


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COMMANDER
SPECIAL LANDING FORCE ALFA
U.S. SEVENTH FLEET

COMMAND



CHRONOLOGY



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14-31 MAY
1967

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
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HEADQUARTERS
Commander Task Group 79.4
Fleet Marine Force, SEVENTH Fleet
FPO San Francisco, 96601

3:PJM:jtl
Ser: 00116167
10 June 1967

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO2D)
Via: (1) Commanding General, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMF
(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Command Chronology for the period 14 - 31 May 1967, submission of
Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) Brigo 5750.1A
(c) CG FMFPac msg 261950Z Jul66
Encl: (1) Command Chronology - CTG 79.4
(2) Command Chronology - BLT 1/3
(3) Command Chronology - HMM 263
(4) After Action Report, BEAU CHARGER/HICKORY
1. In accordance with references (a) through (c), the Command Chronology for Commander Task Group 79.4 is submitted as enclosures (1) through (4).


JAMES A. GALLO, JR.

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1. Organizational Data

a. Designation. Special Landing Force ALFA had the task designation Task Group 79.4.

b. Composition. Special Landing Force ALFA was composed as follows:

14 - 31 May 1967 - SLF ALFA - Colonel J. A. GALLO Jr.
 14 - 31 May 1967 - BLT 1/3 - LtCol P. A. WICKWIRE
 14 - 31 May 1967 - HMM 263 - LtCol E. K. KIRBY

c. Locations. Special Landing Force ALFA was embarked aboard Amphibious Ready Group ALFA consisting of the following:

USS OKINAWA (LPH 3)	14 - 31 May 1967
USS BAYFIELD (APA 33)	14 - 18 May 1967
USS SEMINOLE (AKA 104)	14 - 31 May 1967
USS DULUTH (LPD 6)	27 - 31 May 1967
USS POINT DEFIANCE (LSD 31)	14 - 31 May 1967
USS WHITFIELD COUNTY (LST 1169)	14 - 28 May 1967

d. Average Monthly Strength. (Does not include TAD personnel.)

SLF Staff:	USMC Off - 9	USMC Enl - 23	USN Off - 0	USN Enl - 0
BLT 1/3:	USMC Off - 61	USMC Enl - 1592	USN Off - 7	USN Enl - 85
HMM 263:	USMC Off - 50	USMC Enl - 168	USN Off - 1	USN Enl - 3

e. Commanding Officer and Staff. (Does not include TAD personnel.)

Commanding Officer	Col J.A. GALLO Jr.
Executive Officer/Air Officer	LtCol R.C. MARSH
S-2	Major W.D. BENTON
S-3	Major W.W. TAYLOR Jr.
Asst S-3	Major R.W. EDWARDS
S-4	Major R.M. BROWNE
CommO	Capt F.D. KELLY
S-1/Adjutant	Capt M.L. WILKINSON
Asst S-2/AO	2ndLt S.E. DURHAM

f. TAD to the SLF for Special Operations

15 - 31 May 67 - Capt J.O. ROESLER - 9th MAB - Liaison Officer
 16 - 26 May 67 - Maj PERLOW, USA - Sub Sector Advisor - Liaison Off
 16 - 18 May 67 - Lt DUNG, ARVN - Liaison/Interpreter

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16 - 20 May 67 - Lt THUE, ARVN - Liaison/Interpreter
 17 - 21 May 67 - LtCol H.A. CHENOWETH - III MAF CIB - Observer
 17 - 31 May 67 - Maj R.F. MOODY - 9th MAB - Liaison Officer
 17 - 31 May 67 - LtJG JENNINGS, USN - 9th MAB - Liaison Officer
 17 - 28 May 67 - Maj W.M. OLIVER - 9th MAB - Liaison Officer
 19 - 20 May 67 - BGen J.E. GLICK - OG 9th MAB - Observer
 19 - 20 May 67 - LtCol J.F. DIONISOPOULOS - 9th MAB - Observer
 19 - 20 May 67 - Maj J.F. SHOVAR - 9th MAB - Observer
 19 - 20 May 67 - Capt E.B. BURLISON - 9th MAB - Observer
 19 - 20 May 67 - 1stLt R.J. VOGT - 9th MAB - Observer
 25 - 31 May 67 - Maj O.W. OAKS - 9th MAB - LFORM Matters
 25 - 31 May 67 - Maj P.D. FORD - 9th MAB - LFORM Matters
 25 - 31 May 67 - Capt P.J. SAMUELS - 9th MAB - LFORM Matters
 26 - 31 May 67 - 2ndLt R.P. ROUX - 9th MAB - Observer
 27 - 31 May 67 - Capt W.L. HAMMACK - 9th MAB - Liaison Officers
 29 - 31 May 67 - Maj J.A. SHEPARD - 9th MAB - Observer
 29 - 31 May 67 - Capt D.W. RADISMAN - 9th MAB - Observer
 29 - 31 May 67 - Capt W.B. MAYBERRY - 9th MAB - Observer

2. Chronology of Significant Events During the Period 14 - 31 May 1967

- a. The following is a concise review of the activities of Special Landing Force ALFA (TG 79.4). Detailed information of BLT 1/3 and HMM 263 is shown in the appropriate command chronology, enclosures (2) and (3). Detailed information on Operation BEAU CHARGER is shown in enclosure (4).
- b. 14 - 31 May 1967
 - (1) On 14 May TG 79.4 planning representatives to III MAF for planning of upcoming SpecOps. Representatives of Colt Firearms, Mr. ETO and Maj PODURGAL, USA, aboard in connection with M-16 rifles.
 - (2) On 15 May CTG 79.4 and representatives to III MAF for detailed planning in connection with upcoming SpecOps. Capt J.O. ROESLER, 9th MAB, aboard for duty as Liaison Officer.
 - (3) On 16 May members of CTG 79.4 to III MAF for detailed planning of upcoming SpecOps.
 - (4) From 16 - 26 May Maj PERLOW, USA, Sub Sector Advisor, aboard as Liaison Officer.
 - (5) From 16 - 18 May Lt DUNG, 2nd ARVN, aboard as Liaison Officer.
 - (6) From 16 - 20 May Lt THUE, ARVN, aboard as Liaison Officer.
 - (7) From 17 - 21 May LtCol H.A. CHENOWETH, III MAF CIB, aboard as

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observer.

- (8) On 17 May Maj R.F. MOODY and LtJG JENNINGS, 9th MAB, aboard as Liaison Officer and NGF Liaison Officer respectively.
- (9) From 17 - 28 May Maj W.M. OLIVER, 9th MAB, aboard as liaison Officer.
- (10) On 18 May Operation BEAU CHARGER commenced in connection with Operation HICKORY with landing of BLT 1/3 by helicopter and landing craft.
- (11) From 18 - 26 May the ARG/SLF conducted Operation BEAU CHARGER in QUANG TRI Province, northern I CTZ RVN.
- (12) From 19 - 20 May BGen GLICK, CG 9th MAB, and LtCol DIONISOPOULOS, Maj SHOVAR, Capt BURLESON, and 1stLt VOGT, 9th MAB aboard for visit with CTG 79.4 and as observers.
- (13) On 20 May MajGen B. HOCKMUTH, CG 3rd Mar Div, Col WORTMAN, CTG 79.5, and LtCol CHRISTIAN, S-3 TG 79.5 aboard to visit CTG 79.4.
- (14) On 22 May COMPHIBRON FIVE relieved COMPHIBRON NINE.
- (15) On 23 May CTG 79.4, Col GALLO, visited III MAF.
- (16) On 25 May the USS SEMINOLE (AKA 104) rejoined ARG shipping. Vadm HYLAND, COMSEVENTHFLT, RAdm REDDY, and MajGen CUSHMAN DepCmdr III MAF aboard to visit CTG 76.4/79.4. USS WHITFIELD CTY (LST-1169) departed area enroute Danang to off load cargo prior to being released from ARG shipping. Cargo to be re-embarked upon arrival of USS DULUTH (LPD-6).
- (17) On 26 May Operation BEAU CHARGER terminated at 1300H with all units aboard ARG shipping. CTG 79.4 and planning representatives to 3rd Mar Div for planning in connection with future SpecOps. 2ndLt R.P. ROUX, 9th MAB, aboard as observer.
- (18) On 27 May USS DULUTH (LPD 6) joined ARG shipping. Capt W.L. HAMMACK, 9th MAB, aboard as observer.
- (19) On 28 May USS BAYFIELD (APA 33) and USS WHITFIELD COUNTY (LST-1169) departed from the ARG shipping.
- (20) On 29 May CTG 79.4 and representatives to III MAF for detailed planning for future SpecOps. Planning representatives of TG 79.4 and 76.4 to 4th Mar and 3rd Mar Div for planning of SpecOps. Maj SHEPARD, Capt DADISMAN, and Capt MAYBERRY, 9th MAB,

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aboard as observers.

- (21) On 30 May CTG 79.4 and planning representatives TG 76.4 and 79.4 to 3rd Mar Div and 4th Mar for detailed planning forthcoming SpecOps.
- (22) On 31 May CTG 79.4 and representatives to III MAF for planning SpecOps.

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COMMANDER
SPECIAL LANDING FORCE
ALFA
SEVENTH FLEET



TG SPECIAL LANDING FORCE ALFA 79.4

AFTER ACTION REPORT
BEAU CHARGER/HICKORY

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18-26 MAY 1967

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HEADQUARTERS
Commander Task Group 79.4
Fleet Marine Force, SEVENTH Fleet
FPO San Francisco, 96601

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3:PJM:jtl
Ser: 00216167
10 June 1967

~~SECRET~~

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, SEVENTH Fleet
Subj: Combat After Action Report, Operation BEAU CHARGER/HICKORY

Encl: (1) Special Landing Force, After Action Report, BEAU CHARGER/HICKORY
(2) HMM 263, After Action Report, BEAU CHARGER/HICKORY, 10-00 11-01-67
(3) BLT 1/3, After Action Report, BEAU CHARGER/HICKORY, 12-20 11-01-67
(4) Operations Overlay

1. Enclosure (1) contains the Special Landing Force ALFA After Action Report for BEAU CHARGER/HICKORY.
2. Enclosures (2) through (4) amplify enclosure (1). Comments on appropriate portions of subordinate unit After Action Reports are contained in paragraph (10) of enclosure (1).
3. This letter may be downgraded to unclassified upon removal of enclosures (1) through (4).

James A. Gallo Jr.
JAMES A. GALLO, JR.

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COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT, BEAU CHARGER/HICKORY

Map Reference: VIETNAM, AMS Series L7014, Sheets 6442 I, II, III, and IV.

1. Operation BEAU CHARGER was a unilateral amphibious operation utilizing waterborne and heliborne assault forces. It was conducted in accordance with NWP-22(A).

2. The operation was conducted in the TRUNG LUONG and GIO LINH Districts, QUANG TRI Province northern I CTZ, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. The operation commenced 18 May 1967 at 0800H with the simultaneous landing of waterborne and heliborne assault forces over GREEN BEACH and into LZ's GOOSE and OWL. Operations ashore were in conjunction with Operation HICKORY. Operation BEAU CHARGER terminated at 261300H.

3. Task Organization

Special Landing Force

BLT 1/3

HMM 263

Det, VMO-6 (UH-1E)

Det, HMM-164 (CH-46A)

Colonel J.A. GALLO, Jr.

LtCol P.A. WICKWIRE

LtCol E.K. KIRBY

4. Intelligence

a. Terrain

(1) General. The objective area was a coastal lowland and delta plain. It was compartmented by four segments of terrain, all generally aligned with the coast and paralleling one another. They progressed inland from gently rolling sandy beaches and dunes to a low area of rice cultivation, to a flat and sandy plain with no significant relief, and finally to another narrow strip of rice cultivation immediately adjacent to National Highway # 1.

(2) Relief. The area from the coast to 4 kilometers inland was characterized by flat to gently rolling sandy beaches with some steep sand dunes. The ground slopes were normally less than 10 percent and elevations were less than about 10 meters. This strip of sand dunes raised toward the northwest forming a ridge (average elevation 20 meters) which was contiguous to a strip of paddy land averaging 3 kilometers in width and paralleling the beach. This coastal lowland plain consisted primarily of poorly drained, level areas of rice cultivation. The most prominent relief features were the dikes that were commonly 0.5 to 2.0 meters high and 0.5 to 2.5 meters wide.

(3) Beach Study. GREEN BEACH (YD 276780) was 430 meters long and 300 meters wide. There was a sand wall on the beach 8½ feet high on the

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south end and 2 feet high on the north end. Brush, trees, and rice paddies were behind the wall. Composition was fine white sand. It was firm when wet and soft when dry. The gradient was 1:30 to 1:45 low water to high water. There were numerous trails and roads running throughout the area 2700 meters behind the beach.

b. Enemy Situation

(1) Composition

(a) Ground. Enemy ground units in the objective area were identified as the 34th Artillery Regiment and the K400 Local Force Company. There was also one U/I NVA Battalion in the area.

c. Order of Battle

- (1) 34th Arty Regt, 341st Div
Strength: Approximately 1,060
Location: NGHE AN
- (2) U/I NVA BN, 31st Regt, 341st Div
Strength: Approximately 500
Location: YD 253749
- (3) K400 Local Force Co
Strength: 120
Location: YD 264720

d. The above units were equipped with: 60mm mortars, 81mm mortars, 120mm mortars, 57mm recoilless rifles, 76mm howitzers, 105mm howitzers, 12.7 AA/MG, automatic, and individual small arms. The enemy was reported to have 140mm rockets in the objective area.

e. Enemy Contact

(1) On D-day the waterborne forces landed on GREEN BEACH and received only sporadic small arms fire. The heliborne forces landing at LZ GOOSE received intense automatic and small arms fire from a group of trees and a village northwest of the LZ. Air strikes and artillery were called to suppress the enemy fire. At 1800 contact with a sizeable enemy force was made. Through the utilization of tanks and artillery the enemy were forced to withdraw. Throughout the day the enemy employed 60mm and 82mm mortar fire. On D+1 elements at GREEN BEACH received 85mm and 105mm fire. Naval gunfire and artillery suppressed the fire.

(2) Five 140mm rocket launchers were captured. From D+2 to D+3 the enemy continued harassing with mortar fire and sporadic small arms fire.

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On D+4 the Buddha's birthday standown was observed with no contact and only a few sniper rounds were fired. From D+5 to the termination of the operation, enemy activity decreased to sporadic small arms fire and harassing actions, to include light artillery fire. Few mines and surprise firing devices were employed by the enemy.

(3) Enemy tactics included: sniping and harassing fires, night probes of positions in conjunction with mortar attacks, firing from interconnected trench lines in the nature of delaying action, and artillery fire from across the DMZ.

(4) Several helicopters were hit but none were forced down.

(5) During BEAU CHARGER there were 85 KIA (conf) 85 KIA (prob) and 5 detainees.

f. Weather. The weather in the objective area is characterized by the beginning of the southwest monsoon with increasing surface temperatures. Precipitation is generally on the increase with the local area experiencing its maximum period of thunderstorms. Cloudiness and visibility are generally excellent with a persistent early morning fog and haze condition occurring about 25 percent of the time. Winds light and variable during late evening and early morning hours, increasing to a maximum speed during mid afternoon.

g. Miscellaneous. Most studies and terrain analyses indicate poor trafficability for tracked vehicles. It should be noted that vehicular movement of tanks and amtracs in the objective area was almost unlimited.

5. Mission. As directed by COMSEVENTHFLT 141640Z May67 (Initiating Directive), the mission of SLF ALFA was to conduct a search and destroy amphibious operation against VC/NVA forces in the amphibious objective area in northern I CTZ as agreed upon with CG III MAF or his designated representative.

6. Concept of Operations. Operation BEAU CHARGER was a unilateral amphibious operation conducted by ARG/SLF. The operation was planned for an 8 - 10 day search and destroy period utilizing waterborne and heliborne assault landings. Initially, the inherent mobility of SLF ALFA was to be utilized to the maximum extent possible to ensure rapid build-up of combat power ashore, thereby gaining surprise and fire superiority by shock action. Subsequently, aggressive search and destroy operations were to be conducted within the amphibious objective area. Maximum utilization of supporting fires was an essential part of this concept. Fire support was to be provided by the organic artillery of the BLT and naval gunfire ships consisting of the USS BOSTON (CAG-1), USS ST PAUL (CA-73), USS EDSON (DD-946), HMS HOBART, USS SUMNER (DD-692), USS STRAUSS (DDG-16), USS FECHLER (DD-870), USS MANSFIELD (DD-728), and USS OSBORN (DD-846). SLF ALFA was prepared to chop to III MAF

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or his designated subordinate commander for further employment in conjunction with Operation HICKORY. The concept of operations provided for the following: L-hour and H-hour were scheduled concurrently; beach and landing zones were not prepared by fire, however, air and NGF were planned and were "on call" in the event fires were necessary.

7. Execution

a. Operation BEAU CHARGER was executed in accordance with CTG 79.4 OPLAN 120A-67, CTG 76.4 OP ORDER 308-67, 3rd Mar Div OP ORDER 25-67 (HICKORY) (TS), and CTG 79.4 FRAG ORDER for operations in the TRUNG LUONG and GIO LINH Districts, QUANG TRI Province, northern I CTZ.

b. D-day was established as 18 May 1967 with L-hour and H-hour at 0800H.

c. SLF ALFA landed its waterborne and heliborne assault forces on schedule and by nightfall D-day, the BLT was well established ashore and prepared to conduct search and destroy operations at first light, simultaneously, assisting in the orderly evacuation of refugees from the amphibious objective area.

8. Results. Enclosures (2) and (3).

9. Commanders Analysis. This analysis is limited to matters at the SLF level, BLT and Squadron Commanders' analyses are contained in their respective reports, enclosures (2) and (3).

a. Planning. CTG 79.4 and planning representatives were given a broad briefing on operation HICKORY/BEAU CHARGER at Hq, III MAF on 13 May, and immediately flew to 3rd Mar Div for further and more detailed briefings. Due to the highly sensitive nature of the operation, full details regarding its execution were withheld from all but essential personnel until 16 May. TG 79.4 planners returned to 3rd Mar Div and 3rd Mar Div (Forward) on 15, 16, and 17 May for final briefings and plans. All 3rd Mar Div activities were most cooperative and planning for Operation BEAU CHARGER went smoothly from start to finish.

b. Intelligence. Prior to BEAU CHARGER, arrangements were made for maps, area studies, intelligence summaries, and information pertaining to handling of civilian detainees. Area study and OOB were provided by III MAF and 3rd Mar Div. ITT personnel and sub-sector advisors were made available by 3rd Mar Div.

c. Command Relationships. Operation BEAU CHARGER was a unilateral amphibious operation with command relationships in accordance with NWP-22(A). OPCON of the SLF was not passed to an "in-country" commander during the operation, hence CLF/CATF remained in overall control of operations ashore. Operation BEAU CHARGER was terminated 261300H. (COMSEVENTHFLT msg 261220Z May67).

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d. Supporting Arms

(1) Naval gunfire support for BEAU CHARGER was provided by the following ships:

D-day	U.S.S. BOSTON (CAG-1)	General Support
	U.S.S. ST PAUL (CA-73)	Direct Support
	U.S.S. EDSON (DD-946)	Direct Support
	H.M.S. HOBART	Direct Support
	U.S.S. SUMNER (DD-692)	Direct Support
	U.S.S. STRAUSS (DDG-16)	Direct Support
	U.S.S. FECHLER (DD-870)	Direct Support
	U.S.S. MANSFIELD (DD-728)	Direct Support
	U.S.S. OSBOURN (DD-846)	Direct Support
D+1	U.S.S. BOSTON (CAG-1)	General Support
	U.S.S. EDSON (DD-946)	Direct Support
D+2	U.S.S. BOSTON (CAG-1)	General Support
	U.S.S. EDSON (DD-946)	Direct Support
D+3	U.S.S. BOSTON (CAG-1)	General Support
	U.S.S. MANSFIELD (DD-728)	Direct Support
D+4 to	U.S.S. BOSTON (CAG-1)	General Support
D+6	U.S.S. OSBOURN (DD-846)	Direct Support
D+7	U.S.S. PROVIDENCE (CLG-6)	General Support
	U.S.S. OSBOURN (DD-846)	Direct Support

The large number of ships on D-day was required to fire anti-aircraft gun suppression fires as well as to counter artillery fire from the SONG BEN HAI as far north as CAP MUI LAY during the critical initial phases of the landing. It is significant to note that during these suppression fires not one incident of heavy anti-aircraft fire or artillery fire was reported although there were large numbers of enemy weapons reported in intelligence reports. On D-day, D+1, and D+7 NGFS ships duelled with mobile batteries in areas along the coastal highway as well as emplaced batteries in the CAP MUI LAY area. Ships reported receiving minor damage from shrapnel while observing several secondary explosions in the vicinity of enemy batteries taken under fire. Extensive shelling of beach support areas from artillery batteries north of the SONG BEN HAI was received throughout the operation. Timely and effective counter battery fire was accomplished by NGFS ships. This operation vividly demonstrated the need for and effectiveness of NGFS in an amphibious operation.

(2) Effective and timely close air support was provided by the 1st

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MAW. It is believed that the most effective utilization of fixed wing aircraft is obtained by scheduling the assets to perform a particular mission on a pre-planned schedule. Targets of opportunity are engaged in a more timely manner by the utilization of artillery, NGF, or UH-1E's (armed). Of course if the target is of a nature which can more effectively be attacked by fixed wing aircraft a trade-off between target neutralization and time effectiveness must be established. This was accomplished on several occasions in Operation BEAU CHARGER.

(3) In addition to organic artillery, reinforcing fires were available from the 12th Marines. Lines of communication for reinforcing fires were established. However, due to the amount of NGF support available it was not necessary to call upon already taxed artillery units of the 12th Marines for reinforcing fires. Particularly noteworthy was the effectiveness of organic artillery in firing counterbattery fire against incoming artillery and mortar fires.

(4) Coordination and control of supporting arms remained the responsibility of the CATF (SACC) throughout the entire operation. A liaison officer was established at the DONG HA FSCC, which was responsible for fire support coordination throughout QUANG TRI Province. Basic fire support coordination procedures were adhered to. Fires exclusively within the AOA or within the northern portion of the DMZ east of Grid Line YD 19 were delivered without further recourse to 3rd Mar Div. Conversely, fires to be delivered out of the aforementioned areas or to be delivered into the AOA by other units had to be coordinated through the DONG HA FSCC. The following problem areas were noted during Operation BEAU CHARGER:

(a) Clearance to Fire in the Area North of the DMZ. Throughout the operation, fires were received both by ground units and naval vessels from the area along the coast north of the DMZ. In order to fire in this area it was necessary to clear with the U.S. Air Force via DONG HA FSCC. While the time to clear these missions was not inordinate, it on occasion created a time lag which is unacceptable in the delivery of counter battery fire.

Recommendation. In future operations where the VC/NVA have the capability of engaging ground forces or naval vessels with artillery or heavy mortar fire, the AOA be expanded to include this danger area outside the immediate force beachhead where the operation is to be conducted.

(b) LNO Augmentation. In order that LNO's operate at maximum effectiveness it is necessary that their arrival be sufficiently in advance of the operation to receive a thorough briefing as to the forthcoming operation and the modus operandi for coordination of supporting arms within the area of operations. The minimum time required is considered to be three days. Due to the increased tempo of operations within the I CTZ until

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1 September 1967 it becomes difficult to meet this time requirement.

Recommendation. That three fire support qualified liaison officers and two Artillery Operation/NGF SNCO's plus communication augmentation be assigned to the SLF for periods of 30 - 45 days until 1 September 1967.

(c) Tactical Air Observer (TAO) Utilization. The SLF is task organized to include a TAO. In an amphibious operation the services of the TAO as an intelligence gathering agency and aerial observer are required to assure timely intelligence and conduct of fires. During Operation BEAU CHARGER there was initially no aircraft available for the TAO. Only after D+3 was the TAO able to operate with the 3rd Mar Div AO Section. This at best was marginally acceptable as operational control remained with 3rd Mar Div with priority of observation to CTG 79.4 on a "catch as catch can" basis. In order that proper briefings and debriefings be accomplished the TAO aircraft should be based aboard the LPH. Accordingly the best aircraft for such operations is the UH-1E (unarmed).

Recommendation. That the SLF be augmented for each amphibious operation with a UH-1E (unarmed) for utilization by the TAO.

e. Logistics

(1) In order to establish logistic support from "in-country" sources, liaison was made with III MAF as early as possible prior to the commencement of Operation BEAU CHARGER. Because of the high security classification assigned to the operation during the initial planning stages, efforts to coordinate specific functions were somewhat hampered as not all persons requiring detailed information were privileged to it. However, arrangements were made to receive all classes of supplies from the Force Logistic Support Unit, established at DONG HA. Fuel for helicopters was available from a bulk fuel dispensing system maintained at DONG HA by Marine Air Group 16 (Fwd). Additional logistic support was provided from supplies and equipment embarked aboard ARG shipping.

(2) Prior to the commencement of Operation BEAU CHARGER, CTG 76.4 arranged for assignment to the SLF of two YFU boats from the Naval Support Activity in DA NANG. These YFU's, under operational control of CTG 79.4, were used for delivery of supplies from the FLSU at DONG HA, via the CUA VIET River, to a beach support area, established and maintained by the Shore Party Platoon of BLT 1/3. A liaison NCO was sent to the FLSU on D-day to receive resupply requests from the BLT and to coordinate the loading of supplies in a YFU each night for delivery the next morning. This liaison NCO was provided communications with the BLT S-4, as well as the TAC-LOG groups aboard all ships of the ARG, so as to ensure complete coordination of the logistic support effect. Once the daily resupply

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reached the BSA, local distribution was made by LVF's organic to the BLT. This arrangement proved to be very satisfactory. Of note was the fact that the CUA VIET River could not be traveled safely during hours of darkness and had to be cleared of possible mines and/or explosive devices by river patrol boats each morning before craft could safely navigate it. This required careful planning of YFU utilization during the day in order that one would be available to be dispatched to DONG HA early in the afternoon in order to travel the river before darkness.

(3) Priority resupply of selected items was provided from ships of the ARG by helicopter and surface craft, as required. Additionally, water, using 5 gallon cans, was provided from the LPH on shuttle basis as local water was not readily available.

(4) In order that the ARG maintain the required 15 days of supply for contingency operations, Class V LFORM/OPRES supplies expended were reconstituted upon termination of the operation from the Force Logistic Command in DA NANG. Through prior arrangement with FLC, at this same time combat damaged equipment was replaced and the BLT was able to replenish some of the Class II, Type 2 supplies expended during the operation.

(5) In-as-much as the LPH was not provided with a surgical team, evacuation of serious military casualties was to the AH assigned to the ARG, the USS SANCTUARY. Evacuation of minor casualties, such as heat exhaustion and similar cases, was to the LPH. KIA's were initially evacuated to the LPH for further evacuation to Graves Registration Section, 1st Medical Battalion in DA NANG. Seriously wounded civilians were evacuated to the RVN Hospital in QUANG TRI.

(6) Detainees and VC suspects were interrogated at the BLT level before evacuation to the 3rd Mar Div POW compound at DONG HA. No confirmed POW's were encountered during the operation.

(7) With assistance from one hundred RVN National Policemen, all civilians were evacuated from the DMZ area to the BSA for further transportation to DONG HA via YFU. Civilian evacuation of the area south of the DMZ was voluntary. A platoon of LVTP's from the 1st AmTrac Battalion and the Beach Jumper Unit were also used to assist in civilian evacuation.

f. Casualty Reporting. Casualty reporting was conducted in accordance with existing regulations. The CRCC was located onboard the USS OKINAWA. The LPH was designated CECS, however due to the lack of a surgical team on the LPH, it was again necessary to evacuate the majority of the WIA's to the USS SANCTUARY. All KIA's were evacuated to the LPH where the remains were identified, necessary administrative requirements met, and further evacuation to TON SON NHUT Mortuary, SAIGON via 3rd Medical Battalion at PHU BAI. Medical liaison personnel were assigned to D Company

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3rd Medical Battalion, DONG HA; 3rd Medical Battalion, PHU BAI; 1st Medical Battalion, and Naval Support Activity Hospital, DA NANG and the USS SANCTUARY at sea. These corpsmen/liaison personnel were assigned to these locations for the purpose of receiving, reporting and coordinating further evacuation of wounded from their respective facilities. This system continues to prove to be most effective in controlling the flow of casualties that may inadvertently be received at a medical facility other than the primary casualty evacuation ship. Improved radio nets provided the CRCC with more direct communications from the USS OKINAWA to the units ashore to confirm information on casualties. During the course of Operation BEAU CHARGER 23 KIA's, 80 WIAE's, and 26 WIANE's were processed by the CRCC.

g. Civic Action. Civic action in the form of civilian evacuation was accomplished during operation BEAU CHARGER. National Police, with a SLF liaison team (BJU Unit) attached, coordinated the evacuation of 750 (estimated) civilians.

h. Communications

(1) During the operation, as in the past operations, it was necessary to employ SLF assets in order to communicate via FM circuits. Only one (1) radio set, AN/VRC-46 proved reliable. There are still no shipboard FM radios that can be reliably used by the BLF. It was again necessary to employ deck-mounted vehicular radios. The continuous use of these radios during operations are detrimental to the vehicle.

(2) Some mutual interference was experienced. This may be attributed to the close proximity of antennae aboard ship.

(3) Radio relay communications was poor. The antenna system needs maintenance. It was necessary for SLF personnel to erect a directional (YAGI) antenna on board to transmit traffic to the beach area. The effectiveness of radio relay was negligible.

(4) The augmentation of two radio operators with one radio proved to be adequate. They comprised the communication section of the fire support coordination liaison team which was located at 3rd Mar Div (Fwd) FSOC.

(5) It was noted that Naval Gunfire Liaison and Spot Teams, SACC and TACRON Det employ the KAA-60 (Couple Code) and KAC-138 (Authentication Code) while all "in-country" units and the SLF employ KAC-QX (Numerical Code). It is recommended that all units of the ARG/SLF use the KAC-QX (Numerical Code) in order to avoid confusion. It is further recommended that the naval gunfire support ships also use this code. To preclude a lack of communication between units operating in RVN and in

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support of "in-country" operations it is mandatory that all concerned are using the same code system.

10. The following comments are included on subordinate commanders' combat after action reports:

a. HMM 263 After Action Report:

(1) Paragraph 3 of enclosure (2). The selection of landing zones in any operation is based on guidance and direction from higher headquarters. In Operation BEAU CHARGER the plan was to land as close as possible to the BEN HAI River, turn south and conduct search and destroy operations in conjunction with evacuation of civilians. Widely separated LZ's were selected with alternates to each due to the area to be covered and an unfordable dead end water way (the SONG CUT) which divided the area in close proximity to the BEN HAI River. LZ GOOSE was situated on the sand dunes with a minimum of 500 yards to any adjacent built-up area. The first wave of helos landed 300 - 500 yards north of the designated area. This no doubt was due to difficulty in discerning the exact location of the LZ due the vast expanse of sand dunes. The classification of the operation (top secret) and the requirement to inform the very minimum number of personnel concerning the operation obstructed planning and left little time for detailed planning at lower levels. The classification also prevented low level visual reconnaissance, however, excellent up-to-date photo coverage was received. The decision not to prep the LZ's was based on three factors:

(a) To achieve surprise.

(b) location of LZ GOOSE in a sand dune area.

(c) The possibility of heavy civilian casualties since the only area that would be of any value to prep were the built-up areas.

b. BLT 1/3 After Action Report:

(1) Paragraph 1 of enclosure (3). See paragraph 3 of HMM 263 After Action Report.

(2) Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 of enclosure (3). Concur.

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