155MM How TD

161440H Feb- F/2/11(-) Fm (Bolo) ZC 08222719 to (Tomahawk)
 ZC 01804180
 (4)-105MM How TD

161500H Feb- W/3/11(Det.) Fm (Battle Axe) ZC 09133021 to (An Hoa)
 (3)-Howtar

171430H Feb- C/1/12 Fm (Maxwell) ZC 09744192 to (An Hoa)
 (6)-105MM How TD

171430H Feb- D/2/11(-) Fm (Saber) ZC 02343450 to (Maxwell)
 ZC 09744177
 (4)-105MM How TD

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051800H Mar- F/2/11(-) Fm (Tomahawk) ZC 01804180 to (An Hoa)
(4)-105MM How TD

051830H Mar- LY/4/11(-) Fm (Tomahawk) ZC 01664177 to (An Hoa)
(2)-155MM How TD

061145H Mar- LY/4/11(-) Fm (Maxwell) ZC 09774177 to (An Hoa)
(2)-155MM How TD

061745H Mar- D/2/11(-) Fm (Maxwell) ZC 09744177 to (An Hoa)
(4)- 105MM How TD

(8) Fire Support Coordination was established at the Task Force level. Its function was to plan for and to coordinate all supporting arms within the AO established for Task Force Yankee. The FSCC ensured that all supporting arms were economically employed to their maximum effectiveness and within their requisite degree of safety. The FSCC operated within the parameters set forth in Division Order P03300.1; The Standing Operating Procedure For Fire Support Coordination.

(9) The colocation of An Hoa Direct Air Support Center (DASC) and Task Force Yankee FSCC greatly effected a reduction of time necessary to process fire missions. "Sav-a-planes" initiated by the FSCC were immediately processed and supporting air diverted from impact areas and from the flight path of artillery rounds. The ability of the Fire Support Coordinator to work directly with the DASC Coordinator held restrictive fire plans and check-fires to a minimum throughout the operation. No unusual situations were encountered which materially hampered or restricted the effectiveness in coordination of supporting arms during the operation.

(10) The direct support and general support batteries, as an aggregate, operating within the Field Artillery Group structure responded to some 6,640 observed fire missions, 4,781 unobserved fire missions and 9,165 harassing and interdicting fire missions. The 20,586 missions fired accounted for a total expenditure of 251,650 rounds of all calibers and types. The following table is a breakdown of rounds expended by type and caliber from 7 December 1968 through 8 March 1969, in support of Operation Taylor Common.

	4.2	105 H	155 H	155 G	8" H	175 G	
HE	26,794	161,813	39,866	2,039	2,685	2,590	
WP	993	5,760	1,745	121			
ILL	1,901	3,615	1,661	42	25		
TOTALS	29,688	171,188	43,272	2,202	2,710	2,590	251,650

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(11) Within BA 112, heavy double and triple canopy, thick forest area and rugged, inaccessible terrain reduced the surveillance information normally gleaned from forward observers, air observers and reconnaissance teams. The following is a tabulation of artillery mission surveillances received from observers during the period of 7 December 1968 through 8 March 1969:

KIA's	279
Probable KIA's	429
Secondary Explosions	107
Structures Destroyed	137
Bunkers Destroyed	50
Structures Damaged	29
Bunkers Damaged	11
Boats Destroyed	15

(12) Naval Gunfire supported Operation Taylor Common periodically from 7 December 1968 through 8 March 1969. The supporting NGF was mainly directed at enemy fortifications located in the Go Noi Island area.

(a) The following ammunition was expended through the above period:

16" 50 Caliber	261
8" 50 Caliber	585
6" 47 Caliber	1
5" 38 Caliber	12
TOTAL	<u>859</u>

(b) The following surveillances and battle damage assessments as a result of Naval Gun Fire were observed by airborne and ground observers:

Bunkers Destroyed	34
Bunkers Damaged	26
Structures Destroyed	23
Structures Damaged	12
Trenchline Destroyed	425 Meters
Treeline Destroyed	270 Meters
Boats Destroyed	1
Bridges Destroyed	1
Storage Sites Destroyed	2
Tunnel Complexes Destroyed	6
Secondary Explosions	9

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C. Air

(1) General. On 11 December 1968, the air operations for Task Force Yankee commenced as the occupation of RA 112 began. The operation was almost entirely dependent upon helicopters for major troop movements, resupply and reconnaissance due to the dense jungle and the mountainous terrain, which ranged in heights to 1143 meters (IZ Battle Axe). Helicopter support for Task Force Yankee was provided by Marine units located at Marble Mountain Air Facility and Phu Bai. For short periods of time, Army CH-54, CH-47, and UH-1E gunship aircraft also were utilized in conjunction with and to augment Marine Helicopters in order to maintain and secure the vital supply line to the fire support bases and units in the field. Air Force fixed wing support was provided by the 15th Aerial Port Squadron, utilizing C-130, C-123 and C-7 transport aircraft. Air Force AC-47 (Specter) and AC-119 (Shadow) fireships were available "On Call" to Task Force Yankee from the 14th Special Operations Wing. Special mission aircraft for Arolight and Combat Trap drops were fraggged via the 7th Air Force. Air Force CAS aircraft fraggged through Saigon and divers in the area also were utilized. Fixed wing units of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing provided C-130 Flareships, F-4's, A-4's, A-6A's and OV-10 aircraft throughout the Operation.

(2) Air Liaison Functions. During Operation Taylor Common, the function of the Task Force Yankee Air Section was to coordinate all fixed wing requests, helicopter requests and AO requests received from Battalion and Regimental ALO's. The AO requests were reviewed to ensure proper coordination and to avoid duplication of AO sorties. Fixed wing sortie requests were checked to ensure proper fuzing and ordnance for the target described. Helo requests were checked and combined, when feasible, to provide minimal mission duration, consistent with maximum utilization of helicopter assets. The requests were then telephoned to the Division Air Officer, using the twelve line fixed wing and the nine line helo request forms approved by the 1st Marine Division. Additional coordination with the Task Force Yankee NSCC and An Hoa DASC was required to maintain "Save-a-Plane" information for the protection of all aircraft operating in Task Force Yankee's AO. During the day, the Air Section monitored fixed wing and particularly helicopter operations to ensure maximum utilization, in order of priorities assigned, with assets available. Periodically, helicopters were diverted as necessary to reflect changing priorities and emergency situations as they occurred. A mandatory function of the Air Section was to request additional support as necessary to replace aircraft that returned to their base with mechanical difficulty or maximum flight crew time. During the day, frequent liaison was required with supporting units regarding availability of assets and delays or cancellations of aircraft fraggged for the Task Force. This continual monitoring proved necessary throughout

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the entire operation and was found to be the most effective method of enhancing the utilization of air assets.

(3) Helicopter Mission Assignment. Standard mission numbers were assigned to Task Force Yankee for use during Operation Taylor Common. These were as follows:

- MSN - 50 Task Force Yankee Command & Control (CG)
- 51 Aerial Observation (Fixed Wing)
- 52 Logistics (Resupply)
- 53 Reconnaissance
- 54 Troop lifts/Assaults
- 55 Medevac
- 56 Visual Reconnaissance for Requesting Units, C&C
- 57 Special Logistics (Use of Army CH-54's)
- 58 Special Admin

These missions satisfied all the requirements developed by Task Force Yankee to accomplish the air support operations during Taylor Common. Use of standard mission numbers proved to be an effective method of requesting air specific tasks.

(4) Records and Charts. Record keeping of aircraft received was mandatory in order to manage the air assets properly. A helicopter work log, and ground time log, were produced locally by Task Force Yankee Air to accomplish this objective. See enclosures (1) and (2). Additionally, a linear graphic availability chart was developed to depict the progress of the priority missions (MSN 52, 53, 54). See enclosure (3). These graphs provided a quick reference as to how many and what type helos were working missions on an hourly basis. These charts served also to give rapid information to Task Force Yankee Staff Sections and were utilized for briefing purposes. Another chart, "The Daily Helo Summary", utilized for briefing the Task Force Yankee CG and distinguished guests, depicted for rapid appraisal, daily helicopter missions with the desired statistics on aircraft requested, aircraft fragged, actual aircraft received, planned hours of use, hours received, ground hours and net hours received. See enclosure (4).

(5) Support Statistics. From 11 December 1968 to 8 March 1969, the following statistics for helicopter and fixed wing support of Operation Taylor Common were compiled from records kept by the Task

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Force and from additional records kept by the air units involved. These statistics reflect the vital part air played in this operation and will play in similar operations in the future. In addition, enclosure (5) graphically exhibits the explosive bomb weight used to secure and develop selected positions and operating bases in BA 112.

FIXED WING SUPPORT

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>BOMB TONNAGE</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
Close Air Support	-	1862	-
ASST (TPQ-10)	-	1548	-
Beacon Hops	-	292	-
TOTALS	7042	3702	

Visual Recon, Artillery Spot, TAC(A), (OV-10)	430	1486
Flare Drop/Radio Relay, (C-117)	12	47
Flare Drop/Fire Suppressions, (AC-47, AC-119, G-130)	114	238

<u>USAF Aircraft</u>	<u>Delivered An Hoa</u>	<u>Lifted From An Hoa</u>
Cargo Tonnage	7908	694
Mail Tonnage	108	71
Passengers	4666	6301

HELICOPTER SUPPORT

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>MEDEVACS</u>	<u>TONS CARGO LIFTED</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>
MAG-16	9247	58,960	-	9740	30,918
MAG-36	460	3,035	-	749	1,701
US ARMY	540	0	-	580	1,782
TOTALS	10,247	61,995	1,674	11,069	34,401

(6) Helicopter Aircraft Utilization. The factors affecting helicopter support were: (a) aircraft required versus aircraft received, as depicted below; (b) weather; (c) security of landing zones; (d) efficiency of the units handling the air assets; and (e) the timeliness of the aircraft arriving for assigned missions. These factors varied from day to day. Through constant supervision, the variables were compensated for and effective utilization of aircraft was achieved.

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	<u>Avg. Daily Requested</u>	<u>Avg. Daily Received</u>	<u>Tot. Requested</u>	<u>Tot. Received</u>
UH-1E	1	1	86	85
UH-1E(G)	6	5	499	441
CH-46	12	10	1044	874
CH-53	4	3	399	265
UH-34	0	0	2	27
CH-47	0	0	25	20
CH-54	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>7</u>
TOTALS	23	19	2064	1719 or 83%

(7) Direct Air Support Center (DASC). In support of Operation Taylor Common, An Hoa DASC commenced operations on 11 December 1968. The DASC is an air control facility equipped to control and coordinate the employment of aircraft in support of ground forces. The DASC exercised the control and coordination of both fixed wing and helicopters within the Taylor Common AO. In order to accomplish this control, it was necessary for An Hoa DASC to be manned and operational on a 24 hour basis. The physical location of the DASC in the Task Force Yankee COC bunker, in close proximity to the FSCC, G-3, and Air Section, provided rapid communications and liaison where mission priorities, "Save-a-Plane", and immediate operational requests (emergency resupply) were concerned. The establishment of a DASC at An Hoa for control of the Taylor Common AO greatly contributed to efficient utilization of assets through effective local control.

(8) Air Support Radar Team (ASRT)

(a) Toward the latter part of January 1969 it became obvious that targets being developed by Task Force Yankee were beyond the capability of the three ASRT's located near Danang. A feasibility study was initiated under the auspices of MACG-18, which revealed definite advantages of locating a TPQ-10 radar set at the An Hoa Combat Base. It was determined that an ASRT position at An Hoa could adequately cover all the area supported by ASRT's in Danang, and would give additional coverage to the West and South required by Task Force Yankee Operations. A week after the decision was made to move an Air Support Radar Team to An Hoa, the site for the antenna and bunker to house the computer shelter was prepared by "B" Co, 1st Engineer

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Battalion. The team displaced from Danang on 8 February and the set was operational by 10 February. The only difficulty encountered was that of establishing accurate reference points which could be used to precisely orient and establish a location survey. No serious problem areas developed during its one month of operation for Task Force Yankee. New equipment, recently rebuilt generators, a double stock of organic operational spares, a small maintenance float, several back-up radios, and a adequate lumber supply all contributed substantially to the ease of transition from Danang to An Hoa and an up-status time of over 96%.

(b) From 10 February 1969 to 8 March 1969, An Hoa ASRT controlled 430 Marine Corps, Navy and Air Force aircraft, dropping 1436 tons of ordnance on over 700 targets. Ground units called in lucrative and fleeting targets which were struck within 5-10 minutes. The use of spotters, both airborne and on the ground, enabled TPQ strikes to be adjusted to within 25 meters of a desired area. An Hoa ASRT also supported the 7th and 26th Marines during the time Danang's ASRT's were not operational. In addition, strikes were carried out in support of the Army Americal Division, several Special Forces units, the ROK Marines, the 51st ARVN Regiment, and 1st ARVN Ranger Group. The value of locating the AN/TPQ-10 near the command post area of operation, where instant communications to DASC, FSCC and hence to field units available, cannot be over emphasized. In addition to continuing strikes in close proximity to fire support bases in BA 112, nightly strikes were made as close as 1500 meters from the An Hoa perimeter itself to interdict suspected rocket and mortar sites. Even during severe weather conditions units up to 20 miles away were assured of air support. Moreover, the versatility of the ASRT was available also in the form of helo positioning, controlled aerial strip photography, and limited GCA capability.

d. Engineer Support

(1) Forces Available

(a) For the initial phases of Operation Taylor Common, Company B (-)(Rein), 3d Engineer Battalion (Company Headquarters, two platoons and an equipment section) was in direct support of and under OPCON of the 3d Marine Regiment (-)(Rein). In direct support of the 5th Marine Regiment, for the duration of the operation, was Company B (-)(Rein), 1st Engineer Battalion, consisting of a company headquarters with an equipment section, three (3) numbered platoons and a reinforcing platoon from the 3d Engineer Battalion which was subsequently withdrawn. Platoons of this company were provided to the several Battalions of the 5th Marines, as required, for assigned missions including the construction and development of FSB's within BA 112 and COB's within BA 112. Platoons of Company B (-)(Rein), 3d Engineer Battalion were similarly

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provided to support the Battalions of the 3d Marines that operated in BA 112.

(b) Special items of equipment were made available for use during the FSB/COB development phase of the overall operation. Though certain equipment changes occurred during the BA 112 phase of Operation Taylor Common, the basic listing of equipment remained essentially stable. Exceptions were: the acquisition of six (6) additional Remington 18" cut, gasoline engine powered chain saws; and, the reduction from three (3) to one (1) of the M580 Case rubber tired tractor with backhoe attachment. Experience gained during the operation dictated the above changes.

(c) An agent for coordinating and reporting the engineer effort was provided to the Task Force Yankee Staff in the form of one (1) Field Grade Combat Engineer Officer of the Division Engineer Office.

(d) The chart in enclosure (6) illustrates the basic relationships of engineer support in early phases of the operation. Mentioned changes in equipment and changes in command personnel occurred prior to a major shift in engineer support posture; however, totals (by type units and equipments) remained stable through 15 February 1969, except for the 10 February 1969, entry into the operation by BLT 3/26 with a direct support engineer platoon of the 5th Engineer Battalion. This platoon, however, never formally entered into the operation as a separate, identifiable unit, nor were their specific operations or capabilities reported or coordinated through the Task Force Staff. They remained and operated as a part of BLT 3/26.

(e) Other short-term organizational modifications were effected during the period 15-21 February 1969, but were shortlived as to be of little note. Notable changes were:

16 Feb 1969: Company HQ element and the 3d Platoon, Company B (-) (Rein), 3d Engineer Battalion (Dong Ha) was withdrawn from the operation.

21 Feb 1969: 2d Platoon, Company B (-), 3d Engineer Battalion, was withdrawn from the operation. A reinforced Woodpecker organization entered the operation.

The engineer support posture, after the above changes, and for the latter phases of the Operation is illustrated by the chart in enclosure (7).

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(2) Employment of Forces

(a) In the initial phases of the operation, engineer elements were employed primarily in the development of FSB/COB's in the canopied hills and mountains of BA 112. A parallel employment was the provision of close combat engineer support for the movement of maneuvering infantry elements in the Task Force area of operations, to include daily sweeps of the An Hoa/Liberty Bridge main supply route. Secondary assignments were the accomplishment of certain specific tasks within the AO, which were of a general support nature. The details of mission assignment and concept of engineer operations in BA 112 are contained in Annex C (Engineer) of 1st Marine Division Administrative Order 448-68 of 082100H December 1968 (S), with change 1 of 230800H February 1969 (S). Additional details are found in Annex G (Engineer) of Task Force Yankee Operation Order 1-69 (S). All of the information contained in the aforementioned Orders is being considered for consolidation in a forthcoming addition to the 1st Marine Division SOP for Engineer Operations.

(b) The basic concept of employment in FSB/COB development involved the insertion of an engineer team, with a security element, into the proposed landing zone to further develop the zone. Engineer personnel had been trained in rappelling techniques in the event helicopters were unable to touchdown in the initial landing zone. Development of landing zones continued until a zone 100 ft by 100 ft was developed. A Mini-Dozer was inserted into the landing zone to assist engineers in the development of the LZ. Upon completion of the landing zone, work commenced on preparing gun pits for artillery pieces and on the construction of three pre-cut, 8 ft X 8 ft X 12 ft, bunkers for use as a PDC, a Battalion COC, and as a BAS.

(c) Extensive use of demolitions was necessary due to the dense vegetation, the thickness of the trees located within the areas, and the need for rapid development of the FSB. Two significant changes to demolition techniques, involving a locally designed landing area explosive device and more extensive use of forty pound shaped charges and cratering charges in clearing and leveling, have been incorporated in the aforementioned Change 1 to 1st Marine Division Admin Order 448-68.

(d) Gasoline powered chain saws and hand tools were heavily relied upon in the clean-ups and clearing of landing zones and FSB sites, due to the large amounts of debris left in the areas after the use of high explosive ordnance. The Case M-450 Mini-Dozer was employed on each FSB and COB developed. A tabular synopsis of the employment of engineer elements in the initial phases of the operation is contained in enclosure (8).

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(*) Subsequent to the completion of the final FSB/COB, and upon the change in support posture, engineer support focused on utilization of the assets of a task organized "Woodpecker" element. Close combat engineer support provided the maneuvering infantry units continued but the deliberate destruction of enemy installations and fortifications, land clearance of areas possibly affording covered harbors for enemy troops, and rough pioneer road work in the Arizona Area, including Go Noi Island, became, during the latter phases, the most significantly quantifiable facet of the engineer effort for the Operation. The basic concept of employment of the direct support Woodpecker unit was spelled out by CG, TF Yankee message 221524Z Feb 69 (S). The employment statistics of this team together with other elements is presented in enclosure (9).

(x) The Task Force Engineer Officer was employed in a normal staff roll of coordinating the overall engineer effort; expediting supply equipment acquisition; advising the command on engineer matters; affecting liaison between engineer units; collecting feed back reports (see forms, enclosures (10) and (11)); recommending appropriate employment; conducting aerial reconnaissance missions and conducting staff visits to operational FSB's, COB's and CP's.

(3) Effectiveness of Employment

(a) In a simple analysis of the effectiveness of engineer employment, prime importance can be placed on the BA 112 operations since the successful accomplishment of the Task Force mission in no small part depended upon effective and timely accomplishment of assigned engineer tasks. An important indicator of overall engineer effectiveness, in the type of operation conducted, was the appropriate use of explosive demolitions in the clearing and leveling processes for each FSB and/or COB developed. Analysis of the effectiveness of employment was based on the effort expended in the involved demolitions techniques.

(b) The graph shown in enclosure (12) depicts explosive expenditures by FSB, by COB, by type explosive and by total combined weights. From the graphical display, averages were computed so that comparisons could be made. Enclosure (13) was prepared to compare expenditures by type job between involved units, eliminating those tasks (FSB Lance and COB Dagger) in which both engineer units were involved. Again, averages were computed to draw comparisons. Averages computed from both graphical displays are shown in tabular form in enclosure (14). Careful perusal of the graphs and the table leads to the following conclusions regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of engineer operations:

- 1 The total engineer effort was effective and

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successful. The required FSB/COB's were constructed at the time needed upon the selected sites.

2 Effectiveness increased with experience, since total demolition expenditures and time expenditures per FSB/COB generally trended downward even though the terrain conditions became more difficult.

3 Use of the proper shaped charge and cratering charge (S&C) mix in FSB clearing was more effective than other techniques. Use of this technique caused average total demolitions expenditures to be reduced by some 2.5 tons per FSB, and average time of completion of the job to be reduced by approximately twelve (12) hours. As the total expenditure of forty pound shaped charges and cratering charges went up, other demolition requirements came down at a greater rate.

4 The most effective technique of demolitions combined the use of the proper S&C mix with the employment of the locally designed and manufactured "Landing Area Explosive Device", (LAED). Use of the LAED further reduced average total demolitions expenditure per FSB by approximately 0.3145 tons and average time for completion by approximately four hours.

5 Elements of Company B, 3d Engineer Battalion tended to be most effective in accomplishment of tasks. This can be attributed to the fact that:

a Elements of the 3d Engineers had the most experience in FSB/COB construction both prior to and during Operation Taylor Commot.

b Of the FSB's constructed by employment of the proper S&C mix and LAED, elements of the 3d Engineers accomplished the majority of the projects.

c One of the FSB's constructed by other engineer elements (FSB Pike) was developed as a semi-permanent FSB, rather than a temporary one, which caused an inordinate expenditure of demolitions and time, and consequently raised the average expenditures disproportionately for that unit.

(c) Other notable factors of effectiveness in FSB/COB construction were:

1 The excellent and highly effective employment of essential items of equipment; Mini-Dozers and chain-saws.

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2 The use, recovery, and re-use of critical items of special class IV.

a Of the 206 bundles of M3A1 airfield matting set aside for the operation, only 105 were delivered to An Hoa. Of the 105 delivered bundles, 85 bundles were used on various FSB's at least three times and finally returned for use at An Hoa Combat Base. Only 20 bundles were WOTS and eventually scrapped.

b All culverting material was used at least twice on FSB's and finally recovered for use at An Hoa.

c Twenty-five of thirty-four pre-cut, pre-packaged, Tactical Support Functional Component (TSFC) bunkers were used twice, with at least fifty percent (50%) of materials involved returned for use at An Hoa.

(d) The Woodpecker Team employed in the final stages of the operation was not completely effective for three prime reasons:

1 The twelve TD18A Full-Track Tractors with Landing Force Blades that were employed were old, unused models, that had been in dead storage for fifteen or more years. Breakdowns, as a result of dry-rot, were rapid, frequent, and semi-permanent since necessary spare parts were not available.

2 The Team was not actively employed in the role originally envisioned due to a necessary, major change in the tactical plan.

3 Landing Force Blades on the tractors are only fifty to seventy-five percent as effective as an angle blade.

(e) Comparisons of actual to anticipated equipment rates, production and relative effectiveness are presented in the table, enclosure (15). Generally, the assets of the Woodpecker Team were assembled in timely fashion, and even though not employed in the specific area as originally planned, they did effect timely land clearing and destruction of enemy installation support to other deployed battalions.

e. Allied Forces

(1) 1st ARVN Ranger Group

(a) The 1st ARVN Ranger Group, comprised of 3 Battalions, commenced operations on 10 December 1968, with a helo assault into the northern portion of the Arizona Area. Upon landing, the unit commenced search and clear operations throughout the Arizona Area. Initially, the Ranger Group

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consisted of the 21st, 37th and the 39th Ranger Battalion. The 1st Bn, 3d Regt. commenced operations in support of the Ranger Group to permit the Battalion, initially employed, the ability to conduct periodic rehabilitation.

(b) The Ranger Group continued operations in cooperation and coordination with Task Force Yankee until 10 February 1969, when they terminated operations in the area and redeployed to fulfill a newly assigned mission.

(c) Upon termination of the ARVN Ranger Group's participation in the operation on 10 February 1969, the 21st and 39th Bn and the Group Headquarters were the units participating.

(d) The 1st ARVN Ranger Group accounted for 614 NVA KIA, 120 VC KIA, 5 NVA PW's, 6 VC PW's, 115 IWC and 28 CSWC; while sustaining 100 ARVN KIA, 3 USA WIA(E), and 378 ARVN WIA(E), during their participation.

(2) MSF/CIDG

(a) On 26 December 1968, the Nong Song CIDG and two Mobile Strike Force Companies from Company C, 5th Special Forces Group commenced participation in Operation Taylor Common. The units were assigned an area of operations with the mission of conducting extensive search and clear operations along the Song Thu Bon and southern Taylor Common boundary.

(b) The MSF periodically rotated the engaged companies with replacement companies from Danang. The CIDG force rotated personnel in order to retain high morale and combat effectiveness. The Mobile Strike Force units terminated participation in Operation Taylor Common on 11 February 1969.

(c) The MSF/CIDG units accounted for 6 NVA KIA, 28 VC KIA, 3 NVA PW, 5 VC PW, 331 IWC and 30 CSWC while sustaining 5 CIDG WIA(E), 1 USA WIA(E) and 1 MSF WIA(E) during their participation.

8. (5) Intelligence

a. Enemy Forces in the TACR. Upon activation of Task Force Yankee, the following enemy units were considered to be operating in the Taylor Common area of responsibility. Enclosure (16) depicts the disposition of these forces:

Headquarters, Military Region 5

Estimated
Strength
650

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	Estimated Strength
Headquarters, Front 4	600
21st NVA Regiment/2d NVA Division	900
220th Transportation Regiment (Element thereof)	900
Q-81st, Q-83d Local Force Battalion	180
2d Battalion, 141st Regiment	250
Total	3460

b. Enemy Forces Reinforcement. Enemy units considered to be operating contiguous to the Taylor Common AOR and capable of reinforcing units therein are listed below. Their disposition is also illustrated in enclosure (16).

	Estimated Strength
36th NVA Regiment	1000
38th Regiment (Main Force)	1500
141st NVA Regiment (-2d Battalion/141st)	950
31st NVA Regiment	1500
1st VC Regiment	900
Headquarters, 2d NVA Division	350
Total	6200

c. Infiltration and Routes of Supply. Numerous prisoners of war, interrogations, sightings and captured documents identified BA 112 as a major avenue of approach/infiltration route, and logistic support base for enemy units located in the flatlands of Quang Nam Province. A map, captured during Operation Meade River, and interrogation of Senior Lieutenant Huynh Bon, 220th Transportation Regiment, a Hoi Chanh, during the same operation, located a main supply route with related information along the periphery of BA 112. Enclosure (17). The information obtained from these sources proved invaluable and highly accurate. Once ground units traversed the terrain and validated its accuracy, the information was utilized to provide guidance for reconnaissance and tactical unit employment.

d. Enemy Courses of Action.

(1) The nature of the terrain and enemy disposition in Taylor Common conveniently lends itself to description in three sectors: (1) BA 112: the mountains between the Song Cai and Song Thu Bon Rivers north of a line between ZC 0424 - AT 8125. (2) Arizona Area, bounded by BA 112 on the west, Song Thu Bon (River) to the south and east, the Song Vu Gai (River) to the north, and (3) the remainder of the AO to the south and east of the Song Thu Bon (River). The probable courses of enemy activity in these sectors was addressed in Task Force

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Yankee G-2 Estimate dated 4 December 1968, summarized as follows:

(a) BA 112. While the enemy requires BA 112 as a logistics base, to support operations in Quang Nam Province, his most important asset is people. He can permit the destruction of his logistic support; however, he can not afford the capture/destruction of his human resources. For this reason and in the absence of combat elements in the BA, it is believed that he will probably attempt to withdraw his headquarters, supplies and personnel to the west and southwest, as friendly forces uncover the BA. This withdrawal will probably be accompanied by delaying/harassing actions, conducted by local security forces. It is not anticipated that the enemy will strongly defend or reinforce.

(b) Arizona Area. The 21st Regiment will attempt to elude friendly operations unless entrapped or presented with a favorable target of opportunity which could be engaged at a time and place of his choosing. Neither a strong position defense or reinforcement is anticipated.

(c) Remainder of the AO. Continued harassing activities by Local Force units, to include maximum use of surprise firing devices and attacks by fire against the An Hoa Combat Base will occur.

(2) A reestimate of probable enemy actions was prepared prior to conduct of the retrograde of the 3d Marines (-) (Rein) from BA 112. It concluded that the enemy would continue a strong reconnaissance of friendly positions and, upon determining the extent of the withdrawal, would attempt to reoccupy the BA and reestablish supply lines. Concomitantly, friendly forces remaining in the BA on established FSB's would be subjected to attacks by fire, ambushes and probing attacks, to test defensive strengths and weaknesses. Enclosure (18) illustrates the disposition of enemy forces at the commencement of the retrograde, (15Feb69), and at the termination of the operation, (08Mar69).

e. Collection Agencies. The below listed intelligence collection agencies were employed by, or supported, Task Force Yankee. The type support provided is indicated:

(1) First Marine Division G-2. Intelligence from all sources; invaluable background data and administrative assistance.

(2) First Force Reconnaissance Company (Rein). Directions for employment of the company throughout the operation were promulgated in Task Force Yankee's Ground Surveillance Plan 1-68 (10 Dec68-15Feb69). Appendix 2 to Annex B to Task Force Yankee Operation

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Order 1-69 (15-19Feb69) and Task Force Yankee Ground Reconnaissance Plan, BA 112 (19Feb69-07Mar69). Initially, Reconnaissance teams were employed on a mission oriented basis, to conduct observation/surveillance or stingray patrols, to the flanks and forward of friendly forces moving through the BA. During the period 10Dec68-15Feb69, 53 patrols were conducted (Enclosure (19)). During the retrograde from BA 112, (15-19Feb69), reconnaissance was employed to assist in implementing the deception plan and to provide observation/surveillance within mortar range of FSB's/COB's being evacuated. During the period 13-18Feb69, 7 patrols were conducted (Enclosure (19)). Subsequent to the retrograde, reconnaissance was employed to provide mission oriented observation/surveillance or stingray patrols along the most probable lines of communications west of the Song Cai, the approaches to FSB's Tomahawk and Maxwell and through BA 112. During the period 19Feb-07Mar69, 10 patrols were conducted. Enclosure (19).

(3) 13th ITT (Rein)

(a) The 13th ITT, augmented by a sub-team from the 7th ITT, was organized as a Task Force Interrogation Center providing interrogation/classification of detainees and submission of attendant reports; supervision of detainee evacuation; scanning of captured documents; screening of all refugees relocated by Task Force units; and maintaining a "Go Team" capability, to provide interrogation of infantry battalion detainees and wounded detainees transported aboard helicopter.

(b) The interrogation center was deactivated on 17Feb69 and 13th ITT returned to the control of the 5th Marines. Results of its operation during periods 7Dec68-17Feb69 and 18Feb69-7Mar69 are contained in enclosure (20).

(4) Air Observers. During the period 13Dec68-16Feb69 the task organization for Task Force Yankee included 2 Air Observers from the 3d Marine Division. These observers were physically located at An Hoa and assigned to OV-10A aircraft, provided daily in support of the Task Force, by VM0-2. AO and pilot briefs/debriefs were accomplished prior and subsequent to each flight, thereby ensuring a timely and responsive intelligence collection system. First Marine Division provided the AO assets from 17Feb69-07Mar69, adhering to the aforementioned briefing/debriefing procedures. The following statistics indicate some of the more significant Air Observer achievements:

Hours Flown: 520
Airstrikes Controlled: 305
Artillery Missions Controlled: 57

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Photo Missions: 9
 C/S Drops Controlled: 45
 AA sites Uncovered: 23 (11 Active; 12 Unoccupied)
 Bunker Complexes Sighted: 69
 Trail Networks Sighted: 75 (Includes confirmation of previously reported trails and discovery of new networks)

Provided assistance during 3 separate recovery missions of Marine KIA (BNR)

(5) 1st Platoon, Sub Unit #1, First Radio Battalion. Requests for Radio Battalion support, prior to Operation Taylor Common, were in consonance with the Battalion's plans to locate a platoon at An Hoa. Accordingly, their displacement to An Hoa was planned to coincide with the establishment of Task Force Yankee thereat. The team, while in general support of III MAF, provided a portion of its assets in direct support of the Task Force. A system of hot line communications between Yankee G-2 and Sub Unit #1 Command Post provided timely, reliable information.

(6) Sub Team, 3d CIT. Normal CI support.

(7) 245th SAC, (USA). Photography, Infra Red (IR) and SLAR support on an intermittent basis, with inflight readouts in the case of IR, and SLAR. Inflight readouts, processed through An Hoa DASC, provided the opportunity for immediate reaction against targets acquired.

(8) VMO-2. Provided AO aircraft; pilots also participated in AO briefs/debriefs.

(9) VMCJ. Provided aerial photography.

(10) Military Intelligence Battalion (Air Recon Section (MLBAIS), (USA). Provided aerial photography.

(11) 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW), (USAF). Provided aerial photography.

(12) District Intelligence Operations Coordinating Center (DIOCC) Duc Duc. Agent reports and information from refugees.

(13) Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), Nong Son. Tactical and local agent reports.

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(14) Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Sub Unit, An Hoc. Ordnance expertise.

(15) 196th Light Infantry Brigade, (USA). Information via Liaison Officer and radio communications.

(16) Sensor Devices. Employed in three phases, as specified in Task Force Yankee Frag Order 3-69 (Task Force Yankee message 200431ZJan69), and depicted in enclosure (21), issued separately.

f. Situation Encountered. The impact of weather and the enemy situation encountered is discussed below. The enemy situation is discussed as it occurred in the geographical sectors of the AO described in paragraph 8.d.(1).

(1) Weather. The most important planning consideration for Operation Taylor Common was the anticipated weather conditions during the period December through February. Based upon weather data compiled by the First Marine Air Wing, it was anticipated that ceilings would be below 1500 feet for 17 days in both December and January, 9 days in February and approximately 1 day in early March, thereby precluding or hampering normal air operations. Further, that periods of heavy ground fog (Crachin) would place additional limitations on air support. Since operations in the BA were entirely reliant upon helicopter support, such dire predictions caused concern. Obviously, weather considerations significantly affected the scheme of maneuver, supply levels to be maintained on FSB's and tactics to be employed. Fortunately, the weather conditions did not occur as predicted and, except for occasional periods of delay for adverse conditions, did not play a significant role in the operation. Statistically, there were 3 days when operations were precluded entirely. However, there were 14 days when only partial operations were permitted; primarily, resupply and troop lifts into the lowlands, which were not affected by low ceilings in the BA. Further, there were approximately 10 days when fixed-wing could not operate due to ceilings below 3000'.

(2) BA 112.

(a) The initial helicopter entry into FSB's Pike, Spear, Lance and COB Mace went unopposed. As patrols ranged from the bases, they uncovered extensive bunker complexes/supply caches, as indicated in enclosure (22). Simultaneously, reconnaissance teams employed along the valley, between AT 800370 and ZC 049234, verified the existence of a major enemy supply route/line of communication (Enclosure (17)). Generally, enemy resistance was light, stemming primarily from small groups attempting to evade friendly infantry

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Forces. Reconnaissance teams did encounter heavy resistance from large groups of enemy moving along the aforementioned MSR/LOC and in the vicinity of Hill 508 (later FSB Maxwell). Captured documents/POW's (Enclosure (23)) verified the presence of MR-5 and Front-4 Headquarters in the BA and the movement of elements of the 2d NVA Division Headquarters into the area.

(b) As friendly units moved into the central portion of the BA, the incidents of uncovering caches subsided. However, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, operating along the Ong Thu Slope (vic ZC 1647), continued to uncover base areas, hospital sites and small caches with regularity. Anticipated increased resistance in the vicinity of Hill 508 delayed 1st Battalion, 3d Marines landing on FSB Maxwell by one day. As friendly forces moved toward the crest of the Ong Thu Slope, two sharp clashes occurred at ZC 182485 and ZC 164431, with estimated platoon size enemy forces. The enemy began conducting a counter-reconnaissance screen against friendly reconnaissance teams inserted in the western portion of the AO. Concurrently, friendly forces were sighting enemy movement in and around their positions; probably, elements of the counter-reconnaissance screen. URS's indicated the relocation of major enemy headquarters to the south and southwest of the AO. Arclight strikes (Enclosure (24)) continually directed at the suspected headquarters, base camp areas and harbor sites caused further movement of these headquarters units to the West of the Song Cai (River).

(c) As friendly forces approached the banks of the Song Cai, enemy resistance stiffened slightly in the form of increased instances of ambushes. A POW captured by L/3/3, 27Jan, indicated that volunteer "Composite Squad Ambush" Units (6-20 men) had been formed, to counteract friendly movement. In the vicinity of ZC 048 456, K/3/5 met heavy resistance from an entrenched enemy force and AO's observed seven secondaries from bomb runs conducted in this area during the same period. On 15Feb69, URS's indicated that all major headquarters had evacuated the BA at this point. Reconnaissance sightings, vicinity FSB's Spear/Pike, indicated the return of other enemy forces, probably reconnaissance units, to the rear of friendly forces.

(d) On 15Feb69, the 3d Marines began their retrograde from the BA. No enemy resistance or reaction occurred. However, the following day reconnaissance team sightings on FSB Bolo, subsequent recon inserts aborted by fire, and harassment of FSB's Maxwell and Tomahawk (coinciding with the post TET Offensive), indicated the enemy was returning to BA 112 in strength. URS reports substantiated these indications. Enemy harassment of FSB's Tomahawk, Maxwell and COB Dagger continued throughout the withdrawal of all friendly forces from the BA.

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(3) Arizona Area.

(a) During the period 11-29Dec68, the First ARVN Ranger Group fought five significant engagements: AT 832487, 11Dec68; AT 835510, 23Dec68; AT 812505, 26Dec68; AT 870515, 27Dec68; AT 838545, 29Dec68. As a result of POW's captured on 11, 13 and 27Dec68 the 4th, 5th and 6th Battalions, 21st Regiment were identified. Enclosure (11). Documents captured at AT 812505 and AT 838545 indicated the contacts on 26 and 29Dec68 were against the 4th and 6th Battalions, 21st NVA Regiment. Enclosure (23). In the interim, between contacts, the enemy continually attempted to elude; employing sniper fire and surprise firing devices to assist in this maneuver. Subsequent to 30Dec68, contact in the area remained sporadic and light. ARVN units were subjected to attacks by fire and light probes by probable reconnaissance elements of the 21st NVA Regiment.

(b) On 10Feb, BLT 3/26 was introduced into the area, under the operational control of the 5th Marines, and the Ranger Group departed. Initially, the sweeps conducted by the separate companies of 3/26 resulted in the same sporadic contact, as the enemy continued to evade. However, documents captured by L/3/26, 27Feb69, indicated the presence of a C-3 company, while URS reports indicated the presence of elements of the 21st NVA Regiment (suspected 60th Battalion). On 26Feb68, M/3/26, contacted an enemy force, capturing documents disclosing the presence of the Q-83d. Enclosure (23). The enemy subsequently broke contact and probably moved northeast into Dai Loc District. No further confirmed contact was made with this force. On 27Feb69, documents captured by L/3/26 indicated the presence of the 10th Company, 3d Battalion, 21st NVA Regiment. Enclosure (23). Heavy fighting continued throughout the period, 23Feb69-04Mar69, with the enemy attempting to break contact and move.

(c) During the post TET Offensive period, An Hoa Combat Base received rocket attacks from the vicinity of AT 815427 and mortar, recoilless rifle fire from the area in the vicinity of AT 8448. During the 1st week of March, agent reports and URS's indicated the possible presence of the First VC Regiment in the southwestern portion of the Arizona Area. A POW captured by I/3/26 on 07Mar69, was tentatively identified as belonging to the 60th Battalion, First VC Regiment. This appeared to substantiate the 21st NVA Regiment breaking contact with 3/26 while the First VC Regiment established contact. Further, that the First VC and 2d NVA Division supporting units conducted the post TET attacks on An Hoa.

(4) 5th Marine AO.

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(a) On 13Dec68, heavy enemy contact was made on the western end of Go Noi Island. Elements of the Q-81 were identified as having participated by documents discovered after the contact, (enclosure (23)). However, the number of troops involved indicated the presence of a larger unit; possibly the 1st Battalion, 36th Regiment, although no confirmation was obtained. Small contacts continued throughout the month of December, involving primarily VC units.

(b) During the first two weeks of January as 1st Bn, 5th Marines shifted its operations to Go Noi Island, VC activity along MSR (Liberty Road) increased significantly. Attendant to large sightings in the Arizona Area, 27Jan69, B/1/5 also sighted movement crossing the Song Thu Bon. Artillery fire credited 6 VC casualties, however, no unit identification was obtained. Immediately following 1/5's return from Go Noi, the surprise firing devices incidents decreased along the MSR. However, contacts both friendly and enemy remained high. On 29Jan69, C/1/7 sighted an estimated 300 enemy moving south from Go Noi in the vicinity of AT 995536, probably attempting to avoid Operation Linn River. The ensuing contact claimed 73 enemy lives. A search of the bodies the following morning failed to reveal a unit designation.

(c) In the week prior to 22-23Feb69, contacts with enemy forces remained at a low level however, recon insert Mad Hatter sighted 571 NVA/VC in groups ranging from 10-20 moving S-N across Go Noi Island indicating a probable increase in activity to the north. Commencing in the early morning hours of 23Feb69, An Hoa Combat Base and units throughout the Task Force Yankee AO came under both ground and fire attacks. The attack against An Hoa resulted in the loss of approximately 30,000 rounds of artillery ammunition. Subsequently, An Hoa received 8 attacks by fire, and ~~minor~~ probes against the strong points.

(5) In summary, the enemy response to Taylor Common was essentially as estimated prior to commencing the operation and the reestimate made prior to the retrograde. There were two significant variations from the estimates: (a) the favorable weather encountered and (b) the absence of contact with the 2d Battalion, 141st Regiment, tentatively located south of Thuong Duc, prior to the operation.

g. Enemy Units Identified.

(1) Currently held in Free World Military Forces Order of Battle:

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ENCLOSURE

- (a) Headquarters MR-5
- (b) Headquarters Front-4
- (c) Headquarters, 2d NVA Division
- (d) 21st NVA Regiment
- (e) First VC Regiment
- (f) 3d Battalion, 36th Regiment
- (g) Q-91st Battalion, 38th Regiment
- (h) Q-81st LF Battalion
- (i) Q-83rd LF Battalion
- (j) Q-82d LF Company
- (k) 105th MF Battalion

(2) No previous record in First Marine Division Order of Battle:

- (a) 700th Replacement Regiment
- (b) V-401 Security Guard
- (c) 35th Regiment, 1st Division
- (d) V-221 Quang Da Province

(3) Units cited in paragraph 8.g.(1) above were identified by POW's/documents (enclosure (23)). Units listed in paragraph 8.g.(2) were identified solely by POW's. Recognizing the probable mendacity of the statements which divulged the units in paragraph 8.g.(2), the information has been included for possible future use as collateral in unit identification.

(4) Enclosure (23) also cited captured documents identifying the presence of units and subordinate elements thereof, which operated in Task Force Yankee AO. Numerous other captured documents substantiated the fact that BA 112 housed various training schools, hospitals, and R&R type areas, supporting all units operating in the First Marine Division AO. The latter documents have been recorded by 13th ITT (An Hoa) and the First Marine Division Document Translation Center (DTC) for future use.

h. Significant Intelligence

(1) Identification of Infiltration Units and Routes of Supply

(a) BA 112. The primary infiltration route, shown in enclosure (17), was verified by sightings and contacts as previously described. Other routes paralleled the trail networks described in enclosures (25) and (26), connecting the primary waterborne supply route, the Song Cai to the west, and the Ong Thu Slope (vicinity ZC 1647) to the east. Enclosure (25) depicts trail nets reported by

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Delta Force and recon teams prior to Taylor Common which were later verified. Enclosure (26) lists trails reported during Operation Taylor Common.

(b) Arizona Area. A study of the enemy's emplacement of SFD's reveals the existence of three distinct corridors, roughly 1000 meters wide, which connect to the major trail nets from the Ong Thu Slope and have been totally devoid of any mining activity. These corridors are utilized for enemy troop/logistic movement across the Arizona Area, enclosure (27).

(2) Identification of Commo/Liaison Routes. Enclosure (28) locates routes identified by prisoners of war.

(3) Location of Captured/Destroyed Enemy Equipment.

(a) Enclosure (29) lists the total material and complexes captured or destroyed.

(b) Enclosure (30) lists the location of significant caches/bunker complexes. (Enclosure (22) illustrates these locations).

(4) Identification of Ordnance.

(a) During the period 23Feb-08Mar69, An Hoa Combat Base was subjected to intermittent attacks by fire. Employing crater and fragment analysis, it was determined that the 120mm mortar was employed for the first time in the First Marine Division AO.

(b) The 122mm rockets, which impacted at An Hoa Combat Base during the Post TET Offensive, were the first of that caliber used against the base since 6Feb68, when 5 x 122's impacted on the airstrip.

(5) Other Significant Information Recorded.

(a) The following information was recorded for future use

(1) Enemy AA positions. Enclosure (31).

(2) Enemy complexes uncovered and destroyed.

Enclosure (22).

(3) VC terminology for southern districts of Quang Nam Province. Enclosure (32).

(4) Sketches of significant complexes and types of buildings uncovered in BA 112. Enclosure (33).

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(5) Helicopter landing zones in BA 112. Enclosure (34).

i. Targeting.

(1) Targeting was accomplished by the G-2, through employment of the various collection agencies, to support the friendly scheme of maneuver and harass/interdict enemy lines of communication and assembly areas. During the operation, targets were acquired for employment of the following supporting arms:

- (a) Artillery
- (b) TPQ-10
- (c) CAS/TAS
 - 1 CS Gas
 - 2 Delay fuze bombs
- (d) Arclights

(2) A total of 45-CS, 8-Delay fuze bombs, 47-Arclight strikes and approximately one-half of the 1548 TPQ strikes were targeted by the G-2. The amount of artillery fire targeted against intelligence developed targets is undetermined.

j. Cover and Concealment.

(1) BA 112. The dense vegetation, thicket, underbrush and jungle canopy afforded maximum concealment for both friendly and enemy forces. Cover from small arms and flat trajectory weapons is provided by large trees and dense underbrush.

(2) Arizona Area and 5th Marines AO. Natural concealment is generally poor in the rice field areas, improving somewhat near the hamlets, adjacent hedgerows and treelines. Natural cover from flat trajectory weapons, provided by rice paddy dikes, is considered fair. Manmade spider holes, tombs, fortified bunkers and well camouflaged fighting holes provide the enemy with excellent cover and concealment.

k. Obstacles.

(1) BA 112. Numerous densely vegetated, narrow, steep-sided ravines, valleys and gorges compartment the area. The steep mountain slopes restricted and canalized movement.

(2) Arizona Area and 5th Marines AO. The inundated rice paddy dike areas provide the only significant obstacle to both enemy and friendly movement.

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9. (S) Mission. Task Force Yankee conducted operations in cooperation and coordination with ARVN Forces to find, fix and destroy enemy forces in An Hoa area; with Marine Forces conducting search and destroy operations in BA 112 to destroy enemy forces, caches and installations while simultaneously preparing a complex of FSB's and COB's to support operations along avenues of approach from Laotian border. Area of Operations shown in enclosure (35).

10. (S) Concept

a. General. Basically Task Force Yankee conducted a three phase operation to destroy enemy forces, caches and installations in the Area of Operation and prepared a complex of FSB's to support extended operations along avenues of approach to BA 112 from the Laotian border. A vital portion of the concept was the maintenance of a continuous recon screen to the north, south and west of the maneuvering battalions as they progressed into BA 112. In addition, supporting arms not only provided direct support to the infantry and recon elements but also maintained H&I fires on all intelligence targets developed.

(1) During Phase One, search and clear operations were conducted from the vicinity of Liberty Bridge to An Hoa along the axis of the line of communication (LOC). Subsequently, Task Force Yankee conducted operations in cooperation and coordination with 1st ARVN Ranger Group in the An Hoa/Arizona Area to destroy elements of the 2d NVA Division. Concurrently, Task Force Yankee assumed operational control of elements of the 3d Marines (-)(Rein) deployed to An Hoa, and prepared a series of FSB's and Battalion COB's for second phase operations in BA 112 utilizing arclights, mini-lights, special air delivered ordnance and artillery.

(2) Phase Two commenced with four Marine Battalions effecting penetration of BA 112 and establishing FSB's and COB's as required to support extensive search and destroy operations to find, fix and destroy enemy forces and command/logistics installations.

(3) In Phase Three, the Task Force conducted extended operations including: reconnaissance and surveillance deep into the western zone of the area of operations; development of FSB's to support forces completing neutralization of BA 112; and to support interdiction along avenues of approach from the Laotian border.

b. Preliminary Intelligence Collection. A precursor to Operation Taylor Common in BA 112 was the U. S. Army Special Forces Delta Force Operation Warbonnet. On 25 October 1968, Delta Force operations were initiated by the insertion of reconnaissance and road runner teams in the vicinity of BA 112 to determine enemy dispositions and locations. These efforts continued until 14 November 1968, when the operation

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was prematurely terminated to divert the Delta Force to another area in Vietnam. The information collected during their operation was compiled by III MAF and utilized by Task Force Yankee in preparation of the estimate of the enemy situation for Operation Taylor Common.

c. Phases

(1) Phase I (7-11 Dec 1968)

(a) The two overall objectives for Phase I were the elimination of enemy forces as a threat to the An Hoa Combat Base and the preparation of the initial FSB's for the projection of Task Force Yankee into BA 112.

(b) The first objective was accomplished by helo landing of the 2d Bn, 7th Marines into the southwestern portion of the Arizona Area to conduct search and clear operations toward the northeast. The 1st ARVN Ranger Group helo landed on 10 December in the northeastern corner of the Arizona Area and conducted search and clear operations to the southwest through the 2d Bn, 7th Marines. On 8 December, elements of the 1st Bn, 2d Bn and 3d Bns of the 5th Marines, returned from Operation Meade River, conducted a thorough search and clear operation through the 5th Marines northern AO to the An Hoa Combat Base. These operations in conjunction with the Army 196th Brigade Operations, Fayette Canyon, which was contiguous to the southern 5th Marines boundary, accomplished the initial aspects of sweeping major enemy forces from the areas adjacent to An Hoa, Liberty Bridge and the MSR and was a preliminary step to launching Task Force elements into BA 112.

(c) Simultaneously, with the search and clear operation, preparation of the first four FSB sites was initiated by the employment of arolights, TPQ-10, observed fixed wing CAS and concentrated artillery fire missions. The FSB locations were generally hills selected on the bases of mutual fire supportability, intermediate elevation, locally defensible and positioned in response to the density of enemy activity reports. The heaviest concentration of fire during Phase I was directed against FSB Lance and Pike, the first to be established in BA 112. The relatively long distance that FSB Lance was located from An Hoa, the major artillery support site, dictated the need for a temporary mobile FSB to be located as close to FSB Lance as possible, preferably to be oriented in the south to provide complementary fire support to CIDG/MSF operations near Nong Son. The self-propelled 155MM Howitzer (M109) battery supported by an infantry company, displaced overland to establish FSB Marne at a position on the Song Thu Bon approximately five kilometers from FSB Lance. Schematic diagram shown in enclosure (36).

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(2) Phase II (11-31 Dec)

(a) This phase commenced with the helo assault landing against Hill 575, the site for FSB Lance. The location had been visually reconnoitered thoroughly after the preparatory fires by the ZIPPO and FIRRPO teams (see paragraph 14) to determine its suitability as a landing zone and for subsequent development as a FSB. Although the preparatory fire cleared the greatest proportion of vegetation from the landing zone, a few tree trunks were not leveled which necessitated the use of rappel techniques to land engineers and a security force to clear a touchdown landing zone. Within two hours an adequate landing zone had been created and the assault element of the 3d Bn, 5th Marines began landing to establish the FSB security, as engineers commenced the construction of artillery positions, ammunition and command bunkers and enlargement of the landing zones.

(b) Once the FSB security force was established and the 60MM and 81MM mortars emplaced, rifle companies radiated from the FSB to commence deliberate search and destroy operations. The pattern that was established resembled a clover leaf, expanding as the closer areas became saturated by patrol activity.

(c) This pattern of operation was characteristic of the establishment of FSB Pike and Spear and COB Mace. However, on FSB Spear and COB Mace the preparatory fires were augmented by the use of the Combat Trap MK 121 bomb dropped by U. S. Air Force C-130 and controlled by Marine ASRT Teams at Hill 55. Although partially successful on FSB Spear, the CEP of the weapon system was not accurate enough to create the desired landing zone on the extremely narrow ridge lines selected for the FSB's. (See paragraph 14.1) The establishment of the four Marine battalions, under the operational control of the 3d Marines, in the Eastern Zone of BA 112 commenced the search and destroy operation against the area of highest incidence of reported enemy activity. The concentration of enemy installations, and the need to develop experience factors for helicopter operations in triple canopied, mountainous terrain under the anticipated weather conditions, dictated a detailed coverage of all trail networks east of the Ong Thu escarpment for a period of at least two weeks. A representative of the type of patrol coverage executed is shown in enclosure (37). The greatest number of caches and structures and the largest volume of equipment and supplies were located by patrols from these initial FSB's.

(d) In conjunction with the FSB search and destroy operations and as a means to disrupt the helo assault pattern, ground operations were mounted against Hills 1050 and 551. The former was established principally as a communications retransmission site, the latter as a projected FSB to exploit the major trail network identified

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in the COB Mace area.

(e) During this phase three Mobile Strike Force Companies and one CIDG Camp Strike Force Company (Nong Son) conducted operations within an area of operation along the Song Thu Bon south of Nong Son and contiguous to the southern boundary of the Taylor Common AO. Although these forces were relatively small they provided a continuous impediment to the flow of enemy supplies and troops that previously had been using this comm/liaison route into the Que Son mountains and into the flat lands beyond. These forces continued to operate in the area until 29 January when they were helo lifted to the Ong Thu slope to relieve the 2d Bn, 5th Marines, which in turn displaced to An Hoa for a short rehabilitation period.

(f) The ARVN Ranger Group continued search and clear operations by separate battalion maneuvers to locate enemy resistance, and then concentrating the full Group to exploit those contacts as they occurred. Throughout this phase the MSF and ARVN forces periodically relieved in place companies and battalions respectively, to provide continuous rehabilitation for those units. (Schematic diagram shown in enclosure (38))

(3) Phase III (1 Jan-8 Mar)

(a) The 3d Bn, 5th Marines helo lift to COB Javelin on 1 January 1969, signaled the initiation of operations in the Western Zone or, more specifically, the penetration of friendly forces into the large basin area between the escarpment of the Ong Thu slope and the Nui Gaing - Yang Brai ridge (center of mass ZC 0634). Following the establishment of COB Javelin the fire support preparations of Hill 508 for the location of FSB Maxwell commenced. Although over 177 tons of high explosive were used to establish a landing zone, the number of limbless tree trunks obstructing a touchdown landing and continued enemy small arms fire, militated against a helo landing directly on the hill. As a result, the 1st Bn, 3d Marines were helo lifted to the LZ on Hill 728 and attacked toward Hill 508 through Hill 401, finally assaulting Hill 508 on 15 January. Upon the establishment of FSB Maxwell, the 3d Marines were in position to pursue the enemy forces along diverging lines to search and clear the remainder of BA 112. The 3d Bn, 3d Marines conducted search and destroy operations south and west from FSB Cutlass through COB Dart to COB Battle Ax and FSB Bolo. The 3d Bn, 5th Marines continued search and destroy operations through COB Broadsword to FSB Tomahawk. The 1st Bn, 3d Marines concluded search and destroy operations with companies on parallel axis of advance north and west towards the Eo Som-Mai Guy ridgeline (center of mass ZC0648). COB Scimitar was developed on the latter ridgeline overlooking the confluences of the Song Cai and the Song Boung. Relative distances between the FSB/COB and An Hoa are shown in enclosure (39).

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(b) By 5 February, Task Force Yankee was operating along the entire length of the Song Cai within the broad demarkation of BA 112 and 1st Force Recon Co teams were penetrating deep into the western approaches to BA 112.

(c) The ARVN Ranger Group operating in the Arizona Area, the 1st Bn, 5th Marines on Go Noi and in the northern 5th Marines AO and the 196th in the Que Son Mountains were continuing their operations against NVA and VC forces, and directly or indirectly protecting the An Hoa Combat Base while destroying enemy forces and uncovering significant caches of supplies and equipment.

(d) Between 7-12 February, BLT 2/26 was passed OPCON to Task Force Yankee to conduct a short operation in the Go Noi Island Area. On 10 February, BLT 3/26 was deployed in the Arizona Area and the 1st ARVN Ranger Group was withdrawn to Danang. By mid-February Task Force Yankee had neutralized BA 112 and had established FSB/COB's on the western approaches from the Laotian border. Upon order of the 1st Marine Division, on 15 February, Task Force Yankee reduced the scale of Operation Taylor Common by displacing to An Hoa all forces in BA 112 except two companies, each with one battery (-)(Rein) of D/S artillery that were located on FSB Tomahawk and Maxwell.

(e) The 3d Marine Hq and the 3d Bn, 3d Marines were redeployed to Dong Ha/Quang Tri on 16-17 February. Subsequently, on 21 February, immediately after deploying for a short operation in the 5th Marines northern AO, the 1st Bn, 3d Marines were displaced to Hill 55 and subsequently redeployed to Dong Ha/Quang Tri. Commencing on 21 February, 2d Bn, 5th Mar conducted ground and helo movement on Go Noi Island in coordination and cooperation with the 1st ARVN Ranger Group to find, fix and destroy enemy forces, fortifications and installations. Limited land clearing operations by use of high explosives charges, medium dozers and Rome plows were to be conducted immediately following the sweep. However, the general NVA/VC attack by fire throughout I Corps postponed this operation in favor of search and clear operations and company size patrolling in the vicinity of An Hoa and Liberty Bridge. Between the latter date and 5 March, operations continued in the Arizona Area and the 5th Marines northern AO. By 22 February, increased enemy activity at FSB Tomahawk and Maxwell justified the redeployment of the entire 3d Bn, 5th Marines to the defense of the two FSB's. Daily attacks by fire on An Hoa and increased enemy activity throughout the 5thMar AO, coupled with ground probes and mortar attacks against the FSB's, dictated redeployment of forces from BA 112. The termination of Operation Taylor Common was signalled by the displacement of 3d Bn, 5th Marines from the BA 112 to An Hoa. In contrast to the displacement of 15-18 February, the enemy actively opposed the friendly force movement from contact. A precis of this critical displacement is contained in enclosure (45). Schematic diagram shown in enclosure (40).

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(f) Common to all three phases of the operation was a maximum reconnaissance effort, employing reconnaissance teams on a mission oriented basis. These teams conducted observation/surveillance or stingray patrols to the flank and forward of friendly forces moving through BA 112. Concomitantly, artillery support was a bifurcated effort with maneuvering/operating forces and the reconnaissance effort receiving supporting fires from Direct Support 105/155MM How (TD) Batteries tactically positioned on FSB's in BA 112; and, from general support medium and heavy artillery batteries positioned at the An Hoa Artillery Complex. The artillery fire support was ubiquitous and not only effectively support Task Force Yankee Forces; but, also ARVN Forces operating in the Arizona Area; and MSF/CIDG Forces operating in the Thuong Duc and Nong Son Areas.

11. (S) Execution

a. Day-by-day narrative (see enclosure (41)).

b. Significant Actions/Occurrences

27Nov68, Task Force Yankee activated for planning.

4Dec68, Task Force Yankee activated for operations.

7Dec68, Operation Taylor Common commenced with BLT 2/7 conducting a helicopter assault into the southwest portion of the Arizona area.

9-10Dec68, 1st ARVN Ranger Group commenced participation in Operation Taylor Common.

9Dec68, CG, TF Yankee assumed OPCON Hqs, 3d Marines (-)(Rein).

10Dec68, Mobile FSB Marine established vicinity AT 853425.

11Dec68, 3d Marines (-)(Rein) assumed OPCON of the 3d Bn (-)(Rein), 5th Marines.

11Dec68, Phase II of Operation Taylor Common commenced with the initial penetration of Base Area 112 when the 3d Bn (-)(Rein), 5th Marines conducted a helicopter assault on Hill 575 (AT 794406) and commenced development of FSB Lance.

13Dec68, 3d Marines (-)(Rein) assumed OPCON of the 2d Bn (Rein), 5th Marines.

13Dec68, 1st Bn (-)(Rein), 3d Marines closed An Hoa and passed to OPCON of 3d Marines.

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14Dec68, 3d Bn (-)(Rein), 3d Marines closed An Hoa and passed to OPCON of 3d Marines.

23Dec68, 1st ARVN Ranger Group via (AT 8351-AT 8457) made contact with an unknown size enemy force utilizing small arms, automatic weapons, B-40 rockets and RPG fire. The contact continued throughout the day with the enemy breaking contact at approximately 232230H. Results of the contact were: 12 ARVN KIA, 53 ARVN WIA(E), 158 NVA KIA, 18 IWC and 10 CSWC.

26Dec68, BLT 2/7 terminated participation in Operation Taylor Common and OPCON passed from CG, TF Yankee to the 7th Marines.

26Dec68, Nong Son CIDG Forces and two Mobile Strike Force Companies from Company "C", 5th Special Forces Group "A" commenced participation in Operation Taylor Common.

1Jan69, Phase III of Operation Taylor Common commenced when a platoon from L/3/5 and a platoon from Co B, 1st Engr Bn conducted a helicopter assault on Hill 734 (ZC 082378) and commenced development of FSB Javelin. Negative enemy resistance was encountered during the assault.

3Jan69, the 2d Troop, 4th ARVN Cavalry commenced participation in Operation Taylor Common in support of the 1st ARVN Ranger Group.

15Jan69, an Army helicopter flying a visual recon was downed by enemy ground fire in the vicinity of ZC 108387. The helicopter crashed and burned. All personnel on board the helicopter when it crashed were killed. The embarked personnel included the Regimental Commander of the 3d Marines, the Commanding Officer of the 1st Bn, 12th Marines and the Regimental Sergeant Major of the 3d Marines, the Regimental Commander's Radio operator and the four man crew of the helicopter.

28Jan69, Task Force Yankee reached the eastern bank of the Song Cai River when 3d Bn, 5th Marines seized Hill 235 (ZC 016418).

29Jan69, a squad ambush from C/1/7 in the vicinity of (AT 984536) observed an estimated 300 NVA across the Song Thu River vicinity AT 995543. C/1/7 deployed in a blocking position and engaged the enemy with its organic weapons, mortars and Marine artillery. D/1/5 deployed to the vicinity of AT 995543 and engaged the enemy force. The contact continued until approximately 300300H when the enemy was able to break contact and flee to the south. Results of the contact were 7 USMC WIA(E) and 72 NVA KIA.

6Feb69, Task Force Yankee commenced operations west of the Song Cai River with 2d Bn, 5th Marines conducting a helicopter assault

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on Hill 435 (ZC 021235) and commenced search and destroy operations north-northwest along the west bank of the river.

7Feb69, BLT 2/26 commenced participation in Operation Taylor Common under the OPCON of the 5th Marines.

10Feb69, BLT 3/26 commenced participation in Operation Taylor Common when the BLT conducted a helicopter landing into an LZ secured by the 1st ARVN Ranger Group in the vicinity of AT 903558 and commenced search and clear operations in the Arizona area under the OPCON of the 5th Marines.

10Feb69, the 1st ARVN Ranger Group terminated participation in Operation Taylor Common.

11Feb69, the Mobile Strike Force terminated participation in Operation Taylor Common.

12Feb69, BLT 2/26 terminated participation in Operation Taylor Common and passed to OPCON of the 7th Marines.

14Feb69, BGen Samuel JASKILKA relieved BGen Ross T. DWYER, Jr as Commanding General, Task Force Yankee.

15Feb69, TF Yankee commenced reduction in scale of Operation Taylor Common by displacing one Marine Regiment (-)(Rein) and one Battalion (Rein) from BA 112 to An Hoa while continuing recon screen and search and clear operations with one Marine Battalion (-)(2 Companies) to find, fix and destroy enemy forces and command/logistics installations in BA 112.

16Feb69, 3d Bn, 3d Marines completed helo lift from FSB Bolo to An Hoa and commenced redeployment to Quang Tri by C-130 aircraft. OPCON passed to CG, 1st Marine Division.

17Feb69, 1st Bn, 3d Marines lifted from COB Scimitar to Hill 55 and commenced rehab. OPCON passed to 5th Marines.

17Feb69, OPCON Hq, 3d Marines passed to CG, 1st Marine Division upon redeployment to Quang Tri.

18Feb69, 2d Bn, 5th Marines helo lifted from FSB Saber to An Hoa and commenced rehab.

18Feb69, 3d Bn (-), 5th Marines helo lifted from FSB Tomahawk to An Hoa and commenced rehab.

20Feb69, CG, 1st Marine Division issued verbal order for 1st Bn, 3d Marines to return to Hill 55 and prepare for redeployment to Quang

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Tri on 21Feb69.

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22Feb69, 2d Bn, 5th Marines in coordination and cooperation with the 1st ARVN Ranger Group commenced operations on Go Noi Island.

23Feb69, At 0130H, the An Hoa Combat Base received an unknown number of 82MM and 120MM mortar fire from several suspected launch sites. Under the cover of the mortar attack the enemy was able to cut the outer perimeter wire and toss satchel charges into one of the ammo berms causing the ammo to ignite. As the ammo began to detonate it tossed fire and exploding ordnance into the remaining HE storage berms in the area. The enemy were repelled by the use of organic weapons, Marine artillery and Spooky. The enemy broke contact and fled to the north-east. Results of the contact were 4 USMC KIA, 3 PF KIA, 49 USMC WIA(E), 39 USMC WIA(M), 17 VC KIA, 1 IWC and the fire in the ammo berms resulted in the loss of all HE ammo for 105MM, 155MM, 8" and 175MM artillery pieces.

24-25Feb69, On 24 and 25 February the resupply of operating units was transferred from the LSA at An Hoa to the alternate LSA at Hill 55. This transfer was due to the destruction by enemy action of six ammunition storage revetments and 27,845 rounds of artillery ammunition at the LSA An Hoa, causing extensive shrapnel and debris to be scattered throughout the area, with continued cooking off of additional rounds for a 48 hour period. The ammunition exploding caused a possible hazard to helicopters and HST personnel. Also, the levels of supply had to be restored at the LSA in order to resupply the operating units. Resupplying from the alternate LSA for two days was a satisfactory solution, under the emergency conditions. However, it would have been a problem to resupply from the alternate LSA for an extended period of time due to the fact that units' RUC lines and warehouses were located at An Hoa and it would have been difficult to transfer Class II and VIII supplies to Hill 55. If the relocation of the resupply effort to the alternate LSA was to have been permanent or lengthy, it would have been necessary to relocate Class II and VIII supplies, unit representatives, and all LOC personnel, to the alternate LSA immediately.

26Feb69, L/3/26 in the vicinity of AT 830490 made contact with an unknown size enemy force utilizing small arms, mortar and M-79 fire. The company returned fire and moved to assault the position. As the unit moved it came under intense small arms/automatic weapons and mortar fire. The company continued to return fire with its organic weapons, Marine artillery and air strikes. The enemy continued their intense fire as the company moved and additional air strikes and artillery were employed and controlled by an AO. The contact continued until approximately 262015H at which time the enemy was able to break contact. Results of the contact were 6 USMC KIA, 29 USMC WIA(E), 30 NVA KIA and 1 IWC.

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7Mar69, Task Force Yankee terminated operations in BA 112 with the displacement of companies K and M 3d Bn, 5th Marines from FSB Maxwell to An Hoa.

8Mar69, the An Hoa Combat Base received 122 rounds of mixed 82MM Recoilless Rifle, mortar and 122MM rocket fire. Results of this attack were 1 USMC KIA, 20 USMC WIA(E) and 17 USMC WIA(M).

8Mar69, CG, Task Force Yankee passed OPCON of the 5th Marines and 1st Force Reconnaissance Company to the CG, 1st Marine Division effective 080800H Mar69.

8Mar69, Operation Taylor Common terminated and Task Force Staff was reorganized for post Operation administration.

(Note: Significant bunker complexes/caches uncovered are listed in enclosures (30) and (33).)

c. Unusual Tactics or Techniques

(1) Helicopter Drop Recovery Plan

(a) During the course of Operation Taylor Common approximately 20,000,000 pounds of supplies and equipment were delivered to Marines within a radius of 20 miles of An Hoa by 5,000 helicopter sorties. Although only 7 lifts were dropped accidentally or under emergency conditions outside of friendly controlled areas, it was imperative that expeditious action be taken immediately upon notification of drop to preclude the enemy taking possession of valuable material.

(b) The following procedures were established to recover lifts dropped outside of friendly positions.

1. All helicopter pilots were instructed to inform An Hoa DASC immediately of the time and location of the drop, the nature of the material in the lift and the disposition of the material after impact. Additionally, if practicable, the helicopter would remain in the area to guide the pick up team and protect the drop from enemy forces.

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2 The An Hoa DASC immediately notified the Task Force Air Officer of the time and location where the drop occurred and types of items dropped, if known.

3 The Task Force Air Officer:

a Directed an AO, if available, or any aircraft operating in the area to locate and maintain surveillance on the drop, if the dropping aircraft could not remain on station.

b Notified immediately the unit within whose area of operations the drop occurred, of the location, time and nature of the material dropped.

c Notified the Task Force G-2, G-3 and FSCC of the drop and procedures accomplished to that time.

d Designated 2 CH-46 and 2 UH-1E(G) helicopters to execute a helo movement of the security force to the site of the dropped lift. Priority of the helo movement of the security force over other missions was determined by the Task Force G-3.

e The infantry unit responsible for the area in which the lift was dropped:

a Provided a minimum of one platoon (-) as a reaction force within 30 minutes for displacement into the area to secure or search for the drop, if required.

b In the event that a civilian population area was affected, coordinated their operations with the district chief, immediately formulated plans for use of the loud speaker aircraft and HB team to broadcast appeals for civilians to turn in the equipment or supplies for payment and make preparations for solatium payments and initiated medical assistance, if required.

4 The Logistic Operation Center:

a Immediately assembled and provided one HST

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and equipment to accompany the reaction force and to assist in repacking and extracting the dropped items.

b When ordnance items were involved, provided EOD personnel to accompany the reaction force to determine the safety/feasibility of extracting or destroying the items.

6 The Task Force G-2 provided an up-date briefing for the reaction platoon on the enemy situation in the area where the drop occurred.

7 The 1st Force Recon Co:

a Provided one recon team as the reaction force if infantry units were unable to enter the area of the drop due to the terrain and/or vegetation.

b Was prepared to provide qualified divers with SCUBA equipment for over water drops.

(2) Artillery Techniques. Artillery tactics employed in support of Operation Taylor Common followed the basic doctrine established by the 11th Marines. Prep-fires, blocking fires, artillery ambushes, harassing and interdiction, and massing of batteries utilizing time-on-target (TOT's) were all techniques constantly employed against the enemy throughout the Operation.

(a) The technique of initially adjusting with White Phosphorus (WP) rounds in the dense forest areas added materially to observers visual orientation and accelerated the adjustment and fire for effect phases of the fire mission.

(b) Adjustment by sound of impact was also relied upon by observers on occasions where terrain features and weather conditions masked all possibility of visual adjustment.

d. Civil Affairs/PSYOP Activities

(1) Civil Affairs

(a) At the time Task Force Yankee Staff organization was being developed, it was visualized that all civic action (Civil affairs) operations would be restricted to the area of operations of the 5th Marines and would be coordinated through that staff. The arrangement

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would leave only a minimal requirement to coordinate with higher headquarters being invested at Task Force level and would require no specific section or assigned officer. However, the operations of the Mobile Strike Force under the OPCON of the 3d Marines did create approximately 1400 refugees that were far beyond Nong Son's capability to feed, house and gainfully employ.

(b) This presented little difficulty to the Task Force Staff since the Assistant Operations Officer/PSYOP Officer was experienced in these matters, and successfully executed the planning, coordination and supervision required.

(c) The detailed civil affairs report and a summary of the Nong Son problem is contained in enclosure (42).

(2) PSYOP Activities

(a) General. The psychological operations in support of Operation Taylor Common were executed in a superior manner. Daily leaflets drops and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts were planned and executed to exploit enemy contacts, the tactical situation and support, wherever possible, civil affairs activities.

(b) The VIP and Chieu Hoi campaigns received particular emphasis during the TET Chieu Hoi campaign. Rapid reaction by HB (Loudspeaker ground) teams in exploiting contacts by tactical units and the use of Hoi Chanhs to broadcast Chieu Hoi appeals to their comrades was significant to Operation Taylor Common.

(c) Leaflets and Loudspeaker Broadcasts

1 Leaflets and aerial broadcasts were used daily throughout the operation. All efforts were made to insure the themes of the leaflets and broadcasts were relevant to the particular situation.

2 Special leaflets and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts were frequently used to support the tactical situation as it developed. In addition to these, locally produced themes and text were incorporated into the leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcasts to insure maximum utilization of PSYOP assets.

(d) VIP Campaign. The VIP program resulted in significant increases in the number of items of ordnance which were turned in for rewards. Localities which had not previously participated in the VIP program were encouraged to report the location of mines and booby traps. Initial signs of success in this program were indicated when indigenous personnel began reporting the location of mines and booby traps. Additionally, many of these personnel led infantry units to the actual locations of mines and booby traps.

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(e) The detailed PSYOPS report is contained in enclosure (43).

e. Deceptions/Withdrawal

(1) General. The reduction in scale of Operation Taylor Common was visualized as a three phase operation. The first phase was a cover and deception plan covering the period from R-7 day until R-day. The second phase was the displacement of the 3d Marines (-) (Rein), the 2d Bn, 5th Marines and the 3d Bn (-), 5th Marines from their positions in BA 112 to An Hoa. The third phase was the redeployment of the 3d Marines from An Hoa as directed.

(2) Phase I (Cover and Deception)

(a) Basically the cover and deception operations were two separate efforts that were integrated and mutually supporting during the initial phase of the displacement of Task Force Yankee units from BA 112.

(b) The deception plan is included in enclosure (44) (limited distribution).

(3) Phase II (Displacement from BA 112)

(a) The reduction of forces in BA 112 was accomplished by helo lifting battalion size elements reinforced with D/S artillery units directly from their locations to the Combat Base at An Hoa. Since units were most susceptible to enemy attack during displacement utilization of the minimum possible time was the goal.

(b) In order to assure the success of the movement, representatives from the units involved, together with those of the supporting arms, met for a detailed brief early in the planning stages of the displacement. Particular emphasis was given to air support. Representatives for fixed wing units, helicopter units, (flight leader, gunship leader, and TAC (A)); were briefed extensively on the displacement, even to the load movement schedule. A Helicopter Control (Airborne) was included in the planning. The HCA function was to exercise overall supervision of the helo movement, and to make "on the spot" diagnoses of problems arising from air support. This included requests for additional air or, with the unit commander's concurrence, minor deviations from the basic plan to enhance the coordination of the displacement.

(c) A schedule was devised to allow the displacement of all forces over a three day period. It was believed that this was an acceptable time frame particularly if the deception plan had engendered a response by the enemy in another direction.

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(d) Concurrent with the stringent displacement schedule would be the acceptance of the risk of austere stockage levels on the FSB's just prior to close out. This latter evolution was a matter of close command attention and required the strictest compliance with the scheduled downgrading of stockage level.

(e) The most critical ingredient of this phase of the operation was the control of helicopters and the detailed coordination required to assure that units and equipment to be helo lifted were staged at the proper site and at the time prescribed. To coordinate the movement, a helicopter controller airborne, was on station daily during the displacement operation.

(f) A particularly significant facet of the displacement from each FSB/COB was the requirement to police up all trash, small objects, pieces of paper, metal and cloth that could be blown about by the rotor wash from the large helicopters which might result in damage/injury to the aircraft, equipment or personnel. In the same cast it was required that a representative of the Regimental Commander inspect each FSB/COB prior to the departure of the last increment of personnel to insure against material of value to the enemy remaining on site.

(g) The displacement schedule had a certain amount of elasticity to assure relative flexibility in the schedule in the event of foul weather. However, any delay greater than one day would have required a change in the fixed wing schedule for the redeployment of 3d Marines (-)(Rein) to Quang Tri/Dong Ha.

(4) Phase III (Redeployment of 3d Marines (-)(Rein))

(a) The lift of the 3d Marines from BA 112 to An Hoa was planned in such a sequence and interval to provide each battalion a minimum of 18 hours for rehabilitation and staging before departure. However, due to tactical commitments in the 3d Marine Division area the lift of the 3d Marines to Quang Tri/Dong Ha commenced upon arrival of the units at An Hoa.

(b) Redeployment of the 3d Marines was by fixed wing aircraft from An Hoa to Quang Tri/Dong Ha.

(5) Final Displacement of 3d Bn, 5th Marines. Enemy opposition to displacement of 3d Bn, 5th Marines created a different timing sequence and support requirement which may be more indicative of the situations to be expected in future operations in BA 112 or similar type terrain. See enclosure (45).

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<u>USMC</u>	<u>ARVN</u>	<u>CIDG/MSF</u>
157 USMC KIA	100 ARVN KIA	5 CIDG WIA (EVAC)
3 USMC KIA (BNR)	3 USA WIA (EVAC)	1 USA WIA (EVAC)
1 USN KIA	378 ARVN WIA (EVAC)	1 MSF WIA (EVAC)
4 USA KIA	1 USA WIA (NONEVAC)	2 MSF WIA (NONEVAC)
1043 USMC WIA (EVAC)	1 USMC WIA (NONEVAC)	1 MSF KNBC
2 USN WIA (EVAC)	1 AUST WIA (NONEVAC)	
1 USA WIA (EVAC)	2 ARVN WIA (NONEVAC)	
1 KSC WIA (EVAC)	2 ARVN KNBC	
342 USMC WIA (NONEVAC)	1 USA NBC (EVAC)	
23 USMC KNBC	20 ARVN NBC (EVAC)	
102 USMC NBC (EVAC)		
1 KCS NBC (EVAC)		

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~(2) Enemy Personnel Losses

<u>USMC</u>	<u>ARVN</u>	<u>CIDG/MSF</u>
769 NVA KIA	614 NVA KIA	6 NVA KIA
630 VC KIA	120 VC KIA	28 VC KIA
15 NVA PW	5 NVA PW	3 NVA PW
14 VC PW	4 VC PW	5 VC PW
4 RTNEE/NVA	1 RTNEE/NVA	1 RTNEE/NVA
8 RTNEE/VC		
90 CIVDEF	54 CIVDEF	20 CIVDEF

(3) Friendly Equipment LossesUSMCLost

15 M-16
 2 M-79
 1 M-60 MG
 1 FRC-25
 1 FRC-93
 1 45 cal pistol
 1 shotgun
 5 binoculars

Destroyed

17 M-16
 1 M-14
 4 106 Recoilless Rifles
 3 M-60 MG
 3 M-79
 6 FRC-25
 1 sniper rifle
 13 binoculars
 1 starlight scope
 1 UH-1E helicopter
 3 CH-46 helicopters
 1 F-4 Aircraft

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(4) Enemy Equipment Losses: (See enclosure (29)).

b. Bomb Damage Assessments (BDA). Bomb damage assessments were recorded by An Hoa DASC on tactical air strikes and A6A Beacon sorties. The analysis was made by the TAD(A), Aerial Observer, or ground unit supported. BDA's encompass the amount of ordnance on target and the ordnance coverage of the target. An example is 100/95 which means 100% of the ordnance was delivered on target with 95% coverage of the target.

(1) The following bomb damage assessments were reported by airborne and ground observers:

Bunkers Destroyed	99
Bunkers Damaged	27
Structures Destroyed	359
Structures Damaged	31
Trenchline Destroyed	2805 Meters
Treeline Destroyed	1420 Meters
Storage Sites Destroyed	0
Secondary Explosions	104
Sustained Fires	63
Probable KBA	61
Boats	11

(2) BDA's for the 47 Arclight strikes were submitted separately, by message, to the CG, 1st Marine Division (Attn: FSCC).

13. (U) Administrative Matters

a. Administrative Plan. 1st MarDiv Admin Order 448-68 and CG, Task Force Yankee msg 080025Z Dec68, directed the procedures by which the administrative matters for Operation Taylor Common would be accomplished, and described the logistics procedures to be followed. They were adequate in all respects as to basic concepts and procedures except for Annex B (Logistics Operations Center) of the Admin Order. The procedures for the operation of the Logistics Operations Center (LOC) were modified and improved as the operation progressed. Para 14.d. describes in detail an improved method of operation for the LOC.

b. Supply/Resupply

(1) The LSA, An Hoa, was the primary LSA which provided supply and service support to Operation Taylor Common. A LSA at Hill 55 was designated as the alternate LSA. The primary means of resupply was by helicopter. A LOC functioned as a coordination point for unit logistics representatives, aircraft allocations, supply status, and to handle logistics support area capabilities.

(2) Force Logistics Command (FLC) was the primary source of supply. The FLC maintained an LSU at the LSA, An Hoa. The LSU personnel maintained a 10 day level of Classes I, III and V in the Supply Storage areas at the LSA. All other classes of supply were ordered direct by the operating units from FLC and delivered to the units RUC line at the An Hoa LSU.

(3) The Task Force Yankee LOC, which was established at the LSA at An Hoa, supervised and coordinated the functioning of the LSA and resupply of the units in the field.

(4) The concept of operation called for the units operating in BA 112 to operate out of FSB's and COB's. Due to the high probability of inclement weather and possible unavailability of helicopters, operating stock levels had to be established in the event units could not be resupplied on a daily basis. Each FSB and COB was required to maintain a five day operating stock and a three day emergency level for a total of eight days of Class I and V supplies.

(5) The flow of supplies was as follows:

(a) Units requested supplies from their S-4 representatives in the LOC.

(b) Unit representatives drew supplies from the LSU.

(c) Supplies were staged on Helo Pad at the LSA.

(d) HST personnel prepared supplies for external helicopter lifts.

(e) Supplies were lifted by helicopter and delivered to the units in the field.

(6) Daily resupply was based on predetermined requirements to maintain operating and emergency supply levels at the FSB's and the COB's, plus any additional supplies requested by the unit commander.

(7) Resupply to the units in the field on a daily basis was as

shown in enclosure (46), (Daily Resupply Schedule/Completed). In support of the operation the following amounts of supplies were airlifted by CH-53's, CH-47's and CH-46's from the ISA at An Hoa to units operating in the Arizona Area and BA 112.

Total pounds resupply	19,012,631
Total passengers	10,535
Total lifts	4,976
Maximum pounds resupply one day	531,578
Maximum passengers one day	437
Maximum lifts one day	140

(8) All external lifting equipment, used by the HST personnel for the delivery of supplies to the operating units, performed satisfactorily. Out of a total of 4,976 loads lifted to the field, seven loads were dropped, of which only two were due to sling failures. One was due to the snapping of a sling strap and the other was caused by the unraveling of a cable eye. All the other loads were dropped either as a result of helicopter hook failures, loss of helo power, or a direct result of enemy fire.

e. Combat Loads

(1) The combat loads for the operation were divided into two categories; loads for units operating in BA 112, and loads for units operating in the Arizona Area. The combat loads were as follows:

(a) BA 112

Class 1C	3 DOA
Class II E and M	As directed by CO
Class III W	As required
Class IV	None
Class V W	BA plus 3 DOA
Class VI	None
Class VII G, K, & M	As directed by CO

Class VIII	MAL as modified by CO
Class IX G, D, and M	Critical high usage items as required
Class X	None
Water	Individual 3 full canteens plus 5 DOA halizone Iodine Tabs and 24 Salt Tabs.

(b) Arizona Area1. All classes same listed for BA 112 except for:

Class ICG	2 DOA
Class TW	BA plus 2 DOA

(2) The reason for the difference in combat loads for units operating in BA 112 from those units operating in the Arizona Area, was due to the possibility of inclement weather and low cloud cover in BA 112 causing possible delay in resupply efforts. The combat loads designated for the operation for both BA 112 and Arizona Area proved to be satisfactory. Resupply was occasionally hampered by weather; but, the operation itself was not delayed at any time due to lack of supplies or resupply.

d. Transportation

(1) The means of transportation used during the operation consisted of surface transportation by motor convoy, and air transportation by both fixed wing and helicopter. Supplies were delivered daily to the LSA at An Hoa from FLC, Danang, by convoy over 35 miles of an insecure portion of route 540. Prior to commencing the convoys each day, engineer teams had to sweep the entire road for mines. The convoy, when able to start, had to proceed at a slow rate of speed augmented by tank and infantry security units. Enroute, the Song Thu Bon River had to be crossed by the use of a one-vehicle ferry which usually took up to 5 hours to get the whole convoy across. In addition, the convoys were occasionally delayed due to mining incidents, enemy sniper fire, or by road washouts. Normally a resupply convoy could complete a one way trip each day providing that no major problems or enemy action occurred during the trip.

(2) Supplies were also flown in from FLC daily via C-130's, C-123's, and helicopters to the An Hoa airstrip, conditions permitting. Air transportation was often cancelled or delayed for long periods of time because of unsuitable flying conditions usually caused by dense

ground fog or low cloud ceiling. During the last three weeks of the operation, fixed wing air transportation was halted all together due to increased enemy rocket attacks and because aircraft took fire on several occasions. In one instance, a C-130 caught fire on landing due to the ground fire it received during its approach.

(3) Units in the field were resupplied from the LSA by convoy and helicopter, with the primary resupply vehicles being the CH-53, CH-47 and CH-46 helicopters. Helicopter resupply was also hampered for periods of time due to poor flying conditions. During the latter stages of the operation, helicopter ground fire incidents increased while performing resupply missions. As a result, some resupplies were delayed until enemy ground fire could be suppressed or suitable Huey gunship escorts could be provided.

(4) It was determined during the operation, that a standard resupply helicopter package of CH-53's, or CH-47's and CH-46's with UH-1E's escorts were required each day for resupply only. If CH-53's were not available, they had to be replaced on approximately a four to one basis by CH-46's in order to be able to deliver the same amount of supplies to the operating units.

(5) Passengers throughout the operation were transported solely by aircraft. Between Danang and An Hoa, passengers were carried by C-130's, C-123's, CH-53's and CH-46's. To the field, units and personnel were transported by helicopters only.

e. Strengths, Casualties/Hospitalization, and Graves Registration

(1) Strengths

(a) Total strength of forces employed in Operation Taylor Common as of 2400H each Friday is depicted in enclosure (47). The strength varied from a high of 10,812 to a low of 7,075. This variance was due primarily to the attachment and detachment of units during the operation.

(b) Marine Rifle Company strengths are depicted in enclosure (48). As can be seen, "foxhole strengths" are considerably lower than on-rolls strengths. Certain companies of the 5th Marines were only marginally effective due to a large number of non-effective personnel. At times, three rifle companies were below 100 men. In fact, the week ending 10 February 1969, "F" Company 2/5 had only 59 men in the field. Despite efforts of the 1st Marine Division and the 5th Marines to maintain a satisfactory personnel level, replacements barely kept pace with losses due to both battle and non-battle casualties. Although units throughout this period were in either a C-1 or C-2 MARES readiness

category based on on-rolls strengths, some companies were only marginally effective due to low-effective field strength.

(c) The manning level for the Task Force Headquarters is shown in enclosure (49). Based on the experience of Task Force Yankee, recommended modifications for future Task Force Staffs of this type and justifications therefore are shown (see Enclosure (49)).

(2) Casualties and Hospitalization

(a) Concept. Evacuation was via helicopter from the operating area to the clearing platoon at An Hoa; thence, to 1st Medical Battalion or NSA, Danang, if required. Emergency cases were evacuated direct from the operating area to NSA or 1st Medical Battalion. The clearing platoon at An Hoa was tasked to provide a 30 bed holding facility with emergency operating room facilities; to function as a shock and resuscitation facility; and to coordinate the evacuation of casualties to larger medical facilities.

(b) Execution. The clearing platoon arrived at An Hoa on 10 December 1968, concurrent with the commencement of the operation. The clearing platoon was not assigned to the operational control of the Task Force, but remained under OPCON of the 1st Medical Battalion. Upon arrival, the facilities available were very meager and improvements were not completed for approximately eight weeks. Although facilities were limited, execution of the mission was successful. A total of 2,188 patients were evaluated by the clearing platoon with 1,991 being evacuated. No major operations were performed; 538 laboratory procedures and 63 units of blood were administered; and 185 patients underwent 377 X-Ray exposures on 217 films. All supplies were furnished to the clearing platoon by 1st Medical Battalion. Enclosure (50) is a listing of medical supplies used.

(3) Graves Registration. Identification of remains was accomplished at An Hoa by a Graves Registration detachment. All identifications, except in those cases where the remains were so badly burned or decomposed as to require dental ID, were readily accomplished. Initially, units operating at An Hoa were required to send two personnel together with the service and medical records of the deceased to Graves Registration at Danang. This was required for the positive identification of remains prior to issuance of the Death Certificate. The establishment of the Graves Registration detachment at An Hoa eliminated the requirement to remove personnel acquainted with the deceased from combat, and send them to Danang, thus saving countless manhours and considerable travel. In addition, this system has significantly expedited the collection of necessary records, identification of remains, preparation of the Death Certificate at An Hoa, and shipment of remains. (See recommendation 7.a.(4).)

(4) Non-Battle Casualties. Battle casualty statistics are shown in paragraph 12. Enclosure (51) depicts the number of non-battle casualties suffered due to illness, disease or injury by accident.

(5) Malaria Incidence. During the course of this operation, an exceptionally high rate of malaria and fever of undetermined origin was encountered as follows:

December	87 cases
January	274 cases
February	108 cases
1-7 March	14 cases
TOTAL	483 cases

Upon arrival at a hospital, the majority of all FUO cases evacuated were later diagnosed as malaria. Each case amounted to at least 30 days of non-effective time. Several factors relating to this high incidence of malaria and FUO are as follows:

(a) During operations in the mountainous terrain of BA 112, many enemy harbor sites and hospitals were uncovered. Captured records, as well as previous field experience, confirmed that a large number of the enemy who occupied these sites were ill with malaria, in turn causing "hot spots" of infected mosquitoes. This was strikingly revealed by the higher incidence in the units which uncovered these enemy sites.

(b) The long continuous periods of sustained combat operations in the field, with little opportunity to observe matters of personal hygiene such as bathing, haircuts, etc., together with the lack of hot chow and relaxation, had a serious deteriorating effect. Many troops were continually in the field, engaged in combat operations, for periods in excess of 60 days. Medical Officers noted that troops in the field for protracted periods of time, with no idea of when they will be relieved, become careless and uninterested in personal hygiene and malaria preventative measures. The longer troops operated in the field without rest and relaxation, the higher the malaria incidence. Also, due to heat conditions, rugged terrain, and constant combat pressure in BA 112, Marines were lax in keeping the maximum amount of skin covered and using repellent as well as taking the malaria prophylaxis pills as required.

(c) Another factor was the seeming lack of knowledge by the troops and small unit leaders regarding the degree of effectiveness of the malaria prophylaxis pill and the other preventative measures required to reduce or eliminate malaria. More emphasis must be placed on malaria prevention training, prior to troops leaving CONUS,

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and the training should be presented in such a manner as to ensure that officers and NCO's develop the habit of enforcing anti-malaria discipline, as well as indoctrinating troops on the cause and effects of malaria and prescribed preventative measures. (See Recommendation 7.a.(5) and Lessons Learned 7.b.(1) and 7.b.(2).)

f. Communication

(1) General

(a) The communication support of the Task Force headquarters was provided by a Communication Platoon from Communication Company and radio relay teams from Radio Relay Company, 7th Communication Battalion.

(b) The overall concept for the employment of communications made use of radio relay links to higher headquarters backed up by radios. Subordinate units controlled their subordinates by radio circuits. As necessary, radio relay provided communication channels to major subordinate units in the field. Retransmission sites for radio circuits were established by all units as necessary to maintain communication paths.

(2) Operation

(a) Task Force Yankee Headquarters

1. Communications with Higher Commands

a. The primary communication circuits with higher commands were provided by two radio relay links. To 1st Marine Division, a twenty-four channel radio relay link was established using an AN/TRC-97E. To 1st Marine Air Wing, a twelve channel radio relay link was established using an AN/TRC-97A. In addition to these, in order to provide back up and to supplement the number of channels available, a four channel radio relay link was established, using an AN/MRC-62, to both Division and Wing. These links provided a total of 10 common user circuits, 14 single user, and 6 teletype channels to Division and 15 single user and 1 common user circuit to Wing. Enclosure (52) gives the channelization of these radio relay links.

b. The Task Force entered the Division Tactical, the Division Special Purpose, and the Division FSCC Nets. On these circuits, RT-524's with AS-2236 antennas were used. On the Tactical circuit a KY-8 was used to provide ciphony capability. The power source for all benchmounted radios was an R-91 with two truck batteries connected in series-parallel.

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c. The Task Force maintained a message center with two full-duplex circuits and one receive circuit. The receive circuit operated at 60 wpm. Initially, one full-duplex circuit operated at 100 wpm and the other at 60 wpm. Due to an inordinate amount of down-time of the 100 wpm circuit, it was eventually changed to 60 wpm. The Task Force also maintained a 60 wpm half-duplex circuit in the Task Force COC.

2. Communication with Subordinate/Supporting Units.
Primary communication with subordinate and supporting unit headquarters was by land-line and courier. These methods were backed by radios in the event of their failure. The Task Force message center assumed communication guard for all subordinate unit headquarters and message traffic was delivered by courier. The FSCC established an Artillery Liaison Net to all major subordinate/supporting units.

(b) Subordinate Units

1. 3d Marine Regiment

a. The 3d Marine Regiment controlled its subordinate units by means of radio circuits. This was accomplished by establishing the following nets with the following equipments:

<u>Net</u>	<u>Equipment</u>
Regimental Tac #1	AN/PRC-77 w/KY-38; AS-2236
Regimental Tac #2	AN/PRC-77 w/KY-38; AS-2236
Regimental Admin Net	AN/MRC-83; Whip
Tactical Air Control	AN/PRC-25; RC-292
Air Liaison	AN/PRC-25; RC-292
FSCC/FD Net	AN/PRC-25; RC-292

(Note #1: This net made use of an AN/MRC-110 w/HYL-3 to provide retransmission capability with units masked by terrain.)

b. Due to terrain and vegetation, the initial plans called for establishing retransmission sites; however, it was found by using horizontally polarized AS-2236 antennas, adequate communication was established.

c. For supply/resupply, each battalion established its own logistic net on which the Battalion was net control and the

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stations were the individual companies and the LOC. The LOC station on a particular battalion net was operated by a Battalion S-4 representative and was, therefore, directly responsible to that particular battalion commander. Helicopters carrying resupplies to a battalion monitor the battalion logistic net during the mission.

2 5th Marines

a The 5th Marine Regiment primarily operated in the flatlands to the east during the operation. To control subordinate units the regiment established the following nets:

<u>Net</u>	<u>Equipment</u>
Regimental Tac #1	AN/PRC-77 w/KY-38; RC-292
Regimental Tac #2	AN/PRC-25; RC-292
Regimental Logistics Net	AN/PRC-25; RC-292
Tactical Air Control	AN/PRC-25; RC-292

(Note #2: Used also for base defense.)


b As opposed to Battalion Logistic Nets which were established by units of the 3d Marines, the 5th Marines Logistic Net was established by choice as a regimental net with the individual battalions as sub-stations. This was due to the fact that 5th Marines operations differed substantially from those of the 3d Marines operating in BA-112.

3 1st Force Reconnaissance Company. The Reconnaissance Company established VHF/FM radio circuits with its operating patrols. Due to the terrain and canopy in its area of reconnaissance operations, extensive use of retransmission sites were made. During the course of the operation three such retransmission sites were established. This was still found to be inadequate for teams operating beyond the ridgeline to the west of the Song Cai River, a distance of about 20 miles. This indicates a serious deficiency in the communication means available to a Force Reconnaissance Company (See Recommendation 8.a.(6)).

(3) Communication Center Operation. The Communication Center served the Task Force and its major subordinate units. It handled approximately 5,700 messages per month by use of two full-duplex and one receive-only teletype circuits. For further details see enclosure (52).

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(4) Radio Relay Links. Primary communications to higher headquarters were accomplished through the use of radio relay links. For channelization of the various links see enclosure (52). A schematic of the radio relay linkage is presented below:



<u>LINK</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>CHANNELS PROVIDED</u>
1	AN/TRC-97E	20 Voice; 4 TTY
	AN/MRC-62	4 Voice; 2 TTY
2	AN/TRC-97A	12 Voice
	AN/MRC-62	4 Voice
3	AN/MRC-62	4 Voice
	AN/MRC-62	4 Voice

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(5) Evaluation

(a) Communications in support of Operation Taylor Common must be rated good. The terrain did not prove to be the obstacle to tactical communication as was thought. It was found that the present family of manpacked FM radios will generally operate up to two to three thousand meters in the canopy. Due undoubtedly to the knife-like ridgelines, VHF radio waves were diffracted enough to provide direct communication to the FSB's. It was found; however, that to establish the best communication link, radio waves should be horizontally polarized.

(b) The major short-coming of Task Force communications was a lack of 2nd and 3rd echelon electronic maintenance. This was occasioned by the lack of operating space and limitations placed on the number of communication personnel that could be billeted at An Hoa.

(c) A second major problem area was the lack of adequate power. The superimposition of the Task Force headquarters, plus other tactical units headquarters, on the 5th Marines Base Area strained the power supply of the 5th Marines to its limit. This caused power failures, fluctuations, and low voltages. in turn caused a great deal of communication outage.

(d) The third major problem area was the use of fixed-plant teletype equipment. This equipment was old to begin with; did not have maintenance manuals; there were insufficient spare parts; and finally, there was a lack of qualified personnel to operate and maintain this equipment. Just to keep the equipment on line, two teletype technicians were occupied on a full time basis with no time available for other repair functions.

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~~SECRET~~14. (S) Special Equipment/Techniquesa. Scout Dog Teams

(1) During Operation Taylor Common, scout dog teams were employed most effectively throughout BA 112. Their performance was directly responsible for significantly reducing friendly casualties and increasing the effectiveness of search and destroy operations. The teams were credited with locating surprise firing devices and detecting enemy positions before the enemy could initiate action against friendly troops.

(2) The use of scout dog teams provided friendly units more freedom of movement through the thick vegetation encountered throughout the area of operations and substantially improved the capability of the companies to execute detailed search while maintaining the impetus of the operation.

(3) It was determined that the minimum number of scout dog teams required during operations would be one per company. If more teams had been available, they would have been assigned to each maneuvering platoon thereby increasing the units capabilities to operate independent of the company.

(4) During Operation Taylor Common, a total of 8 scout dogs were killed. The indications that the enemy was deliberately attempting to eliminate the scout dogs or their handlers attested to their value in operations against the enemy. Although no firm figures are available as to the number of friendly casualties that were prevented by scout dog teams, all participating units have repeatedly stated that the number of friendly casualties would have been considerably greater without the scout dog teams. Enclosure (53) has more observations on the effectiveness of the scout dog team.

b. Use of TPQ-10's

(1) Air Support Radar Teams (ASRT) and the AN/TPQ-10 Radar Course Directing Centrals were utilized to provide continuous air support to Task Force Yankee units. The primary function of ASRT was to provide harassing and/or interdicting bombing missions on enemy positions and installations. The ability of ASRT to control accurate bombing missions on deep targets in minimum weather conditions provided a continuing deterrent to enemy activity in BA 112.

(2) The following air munitions were delivered by ASRT controlled aircraft during Operation Taylor Common:

<u>BOMBS</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>TONS</u>
250	742	92.75
500	8,771	2342.75

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<u>BOMBS</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>TONS</u>
750	232	87.00
1000	71	35.50
2000	48	48.00
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>9,864</u>	<u>2,606.00</u>

(3) Coordination and targeting for ASRT through FSCC channels followed the prescribed procedures set forth in Division Orders P03300.1 and 03100.3; Standing Operating Procedure for Processing TPQ-10's.

c. Beacons. Operation Taylor Common saw extensive use of the SST 122KV beacon. This device is a compact radio beacon transmitter powered with a 24 volt BB 451 battery or any 24 volt battery source. The beacon is utilized with the A-6 aircraft for bombing missions when the weather and/or darkness prevent conventional delivery of weapons. Essentially, the technique calls for the unit's TAC party to set up the beacon at any location after which time the pilot of the A-6 aircraft is informed of the following:

- (1) Target bearing and distance in feet from the beacon
- (2) Beacon elevation above mean sea level
- (3) Target elevation above mean sea level

The information is fed into the aircraft computer system and a marking run is made by the pilot, dropping one or more bombs. The ground unit observer then corrects for the drop error, if any, and on the next run the bombs are cluster dropped (close group), or rippled, as required by the nature of the target. The beacon gave the ground units a highly desirable, 24 hour, all weather capability with local target selection and control. 1st Bn, 5th Marines and 2d Bn, 5th Marines used the beacon extensively during the operation and reported excellent results. Due to a limited supply of these beacons during the operation, the 2d Bn and 3d Bn, 26th Marines did not have use of the beacon.

d. Delay Fuze Bombs. Delay fuze bombs were utilized to deny the enemy access and infiltration routes in the BA 112 sector of the Taylor Common area. The bombs used were 250 and 500 pound non-tamper, timed fuze, with a detonation delay of from 4 to 23 hours. During this operation these bombs were dropped under TAC(A) control in selected areas beyond the Song Cai River. Results of the drops were not observed by friendly forces, therefore, ultimate effectiveness could not be determined. The coordinates, time of drops, and number of delay fuze bombs utilized, were reported by the Task Force to higher, adjacent, and subordinate units concerned, in the event later information could be obtained.

e. 100 Foot Pendant. Helo resupply operations in the BA 112 sector

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of the Taylor Common AO were frequently hampered by lack of suitable sitdown LZ's. The solution to this problem was the utilization of $\frac{1}{2}$ inch steel cable pendants up to 130 feet in length attached to the external load, allowing the pilot to hover above the jungle and make a slow vertical descent to lower the load through the dense jungle growth. These pendants were successfully used on numerous occasions for daylight resupply missions in BA 112. During the hours of darkness, the pendants proved to be only marginally effective (see Recommendation 3.b.(6)).

f. Recon Ladder. The use of the ladder device for recon team extractions was introduced during Operation Taylor Common. The device consisted of an aluminum ladder similar to a Jacobs ladder which was attached to the CH-46 helo in the stowed position (rolled under), until the helo arrived over the recon team, at which time the ladder was released and unrolled to its full length. With the helo in a hover, the recon members grasped the rungs of the ladder and secured themselves by use of snap rings which each team member carried. The team was then carried externally on the return to a safe area. Pickup by this method was much more expeditious than the hoist method (less than five minutes as opposed to twenty minutes of hovering over the LZ). The advantages are obvious in a hostile fire environment. The ladder was successfully utilized on several occasions for emergency extraction of recon teams in contact with the enemy. It is still being evaluated, and its use is currently restricted to emergency situations (see Recommendation 1.a.(3)).

g. Special Logistics Techniques/Logistics Operation Center

(1) During operation Taylor Common a Logistics Operation Center (LOC) was established at An Hoa. A 20X32 foot bunker was constructed adjacent to the LSA helicopter pad to house the center. In addition, a radio control tower was built for Shore Party personnel atop the bunker for the purpose of directing helicopters into the LSA. Communications was established from the LOC bunker to the Task Force Yankee COC, LSA tower, 1st Marine Division G-4 via "Hot Line", and to each unit operating in the field over unit radio nets.

(2) The center was under the direct control of the Task Force Yankee G-4 and was manned by the following personnel:

1-Captain - LOC Coordinator

1-MSgt - LOC Chief

1-Sgt - Logistic Man

2-Cpl/LCpl- Logistic Clerks

In addition, each regiment and battalion provided one representative and one radio operator.

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(3) The LOC functioned as the coordinator of the overall logistic effort during Operation Taylor Common. It acted as the coordinating point for unit logistic requirements, helicopter allocations, Shore Party operations, supply status, logistic communications and overall LSA functions. Each day, S-4 representatives of supported units submitted to the LOC Coordinator their resupply requirements for the following day. The LOC Coordinator then conferred with the Task Force Yankee Air Officer, LSU Commander, Shore Party Commander, and with the unit representatives in coordinating the helicopter resupply operations. Each supported unit then drew from unit stocks or from the LSU their resupply requirements and staged the loads on the LSA helicopter pad. During this time the LOC Coordinator prepared the lift schedules, dream sheets and assigned the priority of resupply.

(4) When the loads were staged and the schedules completed, the Shore Party Company then controlled the execution of the actual resupply by directing helicopters to pick up loads on the pad and dispatching them to the units in the field. The use of the Logistics Operation Center proved to be extremely successful in coordinating the overall logistic effort required during Taylor Common.

(5) Enclosure (54) describes the detailed procedures for the establishment and functioning of a Logistic Operation Center as evolved during this operation.

h. Engineer

(1) Proportioned, Shaped and Cratering Charge Mix. A special technique, employed successfully during Operation Taylor Common, was the use of a proportioned mix of forty pound shaped charges and forty pound cratering charges to provide for more economical and timely clearing and leveling of selected FSB sites. Basically, the technique involved the placement of a field of downward firing shaped charges; priming and simultaneously firing the field to clear all underbrush and to provide a series of holes for the placement of an equal number of forty pound cratering charges. The cratering charges were primed, tamped, and fired simultaneously, resulting in loosening and displacement of the soil to a depth of about ten feet from original grade and uprooting large trees in the area. A Mini-Dozer was then introduced with a working party equipped with hand tools and chain-saws. Clearing and leveling of the site commenced immediately following the cratering charge shot. The sketches shown in Enclosures (55) and (56) depict the method of placing fields of charges and the basic results of firing. Recommended maximum field size for a single shot is thirty-two (32) charges. The savings realized in the application of this technique have been explained previously in Paragraph 7.d. of this report, and they accrued by the elimination of the necessary firing of individual clearing charges (such as bangalore torpedoes) followed by firing individual tree-cutting and de-stumping charges.

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(2) Side Firing Shaped Charges. A beneficial spill-over of the above described demolition method was the technique of using side-firing shaped charges as a rapid brush-clearing device. By using the forty pound shaped charges, the side-firing technique provided excellent clearance in thick underbrush. The area cleared was generally key-shaped, with the circular portion having a diameter of twelve to fourteen feet and the extended ray (jet-path) being three to four feet wide and extending for thirty-five to forty-five feet from the point of detonation. The sketch in enclosure (57) depicts the result of firing such charges for underbrush clearance.

(3) Mini-Dozers. The M-450 Case full tracked Mini-Dozer (helicopter transportable) was successfully and extensively utilized during Operation Taylor Common. Without this special item of equipment, the FSB's developed during the operation would have been extremely difficult to construct and it would have been impossible to construct them in the time allotted. The technique involved placing the Mini-Dozer into the objective area as soon as possible after a landing or external-lift drop zone of sufficient size was made available. The Mini-Dozer was employed in clearing, leveling sites, and digging howitzer and ammunition pits. Occasionally, the Mini-Dozer was employed as the prime clearing tool. The only disadvantage to the use of this engineer item was the requirement that the tractor and blade be helo-lifted separately. This caused several hours to elapse before the item could be employed once it was called in, due to the necessity for two separate lifts and the time involved in assembly of components. The Mini-Dozer was an absolute necessity for the construction of bases in BA 112.

(4) Rappelling Combat Engineers. Prior to the operation, combat engineer troops were trained in rappelling techniques (from a helicopter) in order that the capability could be exploited when required. Due to the necessity for rapid preparation of landing zones in BA 112, engineer troops were inserted into unprepared areas as early as possible. On four occasions during the operation, engineer personnel were successfully inserted by rappelling techniques.

(5) Landing Area Explosive Device

(a) As previously mentioned in this report, a special Landing Area Explosive Device (LAED), was tactically employed for the first time during Operation Taylor Common. The idea, conceived and experimented with several years ago at the Marine Corps Engineer School, was regenerated as having possible application to this operation. The device was designed by the Task Force Yankee Engineer, and the designed containers were manufactured by Mobile Construction Battalion (MCB) 3 and later by MCB-5. The containers were packed by Engineers of both the 1st and 3d Engineer Battalions, under the supervision of the Task Force Yankee Engineer, who further specified the technique for employment and firing. Four of the devices were fired in support of operations in BA 112, specifically, at

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FSB Dart (1), FSB Bolo (2), and FSB Saber (1).

(b) The device used is basically a doughnut shape with a sixty degree concavity, or a reverse semi-ogive, around the outer circumferential surface. The concave outer surface of the device was of 16 gauge galvanized steel sheet, which was welded to a 10 gauge bottom panel. Also welded to the bottom panel (so as to be located at mass center) was a 16 gauge metal double-funnel spacer, containing four priming holes at mid-points through the narrow interior neck. The device was packed with 750-800 pounds of Composition 4 (C-4) plastic explosive (equivalent TNT = 1005-1072 pounds), and the 16 gauge top was bolted on through the upper rim of the outer circumference of the container. The device was designed to employ the Munroe effect upon detonation, concentrating a prime energy force into a horizontal plane radiating outward from the charge in a 360 degree wave. Tab E to Appendix 1 of Annex C to 1st Marine Division Admin Order 1448-68 with Change 1 (S) is a graphic display depicting the shape and dimensions of the initial LAED. Enclosure (58) further depicts the same basic information.

(c) The loaded device was bolted to a standard wooden pallet, as a lifting platform and for partial stand off, and was helo lifted to the point of employment and lowered in place for detonation by a firing crew previously inserted. As a result of experience gained after the first firing of the device, three layers of filled sand bags were placed underneath and on top of the LAED for tamping. The device was primed with four (4) non-electric caps crimped to detonating cord leads. The det cord trunk line was fuze with a four and one-half minute fuze and ignited.

(d) The areas in which the LAED was employed had medium to heavy underbrush with double canopy. At FSB Dart, the largest trees were 2 to 2.5 feet in diameter, topping at approximately 85 feet. Both the FSB Bolo and Saber areas contained more and larger trees, up to 4-5 feet in diameter and 90-100 feet in height. A sequential photo set is provided (see Photo Supplement, Photor #48 through #57) to show placement and results of the shot at FSB Dart, which occurred on 18 January 1969. The resulting detonation downed the largest trees within a 15 foot radius of the charge, kicking the butt end outward to the perimeter of the resulting clear area (proving the existence of a Munroe effect). All underbrush and small trees (4-6 inches in diameter) were cleared to a radius of 45 feet. Minor chain saw work within the cleared area and around the extreme perimeter, provided a circular LZ of approximately 125 foot diameter within minutes of detonation. A crater did occur at the point of detonation that was approximately 8 feet deep and 10 feet in diameter at ground level. One of the LAEDS used on FSB Bolo did create a larger crater, attributed to the fact that the device was not leveled properly prior to detonation, causing the side wave to produce a spading effect. The other two devices produced similarly to the first, except that the larger trees were not downed, nor was it expected that they would be because of their larger size.

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(e) The LAED was successfully and effectively employed during Operation Taylor Common, producing expected results as a time-saving, brush and small tree clearing tool, and as a means of decreasing the total amount of explosives required for FSB construction (see Recommendation 6.a.(2)).

(6) The Use of Tactical Support Functional Component (TSFC) and Expedient Bunkers

(a) The requirement for bunkers in Operation Taylor Common was initially predicated on the basis of providing three (3) bunkers per Fire Support Base (FSB) and two (2) per Combat Operations Base (COB). The prime difference in the type bases being that the COB would have no artillery pieces on it while the FSB would have. It was planned that the FSB would require bunkers for a Battalion Aid Station, a Battalion Combat Operations Center, and an Artillery Fire Direction Center. The COB would require only the first two bunkers mentioned.

(b) As to type bunkers to be provided, the governing planning factors were: the entire operation was to be completely helicopter supportable; the FSB's and COB's were to be developed as rapidly as possible, and to be temporary in nature; vacation of bases would be accomplished in the minimum amount of time, with reasonable recovery and re-use of material; after final vacation, bases would be subjected to harassing and interdiction fires so that remaining materials would be destroyed to deny use to the enemy. With these considerations in mind, bunkers were prepared with a view towards maximum utilization of recoverable materials.

(c) In the preparation stage for the operation, 8'x8'x12' TSFC timber bunkers were ordered for delivery to the Combat Base at An Hoa. These bunkers were pre-cut and pre-packaged into two packages each; one package of timbers, weighing approximately 5,000 pounds; and a box of barbed wire, water-proofing materials and 200 sandbags, weighing about 250 pounds. Thirty-four of these TSFC bunker packages were pre-staged at the Combat Base Logistics Support Area.

(d) The basic technique followed was to lift the packages to the FSB/COB, when called for, and to erect the bunkers on-site by engineer troops in support of the occupying infantry and/or artillery units. This method caused some problems in recovery, when the occupying unit vacated that particular FSB/COB, since by the time vacation occurred, supporting engineers were usually already at the next FSB/COB preparing other landing zones and artillery positions. There were just not enough engineers assigned to the operation to utilize the preferred method of emplacement as described below.

(e) Briefly, the preferred method envisions complete construction of the bunkers in a rear area. The bunkers would then be lifted to the specified site as a completed unit (minus water-proofing), when called

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for. The site would be prepared by the engineers on the FSB/COB, using the M-450 Mini-Dozer. Upon emplacement on-site, water-proofing would be applied, by the engineers, and the bunker sides would be back-filled by use of the Mini-Dozer. Final sandbagging, as is normal, would be accomplished by the using unit. Design modifications should include a Z-braced, permanently attached, transverse-bar, lifting frame underneath the pre-constructed bunker. A similarly designed, permanently attached, transverse spreader bar system would be required on top (aligned with the lifting frame). Transverse beams of the lifting system should be parallel to the end walls and placed four feet inboard from each end wall. Cable (or long bolts), with top eyes, could be vertically connected through each corner of each lift-frame-and-spreader combination for attachment of lifting slings. The total weight should not exceed 5,500 pounds. With these modifications, recovery and re-use of the bunkers could be expedited by having the using unit remove the sandbags; utilize an M-580 with backhoe to remove earth fill along the sides and ends of each bunker; attach lifting slings; and helo lift out for relocation elsewhere. After completion of operations, the bunkers could be returned to the Combat Base for repair and storage.

(f) Temporary Bunker Construction

1. In the initial clearing of FSB/COB sites, maximum consideration should be given to sectionalizing and stock-piling usable timbers. Four to six inch diameter trees should be cut into lengths of six to eight feet. Seven to twelve inch diameter trees should be cut to lengths of ten to twelve feet. If it is possible to stock enough of these timbers, an expedient bunker can be provided by: cutting a slot with the Mini-Dozer to about seven feet deep; laying the larger timbers across the top of the slot transversely; place the smaller logs close together longitudinally; provide water-proofing with a section of taxi-way membrane; and then sandbag the cover. Side walls can be revetted as necessary with filled ammo boxes, canisters, etc., from the inside. The end walls could be provided by sandbagged and filled ammo boxes.

2. Another method which could be employed would be to construct sides and ends with dirt-filled ammo boxes; cover top with sections of M8A1 matting, waterproof and then sandbag.

3. Either of these methods above will provide a usable temporary bunker with minimal use of recoverable material, which could be blown (after recoverable material is removed) to deny it's use to the enemy.

(g) See Recommendation, Paragraph 6.a.(1) and 6.b.(1).

i. Combat Trap

(1) Commencing on 10 December 1968, ten MK-121 bombs (combat traps) were made available to Task Force Yankee for use in landing zone preparation.

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in the canopy of BA 112.

(2) Initially, four targets were selected for attack in sequence with a bomb damage assessment being made immediately after each drop. Further targets were to be selected and hit as the scheme of maneuver developed.

(3) The MK-121 bomb was delivered by C-130 aircraft manned by personnel of the 434th Air Division, Tan Son Nhut. The drops were controlled by the 1st Marine Air Wing ASRT, Alpha and Charlie. The evaluation and adjustments of drops were made by Task Force Yankee Command and Control Aircraft. The four locations selected as initial targets were:

- (a) Target 1 - Hill 558 - ZC 18423498
- (b) Target 2 - Hill 406 - ZC 17553517
- (c) Target 3 - Hill Mass 1050 - ZC 14304105
- (d) Target 4 - Hill 734 - ZC 08193772

(4) Although ten combat traps were utilized during Operation Taylor Common, only one potential landing zone resulted. In each of the first six drops, the area cleared was sufficient in size to be used as a CH-46 helicopter landing zone; however, the site locations were generally on slopes too steep for tactical troop landings (including rappelling).

(5) Analyzing the terrain after the target sites had been occupied indicated the following:

(a) In the case of target one, center of impact could have been displaced one hundred meters on the long axis of the target (flight directions), but an error left or right of 20 meters would be on slopes too steep for use. The crest of the knoll (Hill 406) on target two allowed an error of only 50 meters in radius, before slopes became too steep. Target three was a flat plateau approximately 75 meters across by almost 200 meters in length, a sufficiently large area but a location that apparently caused control abnormality which produced a consistent right deflection error. The number of combat traps available to Task Force Yankee was exhausted before target 4 was scheduled.

(b) Detailed map and aerial photo studies and very low visual recon flights were used to determine the suitability of the targets in relation to planned scheme of maneuver. However, the triple canopy precluded analysis of specific ground formation under the heavy canopy which hindered the selection of the most suitable terrain for the weapon.

(c) An analysis of effectiveness can be made by comparing the combat trap effects with that of an attack with standard bombs, up to 2000 pounds, rockets and napalm against Hill 375, which was not a combat trap target. This target received over 120 tons of ordnance over a 2½ day

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period to produce the same type of landing zone as produced by the MK-121 bomb in a matter of seconds.

(d) While the ten drops did not produce usable landing zones, the accuracy of the delivery system was greater than expected, particularly in light of the difficult nature of the targets. The potential of MK-121 was amply demonstrated and would have been used extensively if additional bombs had been available. The weapon can be a rapid means of developing landing zones, providing targets meet the following criteria:

1. That the site be a plateau like hill crest measuring at least 1 CEP in width and $1\frac{1}{2}$ CEP's in length.

2. The surface must be relatively smooth and free of boulders more than two feet in diameter.

3. It must be located in an area that can be accurately controlled by ASRT and AN/TPQ-10 Radar Course Directing Central.

j. ZIPPO Team (Zone Interpretation, Planning, Preparation and Overfly)

(1) Prior to all major helo lifts into unsecure landing zones, a "ZIPPO" team was created to brief, plan and select the landing zone.

(2) The team consisted of key personnel from all participating units. The following were the representative personnel:

(a) Flight leader of troop lift and gunship helo

(b) Unit Air Officer

(c) Commander of unit being lifted

(d) Helicopter Controller (Airborne) if utilized

(3) Prior to making the visual recon overfly the "ZIPPO" would be briefed on the operation with regards to the mission, the concept and tentative zones selected. Following the VR of the operating area, the team would meet to determine a final zone selection and provide an operations brief for key participating personnel.

(4) The "ZIPPO" team normally was required two days prior but no later than one day prior to the commencement of the planned helo lift.

k. FIRPPO (Fire Base Interpretation, Recon, Planning, Preparations and Overfly) Teams

(1) The "FIRPPO" team is formed prior to the establishment of each FSB with the objective of determining the suitability of the selected LZ.

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site and to make certain decisions as to the requirement, timing and actual layout of the projected FSB. By an overfly the team makes an inspection of each proposed site to determine gun positions, area to be cleared, bunker locations and other pertinent data. The team should be composed of the following:

- (a) Artillery Bn Commander
- (b) Artillery Btry Commander
- (c) Engineer Officer
- (d) Infantry Commander who will provide security for FSB
- (e) Unit Air Officer

(2) The "FIRPPO" teams determined the following pertinent information prior to commencement of construction of each FSB:

- (a) Time and place for the establishment of the FSB
- (b) Size of area required to be cleared
- (c) Gun positions were selected
- (d) Number of helo transportable tractions (M450 or M580) that were required
- (e) Positions for storage of ammo and construction effort that was required
- (f) Site for the Fire Direction Center bunker
- (g) Estimated time required to complete construction of the FSB

(3) The "FIRPPO" team should make an actual on-site inspection as soon as possible after the location for the proposed FSB has been secured.

1. Employment of Bulk CS

(1) Bulk CS was utilized extensively during Operation Taylor Common. A total of 627 cannisters were dropped by fixed wing aircraft by the 1st Marine Air Wing. Drops were made under the positive control of an Aerial Observer.

(2) Targeting was accomplished through coordination between the G-2/G-3 sections of Task Force Yankee. Targets selected were suspected enemy supply routes, routes of egress/ingress into the base area and areas suspected of being utilized as staging areas and possible headquarters sites.

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(3) No firm assessment can be given as no friendly forces were employed in the area for approximately three weeks after the drops. However, personnel from the Mobile Strike Forces, operating in an area approximately 750 meters north of one of the target areas, were able to sense the effects of the CS. The 3d Bn, 5th Marines found indications that a small amount of CS remained in the vicinity of Hill 235 four weeks after it had been dropped. The powdered CS was found on undergrowth in the area and the unit received minute effects from the CS as they moved through the area of the drops.

(4) Although no firm information is available, it is believed that the CS was able to deny areas to the enemy and prevent his movement through these areas for a period of at least two weeks. One VRS report indicated that a headquarters unit was forced to move due to a CS attack in their immediate area.

m. HYL-3, Ciphony Retransmission Unit

(1) The HYL-3 is a unit designed to provide retransmission capability for a radio circuit using the KY-8/28/38 series of voice encryption equipment.

(2) Due to the nature of the terrain faced on this operation, it was envisioned that some difficulty may be experienced operating the VHF/FM radio circuits between An Hoa Combat Base and BA 112. To overcome this difficulty, it was planned to establish radio retransmission sites. Since ciphony voice traffic cannot be retransmitted, there was a need for a HYL-3.

(3) To ensure the best possible radio link and to safeguard the HYL-3, it was mounted prior to the operation in an AN/MRC-110 radio jeep. It was planned to move this jeep by helicopter to its operating locality.

(4) Although the AN/MRC-110 w/HYL-3 was originally scheduled to provide an enciphered voice radio circuit between the Task Force and its subordinate units, it was not used that way since no major subordinate unit headquarters left the An Hoa Combat Base. Instead it was turned over to the 3rd Marine Regiment for their use. On 31 December, the 3rd Marines moved the combination to COB Dagger to support operations in BA 112. The combination began operating on the 3d of January. It worked intermittently until 5 January when the interconnect cables failed. On 8 January, it was evacuated to An Hoa and subsequently forwarded to 5th Communication Battalion for repair. After being repaired, it was returned to An Hoa on the 14th. It was returned to COB Dagger and reinstalled in the MRC-110 on the 19th where it again worked intermittently until finally failing on the 23rd. Failure was due to the same interconnect cable. On the 24th, the AN/MRC-110 w/HYL-3 was removed from COB Dagger and returned to An Hoa. At An Hoa, the communication technicians thoroughly checked it over. They found that the failure was caused by the interconnect cables being too fragile and too delicately fabricated with multiple wire soldered into a

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relatively small connector which was neither rugged nor permanently sealed or connected. No allowance had been made for cable bending due to catenary action. The tension on the connectors pulled the solder joints loose thereby causing the intermittent operation and final failure of the equipment. The technician built supports for the cables, paid careful attention to soldering the connections and remounted the HYL-3 in the AN/MRC-110. The combination was then helilifted to FSB Battle Ax where it operated satisfactorily from about 4 through 14 February. At this time there was no further need for the equipment and it was returned to An Hoa.

(5) The HYL-3 provides a capability needed by the tactical forces as long as there is primary reliance on VHF/FM radios using the KY-8 family of enciphering units; however, the present design of the interconnect cable and its connector is unsatisfactory (see Recommendation 8.a.(9)).

15. (U) Photographic Supplement issued separately.

16. (U) Enclosure (59) contains all recommendations and lessons learned.

17. (S) Commander's Analysis

a. Tasks. Task Force Yankee was conceived and organized to execute a penetration in force and ultimate neutralization of the enemy's Base Area 112. To accomplish this objective, the Task Force was given a mission for an operation nicknamed "Taylor Common". That mission could be logically subdivided into the following three tasks:

(1) Destroy NVA and VC forces in the assigned area of operations

(2) Neutralize Base Area 112 (BA 112)

(3) Develop Fire Support Bases to interdict the approaches from the Laotian border.

b. Forces

(1) Forces assigned to Task Force Yankee were as follows:

(a) The maneuver elements were from two regimental headquarters with a total of five organic battalions, and on occasions, one or two SLF BLT's. In conjunction with these forces and operating in close cooperation, the 1st ARVN Ranger Group conducted operations in the Arizona Area and later on Go Noi Island.

(b) The artillery support was from the 1st FAG which was in direct support of the Task Force with two battalion headquarters, seven to ten batteries of light artillery, four batteries of medium artillery and three platoons of heavy artillery; attaining a maximum density of 94 artillery tubes.

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(c) The Reconnaissance effort was executed by the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company augmented periodically by 1st Reconnaissance Battalion personnel.

(d) Other Combat Support and Combat Service Support units brought the total strength to approximately 10,000 Marines, organized specifically to accomplish the assigned mission.

(2) The operation had some unique features in relation to operations previously conducted by the 1st Marine Division in Vietnam. Principal among these features was the maneuver forces' total dependence logistically upon helicopter transportation during BA 112 Operations. Similarly, the rifle companies operated basically as independent units following individual traces that diverge as they radiated from the FSB. This manner of operating was necessary to insure that the maximum amount of area was subjected to the most detailed search in the shortest time possible. Also, combat actions with the enemy in the tripled-canopied, dense jungle, in contrast to previous actions in the low lands, were characterized by point to point contact and intense, but short duration fire fights with only a fraction of the unit involved.

c. Preoperational Intelligence. Analysis of the intelligence produced for the planning phase of Operation Taylor Common established the enemy combat forces to the north, northwest and in the flat lands immediately surrounding An Hoa. The enemy logistic, staging, medical and training facilities were concentrated, but dispersed uniformly throughout the Eastern Zone of BA 112, predominantly on the Ong Thu slope. The supply routes, way stations and a scattering of smaller logistics facilities were along the Song Cai and in the broad basin between that river and the escarpment to the west of the Ong Thu Slope. Of a more nebulous nature were the locations of the Headquarters for Military Region 5 and Front 4 and their respective security and administrative units. The mobility of these elements and the cover afforded by the tripled canopied mountains was expected to contribute to the elusiveness of the latter two targets.

d. Scheme of Maneuvers. From the interplay between the forces, enemy dispositions and the terrain evolved a concept of operations that visualized a trident effort against the enemy.

(1) The first phase was a concentrated sweep of the approaches to An Hoa to provide a secure combat base from which to launch and sustain an all-helicopter supported penetration of BA 112. To insure the continued security of the base, the initial sweep was followed for the duration of the operation by friendly forces continuously exerting pressure to find, fix and destroy the enemy units, supplies and equipment in that area. This first phase effort resulted in 1,837 NVA/VC KIA of the total of 2,167 KIA, 235 IWC in the 5th Marine AO and it suppressed enemy activity against An Hoa almost completely until 23 February.

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(2) The second phase was the initial penetration of BA 112 by establishing mutually supportable fire support bases from which to radiate rifle companies to find, fix and destroy enemy forces and installations identified by the available intelligence collecting means. Vital experience factors were gained by this initial thrust and sustained operations in the Eastern Zone of BA 112. Such factors were; the rate of FSB development; the effects of inclement weather on flight operations supporting the FSB's; the size of the enemy forces and the enemy tactics encountered; rates of movement through the jungle; and the medical/health problems to be expected. This phase was particularly remunerative due to the wealth of experience factors developed, as well as the fact that the greatest proportion of the caches, installations, facilities and comm/liaison routes that were uncovered, destroyed or interdicted were located in this region.

(3) The third phase capitalized on the experiences of the preceding phases by concentrating the ground effort in the most likely enemy occupied areas or in direct response to intelligence of the enemy's activities. Emphasis was placed on developing FSB/COB to facilitate the interdiction of the approaches from the Laotian border and the probable re-entry of friendly forces at some future date. Although fewer supply caches and facilities were found than in the Eastern Zone, significant evidence was uncovered that the major headquarters had been evicted from BA 112 and were being harassed by friendly forces even as they were moving further west of the Song Cai. Additionally, there were reports that enemy comm/liaison routes were being drastically altered by the enemy to avoid those areas which were occupied by friendly forces. Further complications to enemy operations were introduced by the employment of air delivered CS gas canisters in four separate areas and delayed fuse bombs along two major east-west routes.

e. Reconnaissance. Throughout all three phases, reconnaissance teams contributed valuable information, primarily concerning the strength and direction of enemy movements and occasionally on the existence of installations and caches. The reconnaissance effort was, in the early stages, directed against all facets of the enemy's operation in BA 112, to verify the pre-operation intelligence estimate. As it was validated, through the various acquisition agencies, the role of the Reconnaissance Company was refined and directed against specific targets such as obtaining prisoners, uncovering trail nets, assembly areas and cache sites. Additional tasks, such as sensor emplacement, providing security elements for FSB development and deception activities were also assigned to support particular phases of the operation. Although delayed occasionally by bad weather, lack of helicopters and the dense canopy (the latter obstacle causing the development of the ladder extract technique), the information obtained by the reconnaissance teams formed a significant segment of the operational intelligence developed during the operation.

f. Intelligence Collection Agencies. During the operation, as many as 16 intelligence acquisition agencies supported Task Force Yankee. These

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assets, employed as described in paragraph 8.e. provided timely and accurate intelligence as a basis for maneuver and fire support planning.

g. Psychological Operations. Operation Taylor Common was highly successful from a PSYOP point of view. The rapid reaction to exploit significant contacts and the HB (ground loudspeaker) broadcast using the Hoi Chanhs were particularly noteworthy. Operations in the BA 112 while not producing any Hoi Chanhs to units operating in that area, did result in returnees turning themselves in to units on the fringes of BA 112, in the Arizona Area and at the CIDG camp at Nong Son. The number of Hoi Chanhs decreased during the last month of the operation. However, this is a normal occurrence prior to an enemy offensive. On the other hand, the amount of ordnance turned in for rewards increased during the operation. Especially important was the increased numbers of mines and booby-traps that were pointed out by the civilian population particularly in areas that had not previously participated in this program.

h. Air Support

(1) Marine Air, supported on occasion by Army helicopters and frequently by Air Force fixed wing aircraft, played a vital role in the operation. Every major troop lift and all supplies as well as artillery pieces and ammunition into BA 112 and the Ong Thu Slope were helo transported. Reconnaissance teams, vital to intelligence collection were helo inserted/extracted. Helicopters brought troops to the scene of battle with their full complement of ammunition, equipment and supplies for assault of the objective. Fixed wing observation planes sought out the enemy and called close air support strikes and artillery fire throughout the area of operations. Eighteen hundred and forty beacon and TPQ sorties interdicted enemy positions and infiltration routes, regardless of darkness or poor weather. "Spooky" and "Shadow" fireships, with their tremendous firepower, stopped enemy assaults and discouraged anti-aircraft fires. Flareships provided illumination for night operations, for FSB construction and frequently revealed enemy movements. Fixed wing transports daily brought men, supplies, and ammunition to the An Hoa Complex to minimize the threat of casualties from vulnerable road traffic. Visual reconnaissance gave unit commanders and their staffs an invaluable knowledge of the terrain, enemy disposition and relative distances. The assignment of a medevac package to the An Hoa area contributed a significant reduction to friendly losses by decreasing materially the time lapse between request and pickup. These aircraft carried 1,674 sick and wounded to life saving medical facilities. Noteworthy in this sphere was the uniformly heroic actions of the night medevac pilots and crews accomplishing extractions from BA 112.

(2) The vital role played by the helicopters became most apparent when the shortages of UH-1E gunships and/or CH-53 helicopters assets precluded Reconnaissance Team inserts/extracts, employment of rapid reaction force to exploit hard intelligence, or FSB artillery from firing any support other than contact missions. This shortage never jeopardized the mission of

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Task Force Yankee, but it frequently hampered the Commanders freedom of action and constricted his flexibility and response to the changing situation on the battlefield.

i. Artillery

(1) The Artillery Supporting Arms effort for Operation Taylor Common was directed and coordinated through the 1st Field Artillery Group located at An Hoa. Some 94 artillery tubes of all calibers supported Task Force Yankee Forces. These artillery pieces answered some 20,586 calls for fire and were responsible for an expenditure of 251,650 rounds.

(2) Artillery inroads into BA 112 were accomplished by help lifting the 105mm How/155mm How TD Batteries into prepared positions in the FSB's. The amalgamation of the 105mm How and the 155mm How TD Battery provided for the greatest economy and best utilization of available assets. The mixed caliber composite battery had no adverse effect upon the ammunition resupply effort. It should be noted that four-fifths of all resupply into BA 112 was composed of artillery ammunition. This composite battery concept provided an increase in the range of supportability and destructive potential of maneuvering infantry units. As a general rule, adjacent FSB's were selected and established at distances approximately 70% of the 105mm Howitzer's 11,000 meter fire-cap, this provides for an overshoot and attenuation of range because of terrain and vegetation. Artillery Batteries supporting from FSB's effectively covered infantry units whose operations radiated from the FSB. The reconnaissance effort was supported by light and medium artillery on the FSB's and by heavy artillery firing from the An Hoa Artillery Complex. Infantry units and reconnaissance teams utilized the ubiquitous artillery units effectively by exploiting targets of opportunity, constantly harassing and interdicting enemy base areas and by calling fires on suspected ambush sites and avenues of egress and ingress.

j. Logistic

(1) The logistic support concept for Operation Taylor Common, which was predicated on factors that blended both 1st and 3d Marine Division experiences, proved to be more than adequate for the operation. The build up and maintenance of supply levels at the LSU located at An Hoa was based upon a ten day requirement. These pre-established levels were required as a contingency for the possible delays in convoy resupply from the primary supply point (FLC) or the interruption of fixed wing resupply due to inclement weather conditions.

(2) A Logistic Operation Center(LOC) was established to coordinate the large number of unit resupply requirements. The LOC, which constantly supervised the flow of supplies, had the capability of instant readout of supply levels and the reactive power to preclude serious shortfalls at the FSB's. The concept and its manifestation, the LOC, proved to be the key to successful logistical operations.

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(3) Based upon the possibility of relatively long periods of inclement weather and the consequential inability to resupply, prescribed operational stock levels were established for COB's based upon one infantry battalion/company and for FSB's based upon one infantry battalion supported by one D/S battery. A 5-day operational stock level and a 3-day emergency stock level totaling 8 days Class I and V was the stock objective established for COB's and FSB's. Companies operating away from the FSB/COB normally carried 2 days LRPR and ammunition. All these levels proved adequate to meet operational contingencies and as a direct result, operations in BA 112 were never seriously jeopardized by lack of supply. However, there were four calls for emergency resupply to companies located in isolated areas.

(4) The primary resupply vehicle was the helicopter. Although resupply was hampered occasionally by inclement weather, lack of helicopter availability and later by an increased tempo in enemy ground fire, the overall resupply effort and support was deemed more than adequate. However, during three periods of poor flying weather, the low artillery ammunition stock levels on the FSB's restricted fires to contact missions only. A total of 4,976 resupply lifts, weighing 19,012,631 pounds were delivered to infantry units during Operation Taylor Common.

k. Engineer

(1) Engineer Operations in BA 112 were dependent upon a successful, concerted engineer effort which was primarily concerned with the rapid development of FSB's, COB's and HLZ's on selected objectives. The Third Marine Division SOP for FSB/COB construction, with modification, was used initially and was found to contain effective procedures. The "ZIPPO" team concept, rappel-capable combat engineers, gasoline engine driven chain saws and Mini-Dozers were proven to be absolute necessities for rapid development of FSB's/COB's.

(2) Even greater effectiveness in FSB development was realized from the Taylor Common engendered changes, such as, modified demolitions techniques, special explosive devices and the recommended use of pre-constructed, portable bunkers. Combination of those procedures that were an outgrowth of Taylor Common, with those developed by the Third Division will facilitate the production of a relative complete, up-to-date, and proven standing operating procedure for FSB/COB construction.

(3) Engineer Woodpecker Team operations, in the Arizona Area, were acceptably effective, though beset with maintenance problems. The type of equipment provided was adequate for the mission and the sufficiently detailed concept of employment allowed for effective control. Actual employment, while producing tangible results in destroyed enemy installations and cleared land, served additionally to reiterate the essential requirement for an adequate back-up of spare parts for heavy equipment. In general, engineers performed effectively and resourcefully, while contributing significantly to the attainment of the operational goals.

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
~~SECRET~~1. Communications

(1) The communications operations were executed essentially as planned with few major problems being encountered throughout the course of the operation. The equipment provided to the Task Force was sufficient in all respects and proved to be adequate to cover all contingencies.

(2) Primary reliance was placed on radio relay to provide communication between the Task Force and senior headquarters. In general, this radio relay link provided excellent communications. The subordinate units relied almost exclusively on VHF/FM radios to command, control and coordinate their subordinate units. Despite estimates to the contrary, it was found that the tactical radios worked well throughout the base area. The problem envisioned due to terrain masking and vegetation absorption of radio signals failed to materialize. Even covered communication from An Hoa to FSB's beyond the escarpment were adequate and continuous. The only problem that arose was communicating with some of the deeper reconnaissance team inserts of the Force Reconnaissance Company who did experience difficulty communicating from certain locations while on the move. Since continuous communication with these teams was necessary, radio retransmission sites were located on three of the highest peaks in the base area to ensure that required communications were maintained.

m. Summary. The impact of Operation Taylor Common on the enemy is measured in both tangible and intangible terms. From a material point of view, the enemy lost manpower in excess of an infantry regiment; a quantity of rice to feed the regiment for over 100 days; weapons to arm in excess of 2½ infantry battalions; medical equipment to outfit a 100 bed hospital with enough surgical supplies to permit 3-6 surgeons to perform any type of major surgery. These equivalents could be extended to include all of the captured/destroyed materials shown in enclosure (29); in any event, it indicates a significant loss of combat capability. On the intangible side, Operation Taylor Common invaded and destroyed the inviolability of BA 112, neutralized it for enemy combat support and service support activity during the period 15 December 1968 to an unknown future date, disrupted supply/comm/liaison routes and created the omnipresent threat of instant return to any combination of positions throughout the network of FSB's. Despite the enemy's infiltration into BA 112 subsequent to the reduction of forces, there will be a significant lapse of time before he reconstitutes his previous logistics and command structure in the Base Area, but the most immediate result of our investment in BA 112 was the disruption of the enemy's ability of immediately mount and sustain a major attack.

S. Jaskilka
S. JASKILKA


END OF OPERATION ENGINEER SUPPORT POSTURE

1

ENCLOSURE (7)

Date: _____									
Helicopter Work Log									
MSN	UNIT	TASK	A/C REQ	TIME IN OUT		CALL SIGN	REMARKS	HRS REQ	HRS REC
50	TFY	C&C	UH-1(S)	0800	1400	COMPRISE 1-0	RETURN TO BASE, MSN COMP	6	6.0
			CH-46	0800	1400	LADY ACE 1-0	RTB, MSN COMP	6	6.0
52	TFY	RESUP	CH-53	0730	1330	DIMMER 1-0	RTB, CREW CHANGE	6	6.0
			CH-53	0730	1330	DIMMER 1-2	RTB, CREW CHANGE	6	6.0
			CH-53	0930	1140	DIMMER 2-0	RTB, MECHANICAL	6	2.2
			CH-53	0930	1635	DIMMER 2-2	RTB, MSN COMP	7	7.1
								6	
			CH-46	0800	1035	SWIFT 3-1	RTB, BATTLE DAMAGE	6	2.1
			CH-46	0800	1035	SWIFT 3-2	RTB, BATTLE DAMAGE	6	2.1
			CH-46	0800	1600	SWIFT 3-3	RTB, OVER MAX CREW TIME	6	8.0
			CH-46	0800	1600	SWIFT 3-4	RTB, OVER MAX CREW TIME	6	8.0
			CH-46	0900	1610	LADY A 4-1	RTB, OVER MAX CREW TIME	6	7.2
			CH-46	0900	1610	LADY A 4-2	RTB, OVER MAX CREW TIME	6	7.2
			UH-1E(G)	0930	1530	HOSTAGE 8-0	DIVERTED BY TADC FOR ..	6	6.0
			UH-1E(G)	0930	1530	HOSTAGE 8-2	EMERG. MSN. DANANG	6	6.0
53	TFY	RECON	CH-46	0730	1130	PCH BSH 2-1	RTB, MSN COMP	5	4.0
			CH-46	0730	1130	PCH BSH 2-2	RTB, MSN COMP	5	4.0
			CH-46	0730	1130	PCH BSH 2-3	RTB, MSN COMP	5	4.0
			UH-1E(G)	0730	1130	COMPRISE 5-0	RTB, MSN COMP	5	4.0
			UH-1E(G)	0730	1130	COMPRISE 5-2	RTB, MSN COMP	5	4.0
55	TFY	MED- EVAC	CH-46	0700	1900	SWIFT 2-0	RETURN TO MARBLE MT. FOR	24	24
			UH-1E(G)	0700	1900	HOSTAGE 2-0	NITE COND I STANDBY	24	24
Helicopter Work Log: Was maintained by the TFY Air Officer and depicted the times individual helos checked in and out of the An Hoa DASC; total time in the area; and other control information. (Sample Entries Shown)									

AIRCRAFT GROUND TIME LOG					DATE _____
CALL SIGN	MSN NR.	SHUT DOWN TIME	TURN UP TIME	SIDE NR.	REASON FOR SHUTDOWN
COMPRISE 1-0 LADY ACE 1-0	50	1030	1130	2 7	AWAITING WORK
SWIFT 3-1, 3-2	52	1000	1030	4 12	INSPECT BATTLE DAMAGE
PEACH BUSH 2-2	53	0835	0940	13	MECHANICAL CHECK, BLADE STRUCK TREE (NO DAMAGE)
		Helo Ground Time Log: Was maintained at the An Hea industrial area (Helo parking area) by the TACP and represents aircraft down time and the reason therefore. (Sample Entries Shown)			



ENCLOSURE (3)


1

DAILY HELO SUMMARY CHART

MSNS.	A/C	REQ	WING FRAG	REC	SCHD HRS	GRND HRS	ACT HRS	REQUEST FOR TOMORROW
MSN 50 C&C	UH-1E	1	1	1	6	1	5	1
	CH-46	1	1	1	6	1	5	1
	TOTAL	2	2	2	12	2	10	2
MSN 52 RESUP	CH-53	4	4	4	24	0	24	4
	CH-47	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	CH-46	6	6	6	36	1	35	8
	UH-1E G	2	2	2	12	0	12	2
	TOTAL	12	12	12	72	1	71	14
MSN 53 RECON	CH-46							
	UH-1E G							
	TOTAL							
MSN 54 TRP LIFT	CH-46							
	UH-1E G							
	TOTAL							
	TOTALS	14	14	14	84	3	81	16


The daily helicopter summary chart was compiled at the close of each day's operations and generally summarized the number of aircraft received and actual hours spent at An Hoa against aircraft requested and planned hours of utilization. (Based on 6 hours per aircraft per day).

(Sample Entries Shown)



AVIATION ORDNANCE UTILIZED TO
DEVELOP SELECTED SITES
IN BASE AREA 112

INITIAL POSTURE OF ENGINEER SUPPORT FOR OP TAYLOR COMMON



B Co (3d Engr Bn) Equipment

- 1 M-450 Mini-Dozer
- 1 M-580 Rubber-tired Tractor
- 15 Power Chain Saws

Passed to OpCon
B/3d Engr Bn

B Co (1st Engr Bn) Equipment

- 2 M-450 Mini-Dozers
- 2 M-580 Rubber-tired Tractors
- 16 Power Chain Saws

ENCLOSURE (6)

ENGINEER WORK ON FIRE SUPPORT BASES/COMBAT OPERATION BASES

FSB (F) COB (C)	BASE CONSTD	START DATE	ARTY POSITS			HLZ	FINISH DATE	ENGR UNIT ASSGND	ENGR ADDNL ASSG (SUP)	ENGR EQUIP/DEMO USED				NOTES
			4.2	105	155					M-580	M-450	CHAIN SAWS	EXPLO (LBS)	
F	Lance	11Dec68	—	4	4	1	15Dec68	B-3Eng	3/3	1	1	8	14140	—
								B-1Eng	3/5					
F	Pike	13Dec68	—	6	4	1	16Jan69	B-1Eng	2/5	—	1	6	23680	(1)
F	Spear	15Dec68	—	6	—	2	28Dec68	B-3Eng	1/3	1	1	6	12027	—
C	Mace	18Dec68	—	—	—	2	22Dec68	B-3Eng	3/3	—	1	6	5340	(2)
F	Cutlass	28Dec68	—	4	4	1	30Dec68	B-3Eng	3/3	—	1	8	10232	(3)
C	Dagger	29Dec68	3	—	—	2	14Feb69	B-3Eng	1/3	—	1	6	6464	(4)
								A-3Eng	5th					
C	Javelin	1Jan69	—	—	—	2	12Jan69	B-3Eng	1/3	—	1	6	3318	(5)
F	Maxwell	17Jan69	—	6	4	1	25Jan69	B-3Eng	1/3	—	2	6	16420	—
C	Broadsword	20Jan69	—	—	—	1	21Jan69	B-3Eng	1/3	—	—	6	—	(3)
F	Dart	18Jan69	—	4	—	2	23Jan69	B-3Eng	3/3	—	1	6	9404	(2&6)
F	Tomahawk	29Jan69	—	6	4	2	3Feb69	B-1Eng	3/5	—	1	5	7100	—
F	Bolo	3Feb69	—	4	4	1	5Feb69	B-3Eng	3/3	—	1	6	8721	(6)
C	Machete	4Feb69	—	—	—	1	6Feb69	B-1Eng	2/5	—	—	5	5530	—
F	Saber	6Feb69	—	4	—	1	10Feb69	B-1Eng	2/5	—	2	5	10563	(6)
C	Battleax	8Feb69	3	—	—	2	10Feb69	B-3Eng	3/3	—	1	6	2050	—
C	Scimitar	10Feb69	—	—	—	2	14Feb69	B-3Eng	1/3	—	1	6	8670	—
TOTAL	9FSB 7COB		6	44	24	24	98 Days	54 Plts 2-CO	5 En	2	16	99	143449	

- Notes:
- (1) Used Linear Line Charges for brush clearance.
 - (2) Rappelled engineers into site.
 - (3) Walked into site with infantry.
 - * All hand work.
 - (4) Three different jobs with two different engineer elements.
 - (5) Started as a FSB, changed due to soil conditions.
 - (6) Used special Landing Area Explosive Device (LAED)

ENCLOSURE (8)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

EMPLOYMENT OF WOODPECKER TEAM

1969 DATE	EIM USED	SPTD UNIT	WORK LOC & GRID COORD (AT)	EN INSTAL DESTRUCT					LND CLRD		ASSET EXPEND			NOTE
				BUNKER	FTG HOLE	SPIDER TRAP	TRENCH YDS	TUNNEL YDS	SQM	ACRE	LND FOR HRS	ROME FLOW HRS	DEMO LBS	
22 FEB	2 TD18, 1 EIMCO	2/5	SONG BA REN 9654								8			CUT TRACK PATH AT FORD
22- 23 FEB	8 TD18, 1 EIMCO	1/5	PHU LOC#6 9252- 9352						150,000	37.1	128	16		
24 25 FEB	8 TD18, 1 EIMCO	1/5	-do-						50,000	12.3	68	8		
26 FEB	-do-	-do-	-do-						50,000	12.3	48	4		
27 FEB	4 TD18	-do-	CU BAN 933520				150		20,000	5.0	32			
28 FEB	6 TD18 1 EIMCO	-do-	LA THAP 4 938519	1			50		15,000	3.8	20	2		
1 MAR	6 TD18 1 EIMCO	2/5	PHU NHUAN 7 905488				150		2,500	0.6	8	8		
2 MAR	-do-	-do-	-do-	9	1	4	100	30	100,000	24.6	40	7	38	
3 MAR	3 TD18	-do-	-do-	1		2	50		8,000	2.0	12		30	
TOTALS		2		11	1	6	500	30	395,500	97.7	364	45	68	

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
ENCLOSURE (9)

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


ENGINEER SIT-REP							
DATE _____							
ITEM	FSB/COB		FSB/COB		FSB/COB		
UTILIZATION	START DATE						
	ENGR EMPLOY						
	MINI-DOZERS						
	BACK HOE						
	CHAIN SAW						
DEMOLITIONS	C-4	TODAY	CUMULATIVE	TODAY	CUMULATIVE	TODAY	CUMULATIVE
	C-3						
	40# SHAPE						
	15# SHAPE						
	40# CRATER						
	BANGALORES						
	DET CORD						
	CAPS						
	DEMO TIME						
	FUZE						
TOTAL WT LB							
CONSTRUCTIONS	LZ						
	GUN POSIT						
	105 MM						
	155 MM						
	BUNKER						
ENEMY	MINE/BOOBY TRAP						
	INCIDENTS						
	EQUIP STATUS		TOTAL DEMO TO DATE		NOTES		
MISCELLANEOUS	ITEM	CH	DN (%)				
	M-450						
	M-58C						
	CHAIN SAW (18*)						

ENGINEER DAILY SIT REP WOODPECKER OP									
DATE _____									
SUPPORTED UNIT									
UTILIZATION	TM ELMS EMPLOYED	LF							
		RP							
		MED							
	GRID COORDS								
TOT EQUIP HRS	LF								
	RP								
DEMO	9#4 (LBS)								
	40#S (EA)								
	15#S (EA)								
	40#C (EA)								
	DET CORD (FT)								
	TOTAL (LBS)								
DESTR/CIRLING	EN BUNKERS (EA)								
	FIGHT HOLES (EA)								
	SPIDER TRAPS (EA)								
	TRENCH (LIN YDS)								
	TUNNEL (LIN YDS)								
	NUMBER LEVELS								
	LND CLRD (SQM)								
EQUIP STATUS	ON	OP	DN	TOTAL TO DATE	EXPLOSIVES		BUNKERS		EA
							FIGHT HOLES		EA
							SPIDER TRAPS		EA
					LND CLRD		ACRES		
					TRENCH		LIN YD		
					TUNNEL		LIN YD		

EXPLOSIVES EXPENDITURES BY TYPE BASE



EXPLOSIVES EXPENDITURES BY TYPE BASE & BY ACCOMPLISHING UNIT



**COMPARATIVE AVERAGE DEMOLITIONS EXPENDITURES BY TYPE BASE,
ACCOMPLISHING UNIT & TECHNIQUE**

AVERAGED TASK DEMO ITEM	FSB (ALL)	FSB BY B/LENG	FSB BY B/3ENG	FSB W/PROPER SHAPE & CRATER MIX	FSB W/O PROPER SHAPE & CHARGE MIX	FSB USING LAED	COB (ALL)	COB BY B/LENG	COB BY B/3ENG
C-4 (LBS)	6111	8314	4476	4154	8561	4606	2924	3425	2687
DET CORD	11,220	13,583	9245	7425	15,450	7183	6654	4250	4833
40# SHAPE (LBS)	2560	1400	3328	2744	2380	2280	807	400	1160
40# CRATER (LBS)	2520	933	3216	3104	1790	2493	853	480	1386
TOTAL WEIGHT (LBS)	12,475	13,781	11,359	10,188	15,335	9559	5195	4424	5353
							AVG L2 COB	1.5	2.0
							AVG WT L2	2949	2676

- NOTES: (1) Bangalore torpedoes and 15# shaped charges in total weight only.
- (2) FSB Lance and COB Dagger not shown in unit figures.
- (3) Det Cord converted from length measure to weight @ 0.025 lbs/ft
- (4) Proper shape and crater (S&C) mix implies use of at least 1600 pounds (40ea) of each type charge with no more than 600 pounds (15ea) difference between total amounts of each type charge used.
- (5) Each use of LAED occurred at FSB where proper S&C mix was used.

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ENCLOSURE (14)

DECLASSIFIED

COMPARISON OF ANTICIPATED TO ACTUAL CLEARING OPERATIONS

RATES ITEMS	HRS USED	ANTICIPATED RATE / HOUR		ANTICIPATED CLEARANCE		ACTUAL CLEARANCE		ACTUAL RATE/HR		% EFF PRODUCT
		ACRES	SQM	ACRES	SQM	ACRES	SQM	ACRES	SQM	
EIMCO W/ROPE PLOW	45	0.5	2024	22.5	91,080	20	80,900	0.44	1798	80.8
TD18A W/LF BLADE	340	0.3	1215	102	413,180	77.7	314,600	0.22	925	76.1
TOTALS	385	0.8	3239	124.5	504,260	97.7	395,500	0.66	2723	78.4

NOTE: (1) Time spent on bunker destruction, ramp cutting, tunnel destruction, etc, eliminated from TD18A hours. (24 HOURS).

(2) All Eimco hours applied to land clearance.

INDEX OF ENCLOSURES

- ✓(1) Helicopter Work Log
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INTERROGATION - TRANSLATION

Results

	<u>07 Dec 68 - 17 Feb 69</u>			<u>18 Feb 69 - 07 Mar 69</u>			
<u>Interrogations</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>ARVN</u>	<u>Sub Total</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>ARVN</u>	<u>Sub Total</u>	<u>Total</u>
NVA PW	17	5	22	2	X	2	24
VC PW	12	6	25	X	X	X	25
NVA Returnee	4	1	5	1	X	1	6
VC Returnee	7	X	7	1	X	1	8
Civil Defendant	69	54	143	21	X	21	164
Innocent Civilian	162	32	194	27	X	27	221
Refugees Screened	1024	X	1024	X	X	X	1024
Indigenous Personnel Screened	386	X	386	55	X	55	441
Documents Scanned	188	X	188	36	X	36	224
	Batches		Batches	Batches		Batches	Batches

Reports Submitted

Spot Interrogation	28	1	29
Initial Interrogation	54	3	57
Supplementary Interrogation	8	X	3
Subtotal	140	19	159
Highlighted	12	2	14

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PRISONERS OF WAR

<u>Name</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>DOC</u>	<u>13th ITT Rpt Nr.</u>
Dang Huu NHAN	3d plt, 11th Co, 150th Bn, GP44	120910H Jan69	09-01-69
Tran Van THAO	5th sqd, 2d plt, 11th Co, 150th Bn, GP44	131245H Jan69	11-01-69
Nguyen Dinh DUC	12th Co, 150th Bn, GP44	251415H Jan69	44-01-69
Truong Ngoc TRI	2d sqd, 3d plt, 11th Co, 150th Bn, GP44	251415H Jan69	45-01-69
Dao Van AN	12th Co, 150th Bn, GP44	251430H Jan69	43-01-69
Hoang Chi QUANG	2d plt, 23d Sapper Co, 21st Regt	090900H Dec68	348-68
Nguyen Van QUY	2d Co, 5th Bn, 21st Regt	230855H Dec68	433-68
Nguyen Minh NGUYEN	19th Trans Co, 21st Regt	261100H Dec68	449-68
Hoang Minh DUC	Comm plt, 5th Bn, 21st Regt	011525H Feb69	52-01-69
Nguyen Ngoc MINH	1st plt, 2d Bn, 21st Regt	011740H Feb69	56-02-69
Nguyen Van HIEU	1st Co, 6th Bn, 21st Regt	021525H Feb69	55-02-69
Pham Van TRO	Sec-5, 2d Div Hqs	261215H Dec68	447-68
Dao MINH	1st Co, 33d Bn, 2d Div	130800H Jan69	12-01-69
Nguyen Ban VINH	1st Co, 5th Engr Bn, 2d Div	251600H Jan69	None

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<u>Name</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>DOC</u>	<u>13th ITT Rpt NR.</u>
Nguyen THONG	GPh4, Education Cadre	081330H Dec68	345-68
Vu Van TINH	Scty Co, GPh4	130700H Jan69	10-01-69
Ngo Van CHI	4th Commo Liaison Co, 3d Sig Bn, GPh4	170845H Jan69	28-01-69
Nguyen Van VUON	3d sqd, 3d plt, Scty Co, GPh4	191950H Jan69	37-01-69
* Van VAN	2d plt, X-2 Co, 21st Bn, 39th Regt, GPh4	07 Mar69	01-03-69
Nguyen BA	3d Bn, 38th Regt	071200H Dec68	332-68
Nguyen Van VUONG	3d Co, Q-91st Bn, 38th Regt	170700H Dec68	393-68
Le Van LIEU	Comm, Q-91st Bn, 38th Regt	151200H Jan69	26-01-69
Vu Kim TUAN	18th Comm Co, 36th Regt	211400H Jan69	35-01-69
Tran Van THU	1st Sqd, 3d Plt, 2d Co, Q-81st Bn	081000H Feb69	06-02-69
Dao Van KHUYENH	C-1 Co, 700th Replacement Regt	101400H Dec68	363-68
Nguyen Van VUONG	2d Co, 3d Bn	170400H Dec68	393-68
* Subsequently identified by 1st MarDiv as a member of 6th Bn, 1st VC Regt, 2d NVA Div			

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<u>Name</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>DO</u>	<u>13th ITT Rpt NR.</u>
Nguyen Than MAI	V-401 Pety Guard	221030H Dec68	428-68
Bao BON	1st Plt, C-82d Co	060700H Jan69	51-01-69
Nguyen Van HUI	Farmer Cell, 1st Prod Plt, 2d Bn, 3d Regt	151050H Jan69	21-01-69
Tran THI	1st plt, 3d Co, 2d Bn	170400H Jan69	22-01-69
Xe Van DANG	1st sqd, 3d plt, 3d Co, 2d Bn	151100H Jan69	23-01-69
Nguyen Ngoc HUNG	Aid Station NR-3, 3d Co, 1st Div	271130H Jan69	46-01-69
Hoan Minh DUC	4th sqd, Comm plt, 3d Co, 4th Bn, 5th Regt	011525H Feb69	50-01-69
Tram MAI	20th Prod Unit, C-25, Worksite 1	051145H Feb69	TFY msg 061715- Feb69
Do Tuan PHONG	2d plt, V-11 Co, 105 Bn	071700H Feb69	57-02-69
Ha Hay DIEN	A-3, V-221, Quang Da Prov.	211045H Feb69	08-02-69
Nguyen Nhoc MINH	1st Comm plt, 2d Bn, 35th Regt, 1st Div	Unknown	None

Pham Van BAY	Guerrilla, Quang Dai (V)	091400H Dec68	345-68
Nguyen TOA	Guerrilla, Loc Tan (V)	160925H Dec68	398-68
Tuong CU	Guerrilla, My Le (3) (H)	161300H Dec68	391-68
Pham MINH	Guerrilla, Xe (H)	011800H Jan69	05-69
Nguyen BON	Guerrilla, Xe (H)	unknown	06-69

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<u>Name</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Doc</u>	<u>13th IFF Bpt Br.</u>
Nguyen HY	Guerrilla, Tu Binh (H)	011800H Jan69	07-69
Nguyen BON	Guerrilla, Tap Phuoc (H)	041300H Jan69	43-01-69
Long BA	Guerrilla, Tap Phuoc (H)	041300H Jan69	47-01-69
Vo BAY	Guerrilla, Tho Son (H)	131000H Jan69	13-01-69
Huynh HANH	Guerrilla, Tho Son (H)	131000H Jan69	17-01-69
Le NAM	Guerrilla, Tho Son (H)	131000H Jan69	18-01-69
Le Van HA	Guerrilla, Nuyen Thu (V)	230800H Jan69	38-01-69

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DOCUMENTS CAPTURED
Units Native to TF Yankee AO

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ITT BATCH NO.</u>	<u>CDEC NO.</u>	<u>POC</u>	<u>DOC</u>
<u>Elements of MR-5</u>				
561 MZ5	1-69	unk	AT974510	31Dec68
502 (Mil Staff)	14-69	unk	ZC129354	3Jan69
502 (Mil Staff)	53-69	unk	ZC074313	22Jan69
502 (Mil Staff)	72-69	1	AT830540	1Feb69
502 (Mil Staff)	82-69	unk	YC974510	2Feb69
<u>Elements of GP-44</u>				
GP-44 V-12	20-68	unk	ZC187437	18Dec68
70C & 31st Regt	60-69	20,400; 20,431; 20,432; 20,453; 20,438	ZC165496	2Jan69
Q-15 Trans Unit	62-69	20,398; 20,383; 20,377; 20,368; 20,385	ZC165540	25Jan69
70C (Rear Ser Sec GP-44)	111-69	unk	AT821540	16Feb69
U70 (GP-44)	115-69	unk	AT891499	21Feb69
70A (Staff Off GP-44)	88-69	unk	AT876505	28Feb69
<u>21st NVA Regiment</u>				
4th Bn, 21st Regt	61-68	unk	AT815203	26Dec68
6th Bn, 21st Regt	74-68	unk	AT854544	29Dec68
C-3 Co, 60th Bn, 21st Regt	129-69	unk	AT831491	27Feb69
<u>Local Force</u>				
Q-81	44-68	unk	AT960520	13Dec68
Q-12 (Q-81 Hoi An Co)	8-68	unk	AT789413	16Dec68
Q-83 (Dai Loc (D))	50-69	unk	ZC200513	18Jan69
Q-14 (Q-83 Dai Loc (D))	111-69	unk	AT821540	16Feb69
Q-83 (Dai Loc (D))	111-69	unk	AT821540	16Feb69
Q-83 (Dai Loc (D))	128-69	unk	AT869551	26Feb69
<u>Others</u>				
3rd Sapper	3-68	unk	AT965524	12Dec68
R-20, 31st Regt	22-68	unk	ZC187437	18Dec68
D-36	42-69	unk	ZC168454	15Jan69
X22 (70/21/2nd Div)	110-69	unk	ZC025272	13Feb69

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COMMO/LIAISON ROUTES

✓ Tab (A) - Overlay of Commo/Liaison Routes

1. The following is a narrative description of commo/liaison routes as related by POW's captured during Operation TAYLOR COMMON. Tab (A) displays these routes.

(a) (Rt #1) POW Tran Van THAO, 150th Transportation Battalion, GMM-44, (13th ITT report number 11-01-69) gave the following route as one used by his battalion for transporting weapons and rice.

(1) weapons. From Quang Dai (2) at AT 913539 to Xuyen Khuong (V) at AT 956515.

(2) Rice. Pickup at Xuyen Khuong AT 956515, carry to Quang Dai (2), AT 913539, then to the Ong Thu Slope by an unknown route.

(b) (Rt #2) POW Ngo Van CHI, 4th Commo-Liaison Company, unit 70A, (13th ITT report number 31-01-69) gave the following route as the one used by his company: Station H-1 vicinity AT 860515 (Dai Loc (D)/Duc Duc (D)) to station H-2 vicinity AT 938514 (Unit Q-80, Duy Xuyen (D)), to station H-3 vicinity AT 984562 (non-operative), to station H-4 vicinity AT 977568 (Unit Q-82, Unit 36, Dien Ban (D)), to station H-5 vicinity AT 028606 (unknown unit).

(c) (Rt #3) POW Nguyen Van VINH, 1st Company, 15th Engineer Battalion, 2nd NVA Division, stated that his unit used 4 boats, hidden on the Thu Bon River, vicinity AT 794300, to pick up rice at Phu Tuan (H) vicinity AT 890518.

(d) (Rt #4) POW Nguyen Dinh DUC, XO of the 150th Transportation Battalion gave 2 routes used by his battalion for transporting rice:

(1) Primary Route. (4.a) from the ferry boat at ~~AT 906526~~, to La Thap, AT 932520, to third hamlet, Xuyen Khuong (V), AT 952513, through Le Bac, AT 960532, to Dien Hong (V), AT 970550, then across the river at AT 979562, to the 1st hamlet, Dien Thai (V) AT 982558.

(2) Alternate Route. (4.b) from Quang Dai (possibly AT 913539), cross the river at AT 900540, go to the Ai Nghai-Giao Thuy Road at AT 922572, follow the road to Loc Hung, AT 940550, to Dien Xuan (V) AT 960565, to 1st hamlet, Dien Thai (V) AT 982558.

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COMPLEXES - EQUIPMENT - MATERIAL CAPTURED/DESTROYED

A. Complexes: 204
 Bunkers: 1403
 Hooches: 1520
 Tunnel Networks: 20
 Medical Sites: 7
 1) Hospitals: 3
 2) Aid Stations: 4
 PW Detention Sites: 14

B. Ammunition:
 .50 Caliber: 9050 rds
 Grenades: 889
 RPG: 552 rds
 Mortars: 2732 rds
 Artillery: 235 rds
 Rockets: 20 rds
 Mines: 42
 Small Arms: 410,080 rds

C. Weapons:
 Individual: 1056
 Crew Served: 81

D. Machinery:
 Rice Shifter: 1
 Buck Saw: 1
 Bicycles: 16

E. Live Stock:
 Pigs: 101
 Chickens: 27

F. Fuel:
 Kerosene: 45 gallons
 Oil: 17 gallons

G. Rice: 206.8 tons
 Corn: 450 lbs
 Cats: 2000 lbs
 Tea: 200 packs
 Noodles: 1 bundle
 Japanese Spaghetti: 42 lbs
 Pre-Packed Shrimp: 1 can
 Fish Oil: 1 gallon
 Cooking Oil: 1 gallon
 Sugar: 325 lbs
 Salt: 800 lbs

H. 782 Gear:
 Beds: 283
 Gas Masks: 126
 Magazine Pouches: 197
 Cartridge Belts: 135
 Canteens: 61
 Mess Kits: 109
 Ponchos: 23
 Helmets: 13
 NVA Belts: 300
 Mosquito Nets: 2
 Uniforms: 1506
 Magazines: 320

I. Document Batches: 224

J. Medical:
 Drugs (Assorted): 50 lbs
 Surgical Instruments:
 6 X 10 gal cans
 Sterilizing Gear:
 7 X 10 gal cans

K. Explosives:
 Satchel Charges: 59
 TNT: 3 boxes
 Fuze Coord: 300 meters

L. Electrical Gear:
 Comm Wire: 18 roles
 Batteries (Assorted): 22
 Generators: 1
 Transformers: 30
 Heavy Duty Fuzes: 33
 Heavy Duty Cable: 350 ft
 Radios (Chicom Type): 4

M. Tools; 14 sets consisting of:
 Pliers: 14
 Wire Cutters: 3
 Comm Tools: 12
 Cleaning Tools: 4
 Picks: 44
 Screw Drivers: 6
 Chisels: 9
 Axes: 23

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N. Miscellaneous Weapons and Equipment

Bows and Arrows:

1 bow, 12 arrows

3 cross bows, 29 bolts

Punji Pits: 23

Malaysian Whips: 2

Field Glasses: 8 sets

Typewriters: 4

Compasses: 3

Cameras: 3

Field Phones: 4

Civilian Clothing: 32 bundles

Radios (Civilian): 11

Whiskey: 9 gallons

16mm movie cameras: 1

Crude Rubber: 800 lbs

Parade Banners: 1

Booby Traps: 339

Pots and Pans: 33 sets

SKS Manuals: 1

Black Boards: 6

Desks and Chairs: 50 sets

Printing paper: 3 bundles

Printing ink: 3 quarts

Foot Lockers: 1

Maps: 383

Flags: 6

Fishing Nets: 3

Mimeograph Machines: 1

Chain Saws: 1

Money:

NVN: 2,000,000\$

SVN: 10,000\$

Bandages: 150 lbs

Medical Kits: 12

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SIGNIFICANT CACHES/COMPLEXES

<u>JUL</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>SIGNIFICANT CACHES/COMPLEX</u>
<u>DAF</u>			
071545H	C/1/5	AT 955523	50-70 tons rice
100645H	B/2/7	AT 825520	20 tons rice
181754H	I/3/5	AC 216415	Hospital site
191000H	B/1/5	AC 184414	Aid Station
191300H	B/1/3	AC 182415	Prison camp
191330H	C/1/3	AC 181393	Base camp; 26 huts/bunkers
201200H	M/3/5	AC 217416	Base camp; 60 huts/bunkers
211200H	K/3/3	AC 162382	Base camp; 55 huts
211600H	F/2/5	AC 194433	Bn size base camp
221030H	I/3/5	AC 218400	Aid station
231800H	K/3/3	AC 165383	Hq complex; 150 bunkers, huts & tunnels
281230H	I/3/5	AC 219420	Hut & bunker complex; 27 huts, 8 bunkers
311200H	A/1/3	AC 178408	Large hut & bunker complex, 9 IWC, 20 maps
<u>JAN</u>			
040945H	HSF	AC 204289	Fortified position (40 bunkers)
041600H	M/3/3	AC 143386	Hut complex, 1 CSWC, 122 NVA maps
051230H	F/2/5	AC 167465	Base camp
051430H	C/2/5	AC 172464	2 underground bunkers, 166 IWC & 3 CSWC
071210H	B/2/5	AC 164341	Hut complex; 14 IWC, ammo & misc gear
100945H	A/1/5	AT 958517	122-82mm rounds
120910H	B/2/5	AC 166449	Hospital complex
131730H	HSF	AC 203245	Weapons caches; 193 IWC & 5 CSWC
191200H	I/3/5	AC 067398	12 huts, 4 bunkers, 100 fighting holes
210940H	B/1/3	AC 100450	2 huts, 90,000 rounds AK ammo, 16 Rds of 60mm, 27 cases 82mm (108 Rds)
211620H	L/3/5	AC 059399	2 (50 man huts) 5 (15 man huts), 27 had bunkers
221335H	D/1/3	AC 085431	Large ammo cache: 33-75mm Rds, 224-82mm Rds, 15-122 Rds, 075 RPG Rds, 2 cases ammo
231655H	M/3/5	AC 071408	Base camp; 25 huts & 25 fighting holes
241605H	M/3/5	AC 071408	20 huts, 10 tons rice, 9 IWC
250900H	D/1/3	AC 085433	Weapon/ammo cache: 5 AK-47's, 36 cases 82mm Rds, 5-122 Rkts, 16-75mm RR Rds, 30 RPG Rds
261300H	D/1/3	AC 084434	Ammo cache: 240 Rds 62mm, 480 Rds SA, 32-75mm RR Rds
261230H	I/3/3	AC 140271	Base camp; 9 huts with bunkers, 3 messhalls

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<u>DTG</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>SIGNIFICANT CACHES/COMPLEXES</u>
<u>JAN</u>			
280945H	A/1/3	ZC 115401	Medical cache & 6 IWC
281230H	I/3/3	ZC 132288	Base camp; 23 huts, 4 IWC, misc gear & medical gear
291200H	C/1/3	ZC 132448	School complex/hospital area; 10 huts with bunkers, blackboard, 1 IWC
292030H	A/1/5	AT 876506	7 tons rice
311415H	K/3/3	ZC 095322	30' high platform with ladder
311400H	M/3/3	ZC 116344	10 huts & OP tower 40' high
<u>FEB</u>			
011425H	L/3/3	ZC 061315	Complex; 9 huts with bunkers, 15 IWC
021550H	C/1/7	AT 984519	62.2 tons rice
		AT 987519	
071500H	P/2/5	ZC 044240	Old French steel bridge
111130H	K/3/3	ZC 064269	Bunker complex with 212 VC & ChiCom maps

ENCLOSURE (30)

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SKETCHES OF SIGNIFICANT COMPLEXES/BUILDINGS
UNCOVERED IN BASE AREA 112


Tab (A) Probable "Chicken Coop"

- ✓(B) NVA/VN living quarters
- ✓(C) Prisoner of War Compound
- ✓(D) Billeting Area
- ✓(E) Base Camp
- ✓(F) Base Camp
- ✓(G) Base Camp
- ✓(H) Base Camp
- ✓(I) Base Camp
- ✓(J) Base Camp

1. The tabs to this enclosure contain sketches and descriptions of unusual or representative types of dwellings, structures and complexes uncovered in the Base Area.

2. During the operation, 204 complexes were discovered and destroyed. The sketches, included in this report, attempt to describe the types of complexes/organization encountered. Where appropriate, verbal descriptions are included.

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PROBABLE "CHICKEN COOP"
DISCOVERED BY 1/3, IN BASE AREA 112
DEC 68 - JAN 69
OPERATION "TAYLOR COMMON"

TAB A
ENCLOSURE (33)


PREPARED BY
TASK FORCE "Y"
G-2
17 FEB 1969

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NVA/VC LIVING QUARTERS
COMPOSITE DEPICTION OF HUT
NORMALLY ENCOUNTERED WITHIN B.A. 112



OPERATION "TAYLOR COMMON"

PREPARED BY
TASK FORCE YANKEE,
G-2
17 FEB 1969

TAB B
ENCLOSURE (33)

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PRISONER OF WAR COMPOUND

Date Discovered: 19Dec68

Unit: B/1/3


Coordinates: XE 182415

Description:

1. Area consisted of 12 hootches, 15'x30', containing cages approximately 8'x20'. Floors of cages were constructed of heavy timber poles secured with vines.

Tab (C)
ENCLOSURE (33)
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~ P.O.W. Compound ~

B/1/3 - 19 DEC '68 - ZC 182415

TAB C

ENCLOSURE (23)

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BILLETING AREA

Date Discovered: 20Dec68


Unit: C/1/3

Coordinates: 2C 191395

Description:

1. Area consisted of 1-well used trail, 1-large 40 man hutch, with fireplaces, pig pen and miscellaneous gear; 1-12'x24' bunker, with tunnel leading into it.

Complex and By 9/1/8 VC ZC 191 395 on 28 0945H DEC



TAB D
ENCLOSURE (3)

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BASE CAMP

Date Discovered: 27Dec68


Unit: 8/2/5

Coordinates: NW 198457

Description:

1. 30 hootches made of wood, built over lightning holes. Each hootch contained tables and chairs. The area also housed 10-firplaces, 20 (2 men) latrines and the remains of 80 gas masks which had been burned. Area estimated to be 1-2 weeks old.

Tab (E)
MICROFILM (35)
CONFIDENTIAL



FIRIS - 27 DEC '68

LEGEND

-  - COVERED BUNKERS
-  - HOT BUNKERS
-  - FOXHOLES

TAB E
ENCLOSURE (3)

CONFIDENTIAL

BASE AREA WITH POSSIBLE HOSPITAL

Date Discovered: 03Jan69




Unit: E/2/5

Coordinates: ZC 167449

Description:

1. Area consisted of 20 huts with bunkers and possible hospital. Search revealed 1 SKS rifle, 1 grease gun, and miscellaneous '82 gear.

Tab (F)
ENCLOSURE (3)
CONFIDENTIAL



TAB F
ENCLOSURE (33)

CONFIDENTIAL

BASS CAMP

Date Discovered: Jan 69


Unit: H/2/5

Coordinates: 20 182472


Description:

1. Hootch is 18'x12' (approximate) with two bunkers located in left rear corner and on right side of hootch. Capable of holding ten people. Hootch was used for sleeping.
2. Hootch is 6'x10', no bunkers, used for sleeping; smaller than #1, but better constructed.
3. Hootch had been burned. Contains large bunker capable of holding 12 people.
4. Hootch is 12'x12', probable messhall, contained stove, shelves, fire wood. Contains tunnel fortified with logs.
5. had been burned out but has tunnel approximately 12' long. Size of hut is 25'x12'.
6. Burned out hut reveals an incomplete tunnel in north corner. Size of hootch 12'x6'.
7. Hootch burned out with bunker in northwest corner. Had rice cache approximately 2' in diameter next to hootch.

- BASE CAMP VIC ZC 182472 -
- H/2/5 CAPTURING UNIT -



TAB G
ENCLOSURE (33)



CONFIDENTIAL

BASE CAMP

Date Discovered: 02Jan69

Unit: L/4/3

Coordinates: 28 128347

Descriptions

1. Thatched roof, kitchen had thatched walls and remainder of structure had no walls. Approximate size was 12'x20'x12' high. Probably used as mess hall.

2. Hootch had cellar with two fireplaces and rifle racks. Floor was dirt with logs and no walls, thatched roof. Approximate size was 10'x16'x8' high.





3. Hut had thatched roof with walls on three sides, dug into hillside. Contained rice bin. Approximate size was 5'x3'x3' high.

4. This hootch is identical to #2, except floor was at ground level also with logs. Had thatched roof and no walls. Approximate size was 12'x16'. One K-44 rifle was found inside.

5. Hootches was approximately 12'x16'x12' high with thatched roof and no walls. Built much the same as hootches 2 and 4. Estimate that it had been vacant approximately 10 days.

Tab (H)
ENCLOSURE (35)
CONFIDENTIAL

CAPTURING UNIT: L/3/3
VICINITY: ZC 128347
DATE: 02 JANUARY 1969



— ZC 128347 —

TAB H
ENCLOSURE (39)

CONFIDENTIAL

BASE CAMP

Date Discovered: 23Dec68


Unit: E/2/5

Coordinates: ZC 174446

Description:

1. The Base Camp occupied an area 150m x 70 meters. It consisted of 6 hootches with 10 to 12 bunkers, large enough to hold 100 troops. The camp also contained washing and head facilities. A structure of particular interest was constructed beneath a large bolder. Two additional sketches of this structure are included.

DECLASSIFIED



DECLASSIFIED

ZC 174446

ENTRANCE TO ROCK WITH
WOOD & DIRT BLAST WALLS,
ROOM WAS UNDER ROCK
AND PROTECTED FROM AN
EXTERNAL FORCE




ROCK
FORMATION

HOOCH #5

TAB I
ENCLOSURE (33)

Top View



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BASE CAMP

Date Discovered: 28Dec68

Unit: W/2/5

Coordinates: ZC 185434

Description:



1. General Description: Village located in a very steep and narrow draw with a small rocky stream running west to east. Village is 50 meters by 100 meters located on north side of stream.

(a) Hootch numbers 1 and 2 were for sleeping about 10 to 15 men, one table in each and hootches measured 8x10 meters.

(b) Hootch number 3 was closed and had no windows. 5 weapons; 2 rifles, 3 light machine guns were found. A bunker was found under the hootch containing NVA packs, cameras, radios, other personal items. Structure was constructed of bamboo and was 8x10 meters in size.

(c) Hootch number 4 was an open hootch with sleeping racks, one table, two benches and bunker under hootch containing flags, and personal gear. Structure was 10x15 meters in size.

(d) Number 5 is a foundation for hootch, area cleared with main, side braces up. No bunker.



TAB J
ENCLOSURE (33)

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HLZ'S (MAN-MADE & NATURAL)

✓ Tab (A) - Overlay of Landing Zones.

1. The following is a list of HLZ's in Base Area 112. The size zone and pertinent descriptive information, where available, is also included. Tab (A) displays the HLZ's.

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>SIZE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
1. ZC 016323	Good 1xCH-46	Stream with bridge
2. ZC 018328	Good 2xCH-46	Ford in river with stone base
3. ZC 025323	Poor 1xCH-46	Bomb crater with stumps and brush
4. ZC 024403	1xCH-46	Gently sloping hillside
5. ZC 037425	Good 2-3xCH-46	
6. ZC 038424	Excellent 1xCH-46	Elephant grass 2-3 feet
7. ZC 043480	Poor 1xCH-46	On slope, large rocks on ground
8. ZC 045483	Poor 1xCH-46	On hillside
9. ZC 056293	1xCH-46	Sandbar on river
10. ZC 066236	1xCH-46	Ravine, stumps and high grass
11. ZC 066254	1xCH-46	Bomb crater on hillside
12. ZC 071231	1xCH-46	Grassy hilltop
13. ZC 082235	Multi-CH-46	Flat, grass 6 ft. high
14. ZC 087319	Good 1xCH-46	Manmade zone on ridgeline
15. ZC 083478	Good 1xCH-46	3-4 ft elephant grass
16. ZC 095463	1xCH-46	Ridgeline, level manmade zone
17. ZC 099491	1xCH-46	Old rice paddy
18. ZC 107254	Fair 1xCH-46	6 ft elephant grass
19. ZC 111240	Good 1xCH-46	Low grass-stumps

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LOCATION	SIZE	DESCRIPTION
20. ZC 112249	1xCH-46	Flat with 3 ft grass
21. ZC 115411	1xCH-46	8 ft grass
22. ZC 136267	Good 6xCH-46	Burnt off area
23. ZC 130513	2xCH-46	Rice paddy
24. ZC 142256	Good 4xCH-46	5 ft elephant grass
25. ZC 145413	Excellent Multi CH-46	FSB Dagger Hill 1050 175'x200'
26. ZC 141517	2xCH-46	Small shrubs on flat ground
27. ZC 156273	Good 1xCH-46	12 ft grass (Rec'd AA on extract)
28. ZC 152524	Good Multi CH-46	Flat, no obstacles
29. ZC 162276	Good 1xCH-46	12 ft grass
30. ZC 163526	1xCH-46	Flat with grass
31. ZC 170280	Good 1xCH-46	Sandbar
32. ZC 175524	Good 1xCH-46	CIDG OP
33. ZC 184297	Good Multi CH-46	Grass 3-5 ft next to river
34. ZC 184401	Good Multi CH-46	Top of hill 558
35. ZC 180515	1xCH-46	Bomb crater, surrounded by 4' brush
36. ZC 191311	Good 1xCH-46	Stream bed, 3-4' grass
37. ZC 190337	1xCH-46	Cleared LZ
38. ZC 201363	Fair 1xCH-46	Shrubs 3-6 ft
39. ZC 203356	Fair 1xCH-46	Elephant grass
40. ZC 207539	Multi CH-46	Rice paddy
41. ZC 211494	Good 1xCH-46	4-6 ft elephant grass and sparse brush
42. ZC 217513	Good 1xCH-46	Top of ridge line

ENCLOSURE (34)

2

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<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>SIZE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
43. AT 750406	2xCH-46	Hill 575; flat, cleared area
44. AT 808467	Multi-CH-46	Rice paddy
45. AT 825453	Good 1xCH-46	Hilltop zone
46. AT 842472	Good 1xCH-46	Not depicted in Enclosure ()
47. ZC 017418	40'x50'	FSB TOMAHAWK
48. ZC 021336	50'x50'	FSB MACHETE
49. ZC 025344	65'x115'	FSB SABER
50. ZC 063391	50'x75'	FSB BROADSWORD
51. ZC 076497	75'x80'	FSB SCIMITAR
52. ZC 082270	40'x40'	FSB BOLO
53. ZC 081378	50'x50'	FSB JAVELIN
54. ZC 087433	1xCH-46	
55. ZC 080445	1xCH-46	
56. ZC 093387	1xCH-53	
57. ZC 095405	1xCH-53	
58. ZC 098418	1xCH-53	FSB MAXWELL
59. ZC 095467	1xCH-46	
60. ZC 099494	2xCH-46	Rice paddy
61. ZC 104477- ZC 102485	Excellent 4-5 CH-46	2'-3' vines
62. ZC 119375	1xCH-46	
63. ZC 111417	1xCH-46	
64. ZC 134357	50'x50'	FSB CUTLASS
65. ZC 149284	50'x50'	FSB DART

CONFIDENTIAL

LOCATION	SIZE
66. ZC 142382	1xCH-46
67. ZC 142411	60'x100'
68. ZC 150358	1xCH-46
69. ZC 158440	60'x70'
70. ZC 155478	1xCH-46
71. ZC 165365	(1) 35'x100' (2) 60'x100'
72. ZC 171405	1xCH-46
73. ZC 173488	1xCH-46
74. ZC 183371	1xCH-46
75. ZC 183383	1xCH-46
76. ZC 181445	50'x100'
77. ZC 182456	40'x40'
78. ZC 185477	100'x125'
79. ZC 192454	40'x100'
80. ZC 196448	1xCH-46
81. ZC 197462	1xCH-46
82. ZC 202455	1xCH-46
83. ZC 815383	30'x40'
84. ZC 064316	1xCH-53
85. ZC 069476	1xCH-53
86. ZC 076292	1xCH-46
87. ZC 070320	1xCH-53

DESCRIPTION

FSB DAGGER

FSB MACE

FSB PIKE

Nong Son CIDG

ENCLOSURE (34)

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LOCATION	SIZE	DESCRIPTION
88. ZC 095501	(1) 1xCH-53 (2) 1xCH-53	FEB BATTLEMAP
89. ZC 098447	1xCH-53	
90. ZC 115496	1xCH-53	
91. ZC 124513	1xCH-53	
92. ZC 133343	1xCH-53	
93. ZC 136362	1xCH-53	
94. ZC 149559	1xCH-53	
95. ZC 156371	1xCH-53	
96. ZC 159376	1xCH-53	
97. ZC 175360	1xCH-53	
98. YC 993344	1xCH-46	
99. ZC 021345	1xCH-46	
100. ZC 012328	1xCH-46	
101. ZC 064406	1xCH-46	
102. ZC 104418	1xCH-46 (Poss 53)	
103. ZC 100402	1xCH-46 (Poss 53)	
104. ZC 106431	Sling L2	
105. ZC 035420	1xCH-53	
106. ZC 035450	Sling L2	
107. ZC 045421	1xCH-46	
108. ZC 028415	1xCH-46	
109. ZC 010414	1xCH-46	
110. ZC 041409	1xCH-46	