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CN 0029667

COMMANDER  
SPECIAL LANDING FORCE  
ALFA  
SEVENTH FLEET



COMMAND  
CHRONOLOGY

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS,  
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED  
DOD DIR 5200.10

1-31 JULY 1967

314 186

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HEADQUARTERS  
Task Group 79.4  
Fleet Marine Force, SEVENTH Fleet  
FPO San Francisco, 96601

UNCLASSIFIED

3/OAN/jtl  
5750.1C  
Ser: 00248A.67  
5 September 1967

~~SECRET~~-NOFORN - Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1)

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 to 31 July 1967

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2  
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8  
(c) Brigo 5750.1C

Encl: (1) Commander Task Group 79.4 Command Chronology

1. Enclosure (1) is submitted in accordance with references (a), (b), and (c).

*John A. Conway*  
JOHN A. CONWAY

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COMMANDER TASK GROUP 79.4

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 July 1967 - 31 July 1967

INDEX

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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## PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. DESIGNATION

Task Group 79.4

COMMANDERColonel J. A. CONWAY  
1-31 July 1967SUBORDINATE UNITS

BLT 1/3 (1-31 July 1967)

LtCol P. A. WICKWIRE  
1-15 July 1967LtCol A. I. THOMAS  
16-31 July 1967

HMM 362 (1-31 July 1967)

LtCol N. J. KAPETAN  
1-31 July 1967ATTACHED UNITS

None.

2. LOCATION

1-31 July 1967

USS OKINAWA (LPH-3)  
USS DULUTH (LPD-6)  
USS HERMITAGE (LSI-34)

1-25 July 1967

USS SEMINOLE (AKA-104)

23-31 July 1967

USS TIOGA COUNTY (LST-1158)

3. STAFF OFFICERS

Commanding Officer

Colonel J. A. CONWAY  
1-31 July 1967

Executive Officer/Air Officer

LtCol R. C. MARSH  
1-31 July 1967

S-1/Adjutant

Capt M. L. WILKINSON  
1-31 July 1967

Ass't S-1/Adjutant

2ndLt J. C. SMITH  
1-31 July 1967

ENCLOSURE (1)

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COMMANDER TASK GROUP 79.4

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 July 1967 - 31 July 1967

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## PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. DESIGNATIONCOMMANDER

Task Group 79.4

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1-31 July 1967SUBORDINATE UNITS

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None.

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USS HERMITAGE (LSD-34)

1-25 July 1967

USS SEMINOLE (AKA-104)

23-31 July 1967

USS TIOGA COUNTY (LST-1158)

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Commanding Officer

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1-31 July 1967

Executive Officer/Air Officer

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1-31 July 1967

S-1/Adjutant

Capt M. L. WILKINSON  
1-31 July 1967

Ass't S-1/Adjutant

2ndLt J. C. SMITH  
1-31 July 1967

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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S-2

Capt W. N. FOWLER  
1-31 July 1967

Ass't S-2/AO

2ndLt S. E. DURHAM  
1-31 July 1967

S-3

LtCol W. W. TAYLOR, Jr.  
1-28 July 1967

LtCol H. PRESTON  
29-31 July 1967

S-3 (Designate)

LtCol H. PRESTON  
19-28 July 1967

Ass't S-3

LtCol W. W. TAYLOR, Jr.  
29-31 July 1967

Major R. W. EDWARDS  
1-31 July 1967

S-4

Major R. M. BROWNE  
1-31 July 1967

CommO

Capt F. D. KELLY  
1-31 July 1967

Ass't CommO

1stLt L. M. ZWICK  
12-31 July 1967

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>Other</u>	
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Hq TG 79.4	12	29	0	0	0	0
BLT 1/3	62	1484	8	89	0	0
HMM 362	47	191	1	3	0	0

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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
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PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

During the period 1-2 July 1967, Task Group 79.4, commenced planning for Operation BEAR CLAW. On 2 July 1967 the Task Group was alerted to proceed to the vicinity of the CUA VIET River, I CTZ, RVN. Operation BEAR CLAW was conducted in conjunction with Operation BUFFALO from 3-13 July 1967. Operation BEAR CLAW was conducted in conjunction with Operation HICKORY II, 14-17 July 1967. On 4 July 1967 OPCON of TG 79.4 was passed to III MAF and then to 3d Mar Div and 9th Marines concurrently. CTG 79.4 remained aboard ARG shipping which continued in support of operations ashore. OPCON of TG 79.4 less BMT 1/3 was passed from 9th Marines to 3d Mar Div on 7 July 1967. On 17 July 1967, BMT was back-loaded aboard ARG shipping. On 18 July 1967 OPCON of TG 79.4 was passed to CTG 76.4 and Operation BEAR CLAW was terminated. On 18 July 1967, Task Group 79.4 commenced planning for Operation BEACON GUIDE which was conducted 21-30 July 1967 in the PHU LOC and PHU TU Districts of THU THIEN Province, I CTZ, RVN. On 30 July 1967 Task Group 79.4 was directed to conduct an amphibious withdrawal of BMT 1/3 and proceed to the vicinity of the CUA VIET, I CTZ, RVN in response to a threat in the DMZ. Operation BEACON GUIDE terminated 310001H July 1967. On 31 July 1967 Task Group 79.4 departed from the holding area vicinity CUA VIET, I CTZ, RVN and proceeded to and arrived at DA NANG for a period of upkeep and rehabilitation.



ENCLOSURE (1)

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S-2

Capt W. N. FOWLER

1-31 July 1967

Ass't S-2/AO

2ndLt S. E. DURHAM

1-31 July 1967

S-3

LtCol W. W. TAYLOR, Jr.

1-28 July 1967

LtCol H. PRESTON

29-31 July 1967

S-3 (Designate)

LtCol H. PRESTON

19-28 July 1967

Ass't S-3

LtCol W. W. TAYLOR, Jr.

29-31 July 1967

Major R. W. EDWARDS

1-31 July 1967

S-4

Major R. M. BROWNE

1-31 July 1967

CommO

Capt F. D. KELLY

1-31 July 1967

Ass't CommO

1stLt L. M. ZWICK

12-31 July 1967

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>		<u>Other</u>	
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
Hq TG 79.4	12	29	0	0	0	0
BLT 1/3	62	1484	8	89	0	0
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## PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1 July 1967 CTG 79.4 and planning representatives and representatives of 76.4 to 3d Mar Div to commence planning forthcoming SPECOPS. 2ndLt J. C. SMITH reported aboard as relief for Capt M. L. WILKINSON as S-1/Adjutant.

1-31 July 1967 Major MOODY, 9th MAB, attached as FSC Liaison Officer.

1-2 July 1967 Capt WIEDEN, 9th MAB, on board as observer.

1-3 July 1967 Capt OOTS, S-3, 2/26, attached as Liaison Officer/Advisor. 2ndLt COFTY, 1st GHT, attached as Liaison Officer/Advisor.

1-31 July 1967 1stLt SOMERVILLE, 9th MAB, attached as Liaison Officer.

1-7 July 1967 LtJG JENNINGS, 9th MAB, attached as NGF Liaison Officer.

2 July 1967 Received BEAR CLAW initiating directive. Continued planning upcoming SPECOPS.

Ref: COMSEVENTHFLT msg 011444Z Jul67.

3 July 1967 Received msg to proceed immediately to mouth of CUA VIET River to support 9th Marines vicinity CON THIEN, I CTZ, RVN. CTG 79.4 and representatives to 3d Mar Div for planning. Commenced Operation BEAR CLAW in support of Operation BUFFALO with the landing of BLT 1/3 by helicopter into vicinity of CON THIEN.

Ref: III MAF msg 021514Z Jul67  
(After Action Report submitted by 9th Marines)

4 July 1967 Operational control TG 79.4 passed to III MAF, 3d Mar Div, and 9th Marines concurrently. CTG 79.4 and representatives to 3d Mar Div for planning.

Ref: COMSEVENTHFLT msg 011444Z Jul67  
III MAF msg 031326Z Jul67  
9th Mar msg 030337Z Jul67

Colonel AMERINE, Cofs, 9th MAB, LtCol EASTER, G-1, 9th MAB, and LtCol BURKE, Operations Officer, 9th MAB, aboard to visit CTG 79.4.

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5 July 1967	CTG 79.4 and representatives to 3d Mar Div.
7 July 1967	OPCON of TG 79.4 less BLT 1/3 passed to 3d Mar Div.
8 July 1967	Commenced complete debark of BLT 1/3.
10 July 1967	Completed debarking of BLT 1/3. All units and equipment staged vicinity DONG HA, I CTZ, RVN.
12 July 1967	LtCol THOMAS reported aboard as relief for LtCol WICKWIRE as CO, BLT 1/3. 1stLt ZWICK reported as relief for Capt KELLY as Communications Officer.
12-14 July 1967	LtCol PROSS, Capt RICHTER aboard as observers. 1stLt RENTZ aboard in connection with RPS matters.
14 July 1967	BGen GLICK, CTF 79 and CTG 79.4 visited BLT 1/3 in vicinity CON THIEN; CTF 79 presented Purple Heart medals to WAs on board USS Okinawa and discussed various items with CTG 79.4.
16 July 1967	CTG 79.4 and representatives to 3d Mar Div. LtCol THOMAS assumed command of BLT 1/3.
17 July 1967	BLT 1/3 reembarked aboard ARG shipping.
18 July 1967	CTG 79.4 assumed operational control of BLT 1/3 less Truck Platoon. OPCON of 79.4 CHOPPED to CG III MAF and passed to CTG 76.4 concurrently. Termination of Operation BEAR CLAW/BUFFALO/HICKORY II.
	Ref: 3d Mar Div msg 181353Z Jul67. III MAF msg 181420Z Jul67. CTG 79.4 msg 190010Z Jul67. COMSEVENTHFLT msg 181040Z Jul67.
18-20 July 1967	Capt WATKE, CO, Co G, 2/26 on board for liaison visit in connection with forthcoming operation.
18-21 July 1967	2ndLt COFFY, 1st CIT, attached as Liaison Officer/Advisor.
19 July 1967	CTG 79.4 and representatives to 3d Mar Div in connection with final planning of SPECOPS. LtCol H. PRESTON reported as relief for LtCol TAYLOR.
19-31 July 1967	LtJG JENNINGS, 9thMAB, attached as NGF Liaison Officer.
20-22 July 1967	Colonel D. E. LOWNDS, Assistant CoS G-3, 9th MAB, aboard in connection with operation matters.
20-21 July, 1967	Capt MCINTYRE, OIC Armed Propaganda Team aboard for liaison.

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visit concerning forthcoming operation.

20-30 July 1967 Lt CHANN, ARVN, attached as representative of PHU LOC District Chief for Operation BEACON GUIDE.

21 July 1967 Operation BEACON GUIDE commenced with the landing of BLT 1/3 by helicopter and landing craft in PHU LOC District, THUA THIEN Province, I CTZ, RVN. CTG 79.4 assumed operational control Co G, 2/26 and passed to CO, BLT 1/3 concurrently.

Ref: 3d Mar Div msg 191121Z Jul67.  
CTG 79.4 msg 210316Z Jul67.  
TAB 3, Part IV.

CTG 79.4 assumed operational control of Truck Platoon.  
(see 18 July 67)

Ref: 3d MT Bn msg 212351Z Jul67.

22-25 July 1967 2ndLt P. A. BERGER, Assistant ISO, 9th MAB, on board in connection with informational services matters.

23 July 1967 Operational control of TG 79.4 passed to CG 3d Mar Div.

Ref: III MAF msg 230054Z Jul67.  
3d Mar Div msg 230535Z Jul67.

26 July 1967 Operational control Co G, 2/26 passed to 3d Mar Div.

Ref: CTG 79.4 msg 260346Z Jul67.

26-28 July 1967 Capt E. B. BURLISON, G-2 Section, and Capt D. W. DADISMAN, G-3 Section, 9th MAB, aboard as observers.


27 July 1967 CTG 79.4 and representatives to 3d Mar Div for planning further operations in connection with Operation BEACON GUIDE.

28 July 1967 CTG 79.4 and representatives to 3d Mar Div for final planning of additional operating areas for Operation BEACON GUIDE.

29 July 1967 BLT 1/3 landed by helicopter in PHU THU District, THUA THIEN Province, I CTZ, RVN.

Ref: TAB 3, Part IV.

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29-31 July 1967 Colonel E. MUELLER, Assistant CofS G-4, 9th MAB,  
aboard in connection with operational matters.

30 July 1967 Received message to conduct an immediate amphibious  
withdrawal of BLT 1/3 and proceed to vicinity CUA VIET  
River, I CTZ, RVN. Amphibious withdrawal of BLT 1/3  
completed and ARG shipping underway.

Ref: CG 3d Mar Div msg 300355Z Jul67.

30-31 July 1967 Mr. Robert STACK aboard for handshaking tour.

31 July 1967 Operation BEACON GUIDE terminated 310001H July67.

Ref: COMSEVENTHFLT msg 312154Z Jul67.

31 July 1967 ARG shipping departed vicinity CUA VIET River enroute  
DA NANG for period of upkeep and rehabilitation.

Ref: CG III MAF msg 260824Z Jul67.

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PART IV  
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS      JULY 1967

BLT 1/3 Command Chronology, July 1967 (Tab A)

*Filed*  
HMM-362 Command Chronology, 28 Jun - 31 Jul 1967 (Tab B)

SIF Alfa After Action Report, BEACON GUIDE, 21-31 Jul 1967 (Tab C)

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SPECIAL LANDING FORCE  
ALFA  
SEVENTH FLEET



TG SPECIAL LANDING FORCE ALFA 79.4

AFTER ACTION REPORT  
BEACON GUIDE

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21-31 JULY 1967

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Task Group 79.4  
Fleet Marine Force, SEVENTH Fleet  
FPO San Francisco, 96601

3/OAN/jt1  
Ser: 00215A-67  
3 August 1967

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~~SECRET~~-NOFORN - Unclassified upon removal of enclosures (1) through (5)

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Combat After Action Report, Operation BEACON GUIDE

Encl: (1) - Commander Task Group 79.4, After Action Report, BEACON GUIDE, 21-30 Jul 67  
filed (2) - HMM 362, After Action Report, BEACON GUIDE, 21-30 Jul 67  
ref (3) - BLT 1/3, After Action Report, BEACON GUIDE, 21-30 Jul 67  
(4) - Operations Overlay, PHU LOC District  
(5) - Operations Overlay, PHU TU District

1. Enclosure (1) contains the Commander Task Group 79.4's After Action Report for Operation BEACON GUIDE.

2. Enclosure (2) through (5) amplify enclosure (1).

*John A. Conway*  
JOHN A. CONWAY

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COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT, BEACON GUIDE

Map Reference: VIETNAM, AMS Series 17014, Sheets 6641 III, IV, 6541 I, II, and IV.

1. Operation BEACON GUIDE was a unilateral amphibious operation utilizing waterborne and heliborne assault forces. It was conducted in accordance with NWP-22(A).

2. The operation began in the PHU LOC District, THUA THIEN Province located in central I CTZ, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. At 210730H July a heliborne force and a waterborne force made simultaneous assault landings in LZ QUAIL and over GREEN BEACH. Operational control of the Landing Force passed to CG 3d Marine Division on 23 July. On 28 July he ordered that a heliborne assault be conducted into the PHU TU District, THUA THIEN Province. This assault began 290701H July with the landing of a blocking force in LZ HAWK. Assault forces began landing at 0810H in LZ SPARROW. An emergency amphibious withdrawal was executed on 30 July in order to lie off CUA VIET in response to a threat in the DMZ. The operation was terminated on 31 July at 0001H.

3. Task Organization

Commander Task Group 79.4

Colonel J. A. CONWAY

BLT 1/3

LtCol A. I. THOMAS

IMM 362

LtCol N. J. KAPETAN

4. Intelligence

a. Terrain

(1) General

(a) Phase One. The central portion of the area of operations is predominately flat coastal lowlands. Mountainous terrain runs perpendicular to the northwest coast and northeast tip of the area. National Route #1 crosses the entire area in an east-west axis approximately five kilometers south of the northern coast.

(b) Phase Two. The area of operations is a portion of the central low lands and delta plain, consisting of low lying, often flooded, poorly drained land.

(2) Relief

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(a) Phase One. The coastal lowlands consist of rolling plains, uplands, with local relief less than 120 meters with slopes 6-14 percent. Elevations along the ANNAMITE chain range upward from 1448 meters at BACH MA to 1528 meters at HENG CHAN. The central spine lies on an east-west axis with numerous spurs radiating toward the coast on the north. The mountains are dissected by numerous perennial and intermittent streams. Slopes are generally between 40 and 60 percent and are often up to 100 percent. Along the northwest coast the slopes are gradual, the highest elevation being 592 meters. On the northeastern tip, slopes are steep and range upwards to 300 meters.

(b) Phase Two. The area is flat. Dikes separate the rice paddies and numerous burial mounds are found throughout the area.

(3) Beach Study. Phase One. GREEN BEACH is centered at 16° 18' 48" N, 107° 59' 45" E (UTM ZD 200057). The beach is 4.5 miles long and is concave. Four miles of the beach are usable. The width of the beach is 37-183 meters at low water and 18-91 meters at high water. The gradients are: 1 on 30 to 1 on 150 from low to high water, 1 on 15 at the high water zone. The approaches are clear. The mean tidal range is 2.6 feet. Composition of the beach is loose sand. Behind the beach is a river running parallel to the beach at its eastern half. Villages lie on both sides of the river.

#### b. Enemy Situation

##### (1) Composition

(a) Phase One. Enemy ground units in the objective area were identified as the C-118 Local Force Company, one unidentified (U/I) Engineer Company and one U/I Main Force Company.

(b) Phase Two. Enemy units in the objective area were identified as: C-177 Local Force Company and the 2d and 3d Companies of the 804th Main Force Battalion.

#### c. Order of Battle

##### (1) Phase One

Unit	Location	Strength
C-118 LF Co.	ZD 142980	60
U/I Engr Co.	ZD 081990	100
U/I MF Co.	PHU LOC Dist.	100

##### (2) Phase Two

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Unit	Location	Strength
C-177 LF Co.	YD 965175	60
2d Co. 804th MF Bn.	YD 967130	Unk
3d Co. 804th MF Bn.	YD 967123	Unk

d. The above units were equipped with the following weapons: 60mm mortar, 81-82mm mortar, machine guns, automatic rifles, B-40 and B-90 anti-tank rocket launchers, recoilless rifles, and K-50 submachine guns.

e. Enemy Contact

(1) Phase One. On D-day the waterborne forces made an unopposed landing at GREEN BEACH. The heliborne forces landed at LZ QUAIL with no opposition. No enemy contact was made throughout the day. On D+1 a recon patrol engaged 15-20 VC's but withdrew and called arty and mortar fire. From D+2 to D+7 no significant enemy contact was made. Numerous weapon positions, fighting holes, billeting areas, and caves were discovered and destroyed. A small amount of equipment and explosives were found.

(2) Phase Two. On D+8 the heliborne forces landed in LZ SPARROW with no opposition. Numerous punji traps were encountered and destroyed. A small amount of sniper fire was received. On D+9, a sweep of the area uncovered spider traps. One 7.62mm carbine M1944 and several documents were found.

(3) There was no enemy opposition during the amphibious withdrawals from the beach or the HLZ's.

(4) During BEACON GUIDE there were no enemy KIA (confirmed), 3 KIA (probables), and 23 detainees, four of which were later confirmed as VC.

f. There was negative enemy anti-air opposition during both phases.

g. Weather. Partly cloudy weather and occasional showers occurred periodically in the area. The mean temperature was 84 degrees. Visibility was excellent except during periods of precipitation. Winds were prevalent from the southeast and averaged around 10 kts.

5. Mission

a. As directed by COMSEVENTHFLT 180638Z Jul67 (Initiating Directive), the mission assigned to the CATF, of which TG 79.4 was the landing force, was "When directed, conduct a search and destroy amphibious operation against VC/NVA forces in amphibious objective area in THUA THIEN Province of I CTZ or other operations as agreed upon with CG III MAF or his designated representative."

ENCLOSURE (1)

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b. As directed by CG 3d Mar Div Frag Order 44-67, "land elements of BLT 1/3 in selected LZ at L-hour on D-day. Conduct search and destroy operations in assigned AO."

#### 6. Concept of Operations

a. Operation BEACON GUIDE as directed by COMSEVENTHFLT was a unilateral amphibious operation conducted by TG 76.4/79.4. The operation was planned for an 8-10 day search and destroy period commencing with waterborne and heliborne assault landings. Initially, the inherent mobility of TG 79.4 was to be used to the maximum extent possible to ensure a rapid build up of combat power ashore, thereby gaining surprise and fire superiority by shock action. Subsequently, aggressive search and destroy operations were to be conducted within the AOA. Employment of supporting arms was an essential part of this concept. Fire support was to be provided by the artillery organic to the BLT and the naval gunfire ships USS HOWELL (DD-681) and USS WALKER (DD-517). CTG 76.4 chopped OPCON of TG 79.4 to CG III MAF who in turn, passed OPCON to CG 3d Mar Div for further employment in conjunction with operations as required. The concept of operations included the following: L-hour and H-hour were scheduled concurrently; beach and landing zones were not to be prepared by fire, although the hills to the west of the beach received preparation fires.

b. Continuation of BEACON GUIDE as directed by CG 3d Mar Div was a heliborne assault conducted by TG 79.4 into PHU TU District. The operation was planned for a 36 hour search and destroy operation. Initially the inherent mobility of heliborne assault units was to be utilized to the maximum extent possible to ensure a rapid build-up of combat power in the LZ and to gain surprise and fire superiority by shock action. Subsequently aggressive search and destroy operations were to be conducted within the TAOR. Fire support was to be provided by the artillery organic to the BLT and a naval gunfire support ship.

#### 7. Execution

a. Operation BEACON GUIDE as directed by COMSEVENTHFLT was executed in accordance with CTG 76.4 Op Order 310-67 and CTG 79.4 Op Plan 120A-67 supplemented by CTG 79.4 frag orders for operations in the amphibious objective area.

(1) D-day was established as 21 July 67 with L-hour and H-hour at 0630H. Due to non-arrival of UH-1B augmentation until after first light on D-day, L/H-hour was delayed until 0730H.

(2) TG 79.4 landed its waterborne and heliborne assault forces at 210730H July 67 and by 211500H July 67 the BLT was well established ashore

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and conducting operations as required. JLP assumed responsibility for control and coordination of supporting arms effective 211500H Jul67.

b. Operation BEACON GUIDE as directed by CG 3d Mar Div FragO 44-67 and supplemented by CPG 79.4 FragO #10 for Operation BEACON GUIDE was conducted in the newly assigned TAOR (see enclosure (5)).

(1) The blocking force was inserted by helicopter at 0701H and the lift was completed at 290725H July 1967.

(2) The BLT began landing its heliborne assault forces at 290810H July 1967 and immediately commenced operations.

8. Results. Enclosures (2) and (3).

9. Commanders Analysis. This analysis is limited to matters at TG 79.4 level. BLT and Squadron Commanders' analyses are contained in their respective reports, enclosures (2) and (3).


a. Planning. Planning for Operation BEACON GUIDE commenced on 29 June while BLT 1/3 was reembarking aboard ships of TG 76.4 following the Task Group's upkeep period at SUBIC BAY. TG 76.4 and 79.4 representatives proceeded by previous arrangement to 3d Mar Div CP for receipt of the target area. A complete briefing concerning objectives of the PHU LOC operation and intelligence concerning the area was received. TG 76.4/79.4 representatives were to return on the morning of 30 June to present plans for the conduct of the operation, scheduled to commence about 2 July. The force was diverted unexpectedly on the night of 29 June and proceeded north to conduct Operation BEAR CLAW/BUFFALO, lasting until 14 July and delaying the PHU LOC operation. TG 76.4/79.4 planners returned to the 3d Mar Div CP on 17 July and presented the plan for operations in PHU LOC District. The plan was approved with minor modifications, and with agreement by CG 3d Mar Div to provide an additional rifle company to BLT 1/3 in support of the operation. Additional liaison visits to 3d Mar Div CP on 18, 19, and 20 July paved the way for a 21 July D-day for Operation BEACON GUIDE. No significant problems were encountered in planning.

b. Intelligence. Prior to Operation BEACON GUIDE, arrangements were made with III MAF and CG 3d Mar Div for area studies and intelligence summaries. Augmentation personnel in the form of ITT, APT, interpreters, and PF's, were requested along with reward funds and pamphlets.

(1) ITT. ITT personnel were not available, however, two CIT subteams from the 1st CIT of the PHU LOC District were furnished. These personnel proved to be very helpful to the tactical situation as well as an immediate intelligence source.

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(2) APT. Four Armed Propaganda Teams were assigned; each consisted of four VN and one Marine. One team was assigned to each company and proved to be extremely valuable in pointing out VC/NVA suspects.

(3) Interpreters. Two interpreters were furnished. They assisted a CTF subteam who had an interpreter who became ill. The other was employed with the battalion S-2. The minimum requirement is to have one interpreter with each company plus one with the battalion S-2.

(4) PF's. A total of 20 PF's from the S-2 section of the PHU LOC District were employed. These were useful mainly for their knowledge of the area.

(5) Rewards Fund. A total of \$10,000 VN was procured and distributed to each company. Only \$400 VN was used. It was given to a VN boy by A/1/12 for pointing out a surprise firing device. Most people in the area appeared to be afraid of reprisals at a later date and would not divulge information or accept money.

(6) The above intelligence sources were exploited and utilized to a maximum and were found to be very useful in this type of operation where the units often found themselves working among the indigenous personnel.

c. Command Relationships. Operation BEACON GUIDE was a unilateral amphibious operation with command relationships in accordance with NWP-22(A). Responsibility for control and coordination of supporting arms was assumed by CLF effective 211500H. OPCON of TG 79.4 was passed to an "in country" commander during the operation. At 230801H July 67, CTG 76.4 passed OPCON of TG 79.4 to CG III MAF (CTG 76.4 msg 221316Z Jul67). CG III MAF simultaneously passed OPCON to CG 3d Mar Div (CG III MAF msg 230654Z Jul67). At 301200H July 67, CG 3d Mar Div passed OPCON to CG III MAF (CG 3d Mar Div msg 300355Z Jul67). At 301200H July 67, CG III MAF passed OPCON to CTG 76.4 (CG III MAF msg 300910Z Jul67) Operation BEACON GUIDE was terminated at 310001H Jul67 (CTG 76.4 msg 300752Z Jul67).

d. Supporting Arms

(1) Naval gunfire support for BEACON GUIDE was provided by the following ships:

D-day	USS HOPEWELL (DD-681)	Direct support
	USS WALLER (DD-517)	Direct support
D+1 (until completion)	USS HOPEWELL (DD-681)	Direct support
W-day (until 1200)	USS HUBBARD (DD-740)	Direct support

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W-day (1200 to completion)

USS SUMNER (DD-692)

Direct support

Naval gunfire preparation fires were delivered on the high ground to the west overlooking GREEN BEACH. It was scheduled from L/H-hour-40 minutes to L/H-hour-10 minutes. The initial salvo was observed by the TAO who adjusted it on to the target from its radial miss distance of 500 meters. Once adjusted on target it was intended to utilize corrections obtained to apply to other targets. As subsequent targets were fired, it was found necessary to adjust the initial volleys to assure that rounds were on target and not endangering the civilian populace. This procedure diminished the speed with which fires could be delivered resulting in a degradation in shock action.

Recommendation: That where NGF preparation fires are required and where care must be taken to assure that rounds do not impact in built up areas which are in proximity to the area to be prepped, additional time must be allotted in order to deliver a large volume of fires. Accordingly this increase in time must be weighed against the volume of fire required to determine if premature disclosure of landing plans will affect the overall scheme of maneuver.

(2) Close air support was provided by 1st MAW. It was both timely and effective. Comments relative to the use of CAS for the construction of landing zones in the high ground are contained in the logistics portion of this report (para 9.e.). The VMO-6 detachment of armed and unarmed UH-1E's performed their missions of helo escort, suppressive fires, TAC(A) and TAO platform in an outstanding manner.

(3) Artillery support was provided by the 105mm howitzer battery and the 4.2 inch mortar battery organic to the BLT. This was the first operation with 4.2 inch mortar battery organic to the BLT. This was the first operation with 4.2 inch mortars since W/2/12 replaced the 107mm howtar with the 4.2" mortar. No significant problems were noted in the change over of weapons.

(4) Coordination and control of supporting arms was passed to Commander Landing Force the afternoon of D-day. The facilities of SACC were utilized by CLF in coordination and control of fires. Just prior to the amphibious withdrawal, coordination and control was reassumed by Commander Amphibious Task Force. Communications were maintained with 3d Mar Div FSCC at PHU BAI. A representative of the PHU LOC District Chief was located aboard the USS OKINAWA in SACC/FSCC. The services rendered by this representative in clearing fires was invaluable. His performance was characterized by helpfulness and professionalism.

e. Logistics

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(1) Prior to the commencement of Operation BRACON GUIDE, liaison was established with the 3d Mar Div to coordinate logistic support from "in-country" sources. Force Logistic Support Group ALFA, located in PHU BAI, was designated as the primary resupply point for TG 79.4 during the operation. Classes I, III, IV, V and limited Class II (consumables only) were available on request. Additional logistic support was provided from supplies and equipment embarked aboard ARG shipping.

(2) Commencing on D+2 daily distribution of resupply from FLSG "A" was by truck direct to the BLT LSA, where distribution to units was made by helicopter and/or LVT as feasible. Prior to the establishment of an LSA which was accessible by truck convoy, resupply was made direct from supplies embarked aboard ARG shipping by helicopter and LVT.

(3) In order to provide for necessary coordination, receive resupply requests, and to draw supplies, a liaison team was established at Supply Company, FLSG "A" on D minus one. The Truck Platoon, which remained at DONG HA upon termination of the BLT's previous operation, HICKORY II, traveled to PHU BAI to transport supplies from FLSG "A" to the BLT LSA when established. So as to ensure complete coordination of the logistic support effort, communication was provided between the BLT S-4, FLSG "A" liaison representative, and TAC-LOG groups aboard all ships of the ARG. Land line communication was available between the Truck Platoon and the FLSG "A" liaison representative. In order to provide for priority resupply at other than the daily scheduled time, a staging area at the PHU BAI airstrip was used to permit helicopter delivery to the BLT LSA when required. On D+8, the AOA shifted to an area which did not lend itself to resupply by truck. By coordination with the MAG 16 (FWD) Area Coordinator the LSA was moved to the PHU BAI airstrip and all resupply was delivered direct from this LSA to BLT units by helicopter.

(4) Difficulty was encountered in resupplying three companies during the period they were operating in mountainous terrain. Helicopter landing zones were prepared by concentrated application of aerial delivered ordnance on the designated LZ's. This was followed by attempts to further improve the area by troops with axes and demolitions. The resulting LZ's were extremely confined. This, coupled with their high altitude, made delivery of supplies by organic UH-34 helicopters extremely hazardous. All payloads were required to be delivered externally and were restricted to only several hundred pounds. Because of their greater lift capability CH-46 helicopters were requested daily from 3d Mar Div for resupply to these particular LZ's and, when provided, were able to accomplish the delivery with little difficulty. However, CH-46 helicopters were not readily available and, with the exception of one day, all resupply was accomplished with the UH-34's. Had TG 79.4 been augmented with at least one CH-46 for the entire operation, resupply could have been accomplished with greater ease. It is recommended that TG 79.4 be augmented with medium lift helicopters for resupply purposes for all future operations.

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(5) Water, in 5 gallon cans, was provided from the LPH and LPD by helicopter and LVT, as required, when local water was not available.

(6) TG 79.4 casualties were evacuated to the LPH, which was designated as the casualty evacuation control ship (CECS). Only minor casualties were experienced during the operation.

(7) After interrogation at the BLT level by an augmented CIT, all VC suspects and detainees were evacuated to PHU BAI where they were turned over to the 3d Mar Div PMO for further disposition.

f. Casualty Reporting. Casualty reporting was conducted in accordance with current directives. The CRCC was located aboard the USS OKINAWA which was designated the CECS. A total of 5 WIA's and 30 non-hostile casualties were evacuated to the CECS. A BLT medical representative was positioned at Naval Support Activity Hospital, Danang and 3d Med Bn, PHU BAI to collect and pass information on BLT 1/3 casualties to the CRCC. No problems were experienced during the operation concerning handling of casualties.

g. Civic Action. Unlike previous operations, BEACON GUIDE was conducted in an area where CAC units were established and some pacification was present. Due to the low casualty rate, it was possible to conduct extensive civic action programs in the form of MED CAP. BLT 1/3 had a platoon of the 29th Civic Action assigned for this operation. Through the assistance of the OIC of the civic action unit, and the liaison established through his familiarity with the area, a very successful program was conducted. The average MED CAP team consisted of 2 doctors, 10 corpsmen, 1 dentist and a dental technician plus TG 79.4 and BLT civic action personnel. MED CAP's were setup in 3 separate villages returning to each on three different days. A total of 593 were treated by the medical personnel while the dental team treated 84 persons. One Vietnamese child was evacuated from the village of THUOC LURU to HUE Hospital for extensive treatment. The native people were warm and receptive to the MED CAP effort. HAND-CLASP was limited due to unavailability of material, however several boxes of candy and soap were left with the village chief of THUOC LURU for distribution. This MEDCAP was by far the most extensive and successful undertaken by TG 79.4.

h. ISO. ISO was limited due to the lack of contact with enemy forces and any extraordinary action. The ISO team was withdrawn on D+2.

i. Communications

(1) Radio

(a) All shipboard radio equipment functioned with a minimum of problems. It should be noted that there were no spare parts available.

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for the radio set, AN/VRC-46, installed aboard the USS OKINAWA. These parts are on order. There was a power failure of short duration, on 30 July. No auxiliary power source was provided and it was necessary to deck mount two radio sets, AN/PRC-25, for about twenty minutes.

(b) BLT 1/3 was provided the following support by TG 79.4:

- 1 Three long antennae with bases for AN/PRC-25
- 2 Eight handsets, H-138 for AN/PRC-25
- 3 One antennae, RC-292

NOTE. Items 1 and 2 were provided to assist BLT 1/3 in increasing the number of AN/PRC-25's available for their use. The radios are deadlined for lack of these parts. Item 3 was loaned to shore party as one of his RC-292 was inoperative.

(c) Adequate augmentation was provided by 9th MAB. Four radio operators, two AN/PRC-25's and two antennae, RC-292 were provided. The men and equipment were employed with liaison teams.

(d) It was noted that FM radio communications improved when the flagship positioned itself close to the shore. It is recommended that in future operations, this be made standard procedure in order to maintain firm communications between ships and units ashore.

(e) Fifteen radio frequencies and frequency designators were considered compromised by the loss of an extract from the Operation BEACON GUIDE COI by a recon patrol. The loss was reported to 3d Mar Div and new frequencies were issued.

## (2) Radio Relay

(a) One radio relay, AN/MRC-62, was provided by 3d Mar Div to assist communication to 3d Mar Div headquarters.

(b) TG 79.4 organic AN/MRC-62 was not brought ashore until 23 July 67.

(c) Ship to shore radio relay communication was unsatisfactory. Reception was interrupted constantly by shipboard radio equipment even though there was a wide separation of frequencies. Close proximity of antennae is believed to be the cause of the interference. This problem may continue since the antennae cabling between the radios and antennae are "hard wired," and cannot be patched to other antennas. It is recommended that during an "in port" period antennas be revised in order to provide the flexibility to

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separate radio relay antennas from other antennas and that a study was conducted to determine optimum antenna positioning.

10. The following comments are included on subordinate commanders' combat after action reports:

a. HMM 362 After Action Report:

(1) Paragraph 2.a of enclosure (2). It is recognized that occasionally circumstances exist that result in less than optimum utilization of helicopters. These instances, however are usually caused by a one time requirement that is not routine in nature or by overriding operational considerations. There are times when due to operational requirements a specific number of helicopters are fragged to perform a specific mission. Although this procedure should not be customary, it will be used when necessary in the judgement of the Commander. In order to restrict less than optimum helicopter utilization, those agencies with authority to frag helicopter missions (SLF S-3 and TAC-LOG) have been, and will continue to be, instructed to state only their lift requirements - not a specific number of helicopters to perform the lift. With this request procedure and a close working relationship between the Helicopter Direction Center (HDC) and the squadron, helicopter utilization should approach the optimum.

(2) Paragraph 2.d of enclosure (2). Concur with the statement of the problem and in part with the recommended solution. The situation that caused resupply problems was a direct result of the available terrain and the enemy situation. The units requiring resupply were situated on a ridgeline which was covered with dense vegetation. A small LZ was constructed which would accommodate only one helicopter at a time. The approach and take off were exceptionally hazardous due to overhanging tree branches. Attempts were made to enlarge the zone. With the restricted LZ size and small payloads (due to air density at high altitudes) the resupply was understandably slow. Because of the slowness of the move, two more helicopters were sent to assist in the resupply mission. The two additional helicopters could not contribute and resulted in one instance of poor helicopter utilization discussed in paragraph 10.a.(1) above. Such instances will occur when decisions are taken based on inadequate information. One solution to the particular resupply problem under discussion would have been use of CH-46 helicopters. The increased hovering and load carrying capability of this aircraft would have permitted faster resupply. CH-46s were used in other phases of this operation, however, they were not available during this particular period. In order to cover all eventualities, CH-46s would have to be attached for the duration of the amphibious operation. The availability of CH-46s has not permitted such assignment.

b. BLT 1/3 After Action Report

(1) Paragraph 11.a of enclosure (3). This problem area was discussed

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in paragraph 10.a(2) above.

(2) Paragraph 11.b of enclosure (3). This was a complex tactical maneuver. Orders from higher headquarters required an early landing in a different area. The BLT desired to retain the supporting arms overnight. Planning time was minimal, however each of the various alternatives were considered in the commanders estimate of the situation. Lifting the heliborne assault forces prior to withdrawal of the armored column to the beach was considered to be the most desirable course of action. The heliborne assault to accomplish the mission was the more critical of the required maneuvers and therefore the SLF's supporting arms were assigned for this assault. Furthermore, available intelligence indicated that the probability of the withdrawal force being attacked was remote. Difficulties could have arisen but support was available on short notice if needed.

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