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SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CTF-78 ltr 3:GLB:raj over 5213 dtd
30Oct65

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)

Subj: Command Chronology

Ref: (b) CMC ltr A03D22-kps of 7Aug 65

1. Forwarded in compliance with paragraph 3 of reference
(b).

H. J. Woessner

H. J. WOESSNER
By direction

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Ser: 0041-65
30Nov65

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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CTF-78 ltr 3:GLB:raj over 5213 dtd 30Oct65

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force SEVENTH Fleet
(TF-79)


To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)

Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2

1. Readdressed and forwarded in accordance with reference (a).
2. By this endorsement the basic letter is classified Secret and may be downgraded to unclassified upon the removal of enclosure (1).
3. This endorsement is downgraded to unclassified upon the removal of enclosure (1) to the basic letter.



LEWIS J. FIELDS

Copy to: CTG-78.5
CTG-79.2 w/Basic Correspondence
CTG-79.3 w/Basic Correspondence

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HEADQUARTERS
TASK FORCE - 78
C/O USS ESTES (AGC-12)
FPO SAN FRANCISCO 96601

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3:GLB:raj
5213
30 Oct 1965

From: Commander
To: Commanding General, Task Force 79, FPO San Francisco 96601
Subj: Command Chronology
Encl: (1) Command Chronology for HMM-163 and BLT 2/1 for
first series of Dagger Thrust Raids

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded for inclusion into TF 79's command chronology as the report of the first series of Dagger Thrust Raids conducted in South Vietnam during the period 25 September to 2 October 1965.

E. G. Winstead
E. G. WINSTEAD

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MARINE MEDIUM HELICOPTER SQUADRON 163 HMM-163 S & C HMMES
 Marine Aircraft Group 16
 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF, Pacific
 C/O Fleet Post Office
 San Francisco, California 96601

NGE:whs
 5750
 Ser: 003A30065
 27 Oct 1965

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From: Commanding Officer
 To: CTF 78

Subj: Command Chronology, SLF (TG 78.5) period 19 June - 10 October 1965

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2

Encl: (1) HMM-163 Command Chronology (~~missing~~)
 (2) BLT 3/7 Action Report Operation Starlite. (~~missing~~)
 (3) BLT 2/1 Command Chronology (~~missing~~)
 (4) BLT 3/7 Command Chronology (Forwarded separately)
 (5) CTG 78.5 Operation Order 1-65
 (6) CTG 78.5 Operation Order 2-65
 (7) CTG 78.5 Operation Order 3-65
 (8) CTG 78.5 Operation Order 4-65
 (9) CTG 78.5 Post Operations Report (Lessons Learned) from
 "Dagger Thrust" targets 2, 4 and 11

1. The following is submitted in accordance with reference (a) as the Command Chronology for the Special Landing Force (TG 78.5) for the period 19 June- 10 October 1965.

2. Enclosures (1), (2), (3) and (4) provide the detailed substance of this report for the two major subordinate elements (BLT and HMM). Enclosure (4) is not available at this time and by copy of this letter Commanding Officer 3rd Bn 7th Marines is requested to submit his Command Chronology direct to CTG 78.5. Some of the documentation requested by reference (a), is not available at time of submission and it is requested that CTF 78 add those operations orders and plans deemed appropriate.

3. Organizational data

a. Designation. The Special Landing Force had the Task designator of Task Group 78.5. It was composed of BLT 3/7 commanded by LtCol C. H. BODLEY for the period 19 June 1965 to 2 September 1965; BLT 2/1 commanded by LtCol R. T. HANIFIN for the period 5 September to 10 October 1965; and HMM-163 commanded by LtCol N. G. EWERS for the period 19 June to 10 October 1965. The SLF was embarked in the assigned shipping of TG 76.5. The ships were the USS Iwo Jima, (LPH-2) USS Point Defiance (LSD-31) and the USS Talladega (APA-208).

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5750b. Average Monthly StrengthBLT USN OFF 7 USN ENL 84 USMC OFF 61 USMC ENL 1572HMM USN OFF 1 USN ENL 2 USMC OFF 54 USMC ENL 166c. Commanding Officer and Staff

N. G. EWERS	LTCOL	COMMANDING OFFICER
B. H. MANN	MAJOR	OPERATIONS OFFICER
C. A. BLOCK	CAPTAIN	ASST. OPERATIONS OFFICER
D. T. WALLACE	CAPTAIN	ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
D. S. WAUNCH	CAPTAIN	LOGISTICS OFFICER
FITZGERALD	CAPTAIN	COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER (19 Jun - 2 Sept)
H. D. READ	CAPTAIN	COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER (5 Sept - 10 Oct)
W. B. SHIRK	1STLT	INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
D. B. WILLIAMS	1STLT	S & C FILES OFFICER

The above staff with the exception of the Communications Officers were provided from members of HMM-163 as were the enlisted clerical assistants.

4. Chronology of Significant eventsa. Okinawa - Re-constitution and Embarkation of the SLF 19-26 June 1965

On 19 June 1965 the Special Landing Force was re-constituted for planning and LtCol N. G. EWERS was designated Commander Task Group 78.5. Units of TG 78.5 were Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 (TU 78.5.3), LtCol N. G. EWERS commanding, and Battalion Landing Team 3/7, (TU 78.5.2), LtCol C. H. BODLEY, commanding. The 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines arrived in Okinawa in early June 1965 from CONUS and commenced training and BLT organization. On 10 June 1965 an advanced party from HMM-163 arrived on Okinawa from DaNang, RVN. Representatives of the squadron and battalion were given cursory briefings within security classification limitations on the mission of the SLF, and preliminary joint embarkation preparations were begun. Upon arrival of HMM-163, a TG 78.5 staff was formed and immediately commenced embarkation and contingency operations planning. CTG 78.5 inherited voluminous quantities of SLF classified documents. A thorough review of all material revealed that many operation orders and plans were nebulous and obsolete. An accurate inventory was conducted and irrelevant material destroyed. Embarkation of the SLF commenced on 24 June 1965 at White Beach.

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Shipping consisted of the USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2), USS Point Defiance (LSD-31) and the USS Talladega (APA-208). Due to the compressed time frame allotted for embarkation planning and subsequent loading, only rough plans were prepared for each ship. Detailed smooth loading plans were prepared and submitted after sailing. The USS Talladega arrived at White Beach with a portion of Class V LFORM already aboard. Delivery of Class V to the beach to complete the LFORM aboard all ships was still being made after initial loading had commenced. As a result an accurate inventory was not conducted.

Exact figures for quantities and DCA could not be determined until a physical inventory underway could be performed. All of the battalion's mount-out blocks of spare parts and repair items had not arrived in follow-up shipping when the SLF sailed. They were later delivered to and loaded at Qui Nhon, RVN. With cargo space already critical, a portion of the flight deck aboard the USS Point Defiance was used for stowage. HMM-163 arrived 3 days prior to initial loading and did not have an opportunity for field carrier practice prior to flying aboard the LPH. The squadron's last carrier operation was conducted in September 1964 aboard the USS Bennington. Lack of time for accurate, detailed planning hampered embarkation of the SLF, but loading was completed within the time prescribed. The SLF departed Okinawa on 26 June 1965 enroute to the Republic of Viet Nam. Underway the task group staff, organized with squadron and battalion officers, commenced work on Operation Order 104-65 for the SLF. Previously a document had not been specifically written to depict the task group's organization, missions, and embarked equipment and supplies. TG 78.5 Operation Order 104-65 may be used as a guide to assist future HMM's and BLT's in planning for embarkation and contingency operations. A joint TG 78.5 intelligence section made up of HMM and BLT personnel began plans for intelligence collection. Initially the SLF received little current intelligence, but through the dogged efforts of the intelligence officers, topical, useful information was obtained from various military agencies at every opportunity. The original contingency pack-up of maps aboard the SLF shipping was inadequate for sustained operations. Fortunately both squadron and BLT anticipated this problem area and procured sufficient maps for expected areas of operation. (See enclosures 1 and 4).

b. QUI NHON 30 June - 20 July 1965

Upon departure from Okinawa the SLF was assigned the mission of being prepared to participate in the defense of the U. S. Army supply installation at QUI NHON until other more permanent defense forces arrived. The SLF was well suited for this mission, with the ability to land by surface and/or helo, provide its own fire support and limited armor and anti-tank capability. Upon arrival at QUI NHON BLT 3/7 was ordered to land and was assigned a TAOR. Command and control of the BLT was accomplished by accommodation rather than by any well defined command and control structure.

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The problem arose because of the split area of responsibility for the defense of the area. Part of the responsibility was vested in the Senior U. S. Army advisor at Qui Nhon and part with the 22nd ARVN Division, while command of the BLT remained afloat. Had the threatened Viet Cong regiment materialized into fact there may well have been some problems with command and control. The period ashore provided excellent training for the BLT, preparing them for future operations. The HMM also gained valuable experience and refresher training in day and night LPH operations. During the period ashore limited supply support in the form of CLASS I and V was received from the U. S. Army. Prior to the relief of the BLT it was requested by higher authority that the SLF HMM continue to support BLT 2/7 that was scheduled to relieve BLT 3/7. In order to free the SLF, plans were made to establish an 8 plane detachment ashore at Qui Nhon but was never implemented. BLT 3/7 was relieved of its responsibilities by BLT 2/7 on 6 July 1965, while HMM-163 supported BLT 2/7 ashore. The SLF remained off Qui Nhon until 20 July when a 12 plane detachment from HMM-161 arrived and relieved HMM-163 of its support mission. The SLF was released and departed Qui Nhon on 20 July 1965 for Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines for a planned upkeep and training period. Prior to arrival as was to happen many other times the SLF was diverted to another mission, for which it had a special capability, (See Enclosures 1, 4 and 5)

c. PRATTAS REEF 22 July - 31 July 1965

The SLF departed Qui Nhon with the intentions of sailing for Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines to conduct training the upkeep of equipment. Plans had been prepared for a 10 day training schedule, advance parties dispatched and initial arrangement has been made for billeting and training facilities. On 22 July the SLF was diverted by CCMSEVENTHFLT to assist in the salvage of the USS Frank Knox which was aground on Prattas Reef (105 miles east of Hong Kong). The SLF was placed under the operational control of CTF 73. The reason that the SLF was designated was two-fold, first the Helicopters were needed for transport of equipment and personnel needed for the salvage operation, and second the USS Iwo Jima was needed because of her ability to produce large quantities of fresh water. The HMM's state of training increased during this period because of the demanding type of flying that was required. The state of training of the BLT deteriorated due to the crowded conditions and the limited amount of physical and classroom training that could be conducted. Shortly after arrival it was requested by CTG 78.5 that the USS Taladega and the USS Point Defiance be allowed to sail for Subic Bay in order to allow them to conduct training and upkeep of equipment. This request was disapproved, however, the USS Point Defiance was ordered to the Philippines in order to remove some of the landing force equipment.

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This was required because of the ICU aboard the ship was needed for salvage operations, as was additional deck space. The plans were for the LSD to then rejoin the USS Iwo Jima and the USS Taladega at Prattas Reef. Meanwhile permission was received for the USS Iwo Jima and the USS Taladega to sail to Hong Kong for R & R. This resulted in the Point Defiance sailing Prattas Reef without some of the landing force equipment embarked while the remainder of the SLF was on R & R in Hong Kong. This splitting of the landing force proved to be detrimental to the overall readiness of the SLF in subsequent operations. On 31 July the SLF was released from operational control of CTF 73. (See Enclosures 1 and 4).

d. Hong Kong 2-10 August

On 2 August 1965, the SLF arrived in Hong Kong for a much needed period of R & R. The squadron had been in the Republic of Viet Nam or aboard ship almost continually since February. BLT 3/7 had little opportunity for recreation since leaving CONUS. The ships were in harbor sufficient time for all personnel to get shore liberty, excepting those aboard the Point Defiance which was detained for salvage operations at Prattas Reef. Few minor and no major disciplinary problems were encountered. On 10 August the SLF (less those elements embarked on the Point Defiance) sailed for Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines and the delayed training and upkeep period. Dagger Thrust plans were also to be made while at Subic and near CTF 78 and CTF 76. (See Enclosures 1 and 4)

e. Subic Bay P. I. 12 Aug - 17 Aug 1965

On 12 August the SLF, minus the USS Point Defiance, arrived at Subic Bay for a period of upkeep and training. Plans had been made for the BLT to conduct individual training as well as coordinated training with the HMM. The HMM had drawn up a schedule to include instrument refresher training, night tactic problems as well as integrated problems with the BLT. Due to the crowded facilities aboard the ships the BLT and HMM moved ashore. While this training was going on the SLF was placed on a 72 hour reaction to the coast of RVN. Plans were also being prepared at the TF 78 and TG 78.5 level for future Dagger Thrust operations. This exchange of ideas period proved to be very beneficial at a later date. On 17 August the order was received to depart Subic Bay as soon as possible for the coast of RVN. This order was received at 1030 and by 2400 the entire SLF less Point Defiance elements was back aboard assigned shipping. This included loading some of the equipment that had been offloaded from the Point Defiance aboard the USS Taladega. After backloading had been completed the SLF departed independently for RVN. The USS Point Defiance was ordered to proceed direct from Prattas Reef to the coast of RVN which necessitated that some of the equipment previously offloaded be left at Subic Bay P. I.

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The SLF arrived off the coast of RVN with time remaining on the 72 hour reaction time required. During the period ashore at Subic Bay P. I. the intelligence personnel took advantage of the intelligence sources available at TF 76/78 and continued developing their collection plan. In addition to training and planning some resupply was conducted particularly of aviation spare parts. There was only limited resupply available for the BLT. During this period the Commanding Officer of BLT 3/7 and selected staff officers were ordered to Chu Lai, RVN for a liaison conference. This required that the initial planning for the next operation be started without benefit of the Commanding Officer, S-3, or Communications Officer. (See Enclosures 1 and 4).

f. Operation Starlight 18 Aug - 24 Aug 1965

Upon notification the SLF departed Subic Bay with the mission of acting as a ready reserve for Operation Starlite. The operation order specified that the BLT or portions thereof landed would CHOP to CG III MAF after landing. Other than limited fragmentary and warning orders the SLF arrived off the coast of RVN with little or no knowledge of what the overall operation was. A liaison party was flown in by helicopter to Chu Lai in advance of the arrival of the SLF to establish initial liaison and to make contact with the C. O. of BLT 3/7 and obtain a briefing. Contact was made and shortly after the arrival of the SLF it was committed. An infantry company, from the Talladega was landed at night. By utilizing previously prepared landing plans this was accomplished without incident. A minor problem arose in that CG III MAF was committing the SLF units without prior knowledge of the 78.5. On D plus 1 the remainder of BLT 3/7 was committed. However, the HMM remained under operational control of CTG 78.5. After some initial confusion it was determined that control of helicopters and fire support coordination was passed ashore and the CTG 78.5 helicopters, although under the control of CTG 78.5 were being controlled by CG III MAF. This pointed out the lack of sufficient controlling facilities aboard the assigned shipping of the SLF in addition to the non-existence of a fire support coordination capability. During Operation Starlite the BLT was resupplied by HMM-163 from supplies aboard the LPH. This resulted in the reduction of the overall material readiness of the SLF. Equipment damage during the operation was light. Valuable intelligence was gained by the SLF on Operation Starlite. S-2 personnel from the TG 78.5 staff had the opportunity to see first hand the tactics and techniques employed by the Viet Cong. The lessons learned on this operation were very beneficial on Dagger Thrust operation. The backload of the SLF was uneventful and unopposed. A quick inspection of the assigned equipment made it obvious that the SLF required a brief period of upkeep of equipment before participating in any other operations.

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Based on the above, permission was granted for the SLF to sail to Subic Bay, P. I. for this upkeep period. (See Enclosures 1, 2 and 4).

g. Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines 26Aug - 29 Aug 1965

Plans were once again prepared for a 10 day training period at Subic Bay P. I. It was necessary to reduce this time in order to be on station off Qui Nhon, RVN by 10 Oct 1965. Between 26 Aug and 10 Sep the following had to be accomplished; upkeep of BLT and HMM equipment; offload of BLT 3/7 at Chu Lai RVN; onload of BLT 2/1 at Okinawa. In addition there was a requirement for conducting Dagger Thrust planning. During the four day period in Subic Bay the emphasis was on upkeep of HMM and BLT equipment and resupply of spare parts. It was necessary to conduct as much upkeep as possible in the short time allotted prior to sailing to RVN for the offload of BLT 3/7. Upon departure from Subic Bay P. I. both the BLT and HMM were combat ready for any future operation. Also during this period CTG 78.5 and the TG 78.5 S-4 departed the SLF proceeding direct to Okinawa for liaison with the new SLF BLT, BLT 2/1. On 29 August the SLF, once again intact after reloading the equipment previously offloaded from the USS Point Defiance, departed for Chu Lai, RVN. (See Enclosures 1 and 4).

h. Chu Lai, RVN 30 August - 2 September 1965

The SLF arrived off the coast of Chu Lai for the offload of BLT 3/7. The offload was uneventful, however, high seas and bad weather required that a limited amount of Class V be left aboard and taken to Okinawa. HMM-163 conducted support operations delivering the BLT directly to their assigned defensive positions. On 2 September the lift was completed and the SLF departed for Okinawa to reconstitute with BLT 2/1. (See Enclosures 1 and 4).

i. Okinawa - Reconstitution of the SLF and Embarkation of BLT 2/1 5-7 September 1965

On 28 August 1965 orders were received to offload BLT 3/7 at Chu Lai, RVN and be prepared to embark BLT 2/1 as the new SLF battalion. It was originally planned to send task group and task unit representatives to Okinawa to assist BLT 2/1 in their preparation for embarkation. A final decision was made to send only CTG 78.5 and the task group Logistics Officer. CTG 78.5 and staff departed Subic Bay, P. I. and arrived on Okinawa 28 August 1965. BLT 2/1, LtCol R. T. HANIFIN commanding, arrived on Okinawa from CONUS on 28 August 1965. CTG 78.5 and TF 79 presented a complete briefing on SLF contingency operations and proposed said missions for CTG 78.5 and BLT 2/1. Detailed liaison was made with individual battalion staff sections to assist in their preparation for embarkation. Embarkation orders and accurate loading plans were prepared.

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TG 76.5 arrived at White Beach on 5 September 1965 and loading commenced immediately. All BLT 2/1 supplies and equipment were staged prior to commencement of loading and timely assistance by 3rdMarDiv embarkation personnel facilitated the operation. BLT 2/1 arrived on Okinawa already organized as a battalion landing team along with their supplies and equipment. This facilitated embarkation planning and staging within the time allotted for preparation. The Task Group units were given a thorough mission briefing by TF 79, which served as an initial planning guide. In this embarkation one task unit was familiar with the SLF operation and was able to assist the other in planning phases. The SLF sailed on 7 Sept 1965 enroute to the Republic of Viet Nam to support the landing of the U. S. 1st Cavalry (Air Mobile) Division. (See Enclosures 1 and 3).

j. Qui Nhon 10-22 Sep 1965

The SLF was assigned the mission of a Floating Reserve on a 6 hour reaction time to assist in providing protection to the 1st Cavalry (Air Mobile) Division during their landing at Qui Nhon, Viet Nam and during their movement inland to An Khe. Upon arrival representatives of TG 78.5 Staff, HMM-163, and BLT 2/1 effected liaison and obtained situation briefs from Task Force Alpha, reps of 1st Cavalry, 22 RVN Division and 2nd Bn 7th Marines. The landing and movement inland was relatively unopposed but the time was well utilized for Dagger Thrust planning. Detailed plans were completed and much desperately needed intelligence was gathered for targets 2, 4 and 11. Squadron and Bn training was greatly enhanced by a daily rotation of a rifle platoon with 2/7, who was in defensive position in the Qui Nhon area. Rendezvous with TF 78 was accomplished for detailed plans on command and control, supporting arms, and preparation for Dagger Thrust Rehearsal area. After an uneventful 12 days the SLF was released to proceed with the long awaited Dagger Thrust amphibious raids. (See Enclosures 1 and 3).

k. Dagger Thrust Operations 22 Sep - 2 Oct 1965

On 21 September 1965, when released from its "Operation Highland" commitment the SLF was at last cleared to commence the long awaited and often postponed Dagger Thrust Amphibious raids. Planning for these raids has been classified top secret and had commenced as far back as May. Now all was in readiness, detailed plans completed and permission received to strike in rapid succession during the period 25 September to 2 October three of several suspected Viet Cong infiltration points. These were in order; Dagger Thrust target no 2, the Vung Ma Peninsula, 12 miles south of Qui Nhon, RVN; Dagger Thrust target no. 4, Ben Goi Bay, 27 miles north of Nha Trang RVN; and Dagger Thrust target no 11 the Tam Quam area 31 miles south of Quang Ngai, RVN.

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A rehearsal, considered an essential part of the raiding sequence, was conducted on 23 September. Site of the rehearsal was the III MAF enclave at Chu Lai, RVN. Rehearsal plans closely approximated those of the projected raid of Dagger Thrust target no 2. Although one tank was submerged during rehearsal retraction no other equipment or personnel casualties occurred. The rehearsal was considered satisfactory and the raiding force under CTF 76 (CATF) and CTG 78 (GLF) proceeded. Dagger Thrust target no. 2 was struck 25 and 26 September 1965. Simultaneous surface and air landings were made 25 minutes after sunrise. The Vung Mu peninsula was quickly seized and hasty search and seizure operations conducted. Intelligence on the area had been sketchy and evidence produced during the raid indicated that although the VC may at one time have been there in some strength most had been gone for sometime. Useful intelligence information was gained from interrogation of local citizens. Leaflets dropped during the initial landing as a civil control measure were considered successful. The raid complete withdrawal was done as planned and in good order. All forces were reembarked without any personnel or material casualties which would prevent continuations of the raids. Dagger Thrust target no. 4 was struck on September 28th. Three Force Reconnaissance teams under operational control of CTF 78 were introduced by rubber boat during the night of 27 September. Their mission; Discover VC activity. Report it for surface and/or helicopter borne assault by the SLF. Their mission was aborted when one of the Recon Teams failed to establish radio contact. All three teams were withdrawn by helicopters without difficulty and without any significant contact. Personnel and material readiness condition of the SLF remained unchanged. Dagger Thrust target no. 11 was struck on 1 and 2 October. This was considered to be the most lucrative of the three targets, based upon the sketchy intelligence available at this time. Here surface landings were made at sunrise. A helicopter borne landing was made on order of the BLT commander approximately 3 hours later, and hasty search and clear operations conducted; including a shore to shore LVT borne raid of an adjacent VC installation. Contact and light resistance was encountered throughout this raid without personnel casualties and with one helicopter disabled by ground fire. Time and the press of other missions worked against the SLF on this raid and frustrated completion of the sweep. Withdrawal was ordered at 0900 on 2 October and forces reembarked under sporadic small arms fire from VC remaining in the area. Leaflets and the psychological warfare team again proved useful. Much new intelligence was gained by the raid although search and sweep operation came up empty handed. Related discussion, maps, and lessons learned on these raids may be found in enclosure (9).

1. Indonesian Crisis 3-8 October 1965

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On October 3, 1965, the SLF moved from the Republic of Viet Nam toward positions at sea to the north of Indonesia for possible participation in the evacuation of U. S. non-combatants and other designated persons. While SLF shipping moved south, the staff began planning for operations concentrating on the Medan area of Sumatra and Djakarta and Soerabaja on the island of Java. On formation of the SLF certain officers had been directed to prepare detailed briefings on possible areas of SLF operations based on contingency plans and available intelligence. The familiarity of these officers with the area and the operations plans enabled the staff to begin meaningful planning immediately. Planning was hampered by lack of specific intelligence on the current situation in Indonesia. The only information received on the crisis by the SLF came off the AP teletype wire.

In addition to planning at the SLF level, two officers from the HMM and one officer from the BLT went to the USS Estes for liaison with the staffs of Task Forces 76 and 78. The SLF contingency map pack up was opened and found to be adequate for planning purposes.

However, had the entire SLF been required to execute operations there would have been some shortages. This unexpected deployment of the SLF delayed relief of HMM-163, which had been scheduled to take place at DaNang on 5 October. It also delayed the change of SLF shipping at Subic, programmed for 8-10 October. The additional time at sea was utilized by BLT and HMM for classroom training and physical fitness training. The SLF equipment was maintained and brought up to the highest state of readiness possible without off-loading the equipment. (See Enclosures 1 and 3).

m. HMM Rotation/CTG 78.5 Relief 8-10 October 1965

On 8 October 1965 the SLF Indonesian alert was set at a 72 hour reaction. Based on this reaction time the plan for rotation of HMM and change of SLF shipping was executed. An advanced echelon of BLT 2/1 was placed aboard the USS Valley Forge and that ship with the USS Talladega and the USS Point Defiance depart for Subic Bay P. I. The USS Iwo Jima with CTG 78.5, HMM-163 and C. O. BLT 2/1 aboard sailed for DaNang RVN to effect rotation of HMM and relief of CTG 78.5. On 10 October 1965 the USS Iwo Jima arrived at DaNang RVN. A liaison group was dispatched ashore early morning and rotation of HMM squadrons commenced at approximately 1000. LtCol M. B. PORTER embarked with Liaison group for briefing and relief of CTG 78.5. After detailed brief between staffs and completion of HMM rotation Colonel N. G. EWEERS was relieved as CTG 78.5 by LtCol M. B. PORTER Commanding Officer HMM-261.

N. G. EWEERS
N. G. EWEERS

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CTF 78.5 (3)
File (1)

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CTG 78.5 OPERATION ORDER 1-65

- A. CTF 76 281456Z
- B. CTG 76.5 OPORD 201-65
- C. CTF 76 281332Z
- D. DTG 76.5 291740Z
- E. MAPS: AMS SERIES LZol 1:50,000 SHEETS 6852 I, II, III, AND IV
- F. CTG 78.5 OPPLAN 104-65

Time Zone: Local for area of operation

Task Organization: Commander Amphibious Task Group Capt D. A. SCOTT.
 2. Commander Landing Group LtCol. N. G. EWERS.

- a. TG 76.5 CAPT, D. A. SCOTT.

TWO JIMA

PT DEFIANCE

TALLADEGA

- b. TG 78.5 LTCOL N. G. EWERS.

HMM-163

BLT 3/7 (REINF)

1. SITUATION. COMUSMACV HAS REQUESTED A MARINE BLT TO PROTECT U. S. INSTALLATIONS AT QUI NHON WHICH NOW PRESENTS A LUCRATIVE TARGET FOR POSSIBLE VIET CONG ATTACK IN CONNECTION WITH GENERAL OFFENSIVES CENTRAL HIGHLANDS TO COAST.

A. ENEMY FORCES. VIET CONG PRESENT IN SMALL GROUPS IN HIGH GROUND WEST AND SOUTH OF QUI NHON. (CR 068176 TO CR 023253) NUMEROUS TRENCH LINES AND FOXHOLES REPORTED RECENTLY DUG IN THIS AREA ALSO. SMALL GROUP VIET CONG ACTIVITY REPORTED IN VILLAGE SOUTH FLANK OF BEACH (CG 070200) AND ON PRESQU'ILE DE PHUOC MAT. ISLANDS VICINITY HON DAT (CF 115128) USUALLY UNOCCUPIED BUT SOME SNIPING OCCURS. THREE VIET CONG BNS. LOCATED IN BINH DINH PROVINCE. THERE IS NO KNOWN AIR THREAT. NAVAL SURFACE THREAT LIMITED TO SUPPLY JUNKS. VIET CONG IN AREA NOT CONSIDERED THREAT FOR LARGE SCALE FRONTAL ASSAULT. MAXIMUM THREAT CONSIDERED BY U. S. FORCES QUI NHON TO BE MASSED MORTAR ATTACK FROM HIGH GROUND TO WEST AND PRESQU'ILE. MORTAR ATTACKS OCCUR SPORADICALLY ON SMALL SCALE. SMALL NUMBER VIET CONG EXECUTE OCCASIONAL TERRORIST TACTICS IN QUI NHON CITY.

- B. FRIENDLY FORCES.

SECRET

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- (1) COMUSMACV. COORDINATES IN COUNTRY OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS.
- (2) ARVN FORCES. COORDINATED THROUGH II CORPS HEADQUARTERS PLEIKU.
- (3) U. S. FORCES. 2500-3000 U. S. ARMY SERVICE SUPPORT PERSONNEL.
- (4) NGF/CAS AS REQUIRED AND APPROVED BY CTF 76.
- (5) LOGISTIC SUPPORT FORCE (TF 73) AS REQUIRED.
- (6) HELICOPTER DIRECTION CONTROL UNIT (TU 76.5.5).
 - (A) ESTABLISHED AND OPERATES IN HDC IN LPH.
 - (B) CONTROLS AND COORDINATES ALL AIRCRAFT IN AOA.
 - (C) CONTROLS HELICOPTERS IN SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT.
 - (D) CONTROLS AND COORDINATES SAR WITHIN AOA.
- (7) TRANSPORT UNIT (TU 76.5.2)
 - (A) LANDS THE LANDING FORCE OVER RED BEACH.
 - (B) CONDUCTS SURFACE AND HELIBORNE SHIP-TO-SHORE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS.

(C) CONDUCTS ANTI-SNEAK AND ANTI-SMALL BOAT OPERATIONS.

(8) HELICOPTER TRANSPORT UNIT (TU 76.5.3) LANDS THE LANDING FORCE BY HELICOPTER INTO ASSIGNED LANDING ZONES.

(9) SURFACE TRANSPORT UNIT (TU 76.5.4) LANDS THE LANDING FORCE OVER RED BEACH TO SECURE ASSIGNED OBJECTIVES.

2. MISSION.

A. GENERAL. WHEN DIRECTED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY LAND AT QUI NHON AND PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE U. S. MILITARY COMPLES IN QUI NHON.

B. BLT 3/7. LANDS BY SURFACE AND HELIBORNE ASSAULT TO ESTABLISH DEFENSIVE POSITION IN QUI NHON AREA.

C. HMM-163. PROVIDES HELICOPTER TRANSPORT FOR ELEMENTS OF BLT 3/7.

3. EXECUTION.

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATION.

(1) BLT 3/7 LANDS TWO COMPANIES BY HELICOPTER IN ASSIGNED LANDING ZONE, ONE BY SURFACE OVER RED BEACH AND ONE COMPANY IN RESERVE. ATTACK AND SEIZES OBJECTIVE, AND ESTABLISHES TAOR FROM 074202 TO 095127 TO 011131 TO 997157 TO 989211 TO 057225.

(2) HMM-163 PROVIDES HELICOPTERS FOR INITIAL MOVEMENT, OF TROOPS AND SUPPLIES, RESUPPLY, MEDICAL EVACUATION, AND SUCH OTHER MISSIONS AS MAY BE DIRECTED.

(3) SHORE PARTY TEAM TO OPERATE BEACH FOR ON CALL SURFACE LANDING AND COMBAT SUPPORT AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT.

(4) RESERVE COMPANY OF BLT 3/7 to LPH-2 FROM APA AS MOBILE RESERVE.

B. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) THIS OPERATION ORDER IS EFFECTIVE FOR PLANNING ON RECEIPT AND EXECUTION ON SIGNAL FROM CTF 76 OR HIGHER AUTHORITY.

(2) D-DAY TO BE SIGNALLED BY CTF 76 OR HIGHER AUTHORITY.

(3) H AND L HOURS TO BE SIGNALLED BY TF 76.5.

(A) H HOUR IS TIME OF LANDING FIRST WAVE RED BEACH.

(B) L HOURS IS TIME OF LANDING FIRST HELIBORNE ELEMENTS

IN LZ.

(5) PRIMARY LANDING ZONES/ALTERNATE LANDING ZONES:

RAVEN 030230

SPARROW 046203

CROW 051194

SECRET

(6) AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA: CENTERED ON GR 0821 TO LANDWARD A TEN NAUTICAL MILE RADIUS CIRCLE AND TO SEAWARD A CIRCLE OF TWENTY-FIVE NAUTICAL MILES RADIUS TO INCLUDE ALL SEA, LAND AND AIRSPACE LOCATED THEREIN.

(7) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMUSMACV INSTRUCTIONS AND LIAISON WITH SENIOR ADVISOR 22ND DIVISION (COL. MITCHELL).

(8) UNIT COMMANDERS ASSIGNED PROMULGATE SUPPORTING PLANS AS REQUIRED WITH COPIES TO CTG 78.5.

(9) D+L AND SUBSEQUENT AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS WILL BE SUBMITTED BY SEPERATE MESSAGE VIA TAR NET BY 1800 DAILY.

(10) NGF SUPPORT NOT REQUIRED, BUT AVAILABLE THROUGH CTG 76.1.

(11) RELIEF AND WITHDRAWAL ABOUT 15 JULY 1965.

(12) REPORTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE (F).

(13) REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVACUATION AND EMERGENCY RESUPPLY WILL BE REQUESTED VIA TAR NET TO THE HDC. HDC WILL NOTIFY HMM-163 (CTU 78.5.3) IMMEDIATELY OF SUCH REQUEST.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

A. LIBERTY ASHORE IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY U. S. SENIOR ADVISOR 22ND DIVISION ARVN.

B. PRISONERS OF WAR.

(1) POW, REFUGEE REPATRIOTS, CAPTURED VIET CONG AND VIET CONG SUSPECTS WILL BE HANDED OVER TO THE CUSTODY AND CONTROL OF THE 22ND ARVN DIVISION ASAP. LIAISON WILL BE AFFECTED WITH THE 22ND ARVN DIVISION G-2 ADVISOR.

(2) POWS WILL BE TREATED HUMANELY AT ALL TIMES IN ACCORDANCE WITH LOCAL CUSTOMS AND THE GENEVA CONVENTION.

C. CIVIL AFFAIRS.

(1) CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS WILL BE RESTRICTED TO THE MINIMUM NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE ASSIGNED MISSION.

(2) LIAISON WITH THE SENIOR U. S. ADVISOR TO ENSURE PROPER ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PROTECTION OF PROPERTY, AGREEMENTS FOR THE USE OF BUILDINGS OR PROPERTY AND RESTITUTION FOR USE OR DAMAGE TO PRIVATE PROPERTY.

D. CASUALTY REPORTING.

(1) IN ACCORDANCE WITH MARCORPERSMAN AND DIVO 3040.2.

E. SUPPLIES TO BE LANDED WILL BE PUBLISHED BY BLT 3/7 (CTU 78.5.2).

F. RESUPPLY WILL BE PROVIDED 78.5.3 AND SUPPLEMENTS BY COMUSMACV ASHORE.

G. RESUPPLY WILL BE REQUESTED THROUGH TACLOG CHANNELS FROM HST TO TACLOG.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

A. COMMAND POSTS:

(1) CTE 76.5 U.S.S. IWO JIMA

(2) CTU 76.5.2 U.S.S. IWO JIMA

SECRET

SECRET

CTG 78.5 OPOORDER 2-65

- REF: A. CTF 76/78 OPOORDER 323-66
 B. CTF 76 120250Z SEPT
 C. CTG 78.5 OPPLAN 104-65

TASK ORGANIZATION. SEE REF (A) AND (B)

1. SITUATION

- A. ENEMY FORCES - SEE REF (A) AND (B)
 B. FRIENDLY FORCES - SEE REF (A) AND (B)
 C. FOLLOWING ATTACHMENTS EFFECTIVE 230000Z SEPT 1965.
 (1) PSYWAR TEAM ATTACHED CTG 78.5
 (2) PLO TEAM ATTACHED TO CTG 78.5
 (3) ITT SUB TEAM ATTACHED BLT 2/1
 (4) RVN LIAISON OFFICER ATTACHED BLT 2/1
 (5) 16 ARVN INTERPRETERS ATTACHED BLT 2/1
 (6) 2 ARVN INTERPRETERS/FAC ATTACHED HMM-163
 (7) 2 U. S. ADVISORS ATTACHED BLT 2/1
 D. FOLLOWING DETACHMENT EFFECTIVE 230000Z SEPT 65
 (1) DET FORCE RECON CO. FROM BLT 2/1 TO CTF 78.
 2. MISSION. ATTACK AND DESTROY VIET CONG INSTALLATIONS, CAPTURE OR DESTROY VIET CONG PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL IN OBJECTIVE AREA AND WITHDRAW.

3. EXECUTION:

- A. CONCEPT OF OPERATION SEE REF (A) AND (B)
 B. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS
 (1) SEE REF (A) AND (B)
 (2) REPORTS
 (A) BLT SUBMIT ISUM TO CTG 78.3 VIA BLT/CMD NET 4 HOURS AFTER H HOUR AND THEN EVERY SIX HOURS THEREAFTER. HMM SUBMIT THIS HQ.
 (B) BLT AND HMM SUBMIT AFTER ACTION REPORT TO CTG 78.5 FOUR DAYS AFTER COMPLETION OF MISSION
 (C) CASUALTY REPORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF (C)
 (D) HMM SUBMIT DAILY SUMMARY OF HELICOPTER OPERATION REPORT TO HDC BY 1830 FOR PERIOD ENDING 1800 IAW REF (A).
 (E) AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY SUBMITTED BY HMM IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF (A)

(3) LZ BUZZARD

- (A) 1ST WAVE: CHANGE TO ALTERNATE LZ AUTHORITY REPRESENTATIVE BLT 2/1 IN COORDINATION WITH REPRESENTATIVE HMM-163
 (B) SUBSEQUENT LZ UNTENABLE CO COMPANY DIRECT CHANGE. IF LZ INTERDICTED AND NO CONTACT WITH LZ FLT LEADER CHANGE TO ALTERNATE. THOSE CHANGING ADVISE ALL CONCERNED BY MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS.

- (4) SUBSEQUENT ASSAULT LIFTS WILL USE SAME GENERAL PRINCIPLE
 (5) APPROACH AND RETIREMENT LANES CHANGE UPON APPROVAL

HDC OR HIGHER AUTHORITY

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- A. SEE REF (A) AND (B)
 B. CTU 78.3.2 WILL ENTER BLT/CMD NET ABOARD LPH-2. PASS ALL ADMIN AND TACTICAL TRAFFIC THIS NET.

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DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

C. THE TASK DESIGNATOR 78.3.2 WILL BE USED EFFECTIVE 230000Z AND ONLY FOR TRAFFIC THAT PERTAINS TO TARGET TWO WITHIN THE TASK GROUP. ORIGINAL TASK DESIGNATORS IN TE 78.5 TU 78.5.2 AND TU 78.5.3 WILL BE USED FOR ALL OTHER TRAFFIC.

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CTG 78.5 OPORDER 3-65 (U)

REF: (A) CTF 76/78 OPORDER 323-66

(B) CTF 76 MAG 201030Z SEPT

(C) CTU 76.3.2 OPPLAN 201-66

(D) CTG 78.5 OPPLAN 104-65

TASK ORGANIZATION. SEE REF(A) AND (B)

1. SITUATION

A. ENEMY FORCES SEE REF (A) AND (B)

B. FRIENDLY FORCES SEE REF (A) AND (B) AND (C)

C. FOLLOWING ATTACHMENTS EFFECTIVE 230000Z SEPT

(1) PSYWAR TEAM ATTACHED CTG 78.5

(2) PIO TEAM ATTACHED CTG 78.5

(3) ITT SUB TEAM ATTACHED BLT 2/1

D. FOLLOWING DETACHMENTS EFFECTIVE

(1) DET FORCE RECON CO. FROM BLT 2/1 TO CTG 78.3 230000Z SEPT

(2) SEAL TEAM VNN FROM BLT 2/1 TO CTG 78.3 300000Z SEPT

2. MISSION. BE PREPARED ON ORDER TO WITHDRAW OR REINFORCE RECON AND SURVEILLANCE TEAMS INTRODUCED IN OBJECTIVE AREA. BE PREPARED, ON ORDER TO LAND BY AIR OR SURFACE MEANS TO ATTACK AND SEIZE OR DESTROY VIET CONG INSTALLATIONS, MATERIAL AND PERSONNEL. WITHDRAW ON ORDER

3. EXECUTION.

(A) CONCEPT OF OPERATION SEE REF (A) AND (B) AND (C)

(B) HMM-163 PROVIDE 4 UH-34 IN CONDITION IV STANDBY FOR EMERGENCY WITHDRAWAL OF RECON TEAMS. PROVIDE 2 UH-34 IN CONDITION IV STANDBY TO ACT AS TAO/NGF SPOT AND SAR. BE PREPARED TO LAND BLT 2/1 IN LZ TO BE DESIGNATED AT TIMES TO BE DESIGNATED.

(C) BLT 2/1 PROVIDE 4 - 7 MAN TEAMS IN 30 MINUTE STANDBY TO ASSIST IN EMERGENCY WITHDRAWAL OF RECON TEAMS. PROVIDE FAC & NGF SPOTTER FOR TAO AIRCRAFT. BE PREPARED TO LAND BY AIR OR SURFACE MEANS IN FORCE AND AT TIMES AND PLACES TO BE DESIGNATED WITHDRAWAL ON ORDER

(D) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) SEE REF (A) AND (B)

(2) REPORTS

(A) BLT SUBMIT ISUM TO CTG 78.3 VIA BLT/CMD NET 4 HOURS AFTER H HOUR AND THEN EVERY SIX HOURS THEREAFTER. HMM SUBMIT THIS HQ

(B) BLT AND HMM SUBMIT AFTER ACTION REPORT TO CTG 78.3 FOUR DAYS AFTER COMPLETION OF MISSION

(C) CASUALTY REPORT IAW REF (D)

(D) HMM SUBMIT DAILY SUMMARY OF HELICOPTER OPERATIONS REPORT TO HDC BY 1830 FOR PERIOD ENDING 1800 IAW REF (A)

(E) AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY SUBMITTED BY HMM IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF (A)

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

A. SEE REF (A) AND (B)

B. BLT 2/1 ESTABLISH TACLOG ABOARD USS PT DEFIANCE ON ORDER

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5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

- A. SEE REF (A) AND (B)
- B. CTU 78.3.2 WILL ENTER BLT/CMD NET ABOARD LPH-2. PASS ALL ADMIN AND TACTICAL TRAFFIC THIS NET
- C. THE TASK DESIGNATOR 78.3.2 WILL BE USED EFFECTIVE 230000Z AND ONLY FOR TRAFFIC THAT PERTAINS TO TARGET 4 WITHIN THE TASK GROUP. ORIGINAL TASK DESIGNATORS IE TE 78.5 TU 78.5.2 AND 78.5.3 WILL BE USED FOR ALL OTHER TRAFFIC

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CTG 78.5 OPORDER 4-65

- REF A. CTG 76/78 OPORDER 323-66
 B. CTG 76 201034Z
 C. CTG 78.5 OPPLAN 104-65
 D. CTU 76.3.2 OPPLAN 201-66
 E. CTG 78.5 290025Z SEPT NOTAL

TASK ORGANIZATION. SEE REF (A) AND (B) AND (C)

1. SITUATION

- A. ENEMY FORCES SEE REF (A) AND (B)
 B. FRIENDLY FORCES SEE REF (A) AND (B) AND (C)
 C. FOLLOWING ATTACHMENTS EFFECTIVE 230000Z SEPT
 (1) PSY WAR TEAM ATTACHED CTG 78.5
 (2) PIO TEAM ATTACHED CTG 78.5
 (3) IPT SUB TEAM ATTACHED BLT 2/1
 (4) SEAL TEAM VNN ATTACHED BLT 2/1 EFFECTIVE 300000Z SEPT
 D. DETACH DET FORCE RECON CO FROM BLT 2/1 TO CTG 78.3 230000Z SEPT

2. MISSION. ATTACK AND DESTROY VIET CONG INSTALLATIONS, CAPTURE OR DESTROY VIET CONG PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL IN OBJECTIVE AREA AND WITHDRAW ON ORDER.

3. EXECUTION.A. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

- (1) SEE REF (A) AND (B) AND (C)
 (2) AT H HOUR ON D DAY TWO COMPANIES LAND ACROSS RED BEACH. SECURE HIGH GROUND VICINITY BS 912145 TO BS 918157. AT L HOUR (TO BE ANNOUNCED) LAND ONE COMPANY BY HELO IN LZ DIANE. ONE COMPANY AFLOAT LPH-2 AS RESERVE.

B. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

- (1) SEE REF (A) AND (B)
 (2) REPORTS
 (A) BLT SUBMIT ISUM TO CTG 78.3 VIA BLT/CMD NET 4 HOURS AFTER H HOUR AND THEN EVERY SIX HOURS THEREAFTER. HMM SUBMIT REPORT TO THIS HQ.

(B) BLT & HMM SUBMIT AFTER ACTION REPORT TO CTG 78.5 FOUR DAYS AFTER COMPLETION OF MISSION.

- (C) CASUALTY REPORTING IAW REF (C).
 (D) HMM SUBMIT DAILY SUMMARY OF HELICOPTER OPERATIONS REPORT TO HDC BY 1830 FOR PERIOD ENDING 1800 IAW REF (A).

(E) AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY SUBMITTED BY HMM IAW REF (A).

(3) CHANGE OF LZ DIANE TO ALTERNATE LZ.

(A) 1ST WAVE OF HELICOPTERS WILL CHANGE TO ALTERNATE LZ AUTHORITY REPRESENTATIVE BLT 2/1 IN COORDINATION WITH REPRESENTATIVE HMM-163.

(B) SUBSEQUENT WAVES CHANGES WILL BE DIRECTED BY CO OF COMPANY IN LZ. IF LZ INTERDICTED AND NO CONTACT WITH LZ FLT LEADER MAY CHANGE TO ALTERNATE. THOSE CHANGING ADVISE ALL CONCERNED BY MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS.

(4) SUBSEQUENT ASSAULT LIFTS WILL USE SAME GENERAL PRINCIPLE

(5) APPROACH AND RETIREMENT LANES CHANGE UPON APPROVAL HDC OR HIGHER AUTHORITY.

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(6) HELO ZONES AND LANES LAW REF (E)

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

A. SEE REF (A) AND (B)

B. BLT 2/1 ESTABLISH TACLOG ABOARD USS PT DEFIANCE

5. COMMAND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

A. SEE REF (A) (B) AND (C).

B. CTU 78.3.2 WILL ENTER BLT/CMD NET ABOARD LPH-2. PASS ALL
ADMIN AND TACTICAL TRAFFIC THIS NETC. THE TASK DESIGNATOR 78.3.2 WILL BE USED EFFECTIVE 230000Z
SEPT AND ONLY FOR TRAFFIC THAT PERTAINS TO TARGET ELEVEN WITHIN THE
TASK GROUP. ORIGINAL TASK DESIGNATORS, IE TU 78.5.2 AND TU 78.5.3
WILL BE USED FOR ALL OTHER TRAFFIC.

GP-4

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Enclosure (9)

MARINE MEDIUM HELICOPTER SQUADRON 163
 Marine Aircraft Group 16
 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, MACV
 FPO, San Francisco, 96601

3: CAB:wjg
 3760
 5 October 1965

SECRET

From: Commander Task Group 78.5
 To: Commander Task Force 78

Subj: Post Operations Report (Lessons Learned) from Dagger Thrust Targets #2, 4, and 11.

Ref: (a) CTG 76.3 msg 290931Z Sep 65

1. Value of Amphibious Raids

a. Amphibious raids such as Dagger Thrust serve useful purposes in the fight against the Viet Cong.

b. Schedule additional Dagger Thrust operations against suitable targets, provide the Commander Amphibious Task Force/Commander Landing Force with funds and in kind supplies with which to compensate the innocent for losses and damages incidental to operations ashore (crops destroyed by arty emplacements, tank operations, etc.) Consider night landings by rubber boat, helos, or conventional means.

c. Dagger Thrust operations provide friendly Naval forces a measure of needed initiative. These raids show the local people how tenuous the VC hold is over them. They provide an opportunity to secure needed intelligence. By the display of restraint and compassion, troops ashore counter Viet Cong anti-U. S. and anti-government propaganda.

2. Time Interval Between Raids

a. Minimum time between targets should be five days to effect proper planning and maintenance, repair and upkeep of equipment. More detailed planning is required for a raid (scheme of maneuver, fire support and withdrawal) than for normal amphibious operations.

b. If raids are not conducted at least 5 days apart, then complete all planning prior to conducting a series of raids. At least 3 days would still be required if latter were effected for maintenance and upkeep of equipment.

c. In amphibious raiding the initiative is ours and there is no compelling reason to rush from target to target. In this series planning and coordination was particularly poor on Target 4. On Targets 4 and 11, BMT planners were harried by changes and the urgent requirements of Naval counterparts.

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ENCLOSURE (9)

To CTG 76.5 Command Chronology
 19 JUNE - 10 OCT 65

SECRET

3. Mission Type Orders

a. A detailed scheme of maneuver ashore promulgated at CLF/CATF level involving companies and designating a reserve (when no other tactical units are committed) is not considered to be in accordance with accepted doctrine and does not allow BLT commander sufficient flexibility.

b. That SLF/BLT CO be given mission type orders. The detailed scheme of maneuver ashore should be the responsibility of BLT commander.

c. That too many restrictions on tactical movement ashore and coordination of supporting arms were imposed on BLT commander during last series of operations.

4. Intelligence

a. Intelligence inputs for Dagger Thrust operations were generally dated and characterized by incompleteness and inaccuracy.

b. Establish better incountry intelligence liason.

c. NIS beach studies were incomplete. Aerial photo readouts were inaccurate. Suspected VC caches failed to materialize. Planning was done in a real time intelligence vacuum.

5. Compromise of Plans

a. Compromise of plans is a constant threat through agents or upon appearance of the Amphibious Task Force.

b. Watch the need to know (done in this instance). Beware of ambush (especially helo landings). Turn compromise against the enemy through "cover" plans and demonstrations. Seek ways to get ashore faster and without disclosing the presence of the Amphibious Task Force.

c. There is an equal chance future plans are or will be compromised. Plans must consider this.

6. Designation of H and L Hour

a. H and L hour designated 15 minutes after sunrise will permit TAO, NGF spot and CAS aircraft approximately 30 minutes of daylight for recon and attack. Landing of helo elements at times not tied to H Hour, but to the rate of advance of troops ashore (as was the case in LZ Crow on Target 2 and Diane at Target 11) should not properly be called L Hour landings for promulgation at CATF/CLF level.

b. Control H and L Hour at CATF level. Let CO of troops ashore control all other "on call" elements whether surface or helo landed.

c. It takes approximately 45 minutes to commence helo landing on on-call

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serial such as the company landed at Diane in Target 11. Such on call commitments are further complicated by delays in transmitting and understanding orders to land. Troop commanders must consider this, especially when such commitment is critical to the scheme of maneuver ashore.

7. Command And Control

a. Command relations and control and coordination responsibilities can and do become confused as they did in certain areas of these raids.

b. Spell out CATF/CLF/SLF/BLT/HMM command relations and control responsibilities in applicable operations plans so far as they relate to supporting arms, scheme of maneuver ashore, TACLOG operations, and helo operations.

c. Troop and helicopter units should receive their orders from the CLF, not the CATF as was the case on target 4 when CTG 76.3 ordered CTU 76.3.2 to launch all helos to redover the reconnaissance teams on target 11 when CTG 76.3 ordered CTU 76.3.2 to land troops in LZ Diane.

8. Withdrawal Operations

a. BLT daylight withdrawals unopposed or lightly opposed as was the case here, last 5 hours or more. Withdrawal in under 5 hours seems unlikely. Time of day, enemy opposition, surf and weather conditions, level of crew training and familiarity of responsible officers with plans are all-important contributing factors.

b. Plan and train for withdrawal like any other tactical operation. Give the BLT commander the same support and freedom of action.

c. In these raids, target 2 withdrawal was poorly executed. Target 4 withdrawal was confused by conflicting directives. Target 11 withdrawal profitted by the previous experience, and was generally satisfactory.

9. Selection and Preparation of Helicopter Landing Zones

a. In an environment of: limited intelligence, possibility of compromise, restrictions on free use of offensive fire power, and a slow troop buildup, helicopter borne assaults are vulnerable to ambush and defeat in detail. One rifle company takes about one hour to land, with approx. 125 troops landed in the first 5 minutes.

b. Select multiple landing zones for company size lifts. Avoid assault landing in zones with good defensive terrain nearby. (LZ Diane in target 11)

c. We were lucky in target 2 and 11. Had the enemy occupied these positions in even small numbers, she could have hurt us badly coming in as we did without any preparatory strikes or fires and escorted by attack aircraft whose pilots were unfamiliar with helicopter escort tactics.

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10. Use of the UH-34D as a TAO Aircraft

- a. The UH-34D aircraft is not suitable for the TAO mission. It was made to work on these raids by the courage and skill of the crews.
- b. The SLF be task organized to include a detachment of four UH-1B helicopters. This has been requested by CTG 78.5 msg 2307253 July 65, by CTG 78.5 letter 03A23866 of 26 Aug 1965, and by CTV 78 for these operations, but not provided.
- c. The UH-34D was utilized on target 2, 4, and 11 as a TAO aircraft. 72 TAO sorties were flown and 4 aircraft sustained hits from smallarms fire. This represents 100% of all SLF personnel and equipment sustaining hits during the three operations. The aircraft is vulnerable. The pilot and co-pilot are the only persons that have any visibility and this is not good enough for TAO work. Crew coordination on a TAO mission is difficult. Similar problems were encountered when using the UH-34D as an armed helicopter and it was not considered suitable for that mission either.

11. Control of Visitors Ashore

- a. The length of a raid operation coupled with rapidity of movement and logistical and tactical planning considerations preclude handling the large number of visitors normally associated with an amphibious operation of greater magnitude and extended duration.
- b. That in view of rapid concept (time and size of unit) visitors not be allowed ashore.
- c. Too many interested personnel came ashore and desired tours/briefing, etc. Such is not compatible with mission.

12. SITREPS

- a. SITREP presently required from BLT every 12 hours, ISUMS required every 4 hours. Many efforts made to comply in timely and informative fashion. However, RQR then laid on to informing afloat activities of every skirmish/move, anticipated action, etc. Even though personal representative of CATF was ashore with radio (provided by BLT) CO and XO of BLT was constantly required to brief situation and take time away from planning and supervision.
- b. That SITREPS be submitted every 8 hours. That ISUMS be submitted every 4 hours. That CATF representative supply on the spot information over CLF tactical net iaw existing situation.
- c. That too much on the spot information was personally requested from CO BLT during operations even after SITREPS and on the spot information submitted by CATF representative. Other sources, TACC, T.C, HBC and radio.

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TAC logs were available, but not fully utilized.

13. Use of leaflets

- a. Leaflets are an effective method of controlling the population during amphibious raids.
- b. Leaflets should be dropped on subsequent Dagger Thust Operations.
- c. Prior to target 2 and 11 very little was known as to the effect of the leaflets on the population when used immediately prior to an amphibious assault. They proved to be effective on target 2, which was evident by the number of civilians that came out of their homes and gathered on the edge of the village as directed by the leaflets. Although the effect was not as evident on target 11 it is believed that the leaflets were effective there.

14. Limitations on Employment of Tracked Vehicles

- a. Tracked vehicles (LVT, Ontos, tanks) have a limited utility on raids due to trafficability and lack of good roads/trails. Additionally they are prone to breakdown and difficult to repair and maintain in cramped shipping spaces.
- b. That tracked vehicles embarked with the BLT be the best available and continued through rotation of each BLT. That LVTs, Ontos, and tanks be employed in beach area only as protection during assault landing and withdrawals.
- c. That current equipment (LVTs, tanks, Ontos) cannot operate satisfactorily in most instances away from beach areas in South Viet Nam. That BLT has insufficient repair parts, ship facilities and trained personnel to effect 3rd echelon repairs on time-worn equipment. Equipment in need of 3rd echelon repairs should be exchanged or turned in to FSR for repairs.

15. Coordination of Supporting Area

- a. Terms were misunderstood by control agencies involved and resulted in severe restriction imposed upon BLT CO even after coordination of supporting arms was passed ashore. For example, on target, 11, BLT could not register arty and mortars day or night due to helicopter and CAS aircraft continually flying over TAOR at the time BLT had coordination.
- b. That control and coordination measures and principles be discussed at the earliest by representatives of SACC and FSCC.
- c. That operation of SACC/FSCC during target 11 was not in standard doctrine and unacceptable from BLT CO's viewpoint.

N. G. EWERS

5/MCD/lab
Ser: 00412 66
1 APR 1966


SECRET (unclassified upon removal of the endorsement)

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CTG-79.5 ltr JRB:raj over 3000 of 30Jan66

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)

Subj: Command Chronology

1. Readdressed and forwarded.


M. C. DALBY
By direction

T.J. 79.5 (SLF)
79.5

290 521

SECRET

103:OBJ:mpe
Ser: 008-66
9Feb66

66 1450


SECRET

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CTG-79.5 ltr JRB:raj over 3000 of 30Jan66

From: Commander, Task Force Seventy-Nine
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology

1. Readdressed and forwarded.
2. This endorsement and the basic letter are unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1) to the basic letter.



LEWIS J. FIELDS

Copy to:

CTG-79.5
CTG-79.2 w/basic correspondence
CTG-79.3 w/basic correspondence

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HEADQUARTERS
Task Group 79.5
USS Valley Forge (LPH-8)
FPO San Francisco, 96601

JRB:raj
3000
30 Jan 1966


From: Commander
To: Commander Task Force 79

Subj: Command Chronology

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2

Encl: (1) Command Chronology for the SLF (TG 79.5) for the period 11 October to 31 December 1965.

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded in accordance with reference (a).


J. R. BURNETT
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

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COMMAND CHRONOLGY1. Organizational Data.

a. Designation. The Special Landing Force had the Task designator of Task Group 78.5 from 11 October to 25 December 1965. Effective 250001Z December, and as directed by COMSEVENTHFLT msg 230532Z Dec, the Special Landing Force became Task Group 79.5, under the operational control of CTF 79.

b. Composition. The Special Landing Force was composed as follows:

11-17 October 1965

CTG 78.5 - LtCol M. B. PORTER
 CTU 78.5.2 (BLT 2/1) - LtCol R. T. HANIFIN
 CTU 78.5.3 (HMM 261) - LtCol M. B. PORTER

18 October - 22 December 1965

CTG 78.5 - Col J. R. BURNETT
 CTU 78.5.2 (BLT 2/1) - LtCol R. T. HANIFIN
 CTU 78.5.3 (HMM 261) - LtCol M. B. PORTER

23-24 December 1965

CTG 78.5 - Col J. R. BURNETT
 CTU 78.5.2 (BLT 3/4) - LtCol S. A. VALE
 CTU 78.5.3 (HMM 261) - LtCol M. B. PORTER

25-31 December 1965

CTG 78.5 - Col J. R. BURNETT
 CTU 78.5.2 (BLT 3/4) - LtCol S. A. VALE
 CTU 78.5.3 (HMM 261) - LtCol M. B. PORTER

c. Location. The Special Landing Force was embarked aboard the amphibious ships of the Amphibious Ready Group. Initially, they were aboard the USS Iwo Jima, (LPH-2), USS Point Defiance (LSD-31), and USS Talladega (APA-208). Upon reembarkation at Subic Bay, they sailed on 6 November aboard the USS Valley Forge (LPH-8), USS Monticello (LSD-35), and USS Montrose (APA-212).

d. Average Monthly Strength.

BLT	USMC OFF	62	USMC ENL	1531	USN OFF	6	USN ENL	88
HMM	USMC OFF	55	USMC ENL	0186	USN OFF	1	USN ENL	02
SLF	USMC OFF	06	USMC ENL	0012	USN OFF	0	USN ENL	00

e. Commanding Officer and Staff.

J. R. BURNETT	Colonel	Commanding Officer
T. E. GLEASON	LtColonel	X.O./S-3
L. M. DUFFY	LtColonel	S-1/S-4
G. I. BARTLETT	Major	Asst. S-3
F. E. GRUBE	Major	S-2
C. ALBANS	Captain	Asst. S-2
R. A. LIST	1st Lieutenant	CommO/Asst. S-3

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2. Chronology of Significant Events.a. Subic Bay - 11 October to 5 November 1965.

(1) Intelligence - The intelligence effort during this period centered around the collection, processing and evaluation of factual and photographic data and information relative to the Dagger Thrust objectives. The S-2A photographed proposed Dagger Thrust objective areas in Market Time aircraft. This was done to augment the photographic coverage obtained from other sources (CTF 115 and CTF 77).

(2) Training - During this period, special emphasis was placed on training for amphibious operations and jungle warfare. CPX's were held, jungle warfare training exercises were conducted under the guidance of Negrito guides, debarkation drills were held, and general military subjects training continued. Two amphibious landing exercises were conducted at Green Beach, Subic Bay utilizing both surface and helicopterborne forces.

(3) Personnel - During this period, the new members of the permanent SLF staff began arriving at Subic Bay to assume their new duties.

(4) Command and Control - Colonel John R. BURNETT relieved LtCol M. B. PORTER as CTG 78.5 on 18 October 1965. Colonel BURNETT established his command post aboard the USS Valley Forge (LPH-8) and conducted liaison visits with various commands located in the Subic Bay area.

(5) Helicopter Operations - The helicopters of HMM 261 engaged in normal training operations during this period with special emphasis placed on amphibious operations. In addition, they supported planning by providing aircraft for liaison visits by various staff members.

(6) Logistics - The major logistics problem encountered during this period resulted from the inadvertent flooding of the well deck of the LSD on 2 November. Numerous embarked vehicles were contaminated by salt water. The vehicles were off-loaded at Subic Bay for inspection and maintenance. Those parts which were not immediately on hand were obtained at Clark AFB. Parts for vehicles not common to Marines and Air Force were obtained from mount-out stocks. Subsequently the vehicles were backloaded and repairs and maintenance continued aboard ship subsequent to departure from Subic Bay on 6 November. The BLT established a base camp ashore during this period on the site of the old SeaBee camp at Subic Bay. No formal training facilities were available, and no permanent camp facilities were available except for one wooden building which was used by BLT 2/1 as their CP ashore.

b. At Sea - 6 November to 27 November 1965.

(1) Intelligence - The S-2A photographed Dagger Thrust objectives "B" and "C" in order to augment photographic coverage supplied by CTF 115 and CTF 77. On 18 November, the S-2 was increased when one Major, two Gunnery Sergeants, and one Corporal were transferred from CTF 78 staff to TG 78.5 staff.

(2) Training - The BLT conducted shipboard training in general military subjects in addition to normal physical training. The HMM conducted pilot proficiency training and supported planning by providing aircraft for liaison flights. Special debarkation and silent landing drills were conducted on several occasions during hours of darkness in order to enhance the tactical surprise desired in Dagger Thrust operations.

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(3) Special Operations - During the periods 8-10 and 16-18 November, the SLF participated in the III MAF operation "Blue Marlin". While performing its assigned mission as a floating reserve, continual liaison was maintained with the Commander Landing Force aboard the USS Paul Revere (APA-248). Plans were prepared in the event that the SLF was committed to this operation. (see CTG 78.5 Operation Order 4-65).

(4) Command and Control - During this period, and concurrent with the planning for "Blue Marlin", the TG 78.5 staff engaged in the detailed planning for Dagger Thrust operations. Joint briefings were conducted on a daily basis to ensure that continuous coordination was maintained on all aspects of the planning. The "W" annex to the joint TG 76/78 Dagger Thrust operation order which contains the details for the specific Dagger Thrust objective "A" was distributed on 12 November. Subsequently, the "W" annexes for objectives "B", "C", and "U" were distributed on 15, 17, and 19 November respectively. Upon completion of "Blue Marlin" (without being committed), the ARG/SLF sailed for a three day stay in Manila. This ended in a joint Dagger Thrust briefing aboard the Valley Forge for all staffs concerned. On 23 November, the ARG/SLF sailed for Vi etnam waters. Enroute, warning orders were received indicating that the ARG/SLF might possibly be committed as a relief force for a Vietnamese ranger battalion under seige south of Quang Ngai. TG 78.5 representatives accomplished liaison with CG III MAF in Danang but the possible commitment was lifted on 25 November. Emphasis again reverted to final preparations for the forthcoming Dagger Thrust raids. Vietnamese liaison and psychological warfare advisors were highlined aboard the Valley Forge on 26 November in preparation for Dagger Thrust objective "C".

c. Dagger Thrust Objective "C" - 28 November to 2 December 1965.

(1) Intelligence - Information obtained from CTF 115 prior to the raid on Dagger Thrust objective "C" indicated that the area would not prove to be a very lucrative target. Prior to completion of withdrawal from objective, the S-2A visited the ARVN security platoon which was guarding the lighthouse on the Isle de Ke Ga located just offshore on the eastern flank of the landing beach. Information obtained at this time confirmed that the area had been deserted for some time. It had, in fact, been a free strike zone for approximately one month. Based on this, it was recommended that the CATF should make the final decision as to whether a particular objective requires the time and expense of such a raid.

(2) Special Operations - During this period the ARG/SLF conducted an amphibious raid on Dagger Thrust objective "C" utilizing helicopter and surfaceborne forces as directed by COMSEVENTHFLT 281136Z Nov65.

(3) Command and Control - Pre-D-Day transfers were accomplished on 28 November, including the BLT command group "A" moving to the LSD. Due to high seas and adverse weather, D-Day was postponed until 30 November. A detachment of four (4) armed UH-1E's flew aboard the LPH on the 28th to support the SLF. Vietnamese advisors were transferred from the LPH to assigned companies aboard the LSD and APA. On the night of 29 November, radio circuits were checked prior to enforcing EMCON at 2400H. On D-Day, the landing forces hit the beach at 0630H, the prescribed H-Hour. Little resistance was encountered and assigned objectives were secured by early afternoon. CTG 78.5 went ashore at approximately 1030H. Patrols were sent out and ambushes were established by the BLT throughout the period ashore. No

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friendly casualties were sustained. Withdrawal was completed at 1630H on 2 December.

(4) Close Combat - During the operations, only a few rounds of small arms fire were received by friendly forces. One round of mortar ammunition was reported on the night of D-Day. Friendly forces returned the fire of snipers and possibly wounded one or two of them. This was the extent of enemy contact throughout the operation. (see BLT after-action report).

(5) Fire Support - Due to lack of enemy contact during the operation, little fire support was required. The armed UH-1E's prepared the landing zone on the morning of D-Day. The 105mm Howitzer Battery was landed on D-Day but conducted only one fire mission during the operation - a registration. Naval gunfire was not required. No close air support was employed, although support aircraft were on station throughout the operation.

(6) Logistics - Logistics problems created delays and extra effort during the operation. Deceptively firm surfaced roads in the area proved to be a crust covering soft quagmires. Tracked vehicles became mired once they left the beach. Considerable time and effort was required to extract the vehicles which had sunk through the crust. One bulldozer was eventually destroyed prior to withdrawal because it was inoperable and could not be extracted.

(7) Helicopter Operations - HMM 261 provided troop lifts, logistics lifts, armed recon, and fire support, and general administrative lifts throughout the operation. Helicopter operations proceeded generally as planned with little unusual occurring. (see after-action report).

(8) Civic action/Civil affairs - The area of operations had apparently been evacuated several months prior to the raid. No civilians were encountered ashore. The extent of the civic action performed was the donation of five cases of "C" rations to the Vietnamese family and ARVN platoon on the small island offshore. These people operated and protected a government owned lighthouse on the island and were apparently running short of supplies.

d. Dagger Thrust Objective "U" - 3 December to 6 December 1965.

(1) Intelligence - On 3 December, the S-2 and S-2A visited Qui Nhon to obtain current intelligence on Dagger Thrust objective "U". While there, the S-2A had the opportunity to fly over the area in an Air Force L-19, photographing it and being briefed by the pilot who was quite familiar with the area. Observation revealed a canal being dug between the ocean and the swampy inland area which was not fordable by foot troops. Interrogation of villagers during the operation confirmed that about 40-50 Main Force VC were in the area on a rice buying mission. The area had also been used as a medical training center for corpsmen and nurses. The VC had been conducting political indoctrination classes on a regular basis throughout the area. Captured documents were forwarded to J-2 (COMUSMACV) in Saigon after they had been exploited for immediate intelligence.

(2) Special Operations - During this period, the ARG/SLF conducted an amphibious raid on Dagger Thrust objective "U" utilizing a combination helicopter and surface borne assault as directed by COMSEVENTHFLT 030050Z Dec65.

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(3) Command and Control - On 3 December, change to the "W" annex for Dagger Thrust objective "U" were distributed. The basic concept of operations remained unchanged, however, the scheme of maneuver was modified so as to permit only limited penetration by tracked vehicles. This precluded miring but permitted the accomplishment of the mission. On 4 December, the BLT command group "A" accomplished their pre-D-Day transfer. D-Day was postponed due to bad weather. On 5 December, the landing force tactical elements landed over the assigned beach at 0630H. Helicopterborne forces touched down in the assigned landing zone at 0640H. L-Hour had been scheduled for ten minutes after H-Hour so that the tactical surprise achieved by the surface elements would not be compromised before they had begun to move inland. No pre-H-Hour air or naval gunfire preparation was conducted. The forces landing over the beach encountered only light and sporadic resistance, however, the helicopterborne force was taken under fire as the troops began debarking.

(4) Close Combat - All infantry elements involved in this raid experienced some close combat with enemy forces. Several fire fights involving the exchange of a heavy volume of small arms fire were experienced. Machine guns, mortars, rocket launchers and T/O weapons were employed with good effects. The action resulted in 26 confirmed VC KIA and 3 VC WIA. Additionally, there was a probable 31 VC KIA and 3 VC WIA. The BLT had 3 KIA and 10 WIA. Approximately 2700 pounds of rice was captured and subsequently destroyed. All VCC and VCS were turned over to Vietnamese authorities in Qui Nhon.

(5) Fire Support - All available fire support was utilized throughout this operation. Naval gunfire was employed during the initial stages to interdict routes of egress from the area. Artillery and 81 mortars were brought ashore early and fired in support of the attack. During the night, artillery and NGF harassing and interdiction fires were delivered. The machine guns and rockets (FFAR) (2.75) of the armed UH-1E's were especially valuable during the initial stages of the assault. They were able to observe and fire upon enemy positions and troops which could not be taken under fire by other supporting arms. Throughout the operation, these aircraft ranged over the area, pursuing by fire the escaping enemy troops. The UH-1E's acted in the capacity of TAO/TAC(A). The bombs, rockets and napalm from these aircraft inflicted additional casualties on an already bloodied and harassed enemy. They were able to reach out and destroy what could not be hit by the ground forces.

(6) Logistics - Logistics problems were considerably less time consuming during this operation but none the less they were present. Initially, an LCU with three tanks embarked grounded on a sand bar some distance from the beach. After determining that the depth of the water was apparently not hazardous to the tanks, the first tank debarked and headed for the beach. After progressing several meters, the tank drove into a pothole and completely submerged. The remaining tanks were kept aboard the LCU and salvage operations commenced with the aid of the UDT personnel. On the afternoon of D-Day, the tank was pulled onto the beach in an inoperable condition. It was later taken back to the LSD. The remaining two tanks had in the meantime been debarked at a different location taking precautions to ensure that a guide preceded each vehicle as it moved through the water and onto the beach. After withdrawal had commenced on 7 December, one UH-1E experienced what appeared to be a tail rotor failure and crashed a thousand meters inland from the beach. The crew escaped serious injury. The hulk was stripped of all salvageable equipment and then destroyed. Later in the day, the LVT command tractor

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was returning to the LSD through a moderate surf, when the engine hatch cover was torn off by a swell and the engine compartment flooded cutting off the power for the pumps. The vehicle sank, however, the crewmen escaped uninjured, and were picked up by helicopter. Salvage operations were conducted for approximately a week following the raid by elements of TF 76; however these operations were unsuccessful and the LVTC was stripped of radios, crew's gear, machine guns, then destroyed. Medical evacuation during the operation was accomplished by helo-lifting casualties directly to the LPH. Resupply was accomplished by helicopter, lifting supplies embarked on the LPH directly to the individual companies ashore.

(7) Helicopter Operations - With the exception of the one UH-1E which crashed, helicopter operations proceeded as scheduled throughout the operation despite several hits on individual aircraft by small arms fire. (see HMM after-action report).

(8) Civic action/Civil affairs - Civic action during this operation included the distribution of Handclasp materials and the treatment and/or evacuation of civilians injured during the raid.

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e. Operation Harvest Moon - 7 December to 20 December 1965.

(1) On 8 December CTG 78.5 attended a planning conference in Danang in conjunction with the employment of the SLF during Operation Harvest Moon. On 9 December a liaison officer from TG 78.5 staff reported in to CG Task Force Delta at his CP at Que Son. The two companies on the Valley Forge (LPH-8) "F" and "G" together with the BLT Command Group, received a warning order on the 9th of December to be prepared to land by helicopter to seize an area to block a possible VC escape route. The remaining two companies aboard the Montrose, "E" and "H", were enroute to the objective area from Manila at the time. They entered the objective area at approximately 1600 on the 10th, and subsequently effected a transfer to the LPH in order to be prepared for helicopter employment. On 10 December, upon request TF Delta, "F" and "G" companies and the BLT command group were landed at approximately 1115 in two separate landing zones. "F" Company landing first was heavily engaged and the TAC(A) directed subsequent waves to the alternate LZ. Upon landing these units were chopped to OPCON of CG Task Force Delta. On 11 December companies "E" and "H" were landed by helicopter and chopped to OPCON CG Task Force Delta. Subsequently two 107mm howtars were landed as well as six provisional platoons. The 107mm howtars were landed on hill 407 from where they provided support throughout the remainder of the operation. The six provisional platoons were landed by helicopter from the Monticello (LSD-35) to the Logistic Support area and hill 407. Four platoons provided security for the LSA. Two platoons provided security for the 107mm section.

(2) Command and Control - Throughout the operation, CTG 78.5 maintained command and staff liaison with CG Task Force Delta and CG III MAF. Radio communications were established with III MAF and CG Task Force Delta.

(3) Close Combat - During "Harvest Moon", both the BLT and HMM suffered casualties from enemy fire. Approximately 100 personnel were wounded or killed by enemy fire. The operation entailed normal combat type missions (e.g., patrols, clearing operations, local security, and full scale assaults of enemy positions). Artillery and air support was employed on a continual basis. BLT report on "Harvest Moon" submitted to CG 3rd MarDiv.

(4) Logistics - Logistics missions consisted of initial supply of forces, medical evacuation and administrative flights. Subsequent resupply was effected by Task Force Delta. Medical evacuation was to the LPH as well as to the medical companies in Danang and Chu Lai.

(5) Helicopter Operations - HMM 261 remained under the operational control of CTG 78.5 throughout the operation. The squadron was initially committed on 9 Dec when they provided aircraft for the troop lift of BLT 3/3 from the BSA. After this lift was completed, the squadron continued to operate from the BSA for the remainder of the day conducting additional troop lifts and logistic missions. On 10 December HMM 261 augmented by in-country helos provided the troop lift for the assault landing of two companies of BLT 2/1, F and G, from the Valley Forge. On 11 Dec HMM 261 again augmented by in-country helos landed the remaining two companies of BLT 2/1. For the remainder of Operation Harvest Moon, HMM 261 operating under the control of CTG 78.5, was responsive to requests from CG Task Force Delta on a daily basis, conducting troop lifts, logistic functions, medical evacuations, and administrative missions in support of Task Force Delta.

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f. Hue-Phu Bai BLT Rotation - 21 December to 24 December 1965.

(1) Command and Control - The Third Marine Division was assigned the responsibility for coordinating the offloading of BLT 2/1 and supporting elements and the onloading of BLT 3/4. Landing craft from the USS Monticello LSD-35, the USS Montrose APA-212, and USS Seminole AKA-104 were employed for the surface phases of the rotation. The helicopters of HMM 261, operating from the USS Valley Forge LPH-8, were used to helilift troops and material. The LPH was offloaded using both methods. The LSD and APA were offloaded/loaded using only landing craft. Surface elements staged at the Tan My pier and at the Hue landing. Helilifted elements staged at the Phu Bai compound. Helicopter control was maintained from the LPH. Surface movement elements were controlled by individual element commanders with overall coordination by CTG 76.5/78.5. Armed UH-1E's were used to provide security to the motor convoys on the road between Hue and Phu Bai. They also provided security for the boats on the Song Hue river. In addition, the helicopters were able to provide up-to-the-minute status reports on the progress of the convoys and boats. Initial liaison and coordination for the rotation was made at Danang on 19 December.

(2) Logistics - Initial phases of the rotation were carried out at Danang and Chu Lai with the offloading of the LVT's and Shore Party personnel and equipment. In addition, F/2/1 and I/3/4 were rotated between the LPH and Hill 41 located within the Danang TACR. Subsequently, the rotation at Phu Bai commenced with the offloading of BLT 2/1. Additional helicopter support was furnished by HMM 161. The initial coordination and liaison was hampered by a shortage of time between the backloading of BLT 2/1 after operation "Harvest Moon" and the commencement of the rotation. The equipment readiness of BLT 2/1 had suffered as a result of their participation in "Harvest Moon". A partial exchange of organic equipment during the rotation contributed to the difficulties encountered. Poor flying weather resulted in further delays. Revised plans called for the switch from helicopter to surface rotation. This placed an unexpected load on the facilities at Hue landing and at Tan My pier and necessitated an increased utilization of the motor transport capability, thereby increasing time factors. Forklifts had to be repositioned on short notice over long distances, boats had to be diverted and had to make longer runs between the LPH and the loading points ashore. Cargo and personnel which had been staged at the landing zone in Phu Bai had to be moved to the Hue landing and Tan My pier. However, despite these and other difficulties, the rotation was accomplished within the time frame desired.

g. Okinawa BLT Rotation - 25 December to 31 December 1965.

(1) Command and Control - On 25 December, the SLF sailed from Vietnamese waters with HMM 261 and BLT 3/4 embarked. Upon arrival at Buckner Bay on 29 December, the offload of BLT 3/4 commenced over White Beach. This was an administrative type surface operation utilizing landing craft from TG 76.5 ships and from the port facility. The last elements of BLT 3/4 were debarked on 30 December and chopped OPCON to CTG 79.2 when the command group debarked at 1500 on 29 December. On 31 December, advance elements of BLT 2/3 embarked to prepare for the onloading of their BLT.

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APPENDIX I TO ENCLOSURE (1)LIST OF REFERENCES

BLT 2/1 Operation Order 206-65 (Dagger Thrust Objective "C")
BLT 2/1 Operation Order 207-65 (Dagger Thrust Objective "U")
CTF 76/CTF 78 Joint Operation Order 323-66 (Dagger Thrust)
CTG 76.4 Operation Order 325-66 (Dagger Thrust Objective "C")
CTG 76.4 Operation Order 326-66 (Dagger Thrust Objective "U")
CTG 76.3 Operation Order 302-66 (Operation Blue Marlin)
CTG 78.3 Operation Order 1-65 (Operation Blue Marlin)
CTG 78.5 Operation Order 4-65 (Operation Blue Marlin)
CTG 78.5 Operation Order 5-65 (Operation Harvest Moon)
Task Force Delta Operation Order 1-65 (Operation Harvest Moon)
Commander Amphibious Ready Group/Commander Special Landing Force
Administrative Order 1-66 (Hue-Phu Bai BLT Rotation Plan)
BLT 2/1 Command Chronology for period of 11 October to 22 December 1965.
HMM 261 Command Chronology for period of 11 October to 31 December 1965.
COMSEVENTHFLT Msg 281136Z November 1965
COMSEVENTHFLT Msg 030050Z December 1965
COMSEVENTHFLT Msg 250532Z December 1965

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APPENDIX II TO ENCLOSURE (1)

TABULATION OF DOCUMENTATION

Tab A: HMM 261 Operations Report for Dagger Thrust Objective "C"
Tab B: HMM 261 Operations Report for Dagger Thrust Objective "U"
Tab C: BLT 2/1 Unit Report for Dagger Thrust Objective "C"
Tab D: BLT 2/1 Unit Report for Dagger Thrust Objective "U"
Tab E: CTG 78.5 Operation Order 4-65 (Operation Blue Marlin)
Tab F: CTG 78.5 Operation Order 5-65 (Operation Harvest Moon)
Tab G: Commander Amphibious Ready Group/Commander Special Landing Force
Administrative Order 1-66 (Hue-Phu Bai BLT Rotation)
Tab H: COMSEVENTHFLT Msg 230532Z December 1965

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TAB A

HMM 261 Operations Report for Dagger Thrust Objective "C"

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MARINE MEDIUM HELICOPTER SQUADRON 261
Marine Aircraft Group 36
1st Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF, Pacific
FPO, San Francisco, 96601

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S-3/GSP/kav
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9 December 1965

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commander, Task Group 78.5

Subj: Dagger Thrust Air Operations Report, submission of

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) CTG 78.5 OpOrder 201-65

Encl: (1) Operation "Dagger Thrust Charlie" Narrative
(2) Statistics Recapitulation for "Operation Dagger Thrust Charlie"

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) the following report is hereby submitted for Operation "Dagger Thrust Charlie".


M. E. PORTER

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVAL
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

SEC FILES HMM-261

LOG NUMBER 403-65-5-5

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Tab A

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9 December 1965

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DAGGER THRUST CHARLIE OPERATIONS NARRATIVE

Map Ref: 1:50,000 Series L701, Sheets 6543 II and 6643 III.
Time Zone: Hotel.

D-Day, 30 November 1965. 12 UH-34D's escorted by 4 UH-1E's and 4 A-1's, commenced airborne assault departing LPH-8 at 0605. First wave touched down in LZ (ZS 245861) at L-Hour, 0630. Simultaneously, 1 UH-34D dropped leaflets in objective area instructing civilians in procedures to follow to insure their safety. One reinforced company was landed without opposition, and the initial assault was completed by 0700. UH-1E's struck LZ in the minutes prior to L-Hour with machine gun and rocket fire. However, objective area contained no hostile forces. Squadron assumed standby status aboard LPH-8, and for the remainder of D-Day. Transported food, water and support personnel to objective areas as requested. 2 UH-34D's were on Med. Evac. standby aboard LPH-8 from sunset to sunrise.

D+1, 1 December 1965. Continued resupply of cargo ashore and thence to company CP's within TAOR. Evacuated 1 USMC injured and 3 USMC sick to LPH-8. VMO detachment continued TAO missions within TACR.

D+2, 2 December 1965. Commenced backload of "G" Co. and "F" Co. from LZ (ZS 265855) at 0826. Withdrew Command Group "A" at 1026. Completed withdrawal at 1625 with the removal of Command Group "B".

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9 December 1965

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STATISTICS RECAPITULATION FOR OPERATION "DAGGER THRUST CHARLIE"

<u>UH-34D TOTALS:</u>	<u>30Nov</u>	<u>1Dec</u>	<u>2Dec</u>	<u>Total</u>
Missions	4	9	6	19
Sorties	208	167	266	641
Troops	504	107	502	1113
Med Evacs		4		4
Flt Hrs	36.0	40.0	32.2	108.2
Tons Cargo	12.7	16.8	9.6	39.1

<u>UH-1E TOTALS:</u>	<u>30Nov</u>	<u>1Dec</u>	<u>2Dec</u>	<u>Total</u>
Missions	2	2	1	5
Sorties	64	20	8	92
Troops	10			10
Pax				0
Flt Hrs	24.5	5.3	6.1	35.9
Rockets	10		4	14
Rounds	600			600

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TAB B

HMM 261 Operations Report for Dagger Thrust Objective "U"

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MARINE MEDIUM HELICOPTER SQUADRON 261
Marine Aircraft Group 36
1st Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF, Pacific
FPO, San Francisco, 96301

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003B34365
9 December 1965

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commander, Task Group 78.5

Subj: Dagger Thrust Air Operations Report, submission of

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) CTG 78.5 OpOrder 201-65

Encl: (1) Operation "Dagger Thrust Uniform" Narrative
(2) Operation "Dagger Thrust Uniform" Statistics Recapitulation

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) the following report is hereby submitted for Operation "Dagger Thrust Uniform".


M. L. PORTER

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 117.1

SEC FILES HMM-261
LOG NUMBER 402-65-5-5
COPY 1

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9 December 1965

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DAGGER THRUST UNIFORM OPERATIONS NARRATIVE

Map Ref: 1:50,000 Series L701, Sheets 6854III and 6853 IV
Time Zone: Hotel.

D-Day, 5 December 1965. 19 UH-34D's escorted by 4 UH-1E's and 4 A-1's commenced airborne assault of 2 reinforced rifle companies, consisting of 450 USMC and 6 ARVN. First wave of H-34's touched down in the LZ (BR 965863) at L-Hour, 0640. Propaganda leaflets dropped in objective area at L-Hour. Light intensity hostile small arms fire encountered from ridgeline in vicinity of (BR 965875). 1 UH-34D and 2 UH-1E's received minor damage as a result of this fire but continued mission without further incident. Evacuated 4 USMC WIA from strike LZ. Initial assault completed at 0735. UH-1E's took ridgeline under machine gun and rocket fire during and after initial assault. Squadron assumed "on-call" standby, and shortly thereafter evacuated 3 USMC KIA, 2 USMC WIA, 9 Viet Civilians WIA and 1 Viet Cong WIA to LPH-8. Transported elements of 81 mm Platoon and other support sections of H&S Co. ashore. 3 H-34's received minor damage from hostile small arms fire during resupply missions of men and equipment in the hours following L-Hour. No injuries, no further incidents. UH-1E's observed group of VC on ridge line near (BR 943868). Target was attacked by UH-1E and A-1 aircraft. Ridge line struck twice more during afternoon by A-1's controlled by UH-1E's. During this period, UH-34's continued to bring supplies ashore to designated LZ's within the TAOR. 12 UH-34D's transported 223 USMC and 7 ARVN of a reinforced rifle company from the Bn. CP (BR 975885) to LZ (BR 962-853). Light hostile fire was encountered and 1 USMC WIA was evacuated to LPH-8. 4 UH-34D's flew to Chu Lai to pick-up additional FFAR's for VMO Detachment. Squadron maintained 2 H-34's in Evac standby's from sunset to sunrise.

D+1, 6 December 1965. Commenced partial withdrawal of personnel and cargo to LPH-8 during mid-morning. At 1155, commenced general withdrawal of "G" Co. (BR 963878), "F" Co. (BR 964885) and Recon Plt. and Command Group "A" (BR 976888). Lift completed at 1305. Evacuated 7 USMC WIA and 3 USMC KIA from LPH-8 to Chu Lai. Evacuated 4 Viet Civ. WIA to Qui Nhon. Carried 414 USMC, 7 ARVN and cargo from (BR 980895) to beach area for further surface reembarkation. Evacuated 4 injured crewmembers of UH-1E that crashed after experiencing tail rotor failure. A/C received strike damage and was later intentionally destroyed after salvagable parts were removed. Transported Command Group "B" from beach area to LPH-8. Rescued 3 crewmen of LVT that sank in surf off beach and evacuated them to LPH-8. Backload completed at 1810 without hostile opposition.

3000
003B34365
9 December 1965

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DAGGER THRUST UNIFORM OPERATIONS NARRATIVE CONT.

UH-34D's inflicted 1 confirmed VC kill, 1 probable VC kill during the 2 day operation. VMO Detachment was credited with 11 confirmed VC kills and 1 probable kill.

3000
003B34365
9 December 1965

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STATISTICS RECAPITULATION FOR OPERATION "DAGGER THRUST UNIFORM"

<u>UH-34D TOTALS:</u>	<u>5Dec</u>	<u>6Dec</u>	<u>Total</u>
Missions	7	13	20
Sorties	374	434	808
Troops	780	823	1603
Flt Hrs	70.2	86.9	157.1
Tons Cargo	16.8	22.6	39.4
Med Evac	28	8	36
Rounds	125		125

<u>UH-1E TOTALS:</u>	<u>5Dec</u>	<u>6Dec</u>	<u>Total</u>
Missions	3	1	4
Sorties	72	30	102
Troops			0
Flt Hrs	27.4	20.8	48.2
Rockets	255	36	291
Rounds	18,815	1000	19,815

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TAB C

BLT 2/1 Unit Report for Dagger Thrust Objective "C"

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Hdqs 2/1 1stMarDiv
Log No. 517-65
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HEADQUARTERS
BLT 2/1
1st Marine Division (Rein), FME
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California, 96601

3:PDS:mgh
5213/2
Ser No 0517-65
20 December 1965

From: Commanding Officer
To: CTG 78.5

Subj: Unit Report for period 300630H November to 021530H December 1965.

Ref: (a) JT CTF 76/78 Operation Order 323-66
(b) CTG 76.5 Msg 171628Z November 1965

Encl: (1) BLT 2/1 Unit Report covering period 300630H November to 021530H December 1965.

1. Pursuant to Instructions contained in references (a) and (b) enclosure (1) is submitted herewith.
2. This cover letter is declassified upon detachment of enclosure (1).


JOHN C. WICKHAM
By direction

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Tab C

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Copy 1 of 4 copies
 BLT 2/1
 USS VALLEY FORGE
 Ser No 0517-65
 201900H December 1965

Unit Report No 4

Period covered: 300630H November to 021530H December 1965.

Ref: (a) BLT Operation Order 206-65
 (b) MAPS: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AP TAM TAN, THAN BINH, Series L 701, Sheets 6543 II and 6643 III.

1. ENEMY.

- a. Units in contact. There were no known units in the objective area.
- b. Enemy reserves that can effect our situation. There were no known reserves in the immediate area.
- c. Enemy activity during period. The enemy activity was limited to small unit (2-4 men) probing the lines at night attempting to draw fire. On one instance a group of four VC fired at a friendly patrol.
- d. Estimate of enemy strength, material, means, morale, and probable knowledge of our situation. One VC platoon (guerrilla) was in the immediate objective area. Due to the slight contact it is impossible to give an estimate of the morale, etc.
- e. Conclusions. The only capability available to the VC with the forces available, was to withdraw from the objective area.

2. OWN SITUATION.

- a. Front Lines, Command Post and Boundaries. See Annex A (Situation Overlay).
- b. Own operations during period.
 - (1) Assault elements of the BLT, Company E landed over BLUE BEACH (Coordinates 273846) at H-Hour (0630H) and Company G landed in LZ SPARROW at L-Hour (0630H). All scheduled waves were landed by 0650H.

-1-

DOWNGRADED AT 5 YEAR INTERVALS,
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
 DON LAM 02040

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- (2) The assault landing was unopposed over an unobstructed beach and Company E rapidly seized Objective 1 (LANG KE GA).
- (3) By 0740H Company H had secured Objective 3 encountering no enemy resistance. The village of LANG VAN KE was deserted and indications were that it had been so for some period of time.
- (4) At 0815H Company G had established their assigned blocking positions (coordinates 246861 to 245867) and had linked up with elements of Company E, which had completed sweep operations through LANG VAN KE.
- (5) During the sweep through Objective 2 by Company E 3 LVTP-5's became bogged down in the vicinity of coordinate 265856, which necessitated the dismounting of the company and continuing the search and destroy operations afoot.
- (6) At 1045H a patrol from Company E encountered a squad size VC patrol on the trail at coordinate 257868 and in the ensuing fire fight one VC was wounded. The VC patrol withdrew and contact was not reestablished.
- (7) At 1515H the reserve Company (Co F) was landed primarily to provide assistance with the recovery operations of the disabled LVTP-5's.
- (8) Recovery operations resulted in the additional bogging of two LVTP-5, one TD-15 and one TD-24. By 1700H Co F relieved Co G on line, with the latter providing assistance for recovery operations.
- (9) Night time activity was restricted to security patrolling within the TAOR. Some small arms fire and scattered mortar rounds were received throughout the night.
- (10) Vehicle recovery operations were conducted on a continuous basis and by 0050H on 2 December all 5 LVTP's and the TD-24 were recovered and proceeded to BLUE BEACH.

-2-

ENCLOSURE (1)

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(11) W-Hour was established at 020830H and the withdrawal was conducted as scheduled. All efforts to recover the TD-15 were to no avail, therefore, it was destroyed subsequent to the last elements of the BLT withdrawing.

- c. Combat efficiency. Morale and combat efficiency remain excellent.
- d. Result of operations. Search and capture or destroy operations within the assigned TAOR resulted in the estimated wounding of one VC.

3. PERSONNEL.

a. Strengths.

USMC Officers	56
USMC Enlisted	1223
USN Officers	3
USN Enlisted	65
Total Ashore	1198

b. Casualties.

- (1) Wounded in Action (WIA). None.
- (2) Non-Battle Casualties. Two (2) Marines were evacuated to the USS VALLEY FORGE (LPH-8) as Non-Battle casualties, one (1) for Tonsillitis and one (1) for lacerated left arm.

c. Discipline, Law and Order. No unusual problems encountered.

d. Prisoners of War. None.

e. Grave Registration. None.

f. Morale. The morale of the BLT was excellent.

g. Civic Action. None.

4. LOGISTICS.

a. Location of Administrative Troops and Installations.

USS VALLEY FORGE (LPH-8), USS MONTROSE (APA-212) and USS MONTICELLO (LSD-35).

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b. Status of Supply.

- (1) Class I. 14 days Meal, Combat Individual, on hand
14 days Fuel, bar, trioxane on hand

(2) Class II.

Normal allowances on hand.

24 days batteries on hand.

Tracked vehicles deadline awaiting repair or replacement:

2 LVTP-5

1 TD-24

1 TD-15

Communication items awaiting repair:

5 AN/PRC-9

13 AN/PRC-10

2 AN/MRC-83

1 AN/TRS-21

Ordnance items awaiting repair: 1 Sight Unit M34A1.

(3) Class IV.

Initial issue on hand minus 2,400 sandbags.

(4) Class V.

Basic allowance plus 15 days on hand.

c. Status of transportation.

The following vehicles are deadlined awaiting repair or replacement:

5 M-422 Mite

1 M-274 Mule


1 3000 Lb. Forklift

d. Status of Evacuation. All evacuation was conducted by helicopter.e. Condition of roads and status of circulation. The existing road was one lane of hard packed dirt.

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- f. Salvage and captured material. None.
- g. Miscellaneous activities. Nothing to report.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HANIFIN


JOHN C. WICKHAM
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

ENCLOSURE (1)

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TAB D

BLT 2/1 Unit Report for Dagger Thrust Objective "U"

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Hdqs 2/1 1stMarDiv
Log No. 518-65
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HEADQUARTERS
BLT 2/1
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California, 96601

3:PDS:mgh
5213/2
Ser No 0518-65
201900H December 1965

From: Commanding Officer
To: CTG 78.5

Subj: Unit Report for period 050630H to 061700H December 1965

Ref: (a) JT CTF 76/78 Operation Order 323-66
(b) CTG 76 MSG 210323Z November 1965

Encl: (1) BLT 2/1 Unit Report covering period 050630H to 061700H
December 1965.

1. Pursuant to instructions contained in references (a) and (b) enclosure (1) is submitted herewith.
2. This cover letter is declassified upon detachment of enclosure (1).


JOHN C. WICKHAM
By direction

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Tab 8

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Copy of 4 copies
 BLT 2/1
 USS VALLEY FORGE
 Ser No 0518-65
 201900H December 1965

Unit Report No 5

Period Covered: 050630H to 061700H December 1965

Ref: (a) BLT Operation Order 207-65
 (b) MAPS: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 DUONG LIEU, HOAI NHON, Series
 L 701, Sheets 6853 IV and 6854 III.

1. ENEMY

- a. Units in contact. Units in the objective area consisted of elements of one battalion (possibly a battalion from the 210th Regiment) and one platoon of local VC guerrillas.
- b. Enemy reserves that can affect our situation. Within a 10 mile radius of the objective area there was one VC Regiment and up to 6 local force companies and from a 10-20 mile radius one VC Regiment capable of reinforcing the present units.
- c. Enemy activity during period. The initial contact was with VC units caught attempting to exfiltrate the objective area. As the operation proceeded, groups of VC that were trapped, scattered in the hamlets, taking up prepared positions, firing small arms and automatic weapons as friendly units advanced. Sniper fire continued throughout the operation. During the period of darkness VC movement consisted of small groups (2-3) attempting to infiltrate the hamlets and setting up ambush sites within the objective area. Local guerrillas attempted to mingle and maintain a "villager" appearance, removing all trace of military and returning to the "black pajama" attire.
- d. Estimate of enemy strength, material, means, morale, and probably knowledge of our situation.
 - (1) The estimated strength in the objective area was 300-400 including local guerrillas.
 - (2) Weapons, ammunition, medical supplies and food were in sufficient quantities for limited operations.
 - (3) The interrogation of POW's indicated that morale was high.

-1-

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 BY 1045

ENCLOSURE (1)

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- (4) The VC units located in the objective area did not have any prior knowledge of friendly forces landing or their intentions during the operation: ~~for the following reasons:~~
- (a) The VC units around the hamlet of PHU THU were carrying rice from the village up Hill 106 when the friendly forces approached.
 - (b) VC units trapped by our units were thrown from one friendly unit to another in an attempt to exfiltrate the objective area.
- e. Conclusions. The enemy had the following courses of action available to him:
- (1) Exfiltrate the objective area, leaving small groups to delay and harrass friendly forces.
 - (2) Defend the area with present forces.
 - (3) Reinforce with up to one (1) regiment and six (6) local force companies.
- The enemy chose to implement the first course of action as listed above.

2. OWN SITUATION

- a. Boundiaries and Command Post. See Annex A (Situation Overlay).
- b. Own Operations during period.
 - (1) Companies E and G, as assault elements of the BLT, landed on WHITE BEACH (Coordinate 986877) and LZ EAGLE respectively at H/L Hour (0630) encountering no enemy resistance or obstacles.
 - (2) By 0715H Company E had seized Landing Force Objective 1 (PHU THU). Interrogation of local villagers disclosed that approximately 30 VC were heading up Hill 106. An air strike was called. By 0725H the company was established in assigned blocking positions (Coordinates 967903 to 973902).
 - (3) At 0640H Company H landed on WHITE BEACH proceeded along direction of attack and seized BLT Objective A (HOA TAN (2)) by 0745H. Trenches and bunkers were encountered throughout the area but there was no significant enemy activity.

-2-

ENCLOSURE (1)

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- (4) While proceeding towards BLT Objective C, Company G encountered moderate enemy resistance vicinity of coordinate 695869. However, by 1010H the objective was secured and consolidating positions established.
- (5) At 0708H Company F landed in LZ EAGLE and prepared to seize BLT Objective B (HOA TAN (1) and (3)). Moderate small arms fire encountered vicinity coordinate 964866. By 1440H the objective was swept and blocking positions established at coordinates 962896 to 961889.
- (6) Once Company F had secured BLT Objective B (HOA TAN (1)) Company H was directed to establish blocking positions at coordinates 956883 to 957888.
- (7) Night time activity was restricted to the establishment of 6 squad size ambush sites at likely avenues of approach within TAOR and H&I fire missions conducted by 81mm Mortar Plat, Btry B, 1st Bn, 11th Mar and NGF units. Some small arms fire and scattered incoming mortar rounds were reported throughout the night.
- (8) All ambush sites were established after dark and remained in effect until daylight.
- (9) W-Hour was established at 061200H and was conducted as scheduled. As the last elements of the BLT withdrew from the beach a LVTC sank approximately 300 yards off WHITE BEACH and was abandoned.

c. Combat efficiency. Moral and combat efficiency remains excellent.

d. Result of operations. Search and capture or destroy operations within the assigned TAOR resulted in 16 VC KIA, by body count, 31 VC estimated KIA, 1 VC actual WIA, 3 VC estimated WIA, the capture of 2700 pounds of rice, one shotgun and assorted ammunition.

3. PERSONNEL

a. Strengths.

USMC Officers	56
USMC Enlisted	1223
USN Officers	3
USN Enlisted	65
Total Ashore	1398

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b. Casualties.

- (1) Killed in Action (KIA). Three (3) Marines were killed in action. All KIA's were a result of enemy fire.
- (2) Wounded in Action (WIA). Nine (9) Marines were wounded in action. One (1) Marine suffered an internal derangement of the left knee and eight (8) Marines suffered wounds as a result of enemy fire. One (1) Hospital Corpsman was wounded in action as a result of enemy fire. Total wounded ten (10).

- (3) Non-Battle Casualties. There were no Non-Battle Casualties.

c. Discipline, Law and Order. No unusual problems encountered.d. Prisoners of War. Enemy captured during the period were as follows: 17 VC suspects of which 5 were confirmed and sent to the 27th ARVN Division. The remainder were released.e. Graves Registration. None.f. Morale. The morale of all personnel of the BLT was extremely high.g. Civic Action. Operation HAND CLASP articles consisting of clothing, food and boys wear distributed to the inhabitants of PHU THU Village. Eight (8) civilians were treated by the medical team on board the USS VALLEY FORGE (LPH-8). Four (4) civilians were evacuated to the ARVN Hospital in QUI NHON and the remaining four (4) were released and flown to QUI NHON.

4. LOGISTICS

a. Location of administrative troops and installations. USS VALLEY FORGE (LPH-8), USS MONTROSE (APA-212) and USS MONTICELLO (LSD-35).b. Status of Supply.

(1) Class I

13 days Meal, Combat Individual, on hand
13 days Fuel, bar, trioxane, on hand

(2) Class II

Normal allowances on hand
22 days batteries on hand
Tracked vehicles awaiting repair or replacement:

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2 LVTP-5
 1 LVTC-1
 1 M48A3
 1 M50A1
 1 TD-24
 1 TD-15

Communication items awaiting repair:

5 AN/PRC-9
 17 AN/PRC-10
 2 AN/MRC-83
 1 AN/TPS-21

Ordnance items awaiting repair:

1 Sight Unit M34A1

(3) Class IV. Initial issue on hand minus 2,500 sandbags.

(4) Class V. Basic allowance plus 14 days on hand.

c. Status of transportation.

The following vehicles are deadlined awaiting repair or replacement:

5 M-422 Mite
 1 M-274 Mule
 1 300 Lb. Forklift

d. Status of evacuation. All evacuation was conducted by helicopter.

e. Condition of road and status of circulation. There were no defined vehicle roads in the objective area.

f. Salvage and captured material. 2700 pounds of rice was captured, of which 1200 pounds were destroyed and 1500 pounds evacuated. In addition, the following arms and ammunition was captured and evacuated:

- (1) 6 hand grenades
- (2) 6 Shotguns shells
- (3) 30 rounds of 30 Cal.


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(4) 25 rounds of 45 Cal.

(5) 1 Shotgun

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HANIFIN


JOHN C. WICKHAM
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

-6-


ENCLOSURE (1)

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
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Ref: Map: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AP TAM TAN, THANH GINH,
Series L 701, Sheets 6543 II and 6643 III 73




Annex A (Situation Overlay) to Unit Report No 4

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Ref: MAP: VIETNAM, 1:50,000 DUONG LIEU, HOIA NHON, Series L 701, Sheets 6853 IV and 6854 III

Annex A (Situation Overlay) to Unit Report No 5



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TAB E

CTG 78.5 Operation Order 4-65 (Operation Blue Marlin)

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CTG 78.5
USS VALLEY FORGE (LPH-8)
082000 NOV 1965

CTG 78.5 Op Order 4-65

- A. Maps Vietnam 1:50,000 sheets 6657 I, II, 6757 III & IV, 6747 I, III & IV, 6658 I & IV
- B. CLF Op Plan 1-65
- C. CTG 76.3 Op Order 302-66

Time Zone: H

Task Organization:

Special Landing Forces
HMM 261
BLT 2/1

Col J. R. BURNETT
LtCol M. B. PORTER
LtCol R. T. HANIFIN Jr.

1. SITUATION,

A. Enemy Forces: See current intelligence summaries and periodic and special intelligence reports as issued.

B. Friendly Forces

(1) Landing Force conducts amphibious assault over beaches NE of Tam Ky landing area to Chu Lai TAOR and from Hoi An landing area to Danang TAOR.

(2) BLT 2/7 (PHASE I) lands over Green Beach. Covers landing 2d Bn RVMC subsequently conducts search and destroy operations to SE.

(3) 3d Bn RVMC makes covered landing over Green Beach, passes through 2/7 and conducts search and destroy operations to SE.

(4) BLT 3/3 (PHASE II) lands over Orange Beach. Covers landing 3d Bn RVMC, subsequently conducts search and destroy operations to NW.

(5) 3d Bn RVMC makes covered landing over Orange Beach, passes through 3/3, conducts search and clear operations to NW.

(6) CTG 76.5 provides shipping for SLF.

(7) 3/12 supports PHASE I from Chu Lai TAOR.

(8) 12th Marines support crossing of Song Cau Lau River and movement into Danang TAOR in PHASE II.

(9) FMAW provides fixed wing and helicopter support.

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(10) Elements of 4th Marines conduct M/M march from Chu Lai TAOR North along Highway #1 (PHASE I).

(11) Elements of 9th Marines conduct M/M march South from Danang TAOR along highway #1 (PHASE II).

(12) Elements of 2d ARVN Div support within FBHA.

(13) CTG 76.3 provides NGF support.

2. MISSION. Be prepared to conduct helicopter-borne and surface landings to support LF ashore during both PHASE I and II operations.

3. EXECUTION.

A. Concept of Operation. Landing Force lands one BLT & one Battalion RVMC on D-Day and D plus 5 respectively to conduct search and destroy operations between Danangs and Chu Lai TAOR's. SLF acts as Landing Force reserve both phases of operation.

B. BLT 2/1

(1) Be prepared to land by surface and helicopter means, or both, over beaches and into LZ's to be designated.

(2) Be prepared to land one company reinforced, as directed, by helicopter.

C. HMM 261 - Be prepared to:

(1) Provide helicopter support for BLT 2/1.

(2) Provide helicopters for aerial recon, airborne spot, supply and evac, SAR, or such other missions as may be assigned.

D. Coordinating Instructions

(1) This order effective for planning on receipt; execute on order.

(2) Tentative D-Day, H-Hour
PHASE I - 0700H 10Nov
PHASE II - 0900H 15Nov

(3) Direct liaison between elements of SLF authorized.

(4) Minimize non combat casualties and damage to crops.

(5) Civil police actions to be accomplished by SLF troops only in the absence of National Police or Vietnamese Forces.

(6) Unclassified code name for operation is "Blue Marlin".

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- (7) Current rules of engagement will be complied with.
- (8) Use of CN/CS on authority of CLF only.
- (9) All ARTY and NGF missions will be observed call missions only to ensure positive identification of targets as hostile before they are taken under fire.
- (10) To mark enemy positions for CAS use red smoke or WP when available.
- (11) Operation overlay will be issued separately to CTU 78.5.2 and CTU 78.5.3.
- (12) LNO will be provided by CLF to SLF prior to commitment of SLF.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

- A. Debarkation uniform and prescribed load will be promulgated.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS.

A. Command Posts

- (1) Afloat - LPH-6
- (2) Subordinate units report CP locations when established ashore.

B. Communication-Electronics

- (1) Annex N reference C
- (2) Call sign IAW JANAP
- (3) Mark friendly front lines with air panels when requested
- (4) Clear helo landing zones
 - (a) Primary - Green
 - (b) Alternate - Yellow
 - (c) Enemy firing in LZ - Red

(5) Reports

- (a) Situation reports every two hours to CLF

J. R. BURNETT
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

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CTG 78.5
USS VALLEY FORGE (LPH-8)
151300 NOV 1965

CHANGE 1 to CTG 78.5 Op Order 4-65 (080200 NOV 65)

1. Make the following changes to subject order:

A. Under paragraph 1B, change subject para (4) to read: "Two companies BLT 3/3 and one company of 1/7 and attached units, lands Orange Beach".

B. Under paragraph 1B, delete subject para (5) and (8).

C. Under paragraph 1B, change subject para (12) to read: "Two RVN Ranger Bns and two RVN Special Companies will conduct operations West of Truong Giang River within FBHA".

D. Under paragraph 3A, change to read: "Landing Force lands one BLT and one Battalion RVMC on D-Day and on D plus 6 lands one BLT to conduct search and destroy operation between Da Nang and Chu Lai TAOR's. SLF acts as landing force reserve both phases of operation".

E. Under paragraph 3D, change subject para (2), PHASE II, to read: "H-Hour to be announced D-Day, 16 Nov".

J. R. BURNETT
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

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TAB F

CTG 78.5 Operation Order 5-65 (Operation Harvest Moon)

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CTG 78.5
 USS VALLEY FORGE (LPH-8)
 09100CH 1965

OPERATION ORDER 5-65

Ref: (a) Map: AMS Series L701 1:50,000 Sheets 6657 I & IV, 6658 II & III
 (b) 3rd MarDiv OpnO 1-65

Time Zone: H

Task Organization:

Special Landing Force
 HMM 261
 BLT 2/1

Col J. R. BURNETT
 LtCol PORTER
 LtCol HANIFIN

1. SITUATION.

A. Enemy Forces

(1) See current intelligence summaries and periodic and special intelligence reports as issued.

(2) Annex B (Intelligence) to reference (b)

B. Friendly Forces

(1) Task Force Delta conducts spoiling attack in Que Son-Vet An-Hiep Duc Valley complex to prevent VC from capturing Que Son and eliminate VC forces that have isolated ARVN outpost at Viet An.

(2) 3rd MarDiv continues operations against VC.

(3) FMAW provides CAS and helicopter support as required.

(4) ARVN Forces

(a) One ARVN Regt (-) on D-1 in coordination with TF Delta advances Northwest between Highway 1 and railroad to Thang Binh. On D-Day advances Southwest to Phase Lines A and B. It is anticipated that enemy contact will be made in the vicinity of PLB.

(b) Provides security at selected bridge sites along Route 1.

(c) 3dBn, 5thRegt (-) (Rein) RF on order feints attack West from Hiep Duc District Headquarters and blocks along line at AT 970275 to AT 980260.

(5) NGF - One (1) DD and one (1) CL provide NGF support.

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2. MISSION. Be prepared to chop OpCon III MAF and carry out assigned mission.

3. EXECUTION.

A. Concept of Operation. Upon chop OpCon III MAF, SLF prepared to land BLT 2/1 by helo into LZ as directed; provide helo support as directed.

B. BLT 2/1

(1) Chop to OpCon TF Delta on order.

(2) Be prepared to land by helo in designated LZ's and carry out missions as assigned by TF Delta.

C. HMM 261

(1) Be prepared to provide helo lift as directed.

D. Coordinating Instructions

(1) D-Day - 8Dec

(2) Code Name - Harvest Moon

(3) Use CN/CS on authority CG TF Delta.

(4) Coordinate ARVN units thru Headquarters TF Delta.

(5) Minimize non combat casualties and damage to crops.

(6) FCL - Coordinate thru TF Delta Headquarters

4. ADMIN AND LOGISTICS.

A. LSU primary source supply after chop OpCon to TF Delta

B. Prescribed Load

1 Day MCI per individual

B/A Class V

2 Canteens per man

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS.

A. Annex E to reference (b)

J. R. BURNETT
Colonel U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

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SECRET

TAB G

Commander Amphibious Ready Group/Commander Special Landing Force
Administrative Order 1-66 (Hue-Phu Bai BLT Rotation)

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From: Commander Amphibious Ready Group/Commander Special Landing Force
To: Distribution List


Subj: CTG 76.5/CTG 78.5 Administrative Order 1-66; promulgation of


Ref: (a) COMSEVENTHFLT 071140Z DEC
(b) CTG 76.5 OPOD 201-65

Encl: (1) Hue Phu Bai BLT Rotation Plan

1. Enclosure (1) provides for the offloading of BLT 2/1 and the loading of BLT 3/4 and is promulgated for appropriate action.

2. This order is effective for planning and operations upon receipt.


Thomas R. WESCHLER
Captain, U. S. Navy
Commander Amphibious Ready Group
U.S. SEVENTH Fleet


J.R. BURNETT
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commander Special Landing Force
Fleet Marine Force
U.S. SEVENTH Fleet

Distribution List:

CO USS MONTICELLO (5)
CO USS VALLEY FORGE (5)
CO USS MONTROSE (5)
CO USS SEMINOLE (3)
CO USS VESOLE (2)
CTU 78.5.2 (3)
CTU 78.5.3 (3)
CO BLT 3/4 (3)

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TASK ORGANIZATION

CTG 76.5	Offloading/Loading Group Commander	CAPT T.R. WESCHLER, USN (COMPHIBREADYGRU)
CTU 76.5.2	Offloading/Loading Unit	CAPT T.R. WESCHLER, USN (COMPHIBREADYGRU)
	LSD Offloading/Loading Element	CAPT G.W. FOLTA, USN (CO USS MONTICELLO)
	LPH Offloading/Loading Element	CAPT R.O. MADSON, USN (CO USS VALLEY FORGE)
	APA Offloading/Loading Element	CAPT R. JUAREZ, USN (CO USS MONTROSE)
	AKA Offloading/Loading Element	CAPT W.C. DIXON, USN (CO USS SEMINOLE)
CTG 78.5	Commander Landing Force	COL J.P. BURNETT, USMC (COMMANDER SPECIAL LANDING FORCE)
CTU 78.5.2	BLT 2/1 Offloading Unit	LTCOL R.T. HANIFIN, JR. USMC (CO BLT 2/1)
CTU 78.5.3	Helicopter Squadron HMM 261	LTCOL M.B. PORTER, USMC (CO HMM 261)

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HUE PHU BAI BLT ROTATION PLAN1. SITUATION.

In compliance with reference (a), this administrative order supplements reference (b) in providing for the offloading of BLT 2/1 and supporting elements and the subsequent administrative loading of BLT 3/4 and supporting elements at Hue Phu Bai, Viet Nam. This rotational unloading and loading sequence will be coordinated by Commander Amphibious Ready Group/Commander Special Landing Force. Upon completion of loading BLT 3/4, ships of the offloading/loading unit sortie as directed by COMPHIBREADYGRU. USS SEMINOLE shall be detached to proceed as previously directed.

2. CONCEPT.

a. At the time designated by CTG 76.5, UNIFORM-Hour, ships commence offloading from their assigned anchorages, LPH operating area near the mouth of Song Hue River, Viet Nam, as designated in Appendix I and in accordance with Appendices II and III plus individual ship's loading plan.

b. In accordance with Appendices II and III, landing craft shall be utilized to transport supplies and equipment from the APA and LSD via the Song Hue River to the Hue Landing and the Tan My Pier. Troops embarked aboard the APA and LSD shall be transported by landing craft at approximately U+24 hours to the Tan My Pier for further transfer to Phu Bai as arranged by CTU 78.5.2. The ships' platoons as designated by CTU 78.5.2 shall remain embarked until offloading is completed and loading has commenced, at the discretion of the individual ship's Commanding Officer. The ships' platoons will be transported to the Hue Landing by landing craft. Supplies and equipment embarked aboard the LPH shall be helo-lifted to Phu Bai. Troops shall be helo-lifted with personal gear to a landing zone (to be designated) adjacent to the Tan My Pier staging area if heavy seas prohibit surface transport by landing craft to the Tan My Pier.

c. Vehicles, up to and including 5-ton trucks, that are embarked aboard the APA and LSD shall be debarked by landing craft at the Tan My Pier (YD 827317), Appendix V, and proceed to Phu Bai by road. All heavier vehicles, including Ontos, shall be transported up the Song Hue River (Appendix VI) to the Hue Landing. Instructions on deadlined vehicles will be promulgated separately.

d. Following the completion of offloading BLT 2/1, ships' shall commence the loading of BLT 3/4 observing the same general plan that was utilized for offloading and in accordance with approved loading plans. If feasible, in accordance with Appendix III, partial embarkation of BLT 3/4 shall commence prior to the complete debarkation of BLT 2/1.

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e. A guide boat (LCPL) with Convoy Commander and security force (plus river guide and interpreters as available) embarked, shall guide each convoy of boats up the Song Hue River to the Hue Landing and back. LCUs are authorized to operate independently as directed by the PCS.

f. River operations to the Hue Landing and road travel shall be suspended at dark. Unless otherwise directed, unloading/loading at the Tan My Pier shall continue during the hours of darkness, providing appropriate security forces are in place.

g. In order to provide surveillance and security for safe river operation, one TAO to be requested from III MAF, will be airborne continuously during river passages and shall report the status of convoys to CTG 76.5.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Commander Offloading/Loading Group (CTG 76.5)

(1) Exercise overall control of ship anchorages, LPH operating area, river and harbor operations during the BLT rotation.

(2) Offload BLT 2/1 and administratively load BLT 3/4, plus supporting elements, in accordance with approved loading plans.

(3) Coordinate arrangements for berths, lighterage and anchorages, as necessary.

(4) Provide for the availability of Coastal Group advisors/river guides and interpreters if available.

(5) Control and coordinate all supporting arms outside the Hue Phu Bai TAOR.

(6) Provide for the settlement of claims arising as a result of boat operations.

b. Commander Offloading/Loading Unit (CTU 76.5.2)

(1) Direct offloading and loading in accordance with respective landing and loading plans.

(2) During offloading and loading, control movement and assigned anchorages of ships attached.

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c. Commander Landing Force Offloading Unit (CTU 78.5.2)

(1) Coordinate the arrangements of the Landing Force offloading and Loading Units for loading ramps, staging areas, and beach loading facilities and aids.

(2) Provide for necessary security of the Tan My Pier, road convoys and the Hue Landing area.

(3) Provide Boat security for river convoys. Security forces to be embarked aboard PCS to be further embarked aboard each LCPL.

(4) Coordinate all communication/control requirements between the Landing Force offloading and Loading Unit.

(5) Debark units from assigned shipping in accordance with this plan and approved debarkation plans.

(6) Supervise the establishment of a debarkation/embarkation control system at unloading/loading sites.

(7) Coordinate all requirements for loading facilities, dunnage, and wheel chocks.

(8) Arrange for the transport/security of troops via road from the vicinity of Tan My Pier to Hue Phu Bai.

(9) Insure that all unloading is completed prior to the debarkation of the ship's platoon.

(10) Provide 2 forklifts for offloading operations at Hue Landing.

(11) Provide 2-5KW generators for night operations at Tan My Pier.

(12) Claims resulting from land operations will be referred to III MAF for settlement.

d. Commander Helicopter Squadron HMM 261 (CTU 78.5.3)

(1) Provide helicopters for shuttle of troops and specified equipment to and from designated landing zones as directed.

(2) Coordinate with the CTU 78.5.2 in the selection of a landing zone in the vicinity of the Tan My Pier, if required.

(3) Be prepared to provide helicopters for TAO during river operations.

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e. LSD Offloading/Loading Element Commander

(1) When directed by CTG 76.5, proceed to Danang, and offload equipment and personnel as designated by CTG 78.5. Direct liaison is authorized with NSA. Upon completing the offload, rejoin TG 76.5.

(2) Anchor in assigned anchorage (Appendix I) when directed by CTG 76.5.

(3) Coordinate the utilization of security forces embarked in LCPLs. Provide armed LCPL and convoy Commander as needed.

(4) At U-Hour, debark elements of BLT 2/1 in accordance with the basic plan and Appendix III.

(5) Upon completing the rotation, back load 2 fork lifts and 2-5KW generators for transportation and offloading at Danang.

(6) Function as Primary Control Officer. Control all boat movements from the transport area to landing sites. Make up convoys and dispatch to Hue Landing site in groups as boats are ready for transit. LCUs are authorized to make independent transit of river when ready.

(7) Upon the completion of loading BLT 3/4, and when directed by CTG 76.5, proceed to Danang/Chu Lai and load personnel and equipment as designated by CTG 78.5. Rejoin TG 76.5 upon completion.

(8) Advise CTG 76.5 of any situations which may require fire support.

f. LPH Offloading/Loading Element Commander

(1) Anchor or operate in assigned operating area (Appendix I) when directed by CTG 76.5, or as necessary to conduct required flight ops.

(2) Commencing at U-Hour, control debarkation of heliborne elements of BLT 2/1 in accordance with this basic plan, and approved landing plan as promulgated by CTU 78.5.2.

g. APA Offloading/Loading Element Commander

(1) Anchor in assigned anchorage (Appendix I) when directed by CTG 76.5. Provide boats as directed by PCS.

(2) At U-Hour, debark elements of BLT 2/1 in accordance with this basic plan, Appendix III, and approved landing plan.

(3) Function as Secondary Control Officer.

(4) Provide a heavy salvage boat in the transport area.

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(5) Provide two LCPLs (armed), one to function as Boat Group Commander and the other as Convoy Commander.

h. AKA Offloading/Loading Element Commander

- (1) Provide boats as directed by PCS.
- (2) Provide armed LCPL and Convoy Commander as directed by PCS.
- (3) Provide heavy salvage at Hue Landing site.
- (4) Provide LCPL with ABGC if required.

x. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Individual ships report offloading/loading status in accordance with Appendix VII.

(2) Convoy Commanders report passing checkpoint "TEMPLE" in accordance with Appendix VII.

(3) The loading of explosive and hazardous cargo will be in accordance with USCG-108 as modified by COMPHIBPAC INST 8023.3 of 11 March 1959 and existing directives and instructions. Palletized cargo, will be offloaded/loaded intact.

(4) Class III drums that are loaded shall be carefully inspected. No leaking drums are to be loaded. Vehicle fuel tanks will not be filled to more than 75% of capacity.

(5) Spreaders will be used for all vehicle lifts. Shackle boats will be used for all vehicle/heavy lifts.

(6) All boats must be clear of the Song Hue River by darkness. River operations commence each day at 0700. Boats which cannot transit back to the transport area by 1830 will remain overnight at the Hue Landing.

(7) All personnel of the Landing Force will be debarked ashore with their personal gear in their possession.

(8) Ships' Commanding Officers ensure that all landing craft transiting the river are equipped with machine guns either mounted or carried. Weapons will not be loaded and/or fired except on order of Senior Officer or PO present when considered necessary because of actual situation. For river passage in this area opening fire is not authorized unless fired upon.

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(9) Ships furnish copies of Appendices V and VI to boat coxswains. Additional copies will be provided by CTG 76.5 for this purpose. Brief all coxswains on river navigation.

(10) Ships provide cots for boat crews who are likely to remain overnight in Phu Bai.

(11) All ships be prepared to provide any boat crew alongside hot meals upon request. In no case shall boat crews be worked over eight hours without a hot meal.

(12) All boats carry a minimum of five gallons of water and one day of rations for the crew and security force/guide/interpreter embarked.

(13) All personnel boats are to wear life jackets when seaward of the channel marker. Helmets and armor vests shall be carried for use when considered necessary.

(14) All ships provide sunburn ointment for boat crews.

(15) PCS coordinate the refueling of landing craft.

(16) CECO is embarked aboard the VALLEY FORGE.

(17) All boats maintain a distance of 75 yards while navigating the Song Hue River. Boat coxswains utilize directions indicated Appendices V and VI.

(18) U-Hour to be promulgated separately.

(19) Ships remaining at anchor at night, provide self-protective measures in accordance with Annex J to reference (b).

(20) Convoy/escort to and from Tan My Pier is not required.

(21) Bulk cargo will be transported by LCM8 up the Song Hue River to the Hue Landing.

4. Administration and Logistics

As in the basic operation order.


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5. Command and Signal

a. Communications in accordance with Appendix VIII.



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Fleet Marine Force
U.S. SEVENTH Fleet

APPENDICES:


- I - Transport Area Diagram
- II - Landing Craft Availability Table
- III - Landing Craft Employment Plan (PASEP TO CCO'S)
- IV - Helicopter Availability Table (NOT ISSUED ESTIMATED 12 HELOS CONTINUOUS)
- V - Tan My Pier
- VI - Song Hue River
- VII - Reports
- VIII - Communication Plan (TO BE ISSUED SEPARATELY)

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ENCLOSURE (1)


COMPHIBREADYGRU/COMMANDER SLF
ADMINORDER 1-66

APPENDIX I

TRANSPORT AREA DIAGRAM



ANCHORAGES: LSD - YD 810358
LPH - YD 820370
APA - YD 797361
AKR - YD 822352
DD - YD 834347



SONG HUE
RIVER

MAP REFERENCE :
CHART 15,551-50-28

- NOT TO SCALE -

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COMPHIBREADYGRU/COMMANDER SLF
ADMINORDER 1-66

APPENDIX II

LANDING CRAFT AVAILABILITY TABLE

SHIP	LCVP	LCM3	LCM6	LCPL	LCM8	LCU	SALVAGE
APA	19	0	1	3	0	0	1
AKA	5	2	5	2			1
LSD	2	0	0	2	2	1	0
NSA DANANG	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
TOTAL	26	2	6	7	2	2	2
NOT AVAIL DUE NAVAL MAINT REQD	1	0	0	7	0	0	2
TOTAL AVAILABLE	25	2	6	0	2	2	0


NOTE: 1. AKA PROVIDE ONE HEAVY SALVAGE TO HUE LANDING IN ORDER
TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE BETWEEN CHECK POINT "TEMPLE" AND LANLING; STAY
VICINITY LANDING WHEN NOT BEING UTILIZED.

2. SHIPS PROVIDE LCPL'S AND PERSONNEL AS FOLLOWS:

APA	1	LCPL	CONVOY COMMANDER
	1	LCPL	BOAT GROUP COMMANDER
AKA	1	LCPL	CONVOY COMMANDER
	1	LCPL	ASSISTANT BOAT GROUP COMMANDER
LSD	1	LCPL	CONVOY COMMANDER

COMPHIBREASYGRU/COMMANDER SLF
ADMINORDER 1-66 APPENDIX V

TAN MY PIER




NOT TO SCALE

COMPHIBREASYGRU/COMMANDER SLF
ADMINORDER 1-66

APPENDIX VI TO ADMIN ORDER 1-66

SHEET 1



CONT'D SHEET #2

- WATCH FOR FISH TRAPS -

* CHANNEL MARKER
USUALLY MARKED
WITH STREAMERS,
BLDG. PAINTED PEA GREEN.

SONG HUE RIVER

GENERAL RIVER RULE:
STAY WITH THE CURRENT




SCALE: 1" = 1000 yards

ENCLOSURE (1)

VI-1

COMPHIBREASYGRU/COMMANDER SLF
ADMINORDER 1-66



COMPHIBREDAYGRU/COMMANDER SLF
ADMINORDER 1-66

APPENDIX VII

REPORTS1. GENERAL

All ships report if unable to meet scheduled off-load time (UNIFORM HOUR), stating nature of delay and estimated time of delay. Utilize most expeditious communication means available. Additionally, report when off-loading of BLT 2/1 is completed, upon commencing to on-load BLT 3/4 and when on-loading BLT 3/4 is completed.

2. SIX-HOUR REPORTS

Report unloading/loading status every six hours using the following message format to CTG 76.5.

- A. Status of boating
- B. Percentage unloading/loading
 - (1) Bulk cargo
 - (2) Vehicles
 - (3) Personnel
- C. Problems encountered
- D. Estimated time of completion unloading/loading

3. BOAT REPORTS

Boats to Hue and return report the following to PCS:

- A. Passing checkpoint "TEMPLE" (appendix VI)
- B. Upon arrival at landing at Hue
- C. Upon departing landing at Hue
- D. Passing checkpoint "TEMPLE"
- E. Passing green channel marker building at breakwater

Boats to Tan My Pier and return report the following to PCS:

- A. Arrival pier
- B. Departing pier
- C. Passing green channel marker building at breakwater

4. UNLOADING/LOADING DELAYS

All ships report delays as they occur and again when corrected to CTG 76.5.

COMPHIBREACTGRU/COMMANDER SLF
ADMINORDER 1-66

APPENDIX VII

COMMUNICATIONS

1. In order to provide adequate control and coordination during the BLT rotation the following communications will be required:
 - a. Single Side Band at the following locations: Phu Bai; Hue landing Tan My pier; LSD (NCS), APA, and AKA, LPH.
 - b. F. M. at Tan My pier; on boats shuttling between the pier and ships; on LPH, LSD (NCS), APA, AKA, Helos; on all lead boats proceeding up/down river.
2. All Single Side Band equipment, with the exception of Naval Gunfire, will be on 10221 KCS (USB), BLT rotation control and coordination net. All F. M. equipment will be on 38.5 MCS, boat common. Strict radio discipline must be maintained at all times.
3. Helos used to provide surveillance and limited air protection for convoys on Hue river to maintain guard on TAO/A SPOT (285.8 MCS) and boat common (38.5 MCS). Report to CASHBOOK VICTOR on button purple for initial control. Shift to control by COMPANY STORE when directed.
4. All ships shall maintain individual guard on netted fleet broadcasts.

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COMPHIBREADYGRU/COMMANDER SLF
ADMINORDER 1-66

TAB A TO APPENDIX VIICALL SIGNS

<u>NAME</u>	<u>CALL SIGN</u>	<u>CW</u>
VALLEY FORGE	BEARCAT	M8NW
MONTICELLO	CASHBOOK VICTOR	NGVD
MONTROSE	EXPERT INDIA	NPPP
VESOLE	MILK PUNCH	
SEMINOLE	GLENHILL PAPA	
LCU	MESH _____	
LCM-8	BLUEJAY _____ (BOAT NR.)	
LCM-6	(SHIP'S CALL) _____ (BOAT NR.)	
BLT 2/1	CEDAR BIRD	
BLT 3/4	BEARMAT	
HMM 261	STATION BREAK	
3RD MARINE DIV	MONROE	
CONVOY COMMANDER	COMMANDER -- RED, BLUE, ETC.	

COLLECTIVECOMMAND

CTG 76.5	GRUDGE	COMPANY STORE
CTG 78.5	MILFORD	REPTILE
PRIMARY CONTROL SHIP		PHUBAI CATSKILL
CENTRAL CONTROL SHIP		CATSKILL
TAN MY PIER		TAN BEET
HUE LANDING		PHUBAI BEET

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AKA	JUNK	TAN MY	PHU BA	HUE LN	LCM	LCU	HMM	DD	APA	LSD	LPH	FREQ.	CIRCUIT DESIG.	EMMIS.	NET
G						G		G	G	G	G	299.4mcs	N-1	6A3	TM&W/AMPHIB CMN (P)
G								G	G	G	G	315.4mcs	N-2	6A3	CI/LOG SUPPORT (P)
G								G	G	G	G	277.8mcs	N-3	6A3	FLT CMN?TM&W (S)
G								G	G	G	G	2096 kcs	N-4	6A3	7TH FLT GEN WARN
G		G	G	G					G	G	G	10221kcs	N-5	3A3J	BLT ROTATION COOR/CONTROL
G		G		G	G		W		G	C	G	38.5mcs	N-6	36F3	BOAT COMMON
G								G	G	G	C	4441kcs	N-7	1.24F1	O/L KW-7 ORESTES
W								W	W	W	C	2840kcs	N-8	0.1A1	TG COMMON
								G			G	4301kcs	C-1	3A3J	NGF CONTROL (P)
								W			W	3179kcs	C-2	3A3J	NGF CONTROL (S)
							W				C	361.8mcs	H-1	6A3	VALFOR LAND/LAUNCH
							W				C	280.2mcs	H-2	6A3	HELO COMMON (MAROON)
							W	G		G	G	285.8mcs	H-3	6A3	TAO/AIR SPOT (PURPLE)
											G	8500kcs	N-9	3A3J	MARKET TIME
G											G	2716kcs	N-10	6A3	JUNK FORCE NET

G - GUARD

L - LISTEN

W - WHEN DIRECTED

C - NET CONTROL STATION

TAB B TO APPENDIX VII

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TAB H

COMSEVENTHFLT Msg 230532Z December 1965

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TAB H

230532 DEC 65

FM COMSEVENTHFLT

TO CTF 79

CTF 78

INFO CTF 76

CTG 78.5

CTG 76.5

CINCPACFLT

CG FMFPAC

~~CG~~ FMFPAC/I MAC (FWD)

~~CTF~~ 115

COMUSMACV

CG III MAF

S E C R E T

TASK DESIGNATORS (U)

A. MY 241018Z NOTAL

B. MY OPLAN 104-66 NOTAL

1. REF A REFERS. EFFECTIVE 250001Z TF 78 IS DISSOLVED. CTF 79 ASSIGN TASK
FORCE 79 DESIGNATOR TO SLF AND ADVISE ALCON.

GF-4

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H-1

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TAB H