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4/20/66

From: The Military Secretary
For: G-3

Note G M C memo
to Mil Sec. on
break tray.

Very respectfully,
JH

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 J. C. Caldwell
 Col USMC
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15 Apr 1966

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From: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
To: Distribution List

Subj: Report of Operation JACK STAY

Encl: (1) COM ARG U.S. 7th Flt ser D-004, CPR1: DEP:ht 3000(01)
to COM U.S. 7th Flt of 7 Apr 1966

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COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP
U. S. SEVENTH FLEET
USS PRINCETON (LPH 5)
FPO SAN FRANCISCO 96601

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Ser: D-004
7 April 1966

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From: Commander Amphibious Ready Group, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Operation JACKSTAY Post Operation Report; forwarding of (U)

Ref: (a) COMSEVENTHFLT msg 201134Z MAR 66
(b) CTG 76.5 OPOD 328-66
(c) CTG 76.5 msg 211929Z MAR 66 (Msg OPOD 328A-66)
(d) H.O. Chart 15,551-50-50

Encl: (1) Task Organization
(2) Ship-to-Shore Movement and River Operations
(3) Supporting Arms
(4) Communications
(5) Logistics
(6) Medical
(7) Psy War/Civic Action Activity
(8) Public Affairs
(9) Distilling Operations in Rivers
(10) Lessons Learned

1. Background. During the period 26 March through 6 April Commander Amphibious Ready Group (CTG 76.5) was Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) for the conduct of Operation JACKSTAY in accordance with reference (a), the initiating directive.

2. Mission. The Amphibious Task Force was charged with the responsibility for conducting an amphibious landing in the RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE (RSSZ) to locate and destroy Viet Cong forces and base areas in order to assist in establishing positive RVN control over vital ship channels between the South China Sea and the port of SAIGON.

3. Execution. The initial assault was conducted on the LONG THANH peninsula with a surface landing of troops and artillery over RED BEACH (YS054472) and a helicopter-borne landing of troops in HLZ ROBIN (YS113503) and SPARROW (YS113514). This was followed by a series of subsidiary landings along the

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rivers and waterways of the RSSZ to conduct search and destroy operations in a tactical environment believed not encountered by the U. S. Navy since the river operations of the Civil War. Final withdrawal of troops was accomplished on 6 and 7 April.

4. Summary of Significant Events

- 22 March - PRINCETON departed Subic Bay, P. I. for CHU LAI/DANANG area with Commander Amphibious Task Force, CTG 76.5, CAPT J. D. WESTERVELT, USN embarked to pick up 2 UH-1E and 2 CH-46 helicopters to augment the SLF capabilities. In addition, in-country prepositioned news media representatives were to be embarked. ALAMO, PICKAWAY and MERRICK departed Subic Bay (CO, ALAMO OTC) for CAM RANH BAY to rendezvous with PRINCETON and conduct pre D-Day transfers. WEISS departed Subic Bay to steam directly to VUNG TAU, South Vietnam.
- 23 March - PRINCETON arrived CHU LAI/DANANG and picked up news media and augmentation helicopters. CTG 76.5 and CTG 79.5 departed Flagship for SAIGON and conference with COMUSMACV. CO, PRINCETON temporarily assumed CTG 76.5 and departed CHU LAI/DANANG area for CAM RANH BAY.
- 24 March - PRINCETON UNREPPED from GUADALUPE (AO 32) during the morning and conducted pre D-Day transfers with the ALAMO group upon rendezvous in the CAM RANH BAY area. CTG 76.5 and CTG 79.5 returned to Flagship. Ships departed proceeding out of sight of land for rendezvous point of all ships off VUNG TAU. PRINCETON proceeded directly at higher SOA.
- 25 March - TG 76.5 ships including other attached shipping for the operation arrived at rendezvous point 25 miles off VUNG TAU. COM-LANSHIPRON ONE and LST CO'S were heloed to PRINCETON for a briefing on upcoming operations. ROBISON refueled by PRINCETON. CTF 115 representatives were embarked aboard PRINCETON from VUNG TAU by helicopter. 1 H-34 of HMM 362 developed engine failure and was lost at sea. No injuries were incurred. CTG 76.5 assumed tactical command of all units. Formation 51 was set up with ROBISON as screen and the LSTs steaming independently. ALAMO detached at midnight to proceed into assault anchorage with other ships following at timed intervals. CTF 115 patrol boats took up their blocking positions along the SOIRAP, DONG TRANH and LONG TAO to prevent exfiltration of VC forces from the RUNG SAT. These forces maintained blocking positions throughout the operation altering stations at times to coincide with Marine movements.

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- 26 March - D-Day. All ships in assault positions. UDT personnel from WEISS landed at RED BEACH (YS054472) in the vicinity of DONG HOA by CTF 115 armed LCPL prior to H-Hour to perform beach reconnaissance and set up range light system to aid incoming boat waves. 0630 was set as H-Hour at RED BEACH but was delayed to 0715 due to mechanical failure of LCM6 and an inopportune thunderstorm which reduced visibility to near zero. 0645 was set as L-Hour HLZ SPARROW (YS143514) located in the vicinity of CAN GIO but delayed to 0720 because of weather. NGF and CAS prep was conducted at HLZ ROBIN (YS113503) in the vicinity of LONG THANH. LCU landed artillery over RED BEACH at 1635 at second high tide of the day. HENRY COUNTY loaded three ONTOS on main deck at VUNG TAU ramp and prepared for river operations. NGF coordination was passed ashore. At 1530, 21 surveillance teams composed of SEAL, UDT and Marine Recon personnel departed WEISS and led by VNN FOMs which performed minesweeping, were positioned by LCPLs along streams north of landing areas on the LONG THANH peninsula to provide surveillance and prevent infiltration/exfiltration during the night.
- 27 March - WASHOE COUNTY loaded 2 ONTOS aboard on main deck at VUNG TAU ramp. IST movements commenced for river operations with HENRY COUNTY proceeding to mouth of SOIRAP where MERRICK provided 5 LCM6s, 1 salvage boat and 1 LCPL. Upon arrival HENRY COUNTY, preceded by USN MSB minesweepers, convoyed the assault crafts up the river to anchorage in the vicinity of BLUE BEACH (XS926620). WASHOE COUNTY proceeded to mouth of SOIRAP, anchored and commenced backloading 2 companies of BLT 1/5 over RED BEACH. COMSEVENTHFLT, Admiral HYLAND, visited Flagship and various other units of the task group during the afternoon. Phase II of JACKSTAY commenced.
- 28 March - WASHOE COUNTY underway up SOIRAP with 2 companies embarked for transfer to HENRY COUNTY assigned assault boats. A B-52 ARC LIGHT strike was conducted from 0907 to 0912 in the RUNG SAT just east of the VAM SAT river. The strike was followed by a landing of 2 companies over BLUE BEACH. A HOWTAR battery was helo lifted into HLZ BLUEJAY (XS937583) along with 2 platoons of provisional rifle company with the WASHOE COUNTY moving into position opposite the landing zone to support their operation. One company was lifted into HLZ BLACKBIRD (YS094565) to the north of LONG THANH peninsula to conduct search and clear operations in this area. CTF 115 patrol forces continued on station encircling the RSSZ area 24 hours a day receiving occasional small arms fire from the shores. PRINCETON UNREPPED with CACAPON. COMUSMACV, General WESTMORLAND,

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visited Flagship with Admiral WARD, COMNAVFOR VIETNAM, LGEN VIEN, Chief of General Staff, RVNAF, and Admiral WULZEN. Included in the party were other Vietnamese and U. S. officers. He later visited CP ashore. An attempt was made to insert 5 surveillance teams deep into the RUNG SAT up the SONG DONG TRANH during early evening hours. However, VC opposition and hydrographic conditions hindered these insertions. Three teams eventually were inserted.

29 March - Two companies with elements of the provisional rifle company and a HOWTAR battery were landed by helo in HLZ CROW (XS963702). Messages were received during the day coordinating planning for the Vietnamese Marine Corps to conduct operations in the RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE in coordination / conjunction with the U. S. Forces. One of these would be conducted to the north with the cordoning off of TAM THON HIEP and the other a re-assault of the LONG THANH peninsula with the use of SLF helicopters.

30 March - WASHOE COUNTY was positioned up the river close to HLZ CROW to support Marine units in the area. HENRY COUNTY moved to an anchorage just off the mouth of the VAM SAT for a better firing position of her deck-loaded ONTOS and LCM's on the following day. During the afternoon HENRY COUNTY opened fire on VC movements along the eastern river bank. BOEN PHONG and representatives from the RVN Marine Corps arrived on board the Flagship for conference and to firm up forthcoming VNNMC operations in the RSSZ.

31 March - At 0630 VNN minesweeping FOMs and RAG gun boats joined up with U. S. assault boats on the SOIRAP in the vicinity of the VAM SAT LST anchorages. At 0635 the force, consisting of 2 LCPLs, 4 LCMs, one salvage boat and 5 VNN support craft, proceeded towards the VAM SAT. The HENRY COUNTY and WASHOE COUNTY conducted shore bombardment in conjunction with air strikes conducted by carrier based aircraft. At 0730 shore bombardment was lifted and the convoy entered into the VAM SAT. Air strikes, by HU-1Es and fixed wing aircraft, in addition to reconnaissance by fire was carried out during the transit to troop drop-off point. One mine was detonated during the transit and ambushes were encountered from the river banks. At 0930 2 companies were offloaded to the RACH BAGIONG. 2 companies were backloaded on the return trip from the west bank and at 1028 convoy was outbound to the SOIRAP. Air strikes were in progress throughout the transit. At 1110 convoy was sighted at river

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mouth. Penetration of VAM SAT was completed and 2 companies aboard the convoy were dispatched to WASHOE COUNTY. HENRY COUNTY shifted anchorage in the evening and supported battalion ashore with H & I fire support until 2200.

- 1 April - Intensive Marine search and clear operations continued ashore. At 2335 approximately 55 junks in convoy moved down river towards WASHOE COUNTY from the north. After several anxious moments CTF 115 patrol craft rounded the junks up and discovered they were a VNN organized convoy. No word of this movement had been passed to CTG 76.5 or CTF 115 by the VNN.
- 2 April - Intensive search and clear operations by USMC units continued ashore. The 5th VNNC Battalion landed on TAM TREP ISLAND and commenced their operations at 0630. WASHOE COUNTY came under enemy mortar and automatic weapons fire and returned fire with her batteries.
- 3 April - At 0628 Marine Reconnaissance Teams were inserted into lower LY NHON peninsula by WEISS LCPL. VEGA replenished ships of the task group during the afternoon. Recon teams were retracted from LY NHON.
- 4 April - 0700 was L-Hour for 4th VNNC Battalion. First waves touched down on LONG THANH peninsula. Area was prepped by NGFS from HOBSON and VNN ISIL. 3 companies were picked up by river convoy on the VAM SAT and were returned over the beach to HLZ CROW. In the process of retraction out of the river 2 VC attacks of small arms were suppressed and one salvage boat was hit by a mortar round. Three men were slightly injured. POLUX UNREPTED the task group.
- 5 April - Continued Navy support of troop operations. One company was hoisted to HLZ CROW. WASHOE COUNTY and HENRY COUNTY conducted shore bombardment against RACH IA in preparation for river operations. At 1000 3 companies of BLT 1/5 were landed deep in the RACH IA in the vicinity of XS998723 and commenced search and clear operations towards the LONG TAU. Under sporadic light enemy fire the convoy returned up the RACH IA to the SOIRAP. At 1630 the 4th VNNC Battalion completed operations on the LONG THANH peninsula and was backloaded by SLF helos to VUNG TAU.
- 6 April - Backloading of all troops and equipment of BLT 1/5 commenced. WASHOE COUNTY and HENRY COUNTY moved north to the juncture of SOIRAP and LONG TAU Rivers at NHA BE, embarked VNN advisors

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and proceeded south down the LONG TAO to anchor in the vicinity of YSO45720. One company was backloaded from HLZ CROW at 0800 to PRINCETON. 3 companies were backloaded into LST commencing at 1000. Upon completion of backloading to LSTs, HENRY COUNTY and WASHOE COUNTY transited the LONG TAO to VUNG TAO and commenced offloading troops and artillery at high tide to the LST ramp. Backloading continued throughout day and night to various ships of the task group. RECLAIMER and ROBISON detached to normal OPCON.

7 April - Backloading completed and operation terminated. PRINCETON underway for CHU IAI to offload helicopters. ALAMO and PICK-AWAY steamed to Subic Bay. HENRY COUNTY, WASHOE COUNTY and MERRICK detached to normal OPCON.

5. Summary of Operations

a. There were four (4) assault landings by boats and four (4) by helicopter during the operation. Twenty-five (25) surveillance teams and one Marine recon team were inserted on three separate occasions. The VN Marine Corps conducted 2 coordinated assault landings, one by boat and one by helicopter in zone adjacent to but separate from U. S. Marine operations. These were coordinated by means of a CTG 76.5 OPORE and CTF 115 advisors. Some difficulty was experienced in maintaining up to date coordination and information of the movements of these battalions.

b. The known casualties inflicted by all U.S. sources on the VC during the operation were as follows:

(1) Total. KIA-63; POSSIBLE KIA-84; WIA-5; POSSIBLE WIA-6; CAPTURED-0.

(2) By Units:	KIA	KIA(POSS)	WIA	WIA (POSS)
USMC	57	68	5	4
SURVEILLANCE TEAMS	5	1	0	2
WASHOE COUNTY	1	UNK	UNK	UNK
NAVAL GUNFIRE	UNK	UNK	UNK	UNK
KBA	UNK	15	UNK	UNK

c. Marine forces ashore captured or destroyed the following:

Small arms weapons (rifles, carbines, shotguns) - 24
Hand grenades - 1520

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Rifle grenades - 40
 60MM mortar rounds - 55
 VC campsites - 14
 Arms factories - 2
 Huts - 90
 Bunkers - 270
 Hospitals/aid stations - 2
 S/A ammo (7.62MM) - 60,000+ rounds
 Medical supplies, vitamins, morphine, bandages, other medications and surgical instruments, plasma, medical books
 Land mines - 200
 Water mines - 180
 Mine manufacturing supplies and equipment, gunpowder, mine casings, detonators, manufacturing instructions
 Manufacturing equipment: anvils, hacksaw blades, washers, hammers, grinding stones, brazing torches, 13 acetylene tanks, tool kits, metal stock, drill presses, etc.
 Rice - Approximately 2200 pounds
 Sampans - 4
 Water - Approximately 800 gallons
 Clothing and personal supplies: Approximately 200 pairs pajamas, shorts, packs, ponchos, approximately 70 hammocks
 55 gallon drums and 55 gallon jugs - total 27, some containing diesel oil
 Documents: numerous propaganda documents, bulletins, rosters, diagrams, etc. (Sent to J-2, MACV)
 Miscellaneous: fishing gear, water jugs, paint, personal items
 Mortar base plates - 2

6. In-country Forces and Advisors

a. Throughout the operation IF 115/116 patrol boats, minesweepers, helicopters and VNN units were used extensively to prevent exfiltration/infiltration attempts, to support TG 76.5 operations, to sweep ahead of river ships and to augment TG 76.5 resources particularly during the river assault convoy operations. These forces were highly necessary to the success of the operation and in fact made some of the evolutions such as river convoys and surveillance insertions possible. The cooperation and coordination provided by CTF 115 was outstanding.

b. CTF 115 also provided senior USN/USMC advisors to CATF/CLF on the Flagship as well as RUNG SAT experienced advisors to the operating forces. CTG 76.5 relied on their advice in making major decisions on operations and the same was true at the lower echelons of command. CTF 115 personnel were

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also used to brief boat crews and troops on RUNG SAT environment, terrain, and tactics. These briefings proved most effective.

c. While there is no absolutely reliable substitute for military operational control of all the forces engaged in an area of operations, the method of coordination established between CTG 76.5/CTG 79.5 and the CTF 115 advisors was very effective.

J. D. WESTERVELT

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COMPHIBGRU THREE
COMNAVOPSUPGRUPAC
COMUSMACV
COMSEVENTHFLT
CTF 115
CTF 79
CTG 79.5
CG FMFPAC
CINCPACFLT
WASHOE CTY
HENRY CTY
ROBISON
PICKAWAY
MERRICK
ALAMO
PRINCETON
COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE

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TASK ORGANIZATION

TG 76.5 AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP

CTG 76.5

TU 76.5.0 SPECIAL OPS & COMMAND UNIT

CTG 76.5

TE 76.5.0.1 FLAGSHIP ELEMENT

CO PRINCETON

TE 76.5.0.2 AIR CONTROL ELEMENT

OIC TACRON II DET

TE 76.5.0.3 RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE ELEMENT

CO WEISS

TE 76.5.0.4 SPECIAL SUPPORT ELEMENT

OIC BJU DET

TE 76.5.0.5 SALVAGE UNIT

CO RECLAIMER

TU 76.5.1 NGFS AND SCREEN UNIT

CO ROBISON

ROBISON

TU 76.5.2 AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT UNIT ALFA

CTG 76.5

PRINCETON, ALAMO, PICKAWAY, MERRICK, ELDORADO

TE 76.5.2.1 BEACHMASTER ELEMENT

OIC BMU DET

TE 76.5.2.2 CONTROL ELEMENT

CO ALAMO

TE 76.5.2.3 TRANSPORT ELEMENT

CO ALAMO

ALAMO, PICKAWAY, MERRICK, ELDORADO

TE 76.5.2.4 HELICOPTER TRANSPORT ELEMENT

CO PRINCETON

TE 76.5.2.5 PATROL ELEMENT

(AS ASSIGNED)

TU 76.5.3 AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT UNIT BRAVO

COMLANSHIPRON ONE

TE 76.5.3.1 LST/CONTROL ELEMENT

CO HENRY CTY

TE 76.5.3.2 PATROL ELEMENT

(AS ASSIGNED)

TE 76.5.3.3 MINESWEEP ELEMENT

(AS ASSIGNED)

TU 76.5.4 AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT UNIT CHARLIE

CO WASHOE CTY

TE 76.5.4.1 LST/CONTROL ELEMENT

CO WASHOE CTY

TE 76.5.4.2 PATROL ELEMENT

(AS ASSIGNED)

TE 76.5.4.3 MINESWEEP ELEMENT

(AS ASSIGNED)

TG 79.5 SPECIAL LANDING FORCE

CTG 79.5

BIT 1/5

HMM 362

VMC 2 DET (2 UH-1E)

HMM 164 DET (2 CH-46)

NORTHERN VNMC GROUP

5TH RVNMC BATTALION

SOUTHERN VNMC GROUP

1TH RVNMC BATTALION

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SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT AND RIVER OPERATIONS

1. The surface ship to shore movement in JACKSTAY consisted of four combat assault landings all of which were made under somewhat less than the classical amphibious assault concept.

a. D-Day, 26 March, landing of one provisional Rifle Company on Red Beach at West end of LONG THANH peninsula. Boat Lane 16,800 yards long. Directed by ALAMO as PCS using 3 LCM6 as Wave 1 and 1 LCU as Wave 2. The LCU could not land because of tidal conditions and awaited next high tide.

b. 29 March, landing of 2 companies of Marines on East Bank of SOIRAP just below VAM SAT entrance. 5 LCM6 used for landing directed by CTG 76.5.3 as PCO in HENRY CTY. Landings made through heavy underbrush and trees. Landing area booby-trapped by VC.

c. 31 March, 4 LCM6 and Salvage boat protected by 5 VNN M/S and RAG boats landed 2 companies of Marines about 7 miles down VAM SAT RIVER at entrance to RACH BAGOING. LCM6 had to push through underbrush while under enemy fire from opposite bank to land troops.

d. 5 April, 2 LCVP, 7 LCM6 and 2 Salvage boats landed 3 companies of Marines about 5½ miles up the RACH IA.

e. Combat withdrawals of troops from the VAM SAT were made on 31 March (2 companies) and 4 April (3 companies).

2. Major helo assaults by Marine troops and helos were conducted as follows:

a. On 26 March, 3 companies and H & S Co. into LZ ROBIN, and 1 company into LZ SPARROW on the LONG THANH peninsula.

b. On 28 March, D Company into LZ BLACKBIRD about 3 miles north of LONG THANH landings.

c. On 28 March, elements of provisional company and HOWTAR battery into LZ BLUEJAY on East bank of SOIRAP.

d. On 29 March, B and D and the H & S Co. into LZ CROW.

3. River Operations:

a. All operations up the rivers were based from the LST's HENRY CTY and WASHOE COUNTY. These ships served as mother ships for the boat groups, provided NGF protection to the boats and troops ashore, and supplied troops with water and pre-loaded rations and ammunition. Because of their shallow draft, good communications, and capability to land helos for liaison flights, they were ideal ships for supporting river operations far from the main body of the Task Group. As an added bonus, 3 Marine ONTOS from HENRY CTY and 2 from WASHOE

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CTY main decks added a potent gunfire capability which was used extensively. WASHOE CTY had one VC confirmed killed and one mortar destroyed. LST gunfire support was used in preparation fires prior to all river transits by boat convoys. Up to 15 boats were based up river on the LST's. In addition LST's provided support to CTF 115 M/S, Patrol boats and VNN RAG Boats. The deep penetrations of the RUNG SAT could not have been made without their use.

b. The ARG is by composition deficient in LCM6 which are needed for combat assault operations. USS MERRICK was assigned to CTG 76.5 for JACKSTAY for the sole purpose of providing LCM6 support.

c. All boats used for River operations were equipped with at least 2 M/G (either 30 or 50 cal.). Sandbags were used as protection for the gunners. 10 commercial radio transceivers were purchased by CTG 76.5 to provide the convoys with a much needed secondary radio control medium. Also each river boat was equipped with a powerful spot light for use in night operations. These lights were not required but they should be available. All boat crews were provided with weapons, helmets, Flak vests, and field uniforms.

d. The convoy commander was in direct radio contact with armed helos overhead to facilitate protection of the convoy. A CTG 76.5 observer/advisor rode in the armed helicopters protecting the convoy.

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SUPPORTING ARMS

1. General. Task Group 77.6 and CTF 115 provided air support in the form of close air support aircraft and armed helicopters. USS ROBISON (DDG-12) was assigned for Naval Gunfire Support. USS WASHOE COUNTY (LST-1165) and USS HENRY COUNTY (LST-824) furnished additional NGFS. Landings Force helicopters augmented by USAF L-19 FAC functioned in the role of TAO and TAC(A). The Naval gunfire section of SACC was manned by USS PRINCETON and TG 76.5 Staff personnel. No FSOC Liaison Officer was assigned. Naval gunfire coordination was passed ashore late in the afternoon of D-Day upon the establishment of FSOC ashore. It was passed back afloat early in the morning on 4 April prior to the landing of the 4th Vietnamese Marine Battalion. Control and coordination of air was retained afloat throughout the operation.

2. Problems encountered. As long as all coordination was afloat no great difficulties were encountered. When the coordination of Naval gunfire was passed ashore and the artillery was established ashore, it was difficult to obtain information on artillery fire. Another difficulty encountered was in the field of communications. Due to shore radio battery life and to the distances involved between the FSOC and the Flagship, power output was sometimes insufficient for good communications.

3. Naval Gunfire Support. ROBISON was assigned for Naval gunfire support; additionally USS WASHOE COUNTY (LST-1165) and USS HENRY COUNTY (LST-824), using their own armament and deck-mounted ONTOS, fired several Naval gunfire support missions each. A VNN LSIL furnished additional NGFS for the landing of the 4th Vietnamese Marine Battalion 4 April on the LONG THANH Peninsula.

a. USS ROBISON (DDG-12). ROBISON fired a total of 242 NGFS missions expending 1285 rounds of 5"/54 AAC, 309 rounds of 5"/54 VT, 47 rounds of 5"/54 ILLUM and 2 rounds of 5"/54 WP. The majority of missions fired were night H & I fires in support of BLT 1/5. Additionally missions were fired in support of VNMC and TF 115 operations. All call fire missions were reported as being highly effective.

(1) The most interesting feature of ROBISON's fire in support of TF 115 was the method of spotting. All fire of this nature came as a result of patrol craft being fired upon. The boats fired upon were all located in the DONG TRANH RIVER. The boats called for fire and spotted through CTF 115 Representative in USS BELLE GROVE who relayed the information to CTF 115 Representative in USS PRINCETON who passed the information to SACC in PRINCETON. Spots were transmitted in compass directions (e.g., West 500 South 200) and were passed to ROBISON in standard terminology. This method, although certainly not highly refined or very new, proved effective.

(2) A problem encountered with ROBISON was her limited magazine capacity. To help alleviate the logistics problems which could have ensued from

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this, a mixture of VT and AAC ammunition was used on H & I missions, with AAC being used on high explosive call fire missions.

(3) Of 47 rounds of illumination fired an estimated 21 were duds, indicating an inherent problem in the 5"/54 illumination projectile.

b. USS WASHOE COUNTY (LST-1165). WASHOE COUNTY fired a total of 5 NGFS missions expending 977 rounds of 3"/50 caliber ammunition (mixed HC and VT) and 155 rounds of 106MM recoilless rifle ammunition. 2 missions were fired as neutralization fires, 2 missions as H & I fires in support of BLT 1/5 and one mission as counterbattery fire when WASHOE COUNTY was subjected to mortar and small arms attack. Subsequent aerial recon confirmed one VC killed and one mortar destroyed. Only problem encountered was miscellaneous damage to windshields, light bulbs, etc., due to the force of the ONTOS.

c. USS HENRY COUNTY (LST-824). HENRY COUNTY fired 3 NGFS missions expending 3899 rounds of 40MM and 200 rounds of 106MM recoilless rifle ammunition. All missions were fired as neutralization fire. No difficulties were encountered other than miscellaneous light bulbs, windshields, etc., broken due to firing of ONTOS.

d. Naval gunfire support in general was highly effective.

4. Air Support

a. Air Operations

(1) General. Air operations commenced at 0500H on 26 March 1966 and ceased at 1430H on 6 April 1966.

(2) Control of air remained afloat throughout the entire operation. The first CAS aircraft reported on station at 0600H. Air support from the USS HANCOCK and the USS KITTY HAWK was considered excellent and the amphibious force was never without CAS during daylight hours or CAS on call during the night, when the tactical situation dictated.

(3) Armed HULEs, both Marine and U. S. Army, were used for escort of helos and boats. They proved invaluable for boat escort in that they were able to suppress small arms fire from the banks of the rivers in very close proximity to the boats. Armed HULEs are considered an absolute necessity for operations in the RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE (RSSZ), and in river operations elsewhere.

(4) The use of Air Force L-19's for FAC(A) also proved to be an invaluable asset due to their first-hand knowledge of the RSSZ. Absence of in-country FAC(A) or TAC(A) on station during the hours of daylight in the RSSZ or in other areas similar in topography would be a severe handicap and would degrade the fast reaction close air support capability.

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(5) U. S. Army Mohawk aircraft flew numerous nightly SIAR/IR missions from 26 March until 4 April. The intelligence gathered from these flights was extremely helpful towards more efficient utilization of all supporting arms.

(6) Communications in the TACC for the overall operations were considered very marginal at best. There were times of good communications and when communications were completely unsatisfactory. TACC attributes the communications problems primarily to insufficient/antiquated equipment. It appears an LPH is not geared to support a staff and an amphibious operation of this magnitude and duration.

(7) Coordination and cooperation within the SACC between TACC and SAC were outstanding. Some problems in coordination arose when the FSCC was established shore due to a lack of artillery firing information being passed to the SACC afloat by the TACP ashore.

b. Statistics

Number of CAS missions	149
Number of CAS aircraft used	410
Tons of bombs dropped	505
Number of rockets fired	4831
Number of Napalm dropped	131
Number of Air Force (FAC(A) missions	44
Number of Search/Destroy and escort missions, flown by Marine and Army UH1Es	22
Number of SIAR/IR recon flights	20
Number of Tactical Air Requests received	25
Number of Tactical Air Requests flown	25
Helicopter supply sorties	1034
Helicopter transport sorties	1706
Helicopter evacuation sorties	116
Helicopter administrative sorties	67
Tons of equipment and supplies put ashore, by helicopter	60
Troops put ashore by helicopter	1183
Troops moved point to point ashore	4956 (3063 U. S./1217 ARVN) 676 Back- load to LPH
Tons of equipment moved point to point ashore	179

c. Comments. Air operations were very smooth. There were moments of frustration due to communications electronic breakdowns and unfamiliarity with call signs and frequencies. The latter was overcome only after a degree of compromise was accepted, as to giving frequencies in the clear. Giving frequencies in the clear is an accepted method by all in-country forces.

d. Recommendations

(1) Exploit to the fullest all in-country forces in this type of operation.

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(2) Much more liaison with forces involved especially at the working level, prior to start of operations, to iron out coordinating and control procedures. Due to the short planning period, the fact that some forces assigned did not rendezvous until D-1, and the initial distances between TG 76.5 and in-country forces, sufficient pre-operation liaison was not achieved.

(3) The SLF acquire and maintain a TAC(A)/TAO/ESCORT capability on board the LPH.

e. Number of refuels made on board PRINCETON of attached aircraft were:

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Refuels</u>
HMM 362	657
HMM 164	47
VMO 2	83
LPH 5	<u>47</u>
	844

f. Gallons of AV GAS Dispensed: 51,287

g. Gallons of JP-5 Dispensed: 16,174

h. Gallons of AV LUBE Dispensed: 1,080

i. No in country aircraft were serviced.

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COMMUNICATIONS

1. Communication support for Operation JACKSTAY was highly effective and reliable. A large volume of high precedence traffic was handled in such a manner as to ensure positive control of all phases of the operation. A vital factor in the effectiveness of the support was the use of the USS ELDORADO as communications relay station.

2. The ELDORADO provided the following services to the task group:

- a. Assumed distress guards.
- b. Activated a task group broadcast which became the primary means for the ships to receive traffic from CATF.
- c. Activated a task group Orestes circuit for ship/shore relay and ship/ship communications. This circuit was utilized by CATF to send and receive flash and immediate traffic to and from the ships.
- d. Activated LPH/AGC ROMULUS full duplex RATT termination for ship/shore relay and inputs to the task group broadcast.
- e. Provided ROMULUS full duplex RATT channel with COMUSMACV.
- f. Assumed HI-COMM guard and ship/shore termination for PRINCETON.
- g. Assumed GROT guard for all ships and GRIT guard for those ships requesting it.
- h. Provided backup guard on GTF 115 Orestes circuit for PRINCETON.
- i. Provided backup guard on air support and gunfire frequencies.

3. The addition of the ELDORADO to the task group allowed the PRINCETON to make necessary equipment available for air, NGF and landing force use as well as providing back up equipment for emergencies. Without an AGC in the task group, the PRINCETON SSB equipment would have been saturated with no additional units available in case of equipment failure. It is recommended that a minimum of two SSB equipments be added to the PRINCETON allowance.

4. Boat communications were excellent throughout the operation. Due to the lack of portable equipment available for use in the boats, small transceivers were purchased for inter-boat use. Considering the type of operations the boats would be involved in, it was decided that each boat should have a radio with which to communicate with the command boat. The transceivers were mainly used in the river assault convoys. Their use proved to be highly beneficial to the success of the river assault operations, enabling the convoy commander to maintain positive control of all his boats. It is recommended that such radios be provided for all similar type operations.

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LOGISTICS

1. Due to the nature of the operations, it was necessary to provide the task group with supplies not normally carried. This consisted of augmenting the ships' small arms allowance with additional automatic weapons and providing the ships with sand bags, utility uniforms, flak suits, and additional small arms ammunition.

2. Logistic support to the LST's moored upstream in the SOIRAP RIVER was accomplished in the following manner:

a. Fuel. Not Required

b. Water. Due to the silting nature of the SOIRAP evaporators were operated only as required. The LCU was used to deliver 9000 gallons of water daily from ships in the assault anchorages to the LST's enabling them to provide the Marines ashore with fresh water and to supply minimum ships' needs.

c. Supplies and Rations. Stores for the LST's far upstream were picked up from replenishment ships and transferred upstream on available assault craft.

3. The LST's were preloaded with three days supplies of rations, ammunition, and radio batteries. These were used to resupply the landing force units shore.

4. The following logistic support was provided from TG 73.5 resources: AO 24 and 29 March, 2 and 5 April; AF 31 March and 3 April; AKS 4 April; AE 28 March and 2 April. The limiting criteria in scheduling the AO's was the AVGAS usage rate of the LPH. ROBISON and WEISS were topped off from task group resources.

5. It was found that PHIBREPS are slower than UNREPS. However in an amphibious operation it often becomes necessary to make use of PHIBREPS. Ships in general are not free to leave the AOA for the long period necessitated by UNREPS.

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MEDICAL

1. Discussion

a. JACKSTAY produced 209 MEDEVACS. There were 5 KIA, 31 WIA and 178 non-combat injuries and illnesses, and 2 MIA, for a total casualty figure of 216.

b. On the day of initial assault 40 marines were evacuated because of heat exhaustion. This had been anticipated. All were returned to action within a few hours. For the entire operation there were 55 cases of heat exhaustion.

c. There were 60 marines evacuated because of foot problems, caused by feet being constantly wet. Although many of these were labeled Immersion Foot, all cleared promptly with cleaning and drying and most returned to duty within 48 hours.

d. The rapidity of helicopter evacuation was directly responsible for the saving of the lives of four casualties.

e. There were 18 casualties evacuated from PRINCETON either to the 36th Field Evacuation Hospital, VUNG TAU or directly to SAIGON. The VUNG TAU hospital had just been erected and was able to provide nursing care only.

f. The physical arrangement of medical spaces in PRINCETON met the needs very well. It was necessary to augment the ship's medical department with a surgical team hastily assembled from the staff of USS REPOSE, and with doctors and corpsmen from the embarked BLT. The embarked Surgical Stock belonging to the Surgical Team at Yokosuka was opened and used. The ship's organic medical supplies and equipment along would have been inadequate for this or similar operations.

g. Sixty (60) units of whole blood were drawn from the ship's crew. Blood which was originally procured for REPOSE was diverted to PRINCETON near DANANG. There were 42 units of blood cross-matched and 26 transfusions were performed.

h. Ten (10) major surgical operations were performed.

i. Statistics

(1) Number of Medical Evacuees: 209

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- (2) Wounded in Action: 31
 - (a) Gunshot wounds: 8
 - (b) Shrapnel wounds: 23
- (3) Killed in Action: 5
 - (a) By gunshot: 2
 - (b) By shrapnel: 3
- (4) Missing in Action: 2
- (5) Non Combatant Injuries: 178
 - (a) Heat prostration: 55
 - (b) Foot problems: 60
 - 1. Immersion foot: 35
 - 2. Cellulitis: 25
 - (c) Gastroenteritis: 16
 - (d) Lacerations: 13
 - (e) Muscle sprain/strain: 16
 - (f) Skin - bug bites: 5
 - (g) Foreign body in eye: 3
 - (h) Ear infection: 3
 - (i) Venereal disease: 2
 - (j) Dental problems: 2
 - (k) Fractured fingers: 1
 - (l) Rope burns: 1
 - (m) Concussion: 1

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2. Lessons Learned. Certain facts emerge from the experience gained in JACKSTAY and from prior operations involving both PRINCETON and VALLEY FORGE. Observations made on REPOSE reinforce these facts.

a. ARQ/SLF amphibious assaults generate enough casualties to warrant the presence on board the LPH of a Surgical Team and a Surgical Block.

b. The ship's medical officer must procure certain items of medical supply far in excess of his usual stock as established in his I.O.L.

c. Minimum space requirements for casualty management are:

(1) Large, open, lighted space for initial reception, sorting, registering, stripping casualties. Only most urgent resuscitation starts here.

(2) Large, open, well-lighted room where resuscitation is given, wounds carefully examined, records opened, casualties washed and prepared for surgery, and minor wounds debrided and dressed. In this room are suction, oxygen, I.V. fluids, dressings, antibiotics, tetanus toxoid, and tracheotomy, cut-down, catheterization, chest tube, and minor debridement sterile sets and kits. Marine field-type portable lights, suction, collapsible I.V. poles and sawhorses for litters work well here.

(3) Two operating rooms with anesthesia machines. These permit two teams to work simultaneously. Non-explosive gasses, as Penthrane and Halothane, are recommended.

(4) X-ray facilities, both fixed and portable.

(5) Laboratory facilities for cross-matching, blood counts, and urinalysis.

(6) A ward for the more seriously wounded and ill. A berthing compartment for the less seriously hurt and ill.

d. It is most important that the medical officer concerned be fully informed during all stages of planning for an operation. When Surgical Teams are to be used they must be brought aboard sufficiently in advance of the operation to get equipment and supplies prepared and to rehearse the mechanisms of casualty management. Without sufficient advance information from those planning military operations, a medical department can find itself badly under-equipped and under-supplied.

e. The chain of medical evacuation must be firmly established prior to an operation. The LPH cannot hold casualties aboard long, but must clear beds to make room for more casualties.

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f. Blood must be procured in advance of the assault, either from the crew or from outlets of the 406th Laboratory (SAIGON, NHA TRANG, or C Medical Company at DANANG).

g. If, during hostile action directed against the LPH, or because of an operational accident the sick bay spaces were destroyed, the ability to give adequate care to seriously injured casualties would be lost. The ship's battle dressing stations are only what their name implies.

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PSY WAR/CIVIC ACTION ACTIVITY1. Aerial Broadcasts: Total 1.

Broadcast over entire Rung Sat Special Zone simultaneous with initial landings 26 March 1966. Broadcast warned people in small boats to get out into middle of designated streams so they could be checked and not strafed or bombed. Tape was prepared planeside by VNN personnel. Mission flown by 5th Air Commando Squadron, Psy War Detachment.

2. Broadcasts Ashore: Total 5.

Broadcast vicinity of CAN GIO. Broadcast told people to return to CAN GIO, to stay near their homes during daytime and in their homes at night. Broadcasts made 26 March 1966.

3. Broadcasts from patrol craft: Total 5.

Broadcasts made from patrol craft (WPB and PCF) on river stations on 28, 29 and 30 March and 4 and 5 April. The broadcasts on evenings of 28 and 29 March and 4 April were harassment broadcasts all night long using a noise maker (curdler). The broadcasts on the mornings of 30 March and 5 April were of about one hour duration, warning innocent people that battle was still going on, not to fish, cut wood, or farm in the area, and to clear the area immediately. Tapes were also prepared for Patrol Craft on river stations to be used to hail small boats alongside and to explain the operation and the requirements necessitating their being stopped.

4. Leaflet Drops: Total 14. 120,000 Leaflets, 120,000 Safe Conduct Passes.

All leaflet drops were made from helos attached to USS PRINCETON. The initial drop on 26 March was simultaneous with the landings and was over the area of the landings. The leaflets informed the people who the military personnel were; what the citizens must do to avoid being harmed, asked the citizens to cooperate and point out VC, cadres, caches, booby traps, mines, etc.; and told VC who wished to surrender what they had to do and where. All leaflets for this operation were prepared in SAIGON before operation and produced by USS PRINCETON Print Shop. All safe conduct passes were brought from SAIGON and are the only officially recognized document.

5. Civic Action Projects:

a. Navy and Marine Medical/Dental/Civic Action teams made up of personnel from SLF and from Task Force ships went ashore at CAN GIO (29 March), LY NHON (30 March), QUAN XUYEN (31 March) and DONG HOA (5 April) to administer Medical/Dental assistance and distribute gifts of food, toys,

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soap, vitamins, etc. Pictures were taken, with polaroid cameras, of family groups and given to the families as mementos. Approximately 1600 persons were treated medically and approximately 1050 teeth were extracted. VN village medical personnel received training and were given medical and dental instruments and supplies.

b. BLT 1/5 personnel distributed gifts of food, toys, soap, etc. to the villagers with whom they came in contact. BLT personnel at QUAN XUYEN gave many of their ammo boxes to the villagers for home repairs.

c. VNN LSM 402 with VNN Psy War/Medical personnel embarked arrived at TANH THOM HIEP on 2 April to work with people of that area, treating the sick and distributing gifts of food and clothing and printed matter of various types.

d. Psy War/Beach Jumper personnel working with broadcasts on patrol craft conducted people-to-people civic action work by distributing gifts and by rendering minor medical assistance when needed to junks stopped for questioning.

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS

1. Public Affairs Organization. Command Information Bureaus were established afloat to coordinate military and civilian coverage of the operation and ashore to effect clearance and release of information in Saigon.
2. Embarkation of Media Representatives. Five civilian newsmen, representing NBC-TV, AP and Stars and Stripes were embarked in Flagship PRINCETON on D-3. Eighteen others, including ABC-TV, UPI, Reuters, Navy Times and numerous individual agencies, were embarked on days subsequent to D-Day. Newsmen covered surface and halo assaults, river landings, special ambush teams, shipboard activities and troop movements ashore. NBC-TV crew of three remained with task force for eight days, shooting 3200 feet of color motion picture film, including interview with Navy and Marine Commanders of the operation. Newsmen were briefed in advance on two occasions by operational briefing teams.
3. Embarkation of Military PAO Teams. The following were embarked for special projects: CHINFO SEASIA Color Still Team, "American Navy in Vietnam" Color Motion Picture Team, CINCPACFLT Mobile Radio Team and an AFRTS Reporter. In addition, a CINCPACFLT Mobile Photo Unit and a Marine ISO Team augmented the regular CIB afloat.
4. Release of Information. CIB afloat submitted daily advance and wrapup releases by message to CIB ashore. Feature material and audio interviews and spot news accounts also were submitted along with black and white and color still and black and white motion picture photography. COMUSMACV released the initial story on D-Day, waiving the previously effective ground rule of withholding information on operations until significant contact with the enemy is made. Daily halo flights to Saigon with press material ensured the timeliness of supplemental photographic and feature releases. FHTNC was an addressee on all messages containing cleared texts of released material.
5. Press Briefings in Saigon. On four occasions, Navy and Marine operational officers and commanders appeared in person to brief the press and answer questions at the daily 1700H JUSPAO briefings in Saigon.
6. Evaluation of PAO Coverage. Initial reports indicate that JACKSTAY was the major war story reported in the news media from D-Day to D+3. Banner headlines were featured in at least three key stateside newspapers, the Los Angeles Times, Washington Evening Star and Philadelphia Bulletin. A major portion of the Sunday, 27 March, NBC-TV Frank McGee show was devoted to the operation, and segments were repeated on 28 and 29 March on NBC's Huntley-Brinkley news program. Pacific Stars and Stripes and Saigon newspapers printed daily stories and photographs and Armed Forces Radio featured daily reports on the operation throughout its duration.

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7. The needs of the news media representatives for transportation were often in conflict with the requirements for both helos and boats generated by the tactical situation. In any operation where considerable press interest is foreseen, it would be highly desirable to provide the CIB with a helicopter specifically designated for press use.

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DISTILLING OPERATIONS IN RIVERS

1. Distilling operations in the RUNG SAT rivers appeared to pose no insurmountable problems to the ships involved - ROBISON, HENRY CTY, and WASHOE CTY. ROBISON was able to support her water needs quite adequately. The two LST's, which provided water to marines on the beach as well as to their own crews, were short on water, but this was not in both cases directly due to unique problems in distillation.
2. Generally, the ships reported the following:
 - a. No reduction in quality was noted.
 - b. Chlorination of potable water was increased and feed rate was slowed giving increased water temperature. If feasible, water was allowed to settle in the tanks for two or three days prior to use.
 - c. ROBISON reported kelp in suction strainer forcing shut down for an hour, and all ships observed silt deposits which could prove to be a problem in extended operation, as it did in WASHOE CTY's case.
 - d. No reduction in plant capacity was noted by ROBISON, and HENRY CTY reported a 10% increase over rated capacity. WASHOE CTY, on the other hand, started to make water in the SOLRAP, but considered the sediment level too high and shut down her plant except for emergencies. The water situation for both LST's was eased by the use of the attached LCU as a mobile water barge, pumping water to the ships from her own tanks on a daily water shuttle.
 - e. ROBISON distilled river water for eight days, HENRY CTY distilled water for eleven days as needed in addition to the water provided by the LCU. WASHOE CTY, however, shut down her plant on D+3 and distilled only when in extreme need of water.
 - f. ROBISON is equipped with DKG-2 class low pressure double effect, single shell flash type. HENRY CTY has "vapor compression" type plant; WASHOE CTY type not reported.

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LESSONS LEARNED
COMPHIBREDA GROUP

SUBJECT:

MAJOR: AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP

MINOR: STAFF CAPABILITY FOR EXTENDED OPERATIONS

DISCUSSION:

The ARG Staff consisted of 9 officers and 15 enlisted during this operation. The Staff had been tailored to conduct raid-type operations of the BATTEN DOWN type where the sustained peak effort was limited to 2 or 3 days, planning was fairly unilateral, and requirements for liaison, intelligence gathering, and coordination were generally small.

JACKSTAY, on the other hand, involved a major Staff operational effort of 12 days, involved extensive planning and coordination with in-country forces and additional ships, recon trips, and requirements for liaison officers at Saigon and Subic when the major portion of the Staff was at sea during the planning phases. In addition, JACKSTAY was not one continuous operation, but a series of evolutions each involving separate planning, coordination and execution. The CTG 76.5 Staff was severely taxed by the requirement placed upon it by JACKSTAY.

LESSON LEARNED:

For operations such as JACKSTAY provide augmentation from other PHIBFOR-SEVENTHFLT sources in order to insure that adequate experienced personnel are available on the CTG 76.5 Staff for a long pull.

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LESSONS LEARNED
COMPHIBREADYGROUP

SUBJECT:

MAJOR: AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP

MINOR: HELO REQUIREMENTS

DISCUSSION:

The HMM 362 helos embarked in PRINCETON were augmented for this operation with 2 Marine UH-1E for troop support and 2 Marine CH-46 for heavy lifts. This augmentation improved the capability of the ARG/SLF to provide all types of troop support on a limited basis.

LESSON LEARNED:

Provide 2 heavy lift helos and 4 UH-1E armed helos to the HMM embarked in ARG/SLF.

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LESSONS LEARNED

COMPHIBREADYGROUP

SUBJECT:

MAJOR: RIVER OPERATIONS

MINOR: COMPOSITION OF ARG

DISCUSSION:

To carry the array of LCM's, patrol, escort, and M/S boats which the ARG will have to include if it is to have a flexible capability to conduct river as well as other types of amphibious operations, the composition should be changed to an LPH, LPD, LSD mix. Not only does this provide more well deck space for additional boats but it also provides all three ships with the helo lift capability. This will enable a more flexible approach to operational planning and will eliminate the bugaboo of per H-Hour boat transfers which can, if the weather is bad, delay a planned landing.

LESSON LEARNED:

Assign LPD to ARG vice APA.

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LESSON LEARNED

COMPHIBREAGROUP

SUBJECT:

MAJOR: RIVER OPERATIONS

MINOR: REQUIREMENT FOR LST's

DISCUSSION:

(A) Hydrographic features forced the LPH to operate from proposed HLZs at distances varying from 12 to 27 miles. For this reason and also because of the lack of a sufficient number of suitable landing zones in the swampy terrain, landing by boats based on LSTs anchored up river became the primary means of penetrating the deeper regions of the RUNG SAT. In addition, the deep draft APA/LSD could not get close enough to the action to perform the normal functions of PCS/Boat Haven, etc.

(B) LSTs were the key to the success in penetrating the RUNG SAT. Their shallow draft enabled them to move up the SOIRAP RIVER and take station to support boat convoys, provide fire support and furnish provisions and water to the Marines. They served as a mobile, up-river base from which the boat convoys were able to penetrate the heart of the swamps. By placing Marine ONTOS on their decks, a significant increase in fire support capability was achieved. Lastly, their helo-landing capability made extensive liaison possible between the forces at sea and those up-river.

LESSONS LEARNED:

When ARG is committed to River/Swamp operation provide LST's to support up-river campaigns.

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LESSONS LEARNED

COMPHIBREADYGROUP

SUBJECT:

MAJOR: RIVER OPERATIONS

MINOR: BOAT REQUIREMENTS

DISCUSSION:

The VC cannot traverse swampy terrain on foot any better than can Marines. The key to the VC mobility in the RUNG SAT is the small sampan. Marines using assault boats can beat the VC at his own game and travel the RUNG SAT at will using the innumerable small streams for their boats. Further exploitation of the RUNG SAT can be done by conducting operations up the streams. All facilities discovered in JACKSTAY were invisible from the air or from adjacent thickets, but were all accessible by boat.

LESSON LEARNED:

Provide the ARG/SLF with assault boats so that the force will have an inherent capability to conduct swamp operations.

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LESSON LEARNED

COMPHIBREADYGROUP

SUBJECT:

MAJOR: RIVER OPERATIONS

MINOR: BOAT REQUIREMENTS

DISCUSSION:

The LCM6 was the major factor in TG 76.5 ability to conduct convoy operations on the small rivers deep in the RVUNG SAT. It is roomy, rugged and offers a degree of protection to the troops. While specialized river assault boats are needed to protect the boat group, the LCM6 is a fine nucleus for river troop lifts. All boats should have a built-in capability to sweep for command-detonated type river mines.

All boats used in river operations were provided with 2 machine guns either 50 or 30 caliber. Sand bags were used to provide a protective screen for the gunners. A splinter shield similar to that provided the coxswain would be a help.

LESSON LEARNED:

- (A) Outfit all ARG/amphibious craft with guns, and portable minesweeping gear capable of sweeping for command-detonated type mines.
- (B) Provide armored escort boats similar to the VNN monitors and/or FOMS to the ARG. These boats should also be capable of sweeping.
- (C) Provide a protected gunners station on all assault craft.
- (D) Increase the number of LCM's assigned to ARG by reducing number of LCVP and substituting LCM6.

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LESSONS LEARNED
COMPHIBREADYGROUPSUBJECT:MAJOR: RIVER OPERATIONS
MINOR: BOAT REQUIREMENTSDISCUSSION:

The forces assigned to TG 76.5 did not include the specialized boats necessary to conduct river operations. It was necessary to obtain through CTF 115 VNN minesweepers, VNN Monitors and VNN FOMs to protect convoys on the small rivers and USN in-country force MSBs for SOIRAP river sweeping, LCPL's for emplacement of surveillance/ambush teams, and WFB/Swift boats for patrolling rivers to prevent exfiltration/infiltration. While this arrangement worked very well, it can, because it depends on cooperation rather than military opcon, leave the CATF in a precarious position in that he cannot through his own resources assign the necessary support to accomplish his mission. The ARG needs river monitors, a minesweeping capability, and patrol boats if it is to be expected to conduct river operations.

LESSON LEARNED:

Provide the ARG/SLF with at least a minimum boat suit to conduct effective River/swamp operations.

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LESSONS LEARNED
COMPHIBREADYGROUPSUBJECT:

MAJOR: RIVER OPERATIONS

MINOR: AMBUSH/SURVEILLANCE TEAMS

DISCUSSION:

The opportunities for use of Seal/Recon/UDT personnel for establishing ambushes and surveillance sites are manifold in an area such as the RUNG SAT. All staffs planning for River operations should have a NAVSORG advisor attached who can recommend the best employment of such fordes. Also the mission of the UDT should be reconsidered to ascertain if training in such operations needs to be added to their curriculum.

LESSON LEARNED:

- (A) Include surveillance/ambush operations in plans for future river/swamp operations.
- (B) Provide ARG staff with NAVSORG advisor for special operations.
- (C) Insure UDT are trained and tasked to conduct surveillance operations.

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LESSONS LEARNED

COMPHIBREADYGROUP

SUBJECT:

MAJOR: RIVER OPERATIONS

MINOR: ASSAULT-CRAFT MINESWEEPING

DISCUSSION:

All boats for use in river operations should have the capability to sweep for command-detonated type mines. The winches should be simple and quickly installed and the gear easy to stream. The mines encountered thus far are unsophisticated and the gear provided should be the same.

LESSON LEARNED:

Provide amphibious craft with simple M/S gear to counter river command-detonated type mines.

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LESSONS LEARNED

COMPHIBREADYGROUP

SUBJECT:

MAJOR: RIVER OPERATIONS

MINOR: TRAINING

DISCUSSION:

Training in friendly territory for river/swamp operations is necessary in order that boat crews and troops can become familiar with the difficulties of moving in such an environment before they have to do it in a combat situation.

LESSON LEARNED:

Provide an area containing dense cover and swampy terrain to train Navy and Marine personnel who are expected to have to fight in River/swamp campaigns.

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LESSONS LEARNED

COMPHIBREASYGROUP

SUBJECT:

MAJOR: RIVER OPERATIONS.

MINOR: BOAT CREW TRAINING

DISCUSSION:

The landing beaches (if such they can be called) used in the RUNG SAT operations were not of the type pictured in classic pictures of amphibious operations. The sturdy LCM's pushed their bow ramps into the swamp thickets and were almost hidden from view while landing troops. Such conditions will be common in most swampy regions.

LESSON LEARNED:

Provide Navy boat crews with practical experience in river/swamp operations in their basic training.

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LESSONS LEARNED

COMPHIBREADYGROUP

SUBJECT:

MAJOR: RIVER OPERATIONS

MINOR: EMBARKED ADVISORS

DISCUSSION:

CTF 115 minesweepers, patrol boats, patrol aircraft, VNN craft and junk forces were all present in the rivers bordering and crossing the RUNG SAT. In order to coordinate these forces which were not under the control of CATF, CTF 115 provided representatives aboard PRINCETON to ensure that these in-country units and TG 76.5 units did not mutually interfere with one another. Some such system of coordination will be highly necessary in any future RUNG SAT or DELTA operations.

LESSON LEARNED:

Insure that ARG/SLF embarks competent senior advisors to coordinate with in-country forces when Delta/River operations are scheduled.

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LESSONS LEARNED

COMPHIBREADYGROUP

SUBJECT:

MAJOR: NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT

MINOR: COMMUNICATIONS

DISCUSSION:

Difficulty was encountered during Operation JACKSTAY and in previous operations obtaining information concerning artillery fire missions. This information is vital to the Tactical Air Control Center and the Helicopter Direction Center to protect friendly aircraft from artillery fire and to provide for maximum use of supporting arms with a minimum of restrictive fire plans. There are several solutions to the problem:

a. The most obvious solution is for SACC to monitor the Artillery Conduct of Fire Net. However, in an LPH, with currently installed equipment, sufficient FM frequencies are not available for this use.

b. Methods used in the past have been to pass the artillery information to SACC over either the Naval Gunfire Control Net or the Tactical Air Request Net. Both of these methods have not proved entirely satisfactory. This clogs these nets unnecessarily and as far as the troops in the field are concerned, seriously reduces radio power supply life.

LESSON LEARNED:

Sufficient FM equipment must be installed in LPH's to permit monitoring of the Conduct of Fire Net, as well as other FM nets which ground forces are using more and more frequently.

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SUBJECT:

LESSONS LEARNED

COMPHIBREADYGROUP

MAJOR: COMMAND

MINOR: COMMUNICATIONS

A. DISCUSSION

a. The LPH has insufficient installed communications equipment to support the command organization required for a major sustained operation. Excellent support provided by the AGC included all long haul ship-to-shore communications, net control functions on the Inter Task Force ORESTES net and provision of an Inter Task Force JASON Broadcast. In spite of this support the LPH was forced to augment her installed equipment by temporarily installing AN/ARC 27's and Marine Field UHF Transmitters.

b. PRINCETON operates with 42 men assigned and was required to operate roughly the equivalent number of circuits as a CVS/CVA with 75 to 90 men assigned to the OCR Division. By maintaining a minimum of port and star-board watches and supplementing the division with 2 Radiomen petty officers from the AGC, handling of traffic and response to voice communications was adequate. However, cleaning, equipment maintenance and the administrative process of communications including traffic checking and filing were usually forced to be suspended.

2. ACTION:

a. That the LPH allowance of Radiomen be increased by at least one (1) RM1, three (3) RM2 and six (6) RM3/RMSN.

b. That the following additional equipment be permanently installed:

(1) Five (5) additional UHF transceivers. It is strongly recommended that these be URC 46's with SORENSON NO BATRON DCR 40-10A, 28 volt DC power supplies. (These were used aboard by the CTF 115 representatives with outstanding success).

(2) Five (5) AN/ARC 27's together with power supplies should be permanently installed in SACC for TACRON use and one (1) installed in PRI-FLY.

(3) Replace TBM/TCS with at least four (4) URC 32 or WRT 2's.

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