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COMMANDER
SPECIAL LANDING FORCE ALFA
U.S. SEVENTH FLEET

COMMAND



CHRONOLOGY



DOWNGRADE AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR.5200.10

1-30 JUNE
1967

313 006

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Revised and Amended

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HEADQUARTERS
Task Group 79.4
Fleet Marine Force, SEVENTH Fleet
FPO San Francisco, 96601

3/PJM/jtl
5750.1C
SerNo: 00214A-67
2 August 1967

SECRET-NOFORN (Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1))

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, SEVENTH Fleet
Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 to 30 June 1967

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8
(c) BrigO 5750.1C

Encl: (1) Commander Task Group 79.4 Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references(a), (b), and (c), enclosure (1) is submitted herewith.


JOHN A. CONWAY

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COMMANDER TASK GROUP 79.4

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 June 1967 - 30 June 1967

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. DESIGNATION

Task Group 79.4

COMMANDERColonel J. A. GALLO, Jr.
1-11 June 1967Colonel J. A. CONWAY
12-30 June 1967SUBORDINATE UNITS

BLT 1/3

LtCol P. A. WICKWIRE
1-30 June 1967

HMM 263

LtCol E. K. KIRBY
1-12 June 1967

HMM 362

LtCol N. J. KAPETAN
28-30 June 1967ATTACHED UNITS

None.

2. LOCATION

1-30 June 1967

USS OKINAWA (LPB 3)
USS DULUTH (LPD 6)
USS SEMINOLE (AKA 104)

1-4 June 1967

USS PT DEFIANCE (LSD 31)

3-30 June 1967

USS HERMITAGE (LSD 34)

3. STAFF OFFICERS

Commanding Officer

Colonel J. A. GALLO, Jr.
1-11 June 1967Colonel J. A. CONWAY
12-30 June 1967

Executive Officer/Air Officer

LtCol R. C. MARSH

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S-2

Major W. D. BENTON
1-5 June 1967

2ndLt S. E. DURHAM
6-15 June 1967

Captain W. N. FOWLER
16-30 June 1967

S-3

Major W. W. TAYLOR, Jr.

Ass't S-3

Major R. W. EDWARDS

S-4

Major R. M. BROWNE

CommO

Captain F. D. KELLY

S-1/Adjutant

Captain M. L. WILKINSON

Ass't S-2/AO

2ndLt S. E. DURHAM

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>OTHER</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
SLF Hq	9	27	0	0	0	0
BLT 1/3	72	1560	7	92	0	0
HMM 263 1-12 June 1967	48	168	1	3	0	0
HMM 362 28-30 June 1967	48	196	1	3	0	0

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PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

During the period 1-12 June 1967, Task Group 79.4 commenced planning for, and conducted Operation BEAR BITE (2-12 June 1967), in the QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN Provinces, northern I CTZ, RVN. On 4 June 1967, OPCON of BLT 1/3 was passed to CG III MAF who concurrently passed OPCON to CG 3d Mar Div and thence to the 4th Marine Regiment. CTG 79.4 remained aboard ARG shipping which continued in support of operations ashore until 12 June 1967 at which time Operation BEAR BITE was terminated. On 13 June 1967, HMM 263 was offloaded at KY HA, and, upon completion, the ARG with TG 79.4 embarked, sailed for SUBIC BAY, R.P. for ARG upkeep/training. The ARG remained in SUBIC BAY undergoing extensive communications repairs and general upkeep during the period 13-26 June 1967. The ARG returned to RVN on 28 June 1967 and embarked HMM 362 from KY HA. On 29 June 1967 BLT 1/3 was reembarked out of PHU BAI and OPCON of BLT 1/3 returned to CTG 79.4. On 30 June 1967 the ARG/SLF remained in a holding area off northern I CTZ, RVN.

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PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1 June 1967 CTG 79.4 and planning representatives to 3d Mar Div for planning forthcoming SpecOps.

1-3 June 1967 Major J. T. BOWLIN, USMC, Deputy Sector Advisor QUANG TRI, aboard as liaison officer.

1-9 June 1967 Major MOODY, Captain ROESLER, and LtJG JENNINGS aboard as FSCC Liaison Officer, Liaison Officer, and NGF Liaison Officer respectively. Operation BEAR BITE conducted in QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN Provinces, Northern I CTZ, RVN.

Ref: COMSEVENTHFLT 270914Z MAY67
Tab C Part IV

3 June 1967 VAdm HYLAND aboard to visit CTG 76.4/79.4.

4 June 1967 OPCON of BLT 1/3 was passed concurrently to III MAF, 3d Mar Div, and 4th Mar.

Ref: COMSEVENTHFLT 031601Z Jun67
CG III MAF 041220Z Jun67
CG 3d Mar Div 041501Z Jun67

5 June 1967 CTG 79.4 and representatives to 4th Mar and III MAF in connection with forthcoming operation..

6 June 1967 CTG 79.4 and representatives to 4th Mar for final detailed planning and briefing for Operation COLGATE.

7 June 1967 Operation BEAR BITE/COLGATE commenced.

Ref: Fourth Mar 060115Z JUN67
Tab C, Part IV

8 June 1967 Colonel J. A. CONWAY, CTG 79.4 designate, joined SLF Hq. MajGen ANDERSON, CG 1st MAW, aboard to visit CTG 76.4/79.4.

8-9 June 1967 BGen GLICK, CTF 79, LtCol DIONISOPOULOS, Ass't C/S G-3 TF 79, LtCol REINHART, Airo TF 79, and LtCol ENGLISH, Ass't G-4 TF 79, aboard to visit CTG 79.4.

11 June 1967 Colonel J. A. CONWAY relieved Colonel J. A. GALLO, Jr. as CTG 79.4.

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12 June 1967 Off-loaded HMM 263 at KY HA, RVN. Upon completion of off-load ARG underway to SUBIC BAY, R.P. for upkeep.

13-26 June 1967 ARG shipping upkeep period SUBIC BAY, R.P.

26-27 June 1967 ARG shipping departed SUBIC BAY enroute RVN.

28 June 1967 ARG arrived KY HA, RVN and embarked HMM 362.

29 June 1967 ARG reembarked BLT 1/3. CG 3d Mar Div, MajGen HOCHMUTH, and ADC 3d Mar Div, BGen METZGER aboard to visit with CTG 76.4/79.4.

30 June 1967 ARG/SLF in holding area off I CTZ RVN.

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PART IV

CHRONOLOGY OF SUBORDINATE COMMANDS AND
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

INDEX

TAB A - Command Chronology 1-30 June 1967 BLT 1/3

TAB B - Command Chronology 1-12 June 1967 HMM 263

TAB C - CTG 79.4 After Action Report BEAR BITE

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ALFA
SEVENTH FLEET



AFTER ACTION REPORT
BEAR BITE

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS,
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DOD DIR 5200.10

2-12 JUNE 1967

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HEADQUARTERS
Task Group 79.4
Fleet Marine Force, SEVENTH Fleet
FPO San Francisco, 96601

3/PJM/jtl
Ser: 00217567
1 August 1967

[REDACTED] (unclassified upon removal of enclosures (1) through (5))

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, SEVENTH Fleet
Subj: Combat After Action Report, Operation BEAR BITE

Encl: {1} - Commander Task Group 79.4, After Action Report, BEAR BITE, 2-12 Jan 67
 {2} - HMM 263, After Action Report, BEAR BITE, 31 May - 11 Jan 67
 {3} - BLT 1/3, After Action Report, BEAR BITE, 2-5 Jan 67
 {4} - Operations Overlay Phase I
 {5} - Operations Overlay Phase II

1. Enclosure (1) contains the Commander Task Group 79.4's After Action Report for Operation BEAR BITE/Phases I and II.

2. Enclosures (2) through (5) amplify enclosure (1).

John A. Conway
JOHN A. CONWAY

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COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT, BEAR BITE

Map Reference: VIETNAM, AMS Series 7014, Sheets 6442 I, II, III, and IV.

1. Operation BEAR BITE was a unilateral amphibious operation utilizing waterborne and heliborne assault forces. It was conducted in accordance with NWP-22(A).

2. The operation was divided into two phases: Phase I was conducted in the HUONG DIEN District, QUANG TRI Province, and the HAI LANG and PHONG DIEN Districts, THUA THIEN Province; Phase II was conducted in the PHU VANG District, THUA THIEN Province. Both areas are located in northern I CTZ, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. Phase I commenced 2 June 1967 at 0700H with the simultaneous landing of waterborne and heliborne assault forces over BLUE BEACH and into LZ STARLING. Operations ashore were in conjunction with Operations CUMBERLAND and CHOCTAW already in progress. Phase I terminated on 4 June 1967 with the passing of operational control of the SLF to the 4th Marines. Phase II is reported separately.

3. Task Organization.

Commander Task Group 79.4	2-11 June 1967	Colonel J. A. GALLO JR.
	11-12 June 1967	Colonel J. A. CONWAY
BLT 1/3		LtCol. P. A. WICKWIRE
HMM-263		LtCol. E. K. KIRBY
Det, VMO-6 (3-UH-1E)		
Det, HMM-164 (2-CH-46)		

4. Intelligence.

a. Terrain.

(1) General. The objective area is a portion of the seaward margin of the central coastal lowland and delta plain, consisting of low lying, often flooded, poorly drained land. It is compartmented by three segments of terrain all generally aligned with the coast and paralleling one another. They progress inland from gently rolling sandy beaches and sand dunes, to an area consisting of marshes, swamps, lakes, and lagoons, to an area that is mainly a low area of rice cultivation with some dry land crops.

(2) Relief. The area from the coast to about 1000 meters inland is characterized by flat to gently rolling sandy beaches with some steep dunes averaging 2-3 meters with a maximum of 10 meters. The area behind the beach to about 5 kilometers inland consists of flat to gently rolling sand dunes with some steep dunes, with a maximum height of 20 meters and an average of 10 meters. This area consists of numerous sandy intermittent streams, marshes, swamps, lakes, and lagoons.

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The coastal lowland plain from 5 kilometers behind the beach to Highway #1 consists primarily of poorly drained level areas of wet rice cultivation. The local relief is generally less than 20 meters with slopes less than 3 percent. The most prominent relief features appear to be the dikes and roads which separate the rice paddies. To the south of the lowland plain and in the southeastern portion of the operating area the terrain consists of low rolling sand dunes and flat sandy areas interlaced with intermittent marshes, swamps, and lagoons.

(3) Beach Study. The northern end of the beach is located at 16° 46' 58" N 107° 20' 20" E (YD 491568) and runs southeast to 16° 43' 20" N 107° 25' 25" E (YD 582499). The beach is 11,250 meters long and varies in width from 82 to 273 meters. The approaches are partially obstructed by submerged sand bars 150 to 300 meters off the low water line. Numerous channels provide easy access to the beach. The beach is covered with sand dunes of a maximum height of 10 meters. Huts, cemeteries, churches, and religious pagodas are scattered throughout the area.

b. Enemy Situation

(1) Composition

(a) Ground. The enemy has continued to control the area by the use of guerrilla forces. The enemy forces in the force beachhead consist of one local force company. The possibility also exists that an NVA/MF battalion may be operating in the area. The enemy forces in the area may consist of approximately 600 men.

c. Locally Available Strength

(1) P 14 LF Co also known as C 113
Strength: approximately 80 to 100
Location: vic YD 4843

(2) VII NVA Bn possibly the 806th Bn
Strength: approximately 500
Location: vic YD 5043

(3) The above units are equipped with; 60mm mortars, 81mm mortars, 57mm recoilless rifles, 75mm recoilless rifles, heavy machine guns, anti tank weapons, automatic and individual small arms.

d. Enemy Contact

(1) On D-day waterborne forces made an unopposed landing over BLUE BEACH. The heliborne forces landing in LZ STARLING were also unopposed. Enemy contact throughout the day was light and only sporadic sniper fire was

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received in and around LZ PARTRIDGE. On D+1 enemy contact was light and there was only one instance of enemy mortar fire. (One round 60mm). On D+2 tunnels and punji traps were discovered and destroyed. Only sporadic small arms fire was received. On D+3 40 bunkers and 100 fighting holes with overhead covers were found and destroyed.

(2) There was only one instance of helicopters receiving fire, with insignificant damage.

(3) During Phase I enemy casualties consisted of 2 KIA (confirmed), 6 KIA (probable), 3 POW's and 9 detainees.

e. Weather. Partly cloudy skies and occasional showers prevailed throughout the operation. Visibility was limited only during thunderstorms. The temperature ranged from 83 to 92 degrees. The winds were generally from the southwest and averaged between 8 and 16 knots.

5. Mission. As directed by COMSEVENTHFLT 270914Z May 1967 (Initiating Directive), the mission of TG 79.4 was to conduct a search and destroy amphibious operation against VC/NVA forces in the amphibious objective area in I CTZ, or other operations as agreed upon with CG III MAF or his designated representative.

6. Concept of Operations. Operation BEAR BITE was a unilateral amphibious operation conducted by TG 76.4/79.4. The operation was planned for an 8 to 10 day search and destroy period, utilizing both waterborne and heliborne assault landings. Initially, the inherent mobility of the SLF was to be utilized to the maximum extent possible to ensure rapid build up ashore. Subsequently, aggressive search and destroy operations were to be conducted within the amphibious objective area. Utilization of supporting arms was an essential part of this concept. Fire support was to be provided by the organic artillery of the BLT and the naval gunfire ship USS BIGELOW (DD-942). The SLF was prepared to CHOP to III MAF or his designated subordinate commander for further employment in conjunction with operations as required. The concept of operations provided for the following: L-hour and H-hour were scheduled concurrently; beach and landing zones were not prepared by fire, however, fires were planned and were "on call" in the event they were required.

7. Execution

a. Operation BEAR BITE was executed in accordance with CTG 76.4 Op Order 309-67 and CTG 79.4 Op Plan 120A-67 supplemented by a Frag Order for operations in the amphibious objective area.

b. D-day was established as 2 June 1967 with L-hour and H-hour at 0700H.

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c. The SLF landed its waterborne and heliborne assault forces on schedule and by 3 June the BLT was well established ashore and prepared to conduct operations as required.

8. Results. Enclosures (2) and (3).

9. Commanders Analysis. This analysis is limited to matters at the SLF level, BLT and Squadron Commanders' analyses are contained in their respective reports, enclosures (2) and (3).

a. Planning. TG 79.4 undertook planning for Operation BEAR BITE immediately upon termination of Operation BEAU CHARGER. Liaison was established with 3rd Marine Division on 28 May 1967, and TG 79.4 representatives proceeded immediately to the 4th Marines Command Post for concurrent planning. The CG, 3rd Mar Div had approved the prospective operation and planned to pass operational control of 79.4, once obtained, to CO, 4th Marines. Planning proceeded with no problems, three additional visits were made by 79.4 reps to the 4th Marines C.P. for finalization of plans. Arrangements were also completed to exchange liaison officers as required and for obtaining Popular Force personnel to be integrated with elements of the BLT, as well as GVN representatives required for fire clearance in the two provinces concerned.

b. Intelligence. Prior to BEAR BITE, arrangements were made with III MAF, CG 3rd Mar Div, and the 4th Mar for maps, area studies, and intelligence summaries. Liaison officers and ARVN sub-sector advisors were made available by CG, 3rd Mar Div

c. Command Relationships. Operation BEAR BITE was a unilateral amphibious operation with command relationships in accordance with NWP-22(A). OPCON of the SLF was assumed by III MAF on 040000Z Jun 67 and was concurrently passed to CG, 3rd Mar Div (CG III MAF 041220Z Jun 67). On 4 June 1967 OPCON of the SLF was passed to 4th Mar (CG 3rd Mar Div 041501Z Jun 67). On 12 June 1967 CG III MAF assumed OPCON of the SLF (minus BLT 1/3) and passed OPCON concurrently to CTG 76.4 (CG III MAF 111446Z Jun 67). BLT 1/3 remains OPCON 4th Mar. Command of HMM 263 passed to CG 1st MAF 121200H Jun 67 (CTG 76.4/79.4 120222Z Jun 67).

d. Supporting Arms

(1) Naval gunfire support was provided by the USS BIGELOW from H/L-hour on D-day until 040000H Jun 67 when TG 79.4 became OPCON III MAF. USS BIGELOW returned 050500H Jun 67 and remained until 051800H Jun 67 in order to cover the backload of certain elements aboard amphibious shipping.

(2) Organic artillery was organized into a battery groupment under the Commanding Officer, A/1/12. Lines of communication for reinforcing fires were established with the 3rd Bn, 12 Marines.

(3) TG 79.4 augmentation provided by the 1st MAF were two CH-46's,

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two UH-1E's (armed), and one UH-1E (unarmed), all attached to the task group, and two CH-53's fraggged on an as required basis to lift 105mm howitzers. The services rendered by all aircraft was outstanding. Of particular note was the assignment of the UH-1E (unarmed) for utilization by the TG 79.4 Tactical Air Observer (TAO). The services provided by this aircraft were invaluable in that it provided the TG with an independent intelligence gathering agency as well as a controlling agency for surface oriented supporting arms, capable of observing at ranges far in excess of the limited observation capability of the ground observer in RVN environment.

(4) Fire support procedures utilized were normal for operations conducted in RVN. The rules of engagement provided for no free fire zones and were strictly complied with. Representatives of both QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN Provinces were present to provide supporting arms engagement clearances. Transfer of responsibility for control and coordination between the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and Commander Landing Force (CLF) while conducted in accordance with NWP-22(A), contained a unique feature to assure maximum control and coordination of supporting arms throughout the operation.

(a) The system used was as follows: initial control and coordination was accomplished by the Commander Amphibious Task Force. Once the BLT was established ashore; the BLT Commander's Fire Support Coordination Center was functional; and a solid communication link was established between the BLT FSOC and SACC, the CLF requested that the responsibility for control and coordination of supporting arms be passed to him. The CATF passed responsibility to the CLF who assumed the responsibility and utilized the communication and control facilities of SACC aboard the LPH. This system permitted the assumption of responsibility for control and coordination of supporting arms by the CLF with a minimum of confusion. No change over from established communication circuits relieved the BLT Commander's small fast moving FSOC of the responsibility of maintaining fire support communication with adjacent and lateral units; kept open the necessary communication and liaison with ARVN units and representatives of the Province Chiefs; and permitted a more positive control over the large amount of air traffic in the landward portion of the AOA. In particular, it permitted a closer integration of helicopter movement with fire support coordination than would be feasible by establishment of an SLF FSOC ashore without air control facilities and away from the Task Group operations section.

(b) This feature permitted the responsibility for control and coordination of supporting arms to pass to the CLF when the landing force was firmly established ashore, but prior to the time the mission stated in the initiating directive had been accomplished. This permitted the CLF to assume responsibility for coordination of supporting arms, one of the requirements for the termination of the "amphibious phase" (CTF 76/79 080500Z May67) and subsequent CHOP to III MAF. In addition the procedure

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permitted the Commander Landing Force to exercise the necessary control over supporting arms.

(c) Experience derived from Operation BEAR BITE proved not only the feasibility of this system but established the desirability of maintaining the control and coordination facilities of the Commander Landing Force aboard the LPH.

(d) It is significant to note that control of the air-ground landing force (SLF) requires extensive control and communication facilities to assure integration and proper utilization of ground elements with helicopter elements available to the Commander Landing Force. The only place these physical resources are available to the Commander Landing Force is aboard the LPH. The consolidation of all TG 79.4 manpower and utilization of shipboard communication facilities has proven to be the most efficient method of control and most economical means of employing TG 79.4 assets.

(e) Command and control aspects involved in the employment of the Special Landing Force require control elements to remain aboard the LPH for purposes of controlling helicopter assets and integrating helicopter assets in to the overall scheme of maneuver. The location of the helicopter control agency as well as the fire support coordination agency must of necessity be physically located in close proximity to the Special Landing Force command control element (operations center). To fragment these elements in two physical locations; i.e., aboard ship and ashore, would require communication facilities more extensive and more sophisticated than presently available to TG 79.4. In addition the practice of splitting the CP group would require approximately a 100% increase in manpower in order to operate necessary facilities in two locations.

(f) In consideration of the success achieved during Operation BEAR BITE in control and coordination of supporting arms, the requirement for an integrated air-ground operations center, and the relative paucity of communication and personnel assets within the SLF Headquarters it has been found that the best "trade off" obtainable in command and control aspects of employment of TG 79.4 is achieved by maintaining all facilities operational in one location, i.e., aboard the LPH.

e. Logistics

(1) Prior to the commencement of Operation BEAR BITE, liaison with the 3rd Mar Div and 4th Marine Regiment was established in order to provide for "in-country" logistic support. Arrangements were made to receive resupply in Classes I, III, IV, V, and expendable Class II items from the ISA established at the 4th Marines CP commencing on D+1. Additional logistic support was provided from the supplies and equipment embarked aboard ARG shipping.

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(2) On D-2, a liaison NCO was sent to the LSA to coordinate resupply requests received daily from the BLT. This liaison NCO was provided communications with the BLT S-4, as well as the TAC-LOG groups aboard all ships of the ARG, so as to ensure complete coordination of the logistic support effort. Distribution of resupply was made directly from the LSA to the BLT Command Post by two CH-46 helicopters which were augmented to the SLF for the operation. Local resupply to BLT units was made by UH-34 helicopters as feasible.

(3) Emergency resupply was not required during the operation, although water, in expd. cans, was provided from the LPH during the initial period ashore when local water was not available.

(4) The LPH was designated as the Casualty Evacuation Control Ship and was prepared to accept all types of combat casualties. However, only minor casualties were experienced during BEAR BITE, all of which were treated and returned to duty.

(5) Detainees, VC suspects and POW's were interrogated at the BLT level before evacuation to the 4th Marines POW Compound.

f. Casualty Reporting

(1) Prior to the commencement of operations for Operation BEAR BITE, a surgical team was embarked aboard USS OKINAWA. The presence of this team provided the LPH with a nearly complete medical capability. Only serious/critical cases would have to be immediately evacuated to the hospital ship. As in all operations thus far, all casualty reporting was to be conducted in accordance with existing instructions, however, due to the lack of contact with the enemy the BLT sustained only one reported casualty during Operation BEAR BITE. As a preparatory measure medical liaison personnel were assigned to 3rd Medical Battalion, PHU BAI to coordinate casualty matters. A hospital ship was assigned during the initial phase of the operation but withdrew the following day.

(2) Civic Action. A MEDCAP/HANDCLASP program was conducted jointly by the Civic Action Officers of the SLF and BLT on 4 June 1967 in the village of KOM RU. The MEDCAP Team consisted of 2 doctors, 5 corpsmen, 1 dentist and 1 dental technician. Approximately 30 indigenous people were treated by the medical team while the dentist treated 6 patients. Distribution of HANDCLASP materials consisting of toys, dolls, candy, vitamins, and baby powder was completed. A quantity of medical supplies were delivered to the nuns at the mission where the program was conducted. The MEDCAP/HANDCLASP Team was accompanied by personnel of the Navy Camera Team who recorded the event on both movie and still cameras. Approximately 350 people participated in the program.

g. Communications

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(1) The shipboard FM radio equipment allocated to BLF HQ, was adequate for this operation. Three radio sets, AN/VRC-46 were available during most of the operation. At one point, one radio set, AN/VRC-46 became inoperative. This set was made operational in a short while by Navy and Marine Corps technicians. There is still no new FM radio equipment available for BLF use. As stated previously, there are two radio sets, SRC-12 available in troop message center, but they are unreliable. This condition will probably be corrected during the upkeep period at U. S. Naval Station, Subic Bay. During operation BEAR BITE, the BLF used a vehicular mounted radio set AN/MRC-110 for ship-to-shore communications.

(2) The TSEC/KY-8 was used extensively on the 3rd Mar Div tactical net during both phases of the operation. The BLF's KY-8 was inoperative during the entire operation. During Operation BEAR BITE Phase II, the KY-8 was used successfully by both 3rd Mar Div and 4th Marines tactical nets. Through experience, it was learned that there were flaws in the connector cables of the sets and it was necessary to construct new cables. Once this was accomplished, the KY-8 worked perfectly. The only problem encountered was the fact that the sets had a tendency to overheat. This did not cause any serious delays in transmission of covered traffic.

(3) Radio Relay continued to present a problem. Although maintenance was performed on the AN/GRC-10 and AN/MRC-62 prior to the operation, communications was only marginal. It was necessary to deck mount a directional antenna (YAGI) in order to receive signals from the beach. The antenna system requires maintenance and installation of ground planes. This should be accomplished during the upkeep period at U. S. Naval Base, Subic Bay.

(4) One liaison team was furnished to 4th Marines and one team to 2nd Bn, 4th Marines during Operation BEAR BITE. One additional team was sent to the 4th Marines CP (FWD) at PHU BAI. The provision of two radio operators and one radio set, AN/PRC-25 with antenna RC-292, proved adequate for liaison requirements.

(5) It was again noted that the KAA-60 (Encouple Code) and KAC-138 (Numerical Code) continued to be employed by direct support ships, fire support coordinators in SACC and naval gunfire personnel ashore. All other "in-country" USMC units employed the KAC-QX (Numerical Code) for this same purpose. It is recommended that the KAC-QX series be employed by all units (both Navy and Marine Corps) during these operations to avoid creating problem areas.

(6) One of the frequencies assigned by III MAF for BLF use, interfered with the airport tower at DONG HA (Roseann Alfa). A new frequency was assigned and the problem was corrected.

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PART II COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT, PHASE II

Map Reference: VIETNAM, AMS Series 7014, Sheets 6541 I, IV, and 6542 III.

1. The SLF under OPCON 4th Marines commenced Phase II (Op COLGATE) on 6 June 1967 with the repositioning of the BLT from the 4th Marines CP by Rough Rider Convoy to PHU BAI and then by helicopter into the operation area.

2. The operation terminated 12 June 1967 with the return of OPCON of the SLF (minus BLT 1/3) to CTG 76.4.

3. Task Organization. No changes in the task organization were effected during Phase II.

4. Intelligence

a. The assigned force beachhead is located in the northeastern portion of THUA THIEN Province. The specific area is bounded on the northeast and east by the THUY TU Lagoon, on the south by the CAU HAI Lagoon, on the southwest by a stream (THIEU HOA), and on the northwest by a line running from coordinates YD 928176 to YD 940210. The area consists of low lying, often flooded, poorly drained land. The only significant relief in the area are the dikes which separate the rice paddies and numerous burial mounds scattered throughout. Cultivation is the primary form of vegetation with some grassland and brush. Light forest areas are found surrounding most villages.

b. Enemy Situation. Enemy units in the objective area consisted of elements of the 804th MF Bn and the C 117 LF Co. They were armed with approximately 4 82mm mortars, 8 60mm mortars, 4 anti-aircraft machine guns, 4 recoilless rifles, and a significant number of automatic rifles. Prepared defensive positions consisted of reinforced bunkers, well constructed trenches, complex tunnel systems, and numerous surprise firing devices and punji traps.

c. Enemy Contact by BLT 1/3. Commencing D-day and until the termination of Phase II, small size enemy units employed automatic and small arms fire from concealed positions on advancing friendly units. During the night small enemy probes were made employing grenades, small arms fire, and 60mm and 82mm mortars. Surprise firing devices continued to be encountered. During Phase II 42 enemy were killed (body count) and 58 detainees were held for interrogation.

5. Mission. The SLF under operational control of the 4th Marines was to conduct search and destroy operations against VC/NVA forces in the northeastern area of THUA THIEN Province. 4th Marines were designated control

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headquarters for the operation.

6. Concept of Operations. The concept of operations called for the repositioning of BLT 1/3 by helicopter from PHU BAI into the northern portion of the operation area to conduct search and destroy operations in a southeasterly direction, while two additional rifle companies from the 4th Marines maintained blocking positions in the southern portion to prevent enemy exfiltration from the operating area.

7. Execution. Phase II was conducted in accordance with 4th Marines Frag Order 23-67 (for Operations CHOCTAW, CUMBERLAND, and COLGATE).

8. Results. (See enclosures (2) through (5)).

9. Commander's Analysis. This analysis is limited to operations during Phase II.

a. Planning

(1) The concept of operations was developed by the 4th Marines and approved by CG 3rd Mar Div.

(2) During Phase II, TG 79.4 maintained close and continuous contact with the 4th Marines and BLT 1/3. Liaison officers were maintained with the regiment and the BLT during the entire operation, permitting rapid response with support if and when required.

(3) During the operation, HMM-263 supported BLT operations from the LPH. Additional aircraft during the operation were requested by the 4th Marines as the situation warranted. No control problems were encountered.

b. Command Relationships. During Phase II the SLF remained under operational control of the 4th Marines. On 12 June 1967 OPCON of the SLF (- BLT 1/3) was passed to 3rd Mar Div who then passed OPCON to III MAF (CG 3rd Mar Div 111553Z Jun67). CG III MAF concurrently returned OPCON of the SLF (- BLT 1/3) to CTG 76.4 and directed that HMM-263 report to CG 1st MAF for command (CG III MAF 111446Z Jun67) upon offload, about 13 June.

c. Supporting Arms. During Phase II, supporting fires were provided by the organic artillery of the BLT as well as by the 4th Bn, 12 Mar in general support. Fire support coordination was accomplished by the 4th Marines FSCC.

d. Logistics. On 5 June 1967 the BLT was repositioned at the 4th Marines CP where responsibility for logistic support was assumed by the 4th Marines.

e. Casualty Reporting. Responsibility for casualty reporting was assumed by the 3rd Mar Div. TG 79.4 was an info addressee on all BLT 1/3 casualty reports submitted by 3rd Mar Div.

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