

DECLASSIFIED

TG 79.5 (CARG Bravo) Operation Reports

Operation BEACON TORCH Post Operation Report. 23 Oct 1967. [NOT S&C controlled]
(period 12 Jun - 2 Jul 1967)

Operation DARING ENDEAVOR Post Operation Report. 3 Apr 1969. [NOT S&C controlled]
(period 7 - 17 Nov 1968)

SWIFT MOVE Post Operation Report. 31 Dec 1968. [S&C 907 678]
(period 20 Nov - 6 Dec 1968)

Operation DEFIANT MEASURE Post Operation Report. 20 Feb 1969. [908 408]
(period 7 - 16 Feb 1969)

Operation DEFIANT MEASURE II Post Operation Report. 3 May 1969. [911 408]
(period 8 Mar - 18 Apr 1969)

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DOD DIR 5200.10

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Reg # 13708

**UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET**

FF/7/FNM:ts

3121

Ser: NG- 2414

23 OCT 1967

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From: Commander SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Operation BEACON TORCH Post Operation Report; approval of

Ref: (a) Commander Amphibious Ready Group BRAVO, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet (CTG 76.5) Conf ltr CARG "B"/N33:j1 3500 ser 033 of 21 August 1967
(b) Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet Conf ltr N31:RRW:mn 3120 ser 089 of 15 September 1967

1. References (a) and (b) have been reviewed and are approved for distribution as recommended reference (a) plus additions and corrections contained reference (b) subject to the following changes:

a. Page 1, paragraph 1 - delete "which ended the amphibious phase of the operation". Reason - introduction of the term "amphibious phase" is unnecessary and inappropriate. Term is foreign to jointly accepted amphibious doctrine. Continued use could erode long standing concepts and phraseology of NWP 22(B).

b. Page 3, paragraph 5 delete "amphibious phase".

c. Page 5 paragraph 7e, include friendly casualties in summary of operations in accordance with Article 123, NWIP 10-1(B).

d. Page 6, Recommended Distribution - Change "CO ACRON ONE" to read "COMACRON ONE".

e. Enclosure (2), Page 3, second item - delete first sentence entirely and add "at 210600H" to end of second sentence.

2. Appropriate Lessons Learned will be forwarded to Commander FIRST Fleet.

Alpine W. McLane
ALPINE W. McLANE
Asst Chief of Staff
for Plans

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COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
UNITED STATES SEVENTH FLEET
FPO, SAN FRANCISCO 96601

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N31:RRW:mm

3120

Ser 089

15 SEP 1967

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From: Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Operation BEACON TORCH Post Operation Report; forwarding of (U)

Encl: (1) Commander Amphibious Ready Group BRAVO, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet
(CTG 76.5) ltr ser 033 dtd 21 August 1967

1. (U) Subject report is forwarded.
2. (C) Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet concurs with the contents of enclosure (1), subject to the following:

a. Distribution:

- (1) It is noted that COMUSMACV is an addressee.
- (2) Add: COMLANSHIPRON THREE.
- (3) Change "COMNAVBEACHMASTER ONE" to "COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE".

b. Enclosure (5), paragraph 6. The radio frequency spectrum is crowded throughout Vietnam and certain portions such as 9-12 mcs (HF), 30-75 mcs (VHF), and USN crystallized frequencies in the UHF band are saturated. CTF 76 provided all available frequencies to the ARG/SIF and this allocation is adjusted by the supported in-country commander (some frequencies are deleted, others are added). When additional valid requirements are generated, CTF 76 should be informed using format of JANAP 195, so that representation can be made to COMNAVFORV for additional frequencies.

c. Enclosure (7)

(1) Paragraph 4.d.(2). Do not concur. Liaison personnel should normally be exchanged during operations. Perhaps the continuous liaison between the ARG and the FSCC and DASC throughout the summer has resulted in a close relationship and awareness of each others requirements, but this may not be the case in every operation. Liaison personnel should always be available to assist the DASC/SACC in making decisions regarding supporting arms. The modus operandi and area of operation may necessarily change.

(2) Paragraph 4.d.(3). Location and altitude of helo lanes and effective times should be promulgated to all concerned. Effective coordination between all controlling units must be maintained at all times.

GROUP-4
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d. Enclosure (8). Concur in the comments and recommendations. The ultimate solution to the LST fueling problem is conversion to JP-5, which is carried by fleet AO's. CINCPACFLTINST 9550.6A states that diesel and JP-5 fuel may be intermixed and discusses the properties of JP-5.

e. Enclosure (12), Page 3, paragraph (3).b. It has been common practice to embark UDT in either the first wave of LVT's or the BCC's boat (disembarking the UDT behind the wave) on waterborne assault landings. Either practice is acceptable.

F. W. Vannoy
F. W. VANNOY

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COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP BRAVO
U. S. SEVENTH FLEET
(CTG 76.5)

CARG"B"/N33:j1

3500

Ser 033

21 AUG 1967

From: Commander Amphibious Ready Group BRAVO, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet (CTG 76.5)
To: Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Operation BEACON TORCH Post Operation Report; forwarding of (U)

Ref: (a) COMSEVENTHFLEET 090814Z JUN 67
(b) CTG 76.5 201145Z JUN 67
(c) CG, 111 MAF 210146Z JUN 67
(d) CG, FIRST MARDIV 231559Z JUN 67
(e) CG, FIRST MARDIV 240929Z JUN 67
(f) CG, FIRST MARDIV 300953Z JUN 67
(g) CG, FIRST MARDIV 301215Z JUN 67
(h) CG, FIRST MARDIV 011545Z JUL 67
(i) NWP 22A
(j) COMSEVENTHFLEET 020536Z JUL 67
(k) CTG 76.5 121515Z and 130054Z JUN 67
(l) CINCPACFLT-COMUSMACV Agreement for U. S. Naval Support Operations conducted in RVN dated 3 March 1967

Encl: (1) Task Organization
(2) Chronology
(3) Ship-to-Shore
(4) Intelligence
(5) Communications
(6) Communications Security Analysis
(7) Supporting Arms
(8) Logistics
(9) Medical
(10) Psychological Warfare
(11) Public Affairs
(12) Lessons Learned

S & C FILES
HEADQUARTERS
1ST MAF DIVISION, IMA
67 4762
Coy. 1st / Coy.

1. Command Relationships. During the period 18 June 1967 through 2 July 1967, Commander Amphibious Ready Group BRAVO/Commander Amphibious Squadron NINE (CTG 76.5) was Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) for BEACON TORCH in accordance with reference (a), the initiating directive. On 21 June the SLF chopped to CG, 111 MAF and CG, FIRST MARDIV simultaneously (references (b) and (c) refer) which ended the amphibious phase of the operation. The ARG (TG 76.5) continued to provide support to the in-country commander during the support phase of the operation. At 250600H July, CG, FIRST MARDIV utilizing the SLF and elements of FIRST MARDIV Reinforced commenced CALHOUN in conjunction with BEACON TORCH (references (d) and (e)). CG, FIRST MARDIV terminated CALHOUN at 011200H July and transferred OPCON SLF directly to CTG 76.5 at 012400H July (references (f) through (h) refer). Withdrawal phase commenced at 020930H in accordance with reference (i) and BEACON TORCH was terminated at 021300H July (reference (j)).

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2. Mission. The Amphibious Task Force was charged with the responsibility in accordance with reference (a) to conduct a search and destroy operation against VC/NVA in the Amphibious Objective Area in Quang Nam Province and/or other operations as agreed upon with CG, III MAF.

3. General

a. BEACON TORCH was an amphibious operation in the Quang Nam Province Central I CTZ employing the ARG/SIF in conjunction with the following forces in the area: FIFTH Marines in regimental size operations to the south of the AOA; SEVENTH Marines in ARIZONA to the west of the AOA; FIRST Marines conducting battalion operations northwest of AOA, and an ARVN battalion in an operation from National Highway One between Hoi An and Ba Ren Rivers to the river junction. The SIF was augmented by one DD, one DIG, one WPB and 1 PCF. The WPB/PCFs, although continually rotated, always maintained one WPB and one PCF on station.

b. Quang Nam Province has been a major infiltration zone in the I Corps. Intelligence estimates indicated one NVA regiment, three NVA companies plus one local force battalion and three local force companies.

c. The operation was conducted in accordance with CTG 76.5 Operation Order 312.67.

d. The SIF helicopters of HMM 164 provided the major tactical lift throughout for the Battalion Landing Team (BLT 2/3). In doing so, the squadron maintained an average availability of nine CH-46A aircraft out of 18 total. One CH-46A was lost on takeoff from USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10) on 20 June with the resultant loss of two of the crew members. Average flight distance from the LPH to the various points in the AOA was about 15 miles.

e. Planning for BEACON TORCH commenced on 12 June 1967 when key members of FIRST MARDIV, FIRST MAW, CTF 76, CTG 76.5 and CTG 79.5 arrived at FIRST MARDIV Headquarters in Danang where the initial briefings for the operation were conducted.

4. Amphibious Objective Area. The AOA of the amphibious phase of the operation was defined by reference (k) as the land area contained within a ten (10) nautical mile arc centered on grid coordinate BT 230518. The sea portion of the AOA was contained within a twenty-five (25) nautical mile arc drawn seaward from the above grid coordinate. These arcs terminated in the south at the coastline and in the north at 16-13N 108-33E, thence to coastline at 16-03N 108-15E. Air space above the land and sea AOA from the surface to 25,000 ft MSL was included within the control. An air tunnel from 7,000 to 11,000 MSL was provided for civil air on airway W-1.

5. Execution. The initial assault was made by a helicopterborne landing of "F" Company BLT 2/3 at 0624H, 2,000 meters south of HLZ Cardinal (BT 191150) on D-Day 18 June 1967. Close air support preparation of the HLZ was not completed until 0618H, causing initial landing to be delayed and missing 1-Hour, 0615H. Company H, BLT 2/3, landed in a HLZ 2,000 meters south of HLZ Cardinal (BT 191500) due to zone being marked incorrectly by armed UH-1E.

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Company H moved out to the north toward objective three (BT 185540) and subsequent waves were landed in the vicinity of Company H as they moved northward so as not to delay progress of movement. A waterborne landing of Company G BLT 2/3 and supporting tanks was conducted at H-Hour, 0800H over Red Beach (BT 230518). Company E landed in HLZ Cardinal at 1110H and maneuvered to the northwest and secured objectives one and two (BT 170515), receiving heavy automatic weapons and small arms fire from area west of the river. Close air support missions suppressed the fire. During search and destroy operations, Company H engaged an enemy force estimated in excess of 100 men at vicinity BT 205491 and received heavy automatic weapons and small arms fire. Close air support was called and napalm dropped 50 meters from friendlies forced enemy to break and run. TACA body count reported 50 KIA, with the enemy wearing green uniforms indicating MF or NVA. BLT 2/3 conducted search and destroy operations in the AOA after the initial assault. CATF, CLF and CG, 111 MAF mutually concurred on the completion of the amphibious phase (Phase I) of BEACON TORCH and in accordance with the initiating directive CATF chopped the SLF to CG, 111 MAF effective 210600H June. At 250600H June, in accordance with FIRST MARDIV Order 75-67 and CTG 79.5 240740Z JUN 67, CALHOUN commenced and the SLF was directed to conduct search and destroy operations in the vicinity of Pagoda Valley (Grid Squares BT 0646, BT 0545, BT 0444). Operations continued west of National Highway One until 29 June 1967, at which time BLT 2/3 forces commenced a search and destroy sweep operation to the east. On 1 July at 1200H, CG, FIRST MARDIV terminated CALHOUN and transferred OPCON SLF directly to CTG 76.5 at 012400H. Selective back-loading began on 1 July. Amphibious withdrawal (Phase III) commenced at 020930H July. Completed the tactical amphibious withdrawal at 021300H, and terminated BEACON TORCH as of 021536H July 1967, in accordance with reference (j).

6. Additional Forces Assistance

a. In addition to TRIPOLI (LPH-10), MONTICELLO (LSD-35), OGDEN (LPD-5) and TOM GREEN COUNTY (IST-1159), the normal shipping assigned to the Amphibious Ready Group, the following ships were assigned:

USS HARRY E. HUBBARD (DD-748)	NGFS - 18-21 June
HMAS HOBART (D-39)	NGFS - 18-21 June
USS AULT (DD-698)	NGFS - 1 July
USS PROVIDENCE (CIG-6)	NGFS - 2 July
WPB/PCF	In/Exfiltration (as assigned by CTG 115.1)
PLEDGE (MSO-492)	Search/Salvage Ops - 20-21 June
LCU 1622/NSA Danang Warping Tug	Salvage Ops - 21 June

b. In addition to BLT 2/3 and HMM 164, the normal composition of the Special Landing Force, the following units were assigned:

DET VMO6	4 UH-1E (armed) and 1 UH-1E (slick)
DET HMM 463	2 CH-53A as required

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35007. Summary of Operations

a. Assault boats and amphibious vehicle landings. The initial D-Day (18 June) landing over Red Beach (BT 230518) was made by USMC troops of Company G BLT 2/3 in two (2) waves of LVTs. First wave consisted of 5 LVTs and OGDEN LCVF as wave guide. The second wave consisted of 5 LVTs. Both waves were splashed from OGDEN while underway at 10 knots and touched down on time, H-Hour 0800H. Shore party and Beachmaster personnel, heavy equipment and tanks were landed on-call by LCU, LCM-8s and LCM-6s. The boat lane was 3,000 yards long and was at 070 degrees true to the Red Beach center. On 20 June at 0630H the tank platoon was backloaded to ARG shipping over Red Beach. General backloading on 2 July was over the beach in the vicinity of BT 221554. All ships remained underway in assigned OPAREAs of the AOA.

b. Helicopterborne Assaults. The initial D-Day helicopterborne assault was made by BLT 2/3 Companies F and H in HLZ Cardinal (BT 191500) at 180624H. Company E, held in reserve aboard the LPD, was landed in HLZ Cardinal at 1110H on D-Day. During the initial landing phase three helicopters received combat damage due to intermittent automatic weapons and small arms fire entering the zone. Throughout the operation helicopter lifts were the major means of resupply and movement of troops ashore.

c. Helicopter Ship-to-Shore Statistics

(1) HMM 164 flew 2052 sorties lifting over 4468 troops and 348 tons of cargo. VMO-6 DET flew 1109 sorties and HMM 463 flew 38 sorties while control was afloat.

(2) TRIPOLI's assigned helicopter flew 95 sorties, and 60 tasks for a total of 81.7 hours in the fifteen day period of operations. These flights included 303 personnel transferred, or liaison missions, 4933 pounds of mail between ships and Danang, two MEDEVACs, 5267 pounds of cargo on logistics flights and one rescue.

(3) There were 319 MEDEVACs returned to TRIPOLI for treatment and further evacuation.

(4) Landings and fuel expenditures:

	<u>TRIPOLI</u>	<u>OGDEN</u>	<u>MONTICELLO</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Landings	1,259	235	80	1,574
JP-5	68,079 gals.	8,625 gals.	0	76,704 gals.
AVGAS	2,935 gals.	715 gals.	0	3,650 gals.
MOGAS	278 gals.	900 gals.	0	1,178 gals.

(5) Assigned helicopters expended 1,751 2.75 inch rockets and 246,300 rounds of 7.62MM ammunition.

(6) TRIPOLI supplied the bread and assorted fresh fruit that was flown in to the beach almost daily.

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d. Operation Orders. All naval operations in support of CTG 79.5 were coordinated by CTG 76.5 OPPLAN 120A(A)-67, and a basic message OPORD, CTG 76.5 OPORD 312-67. Close adherence was maintained throughout the operation to procedures set forth in references (i) and (j).

e. Enemy Casualties. The known enemy casualties inflicted during Operation BEACON TORCH were as follows:

<u>KIA</u>	<u>KIA (Probable)</u>	<u>VCS (Detainees)</u>
94	91	35

f. Enemy Material. USMC forces ashore captured or destroyed the following:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount</u>
AK-47 Machine Gun	1
M-1 Rifle	1
M-1 Carbine	1
MAF-36	1
Cows	65
Rice	32 tons

Miscellaneous bunkers and fortifications were destroyed.

8. In-Country Forces.

a. Throughout the operation, CTF 115 forces were provided through CTG 115.1 under the operational control of the CATF. Although not task-organized under TG 76.5, these forces provided continuous coastal infiltration/exfiltration patrols throughout the operation. Their presence was considered highly essential, not only in performing their mission, but also in shepherding indigenous craft from OPAREAs and assisting in UDT salvage operations.

(1) Units assigned during operation:

<u>WPB</u>	<u>PCF</u>
USCGC PT DUME	PCF 05 PCF 16 PCF 55
USCGC PT ARDEN	PCF 13 PCF 17 PCF 59
USCGC PT ORIENT	PCF 14 PCF 22 PCF 99
	PCF 15 PCF 101

[Signature]
J. L. LOWENTROUT

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RECOMMENDED DISTRIBUTION

COMPHIBPAC	COMUSMACV
COMPHIBTRAPAC	CTF 73
CO, NAVPHIBSCOL, CORONADO	CTG 73.5
COMPHIBRON ONE	CO, HMM 164
COMPHIBRON THREE	CO, BLT 2/3
COMPHIBRON FIVE	CTG 70.8
COMPHIBRON SEVEN	
COMPHIBRON ELEVEN	
COMANSHIPRON ONE	
COMANSHIPRON NINE	
COMANSHIPFLOT ONE	
COMPHIBGRU ONE	
COMPHIBGRU THREE	
COMNAVOPSUPPGRUPAC	
COMSEVENTHFLT	
CTG 76.4	
CTG 79.4	
CTG 79.5	
CTF 79	
CG, FMFPAC	
CINCPACFLT	
COMNAVBEACHMASTER ONE	
UDT ELEVEN	
TACRON ELEVEN	
COMSTDIV NINETY-TWO	
CO USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10)	
CO USS MONTICELLO (LSD-35)	
CO USS OGDEN (LPD-5)	
CO USS TOM GREEN COUNTY (LST-1159)	
CO USS PROVIDENCE (CLG-6)	
CO HMAS HOBART (D-39)	
CO USS AULT (DD-698)	
CO USS HUBBARD (DD-748)	
CG IANFORTRAUPAC	
CJNC NOSS WESTPAC DET	
CG FIRST MARDIV	
CG THIRD MARDIV	
CG FIFTH MARDIV	
CG 111 MAF	
CG FIRST MAW	
COMNAVBEACHGRUONE WESTPAC DET	
COMFACGRU ONE	
COMNAVFORV	
CTF 115	
CTE 76.0.4.3	
CO ACRON ONE	
ACDIV 12	

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TASK ORGANIZATION

TF 76		CTF 76
TG 76.5	Amphibious Ready Group BRAVO	CAPT J. L. LOWENTROUT
		CTG 76.5/COMPHIBRON NINE
		(CATF)
TU 76.5.0	Special Ops and Command Unit	CAPT J. L. LOWENTROUT
TE 76.5.0.1	Flagship Element	CAPT H. SUERSTEDT, JR.
		CO TRIPOLI
TE 76.5.0.2	Tactical Air Control Element	ICDR J. R. SONNABEND
		OINC TACRON 11 DET B
TE 76.5.0.3	UDT Element	ENS J. FUKASAWA
		OINC UDT ELEVEN DET F
TE 76.5.0.4	Special Ops Element	LTJG J. DORSEY
		OINC BJU ONE WPDET A
TE 76.5.0.5	Surface Patrol Coordinator	CAPT R. F. STANTON
		CO MONTICELLO
TU 76.5.1	Gunfire Support Unit	Senior NGFS Ship
TU 76.5.2	Transport Unit	CAPT J. L. LOWENTROUT
	USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10)	COMPHIBRON NINE
	USS MONTICELLO (LSD-35)	
	USS OGDEN (LPD-5)	
	USS TOM GREEN COUNTY (LST-1159)	
TE 76.5.2.1	Beach Party Element	LT J. FLYNN
		OINC BMU ONE DET A-8
TE 76.5.2.2	Control Element	CAPT R. L. DISE
		CO OGDEN
TE 76.5.2.3	Helicopter Transport Assault Element	CAPT H. SUERSTEDT, JR.
		CO TRIPOLI
TE 76.5.2.4	IST Support Element	ICDR D. F. DALRY
		CO TOM GREEN COUNTY
TG 79.5	Special landing Force	COL H. D. WORTMAN, USMC
	BLT 2/3	CTG 79.5 (CLF)
	HMM 164	

Enclosure (1)

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CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF EVENTS (All times HOTEL 48)

12 June 1967

Representatives from CTG 76.5, CTG 79.5, FIRST MAW and FIRST MARDIV attended BEACON TORCH planning conference at FIRST MARDIV Headquarters.

15 June 1967

Promulgated message OPORD 312-67.

16 June 1967

Confirmed D-Day of 18 June 1967 for BEACON TORCH. Tentative L-Hour 0600H, tentative H-Hour 0800H.

17 June 1967

Promulgated BEACON TORCH MOVORD.

L-Hour of 0615H and H-Hour of 0800H confirmed.

18 June 1967

Commenced BEACON TORCH. ARG consisting of CTG 76.5, TRIPOLI, OGDEN, TOM GREEN COUNTY, MONTICELLO, TACRON 11 DET B, UDT ELEVEN DET F, BJU ONE DET A (assigned OPCON 79.5 for this operation), ACDIV 12 DET N, BMU ONE DET A-8, Surgical Team ONE, COMSECTEAM TWO; SLF consisting of CTG 79.5, BLT 2/3 and HMM 164.

Support for BEACON TORCH provided by: NGFS, HMAS HOBART/USS HARRY E. HUBBARD, WPB PT DUME, PCF 14; CAS by FIRST MAW, two CH-53, four UH-1E (armed) and one UH-1E (unarmed).

Commenced approach to assigned OPAREAs at 180320H. First helo wave landed in LZ 2000 meters south of LZ CARDINAL (BT 191500) due LZ being marked incorrectly by armed UH-1Es. Helo wave was nine minutes late for H-Hour due to extended LZ prep. Armed UH-1E received S/A fire from vicinity BT 202482. CAS prepped area prior to initial landing with outstanding coverage. CH-46A received intermittent A/W, S/A fire entering the zone. 3 A/C received hits. One Marine WIA, returned to ship.

First boat wave touched down RED Beach (BT 230518) on time with no enemy opposition.

Tanks landed at 180840H.

WPB PT DUME and PCF 14 reported at 180844H and assigned in/exfiltration duties.

LVTs and Beachmaster retracted from RED Beach at 181230H.

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Commenced offloading 105 Artillery Battery by helo from OGDEN at 1330H.

TRIPOLI medical received a total of 84 MEDEVACs, composed of the following: 2 KIA, 15 WIA, 63 Non-Combat, 5 Vietnamese, 5 MEDEVACs for further transfer to Danang.

HUBBARD commenced H/I fire at 182000H on five designated targets, Numbers 114-118 inclusive. Total of 20 rounds fired.

19 June 1967

Night steamed in AOA and returned to assigned OPAREAs at first light to support operations ashore.

NGFS ship received no fire missions during the period 190800H-192000H.

HUBBARD and HOBART unrepd from USS CHEMUNG.

TRIPOLI sent 320 pounds of mixed fruit ashore.

At 2115H, F/2/3 linked up with H/2/3 and engaged enemy. Received A/W, S/A fire. Returned fire with mortars, A/W and S/A. Enemy withdrew under fire. Incoming fire resulted in 3 USMC KIA and 6 WIA.

G/2/3 remained in vicinity Objective 2 (BT 170515). Conducted search of area.

TRIPOLI offloaded one MRC-62 and one three quarter ton trailer.

MONTICELLO offloaded one MRC-109 and personnel via CH-53.

HUBBARD fired H/I mission commencing at 192000H with two rounds per hour per target at five targets. 20 rounds were expended.

20 June 1967

Night steamed in AOA and returned to assigned OPAREAs at first light to support operations ashore.

Units of BLT 2/3 established night defenses and ambush positions and conducted extensive patrol action. All units received light sniper fire but no major engagements.

HUBBARD fired H/I mission throughout the night at five targets. Coordinates were: BT 205515, 207529, 211468, 220481 and 220489. Ceased fire at 200600H. 80 rounds were expended.

Commenced backload of tanks from beach (BT 221557) at 200610H and completed withdrawal to OGDEN at 200645H.

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BIT 2/3 CP (BT 199489) received heavy S/A sniper fire from vicinity BT 193479. Armed UH-1E on station strafed area, incoming ceased.

HUBBARD fired mission for FIRST MARDIV, prep fire on three targets. Coordinates BT 128516, 117515 and 115520.

One CH-46 helicopter of HMM 164 crashed into the water on takeoff from TRIPOLI at position 15-49N9 108-31.5E8 (10 fathoms) at 200727H. Two of four man crew rescued. No others aboard.

PT ARDEN, WTB 82309 relieved PT DUME at 201130H and PCF 15 relieved PCF 99 at 201600H.

RADM VANNOY, CTF 76, visited TRIPOLI upon arrival in AOA at 201330H.

HUBBARD in FSA 11 fired 189 rounds call fire on four targets for 1 Corps NGLO commencing 201335H. Returned to FSA 1 at 201900H.

At 2150H, a wounded female VC entered lines at BT 201489 as a Chieu Hoi. She claimed many VC had been wounded in this area and that they desired to surrender. PSYOPS personnel made unsuccessful effort to entice wounded to surrender.

PLEDGE (MSO 492) on station located CH-46 helo that crashed. UDT personnel buoyed aircraft and retrieved weapons that were aboard. Requested barge from CNSA Danang for 21 June salvage attempt.

21 June 1967

Night steamed in AOA and returned to assigned OPAREAs at first light to support operations ashore.

Amphibious phase of BEACON TORCH terminated at 210600H. Supporting arms passed ashore to SLF BRAVO and OPCON SLF BRAVO passed to CG III MAF.

HUBBARD and HOBART detached at 210600H.

Warping tug towed by LCU 1622 arrived from NSA Danang at 210615H to commence salvage attempts on CH-46 that crashed 200727H.

HUBBARD fired H/1 fire throughout the night with two rounds per hour per target at five targets. Target coordinates were as follows: BT 195536, 189541, 218545, 209509 and 199548. Ceased fire at 210600H. 80 rounds were expended.

NSA Danang warping tug and LCU 1622 successfully raised the CH-46 helo. OGDEN took helo aboard for fresh water washdown and inspection by VERTOL representative and HMM 164 safety officer. Divers, in process of raising CH-46, found body of pilot on sea bottom about 80 feet from fuselage. Body transferred to TRIPOLI.

Enclosure (2)

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F/2/3 was taken under fire on two separate occasions. First at 1030H, fire was coming from area southwest of position vicinity BT 195485. CAS was on station and called on target with excellent coverage. Again at 1915H F/2/3 was taken under fire with heavy A/W and S/A fire from same area. Armed UH-1E ran strike on area but fire continued. Flaeship and CAS called on station.

Detached PLEDGE and LCU 1622 with warping tug at 211510H.

CG 111 MAF visited CTG 76.5 and CTG 79.5 aboard TRIPOLI. Departed 211015H.

22 June 1967

Night steamed in AOA and returned to assigned OPAREAs at first light to support operations ashore.

TOM GREEN COUNTY proceeded to Danang to unrep from PROCYON.

OGDEN and MONTICELLO unreped from PROCYON seaward of BEACON TORCH OPAREA.

Received four medical reps aboard TRIPOLI from Danang. Provided briefing and helo lift into BEACON TORCH area.

UNSECNAV Designate BAIRD, accompanied by VADM HYLAND, COMSEVENTHFLT and official party visited CTG 76.5 and CTG 79.5. Also visited OGDEN by helo and HMAS HOBART by hiline. TRIPOLI UH-34 and HMM 164 CH-46 provided helo transportation to and from Danang.

At 1120H, G/2/3 was preparing to leave area at BT 083490 when a Bouncing Betty type mine was detonated. Fragments covered 360 degree area resulting in 1 KIA and 18 WIA.

At 1430H, 2 armed UH-1E were covering pickup of F/2/3 when they observed 20 armed VC vicinity BT 197483. Gun run on enemy resulted in 6 KIA B/C, 6 KIA probable.

PCF 05 relieved PCF 13 at 221600H.

Tempo of operations precluded TRIPOLI scheduled unrep from PROCYON. OGDEN took TRIPOLI unrep requirements for further transfer to the TRIPOLI.

Helo landing number 2,000 made on TRIPOLI.

23 June 1967

Night steamed in AOA and returned to assigned OPAREAs at first light to support operations ashore.

Vertreped TRIPOLI frozen provisions from OGDEN with HMM 164 helos.

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G/2/3 discovered 2 mines vicinity BT 038452. Mines were cylindrical, diameter 3 inches, yellow body, gold top, resembled mortar shell. Marines destroyed in place.

MEDCAP dentist, doctor and 4 corpsmen went to area vicinity BLT CP (BT 120476) and treated 88 elderly men, 10 women and 8 children.

PCF 17 relieved PCF 05 at 231500H.

24 June 1967

Night steamed in AOA and returned to assigned OPAREAs at first light to support operations ashore.

E/2/3, searching area vicinity BT 081481, recovered 3 tons of rice, 2 tons of potatoes and feeding utensils for about 200 men. Also found one sea bag with documents and medical supplies. Rice and potatoes were lifted to Hoi An, documents and medical supplies to LPH.

Vertreped dry and fresh provisions from OGDEN to TRIPOLI via SLF helos.

TRIPOLI provided 27 cases fruit juice and 10 cases fruit to troops ashore.

25 June 1967

Night steamed in AOA and returned at first light to assigned OPAREAs to support operations ashore.

CALHOUN commenced at 0600H.

G/2/3 apprehended 3 VCS in vicinity BT 075466. 2 males, ages approximately 55 and 30, and one teenage girl, none had ID cards. They claimed to be farmers but appearance was not that of farmers. Personnel were evacuated to S-2.

At 1415H, B/1/12 received 2 rounds of S/A sniper fire from vicinity BT 157456 resulting in 1 USMC WIA. Fire returned and patrol was sent to area.

PCF 101 relieved PCF 14 at 251500H.

WPB PT ARDEN recovered body in vicinity of Cu Cao Cham and transferred it to TRIPOLI. Body was identified as that of missing crewman of CH-46 helo which crashed 20 June. Body was sent to Danang FET to CONUS.

TRIPOLI provided eleven cases fruit juice and four cases fresh fruit to troops ashore.

Vertreped 18,000 pounds provisions from OGDEN to TRIPOLI.

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26 June 1967

Night steamed in AOA and returned at first light to assigned OPAREAs to support operations ashore.

G/2/3 observed 3 VC in vicinity BT 044344, took enemy under fire with S/A killing 1 (B/C) and capturing 1 M-1 rifle.

G/2/3 uncovered an undetermined amount of rice in a cache, vicinity BT 050440. Rice was bagged and sent to LSA by helo. At this time had bagged in excess of 26,000 pounds and much rice still remained.

PT ORIENT relieved PT ARDEN at 1330H.

MONTICELLO ballasted down to offload deadlined M-48 tanks from LCM-8s for repair. Completed repairs and reloaded tanks in LCM-8s.

TRIPOLI provided 17 cases fruit juice and five cases of fresh fruit to troops ashore.

27 June 1967

Night steamed in AOA and returned at first light to assigned OPAREAs to support operations ashore.

BLT 2/3 conducted extensive patrol action with negative contact. At 0715H, 2 platoons of E/2/3 were helo lifted to BT 035455. Established positions on high ground to facilitate sweep of the connecting draw.

At 0945H, F/2/3 discovered 10,000 pounds of rice in 2 small huts vicinity BT 059441. Rice was helo lifted to LSA. Total in excess of 61,000 pounds of rice evacuated within past few days.

PCF 16 relieved PCF 22 at 271700H.

TOM GREEN COUNTY proceeded to Danang to load replacement LFORM ammo for reconstitution SIF LFORM ammo.

Provided 21 cases fruit juice and 7 cases fresh fruit to troops ashore.

28 June 1967

Night steamed in AOA and returned at first light to assigned OPAREAs to support operations ashore.

ALFA command group was helo lifted to new position BT 151460. Companies conducted S/D operations to their new positions with negative contact.

OGDEN departed for Danang at 280900H to transfer CH-46 wreckage to MAG 16. Returned 281215H.

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PCF 22 relieved PCF 16 at 281700.

Provided 8 cases of fresh fruit, 60 loaves fresh bread and 100 pounds roast beef to troops ashore.

TOM GREEN COUNTY returned from Danang 282100H.

29 June 1967

Night steamed in AOA and returned to assigned OPAREAs at first light to support operations ashore.

F/2/3 apprehended 1 detainee, approximately 25 years of age, with no ID card. Detainee had 40 bags of rice. Both were evacuated to LSA.

Patrol from F/2/3 flushed 3 VC, one with weapon, 2 with rice bags. Patrol fired on enemy resulting in 2 KIA B/C. Search of area uncovered blood traces indicating 1 VC KIA Probable.

Requested NGFS ship for withdrawal tentatively scheduled 1-2 July 1967.

PCF 55 relieved PCF 22 at 291600H.

Provided 28 cases fresh fruit to troops ashore.

30 June 1967

Night steamed in AOA and at first light returned to OPAREAs to support operations ashore.

AULT assigned NGFS ship for amphibious withdrawal.

OGDEN departed for Danang 300730H to pick up 80 replacement troops and 20 tons Class I LFORM.

G/2/3 in vicinity BT 192454 received S/A fire from approximately 6 VC dressed in black PJs and white helmets. Returned fire with S/A, A/W, killing 4 VC and capturing 1 AK-47, 1 carbine, 15 CHICOM grenades and miscellaneous NVA 782 gear.

F/2/3 received heavy S/A fire from vicinity BT 217465. Fire was returned and company maneuvered to engage enemy. VC fled. Encounter resulted in 1 USMC KIA, 3 WJA, 3 VC KIA B/C.

PCF 17 relieved PCF 55 at 301700H.

1 July 1967

Night steamed in AOA and returned to assigned OPAREAs at first light to support operations ashore.

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BLT 2/3 conducted S/D operations in assigned area with negative contact.

AULT reported for NGFS duty.

ADM MOORER, prospective CNO, accompanied by VADM HYLAND, COMSEVENTHFLT, arrived at 010958H. Departed at 011100H.

CALHOUN terminated 011200H.

Provided 18 cases fresh fruit to troops ashore.

PCF 101 relieved PCF 17 at 011500H.

2 July 1967

Night steamed in AOA and returned to assigned OPAREAs at first light to support operations ashore.

PROVIDENCE relieved AULT at 020700H.

Commenced tactical amphibious withdrawal at 020700H.

Completed tactical amphibious withdrawal at 021300H.

PROVIDENCE, PT ORIENT and PCF 101 released at 021300H.

BEACON TORCH terminated at 021300H.

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CARG"B"/N33:j1
3500SHIP-TO-SHORE MOVEMENT

1. General. Waterborne ship-to-shore operations were conducted over Red Beach, which was centered at BT 230518. Beach width was 500 yards with a boat lane extending 3,000 yards to seaward at 070 degrees.

2. Execution

a. The ship-to-shore movement was conducted with all ships remaining underway at all times. The waterborne landing commenced at 0615H on D-Day with OGDEN and MONTICELLO launching eight LCMs and one LCU 8,000 yards from the assault beach. At 0733H, OGDEN passed 100 yards to seaward of the LOD at 10 knots and launched two LVT waves. Touchdown of the first LVT wave was H-Hour, 0800H.

b. Other D-Day operations included landing five M-48 tanks over Red Beach at 0850H. LVTs were re-embarked in OGDEN at 1230H.

c. Operations on Red Beach were secured with the backloading of the LVTs on D-Day. The beach was re-activated on D+2 for backloading the M-48 tanks and again on 2 July for backloading GOLF Company, BIT 2/3. All other backloading was accomplished by helicopter.

d. UDT Detachment was embarked in the first LVT wave. At touchdown, the detachment commenced a rapid survey of the boat lane to determine suitability for LCM/LCU operations. Survey was completed at 0818H.

3. Communications

a. The AN/VRC-46 and AN/PRC-25 again provided extremely reliable ship-to-boat communications.

b. During the assault phase, flashing light was used for communications between the BMU and PCS. Use of this means reduced voice traffic.

c. Boat Common, 31.7 MC, was used heavily by other units, as were other VHF frequencies.

4. Problems encountered

a. On D+2, although BMU was ashore, the LCU attempted to beach without Beachmaster assistance resulting in a wet ramp landing. Only one tank was loaded into the LCU and delays occurred while attempting to complete the load. BMU then took control, ordered the LCU retracted, located a suitable beaching site and the tank withdrawal proceeded without further difficulty.

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CARG"R"/N33:j1
3500INTELLIGENCE1. Enemy Situation and Capabilities Prior to Operation BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN

a. Enemy Situation. Enemy forces in the objective area had been identified as 1st and 3rd Battalions, 3rd NVA Regiment; V.28 Local Force Company; V.29 Local Force Company and two unidentified Local Force Companies.

b. Enemy Capabilities. The enemy was capable of the following:

(1) Attacking with a force of up to one NVA Regiment (3rd).

(2) Defending, at a time and place of his choosing, with a force of up to one NVA Regiment.

(3) Reinforce, with a force of up to one NVA Regiment (21st), two separate LF Battalions and four separate LF Companies supported by elements of an NVA Artillery Regiment.

2. Enemy Situation and Factors During Operation BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN

a. Enemy Situation. This operation was limited to small enemy unit contact; light probes and harassing action with mortars, automatic weapons, small arms and surprise firing devices. First contact with the enemy occurred as the second heliborne wave landed in landing zones Wren and Cardinal. The enemy delivered several rounds of automatic weapon and small arms resulting in minor damage to the helicopters. Armed UH-1Es, on station, quickly suppressed the enemy fire and heliborne operations continued unopposed. Heaviest contact with the enemy occurred on D-Day when H/2/3 engaged an estimated 100 Viet Cong. Air strikes were called resulting in 23 enemy KIA (confirmed) and 44 enemy KIA (probable). The remaining contacts with the enemy consisted of light mortar attacks, A/W and S/A fires, mines and surprise firing devices.

b. Enemy Tactics. The enemy displayed those tactics usually associated with a well trained and organized regular force. They used the well constructed bunkers for protection from air strikes and artillery, the numerous trench systems for evasion and tunnel complexes for concealment. Sniper activity was frequent and accurate. The enemy used small unit tactics with exceptional professionalism, occasionally pressing larger forces but usually relying on the hit and run concept.

3. Terrain and Weather

a. Terrain Features. Terrain features in the TAOH consisted primarily of poorly drained flat area of rice cultivation, elevation rarely exceeding 20 meters. To the west, the elevation rose sharply and the topography became extremely rough. The hills and mountainous areas were dissected by numerous perennial and intermittent streams.

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b. Weather. The objective area was presently in the dry season. The temperatures ranged from 85 to 105 degrees causing the usual number of heat casualties as well as hampering the lift capability of helicopters. Light haze and fog were present during early morning, limiting visibility from 5 to 7 miles but had no adverse effect on the operation. One thunder storm occurred during the final days of the operation which held up resupply for one hour, then passed rapidly to the south.

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3500COMMUNICATIONS

1. Communications during BEACON TORCH were considered GOOD overall.
2. NAVCOMMSTA JAPAN Termination. The ROMULUS Termination between USS TRIPOLI and NAVCOMMSTA JAPAN proved to be very effective in comparison to a similar termination with NAVCOMMSTA PHIL which has been used during past operations. There was very little outage logged on the circuit, and all concerned noted that service messages received were relatively few. On the PHIL termination, communications were often bogged down by the inordinate amount of service messages.
3. Use of local Loops Aboard Ship. Two additional in-house circuits were utilized on the Flagship which lessened the work load of the Message Processing Center by approximately one half. One local loop was used to deliver messages to the supply department, the other carried traffic to the SIF Message Center. This extremely effective system has not been available for use on the other ships that have served as flagship.
4. Task Group ORESTES Circuit. The full duplex ORESTES covered Task Group Common circuit was used in the broadcast method and presented no problems.
5. In-Country ORESTES Circuit. The Flagship joined the MAF Command Number 2 circuit which was very reliable and was used for passing Spot Reports to FIRST MARDIV.
6. Frequency Allocation and Selection. Frequency allocation and selection proved to be the most difficult problem encountered on this operation. The UHF/VHF/FM frequencies allocated to the two ARGs are not adequate. CLEAR frequencies are at a premium and the STRICT N1B frequencies are, for the most part, always in use. Heavy interference was experienced on VHF/UHF frequencies both from other transmitters aboard ship and from other stations. FM frequencies used aboard the LPH must have at least 5 MCS separation in order to avoid mutual interference. Shifting frequencies and equipments during certain phases of the operation partially corrected the situation but never completely. It is recommended that more CLEAR UHF/VHF/FM frequencies be assigned by CTF 76 and allocated in separate blocks to each of the ARGs. RATT interference on the 50-70 MCS FM band resulted in further congestion in the lower frequency range.
7. Antenna Installation Aboard the LPH. Antenna installation aboard the LPH, especially VHF, leave a great deal to be desired. FM antennas have numerous dead spots due to the proximity of hull and superstructure. Vibration generated by high-speed turns and maneuvers, necessary for flight operations, played havoc with antenna installations. Base insulators were broken, ground straps were torn loose, and radials were thrown off. The absence of wind, making high speed maneuvers necessary, was a contributing factor to this problem.

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8. KY-8/VRC-46 Installation in the IPH. The remote KY-8 configuration installed in TROOP OPS by SRF SUBIC did not function satisfactorily. This situation was made acceptable by operating the KY-8 adjacent to the VRC-46 in Transmitter Room #1. If the KY-8s were used continuously for any long period of time, they overheated and had to be shut down until they cooled. It is recommended that the two Turnover VRC-46 equipments be installed in TROOP OPS vice Transmitter Room #1, and the KY-8 be operated adjacent to the transceiver in order to be able to shift from covered to uncovered operations more quickly and with less effort. This would help eliminate the problem of overheating.

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3500COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY ANALYSIS

1. COMSEVENTHFLT COMSEC TEAM TWO, CTE 70.7.7.2, embarked USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10), monitored voice circuits of CTG 76.5 and CTG 79.5 from 17 June through 2 July. Monitoring reception of HF/UHF/VHF during BEACON TORCH operations varied from good to very good.
2. Units of Task Group 76.5 isolated in traffic included: USS TRIPOLI, USS MONTICELLO (LSD-35), USS OGDEN (LPD-5), USS TOM GREEN COUNTY (LST-1159), USS HUBBARD (DD-748) and HMAS HOBART (D.39).
3. The COMSEC Team monitored voice circuits for a total of 515 hours during the operation. In proportion to the time expended, the intelligence noted was small, but noteworthy.
4. The observance of communications security procedures on circuits monitored at the beginning of BEACON TORCH was very good. Communications procedures began to deteriorate as the operation continued but abruptly changed when the operation was about half over and once again became outstanding.
5. Items of intelligence information revealed and recovered through COMSEC monitoring and first echelon analysis that could have been protected by the KAC 138 numerical couple code are:
 - a. Coordinates for NGFS and nightly H and I harassment fire revealed friendly forces would soon be moving into these areas.
 - b. Coordinates for helo cargo operations and MEDEVAC pickups revealed several companies' locations.
 - c. Numbers of friendly and enemy casualties by individual engagement.
 - d. Numbers of troops and weight of cargo carried by helos.
6. Other significant items which appeared in traffic were:
 - a. Reference to geographical locations.
 - b. FRAG ORDERS and Situation Reports passed in the clear.
 - c. Circuit designators linked to frequencies.
 - d. Frequencies passed in the clear where frequency designators were assigned to them.
 - e. References to "up river" and "from the river's mouth" when the Hoi An River and its tributaries were the only rivers in the area of operation.
 - f. Information relating to operational intentions.

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6. Numerous transmissions the last two days of the operation revealed that personnel and equipment were being backloaded from beach areas and artillery positions. Another transmission revealed the backloading operations were completed.

7. The overall security of communications during BEACON TORCH was an improvement over similar past amphibious operations. Improved communications procedures were noted approximately half way through the operation and continued to the termination.

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3500SUPPORTING ARMS

1. General. VMO-6 Detachment and FIRST Marine Air Wing provided air support in the form of close air support aircraft and armed helicopters. USS HARRY E. HUBBARD, HMAS HOBART, USS AULT and USS PROVIDENCE were assigned for naval gunfire support. The naval gunfire section of SACC was manned by CTG 76.5 personnel. No FSCC liaison officer was assigned. Naval gunfire/air support and coordination was passed ashore at 0600H D plus 3 days.

2. Problems Encountered. No major problems encountered.

3. Naval Gunfire Support

a. Units. USS HARRY E. HUBBARD (DD-748), HMAS HOBART (D-39), USS AULT (DD-698) and USS PROVIDENCE (CIG-6).

b. Organization. Ships assigned naval gunfire support mission by COMSEVENTHFLT, CTG 70.8, and CTU 70.8.9 reported to CATF, embarked in USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10), for duty upon entering the AOA. The SACC on the flagship controlled the movements and coordinated naval gunfire with the other supporting arms available.

c. Execution. No pre D-Day naval gunfire was planned due to many friendly civilians in the area. However, 46 targets were precleared for on call fire missions. All gunfire missions during BEACON TORCH were on call missions. On D-Day, fire support was available from HUBBARD and HOBART with HUBBARD assigned direct support of BLT 2/3. The HOBART was assigned in support of BLT 2/3 and because of her 5"/54 guns with the long range capability had been additionally tasked with the collateral duty of support for the FIRST Marine Regiment in BROWN which was in progress to the north of BEACON TORCH. The HUBBARD fired a total of 100 5"/38 HE, 80 5"/38 AAC at 15 targets as H and I fires in support of BEACON TORCH. HUBBARD also fired mission in support of I Corps NGLO. HOBART fired a total of 51 5"/54 HC at 12 targets as H and fires in support of BEACON TORCH. HOBART also fired missions in support of the FIRST Marines, SECOND ARVN Division, and I Corps NGLO. HUBBARD and HOBART were released from operational control of CTG 76.5 at 210600H June, and simultaneously the coordination of supporting arms was passed ashore to the FIRST Marines FSCC. On 1 July, the AULT reported for duty to cover the amphibious withdrawal phase and on 2 July, the PROVIDENCE relieved AULT.

d. Coordination. The coordination of supporting arms for the duration of BEACON TORCH was a dual function between SACC in TRIPOLI and the FIRST Marine FSCC. The ability for dual coordination was maintained by constant communication between SACC and FSCC from the onset until the termination of BEACON TORCH.

4. Close Air Support

a. Planning. Planning for the operation was initiated at the FIRST MARDIV Headquarters, Danang. Members of the ARG/SLF (TACRON) Staffs flew

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to Danang on 12 June 1967 to received their initial briefings. Supporting Arms Coordination was discussed at great length and tours were conducted of the DASC and FSCC facilities. It was decided at this time that the ARG Staff would station a liaison member in the DASC ashore for the operation. In an attempt to eliminate other conflicts that developed after the first briefings, two more liaison trips by TACRON into Danang were necessary prior to D-Day. Close contact with the SLF Staff, afloat, was maintained by TACRON personnel right up until L-Hour in order to maintain continuity in the planning and execution of Supporting Arms coordination.

b. Summary of Close Air Support

(1) During the initial phase of the operation, control of all air traffic within the AOA was afloat. The TACC afloat, ICEPACK BRAVO, coordinated air control within the AOA in conjunction with the established DASC, LANDSHARK, ashore. The primary reference point for control of Fixed Wing Aircraft was the Danang TACAN. An initial entry/orbit point was established on the 120 degree radial/20 NM. In the latter stages of the operation, this orbit point was reestablished over the beach line to enable the fixed wing aircraft to observe various target objectives prior to commencing their runs.

(2) The initial D-Day air schedule called for 6 VF/VA aircraft to be on station at L-15. An additional 4 VF/VA aircraft were requested for L-15 providing the TACA with a total of 10 aircraft on station.

(3) Ordnance dropped by aircraft during the LZ prep consisted of 250 and 2,000 pound bombs, rockets, napalm and 20 MM. These aircraft, as were all CAS aircraft during the operation, were controlled by the UH-1E, TACA. The battle damage assessment for these flights was estimated to be 95-100% target coverage. The majority of strikes were conducted on huts and treelines in the vicinity of the landing zones. In addition to the A/C used in the LZ prep, there were 21 more VF/VA aircraft participating in close air support during the remainder of D-Day. These CAS missions were primarily in support of the troops ashore as they were taken under fire. The Statistical Summary contains a detailed summation of CAS statistics for the operation.

(4) Air control within the AOA remained afloat for the period 18-20 June. During this period coordination between TACC, TAC(A) and strike aircraft was excellent. SACC participated in a monitoring status during the CAS mission from 21 June to 1 July, when control of the AOA was moved ashore.

c. Discussion

(1) Supporting arms coordination, while control was afloat, was completely effective. At no time when control was afloat did supporting arms ever endanger the safety of the ground troops or supporting aircraft. It was apparent after D-Day, however, that the HDC was not prepared to maintain positive control of the supporting helicopters; therefore the TACC found itself directing helicopters much of the time as well as controlling all other supporting aircraft. After D+3, with guidance and a little reorganization,

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the HDC afloat became fully effective as an HDC with the TACC acting only as a coordinating agency.

(2) Control of supporting arms was passed ashore on D+3, 21 June 1967. The DASC, ashore, was to become the air controlling agency and was to pass all SAVAPLANE information to the SACC afloat concerning the safety of the SLF's helicopters. Unfortunately, the DASC was not capable of monitoring or directing the SLF helicopters because of the volume of traffic they would have to control. Therefore, the HDC had to remain afloat throughout the operation. In an attempt to coordinate the SLF's helicopter traffic with DASC's air control picture, a helicopter landing diagram was transmitted to them indicating that heavy helicopter traffic would constantly be in progress on the designated lanes.

(3) Although the DASC in fact transmitted 317 SAVAPLANES to the TACC afloat during the operation, there were 5 known incidents involving supporting arms conflicts while control was ashore. On 24 June, an unannounced CAS mission began in the middle of the SLF's operating area and caused immediate re-routing of helicopter resupply flights. Also on 24 June, USS AULT (DD-698) commenced naval gunfire across the helo routes without DASC knowledge. On 28 June, a CAS mission began within 1,000 meters of the Battalion Command Post without the knowledge of the SLF. The same day, the DASC issued a SAVAPLANE that was generated by the FIRST MAJORITY FSCC for an area only 500 meters from the Battalion CP that was involved with helicopter operations at the time. This mission was immediately checked by the SACC afloat. On 29 June, another CAS mission developed unannounced in the vicinity of the helo lanes. As the DASC was repeatedly asked about these conflicts, their report was generally one of having no knowledge of the particular situation. However, upon timely investigation, DASC did, in fact, come up with the full details. The problem generally lies in the fact that when the supporting arms was ashore subordinate agencies to the DASC/FSCC did not report their missions to the DASC/FSCC.

d. Recommendations

(1) Because of the complexities of the air control system of the ARG operations, it is strongly recommended that as many liaison trips as possible be conducted to the supporting DASC/FSCC prior to all operations.

(2) As long as proper liaison is conducted prior to the operation, no useful purpose is served by exchanging liaison officers between the DASC and SACC during the operation. It is recommended that DASC/SACC liaison officers normally not be exchanged during operations.

(3) As long as air control agencies ashore do not have the capability or intention of maintaining positive helicopter control and flight advisory service, it is highly recommended that the HDC afloat remain completely functional throughout the operation even though control is ashore.

(4) It is obvious that the DASC/FSCC ashore cannot positively support the volume of supporting arms coordination requirements in these areas with-

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out a few conflicting developments. However, these few conflicting developments can and have caused unnecessary anxious moments. To assist the controlling agencies ashore during ARG/SIF operations, it is necessary that when control is passed ashore, the SACC afloat continue to monitor the DASC/FSCC radio circuits.

e. Close Air Support Summary

(1) Number of missions	37
(2) Number of fixed wing aircraft	66
(3) Tons of bombs	35
(4) Number of rockets	758
(5) Number of napalm tanks	84
(6) Number of TARS received	24
(7) Number of TARS flown	24

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3500LOGISTICS

Subj: UNREPs

1. Discussion. One AF and one AO UNREP were conducted during the operation. replenishment problems developed as follows:

a. During the period in which the AF was available, the LPH was required to remain within or very close to the AOA. Therefore, the LPD was designated to receive the LPH provisions, which were later VERTREPED to the LPH. This provision resulted in the frozen items remaining in unrefrigerated storage for several hours. Approximately 47,000 pounds of stores were double handled during this UNREP.

b. During the period in which the AO was available, it was necessary to maintain emergency MEDEVAC capability in close proximity to the beach. Therefore, the LPH was required to remain in the LPH OPAREA until relieved by the LPD after the LPD had fueled.

c. The LST was dispatched to Danang for diesel fuel. This was necessary since the AO did not have the fuel needed and the fueling pier was not available to the LST at Naval Station, Subic, prior to the LST deploying for the operation.

2. Recommendation. The following recommendations are submitted as a possible method of alleviating the above problems:

a. That replenishment ship schedules be adjusted to make them available to the CATF for a period of at least 12 hours. This would allow the CATF to coordinate replenishment with the operation and conduct UNREPs without the necessity for double handling provisions and unrefrigerated storage of frozen foods.

b. That the fuel pier at Naval Station, Subic, be made available to LSTs so that they can top off with diesel fuel prior to sailing from that port.

Subj: Boiler Maintenance

1. Discussion. Cleaning boiler fire sides and water sides on the ships of the ARG, other than the LPH, can normally be accomplished during an operation. This is possible since maximum boiler power is seldom required by these ships once the initial landing has been made. The LPH normally cannot, with any degree of certainty, go to one boiler operation due to the frequent necessity to make sufficient wind for the launching and landing of loaded helicopters.

2. Recommendation. It is recommended that mandatory ship maintenance requirements be given all possible consideration when scheduling SPECOPS periods.

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3500MEDICAL1. General

a. The amphibious assault phase of BEACON TORCH commenced 18 June 1967 when BLT 2/3, under the direction of 76.5 as CATF and CTG 79.5, Commander Special Landing Force, landed just south of Hoi An, Republic of Vietnam, by assault craft and helicopter. The entire operation terminated on 2 July 1967. The USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10) was the primary casualty control ship.

b. All casualties except two were directly evacuated to TRIPOLI, including 23 civilians. TRIPOLI supported three MEDCAP programs ashore after the area was secured.

2. Medical Officers available for the operation:

ARG/SLF Surgical Team

1 General Surgeon
1 Orthopedist
1 Anesthesiologist
1 General Medical Officer

C&C

3 General Medical Officers

Ship's Medical Officer

1 General Medical Officer

Battalion Aid Station

2 General Medical Officers

HMM 164

1 Flight Surgeon

3. Table of Casualty Handling Statistics:

a. Blood

- (1) 130 units of blood were received from NSA, Danang.
- (2) 4 units of blood were drawn locally for B negative requirements.
- (3) 52 units of blood were crossmatched.
- (4) 11 units of blood were actually transfused.
- (5) 1 patient required 6 units of blood.
- (6) There were no transfusion reactions or incidents.

b. Casualties

(1) Non-combat - 215. This includes two deaths from drowning. One hundred eighteen (118) or 55% were due to heat exhaustion.

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- (2) Combat injuries - 69 (Marines/Navy)
 - (a) Major procedures: 9 General
8 Orthopedic
 - (b) Minor procedures: 3 General
6 Orthopedic
 - (c) Delayed primary closures: 12
- (3) Died of Wounds - No Marine/Navy casualty received aboard died of wounds. One Vietnamese infant with severe head wounds died while awaiting transportation to a Neurosurgeon in Danang.
- (4) Killed in Action - 13
- (5) Further breakdown of General and Orthopedic cases:
 - (a) Orthopedic Procedures - 12
 - Upper extremities - 12
 - Lower extremities - 11
 - Amputations - 2
 - (b) General Surgical Procedures:
 - Abdominal explorations - 4
 - Chest cases (closed thoracotomies) - 4
 - Vascular cases - 3 (1 ulna artery, 1 radial artery, 1 femoral artery)
 - Neurosurgical cases - 1 craniotomy on a Vietnamese infant
- (6) The above figures represent a composite of multiple procedures performed and do not represent individual cases. There were many instances where one patient had several major surgical procedures performed at one time.
- (7) The total number of MEDEVACs received were 319. This included one Australian sailor from HMAS HOBART with a severe sprain of the ankle, 23 civilians and Navy/Marine personnel from BHT 2/3. Of these, 233 were returned to duty and 67 were transferred. Nineteen (19) are remaining on the wards at the present time and will eventually return to duty.
- (8) Disposition. Three (3) patients, including one body for autopsy were transferred to the USNHS SANCTUARY (AH-17).
 - (a) Nine (9) cases were transferred to NSA, DaNang Station Hospital.
 - (b) Twenty-three (23) Vietnamese civilians were transferred to Hoi An, Republic of Vietnam.
 - (c) Seventeen (17) were transferred to 22nd CSF, Danang.

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(d) One was returned to HMAS HOBART.

(e) Thirteen (13) bodies were transferred to FIRST Medical Battalion at Danang.

(9) On 21 June, the third day of the operation, a CH-46 went down in the ocean. Two of the four crewmen were recovered in good condition. The other two were eventually recovered but were dead on arrival.

4. Expenditure list for Operation BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN:

6505-052-1367	Hydroxyzine Hydrochloride	BT	5
6505-065-0024	Serum, Antihuman, Coombs Test	BT	2
6505-116-4600	Dextrose Injection 5%	BX	4
6505-133-0805	Sodium Thiopental	BX	20
6505-153-8480	Hydrogen Peroxide	BT	48
6505-153-8708	Sodium Chloride Tablets	BT	20
6505-160-7410	Procaine Penicillin; 1,500,000 U	BT	750
6505-285-7881	Succinylcholine Chloride Injection	BX	2
6505-299-8615	Ringers Injection Lactated	BX	27
6505-543-4048	Water For Injection, 5cc	BX	20
6505-598-6115	Lidocaine Hydrochloride Injection 5% 50cc	BT	20
6505-598-6116	Lidocaine Hydrochloride Injection 1% 50cc	BT	120
6505-598-6117	Lidocaine Hydrochloride Injection 2% 20cc	BT	35
6505-664-7116	Potassium Penicillin G, 1,000,000 U	BT	300
6505-753-5042	Streptomycin Sulfate Injection 1 Gm	BT	450
6505-890-1639	Albumen Serum Reagent Bovine, 22% 10cc	BT	2
6505-890-2172	Potassium Penicillin G 20,000,000 U	BT	96
6510-200-2185	2" Bandage, cotton elastic	PG	10
6510-200-2200	3" Bandage, cotton elastic	PG	16
6510-200-2400	4" Bandage, cotton elastic	PG	14
6510-200-2500	6" Bandage, cotton elastic	PG	9
6510-201-2001	3" Bandage, cotton plaster of paris, impreg.	PG	3
6510-201-2009	6" Bandage, cotton plaster of paris, impreg.	PG	5
6510-202-0800	Gauze petrolatum	PG	2
6510-203-2250	Pad, abdominal, 8x10	PG	2
6510-203-2270	Pad, abdominal, 12x16	PG	3
6510-203-5500	Adhesive Tape, Surgical	RI	18
6510-203-8448	Sponge, surgical 4x4	PG	138
6510-203-8480	Sponge, surgical 4x8	PG	100
6510-203-8490	Sponge, surgical radiopaque 4x8	PG	20
6510-371-8800	Plaster of Paris arm splint 4x15	BX	8
6510-372-8100	Plaster of Paris leg splint 5x30	BX	3
6510-582-7992	Kerlix	BX	16
6510-597-2361	4" Bandage, cotton plaster of Paris Imp.	BX	3
6510-597-7469	Bandage, adhesive	BX	10
6510-782-2700	Sponge, surgical 2x2	PG	30
6510-817-2632	Webril 6"	BX	2
6510-817-2634	Webril 4"	BX	4
6515-303-8100	Applicators, disposable wood	BX	1

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6515-303-8250	Applicators, disposable, cotton tipped	PG 190
6515-379-2100	Tape, umbilical	TU 12
6515-387-4100	3/8" Penrose drain	EA 30
6515-387-4140	5/8" Penrose drain	EA 15
6515-387-4180	7/8" Penrose drain	EA 5
6515-616-9449	Suture Absorb. Treated, size 0	PG 1
6515-616-9450	Suture Absorb. Treated, size 00	PG 4
6515-616-9455	Suture Absorb, plain, size 000	PG 10
6515-664-2734	Blood collecting dispensing bag and donor set	PG 4
6515-680-2086	Blade, surgical knife detachable #15	PG 8
6515-680-2088	Blade, surgical knife detachable #10	PG 16
6515-680-2089	Blade, surgical knife detachable #20	PG 1
6515-754-0406	Syringe, Disp. 5cc	PG 15
6515-754-0812	Syringe, Disp. 10cc	PG 11
6515-754-0426	Blade, surgical prep razor	PG 36
6515-754-2810	Suture, silk 4-0	PG 10
6515-754-2912	Suture, silk 2-0	PG 6
6515-754-2834	Needles, hypodermic disp. 18g	BX 3
6515-754-2835	Needles, hypodermic disp. 22g	BX 3
6515-754-2836	Needles, hypodermic disp. 20g	BX 1
6515-754-2837	Needles, hypodermic disp. 26g	BX 3
6515-754-2838	Needles, hypodermic disp. 21g	BX 44
6515-754-2839	Needles, hypodermic disp. 23g	BX 2
6515-821-2406	Blade, surgical knife detachable #11	PG 1
6515-864-5519	Gloves, surgical disp. size 7 1/2	BX 10
6515-864-5520	Gloves, surgical disp. size 8	BX 8
6505-116-1740	Detergent, surgical 5 oz.	BT 5
6505-116-1750	Detergent, surgical 1 gal.	BT 3
6505-116-5000	Dextrose and sodium chloride Inj. 1000cc	BX 2
6505-153-8651	Sodium chloride injection 1000cc	BX 10
6505-286-7302	Tetracycline tablets	BT 10
6505-754-0374	Betadine paint 1 gal.	BT 5
6505-754-2828	Sodium chloride tablets, impreg.	BT 36
6505-994-7224	Detergent, surgical	BT 2
6510-201-4100	Ball cotton 1000's	PG 4
6525-299-8085	Developer, Xray film processing, gal.	BT 8
6525-299-8088	Fixer, Xray film processing, gal.	BT 16
6525-601-7015	Film, radiographic 8x10 75's	PG 3
6525-601-8015	Film, radiographic 10x12 75's	PG 3
6525-601-9015	Film, radiographic 14x17 75's	PG 3
6530-299-9821	Tape, pressure, sensitive	RL 12
6630-618-0072	Tube, capillary blood, plain	TUU 2
6630-618-0073	Tube, capillary blood, heparinized	VL 2
6630-782-6026	Tube, blood collecting, vacuum, nonsterile	CN 2
6630-975-2510	Tube, blood collecting, vacuum, w/o anticoagul.	CN 2
6640-494-3893	Slide, microscopic, plain 25x75mm	PG 5
6640-618-0066	Cover glass, microscopic, slide 22mm	PG 2
6640-782-6008	Pasteur disposable capillary pipettes	BX 1

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Suction catheters	EA 50
Argyle chest tubes	EA 4
Connector 5" pharmerceal	EA 10
Spinal sets, disposable	EA 25
Intracath, size 14	BX 1
Rochester needles	PG 1
Telfa Pads	BX 4

Material expended: The total cost of the material expended in the above list was \$2613.16. This list does not include many smaller items too numerous to mention.

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CARG "B"/N33:j1
3500PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

1. General. Two Beach Jumper teams of one officer and three enlisted each were employed to conduct psy-warfare. Both teams went ashore on D-Day, one by helo with HOTEL Company and one by LVT with GOLF Company. Both teams remained in the field for the majority of the operation, the team with GOLF Company returning to TRIPOLI on 27 June, the team with HOTEL on 1 July. The two teams made a total of eight hours of broadcasts during the operation. A summary of these broadcasts is given below.

2. Summary of Broadcasts

a. GOLF Company. The team with GOLF Company did five hours of broadcasting on D-Day, 18 June. The PA system was mounted on an M-48 tank, and continuous broadcasts were made in both the morning and afternoon as the company moved northward through the villages of Dong Son, Phuong Tri, Trung Phoung and An Luong (1). These broadcasts were designed primarily to help control the civilian populace. The people were told to remain in their homes and not to run from the Marines. They were reassured that the Marines were looking for Viet Cong weapons and supplies and would not harm their homes or religious shrines. They were further told that the Marines were working in support of the recognized government of South Vietnam. Appeals were also made to the people to report any Viet Cong activity in the area. On 19 June, a broadcast was made in the village of An Luong (1), asking the villagers to give the Marines information concerning the Viet Cong. On 20 June, a thirty minute broadcast was made in the village of Dong Lam, telling the people to remain in their homes while the Marines searched the village and offering them payment for information concerning the Viet Cong. None of the above broadcasts produced a response. The villagers went about their affairs as usual giving no attention to the Marines or the broadcasts. The next broadcast was made in "Pagoda Valley" on 25 June. The broadcast, thirty minutes in length, told the people that the Marines were working in support of the recognized government of South Vietnam and asked them to give the Marines information concerning the Viet Cong. It further reassured them that the Marines were searching the pagodas and other shrines not for the purpose of looting or defacing them, but merely to locate Viet Cong supplies. The same broadcast was repeated twice on 26 June and once on 27 June. Some of the local populace indicated that the considerable quantity of rice found in caches in the area was Viet Cong. This may be attributed to the efforts of the BJU team.

b. HOTEL Company. The team with HOTEL Company did a good deal of walking with little opportunity to employ any psy-warfare. On 19 June, a pre-recorded tape was played for two women in the village of Ngai Le. The tape promised payment for information concerning the Viet Cong. The women understood the tape but refused to give any information. This same tape was played for three Viet Cong suspects captured by HOTEL Company on 27 June. Two of the suspects agreed to point out buried weapons and supplies. On 28 June, a ten to fifteen minute broadcast was made in the village of Minh Than, using an ARVN interpreter. The people were told to come out of their homes and assemble by the speakers while the Marines searched the village. The village was known

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to be Viet Cong controlled. The people heard the broadcast but did not respond.

3. Comments. The experience in the village of Minh Than was typical. The villagers seemed to be veterans of American search and clear operations. The attitude of the civilian populace was, if anything, pro-Viet Cong. The village of Dong Lam, for instance, had slogans neatly lettered on the side of a building telling the American troops to leave Vietnam to the Vietnamese and to refuse to serve as "cannon-fodder" for the American "warmaniacs" who direct the war.

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS

1. General. Nine media representatives from ABC, NBC, AP and Stars and Stripes were embarked on D minus One from Danang. The media representatives were phased into helo and waterborne assault waves for coverage of the operation. Coverage by civilian media embarked when aired on national television concentrated on the ground war aspects of the operation. Navy journalists and photographers shot 600 feet of color movie film, black and white and color still film, and gathered material for stories, all of which was forwarded to the SEVENTH Fleet Public Affairs Officer in Saigon for distribution and further forwarding.

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CARG "B" / N33:jl
3500LESSONS LEARNED

ORIGINATING COMMAND: COMPHIBREAGROUP BRAVO

Subj: MAJOR: COMMUNICATIONS
 MINOR: (1) UTILIZATION OF IN-HOUSE CIRCUITS
 (2) FREQUENCY ALLOCATION AND SELECTION
 (3) KY-8/VRC-46 PLACEMENT
 (4) UTILIZATION OF NAVCOMMSTA JAPAN

(1) a. DISCUSSION: During BEACON TORCH operations, two additional in-house circuits were utilized on the Flagship. One local loop was used to deliver messages to the supply department, the other carried traffic to the SLF Message Center. This extremely effective system has not been available for use on the other ships that have served as Flagships.

b. LESSON LEARNED: That utilization of these two circuits lessened the work load of the Message Processing Center by approximately one half, decreased occurrences of back-logging, and contributed to the overall smoothness of the operation.

(2) a. DISCUSSION: Frequency allocation and selection proved to be the most difficult problem encountered on this operation. The UHF/VHF/FM frequencies allocated to the two ARGs are not adequate. CLEAR frequencies are at a premium and the STRICT NIB frequencies are, for the most part, always in use. Heavy interference was experienced on VHF/UHF frequencies both from other transmitters aboard ship and from other stations.

b. LESSON LEARNED: FM frequencies aboard the LPH must have at least 5 MCS separation in order to avoid mutual interference. Shifting frequencies and equipments during certain phases of the operation partially corrected the situation but never completely. It is recommended that more CLEAR UHF/VHF/FM frequencies be assigned by CTF 76 and allocated in separate blocks to each of the ARGs.

(3) a. DISCUSSION: The KY-8 equipments which were used continuously for any long period of time overheated and had to be shut down until they cooled. In most cases the KY-8 and the VRC-46 equipments were not located adjacent to one another making it necessary to operate the KY-8 more than was absolutely necessary.

b. LESSON LEARNED: That the KY-8 and VRC-46 equipments should be located adjacent to one another in order that the operator will be able to shift from covered to uncovered operations more quickly and with less effort thereby eliminating some of the overheating problems.

(4) a. DISCUSSION: During BEACON TORCH operations, the ROMULUS circuit was terminated with NAVCOMMSTA JAPAN instead of NAVCOMMSTA PHIL, which has been used during past operations. Very little outage was logged on this circuit

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and all concerned noted that service messages received were relatively few.

b. LESSON LEARNED: That NAVCOMMSTA JAPAN provides a more attentive service on ROMULUS terminations as evidenced by decreased outage times, and a better quality of traffic as evidenced by the lack of service messages.

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CARGO "B" / N33:J1
3500LESSONS LEARNED

ORIGINATING COMMAND: COMPHIBREAGROUP BRAVO

Subj: MAJOR: SHIP-TO-SHORE MOVEMENT
 MINOR: (1) INDEPENDENT MOVEMENT INTO AOA
 (2) LPD AS PCS AND EMBARKING LVTs
 (3) UDT PERSONNEL IN FIRST LVT WAVE
 (4) LOD MARKER BOAT

(1) a. DISCUSSION: The element of surprise may be retained by a small amphibious task group until the last minute by steaming the ships involved independently to the assault area. The MOVORD specified individual departure times from a holding area, different routes, to join at a common position prior to L/H-Hours.

b. LESSON LEARNED: Steaming the small task group of the ARG into the AOA independently retains the element of surprise.

(2) a. DISCUSSION: The LPD remaining underway, acting as PCS and conducting helo operations simultaneously is both feasible and practical. Embarking the LVTs in the LPD eliminates the need for pre D-Day troop transfers. The LPD acting as PCS precluded the necessity of the LSD closing the beach within range of smaller caliber enemy weapons.

b. LESSON LEARNED: Assign LPD of the task group as the PCS and embarked with the LVTs eliminates requirement for two ships close to beach line.

(3) a. DISCUSSION: UDT ELEVEN Detachment FOXTROT was embarked in the first waterborne assault wave of BEACON TORCH. Immediately upon touchdown of the LVTs, the UDT commenced a rapid survey of the boat lane while swimming to seaward. Upon reaching the Boat Group Commander's boat, a report of the suitability of the boat lane for LCM/LCU operations was passed to CATF and PCS. The survey for the BEACON TORCH boat lane was completed in 18 minutes.

b. LESSON LEARNED: Embark UDT personnel in first wave LVTs when advance survey not desirable.

(4) a. DISCUSSION: Control procedures with PCS remaining underway are greatly enhanced by positioning a marker boat at the LOD. The marker boat provided a visual reference point for wave guides/LVTs and a fixed reference point within the scale of DRT for CIC control of boat waves.

b. LESSON LEARNED: Use of LOD marker boat greatly assists PCS while underway and controlling waves into the beach.

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LESSONS LEARNED

ORIGINATING COMMAND: COMPHIBREAGROUP BRAVO

Subj: MAJOR: COMMUNICATIONS
MINOR: COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY

(1) a. DISCUSSION: BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN proved to be one of the best in the area of communications and communications security of any operation held recently. Although a high percentage of useful information was available at various times, corrective measures were initiated shortly after most individual disclosures to prevent this on a recurring basis. The operation commenced with an overall security conscious atmosphere in the communication area. About midway through the operation, certain areas seemed to become lax, but this was readily corrected and the last few days again saw secure communications.

b. LESSON LEARNED: Communication security has to be maintained for the entire operation without relaxation during lengthy operations.

(2) a. DISCUSSION: Most of the useful intelligence information recovered during BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN was gathered from CASREPs, FRAG ORDERS, UTM GRID COORDINATES, SITREPs and CARGO OPERATIONS. The use of names in the clear and their codewords in the same transmission also made available useful intelligence information. Operator chatter, which can reveal all types of information, seemed prevalent at times. Many of these types of disclosures can be eliminated, whenever feasible, by use of couple codes (shackling) for numbers and grid coordinates, codewords for thrust points, landing zones, etc. Operators should be constantly alert for proper authentication and communication procedures.

b. LESSON LEARNED: The use of covered circuits, to the fullest extent possible, will deny useful intelligence information from being disclosed.

(3) a. DISCUSSION: Brevity codewords and frequency designators noted during BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN have been used for most of the past operations. These designators have been disclosed and no longer provide secure frequency or cover word concealment.

b. LESSON LEARNED: It is recommended that ALL frequency designators and ALL brevity codewords be changed for future operations.

(4) a. DISCUSSION: There were no known instances of enemy communication deception attempts during BEACON TORCH/CALHOUN. There was one case of suspected jamming on a voice circuit by CW.

b. LESSON LEARNED: Operators should be constantly aware of the possibility of deception attempts and jamming, and use proper procedures and authentication.

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3500LESSONS LEARNED

ORIGINATING COMMAND: COMPHIBREAGROUP BRAVO

Subj: MAJOR: CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
MINOR: (1) DASC LIAISON
(2) TACTICAL AIR COORDINATION

(1) a. DISCUSSION: Because of complexities of the air control system of the ARG/SLF operations, four liaison trips to the DASC ashore were conducted prior to this operation. These trips proved to be invaluable for the necessary coordination of supporting arms. A TACRON officer was also stationed at the DASC ashore during the operation when control of air was afloat. It was evident, however, that because of prior liaison with the DASC, the TACRON liaison officer in DASC served only as a convenience in coordination and not a necessary entity for coordination.

b. LESSON LEARNED: As many liaison trips as necessary should be conducted to the supporting DASC prior to all operations. As long as prior liaison is conducted, it is not necessary to exchange liaison officers between the DASC and the TACC during an operation.

(2) a. DISCUSSION: Because of the large area and volume of traffic assigned to the DASCs ashore, it is obvious that the DASCs cannot maintain the positive aircraft control for SLF operations that is necessary as long as the LPH remains in support of the ground forces.

b. LESSON LEARNED: While the LPH remains in support of the SLF, after control of supporting arms has been passed ashore, it is desirable to have the TACC revert to a TADC and become a subordinate control agency to the DASC in accordance with established amphibious doctrine. However, the TADC afloat should remain as an active direction agency when possible, and not an agency in standby status. All air operations then conducted within the SLF's TAOR is handed off to the TADC from the DASC for coordination with the SLF ground forces. SLF helicopters operating from the LPH also remain under the direction of the TADC afloat.

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3500

LESSONS LEARNED

Subj: MAJOR: SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE
MINOR: REQUIREMENT FOR MEDICAL REPAIRMAN ON DEPLOYED LPH

DISCUSSION: A medical repairman on board the LPH has been invaluable in maintaining the sophisticated medical equipment and keeping it at peak efficiency. Because of his skill, the X-ray machine, suction machines and respirators which are in constant use were kept functioning and in dependable working order. However, no definite allowance is made for a medical repairman on the LPH.

LESSON LEARNED: All LPHs deployed in a combat zone have a medical repairman on board.

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CARG "B"/N33:j1
3500LESSONS LEARNED

ORIGINATING COMMAND: COMPHIBREACTGROUP BRAVO

Subj: MAJOR: NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT SHIPS
MINOR: POSITIONS IN FIRE SUPPORT AREAS

DISCUSSION: SACC has a need to know NGFS ships' positions when the ships are ready to commence firing, in order to get the needed information for SAVAPLANES. In the past, ship positions have been transmitted by using KAC 138. This has caused some delays in commencement of fires because a six-digit coordinate has to be coupled by the NGFS ship, transmitted, then uncoupled in SACC. Radio fade-outs or missed couple groups necessitate retransmittal and more delay.

LESSON LEARNED: A novel idea was implemented during BEACON TORCH for ease in transmitting NGFS ships' positions over the NGF nets to SACC. Just as the Marines use "thrust points" to locate friendly positions, so too, a reference grid coordinate was picked within each FSA. Use of these reference points eliminated the need for KAC 138 to couple six-digit coordinates. Using this reference point method enabled SACC to know the exact position of the NGFS ships within FSAs in a matter of seconds.

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FF/7/FNM:rag
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Ser: IN6 086

3 APR 1969

RECEIVED
20 MAY 1969

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From: Commander SEVENTH Fleet

To: Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Operation DARING ENDEAVOR Post Operation Report; approval of (U)

Ref: (a) COMPHIBREADYGRU "B" Conf ltr CARG"B"/3500 ser N337018 of
13 December 1968

(b) COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT Conf ltr N31:PHL:gds 3500 ser 09 of
13 February 1969

1. References (a) and (b) have been reviewed and are approved for distribution as recommended reference (a) with additions and corrections noted reference (b).

2. The originator takes paragraph 6, enclosure (7), reference (a) for action. The Naval Communications Master Station, Western Pacific (NAVCAMS WESTPAC) will be reappraised of the communication deficiencies noted therein and the possible serious consequences of unsatisfactory support in future operations. The CAMS concept, per se, will be the subject of a special conference hosted by Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet in the near future.

3. The originator takes paragraph 3, enclosure (8), reference (a) for action. The news release cited and improved PAO coordination will be a topic of discussion at the forthcoming Commander SEVENTH Fleet Public Affairs Workshop in Subic Bay, 7-11 April 1969.

840 WILKS
HEADQUARTERS
1ST MARINE DIVISION
69 1810

ALPINE W. McLANE
Asst Chief of Staff
for Plans

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GROUP-4

Downgraded at 3-year intervals:

Declassified after 12 years.

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79 16.5

Operation DARING ENDEAVOR

7-17 Nov 1968

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014158

N31:RHL:gds

3500

Ser: 76-09

13 FEB 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander U. S. SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Operation DARING ENDEAVOR Post Operation Report;
forwarding of (U)

Encl: (1) COMPHIBREAGRU BRAVO ltr 3500 ser N33/042 of
13 December 1968 (5 copies)

1. (C) Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet concurs with the contents of enclosure (1) except as noted below:

a. Page 1, paragraph 2. Delete and replace with:

"2. (C) Background. CG III MAF originally proposed an operation for ARG/SLF BRAVO with the Americal Division in the Batangan Peninsula area. CTG 76.5/79.5 planners conducted liaison visits to Headquarters, Americal Division in Chu Lai on 3 and 5 November 1968. This operation was designated VALIANT SEARCH by COMSEVENTHFLT. On 7 November 1968, CG III MAF rescinded approval for OPERATION VALIANT SEARCH and proposed as a more lucrative target, an operation on Barrier Island. A liaison visit to Headquarters Americal Division on 8 November 1968 firmed up the requirements for this operation which was designated DARING ENDEAVOR by COMSEVENTHFLT. The operation was tentatively scheduled to be conducted 10-20 November 1968. The landward AOA was reduced in area to allow the Landing Force the desired thoroughness of their search/destroy mission. Other friendly units were within the proximity of the AOA in the Americal Division's Tactical Area of Responsibility."

b. Page 2, paragraph 3.b. Landing. Delete the last two sentences.

c. Page 2, insert new paragraph 3.b.(3) as follows:

"(3) A third phase, which was to have been conducted as Phase II between the assault and withdrawal phases, was preempted since the numerous enemy contacts in Phase I set back the operation time frame. This phase would have taken place on D+5, 15 November 1968, and planned for heliborne landings in the southern sector of the AOA with a northerly sweep operation in that area."

d. Page 2, paragraph 3.c.(1). Delete the second sentence and replace with: "The SLF was augmented with five UH-IES from Americal Division on D-Day for escort and control functions."

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e. Page 2, paragraph 3.d.(1). Delete and replace with: "(1) On D-Day the ARG and support shipping steamed into the AOA. Land the Landing Force was signalled at 0330H on 10 November 1968 and under cover of darkness, a waterborne assault was conducted with H-Hour 0630H. L-Hour for the heliborne assault was 0720H. The USS CLARION RIVER (LSMR-409) prep fired RED BEACH for 20 minutes with 200 rockets, commencing at 0600H. Waterborne Waves One and Two consisted of five and four LVT's respectively and Wave Three consisted of four LCM(8)s. Wave One reported touchdown at 0628H approximately 100 yards from waters edge. UDT personnel accompanied Wave One and conducted a rapid bottom survey. The waterborne waves landed two rifle companies, ECHO and FOXTROT. The LVT's returned to OGDEN and embarked the HOWTARS for landing over RED BEACH. The Beach Master and Shore Party detachments were landed by LCU 1497. The bulk of the on-call serials were landed by LCM(8)s."

f. Page 3, paragraph 3.d.(3). and 3.d.(4). Delete and replace with: "3.d.(3). Objective One, An Luong 1 and 2 (BT 203555), was seized on D-Day. Objective Two, Thang My (BT 183538), was seized and searched on D+1. Hotel Company, held in reserve aboard ARG shipping, was helo lifted into LZ DOVE in conjunction with a land sweep by forces previously in place. Objective Three, Lang Dong Island (BT 161535), was secured by 1200H on D+2. This was accomplished by a helo assault of ECHO and FOXTROT companies onto the island at 0800H. Following called prep fires by NGFS ships, BLT 2/7 swept south into the vicinity of Objective Four, Ngai Le 1, 2, & 3 (BT 196525), on 14 November 1968. On D+6 Hotel Company was helo lifted to RED BEACH to sweep the area and provide beach security. The remainder of BLT 2/7 commenced a sweep to the east and then northerly toward RED BEACH destroying all bunkers, tunnels and other emplacements enroute. On D+7, BLT 2/7 finished the sweep operations and commenced preparations for the withdrawal of ECHO and FOXTROT companies from RED BEACH and the remainder of the BLT from LZ ROBIN."

g. Change paragraph "3.d.(5)" to read "3.d.(4)".

h. Page 3, paragraph 3.e.(1). In the next to last line insert "Americal" between the words "with" and "resources".

i. Page 4, paragraph 4. Delete the second and third sentences.

j. Enclosure (3), page 3, under 16 NOV. In line 1 change "remained" to read "remaining".

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k. Enclosure (7), page 1 and 2. Change "NON/FNN" to read "NON/FFN" where occurring.

l. Enclosure (7), page 2, paragraph 6, third from last line. Change "NGS(s)" to read "NCS(s)".

m. Enclosure (7), page 3, paragraph 10.b. In the first line change "reocurence" to read "reoccurrence".

n. Enclosure (11). Delete "CTF 117" and "COMLANSHIPRON THREE", and "COMPHIBGRU THREE" and change "OIC, NAVSPECWARGRUPAC WP DET" to read "OIC, WP DET NAVSPECWARGRU".

F.W. CLIFT III
Chief of Staff

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COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP BRAVO
PPO SAN FRANCISCO 96601

CARG"R"/3500
Ser N33/042
13 December 1968

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From: Commander Amphibious Ready Group BRAVO
To: Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet
Subj: Operation DARING ENDEAVOR Post Operation Report; forwarding of (U)
Ref: (a) COMPHIBFORSSEVENTHFLT/CTF 76 INST 3500.1B
Encl: (1) Task Organization
(2) Initiating Directive
(3) Chronology of Events
(4) Planning/Operations
(5) Intelligence
(6) Medical/Logistics
(7) Communications
(8) Public Affairs
(9) Supporting Arms
(10) Map
(11) Distribution

1. (U) In accordance with reference (a), the following report, with enclosures (1) through (11), is submitted.

2. (C) Background. CG III MAF originally proposed an operation for ARG/SLF BRAVO with the Americal Division in the Batangan Peninsula area. CTF 76.5/79.5 planners conducted liaison visits to Headquarters, Americal Division in Chu Lai on 3 and 5 November 1968. This operation was designated VALIANT SEARCH by COMSEVENTHFLT. On 7 November 1968, CG III MAF rescinded approval for OPERATION VALIANT SEARCH and proposed as a more lucrative target, an operation on Barrier Island. A liaison visit to Headquarters Americal Division on 8 November 1968 firmed up the requirements for this operation which was designated DARING ENDEAVOR by COMSEVENTHFLT. The operation was tentatively scheduled to be conducted 10-20 November 1968. The landward AOA was reduced in area to allow the Landing Force the desired thoroughness of their search/destroy mission. Other friendly units were within the proximity of the AOA in the Americal Division's Tactical Area of Responsibility.

3. (C) Concept of Operation and Execution.

a. Mission. When directed, CATE conduct an Amphibious Operation against VC/NVA forces in Amphibious Objective Area in Quang Nam/Quang Tin Provinces of ICFZ in order to find, fix and destroy enemy forces and capture and destroy enemy material and fortifications and to conduct such other operations as agreed upon with CG, III MAF or his designated representative.

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b. Landing. Operation DARING ENDEAVOR was a combined heliborne and waterborne assault into the AOA. The operation was conducted in two phases.

(1) PHASE I: This phase consisted of a combined waterborne/heliborne amphibious assault on the morning of 10 November. The waterborne elements landed over RED BEACH, centered at BT222555. The heliborne elements landed in LZ BLUE JAY located at BT195550. Following the landings, critical complexes in the northern sector of the AOA were seized and a combat sweep/destroy operation throughout the northern sector, including Lang Dong Island, was conducted.

(2) PHASE II: On 17 November an amphibious withdrawal was conducted over RED BEACH and from LZ Robin.

(3) A third phase, which was to have been conducted as Phase II between the assault and withdrawal phases, was preempted since the numerous enemy contacts in Phase I set back the operation time frame. This phase would have taken place on D+5, 15 November 1968, and planned for heliborne landings in the southern sector of the AOA with a northerly sweep operation in that area.

c. Supporting and Augmenting Forces.

(1) The ARG was provided with one DDG, one DD and one LSMR by CTU 70.8.9 to furnish Naval Gunfire (NGF) support and two WPB/PCF craft by CTG 115.1 to furnish anti-infiltration/exfiltration patrol support. The SLF was augmented with five UH-1ES from Americal Division on D-Day for escort and control functions. Additional helicopter assets were provided from in-country sources but no additional helicopter resources were havened aboard ARG shipping. CAS and other aerial support requirements were furnished by the Americal Division and FIRST MAW.

(2) There were no unexpected or complicating factors in the assault or subsequent movement of troops ashore. The Americal Division ("C" Troop, 1/1 Cavalry) provided the major land support force for DARING ENDEAVOR by providing perimeter forces to the west and south of the AOA, plus, sweep forces in southern sector of the AOA. The Americal Division also provided UH-1 Gunships, spotters and liaison teams for the entire operation in addition to Marine assets. During the operation, ROK Marines provided blocking forces and conducted operations on the north side of the Cua Dai and Thu Bon rivers. PCF craft were employed in the deeper/wider portion of the Cua Dai River to provide security/protective measures along the northern boundary of the AOA and to prevent infiltration/exfiltration into/from the AOA.

d. Conduct of the Operation.

(1) On D-Day the ARG and support shipping steamed into the AOA. Land the Landing Force was signalled at 0330H on 10 November 1968 and under cover of darkness, a waterborne assault was conducted with H-Hour 0630H. L-Hour for the heliborne assault was 0720H. The USS CLARION RIVER (LSMR-409) prep fired RED BEACH for 20 minutes with 200 rockets, commencing at 0600H.

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Waterborne Waves One and Two consisted of five and four LVT's respectively and Wave Three consisted of four LCM(8)s. Wave One reported touchdown at 0628H, approximately 100 yards from waters edge. UDT personnel accompanied Wave One and conducted a rapid bottom survey. The waterborne waves landed two rifle companies, ECHO and FOXTROT. The LVT's returned to OGDEN and embarked the HOWTARS for landing over RED BEACH. The Beach Master and Shore Party detachments were landed by LCU 1497. The bulk of the on-call serials were landed by LCM(8)s.

(2) Heliborne Wave One lifted GOLF Company into LZ BLUE JAY at 0721H. The LZ was prepped by Naval Gunfire because bad weather prevented arrival of planned CAS. A few specific on-call serials were landed by helicopters on request.

(3) Objective One, An Luong 1 and 2 (BT 203555), was seized on D-Day. Objective Two, Thang My (BT 183538), was seized and searched on D+1. Hotel Company, held in reserve aboard ARG shipping, was helo lifted into LZ DOVE in conjunction with a land sweep by forces previously in place. Objective Three, Lang Dong Island (BT 161535), was secured by 1200H on D+2. This was accomplished by a helo assault of ECHO and FOXTROT companies onto the island at 0800H. Following called prep fires by NGFS ships, BLT 2/7 swept south into the vicinity of Objective Four, Ngai Le 1, 2, & 3 (BT 196525), on 14 November 1968. On D+6 Hotel Company was helo lifted to RED BEACH to sweep the area and provide beach security. The remainder of BLT 2/7 commenced a sweep to the east and then northerly toward RED BEACH destroying all bunkers, tunnels and other emplacements enroute. On D+7, BLT 2/7 finished the sweep operations and commenced preparations for the withdrawal of ECHO and FOXTROT companies from RED BEACH and the remainder of the BLT from LZ ROBIN.

(4) Operation DARING ENDEAVOR was terminated at 171800H upon completion of the backload of BLT 2/7 aboard the ARG shipping.

e. Civic Action/Psychological Warfare Employed.

(1) No civic action was conducted. However, two three-man teams composed of Beach Jumper Unit ONE, WESTPAC Detachment ALFA personnel were attached to the two assault rifle companies. These teams, at various times during the Operation, played several different tapes to small group of indigenous personnel. The Themes of the tapes expounded upon the "CHIEU HOI" (Open Arms) Program and stressed the futility of the VC efforts and the invincibility of the FWMAF. The loudspeaker teams were also used to control detainees and to broadcast messages to surrounded enemy forces offering them a chance to surrender prior to use of supporting arms. And, in conjunction with Americal resources in-country, a leaflet drop was conducted coincident with a tactical troop movement.

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(2) The population of the area was considered to be hostile and a hard line approach PsyOps-wise was used. Although one VC did rally as a Quy Chanh under the Chieu Hoi Program, just what effect the PsyOps endeavors had on him making his decision to rally, is unknown.

f. Protective Measures Employed.

(1) During the Operation Task Group 76.5 ships remained underway, steaming during the day in assigned AOA areas. TG 76.5 units would night steam in assigned BARBARA OPAREAS except for TRIPOLI, which remained within the LPH AOA OPAREA for MEDEVAC/RESUPPLY missions. The ships steamed darkened.

(2) PFC craft were used on the Cua Dai River for infiltration/exfiltration control. CTG 76.5 gave permission for the PFCs to depart the river patrol when land forces employed night illumination since this illumination lighted up the PCFs as lucrative targets for VC ashore. Heavy seas/swells during the last few days of the Operation forced the PCFs to remain in Danang Harbor. During withdrawal the PCFs were able to return to patrol duty.

g. Statistical Summary.

(1) BLT 2/7 on Operation DARING ENDEAVOR accounted for 39 enemy killed, 30 VC/NVA POWs, and 306 detainees. One VC rallied to the RVN Chieu Hoi Program. The BLT captured the following enemy equipment/material (Disposition not reported): 1 Carbine, 2 AK-47s, 1 RPG-2, 2 SKSs, 20 RDs AK-47 ammo, 25 RDs SKS ammo, 10 RDs 7.62 ammo, 5 CHICOM grenades, 1 Bouncing Betty M-16A Anti-personnel Mine, 3 AK-47 magazines, 1 Carbine magazine, 6200 lbs of rice, and numerous assorted VC/NVA documents, clothing and individual equipment. 1 250 lb bomb rigged as a mine was captured and destroyed in place. 70 bunkers, 5 tunnels, 3 structures and 5 punji pits were destroyed.

(2) Friendly losses totalled 1 killed and 36 wounded (including one USA).

(3) During Operation DARING ENDEAVOR, HMM 165 provided support to BLT 2/7 with MEDEVAC and logistical flights. Within this period, 10-17 November, HMM 165 flew 1256 sorties, 244.4 hours, transporting 3624 passengers and 163.95 tons of cargo.

4. (C) Conclusions. Operation DARING ENDEAVOR was considered to be a very effective operation not only in accomplishments ashore...kill ratio, thoroughness of searches and destruction of enemy property, but also as an Amphibious Ready Group Operation. The ability to temporarily deny enemy forces the use of their territory, while destroying their fortifications and supplies, was fully realized.

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5. (C) Recommendation. It is recommended that the use of the ARG/SIF team as employed in Operation DARING ENDEAVOR be continued in future ARG/SIF Special Operations.

/s/ L. SAVADKIN

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DARING ENDEAVORTASK ORGANIZATION

TG 76.5	<u>Amphibious Ready Group BRAVO</u> USS TRIPOLI (LPH 10) USS OGDEN (LPD 5) USS MONTICELLO (LSD 35) USS SEMINOLE (AKA 104) *USS TOWERS (DDG 9) *USS COGSWELL (DD 651) *USS CLARION RIVER (LSMR 409) (10-11 NOV)	<u>CAPT L. SAVADKIN, USN</u> <u>COMPHIBRON ELEVEN</u>
TG 79.5	<u>Special Landing Force</u> BLT 2/7 HMM 165	<u>COL R. R. WILSON, USMC</u> <u>CLSF BRAVO</u>
TU 76.5.0	<u>Special Operations and Command Unit</u>	<u>CAPT L. SAVADKIN, USN</u> <u>COMPHIBRON ELEVEN</u>
TE 76.5.0.1	<u>Flagship Element</u> USS TRIPOLI (LPH 10)	<u>CAPT D. B. SHELTON, USN</u> <u>USS TRIPOLI (LPH 10)</u>
TE 76.5.0.2	<u>Tactical Air Control Element</u> TACRON 13 DET B	<u>LCDR G. D. CAMPBELL, USN</u> <u>OIC TACRON 13 DET B</u>
TE 76.5.0.3	<u>UDT Element</u> UDT 11 DET F	<u>LTJG J. F. WAGNER, USNR</u> <u>OIC UDT 11 DET F</u>
TE 76.5.0.4	<u>Special Operations Element</u> BJU 1 WESTPAC DET A	<u>CWO-2 J. A. SEARS, USN</u> <u>OIC BJU 1 WESTPAC DET A</u>
TU 76.5.1	<u>Gunfire Support & Screen Unit</u> *USS TOWERS (DDG 9) *USS COGSWELL (DD 651) *USS CLARION RIVER (LSMR 409)(10-11 NOV)	<u>CDR E. W. CARTER III, USN</u> <u>CO, USS TOWERS (DDG 9)</u>
TU 76.5.2	<u>Amphibious Assault Unit</u> USS TRIPOLI (LPH 10) USS OGDEN (LPD 5) USS MONTICELLO (LSD 35) USS SEMINOLE (AKA 104)	<u>CAPT L. SAVADKIN, USN</u> <u>COMPHIBRON ELEVEN</u>
TE 76.5.2.1	<u>Beach Party Element</u> BMU 1 DET B-7	<u>LTJG J. K. HUTCHINSON, USNR</u> <u>OIC BMU 1 DET B-7</u>
TE 76.5.2.2	<u>Control Element</u> USS OGDEN (LPD 5)	<u>CAPT E. G. CARROLL, USN</u> <u>CO, USS OGDEN (LPD 5)</u>

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TE 76.5.2.3 Assault Craft Element
ACU 1 DET B

LTJG F. B. CONZE, USNR
OIC, ACU 1 DET B

TE 76.5.2.4 Helicopter Assault Transport Element
USS TRIPOLI (LPH 10)

CAPT D. E. SHELTON, USN
CO, USS TRIPOLI (LPH 10)

TU 76.5.4 Area Defense Unit

CAPT L. SAVADKIN, USN
COMPHIBRON ELEVEN

TE 76.5.4.1 Surface Patrol Element

CAPT J. A. HOMYAK, USN
CO, USS MONTICELLO (LSD 35)

*PGM 608, VNN (10 NOV)

*PCF 99 (10-11 NOV)

*USCG PT WELCOME (WPB 82329)(10-11 NOV)

*PCF 80 (11-12, 14-15 NOV)

*PCF 79 (11-12 NOV)

*PCF 69 (12-13 NOV)

*PCF 13 (12-13 NOV)

*PCF 27 (13-14 NOV)

*PCF 56 (13-14 NOV)

*PCF 81 (14-15 NOV)

*Augmenting Forces

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DARING ENDEAVOR INITIATING DIRECTIVE (COMSEVENTHFLT 080542Z NOV 68)

Ref: (a) COMSEVENTHFLT OPLAN 101-69
 (b) NWP 22(B)/FM 31-11/AFM 2-53/LFM 01

1. SITUATION. CG III MAF has requested the employment of an ARG/SLF in support of operations conducted by the Americal Division in the ICTZ. COMSEVENTHFLT will provide TG 76.5/79.5 and such other forces as may be necessary for this operation. Initiating directive effective for planning purposes. The operation when executed, will be conducted in accordance with reference (a).
2. MISSION. When directed, CATF conduct an Amphibious Operation against VC/NVA forces in Amphibious Objective Area in Quang Nam/Quang Tin Provinces of ICTZ in order to find, fix and destroy enemy forces and capture and destroy enemy material and fortifications and to conduct such other operations as agreed upon with CG III MAF or his designated representative.
3. CTG 76.5 (COMPHIBRON ELEVEN) embarked in USS TRIPOLI (LPH 10) designated Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF).
4. CTG 79.5 (COMMANDER SLF BRAVO) embarked in USS TRIPOLI (LPH 10) designated Commander Landing Force (CLF).
5. Command relationships in accordance with paragraph 3.x.(2) and (3) of reference (a).
6. COMUSMACV will provide anti-infiltration/exfiltration patrol craft for this operation and will provide CAS and other support as agreed upon with CATF in accordance with paragraph 1.b.(1) of reference (a).
7. The Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) will be promulgated by separate message.
8. Nickname for this operation will be DARING ENDEAVOR with tentative D-Day 10 November 1968. D-Day and H and L Hours to be determined and confirmed by CATF. When forces are prepared, CATF report to originator state of readiness and final confirmation concerning D-Day, H and L Hours. Execute on D-Day at H and L Hours unless otherwise directed. Report execution to ALCON.
9. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
 - a. Withdrawal in accordance Annex B to reference (a).
10. Termination in accordance with Annex B to reference (b).

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11. Public Affairs in accordance with Annex V to reference (a).
12. Action addressees acknowledge receipt.
13. Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL upon termination.

By COMSEVENTHFLT 081448Z NOV 68 the Amphibious Operation Area (AOA) was established as follows: The landward AOA will be that land encompassed by a line commencing at grid posit BT223577 southwesterly along the Cua Dai and Thu Bon Rivers to grid posit BT150531 southeasterly along the Truong Giang River, to include Lang Dong Island and Con Go Bien Islands, to intersection EW gridline BT46 thence east along EW gridline BT46 to coastline. The seaward AOA is the sea area encompassed by a straight line beginning at BT190589 easterly to seaward to Lat 15-57N, Long 108-49.5E thence southerly along a 25 NM arc centered at BT232515 to Lat 15-41N, Long 108-49.2E thence westerly along a straight line to BT335318. The air space above the AOA from the surface to 25,000 ft MSL shall be included within the control area. A free transit area for aircraft will exist above 5,000 ft MSL from the coastline of the landward AOA out seaward four miles and above 2,500 ft MSL from four miles to seaward of coastline to the outer extremity of the seaward AOA.

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OPERATION DARING ENDEAVOR CHRONOLOGY

- 7 NOV Amphibious assault Operation VALIANT SEARCH rescinded by CG, III MAF in favor of operation on BARRIER ISLAND. Arranged meeting with Americal Division Planners for 8 NOV. USS TOWERS (DDG 9) joined TG 76.5 at 1800H.
- 8 NOV Commenced planning BARRIER ISLAND operation. Issued Proposed Initiating Directive to COMSEVENTHFLT at 1132H. COMSEVENTHFLT issued Initiating Directive at 1342H nicknaming the BARRIER ISLAND operation Operation DARING ENDEAVOR. CG, NINTH MAB visited CTG 76.5/79.5. TG 76.5/TG 79.5 planners met with Americal Division planners at Americal Division Headquarters during the morning. Proposed AOA to COMSEVENTHFLT following meeting with Americal Division Planners at 1651H and AOA assigned by COMSEVENTHFLT at 2248H. USS COGSWELL (DD 651) joined TG 76.5 at 2335H.
- 9 NOV Continued general planning for Operation DARING ENDEAVOR having issued the basic OORDER at 0039H. CTG 76.5 conducted Pre-sail briefing for TG 76.5 CO's, OPS, Communications and Weapons Officers. Embarked Combat Camera Team in TRIPOLI. USS CLARION RIVER (LSMR 409) reported for duty 2340H. TG 76.5 departed DaNang holding areas after sunset enroute AOA. At midnight CATF reported ready to execute Operation DARING ENDEAVOR. Confirmed D-Day as of 10 NOV, with H-Hour as 0630 and L-Hour as 0700H.
- 10 NOV CATF signalled Land the Landing Force at 0415H. NGFS ship CLARION RIVER prep fired RED BEACH and TOWERS prep fired Objective One from 0600H to 0620H. First waterborne wave composed of LVT's touched down on RED BEACH at 0628H. (LVT's reported touch down about 100 yards off beach.) No opposition was encountered. Due to the tactical situation, weather and absence of CAS it was decided at 0655 to delay L-Hour to 0720. NGFS ships TOWERS and COGSWELL prep fired LZ BLUE JAY from 0700H to 0719H. First Heliborne wave of "G" Company touched down LZ BLUE JAY 0721H. No opposition. PCF 99 and USCGC PT WELCOME (WPB 82329) and VNN PGM 608 reported to patrol duty and were briefed. Released VNN PGM 608 from TG 76.5 at 1630H. TOWERS provided H and I fires from 102200H to 110400H.

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- 11 NOV At 0630H BLT commenced attack on Objective Two securing it immediately.
UDT inserted on GREEN BEACH at 0900H by OGDEN boats and retracted by helo at 1356H after abortive effort to conduct beach survey due to surf conditions.
Boating to RED BEACH secured due to surf conditions at noon and resumed about 1600H.
PCF 80 reported for duty 1340H.
PT WELCOME WPB 82329 detached 1500H.
CLARION RIVER detached to OPCON CTU 70.8.9 at 1600H.
PCF 79 relieved by PCF 99 1600H.
CTG 76.5/CTG 79.5 representatives visited Headquarters III MAF to discuss future operations.
CAPT J. W. O'NEIL, USN, Chief of Staff CTF 76 visited CTG 76.5/CTG 79.5 aboard TRIPOLI.
COGSWELL provided H and I fires from 112200H to 120400H.
- 12 NOV TOWERS and COGSWELL commenced prep fires on Objective Three at 0700H. Fires lifted 0745H.
Helo assault conducted on Objective Three at 0800H and after securing the objective by 1200H and conducting a sweep of the area, troops were withdrawn to Objective Two at 1500H.
PCF 13 relieved PCF 80 at 1330H.
PCF 69 relieved PCF 79 at 1430H.
MAJ General GETTYS, CG, Americal Division and party visited CTG 76.5/CTG 79.5.
COGSWELL fired H and I fires from 122200H to 130400H.
- 13 NOV SEMINOLE detached 0001H to proceed to Singapore.
Brigadier General COOKSEY and Brigadier General GALLOWAY, ADC's Americal Division visited CTG 76.5/CTG 79.5 aboard TRIPOLI during AM and PM respectively.
PCF's 27 and 56 relieved PCF's 13 and 69 at 1300H.
COGSWELL provided H and I fires from 132200H until 140400H.
- 14 NOV COGSWELL prep fired Objective Four from 0630H until 0800H.
BLT commenced attack on Objective Four at 0700H and secured northern half by nightfall.
BJU conducted PSYOPS ashore.
Vice Admiral O'BRIEN, RN, Commander Far East Forces and party visited CTG 76.5 and CTG 79.5 aboard TRIPOLI.
PCF's secured operations in Cua Dai River due to night illumination at 2100H and returned to DaNang Harbor.
TOWERS provided H and I fires from 142200H to 150400H.
COGSWELL fired illumination on call.

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- 15 NOV Surf conditions precluded PCF support and PCF's remained in DaNang Harbor.
At 0700H BLT commenced attack on Intermediate Objective DELTA preparatory to seizing southern half Objective Four. Objective Four secured by nightfall.
TOWERS provided on call fire ashore.
- 16 NOV Surf conditions precluded PCF support of PCF's remaining in DaNang Harbor.
At 0730H BLT Commenced attack on Objective Seven and after securing it at 1055H moved on to RED BEACH.
TOWERS provided on call/prep fires during the day and H and I fires from 112000H until 170400H.
CTG 76.5/CTG 79.5 and selected Staff members made planning visits to CTF 76, Headquarters, FIRST MARDIV and CP, FIRST Marine Regiment concerning future operation.
Commenced backload selected BLT equipment over RED BEACH at 1300H.
- 17 NOV PCF's returned to patrol Cua Dai River.
ARG/SLF BRAVO commenced withdrawal of forces ashore by boat from RED BEACH and Heliborne lifts from Landing Zone ROBIN at 0700H.
TOWERS provided H and I fires from 1000H until 1300H.
Vice Admiral SMITH, USN. COMPHIBPAC and party arrived aboard TRIPOLI at 1300 and following briefings on current operation visited the OGDEN, MONTICELLO and TRIPOLI.
Admiral SMITH and party remained overnight aboard TRIPOLI.
COGSWELL and PCF's released to normal OPGON 1600H.
TOWERS released to normal OPGON 1800H.
ARG/SLF BRAVO completed withdrawal of BLT 2/7.
Terminated Operation DARING ENDEAVOR at 1800H.

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PLANNING/OPERATIONS DARING ENDEAVOR

1. On 3 November, ARG/SLF Planners arrived at Americal Division Headquarters to commence planning an operation subsequently named VALIANT SEARCH. On 7 November, after a second planning visit on 5 November, a message rescinding this operation in favor of a more lucrative operation on BARRIER ISLAND was received. As a result of these meetings good rapport and working relations had been established between the ARG/SLF and Americal Division personnel. Consequently, when the order to conduct planning for the BARRIER ISLAND Operation was promulgated a good understanding of what could be expected from the Americal Division was already known. Subsequent to a liaison visit by CTG 76.5/CTG 79.5 to CG, III MAF Headquarters, ARG/SLF planners again visited Americal Division Headquarters the morning of 8 November and planning for Operation DARING ENDEAVOR was commenced. It was at this meeting that the majority of the planning was accomplished in the areas of mission assignment, defining landward AOA, Intelligence, Communications, Command and Control, Naval Gunfire, Air Control and Military/Political Clearances. Various agreements were reached between TG 76.5/TG 79.5 and Americal Division personnel at this meeting. These agreements were promulgated by Americal Division 080035Z NOV 68 and clarified by CTG 76.5 091322Z NOV 68. The more prominent of these agreements were:

a. That the mission and the extent of the landward AOA was to be as stated in CTG 76.5 Proposed Initiating Directive and issued in COMSEVENTHFLT Initiating Directive.

b. That Americal Division would coordinate with the Second ROK Brigade to obtain a boundary extension that included the AOA as outlined in the Proposed Initiating Directive and issued in COMSEVENTHFLT Initiating Directive, and would coordinate for ROK Forces to provide a screening force for the northwestern portion of the AOA for the duration of the Operation.

c. That Americal Division would provide screening forces (FIRST Squadron, FIRST Cavalry) along entire western and southern boundaries of the AOA.

d. That all aircraft below 25,000 feet MSL over the landward AOA, below 5,000 feet MSL within four miles of the coastline in the seaward AOA, and below 2,500 feet MSL outside four miles of the coastline and out to the 25 mile extremity of the seaward AOA would check with the TACC aboard TRIPOLI for clearance. The TACC would inform all aircraft passing through it's area of control to report to the Americal Aircraft Warning Control Center (AWCC) for clearance upon leaving it's area of control and entering the Americal AWCC's area of control.

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e. That all air strikes called within the AOA would be cleared through the TACC aboard TRIPOLI. This was to include air strikes called by FIRST Cavalry, if operating in the AOA.

f. That Americal Division would respond to calls for artillery fire from LZ BALDY in support of the operation. A quick fire channel was to be established between the SLF ground Commander and D/3-82 artillery.

g. That Division TACP would be notified of all pre-planned and immediate air strikes in the AOA in order to keep the FAC's operating in adjacent AO's informed.

h. That the Americal Division would obtain Political Clearance for fires within the AOA.

i. That Americal Division would coordinate with Province Headquarters to procure NPFF, PRU, and APT resources when requested by CO of SLF.

j. That liaison officers would be exchanged between Headquarters, Americal Division and the SLF. These officers were to coordinate all requests for boundary extensions, clearance of fires, and requests for all types of support from the Americal Division. Further, that the SLF would place a liaison officer at Hoi An Province Headquarters for coordination of fires.

k. That captured POW's and documents would be evacuated to the CATF's Flagship for immediate interrogation/evacuation and then delivered to DaNang Military Intelligence Facilities (DIOC). The SLF was to provide the name, date and place of capture, location and mission of enemy unit, capturing unit, LBN, infiltration group and dates of departure from NVN and arrival in SVN on all POW's to DIOC. Female POW's would be evacuated directly to DaNang. Wounded prisoners would be evacuated to NSA Hospital, DaNang.

l. That Americal Division would provide two Interrogation Teams, one Counter-Intelligence Team, three Kit Carson Scouts, four interpreters and Scout Dog Teams to support the SLF Operation.

m. That Americal Division would provide PSYOP support on a mission basis. All requirements for propaganda material would be submitted through Americal Division.

n. Both ARG BRAVO and SLF BRAVO would make Americal Division DIOC info on their usual 12 and 6 hour respectively SITREPS to higher authorities, as well as all SPOTREPS.

o. That JP-4 and Helicopter Armament Munitions would be made available at LZ BALDY for support of the Operation.

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2. Early 9 November CTG 76.5 Operation Order 304-69 and supporting Annexes were completed and distribution initiated. Selected ARG/SLF members returned to Americal Division Headquarters on the morning of 9 November to confirm all aspects of coordination, and planning was completed for Operation DARING ENDEAVOR that afternoon.

3. In preparing for Operation DARING ENDEAVOR personal contact by ARG/SLF BRAVO personnel with the following in-country staffs was effected: CG, Americal Division; CG, III MAF; CG, FIRST MAW; Commander 1/1 Cavalry, Americal Division; DaNang DASC; CTG 115.1; CG 14. ROKMC and Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces, as well as necessary District officials were contacted by Americal Division personnel.

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INTELLIGENCE

1. The Intelligence estimate produced by the joint intelligence office was accurate.
2. No EEI's were levied by higher authority during Operation DARING ENDEAVOR.
3. A beach survey was attempted on a portion of beach from BT243480 to BT246474 on D+1 but high surf rendered the operation futile and the UDT team was helo lifted off the beach and returned to the Task Group with negative results.
4. Beach surveys from NIS proved accurate.
5. Light contact was maintained throughout the Operation with Local Force VC. No large scale contacts occurred.
6. No new intelligence was developed during Operation DARING ENDEAVOR.

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MEDICAL/LOGISTICSA. MEDICAL1. General

a. The Amphibious Operation DARING ENDEAVOR commenced at first light on 10 November 1968 with the landing of BLT 2/7 by air and by sea about 17 miles southeast of DaNang in Quang Nam province. The Operation was terminated at 1800 on 17 November 1968 upon the completion of backloading of BLT 2/7. Sniper fire, occasional hidden firing devices, and grenade blasts were the primary source of injuries.

b. USS TRIPOLI (LPH 10) was designated primary casualty receiving facility in addition to providing support to the BLT ashore.

2. Medical Officers available for the operation:ARG/SLF Surgical Evacuation Team BRAVO

1 Orthopedic Surgeon
1 General Surgeon
1 Anesthesiologist
1 General Medical Officer

HMM 165

1 General Medical Officer
(Flight Surgeon)

Ship's Medical Officer

1 General Medical Officer

C&C Platoon

3 General Medical Officers

BAS

1 General Medical Officer

3. Casualties Received

a. Combat injuries:	35
(1) Killed in action	1
(2) Wounded in action	34
(3) Died of wounds	0
b. Non-combat injuries:	22
(1) Died, non-battle casualty	0
c. Vietnamese Casualties received:	4
(1) ARVN PRU	1
(2) Civilian	3
d. Total:	61

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4. Surgical Procedures Performed:

- a. General 11
 - (1) Major 7
 - (2) Minor 4
- b. Orthopedics: 27
 - (1) Major 12
 - (2) Minor 15
 - (3) Extremities 30
 - (a) Upper 10
 - (b) Lower 20
 - (4) Amputations 1
 - (a) Right distal index finger
 - (5) Fractures 2
- c. Anesthesia:
 - (1) General 10
 - (2) Spinal 9
 - (3) Local 5
 - (4) Regional blocks 1
 - (5) Auxiliary blocks 1
 - (6) Supra-clavicular blocks 2
 - (7) Penthrane Duke Inhaler 11

5. Blood

- a. Units on hand for operation 108
- b. Units drawn locally 15
- c. Units actually transfused 17
- d. Units transferred to in-country facility 0
- e. Units actually cross matched 74

6. Disposition

- a. Transferred 13
- b. Returned to duty 15

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c. Remaining

33

7. Comments

a. After the long period of inactivity, the first twenty-four hours of casualty receiving was somewhat ragged and inefficient but all hands quickly adapted and the remainder of the Operation was handled smoothly and with dispatch. No new or unusual problems were encountered in the Operation. However, the capability of maintaining two operating rooms was retained only by utilizing the TRIPOLI Dental Officer who is highly competent in the field of anesthesia. The surgical team is currently without the services of a nurse anesthetist.

B. LOGISTICS

1. During Operation DARING ENDEAVOR 10-17 November 1968, no significant material casualties occurred.

2. An UNREP scheduled for TOWERS and COGSWELL on 12 November 1968 was cancelled by PLATTE due to sea state and an excessive number of commitments. The low fuel state which resulted from this cancellation (TOWERS with approximately 30 percent aboard) necessitated a request for an emergency UNREP. PLATTE returned to the area and refueled both TOWERS and COGSWELL on 14 November 1968.

3. The following is a list of UNREPS/VERTREPS conducted by TG 76.5 ships, including assigned NGFS ships, during Operation DARING ENDEAVOR.

11 NOV	TOWERS/COGSWELL conducted UNREP with CHARA (AE 31).
12 NOV	TOWERS conducted VERTREP with MARS (AFS 1). OGDEN conducted UNREP with PLATTE (AO 24).
14 NOV	TOWERS/COGSWELL conducted UNREP with PLATTE (AO 24). COGSWELL conducted UNREP with WRANGELL (AE 12).
15 NOV	MONTICELLO/OGDEN/COGSWELL conducted UNREP with GRAFFIAS (AF 29). OGDEN received TRIPOLI requirements. MONTICELLO conducted UNREP from NECHES (AO 47). TRIPOLI conducted Intra-Task Group VERTREP with OGDEN.
16 NOV	TOWERS/COGSWELL conducted UNREP with NECHES (AO 47). TOWERS/COGSWELL conducted UNREP with WRANGELL (AE 12).

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COMMUNICATIONS

1. Planning. ARG representatives and their SLF counterparts attended the communications planning conference with the Americal Division on 8 and 9 November during the planning stages of Operation DARING ENDEAVOR. Frequencies assigned were cleared by Americal Division and assigned by CG, III MAF. Additional frequencies utilized were some of the basic circuits listed in CTG 76.5 OPLAN 101-68.
2. Requirements vs Assets. All available equipment was utilized with no reserves for equipment failures replacement. Fortunately no prolonged equipment failures occurred. Naval Gunfire Support as well as Boat Operations circuits necessitated dual assignment of frequencies on some of the less frequently used circuits.
3. Frequencies. The frequencies assigned were adequate and no major problems were encountered. However, during the latter period of the Operation, some interference on UHF Air Circuits was noted. This was attributed to conflict of UHF frequencies assigned by COMSEVENTHFLT and COMUSMACV. This interference problem was ultimately resolved by exchange of communications wirenotes.
4. Traffic Flow. No significant message backlog occurred during the Operation, except for the situation noted in paragraph 6 below. After D-Day, traffic flow was smooth and timely throughout.
5. Crypto Systems. Adequate Crypto material was available and no resupply was necessary, except as noted in paragraph 6 below.
6. NAVCOMOPNET Termination/FFN Entry. Prior to the scheduled SPECOP, CTG 76.5/USS TRIPOLI was terminated with USS ARLINGTON NON/FFN. ARLINGTON was due to leave station on the morning of 10 November (D-Day of Operation DARING ENDEAVOR), and NAVCOMS WESTPAC directed a shift of the CTG 76.5/TRIPOLI termination to USS ELDORADO at 100100Z. To avoid a termination shift which coincided with D-Day of the Operation, CTG 76.5 requested NAVCAMS to delay shift until 11 November. This request was not immediately acted upon and preparations were made to shift the NON/FFN termination to the AGC as scheduled. During this time, a frequency plan was prepared and promulgated for Operation DARING ENDEAVOR which assigned compatible HF frequencies to CTG 76.5 operational circuits and left HF frequencies in the 2, 3 and 4 MHZ range open for the AGC termination. Shipboard equipments, antenna couplers in particular, were allocated to provide the most efficient service with the least mutual interference. On the eve of the Operation, NAVCAMS directed a termination shift from the AGMR to NCS Cam Rahn Bay instead of the AGC. At approximately

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091300Z, TRIPOLI commenced her attempts to shift the termination from ARLINGTON to NCS CRB. NCS CRB called for frequencies in the 9, 10 and 11 MHZ range which TRIPOLI was unable to bring up because of antenna coupler limitations/RFI without changing the entire frequency plan for the Operation. A combination of the aforementioned factors, some technical difficulties and poor frequency propagation, precluded a successful termination with NCS CRB and for approximately 18 hours during the most critical part of the Operation, TRIPOLI was without an effective termination. Fortunately, during this period, CTF 76 in USS ELDORADO arrived in the area and entered the CTG 76.5 Task Group ORESTES Circuit and relieved the situation by accepting and relaying all critical pre-D-Day traffic via his NON/FFN circuits. At approximately D+10 hours, CTG 76.5 via CTF 76 requested to shift the termination from NCS CRB to USS ELDORADO. This was approved by NAVCAMS and the shift was effected without serious problems or prolonged outage. During the remainder of the Operation, ELDORADO provided NON Termination and direct FFN entry with a high level of reliability on both circuits. Another aggravating factor was that TRIPOLI had not received a shipment of MATSYM cards and was critically short of keying material in common with NCS(s) CRB, Japan and Guam. It should be noted that NAVCAMS WESTPAC was advised (CTG 76.5 070533Z NOV 68) several days in advance of the tentative date of D-Day for Operation DARING ENDEAVOR.

7. Broadcast Reception. Broadcast reception was generally good.

8. Equipment. No major equipment problems were encountered during the Operation. However, frequency selection and antenna patching for specific equipments is always a problem because of locally generated interference. This is especially true for the LPH.

9. VHF (FM) Communications. During Operation DARING ENDEAVOR, VHF (FM) communications were marginal and VHF artillery circuits were unsatisfactory. The flagship's VHF transmitters (VRC-46) could be heard by troops ashore almost 100 percent of the time. The ship's reception of the troops ashore was marginal most of the time. The last four days of the Operation, the troops set up a relay ashore using a Jeep mounted VRC-46 and reliable VHF communication was maintained with the relay. It appears the low power portable FM PRC-25 equipment used by troops is unable to overcome the local noise and RFI generated by other transmitters aboard ship. However, when an external antenna, mounted on high ground (RC-292) is used with the PRC-25, two way VHF communications is greatly improved.

10. Comments/Recommendations.

a. Comment. Although the VRC-46 VHF equipment has proven to be very reliable in-country or when vehicular mounted (as designed), it is not suited to shipboard installation due to susceptibility to RFI

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and the high RF noise level generated aboard the LPH. Its use and reliability could possibly be improved by using an antenna system designed for shipboard use, containing a filter network. However, the final solution will require a thorough study and an installation of a different type of VHF (FM) equipment and antenna designed for shipboard use.

b. Recommendation. To preclude reoccurrence of the situation as noted in paragraph 6 above, recommend NAVCAMS WESTPAC keep abreast of tentative D-Day's for scheduled ARG/SLF SPECOPS and, if possible, not schedule a termination shift to occur in the period D-3 to D+3.

c. Recommendation. Recommend a VHF (FM) relay be set up ashore soonest after landing. This is especially critical when the AOA is several miles inland.

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS

1. A combat artist reported aboard the Flagship on afternoon of D-1 (9 NOV) and departed to join the Marines ashore on D-Day (10 NOV). A combat camera team reported aboard the Flagship on evening of D-1 and departed for DaNang on morning of D-Day. Public Affairs representatives from CTF 76 Mobile Amphibious News Team boarded the Flagship on D+1 (11 NOV) to provide Public Affairs assistance and remained on board until D+6 (16 NOV). On D+8 (18 NOV), a Marine Corporal from III MAF arrived on board to conduct interviews for historical and training purposes. He departed the following day having conducted and taped two interviews. No military or civilian newsmen covered Operation DARING ENDEAVOR.
2. A CTG 76.5 Public Affairs proposed press release of Operation DARING ENDEAVOR was submitted to CTE 70.2.1.1 on 9 NOV and recommended to be released upon clearance on 10 NOV. A second press release was submitted on 12 NOV. A CTE 70.2.1.1 prepared press release utilizing the information of the two CTG 76.5 proposed releases was cleared for release by CTE 70.2.1.1 on 14 NOV. The news story was released by MACVOI in Saigon on 18 NOV. In the final release, the names of the ships of ARG BRAVO and CLARION RIVER were omitted due to their scheduled port visits to Hong Kong within thirty days.
3. The following is the 18 NOV news release in Saigon: "At 1700 hours on 17 November, Operation DARING ENDEAVOR terminated. The Battalion Landing Team size search and clear operation was conducted by elements of the SEVENTH Marine Regiment, FIRST Marine Division, while elements of the Americal Division along with Vietnamese Regional and Popular Force Troops and Vietnamese National Police occupied blocking positions and reinforced the Marines. The Operation began on 10 November with an amphibious and heliborne assault from ships of the Navy's Task Force 76.

During the seven - day operation, centered in an area five miles southwest of Hoi An and with the mission of capturing or eliminating enemy forces, installations, and material within their area of responsibility, the Marines killed 33 enemy soldiers, detained 336 suspects. Five individual weapons and one crew-served weapon were captured. U. S. losses were one killed and 36 wounded with 34 evacuated."

NOTE: The following incorrect statements were made in the above press release: Operation was conducted five miles southeast of Hoi An, vice southwest. Vietnamese Regional and Popular Force Troops and National Police did not occupy blocking positions. BLT 2/7 was under OPCON of SLF BRAVO (CTG 79.5) and was not part of FIRST Marine Division. The operation lasted 8 days. The operation terminated at 1800H.

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1. Naval Gunfire Support. Naval Gunfire Support, controlled by SACC aboard TRIPOLI, was provided by the following TU 70.8.9 units: USS TOWERS (DDG-9), USS COGSWELL (DD-651), and USS CLARION RIVER (LSMR-409). Fire support coordination outside the AOA was effected in conjunction with the Americal Division. SAV-A-PLANES were used during the Operation for all fire missions to preclude danger to assigned and transient aircraft. Naval Gunfire ships provided prep, on-call and H and I fires. The following number/type rounds were fired during the Operation: 5" SSR MK7 HC: 304 RDS; 5"/54 AAC: 800 RDS; 5"/54 HC: 87 RDS; 5"/54 VT: 32 RDS; 5"/54 WP: 8 RDS; 5"/38 HC: 691 RDS; 5"/38 WP: 11 RDS; 5"/38 VT: 45 RDS and 5"/38 ILLUM: 6 RDS. Gun Damage Assessment as observed by spotters included: 7 structures destroyed, 6 structures damaged, 2 bunkers destroyed, 50 meters treeline destroyed and 1 Viet Cong KIA. Spotters comments during NGF on-call missions were "OUTSTANDING", "The best Naval Gunfire I have ever observed", "Excellent target coverage", and "100 percent target coverage".

2. Air Support.

a. Control and Coordination. CTE 76.5.0.2 aboard TRIPOLI provided control and coordination of aircraft in support of Operation DARING ENDEAVOR. Agencies contacted were FIRST MAW, DaNang DASC, III MAF, and 1/1 Cavalry, Americal Division.

b. Aircraft Support. Aircraft controlled by the Tactical Air Control Center included:

(1) Close Air Support Aircraft. Beach and primary Landing Zone preps were scheduled to be conducted by Close Air Support aircraft on D-Day. However, both flights were diverted due to inclement weather. Additional Close Air Support aircraft were on-call from FIRST MAW with time on station 30 minutes after submission of request.

(2) Statistical Summary of Close Air Support Sorties:

(a) Number of Sorties: 4

(b) Ordnance Expended by Type: 500 lb GP High Drag: 6 tons.

(c) Effects of Close Air Support: 90 percent target coverage and 90 percent target neutralization.

(3) Gunship/Spotter Aircraft. 4 UH-IE gunships and 1 UH-IE slick comprising a standard D-Day package were fragged from III MAF for D-Day operations. III MAF was unable to provide this gunship package but did provide 1 OV-10 and 2 gunships for D-Day, up to H+4. All

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additional pre-planned and on-call gunship/spotter aircraft requirements were then provided by Americal Division on a mission basis.

c. SAV-A-PLANE was utilized as an artillery and Naval Gunfire Control System in the landward Amphibious Objective Area. SAV-A-PLANES were coordinated between CTE 76.5.0.2, I Corps Air Force Control Reporting Center, Americal Division Aircraft Warning Control Center, Air LNO, Companies E,F,G and H FAC teams of BLT 2/7, USS TOWERS (DDG-9), USS COGSWELL (DD-651), NSG LNO BLT 2/7 and DaNang DASC.

d. Comments/Recommendations

(1) Comment. There was some difficulty throughout the Operation in obtaining air assets when needed. No on-call UH-IE gunships were available through FIRST MAW from D-Day on through the remainder of the Operation, except on emergency basis. Gunships were to be made available from Americal Division on a mission basis. Americal requested eighteen hours prior notice for fragging pre-planned gunships. The non-availability of aircraft on short notice, contrary to the pre-planning brief, caused several delays in troops movements.


(2) Recommendation. It is recommended that in future SPECOPS planning some absolute agreement be reached between all agencies providing on-call gunships/CAS and the ARG/SLF to ensure that the support is available when requested.

(3) Recommendation. It is recommended that at least two UH-IE gunships and one slick be assigned as augmentation to the SLF for employment during the entire operation. These assets could then be used by the SLF AO in NGF and artillery spotting in the event that CAS aircraft were unable to prep LZ's and beaches on D-Day, and would prevent delays in troop monements, dependent on air strikes.

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 CTG 73.5
 CTF 115
 CTG 70.8
 CTG 76.4
 CTG 76.5
 COMPHIBPAC
 COMPHIBLANT
 COMPHIBTRAPAC
 CHAIRMAN AWB, COMPHIBTRALANT
 COMPHIBGRU ONE
 COMPHIBGRU TWO
 COMPHIBGRU THREE
 COMPHIBGRU FOUR
 COMPHIBRON ONE
 COMPHIBRON THREE
 COMPHIBRON FIVE
 COMPHIBRON SEVEN
 COMPHIBRON NINE
 COMPHIBRON ELEVEN
 COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
 OIC, NBG ONE WP DET
 CO BMU ONE
 OIC, BMU ONE WP DET
 COMNAVSPECWARGRUPAC
 CO USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10)
 CO USS MONTICELLO (LSD-35)
 CO USS COGSWELL (DD-651)
 CG AMERICAL DIV
 COMNAVFORV

OIC, NAVSECGRU WP DET
 CO BJU ONE
 CO ACU ONE
 OIC, ACU ONE WP DET
 COMLANSHIPLOT ONE
 COMLANSHIPRON NINE
 COMTACGRU ONE
 CO TACRON THIRTEEN
 CG FMFPAC
 CG III MAF
 CG V MEF
 CG FIRST MAR BDE
 CG FMF SEVENTHFLT
 CTG 79.4
 CTG 79.5
 CG FIRST MAW
 CG FIRST MARDIV
 CG THIRD MARDIV
 CG FIFTH MARDIV
 CG LANFORTTRACOMPAC
 CG LANFORTTRACOMLANT
 PRES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
 CO NAVPHIBSCOL, CORONADO
 CO NAVPHIBSCOL, LITTLE CREEK
 COMDT, MARINE CORPS SCHOOLS
 QUANTICO, VA.
 USAC & GSC, FT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
 CO HMM 165
 CO BLT 2/7
 OIC, WP DET NAVSPECWARGRU
 CO USS OGDEN (LPD-5)
 CO USS SEMINOLE (LKA-104)
 CO USS TOWERS (DDG-9)
 CO USS CLARION RIVER (LSMR-409)
 CO UDT ELEVEN

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ROUTING SHEET (5511)
NAVMC HQ 335c (REV. 3-67)

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ORIGINATOR
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OPERATION CODE

X-ORIGINATOR OR OFFICE
AFFIXING ROUTING SHEET
A-FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION
B-FOR COMPLIANCE
C-PREPARE REPLY FOR SIGNATURE
OF _____
D-FOR COMMENT
E-FOR RECOMMENDATIONF-FOR CONCURRENCE
G-FOR INFORMATION
H-RETURN TO _____
I- _____
J-DISPOSITION _____

RTG.	OPR. CODE	DATE		INITIAL	ADDRESSEES
		IN	OUT		
					COMMANDANT
					ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
					MILITARY SECY TO CMC
					CHIEF OF STAFF
					DC/S (PLANS & PROGRAMS)
					DC/S (MANPOWER)
					DC/S (RD & S)
					DC/S (AIR)
					DC/S (ADMIN)
					SECY OF GEN STAFF
					G-1
					G-2
					G-3
					G-4
					DIRECTOR, ADMIN.
					DATA SYSTEMS
					MCCC
					FISCAL
					INFORMATION
					INSPECTION
					PERSONNEL
					POLICY ANALYSIS
					RESERVE
					SUPPLY
					MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS GROUP
					PROGRAMS
					LEGISLATIVE
					JOINT PLANNING GROUP
					JOINT CONTROL
					COUNSEL
					WOMEN MARINES
					STAFF DENTAL
					STAFF MEDICAL
					STAFF CHAPLAIN
					CLASSIFIED FILES

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SIGNATURE

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703D for permanent
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D. J. Kelly

G-3**PERMANENT RETENTION**

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76.5
open SWIFT MOVE Rpt

20 Nov-68

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N31:RHL:gds
3500
Ser: 08
13 FEB 1969

CONFIDENTIAL - Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1)

From: Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: SWIFT MOVE Post Operation Report; forwarding of (U)

Encl: (1) COMPHIBREAGUR BRAVO ltr 3500 ser N33/046 of 31 DEC 1968

1. (U) Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet concurs with the contents of enclosure (1) except as noted below:

a. Page 1 of the basic letter, change Ref (a) to read "COMPHIBFOR SEVENTHFLT/CTF 76 Inst 3500.1C".

b. Page 1 of the basic letter, change Encl (11) to read "Other (omitted)" and add "Encl (12) Distribution".

c. Delete paragraph 1 of the the basic letter and renumber paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 as "1, 2, 3," and "4" respectively.

d. Paragraph 2.d line 3, change "a" to read "an".

e. Enclosure (12), Distribution, change "OIC, NAVSPECWARGRU WPAC DET" to read "OINC WP DET NAVSPECWARGRU". Delete "CG FIRST MAR BDE, CO FIRST MAR REG, CTG 70.8, COMLANSHIPRON THREE" and "COMLANSHIPRON NINE".

F.W. CLIFT III
Chief of Staff

Copy to:
CTG 76.5

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FF/7/FNM:ml
3500
Ser: N6-295
21 MAR 1969

From: Commander SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet

C907678

Subj: Operation SWIFT MOVE Post Operation Report; approval of

Ref: (a) COMPHIBREADYGRU"B" Conf ltr CARG"B"/3500 ser N33/046 of 31 DEC 68
(b) COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT Conf ltr N31:RHL:gds 3500 ser 08 of 13 FEB 69

1. References (a) and (b) have been reviewed and are approved for distribution as recommended references (a) with additions and corrections noted reference (b) subject to the following change.

a. Enclosure (7), paragraph 1, second sentence-change to read "Since no boating was utilized and the ground elements of the SLF were chopped early to an in-country commander, use of ARG communications was minimized."

ALPINE W. MCLANE
Asst Chief of Staff for Plans

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COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP BRAVO
U. S. SEVENTH FLEET
FPO SAN FRANCISCO 96601

CARG"B"/3500
Ser N33/046
31 December 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander Amphibious Ready Group BRAVO
To: Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Operation SWIFT MOVE Post Operation Report; forwarding of (U)

Ref: (a) COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT/CTF 76 INST 3500.1C
(b) FIRSTMAR REGIMENT (REIN) OPORD 315-68
(c) JOINT COMFIRSTFLT/COMSEVENTHFLT INST 3500.3/3500.8A

Encl: (1) Task Organization
(2) Initiating Directive
(3) Chronology of Events
(4) Planning/Operations (omitted)
(5) Intelligence (omitted)
(6) Medical/Logistics
(7) Communications
(8) Public Affairs
(9) Supporting Arms
(10) Lessons Learned (omitted)
(11) Other (omitted)
(12) Distribution

1. (C) Background. ARG/SLF BRAVO completed Operation DARING ENDEAVOR on 17 November 1968. Planners from CTG 76.5 and CTG 79.5 conferred with FIRST MARDIV on 16 and 18 November on the use of the SLF in the pending multi-battalion operation nicknamed MEADE RIVER. Initial planning and scheme of maneuver did not reflect an amphibious landing. Rework of the utilization of the SLF BRAVO's BLT 2/7 by FIRST MARDIV/III MAF Planners did achieve an amphibious objective area and a heliborne assault into the LZs. This amphibious portion and the subsequent support operation was designated as Operation SWIFT MOVE. Selected elements of SLF BRAVO were chopped ashore on 20 November to CG, III MAF with simultaneous chop to Commander FIRST Marine Regiment. CATF remained in support of operations ashore providing logistical and MEDEVAC facilities. COMPHIBRON ELEVEN, Captain L. SAVADKIN was relieved by COMPHIBRON NINE, Captain A. L. BAITSON, Jr., on 25 November as CATF.

2. (C) Concept of Operation and Execution:

a. Mission. CATF of ARG/SLF BRAVO would, when directed, on or about 20 November, conduct an Amphibious Heliborne Operation against enemy

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forces in the FIRST Marine Regiment AO in Quang Nam Province of ICTZ in order to find, fix and destroy enemy forces and fortifications, capture and destroy enemy material and to conduct such other operations as agreed upon with CG, III MAF or his designated representative.

b. Landing. On D-Day, 20 November, at L-Hour of 0800H, BLT 2/7 (REIN) landed by helicopters along route 1D from Golden Gate Bridge (AT968606) to the junction with route 4 (AT969583), in order to CORDON off the northwest corner of the operation area. Required elements of SLF BRAVO were chopped on 20 November to CG, III MAF with simultaneous chop to Commander, FIRST Marine Regiment.

c. Supporting and Augmenting Forces. No additional forces were utilized during this operation due to the distance inland of landing zones and corresponding early chop of forces ashore. In-country forces provided all supporting and augmenting forces to BLT 2/7 in accordance with reference (b).

d. Operations Ashore. BLT 2/7 (REIN), at L-Hour 0800H on 20 November, landed by helicopter in assigned landing zones on Route 1D. Then on order, the battalion commenced an easterly sweep of the area between route 1D and the abandoned railroad berm. Upon completion of this sweep, a blocking force of three companies on the NS line (AT 994608) to (AT993578) and one in reserve was established along the berm. Further details concerning concept and execution by all units in Operation MEADE RIVER/SWIFT MOVE is contained in reference (b). Elements were backloaded to ARG shipping commencing 4 December for rehabilitation. Upon completion of withdrawal and rehabilitation, BLT 2/7 was moved to vicinity of AN HOA and Operation SWIFT MOVE terminated at 060400Z DEC 1968.

e. Civic Action/Psychological Warfare. No civic action or psychological warfare was conducted by Naval personnel during Operation SWIFT MOVE. Psychological Warfare/Civic Action and refugee control for Operation MEADE RIVER was conducted by in-country forces in accordance with reference (b).

f. Protective Measures Employed. During the operation, Task Group 76.5 ships remained underway, steaming in assigned areas. The ships steamed darkened with dimmed navigation lights at night.

g. Statistical Summary

(1) BLT 2/7, during Operation SWIFT MOVE, accounted for 34 enemy killed and 4 POWs. The battalion captured the following enemy equipment/material (Disposition not reported): 10 individual weapons, 3 crew served weapons, 7,467 RDs small arms ammo (various cal.), 166 RDs mortar ammo (various cal.), 119 grenades, 17 mines/explosive devices, 30 rockets (RPG), and other misc NVA/VC documents, clothing and individual equipment.

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Three weapons parts, communication wire and 3,050 lbs rice was also captured. Structures destroyed during the operation by BLT 2/7 were as follows: 110 individual bunkers, 4 bunker complexes, 6 buildings and numerous trenches/tunnels/punji pits.

(2) Friendly losses totaled:

<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>
KIA 21	2
DOW 3	0
WIA 102 (70 NCI's)	3

(3) During Operation SWIFT MOVE, HMM 165 provided support to BLT 2/7 with MEDEVAC and Logistical flights in addition to supplying augmentation aircraft to FIRST Marine Air Wing for general support of Operation MEADE RIVER. Within this period, 20 November - 6 December, HMM 165 flew 3,251 sorties, 1,709 tasks for 668.6 hours carrying 6,225 passengers, 274 MEDEVACS and 410.6 tons of cargo. No HMM 165 aircraft were lost during this period.

3. (C) Conclusion. SWIFT MOVE was a limited Amphibious Operation. The scheme of maneuver ashore mitigated against retaining OPCON of selected troop elements after departure from the seaward AOA. The extremely short time period between planning meeting and D-Day precluded making any changes to the operation's scheme of maneuver to give it a more classical amphibious nature.

4. (C) Recommendations. Since the desired objectives of the operation were met, it is recommended that the use of the ARG/SLF team employed in a secondary mission capability such as SWIFT MOVE, be continued for future operations only if primary utilization is not required.

/s/ A. L. BATTSON, Jr.

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CARG#B*/3500

SWIFT MOVETASK ORGANIZATION

<p>TG 76.5 <u>Amphibious Ready Group BRAVO</u> <u>USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10)</u> <u>USS MONTICELLO (LSD-35)</u> <u>USS OGDEN (LPD-5)</u> <u>USS SEMINOLE (AKA-104)</u></p>	<p><u>CAPT L. SAVADKIN, USN</u> <u>COMPHIBRON ELEVEN</u> <u>(20-25 NOV)</u></p> <p><u>CAPT A.L. BATTSON Jr., USN</u> <u>COMPHIBRON NINE</u> <u>(25 NOV - 6 DEC)</u></p>
<p>TG 79.5 <u>Special Landing Force</u> <u>BLT 2/7</u> <u>HMM 165</u></p>	<p><u>COL R. R. WILSON, USMC</u> <u>CSLF BRAVO</u></p>
<p>TU 76.5.0 <u>Special Operations and Command Unit</u></p>	<p><u>CAPT L. SAVADKIN, USN</u> <u>COMPHIBRON ELEVEN</u> <u>(20-25 NOV)</u> <u>CAPT A.L. BATTSON, JR., USN</u> <u>COMPHIBRON NINE</u> <u>25 NOV - 6 DEC)</u></p>
<p>TE 76.5.0.1 <u>Flagship Element</u> <u>USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10)</u></p>	<p><u>CAPT D. B. SHELTON, USN</u> <u>USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10)</u></p>
<p>TE 76.5.0.2 <u>Tactical Air Control Element</u> <u>TACRON 13 DET B</u> <u>TACRON 11 DET B</u></p>	<p><u>LCDR G. D. CAMPBELL, USN</u> <u>OIC TACRON 13 DET B</u> <u>(20-28 NOV)</u> <u>LCDR R. BROWN, USN</u> <u>OIC TACRON 11 DET B</u> <u>(28 NOV - 6 DEC)</u></p>
<p>TE 76.5.0.3 <u>UDT Element</u> <u>UDT 11 DET G</u></p>	<p><u>LTJG J. E. WAGNER, USNR</u> <u>OIC UDT 11 DET F</u></p>
<p>TE 76.5.0.4 <u>Special Operations Element</u> <u>BJU 1 WESTPAC DET A</u></p>	<p><u>CWO2 J. A. SEARS, USN</u> <u>OIC BJU 1 WESTPAC DET A</u> <u>(20-28 NOV)</u> <u>LTJG M. JENSEN, USN</u> <u>OIC BJU 1 WESTPAC DET A</u> <u>28 NOV - 6 DEC)</u></p>
<p>TE 76.5.2.1 <u>Beach Party Element</u> <u>EMU 1 DET B-7</u></p>	<p><u>LTJG J. K. HUTCHINSON, USNR</u> <u>OIC EMU 1 DET B-7</u></p>

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 Enclosure (1)

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TE 76.5.2.3	<u>Assault Craft Element</u> ACU 1 DET B	<u>LTJG F. B. CONZE, USNR</u> OIC, ACU 1 DET B (20 NOV - 2 DEC) <u>LTJG D. E. HOLLATZ, USNR</u> OIC, ACU 1 DET B (2-6 DEC)
TE 76.5.2.4	<u>Helicopter Assault Transport Element</u> USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10)	<u>CAPT D. B. SHELTON, USN</u> CO, USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10)
TU 76.5.4	<u>Area Defense Unit</u>	<u>CAPT L. SAVAIDIN, USN</u> COMPHIBRON ELEVEN (20-25 NOV) <u>CAPT A. L. BATTSON, JR., USN</u> <u>COMPHIBRON NINE</u> (25 NOV - 6 DEC)

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SWIFT MOVE INITIATING DIRECTIVE (COMSEVENTHFLT 181604Z NOV 68)

REF: (a) COMSEVENTHFLT OPLAN 101-69

(b) NWP 22(B)/FM 31-11/AFM 2-53/LFM 01

1. (C) Situation. CG, III MAF has requested the employment of an ARG/SLF in support of operations conducted by the FIRST MARDIV in ICTZ. COMSEVENTHFLT will provide TG 76.5/79.5 and such other forces as may be necessary to this operation. Initiating directive is for planning purposes. The operation, when executed, will be conducted in accordance with reference (a).
2. (C) Mission. When directed, CATF conduct an amphibious heliborne operation against enemy forces in the FIRST Marine Regiment AO in Quang Nam Province of ICTZ in order to find, fix and destroy enemy forces and fortifications, and capture or destroy enemy material and to conduct such other operations as agreed upon with CG, III MAF or his designated representative.
3. (C) CTG 76.5 (COMPHIBRON ELEVEN) embarked in USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10) designated Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF).
4. (C) CTG 79.5 (COMMANDER SLF BRAVO) embarked in USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10) designated Commander Landing Force (CLF).
5. (C) Command relationships in accordance with paragraph 3.X.(2) and (3) of reference (a).
6. (C) The amphibious objective area (AOA) will be promulgated by separate message. COMSEVENTHFLT 190514Z NOV 68 defines SWIFT MOVE AOA as: The landward AOA is limited to designated landing zones within the FIRST Marine Division AO in the vicinity of Thanh Phong/Dodge City. The seaward AOA will be that sea area encompassed by a straight line commencing at LAT 16-02N, LONG 108-16E thence northeast to LAT 16-18.5N, LONG 108-36E thence southeast to LAT 16-00N, LONG 108-51.6E thence southwest to the coastline at LAT 15-41.5N, LONG 108-29.5E.
7. (C) Nickname for this operation will be SWIFT MOVE with tentative D-Day 20 November 1968. D-Day and H and L Hours to be determined and confirmed by CATF. When all forces are prepared, CATF report to originator state or readiness and final confirmation concerning D-Day, H and L Hours. Execute on D-Day at H and L Hours unless otherwise directed. Report execution to ALCON.
8. (C) Special Instructions:
 - a. When firmly established ashore and when mutually agreed by CATF and CG, III MAF, required elements of SLF chop to CG, III MAF for simultaneous chop to Commander FIRST Marine Regiment.

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Enclosure (2)

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b. Upon chop of required elements of SLF to in-country Commander, CATF remain in support of operations ashore.

c. Withdrawal in accordance with Annex B to reference (a).

9. (U) Termination in accordance with Annex V to reference (a).

10. (U) Action addressees acknowledge receipt.

CHANGE TO SWIFT MOVE OPORD (CTG 76.5 190554Z NOV 68)

REF: (a) CTG 76.5 message OPORD 305-69

1. (C) The following AOA is promulgated as addendum one to reference (a), paragraph 3.X.(4).

a. The landward AOA is limited to designated landing zones within the FIRST Marine Division AO in the vicinity of Thanh Phong/Dodge City. The seaward AOA will be that sea area encompassed by a straight line commencing at LAT 16-02N, LONG 108-16E thence northeast to LAT 16-18.5N, LONG 108-36E thence southeast to LAT 16-00N, LONG 108-51.6E thence southwest to the coastline at LAT 15-41.5, LONG 108-29.5E. The landward AOA is disestablished upon chop of selected elements SLF to CG, III MAF.

2. (C) Add the following sentence to paragraph 3.X.(9)(B); chop will occur on arrival at Point New York (BT099664), at L-10.

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SWIFT MOVE CHRONOLOGY

- 20 NOV Executed Operation SWIFT MOVE by launching the first wave of Heliborne assault at 0713H and completing the Heliborne assault at 1012H. Negligible initial contact was made. OPCON of selected elements of BLT 2/7 chopped to CG, FIRST Marines as of 0750H.
- Embarked Mobile Amphibious News team in TRIPOLI.
- Administratively offloaded Whiskey Battery (-) in DaNang Harbor.
- 21 NOV CTG 76.5 conducted liaison visit to III MAF Headquarters. OPCON Mortar Battery 3/11 passed to CG, FIRST Marine Division.
- 23 NOV Transferred Mobile Amphibious News team from TRIPOLI to OGDEN.
- MONTICELLO proceeded to Cua Viet for special lift of LCM's from Cua Viet to DaNang.
- 24 NOV MONTICELLO offloaded and completed special LCM lift in DaNang.
- 25 NOV Captain A. L. BATTSON, Jr., COMPHIBRON NINE relieved Captain L. SAVADKIN, COMPHIBRON ELEVEN as CTG 76.5 upon return from emergency leave at 0801H.
- 26 NOV SEMINOLE rejoined TG 76.5 at 1000H.
- 28 NOV ARG/SLF BRAVO provided BLT 2/7 ashore with a hot Thanksgiving dinner in the field.
- 29 NOV OGDEN and MONTICELLO commenced Class V inter-ship transfer/offload/backload.
- 30 NOV CTG 76.5/CTG 79.5 and representatives visited FIRST Marine Division Headquarters to discuss BLT 2/7 backload/offload and BLT/HMM rotation.
- Class V inter-ship transfer/offload/backload completed.
- 1 DEC Continued planning for offload of selected elements BLT 2/7 HMM 165 and rotation BLT/HMM.
- 2 DEC TG 76.5 ships commenced offloading elements of BLT 2/7 HMM 165 administratively.

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Enclosure (3)

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- 3 DEC MONTICELLO conducted search for drone in vicinity 16-19N, 108-22E as requested by CTE 70.2.1.2.
- TG 76.5/TG 79.5 commenced backload of BLT 2/7 personnel for at sea rehabilitation.
- 4 DEC Completed backload of BLT 2/7 personnel for at sea rehabilitation.
- 5 DEC SLF BRAVO completed offload of selected BLT 2/7 personnel and equipment to An Hoa and HMM 165 to Marble Mountain Air Facility DaNang.
- 6 DEC MONTICELLO retracted SLF BRAVO Engineer/Shore Party from DaNang.
- OPCON HMM 165 passed to CG, III MAF.
- Operation SWIFT MOVE terminated at 1200H.

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CARG#B# / 3500

MEDICAL/LOGISTICSA. MEDICAL1. General

a. On 20 November 1968, personnel of BLT 2/7 were moved ashore by helicopter in operation SWIFT MOVE, part of the larger operation, MEADE RIVER. The area was south of DaNang around "Dodge City". The operation was terminated on 6 December 1968 upon completion of back-loading, rehabilitation, and total offloading of BLT 2/7 and HMM 165.

b. The USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10) was designated primary casualty receiving facility in addition to providing support of BLT ashore.

2. Medical Officers available for the operation.ARG/SLF Surgical Evacuation Team BRAVO

1 Orthopedic Surgeon	<u>BAS</u>
1 General Surgeon	
1 Anesthesiologist	1 General Medical Officer
1 General Medical Officer	

HMM 165Ship's Medical Officer

1 General Medical Officer

1 General Medical Officer
(Flight Surgeon)C & C Platoon

3 General Medical Officers

3. Casualties received

a. Combat Injuries - 37

- (1) Killed in action - 10
- (2) Wounded in action - 27

b. Non-combat injuries - 70

- (1) Died non-combat injuries - 0

c. Total - 107

4. Surgical Procedures Performeda. General 8

- (1) Major - 5
- (2) Minor - 3

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Enclosure (6)

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b. Orthopedic 11

- (1) Major - 11
- (2) Minor - 0
- (3) Extremities 15
 - (a) Upper - 10
 - (b) Lower - 5
- (4) Amputations - 1
- (5) Fractures - 1

c. Anesthetics 22

- (1) General - 8
- (2) Spinal - 3
- (3) Local - 3
- (4) Supra-clavicular Blocks - 2
- (5) Axillary Block - 3
- (6) Penthrane Duke Inhaler - 3

5. Blood

- a. Units of blood on hand for operation - 133
- b. Units drawn locally - 7
- c. Units actually transfused - 22
- d. Units transferred to in-country facility - 52
- e. Units crossmatched - 44

6. Disposition

- a. Transferred - 35
- b. Returned to duty - 72
- c. Remaining - 0

7. Comments

a. The large number of non-combat injuries were almost entirely cases of immersion foot ranging from moderate to severe. These first began to occur on the fourth day of the operation. The objective of BLT 2/7 was a railroad berm 2500 meters east of their point of insertion. The area was generally flooded rice paddies in which the men were required to remain almost continuously affording little or no opportunity for drying of footwear. In addition, due to the close proximity of the enemy and constant day and night harassment, the men were reluctant to remove their boots long enough to allow their feet to dry. One company sustained losses of about 33% due to this condition alone.

In contrast to previous operations, where fragmentation devices produced the majority of wounded and killed, sniper fire with AK-47 rifles and occasional machine gun fire were the prime agents in operation SWIFT MOVE. These were mostly upper chest, neck, and head wounds suggesting close proximity of the enemy and accurate firing by the snipers.

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During this operation there was an orderly flow of casualties to the USS TRIPOLI. However, not all casualties sustained by BLT 2/7 were brought to USS TRIPOLI and many were taken to shore facilities giving the first indication, thus far, of an effective casualty distribution system.

B. LOGISTICS

1. During the period of Operation SWIFT MOVE, 20 November - 6 December 1968, one significant material casualty occurred. TRIPOLI's Number 3 Main Feed Pump turbine unit disintegrated during operation, and the Main Feed Booster Pump discharge line was punctured by turbine pieces. The damage to the discharge line, a common header, necessitated shutting down the main plant, anchoring and shifting to emergency power sources until repairs could be effected. No personnel injuries were sustained.

2. There were no major problems encountered relating to scheduling or completion of UNREPS/INREPS. All ships of the task group were refueled as often as possible because of the almost continuous typhoon threat. The services provided by TG 73.5 were excellent. Some minor rescheduling was required due to typhoon evasion by units of TG 73.5.

3. TG 76.5 units (less LPH) continued weekly runs into DaNang Harbor to pick up Fleet Freight/Cargo and passengers as often as operations would permit. During these periods dairy products were also received with the LPD receiving the LPH requirements for later transfer at sea by helo and/or boat.

4. The following is a list of UNREPS/INREPS conducted with CTG 73.5 units during Operation SWIFT MOVE. (No VERTREPS were conducted during this period).

18 NOV	TRIPOLI conducted UNREP with MANATEE (AO-58)
22 NOV	MONTICELLO conducted UNREP with MATTAPONI (AO-41)
25 NOV	OGDEN conducted UNREP with CHEMUNG (AO-30)
27/28 NOV	TRIPOLI/SEMINOLE conducted UNREP with CACAPON (AO-52)
29 NOV	TRIPOLI conducted UNREP; MONTICELLO, OGDEN and SEMINOLE conducted INREP with ZELIMA (AF-49)
30 NOV	MONTICELLO conducted UNREP with CHIPOLA (AO-63)
	OGDEN conducted UNREP with CHARA (AE-31)
3/4 DEC	TRIPOLI, MONTICELLO, OGDEN, SEMINOLE conducted UNREP with MATTAPONI (AO-41)
4 DEC	TRIPOLI, MONTICELLO, OGDEN conducted INREP with REGULUS (AF-57)

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COMMUNICATIONS

1. Planning. Operation SWIFT MOVE was a heliborne landing with the AOA several miles inland. Since no boating was utilized and the ground elements of the SLF were chopped early to an in-country commander, use of ARG communications was minimized.
2. Frequencies. Air frequencies from CTG 76.5 OPLAN 101-68 were used.
3. Comments. No significant communications problems were encountered, and overall communications were excellent.

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Enclosure (7)

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CARG#B"/3500

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

1. The CTF 76 Mobile Amphibious News Team was embarked in USS TRIPOLI on 19 November to cover Operation SWIFT MOVE. A proposed press release was submitted 19 November to be released D-Day 20 November. III MAF concurred in release on 21 November and it was cleared for release on 22 November. Because of the coverage for Operation MEADE RIVER, of which Operation SWIFT MOVE was a part, further press releases from this command were considered unnecessary.

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Enclosure (8)

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SUPPORTING ARMS

1. General. The location of the AOA and the scheme of maneuver precluded the use of afloat supporting arms assets. Supporting arms utilized and supporting arms coordination were provided exclusively through in-country assets and personnel.

2. Naval Gunfire. No Naval Gunfire Ships were assigned or utilized by CATF during the Amphibious Landing.

3. Air

a. CTE 76.5.0.2 provided communications between CTG 79.5 and FIRST MAW Tactical Air Direction Center during Operation SWIFT MOVE. The operation was conducted under the operational control of FIRST Marines.

b. Aircraft controlled by CTE 76.5.0.2 during Operation SWIFT MOVE:

(1) No CAS A/C utilized.

(2) Initial helo wave controlled through HDC.

c. No SAV-A-PLANE's were utilized.

d. No problems were encountered.

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Enclosure (9)

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CARG#B# /3500

DISTRIBUTION LIST

CNO (OP 09B9), Historical Div.	OIC, NAVSECGRU WP DET
CMC	CO, BJU ONE
CINCPAC	CO, UDT ELEVEN
CINCPACFLT	CO, ACU ONE
COMUSMACV	OIC, ACU ONE WP DET
COMNAVFORV	COMLANSHIPFLOT ONE
COMSEVENTHFLT	COMTACGRU ONE
COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT	CO, TACRON ELEVEN
COMSERVGRU THREE	CO, TACRON THIRTEEN
CTG 73.5	CG FMFPAC
CTG 76.4	CG FMFLANT
CTG 76.5	CG III MAF
COMPHIBPAC	CG V MEF
COMPHIBLANT	CG FMF SEVENTHFLT
COMPHIBTRAPAC	CTG 79.4
CHAIRMAN AWB, COMPHIBTRALANT	CTG 79.5
COMPHIBGRU ONE	CG FIRST MAW
COMPHIBGRU TWO	CG FIRST MARDIV
COMPHIBGRU THREE	CG THIRD MARDIV
COMPHIBGRU FOUR	CG FIFTH MARDIV
COMPHIBRON ONE	CG LANFORTRACOMPAC
COMPHIBRON THREE	CG LANFORTRACOMLANT
COMPHIBRON FIVE	PRES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
COMPHIBRON SEVEN	CO, NAVPHIBSCOL, CORONADO
COMPHIBRON NINE	CO, NAVPHIBSCOL, LITTLE CREEK
COMPHIBRON ELEVEN	COMDT, MARINE CORPS SCHOOLS
COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE	QUANTICO, VA.
OIC, NRG ONE WP DET	USAC & GSC, FT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
CO, BMU ONE	CO, HMM 165
OIC, BMU ONE WP DET	CO, BLT 2/7
COMNAVSPECWARGRUPAC	
OIC, WP DET NAVSPECWARGRU	
CO, USS OGDEN (LPD-5)	
CO, USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10)	
CO, USS SEMINOLE (AKA-104)	
CO, USS MONTICELLO (LSD-35)	

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Enclosure (12)

3500
Ser 76/027
30 March 1969

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From: Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: DEFIANT MEASURE Post Operation Report; forwarding of (U)

Encl: (1) COMPHIBREAGRU BRAVO ltr 3500 ser N33/05 of 20 FEB 69 (5 copies)

1. (C) Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet concurs with the contents of enclosure (1) except as noted below:

a. Delete paragraph 1 of the basic letter and renumber paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 as "1, 2, 3" and "4" respectively.

b. Change first sentence, paragraph 1, page 1, to read: "Planning had begun for use of ARG/SLF BRAVO in support of the Fifth Marine Regiment in Quang Nam Province, ICT4 prior to the termination of Operation BOLD MARINER in which the ARG/SLF was involved from 13 January to 9 February 1969."

c. Enclosure (1), Task Organization, under TE 76.5.0.2 change "TACRON 11 DET FOXTROT" and "OIC TACRON 11 DET FOXTROT" to read "TACRON 11 DET BRAVO" and "OIC TACRON 11 DET BRAVO".

d. Enclosure (2), Operation DEFIANT MEASURE Initiating Directive, change reference (a) to read "My OPLAN 101-69".

e. Enclosure (2), Operation DEFIANT MEASURE Initiating Directive, change first sentence, paragraph 7, to read: "Nickname for this operation will be DEFIANT MEASURE with tentative D-Day 10 February 1969. D-Day and H and L hours to be determined and confirmed by CATF when all forces are prepared."

F. W. CLIFT III
Chief of Staff

Copy to:
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CONFIDENTIAL

79 76.5
Opn DEFIANT MEASURE
7-16 Oct 1969

DECLASSIFIED

FF/7/FNM:fl
3500
Ser: N6-074
8 APR 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet
Subj: Operation DEFIANT MEASURE Post Operation Report; approval of
Ref: (a) COMPHIBREADYGRU "B" Conf ltr CARG "B"/3500 ser N33/05 of
20 FEB 1969
(b) COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT Conf ltr N31:RHI:gds 3500 ser 76/027
of 30 MAR 1969

1. References (a) and (b) have been reviewed and are approved for distribution as recommended reference (a) with changes as noted reference (b) subject to the following change:

a. Page 2, paragraph 3b, second sentence - change Fifth Marine Division to read Fifth Marine Regiment.

ALPINE W. McLANE
Asst Chief of Staff
for Plans

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.

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COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP BRAVO
U. S. SEVENTH FLEET
FPD SAN FRANCISCO 96601

CARG"B"/3500
Ser N33/05
20 February 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander Amphibious Ready Group BRAVO
To: Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Operation DEFIANT MEASURE Post Operation Report; forwarding of (U)

Ref: (a) COMPHIBFORSSEVENTHFLT/CTF 76 INST 3500.1C
(b) Joint COMFIRSTFLT/COMSEVENTHFLT INST 3500.3/3500.8A

Encl: (1) Task Organization
(2) Initiating Directive
(3) Chronology of Events
(4) Planning/Operations
(5) Intelligence (omitted)
(6) Medical/Logistics
(7) Communications
(8) Public Affairs (omitted)
(9) Supporting Arms (omitted)
(10) Lessons Learned (omitted)
(11) Other (omitted)
(12) Distribution

1. (C) Planning had begun for use of ARG/SLF BRAVO in support of the Fifth Marine Regiment in Quang Nam Province, ICT4 prior to the termination of Operation BOLD MARINER in which the ARG/SLF was involved from 13 January to 9 February 1969. The anticipated Tet offensive necessitated the removal of ARVN troops from Operation TAYLOR COMMON, and BLT 3/26 was called upon to replace these forces. Therefore, Operation DEFIANT MEASURE was launched only 14 hours after the termination of BOLD MARINER to move BLT 3/26 ashore and to support them when ashore.

2. (C) Concept of Operations and Execution.

a. Mission. To conduct an Amphibious Heliborne Operation against enemy forces in the Fifth Marine Regiment AO in Quang Nam Province of ICT4 in order to find, fix and destroy enemy forces and fortifications, to capture and destroy enemy material and to conduct such other operations as agreed upon with CG III MAF or his designated representative.

b. Landing. On D-Day, 10 February, at H-Hour of 0800H, LST 3/26 landed by helicopters in landing zone vicinity AT900556. Forces were CHOPED to CG III MAF with concurrent chop to CG First Marine Division and CG Fifth Marine Regiment on arrival at PT ROZ (BT099664) at H-15. Selected elements of the LST were off loaded by boat at Bridge Ramp in Danang.

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c. Supporting and Augmenting Forces. No supporting or augmenting forces were required for this operation. The distance in-country and early CHOP of forces ashore negated the value of additional supporting forces.

d. Operations Ashore. During this support operation, BLT 3/26 participated in Operation TAYLOR COMMON.

e. Civic Action/Psychological Warfare. No civic action or psychological warfare was conducted by naval personnel during Operation DEFIANT MEASURE. Psychological warfare and civic action were handled by in-country forces.

f. Protective Measures Employed. During the operation, Task Group 76.5 ships remained underway at night, steaming in assigned opareas with dimmed navigation lights. Task Group ships maintained an armed picket boat on continuous patrol and armed sentries on deck at all times while at anchor in Danang harbor.

g. Statistical Summary. During Operation DEFIANT MEASURE, HMM 164 flew 278.6 flight hours, completed 1157 sorties and carried 3,382 passengers, 166.2 tons of cargo and one medevac. TRIPOLI helo flew 24.5 hours, completed 151 sorties and carried 218 passengers, 1,915 pounds of cargo and 4,425 pounds of mail.

3. (C) Conclusions. DEFIANT MEASURE, although a limited Amphibious Operation, was a graphic demonstration of the incredibly rapid reaction time available to in-country forces by the use of an ARG/SLF. In spite of the extremely short time between operations (14 hours) no major problems were encountered.

4. (C) Recommendations. It is recommended that the ARG/SLF be employed as a ready strike/reinforcement force which can be brought to bear with minimum delay during periods when primary utilization is not required.

/S/ A. L. BATTSON, Jr.

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DEFIANT MEASURETASK ORGANIZATION

TG 76.5	<u>Amphibious Ready Group BRAVO</u> USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10) USS OGDEN (LPD-5) USS MONTICELLO (LSD-35)	<u>CAPT A. L. BATTISON, Jr., USN</u> COMPHIBRON NINE
TG 79.5	<u>Special Landing Force</u> BLT 3/26/ /HMM 164	<u>COL R. R. WILSON, USMC</u> Commander SLF BRAVO
TU 76.5.0	<u>Special Operations and Command Unit</u>	<u>CAPT A. L. BATTISON, Jr., USN</u> COMPHIBRON NINE
TE 76.5.0.1	<u>Flagship Element</u> USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10)	<u>CAPT D. B. SHELTON, USN</u> CO, USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10)
TE 76.5.0.2	<u>Tactical Air Control Element</u> TACRON 11 DET BRAVO	<u>LCDR R. N. BROWN, USN</u> OIC TACRON 11 DET BRAVO
TU 76.5.2	<u>Amphibious Assault Unit</u>	<u>CAPT A. L. BATTISON, JR., USN</u> COMPHIBRON NINE
TE 76.5.2.4	<u>Helicopter Assault Transport Element</u> USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10)	<u>CAPT D.B. SHELTON, USN</u> CO, USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10)
TU 76.5.4	<u>Area Defense Unit</u>	<u>CAPT A. L. BATTISON, JR., USN</u> COMPHIBRON NINE

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Enclosure (1)

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OPERATION DEFIANT MEASURE INITIATING DIRECTIVE (COMSEVENTHFLT 081002Z FEB 69)

Ref: (a) My OPLAN 101-69
 (b) NWP 22(B)

1. (C) Situation. CG III MAF has requested the employment of an ARG/SLF in support of operations in the ICT4. COMSEVENTHFLT will provide TG 76.5/79.5 and such other forces as may be necessary for this operation. Initiating directive is for planning purposes. The operation when executed, will be conducted in accordance with references (a) and (b).
2. (C) Mission. Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) conduct an amphibious operation against VC/NVA forces in Amphibious Objective Area in Quang Nam Province of ICT4 in order to find, fix and destroy enemy forces and fortifications and capture or destroy enemy material and to conduct such other operations as agreed upon with CG III MAF or his designated representative.
3. (C) CTG 76.5 (COMPHIBRON NINE) embarked in USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10) designated CATF.
4. (C) CTG 79.5 (Commander SLF BRAVO) embarked in USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10) designated Commander Landing Force (CLF).
5. (C) Command relationship IAW 3.A. (2) and (3) of reference (a).
6. (C) The Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) will be promulgated by separate message.
7. (C) Nickname for this operation will be DEFIANT MEASURE with tentative D-Day 10 February 1969. D-Day and H and L hours to be determined and confirmed by CATF when all forces are prepared. CATF report to originator state of readiness and final confirmation concerning D-Day, H and L hours. Execute on D-Day at H and L hours unless otherwise directed. Report execution to ALCON.
8. (C) Special Instructions
 - a. When firmly established ashore and when mutually agreed by CATF and CG III MAF, required elements of SLF CHOP to CG III MAF.
 - b. Upon CHOP of required elements of SLF to in-country commander CATF remain in support of operations ashore.
 - c. Withdrawal IAW Annex B to reference (a).
9. (C) Termination IAW Annex B to reference (a).
10. (C) Public Affairs IAW Annex V to reference (a).
11. (C) Downgraded to Confidential upon termination.

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 Enclosure (2)

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DEFIANT MEASURE

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 7 FEB CTG 76.5/79.5 planners visited III MAF, FIRST MARDIV, and FIFTH Marines to discuss ARG/SLF utilization in a forthcoming operation.
- 9 FEB TG 76.5 terminated Operation BOLD MARINER, departed the Batangan OPAREA and proceeded to the assault area for Operation DEFIANT MEASURE.
- 10 FEB Executed Operation DEFIANT MEASURE. H-Hour was confirmed as 0800H, the first heliborne assault wave was chopped to III MAF at 0748H with concurrent CHOP to the FIFTH Marine Regiment and the first wave touched down at 0800H. USS OGDEN and USS MONTICELLO offloaded selected elements of BLT 3/26 in DaNang Harbor. CTG 76.5 visited CTF 76 and NSA DaNang.
- 11 FEB MONTICELLO and OGDEN continued offload of selected elements of BLT 3/26 in DaNang Harbor. TRIPOLI continued offload of BLT 3/26 equipment/supplies/personnel by helicopter. COMPHIBRON ELEVEN and advance party arrived aboard TRIPOLI.
- 12 FEB ARG/SLF continued support of BLT 3/26 ashore. OGDEN continued offload in DaNang Harbor, TRIPOLI continued offload by air, and MONTICELLO proceeded to Sa Huynh to transport NSA DaNang LCM8 from Sa Huynh to DaNang. CTG 76.5, CTG 79.5, COMPHIBRON ELEVEN and selected staff members attended an operational planning conference at III MAF. MONTICELLO picked up an organic TG 76.5 LCM8 at Chu Lai and offloaded NSA DaNang's LCM8 at DaNang. OGDEN conducted an UNREP from USS PICTOR (AF-54)
- 13 FEB ARG/SLF continued support of BLT 3/26 ashore. TG 76.5 completed offload of BLT 3/26. OGDEN and MONTICELLO conducted an UNREP from USS PLATTE (AO-24). CTG 76.5 and COMPHIBRON ELEVEN visited COMSEVENTHFLT.
- 14 FEB ARG/SLF continued support of BLT 3/26 ashore. Selected members of CTG 76.5 and COMPHIBRON ELEVEN visited FIRST Marine Division CP and III MAF. CTG 76.4 visited CTG 76.5 and COMPHIBRON ELEVEN aboard TRIPOLI.

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15 FEB

ARG/SLF BRAVO continued support of BLT 3/26 ashore. OGDEN made a logistics pickup in DaNang Harbor and returned to the OPAREA. TG 76.5 Commanding Officers visited CPG 76.5 and COMPHIBRON ELEVEN aboard TRIPOLI.

16 FEB

ARG/SLF BRAVO continued support of BLT 3/26 ashore. HMM 164 moved ashore and OPCON was passed to CG III MAF for concurrent CHOP to CG FIRST MAW at 161200H. Operation DEFIANT MEASURE was terminated at 161200H.

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Enclosure (3)

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DEFIANT MEASUREPLANNING/OPERATIONS

1. A planning conference was held on 7 February at III MAF which was attended by representatives from CTG 76.5, CTG 79.5, III MAF, FIRST MARDIV and FIFTH Marines in which ARG/SLF utilization was discussed. It was planned to conduct an Amphibious Heliborne Operation in conjunction with the offload of BLT 3/26 and HMM 164. Periodic conferences were held throughout the Operation. The offload of BLT 3/26 and HMM 164 cargo and support elements in DaNang was coordinated with NSA DaNang. The planning proved to be adequate in all respects, and no major problems were encountered as all phases of the Operation were completed as anticipated.

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Enclosure (4)

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DEFIANT MEASUREMEDICAL/LOGISTICSA. MEDICAL1. General

a. On 10 February 1969 BLT 3/26 was moved ashore in the Arizona OA (Opn TAYLOR COMMON) south of DaNang. Support of the operation, DEFIANT MEASURE, was terminated at 1200 on 16 February 1969. Although available for support no MEDEVACS were received.

2. Medical Officers Available for the OperationSURGICAL EVACUATION TEAM BRAVOBLT 3/26

1 General Surgeon
1 Orthopedic Surgeon
1 Anesthesiologist
1 General Medical Officer
1 Anesthetist

2 General Medical Officers

C&C PLATOON

3 General Medical Officers

SHIP'S MEDICAL OFFICER

1 General Medical Officer

3. Casualties Received - 04. Surgical Procedures Performed - 05. Blood

a. Units of blood on hand at start of operation	167
b. Units drawn locally	0
c. Units actually transfused	0
d. Units transferred to in-country facilities	0
e. Units cross matched	0

6. Disposition

0

7. Comments - NONEB. LOGISTICS

1. The following is a list of UNREPS/INREPS conducted during Operation DEFIANT MEASURE:

12 FEB 69 OGDEN conducted UNREP with PICTOR (AF-54).
Also received supplies FFT TRIPOLI.

13 FEB 69 MONTICELLO/OGDEN conducted UNREP with PLATIE (AO-24).

2. No major material casualties occurred.

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Enclosure (6)

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DEFIANT MEASURECOMMUNICATIONS

1. Planning. Operation DEFIANT MEASURE was a heliborne landing with the AOA several miles inland. Since no boating was utilized, and the troops CHOPPED to an in-country commander about 500 meters inland, use of ARG communications was minimal.
2. Frequencies. Frequencies from CTG 76.5 OPLAN 101-68 were used.
3. Comments. No significant communications problems were encountered, and overall communications were excellent.

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Enclosure (7)

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DEFIANT MEASURE

DISTRIBUTION

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CG FMFPAC
COMPHIBTRAPAC
CG LANFORTACOMPAC
CO NAVPHIBSCOL CORONADO
COMPHIBGRU ONE
COMPHIBGRU THREE
COMPHIBRON ONE
COMPHIBRON THREE
COMPHIBRON FIVE
COMPHIBRON SEVEN
COMPHIBRON NINE
COMPHIBRON ELEVEN
COMLANSHIPFLOT ONE
COMTACGRU ONE
COMNAVSPECWARHGRUPAC
COMNAVBEACHGROU ONE
CO, BJU ONE
CO, ACU ONE
CO, BMU ONE
OINC BMU ONE WPDET
OINC ACU ONE WPDET
OINC WPDET NAVSPECWARHGRU
OINC NAVBEACHGROU ONE WPDET
OINC NAVSECGRU WPDET
CO, TACRON ELEVEN
CO, UDT TEAM ELEVEN
USAC&GSC, FT LEAVENWORTH KANSAS

CINCPAC
COMUSMACV
COMNAVFORV
CG III MAF
CG V MAF
CG 1ST MARDIV
CG 3RD MARDIV
CG 5th MARDIV
CG 1ST MAW
CNO (OP09B9) HISTORICAL DIVISION
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COMPHIBLANT
CG FMFLANT
PRES NAVWARCOL
CMCS QUANTICO VA
CHAIRMAN AWB COMPHIBTRALANT
CG LANFORTACOMLANT
CO NAVPHIBSCOL LITTLE CREEK
COMPHIBGRU TWO
COMPHIBGRU FOUR
COMSERVGRU THREE
CTG 73.5
CTG 76.4
CTG 76.5
CTG 79.4
CTG 79.5
CO, BLT 3/26
CO, HMM 164
CO, USS TRIPOLI
CO, USS MONTICELLO
CO, USS OGDEN

CO, FIFTH MARINES

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Enclosure (12)

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DC/S (ADMIN)
SECY OF GEN STAFF
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T.g. 76.5

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S. Man - 18 Apr 1969

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N314:RHL:gds
3500
Ser 76/053
26 MAY 1969

CONFIDENTIAL - Unclassified upon removal of enclosure

From: Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: DEFIANT MEASURE II Post Operation Report; forwarding of (U)

Encl: (1) Commander Amphibious Ready Group BRAVO ltr 3500 ser 021 of 5 May 1969
(5 copies)

1. (U) Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet concurs with the contents of enclosure (1) except as noted below:

- a. Page 1 of the basic letter, delete paragraph 1.
- b. Page 1 and 2 of the basic letter, renumber paragraphs "2, 3, 4" and "5" as "1, 2, 3" and "4" respectively.

c. Enclosure (12), DISTRIBUTION, change "CO TACRON PARTICIPATING, CO BLT PARTICIPATING, CO HMM PARTICIPATING" and "CO UDT PARTICIPATING" to read "CO TACRON ELEVEN, CO BLT 3/26, CO HMM 164" and "CO UDT THIRTEEN" respectively. Delete "COMLANSHIPRON ONE (IF UNITS PARTICIPATED), COMLANSHIPRON THREE (IF UNITS PARTICIPATED), COMLANSHIPRON NINE (IF UNITS PARTICIPATED), CTG 70.8 (IF UNITS PARTICIPATED), CTF 115 (IF UNITS PARTICIPATED)" and "CO, SHIPS/UNITS PARTICIPATING". Add "CO USS VALLEY FORGE (LPH-8), CO USS ALAMO (LSD-33), CO USS TULARE (LKA-112)" and "CO USS PAUL REVERE (LPA-248)".

F.W. CLIFT III /s/
Chief Staff

Copy to:
CTG 76.5

FF/7/FNM:tim
3340
Ser: N6-620
9 JUN 1969

From: Commander SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Operation DEFIANT MEASURE II Post Operation Report; approval of

Ref: (a) COMPHIBREADYGRU "B" ltr CARG "B"/N3 3500 ser 021 of 3 May 1969
(b) COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT Conf ltr N314:RHL:gds 3500 ser 76/053 of 26 May 1969

1. References (a) and (b) have been reviewed and are approved for distribution as recommended reference (a) with additions and corrections noted reference (b).

ALPINE W. McLANE
Asst Chief of Staff
for Plans

C911408

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COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP BRAVO
U. S. SEVENTH FLEET
FPO SAN FRANCISCO 96601

CARG" B"/N3
3500
Ser: 021
3 May 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander Amphibious Ready Group BRAVO
To: Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Operation DEFIANT MEASURE II Post Operations Report; forwarding of (U)

Ref: (a) COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT/CTF76 INST 3500.1C

Encl: (1) Task Organization
(2) Initiating Directive
(3) Chronology of Events
(4) Planning/Operations (Omitted)
(5) Intelligence
(6) Medical/Logistics
(7) Communications
(8) Public Affairs (Omitted)
(9) Supporting Arms (Omitted)
(10) Lessons Learned (Omitted)
(11) Other (Omitted)
(12) Distribution

1. (C) Background. ARG/SLF BRAVO completed upkeep/training at Subic Bay, R. P. on 2 March 1969 and returned to ICTZ. Due to the existing in country situation BLT 3/26 was not backloaded but remained in the field under OPCON of III MAF (FIRST MAR DIV). On 8 March HMM 164 was backloaded in ARG BRAVO shipping, and on 9 March ARG BRAVO commenced operation DEFIANT MEASURE II in support of in-country forces.

2. (C) Concept of Operation and Execution

a. Mission. Conduct operations in the northern ICTZ RVN in order to provide combat support to designated in-country forces.

b. Landing. No heliborne or waterborne assault was conducted. Landing of BLT 3/26 was accomplished prior to Operation DEFIANT MEASURE II.

c. Supporting and Augmenting Forces. No additional forces were used during this supporting operation.

d. Operations Ashore. During this period of supporting operations BLT 3/26 participated in Operation TAYLOR COMMON and Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS.

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e. Civic Action/Psychological Warfare. No civic action or psychological warfare was conducted by personnel of ARG/SLF BRAVO during Operation DEFIANT MEASURE II.


f. Protective Measures Employed. During the operation, TG 76.5 remained underway except for occasional entry into DaNang Harbor. While in port, anti-swimmer security measures, such as armed patrols and random dropping of percussion grenades, were employed. Primarily, the TG remained underway, steaming during hours of darkness at darkened ship with dimmed navigational lights.

g. During Operation DEFIANT MEASURE II, HMM 164 provided support to in-country forces directly with logistic and MEDEVAC flights and indirectly through augmentation aircraft to FIRST Marine Air Wing. HMM 164 flew 3,570 sorties, carrying 11,097 passengers, 516 MEDEVACS, and 424.8 tons of cargo during 1,547.3 hours flying time. A total of 179 aircraft were supplied as FIRST MAF augmentation.

3. (C) Conclusions. Operation DEFIANT MEASURE II presented an opportunity for ARG/SLF BRAVO and HMM 164 to provide combat support to numerous in-country units. Although low visibility in the off-shore areas hampered operations from time to time, the mobility of the ARC enabled the Force to relocate to clear areas and resume operations on short notice. In this manner, combat support was provided with maximum effectiveness.

DEFIANT MEASURE II was entirely a combat support operation with the BLT employed ashore under OPCON of III MAF during the entire period. As in some other recent operations, utilization of ARG/SLF assault capability was not planned or required.

4. (C) Recommendation. Commander Amphibious Ready Group BRAVO strongly recommends maximum utilization of the ARG/SLF amphibious assault capability in future operations.


R. J. COAD

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CARG "B"/N3
3500DEFIANT MEASURE 11TASK ORGANIZATION

<p>TG 76.5</p> <p><u>Amphibious Ready Group BRAVO</u> <u>USS VALLEY FORGE (LPH-8)</u> <u>USS ALAMO (LSD-33)</u> <u>USS TULARE (LKA-112)</u> <u>USS PAUL REVERE (LPA-248)</u></p>	<p>CAPT L. SAVADKIN 9 Mar-17 Apr CAPT R. J. COAD 17 Apr-18 Apr <u>COMPHIBRON ELEVEN</u></p>
<p>TG 79.5</p> <p><u>Special Landing Force</u> HMM 164</p>	<p>COL A. E. COFFEEN, USMC CO, SLF BRAVO</p>
<p>TU 76.5.0</p> <p><u>Special Operations and Command Unit</u></p>	<p>CAPT L. SAVADKIN 9 Mar-17 Apr CAPT R. J. COAD 17 Apr-18 Apr <u>COMPHIBRON ELEVEN</u></p>
<p>TE 76.5.0.1</p> <p><u>Flagship Element</u> <u>USS VALLEY FORGE (LPH-8)</u></p>	<p>CAPT D. W. HENDERSON <u>USS VALLEY FORGE (LPH-8)</u></p>
<p>TE 76.5.0.2</p> <p><u>Tactical Air Control Element</u> TACRON 11 DET B</p>	<p>LCDR R. N. BROWN OIC TACRON 11 DET B</p>
<p>TE 76.5.0.3</p> <p><u>UDT Element</u> UDT 13 DET F</p>	<p>LTJG W. C. ROBERTSON OIC UDT 13 DET F</p>
<p>TE 76.5.0.4</p> <p><u>Special Operations Element</u> BJU 1 WESTPAC DET A</p>	<p>LTJG A. M. GOODRICK OIC BJU 1 WESTPAC DET A</p>
<p>TU 76.5.1</p> <p><u>Gunfire Support and Screen Unit</u></p>	<p>(Not Activated)</p>
<p>TU 76.5.2</p> <p><u>Amphibious Assault Unit</u></p>	<p>(Not Activated)</p>
<p>TE 76.5.2.1</p> <p><u>Beach Party Element</u> BMU 1 DET B</p>	<p>LTJG P. T. DOLAN OIC BMU 1 DET B</p>
<p>TE 76.5.2.2</p> <p><u>Control Element</u></p>	<p>(Not Activated)</p>
<p>TE 76.5.2.3</p> <p><u>Assault Craft Element</u> ACU 1 DET B</p>	<p>ENS J. B. MCKENRY OIC ACU 1 DET B</p>
<p>TE 76.5.2.4</p> <p><u>Helicopter Assault Transport Element</u></p>	<p>(Not Activated)</p>
<p>TE 76.5.2.5</p> <p><u>LST Support Element</u></p>	<p>(Not Activated)</p>
<p>TU 76.5.4</p> <p><u>Area Defense Unit</u></p>	<p>(Not Activated)</p>
<p>TE 76.5.4.1</p> <p><u>Surface Patrol Element</u></p>	<p>(Not Activated)</p>

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DEFIANT MEASURE II

INITIATING DIRECTIVE

1. An initiating directive in the sense of NWP-22B, Art 200 was not issued. The combat support operation in progress was designated DEFIANT MEASURE II by COMSEVENTHFLT message 090920Z March 1969.

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DEFIANT MEASURE II

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS FOR OPERATIONS

8 MAR Embarked HMM 164 in USS VALLEY FORGE (LPH-8) off Phu Bai. SLF assumed Casualty Reporting responsibility for HMM 164. ARG/SLF BRAVO commenced supporting BLT 3/26 in combat operations ashore.

9 MAR Combat support operation for BLT 3/26 designated DEFIANT MEASURE II. ARG operating off DaNang.

15 MAR Backloaded 3RD Plat., A Co., 5TH anti-tank and 5TH AMTRAC Battalions.

18 MAR Repositioned ARG BRAVO off Quang Tri to facilitate in-country support by HMM 164.

27 MAR TE 76.5.0.3 made RECON survey of possible landing site north of Cua Viet River.

30 MAR Fog conditions forced cancellation of all helicopter operations from LPH.

5 APR Repositioned ARG BRAVO off DaNang to avoid delays being encountered in helicopter operations due to fog.

11 APR ARG BRAVO executed a practice waterborne ship-to-shore movement at Red Beach in DaNang harbor.

13-15 APR VAIM J. V. SMITH (COMPHIBPAC) and party visited units of ARG BRAVO afloat and ashore.

17 APR CAPT R. J. COAD, USN, relieved CAPT L. SAVADKIN, USN as CARG BRAVO/CTG 76.5/COMPHIERON ELEVEN.

18 APR HMM 164 offloaded and CHOPPED to CG FIRST MAW. Operation DEFIANT MEASURE II terminated as of 180800Z. ARG BRAVO departed for upkeep in Subic Bay, R. P.

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DEFIANT MEASURE II

INTELLIGENCE

1. No estimate was published by the SLF.
2. No EEI was levied by higher authority for this operation.
3. Underwater Demolition Team THIRTEEN, Detachment FOXTROT performed a beach survey on an area between the Cua Viet and the IMZ on 27 March 1969. Extensive security precautions were taken to preclude enemy detection of this survey, which was accomplished without incident. No other beach or hydrographic information was required since no AOA was established.
4. Enemy order of battle was not utilized since no objective area was established.
5. No specific intelligence requests were issued.
6. Weather information available in this area was adequate.
7. The only new intelligence obtained was the beach information outlined in paragraph three.

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DEFIANT MEASURE IIMEDICAL

1. General. Operation DEFIANT MEASURE II commenced on 9 March 1969 with resumption of combat support of BLT 3/26 and other in-country forces. Primary MEDEVAC responsibility for the BLT remained ashore however. The operation was terminated on 18 April 1969.

2. Medical Officers Available for the OperationSurgical/Evacuation Team BRAVO

1 Orthopedic Surgeon
1 General Surgeon
1 Anesthesiologist
1 General Medical Officer
1 Nurse Anesthetist

Ship's Medical Officers

2 General Medical Officers

C & C PLATOON

3 General Medical Officers

HMM 16h

1 Flight Surgeon

3. Casualties Receiveda. Combat Casualties - 2

(1) Killed in action - 0
(2) Wounded in action - 2
(3) Died of wounds - 0

b. Non-Combat Injuries - 94. Surgical Procedures: None5. Blood

a. Units of blood on hand at start of operation - 80
b. Units drawn locally - 79
c. Units actually transfused - 7
d. Units transferred to in-country facilities - 79
e. Units transferred to USS REPOSE (AH-16) - 7h
f. Units cross-matched - 17

6. Dispositionsa. Transferred

(1) 22 CSF - 2
(2) NSA DaNang - 1

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- b. Returned to duty - 5
- c. Remaining - 1
- d. Treated and released - 2

7. Comments

a. As noted in the statistics the medical capabilities of the LPH were essentially unused during the six week period. Various medical officers were allowed to spend a week or more at the Station Hospital, NSA, DaNang to help maintain skills, and assist the hospital.

b. In an attempt to permit the LPHs to assist in medical support of in-country medical facilities, contact with appropriate persons of both ARG's and with III MAF was made. The following message resulted.

P 251414Z MAR 69
 FM CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
 TO CG III MAF
 I CORPS COORDINATOR DNG
 INFO CTF SEVEN SIX
 COMNAVSUPACT DNG
 CG FIRST MARDIV
 CG THIRD MARDIV
 CG FIRST MAW
 CG FORLOGCOMD
 CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
 SURG TEAM BRAVO
 USS VALLEY FORGE
 CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ARG BRAVO LPH MEDICAL SUPPORT OF INCOUNTRY FORCES IN I CORPS (U)

- A. CG III MAF 060832Z JUN 68 NOTAL
- B. CG III MAF 241409Z OCT 68 NOTAL

1. (C) TO ESTABLISH FIRM GUIDELINES CONCERNING MEDEVAC TRANSFERS TO ARG BRAVO MEDICAL FACILITIES AND TO MINIMIZE DELAYS IN TRANSIT OF MEDEVACS FROM INCOUNTRY LZ TO LPH DECK, THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES ARE PROPOSED:

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(1) NLT 0830 (H) DAILY, WHEN LPH IS AVAILABLE FOR MEDEVAC SUPPORT, IN EITHER DANANG OR QUANG TRI AREA, LPH WILL REPORT BY RADIO TO THE APPROPRIATE INCOUNTRY AREA CASUALTY COORDINATOR (IACC) REPORTING LPH MEDEVAC INFORMATION USING THE FOLLOWING FORMAT:

ALFA	-	PATIENT CENSUS
BRAVO	-	PATIENT BEDS AVAILABLE
CHARLIE	-	NUMBER OF OPERATING ROOMS OPEN
DELTA	-	HOURS OF OPERATING ROOM BACKLOG
ECHO	-	AFFIRMATIVE OR NEGATIVE AVAILABILITY OF LPH MEDICAL FACILITIES

CONDITIONS CHANGING THE STATUS AS REPORTED AT 0830 (H) WOULD BE REPORTED TO IACC IN THE SAME FORMAT WHEN OCCURRING.

(2) WHEN NECESSARY TO UTILIZE THE LPH FACILITIES, THE INCOUNTRY AREA COORDINATOR DIRECTS MEDEVAC HELOS TO LPH. UPON ESTABLISHING RADIO CONTACT WITH LPH CONTROL, THE HELO DECLARES THE CASUALTIES ABOARD UTILIZING THE FOLLOWING MEDEVAC CASUALTY CODE:

WIA (LITTER)	-	BRAVO DELTA
WIA (WALKING)	-	XRAY ZULU
KIA	-	FOXTROT OSCAR
HEAT (LITTER)	-	YANKEE ALFA
HEAT (WALKING)	-	LIMA SIERRA
POW/VCS	-	ECHO ECHO
CREW WIA	-	ROMEO NOVEMBER
CREW KIA	-	GOLF TANGO

(3) IN RESPONSE TO HIS INITIAL CALL-UP THE LPH WILL ADVISE THE HELO TO CONTINUE OR PROCEED TO "CHANNEL (TACAN CHANNEL)" AND TO REPORT AT THREE MILES TO "(LPH VOICE CALL) TOWER" FOR LANDING INSTRUCTIONS.

B. COMMUNICATIONS

(1) III MAF COMMAND NET NUMBER ONE (3844 KHZ). GUARDED 24 HOURS DAILY BY LPH UTILIZING VOICE CALL "(LPH VOICE CALL) CONTROL." WHEN ARG BRAVO IS AVAILABLE FOR MEDEVAC SUPPORT, LPH WILL UTILIZE THIS FREQUENCY TO PROVIDE THE APPROPRIATE INCOUNTRY AREA CASUALTY COORDINATOR WITH TIMELY MEDICAL STATUS INFORMATION OF THE LPH.

(2) DANANG AREA HELO MEDEVAC FREQ (35.5 MHZ) - QUANG TRI AREA HELO MEDEVAC FREQ (45.6 MHZ). GUARDED BY LPH UTILIZING CALL SIGN "(LPH VOICE CALL) CONTROL" AND "(LPH VOICE CALL) TOWER." ALL PHASES OF LPH CONTROL OF MEDEVAC HELO FLIGHT WILL BE CONDUCTED ON THE FREQUENCY APPROPRIATE FOR THE AREA THEREBY NEGATING THE REQUIREMENT FOR RADIO CIRCUIT CHANGES WHILE THE HELO IS TRANSITING INBOUND TO THE LPH.

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2. (U) THE ABOVE PROCEDURES WOULD ELIMINATE THE REQUIREMENT FOR REPORTS DETAILED IN REFERENCES A AND B. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT, IF APPROVED, THE DIRECTIVE ESTABLISHING THE ABOVE PROCEDURES CANCEL THE ABOVE MENTIONED REPORTS.

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1. Planning. The frequencies assigned for naval use during this operation were from CTG 76.5 OPLAN 101-(YR).
2. Requirements vs Assets. Sufficient equipment was available to support operations DEFIANT MEASURE II. This operation did not require the use of naval gunfire ships.
3. Frequencies. Adequate frequencies were available to support Operation DEFIANT MEASURE II.
4. Crypto Systems. Adequate Crypto material was available.
5. Traffic Flow. No significant message backlog occurred during the operation. Traffic flow was smooth and timely throughout DEFIANT MEASURE II.
6. NAVCOMOPNET Termination/FFN Entry. CTG 76.5 maintained a full period on-line ROMULUS termination of two send and two receive channels with USS ANNAPOLIS from 9 March to 28 March. Channel ALFA was NAVCOMOPNET. Channel BRAVO, black-patched to NAVCOMMSTA PHIL, was used for the FFN. On 28 March, termination was shifted to COMNAVSUPPACT, where it remained until completion of the exercise. NAVCOMOPNET was full period on-line ORESTES with the FFN black-patched to NAVCOMMSTA PHIL.

Problems Encountered: VALLEY FORGE KW-7 equipment is not wired to the Red Board in the Crypto space; therefore, the NAVCOMOPNET was terminated in secure comm rather than Crypto.

7. Broadcast/Reception. Due to poor atmospheric conditions and severe magnetic storms, frequency fade was extremely bad during most of this period. On VALLEY FORGE recommendation, NAVCOMMSTA, PHIL. routed the FMUL Tone package to COMNAVSUPPACT DaNang COMMCEN East via WETWASH cable/TROPO/Microwave for re-broadcast, improving reception in the ICTZ. Re-broadcast was initiated 24 March. Reception was generally very good subsequent to 24 March.

8. Comments. Plan to rewire two KW-7s during upkeep/RAV Subic to facilitate operation of ORESTES covered full time termination in Crypto space.

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DEFIANT MEASURE II

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CG, FMFPAC
COMPHIBTRAPAC
CG, LANFORTTRACOMPAC
CO, NAVPHIBSCCL, CCRONADO
COMPHIBGRU ONE
COMPHIBGRU THREE
COMPHIBRON ONE
COMPHIBRON THREE
COMPHIBRON FIVE
COMPHIBRON SEVEN
COMPHIBRON NINE (5)
COMPHIBRON ELEVEN
COMLANSHIPFLOT ONE
COMPHIBGRU TWO
COMPHIBGRU FOUR
COMSERVGRU THREE
COMTACGRU ONE
COMNAVSPECWARGRUPAC
COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
CO, BJU ONE
CO, ACU ONE
CO, BMU ONE
OINC BMU ONE WP DET
OINC ACU ONE WP DET
OINC WP DET NAVSPECWARGRU
OINC NAVSECGRU WP DET
CO, TACRON ELEVEN
OINC NAVBEACHGRU ONE WP DET

CINCPAC
COMUSMACV
COMNAVFORV
CG, III MAF
CG, V MEF
CG, 1ST MARDIV
CG, 3RD MARDIV
CG, 5TH MARDIV
CG, 1ST MAW
CNO (OP09B9) HISTORICAL DIVISION
CMC
COMPHIBLANT
CG, FMFLANT
PRES. NAVWARCOL
CMCS QUANTICO, VA.
CHAIRMAN AWE COMPHIBTRALANT
CG, LANFORTTRACOMLANT
CO, NAVPHIBSCOL LITTLE CREEK
CTG 73.5
CTG 76.4
CTG 76.5
CTG 79.4
CTG 79.5
CO, BLT 3/26
CO, HMM 164
CO, UDT THIRTEEN
CO, USS VALLEY FORGE (LPH-8)
CO, USS ALAMO (LSD-33)
CO, USS TULARE (LKA-112)
CO, USS PAUL REVERE (LPA-248)
USA C&GSC, FT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

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