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EN 0030767

COMMAND
SPECIAL LANDING FORCE
ALFA
SEVENTH FLEET



COMMAND
CHRONOLOGY

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS,
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

1-31 AUG 1967

Copies

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HEADQUARTERS
Task Group 79.4
Fleet Marine Force, SEVENTH Fleet
FPO San Francisco 96602

3/OAN/jtl
5750.1C
Ser: 00260a67
17 September 1967

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
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 to 31 August 1967

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8
(c) BrigO 5750.1C

Encl: (1) Commander Task Group 79.4 Command Chronology

1. Enclosure (1) is submitted in accordance with references (a), (b), and (c).


JOHN A. CONWAY

DISTRIBUTION:

Copies 1 & 2 - CG, NINTH MAB
Copy 3 - CTG 76.4
Copy 4 - CTG 79.5
Copy 5 - CO, HMN-362
Copy 6 - CO, BLT 1/3
Copies 7 & 8 - RLT (26) Rear; CO, MAG-15
Copy 9 - CO, PROVSRBN.
Copies 10 & 11 - CTG 79.4; File

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COMMANDER TASK GROUP 79.4

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 August 1967 to 31 August 1967

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SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
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ENCLOSURE (1)

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PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. Designation

Task Group 79.4

CommanderColonel J. A. CONWAY
1-31 August 1967

Subordinate Units

BLT 1/3
1-10 August 1967
28-31 August 1967LtCol A. I. THOMAS
1-31 August 1967HMM-362
1-15 August 1967
28-31 August 1967LtCol N. J. KAPETAN
1-31 August 1967

Attached Units

None.

2. Location

1-31 August 1967

USS OKINAWA (LPH-3)
USS DULUTH (LPD-6)
USS HERMITAGE (LSD-34)
USS TIOGA COUNTY (LST-1158)3. Staff Officers

Commanding Officer

Colonel J. A. CONWAY
1-31 August 1967

Executive Officer/Air Officer

LtCol R. C. MARSH
1-14 August 1967

Executive Officer

LtCol H. PRESTON
15-31 August 1967

S-1/Adjutant

2ndLt J. C. SMITH
1-31 August 1967

S-2

Captain W. N. FOWLER
1-31 August 1967

ENCLOSURE (1)

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Assistant S-2/Aerial Observer

2ndLt S. E. DURHAM
1-31 August 1967

S-3

LtCol H. PRESTON
1-31 August 1967

Assistant S-3

LtCol W. W. TAYLOR, Jr.
1-5 August 1967

Major G. F. WARREN
6-31 August 1967

Air Officer

LtCol R. C. MARSH
15-31 August 1967

Fire Support Coordinator

Major R. W. EDWARDS
1-13 August 1967

Major R. F. MOODY
14-31 August 1967

S-4

Major R. M. BROWNE
1-31 August 1967

Communications Officer

Captain F. D. KELLY
1-14 August 1967

1stLt L. M. ZWICK
15-31 August 1967

Assistant Communications Officer

1stLt L. M. ZWICK
1-14 August 1967

4. Average Monthly Strength

	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Hq, TG 79-4	11	26	0	0
BLT 1/3	61	1482	8	81
HMM 362	48	194	1	3

ENCLOSURE (1)

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PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

During the period 1-6 August 1967, Task Group 79.4 commenced and completed planning for Operation BEACON GATE. On 7 August 1967 Operation BEACON GATE commenced with the landing of BLT 1/3 units by landing craft and helicopter. Operation BEACON GATE was conducted 7-10 August 1967 in northeastern QUANG NAM Province, I CTZ, RVN. On 10 August 1967 OPCON of 79.4 was CHOPPED to CG III MAF and CG 1st Mar Div concurrently. OPCON of BLT 1/3 was further passed to Task Force XRay. Task Group 79.4 remained on ARG shipping which continued in support of Operation COCHISE ashore. On 15 August 1967 TG 79.4 was CHOPPED to CG III MAF and then to COMSEVENTHFLT, minus BLT 1/3 and HMM-362. BLT 1/3 was CHOPPED to 1st Mar Div and HMM-362 was CHOPPED to 1st MAW. On 15 August 1967 HMM-362 was debarked at KY HA, I CTZ, RVN and at 160001H August 1967 ARG shipping departed enroute to SUBIC BAY, R. P. for a period of upkeep. While at SUBIC, CTG 79.4 was requested to send planning representatives to 3rd Mar Div to begin planning future operations. From 19-21 August 1967 CTG 79.4 and representatives were enroute to RVN, attending planning conferences, and returning to SUBIC BAY, R. P. During the period 22-29 August 1967 CTG 79.4 and staff continued planning for special operations. On 27 August 1967 ARG shipping departed SUBIC BAY, R. P. enroute to CHU LAI, I CTZ, RVN. On 29 August 1967 BLT 1/3 and HMM-362 were reembarked aboard ARG shipping. From 29-31 August 1967 CTG 79.4 and staff continued to attend planning conferences and make final preparations for Operation BEACON POINT.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1 Aug 1967 CTG 79.4 and planning staff and representatives of TG 76.4 to 1st Mar Div to commence planning forthcoming SPECOPS.

2 Aug 1967 CTG 79.4 and staff to 1st Mar Div for planning SPECOPS.

2-3 Aug 1967 LtCol L. A. GUBB, Communications-Electronics Officer 9th MAB, aboard in connection with communications matters.

3 Aug 1967 CTG 79.4 and staff to III MAF and 1st Mar Div for planning upcoming SPECOPS.

3-5 Aug 1967 Capt MAYBERRY, 9th MAB aboard in connection with intelligence matters.

4 Aug 1967 CTG 79.4 staff to 1st Mar Div for planning SPECOPS.

4 Aug 1967 Received initiating directive for Operation BEACON GATE.
Ref: COMSEVENTHFLT 040714Z Aug67.

5 Aug 1967 CTG 79.4 and staff to 1st Mar Div for detailed planning of upcoming SPECOPS.

6 Aug 1967 CTG 79.4 and staff to 1st Mar Div for final planning of SPECOPS.

6 Aug 1967 Major G. F. WARREN joined the staff, assigned as Assistant S-3.

6-7 Aug 1967 Lt ANDERSON, U. S. Army (APT) aboard with Armed Propaganda Team personnel.

6-12 Aug 1967 Capt MARTINSON, U. S. Army Liaison Officer for 2nd ARVN Div aboard as Liaison Officer. Lt KNABB, U. S. Army Liaison Officer for Special Sector QUANG NAM Province located in HOI AN aboard for Operation BEACON GATE.

6-14 Aug 1967 LCDr J. R. LOMAX, 9th MAB, attached as NGF Liaison Officer.

7 Aug 1967 Operation BEACON GATE commenced with the landing of BLT 1/3 units by landing craft and helicopters into north-eastern QUANG NAM Province, I CTZ, RVN.

Ref: PART IV TAB D

ENCLOSURE (1)

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10 Aug 1967 OPGON of TG 79.4 passed to CG III MAF and on to CG 1st Mar Div concurrently. OPGON of BLT 1/3 was passed to Task Force XRay.

Ref: COMSEVENTHFLT 040714Z Aug67
CG III MAF 091442Z Aug67
CG 1st Mar Div 100555Z Aug67

12 Aug 1967 CTG 79.4 and CTG 76.4 to 1st Mar Div for luncheon and liaison visit with CG 1st Mar Div.

13 Aug 1967 BGen GLICK, CG 9th MAB, LtCol SMITH, G-3 9th MAB, LtCol RINEHART, Air Officer 9th MAB, and 1stLt KOEHLER, 9th MAB, aboard for visit with CTG 79.4.

15 Aug 1967 OPGON of TG 79.4 passed to CG III MAF and then to COMSEVENTHFLT less BLT 1/3 and HMM-362.

Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 131515Z Aug67
CG III MAF 140708Z Aug67
CTG 79.4 142254Z Aug67

15 Aug 1967 HMM-362 debarked from ARG shipping at KY HA.

16 Aug 1967 Operation BEACON GATE terminated 160001H August 1967. ARG shipping departed I CG, RVN to steam independently enroute to SUBIC BAY, R. P.

Ref: COMSEVENTHFLT 151340Z Aug67

17-27 Aug 1967 ARG shipping at SUBIC BAY, R. P. for upkeep.

19 Aug 1967 CTG 79.4 and staff with 76.4 representatives to III MAF and 3rd Mar Div for planning of forthcoming SPECOPS. Departed CUBI POINT, R. P. enroute to PHU BAI, CHU LAI, and DA NANG.

Ref: CG III MAF 170834Z Aug67

20 Aug 1967 CTG 79.4 and staff with representatives of 76.4 at 3rd Mar Div for planning of SPECOPS. Departed PHU BAI and arrived at III MAF for further planning of SPECOPS.

21 Aug 1967 CTG 79.4 and staff with representatives of 76.4 departed III MAF enroute to CUBI POINT, R. P., via CHU LAI. Arrived SUBIC BAY, R. P.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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25 Aug 1967 Received initiating directive for Operation BEACON POINT.
Ref: COMSEVENTHFLT 240328Z Aug67

27 Aug 1967 ARG shipping departed SUBIC BAY, R. P. enroute to CHU LAI,
I CTZ, RVN.

28 Aug 1967 ARG shipping enroute to CHU LAI, I CTZ, RVN.

29 Aug 1967 BLT 1/3 CHOPPED OPCON to CTG 79.4. CTG 79.4 assumed
OPCON of HMM-362.
Ref: CG 1st Mar Div 280115Z Aug67
CG III MAF 281604Z Aug67
CTG 79.4 301310Z Aug67

29 Aug 1967 CTG 79.4 and staff with representatives of 76.4 to III
MAF, for planning SPECOPS.
Ref: CTF 76 280304Z Aug67

30 Aug 1967 CTG 79.4 and staff with representatives of 76.4 to 3rd
Mar Div and further to 4th Mar for detailed and final
planning of upcoming SPECOPS.

31 Aug 1967 CTG 79.4 and representatives to 3rd Mar Div for final
planning of Operation BEACON POINT.

31 Aug 1967 LtCol B. F. MEYERS, G-3 9th MAB, aboard to visit CTG 79.4.

31 Aug 1967 Major QUANG, ARVN aboard as representative of PHONG DIEN
District Chief. Lt CAM, ARVN aboard as artillery Liaison
Officer from 1st ARVN Divison. LtJG ERNST, USN aboard as
NGF Liaison Officer from Military Advisory Group, HUE.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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PART IV

CHRONOLOGY OF SUBORDINATE COMMANDSAND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

TAB A ✓

- 1 COMSEVENTHFLT msg 040714Z Aug67
- 2 CG III MAF msg 091442Z Aug67
- 3 CG 1st Mar Div msg 100355Z Aug67
- 4 CG 1st Mar Div msg 131515Z Aug67
- 5 CG III MAF msg 140708Z Aug67
- 6 CTG 79.4 msg 142254Z Aug67
- 7 COMSEVENTHFLT msg 151340Z Aug67
- 8 CG III MAF msg 170834Z Aug67
- 9 COMSEVENTHFLT msg 240328Z Aug67
- 10 CG 1st Mar Div msg 280115Z Aug67
- 11 CG III MAF msg 281604Z Aug67
- 12 CTG 79.4 msg 301310Z Aug67
- 13 CTF 76 msg 280304Z Aug67

TAB B ✓

*filed
ref →*

Command Chronology 1-~~11 Aug 1967~~, ~~29~~-31 Aug 1967 BLT 1/3
(BLT 1/3 After Action Report for Operation Beacon Gate
is included as encl (3) to TAB D).

TAB C ✓

Command Chronology 1-~~15 Aug 1967~~, ~~29~~-31 Aug 1967 HMM 362.

TAB D ✓

CTG 79.4 After Action Report, BEACON GATE, COCHISE, 7-15 Aug 67

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET-NOFORN

00 040714Z AUG 67

TO COMSEVENTHFLT
TO CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
CTG SEVEN SIX
CTG SEVEN NINE
COMUSMACV

TO COMNAVFORM
COMNAVFORM

CTG SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE

CTG SEVEN THREE

CINCPAC

MACV PACFLT

COMPHIBPAC

CG FMFPAC

CG FMFPAC FWD

CTF ONE ONE FIVE

COM SEVENTH AIR FORCE

CTG SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE

COF SEVEN SEVEN

CG THIRD MARDIV

CG FIRST MARDIV

CG FIRST MAW

CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE

CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

TU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE

CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE

BT

SECRET

CTE 70.2.1.1 PASS ADVANCE COPY TO COMUSMACV

BEACON GATE INITIATING DIRECTIVE (U)

A. MY OPLAN 101-67

1. SITUATION. CG III MAF HAS REQUESTED THE EMPLOYMENT OF AN ARG/SLF IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE I CTZ. COMSEVENTHFLT WILL PROVIDE TG 76.4/79.4 AND SUCH OTHER FORCES AS MAY BE NECESSARY FOR THIS OPERATION. INITIATING DIRECTIVE IS FOR PLANNING PURPOSES. THE OPERATION, WHEN EXECUTED, WILL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A.

2. MISSION. WHEN DIRECTED, CATF CONDUCT A SEARCH AND DESTROY AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION AGAINST VC/NVA FORCES IN AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA IN QUANG TIN PROVINCE OF SOUTHER I CTZ OR OTHER OPERATIONS AS AGREED UPON WITH CG II MAF OR HIS DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE.

3. CTG 76.4 (COMPHIBRON FIVE) EMBARKED IN USS OKINAWA (LPH-3) DESIGNATED COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (CATF).

4. CTG 79.4 (COMMANDER SLF ALFA) EMBARKED IN USS OKINAWA DESIGNATED COMMANDER LANDING FORCE (CLF)

5. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IAW PARA 3X(2) AND (3) OF REF A.
 6. COMUSMACV WILL PROVIDE ANTI-INFILTRATION/EXFILTRATION PATROL CRAFT FOR THIS OPERATION AND WILL PROVIDE CAS AND OTHER AERIAL SUPPORT AS AGREED UPON WITH CATF IAW PARA 1B (1) OF REF A.
 7. AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA (AOA). THE AOA WILL BE PROMULGATED SEPARATELY.
 8. NICKNAME FOR THIS OPERATION WILL BE BEACON GATE WITH D-DAY 0/A 07 AUG DEPENDING ON TACTICAL SITUATION. H AND L HOURS TO BE DETERMINED BY CATF AND D-DAY CONFIRMED BY CATF. UPON DETERMINATION OF CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND WHEN ALL FORCES PREPARED, CATF REPORT TO ORIG STATE OF READINESS. FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING D-DAY, H AND L HOURS AND OTHER MATTERS RELATING TO THIS OPERATION, COMMAND OF EXECUTION WILL BE BY SEPARATE MESSAGE. UPON RECEIPT OF THIS DIRECTIVE, DESIRE DTG 76.4 PROVIDE ORIG AMPLIFYING DETAILS CONCERNING AOA EARLIEST TO COMPLETE INITIATING DIRECTIVE. SUBMIT FORMAL REQUEST FOR EXECUTION AS EARLY AS PRACTICAL TO ALLOW FOR COMMUNICATIONS DELAY. IF ORIGINATOR EXECUTE MSG NOT RECEIVED AT RECOMMENDED TIME FOR EXECUTION, ASSUME APPROVAL AND ACT ACCORDINGLY, INFORMING ALCON.
 9. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.
 - A. WHEN FIRMLY ESTABLISHED ASHORE AND WHEN MUTUALLY AGREED UPON BY CATF AND CG III MAF, REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF SLF CHOP TO CG III MAF.
 - B. UPON CHOP OF REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF SLF TO OPCON OF IN-COUNTRY COMMANDER, CATF REMAIN IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS ASHORE UNTIL TIME AND DATE MUTUALLY AGREED UPON BY CATF AND CG III MAF (APPROX DATE 16 RPT 16 AUG).
 - C. WHEN TIME AND DATE OF RELEASE FROM SUPPORTING ROLE ARE DETERMINED, CATF REQUEST TERMINATION OF OPERATION BEACON GATE IAW ANNEX B TO REF A.
 - D. UPON INITIATION OF REQUEST CITED PARA 9C, ARG ALFA PROCEED TO SUBIC BAY FOR UPKEEP.
 - E. FOR CG III MAF: IF OPERATIONALLY/TACTICALLY FEASIBLE, DESIRE EVENTUAL BACKLOAD OF SLF (MINUS) IN LATE AUG TO TAKE PLACE IN A SECURE AREA TO PRECLUDE ASSIGNMENT OF ALREADY HEAVILY COMMITTED SUPPORT FORCES.
 10. PUBLIC AFFAIR: IAW ANNEX V TO REF (A)
 11. ACTION ■ ADDRES ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT.
- GP-4
BT

00 091442Z AUG 67
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 INFO CG FIRST MARDIV
 CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 TF XRAY

BT

SECRET

SLF OPS

A. COMSEVENTHFLT 040714Z AUG 67 (S)

B. CTG 79.4 070704Z AUG 67 (S) NOTAL

C. CTG 76.4 070750Z AUG 67 (C) NOTAL

D. CG 1ST MARDIV 080843Z AUG 67 (S)

1. REF A STATES CHOP TG 79.4 TO III MAF WHEN MUTUALLY AGREED BY CATF (CTG 76.4) AND CG III MAF AND WHEN THE LANDING FORCE FIRMLY ESTABLISHED ASHORE.

2. REF B ADVISED THAT THE LANDING FORCE IS ESTABLISHED ASHORE AND REQUESTED THAT CONTROL AND COORD OF SUPPORTING ARMS BE PASSED ASHORE.

3. REF C PASSED CONTROL AND COORD OF SUPPORTING ARMS TO CLF ASHORE AS OF 0717H.

4. REF D REQUESTED TG 79.4 BE CHOPPED TO 1ST MARDIV BY CG III MAF EFFECTIVE 101200H AUG 67.

5. IN VIEW REF CITED ABOVE REQUEST TG 79.4 BE CHOPPED TO CG III MAF EFFECTIVE 101200H AUG 67.

GP-4

BT

00 100355Z AUG 67
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN
 TO CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 CG TASK FORCE XRAY
 INFO CG III MAF
 CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

BT

SECRET

SLF OPS

A. COMSEVENTH FLT 040714Z AUG 67 (S)

B. CTG 79.4 070704Z AUG 67 (S)

C. CTG 76.4 070750Z AUG 67 (C)

D. CG FIRST MARDIV 080843Z AUG 67 (S)

E. CG III MAF COC 100359Z AUG 67

F. CG FIRST MARDIV OPO 93-67 (OPN CHOCHISE)

1. REFS A, B, C, AND D PROVIDE BACKGROUND INFO. REF E CHOPPED

BLT 1/3 TO FIRST MARDIV.

2. FOR CTG 79.4 REQUESTS CHOP BLT 1/3 TO TASK FORCE XRAY

EFFECTIVE 111200H. AUG 67.

3. FOR TASK FORCE XRAY: ASSUME OPCON BLT 1/3 EFFECTIVE 101200H AGU 67

CP-4

BT

NNNN

SECRET

VV NMSS982CPHC32ZCAPA815

PP RUABJM

DE RUHMLA 1538 2251585

ZNY SSSSS

RUABJM-T-CIG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

RUABJM-T-CIG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

P 131515Z AUG 67

FM CG FIRST HARDIV EIN

TO ZEN/CG III MAF

RUABJM/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOURINFO ZEN/CG TASK FORCE XRAYRUABJM/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

BT

SECRET

SLF OPS

A. III MAF COC 130647Z AUG 67

1. REF A CHOPPED IG 79.4 TO FIRST HARDIV.

2. FOR CG III MAF: REQUEST CHOP IG 79.4 TO III MAF EFFECTIVE 150600H.

3. FOR IG 79.4: UNODIR CHOP TO CG III MAF EFFECTIVE 150600H.

GP-4

BT

(E)N3 (M)

LWO/HR

ADV F/P

NNNN

131515Z Aug 67

NNNNV NMSS 224CZCPNA 630ECPPX048

OO RUABJN

BE RUHHNF 1064 2260700

ZNY CCCCC ZOC ZFD

Q P 140700Z AUG 67

FM CG III MAF

TO RUABUL/CONSEVENTHFLT

ZEN/CG FIRST MAW

ZEN/CG FIRST NARDIV

INFO RUHHNHA/CINCPAC

RUHHNRA/CINCPACFLT

RUMSNA/ONUSMACV

RUHNSA/COMPHIBPAC

ZEN/CG FMFPAC

IN/CG FORLOGCMD

RUMFUV/CTG SEVEN SIX

ZEN/KLT ONE SLANT THREE

RUMFKE/CTE SEVE

WZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE

RUABQL/CTG SEVEN NINE

RUHHA/CG TASK FORCE XRAY

RUMFHAA/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT

RUABJN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

RUABJG/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

RI BJN/CG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

*102: 04192/16 Aug
A-25 of 0*

D ure

PAGE TWO RUHHNF 1064 C O N F I D E N T I A L

ROF USJG/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

RUMFERF/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE

RUABJN/HMM THREE SIX TWO

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

GLF ALPHA OPCON

A. CG 3RD NARDIV 131500Z AUG 67 (,7) NOTAL

1. REF A REQ CTG 79.4 BE CHOPPED TO CG III MAF EFFECTIVE 150600H AUG 67.

2. CG III MAF ASSUMES OPCON CTG 79.4 EFFECTIVE 150600H AUG 67 AND PASSES OPCON BLT 1/3 TO CG FIRST NARDIV, HMM 362 TO CG FNAV, AND CTG 79.4 LESS BLT 1/3 AND HMM 362 TO CONSEVENTHFLT ALL EFFECTIVE 150600H.

3. FOR CG FNAV: REQ YOU PROVIDE OFFLOADING INSTRUCTIONS TO HMM 352.

GP-4

BT

NNNN

102: 04192/16 Aug

A-25

VV BJN881
 PP RUABQL RUMSHA RUMHMF RUMHAF RUMHFL RUMFUV RUABQL
 DE RUABJM 097 2262254
 ZNY SSSSS

P 142254Z AUG 67
 FM CTR SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 TO RUABQL/COMSEVENTHFLT
 INFO RUMSHA/COMUSMACV
 RUMHMF/CG III MAF
 RUMHAF/CG FIRST MAF
 RUMHFL/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMFUV/CTF SEVEN SIX
 RUABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE
 ZEN/CTR SEVEN SIX PT FOUR.
 BT

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OPCON TO 79.4 (U)

A. CG III MAF 140700Z AUG 67

1. CTR 79.4 LESS BLT 1/3 AND HMM-362 REPORTS OPCON LAW REF A AS
 OF 150600H.

GP-4

BT

(M)

(F) N3

CWO/TF

142254Z AUG

NNNN

SECRET

VV NMSS 192CPHA5192CPPH832

PP RUAUBJM

DE RUMGUL 0989 2271340

ZNY SSSSS

P 151340Z AUG 67

FM CONSEVENTHFLT

TO RUAUBJM/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

RUENAAAACNO

RUHHHQA/CINCPAC

RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT

INFO RUAUBJM/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

RUAUBJB/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

RUAUBJB/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

RUMFUAA/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV

RUHHMF/CG III MAF

RUABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE

RUMFKE/CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE

RUABUZ/CTF SEVEN THREE

RUWJMS/COMPHIBPAC

RUABHT/CG FMFPAC (FWD)

RUMVHD/CTF ONE ONE FIVE

RUMSBJ/CMR 7TH AFD

PAGE TWO RUMGUL 0989 S E C R E T

RUMECR/TU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE

RUMFUE/CTF SEVEN SEVEN

RUMOCR/CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE

RUMFKH/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW

RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV

RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

RUMFUV/CTF SEVEN SIX

RUMVHD/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE

RUMOCR/TG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE

BT

S E C R E T

BEACON GATE (U)

1. FOR CTG 76.4: TERMINATE OPERATION BEACON GATE

2. FOR CNO, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT: CANCEL NICKNAME BEACON GATE 16 AUGUST.

IGP-4

BT (F) N3

PV

Adm Copy FP

151340Z AUG

SECRET

JNP DEE CSVN 004/18
 R 180750Z AUG 67
 FM CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 INFO TG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 P 170034Z AUG 67
 FM CG III MAP
 TO CONSEVENTHFLT
 CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 INFO CINCPACFLT
 COMUSMACV
 CG FMFPAC
 CTF SEVEN SIX
 CTF SEVEN NINE
 CG THIRD MARDIV
 CG FIRST MAW
 CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
 CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
 CTU SEVEN ZERO PT NINE PT NINE
 BT

SECRET

EMPLOYMENT ARG/SFP ALPHA

A. ADMIN CONSEQUENTFLT 160170Z AUG 67 (S) NOTAL

1. REF A PROPOSIS CONTINCE COMMITMENT ARG/SFP ALPHA TO SPEC OPS

-NDPR
 -NVJU
 -NRUP

TG-000000

9/8

09082/18 AUG 67

PAGE TWO RUABUSN SECRET
 UNTIL 14 SEP.

2. SUBJECT CONCURRENCE CONSEVENTHFLT, PROPOSE ARG/SFP ALPHA CONDU CT
 ANPNIS OPS (S&D) IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE COMMENCING 1 SEPT IN
 ACCORDANCE WITH PRE-ELECTION REQUEST FROM CG I CORPS.

3. REQUEST CTG 76.4/79.4 PLANNERS ARRIVE 3RD MARDIV CP FLT 20
 AUG 67. IF UNABLE ARRIVE 20 AUG ADVISE EARLIEST ARRIVAL POSSIBLE.
 GP-4

BT

(S) CO - NO - 005/A

(F) NB

005/TF

NNNN

PP 246328Z AUG 67
 FM COMSEVENTHFLT
 TO CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 CTG SEVEN SIX
 CTF SEVEN NINE
 COMUSMACV
 COMNAVFORV
 CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE
 CTF SEVEN THREE
 CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
 CG III MAF
 INFO CINCPAC
 CINCPACFLT
 COMPHIBPAC
 CG FMFPAC
 CG FMFPAC (FMD)
 CTF ONE ONE FIVE
 CMOR 7TH AIR FORCE
 CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE
 CTF SEVEN SEVEN
 CG THIRD MARDIV
 CG FIRST MARDIV
 CG FIRST MAW
 CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
 CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
 CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE
 TU SEVEN PT EIGHT PT NINE
 CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE
 BT

S E C R E T

CTE 70.2.1 PASS ADVANCED COPY TO COMUSMACV
 INITIATING DIRECTIVE (U)

A. MY OPLAN 101-67D

1. SITUATION: CG III MAF HAS REQUESTED THE EMPLOYMENT OF AN ARG/SLF IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE I CTZ. COMSEVENTHFLT WILL PROVIDE TG 76.4/79.4 AND SUCH OTHER FORCES AS MAY BE NECESSARY FOR THIS OPERATION INITIATING DIRECTIVE IS FOR PLANNING PURPOSES. THE OPERATION, WHEN EXECUTED, WILL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A.
2. MISSION: WHEN DIRECTED, CATF CONDUCT A SEARCH AND DESTROY AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION AGAINST VC/NAVA FORCES IN AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA PX THUA THIEN PROVINCE OF I CTZ OR OTHER OPERATIONS AS AGREED UPON WITH CG III MAF OR HIS DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE.
3. CTG 76.4 (COMPHIBRON FIVE) EMBARKED IN USS OKINAWA (LPH-3) DESIGNATED COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (CATF).
4. CTG 79.4 (COMMANDER SLF ALFA) EMBARKED IN USS OKINAWA DESIGNATED COMMANDER LANDING FORCE (CLF).
5. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IAW PARA 3X(2) AND (3) OF REF A.
6. COMUSMACV WILL PROVIDE ANTI-INFILTRATION/EXFILTRATION PATROL CRAFT FOR THIS OPERATION AND WILL PROVIDE CAS AND OTHER SUPPORT AS AGREED UPON WITH CATF IAW PARA 1B (1) OF REF A.

7. AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA (AOA): THE AOA FOR THIS OPERATION IS THE LAND AREA ENCOMPASSED BY THE FOLLOWING LAND MARKS AND COORDINATES: FROM YD 549524/SOUTHWESTWARD ALONG THE THUA THIEN/DOIGU GIRL PROVINCE BOUNDARY TO YD 492447/ RPT YD 492447/SOUTHWARD TO YD 607365/ RPT YD 607365/NORTHWARD TO YD 620408/ RPT YD 620408/ THENCE TO YD 650445/ RPT YD 650445/ THE SEWARD EXTENSION OF THE AOA WILL BE A 25 NM ARC CENTERED AT YD 600484/ RPT 600484/ AND TRUNCATED TO THE NORTHWARD BY LATITUDE 16-54F6 RPT 16-54F6, CONNECTED TO LAND AOA BY THE SHORELINE. AIRSPACE ABOVE THE LAND AND SEA AOA FROM 0-25000 SFT MSL COORDINATED IN APPROACHES TO HUE INTL AIRPORT WITH DASC PHU BAI. SAFE TRANSIT OF CIVIL AIRCRAFT TO BE PROVIDED BY NOTAM.

8. NICKNAME FOR THIS OPERATION WILL BE BEACON POINT WITH TENTATIVE D-DAY 0/A 01 SEPT DEPENDING ON TACTICAL SITUATION. H AND L HOURS TO BE DETERMINED BY CATF AND D-DAY CONFIRMED BY CATF. UPON DETERMINATION OF CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND WHEN ALL FORCES ARE PREPARED, CATF REPORT TO ORIG STATE OF READINESS. FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING D-DAY H AND L HOURS AND OTHER MATTERS RELATING TO THIS OPERATION. COMMAND OF EXECUTION WILL BE BY SEPARATE MESSAGE. SUBMISSION OF REQUEST FOR EXECUTION AS EARLY AS PRACTICABLE TO ALLOW FOR COMMUNICATION DELAYS. IF ORIGINATOR EXECUTE MSG NOT RECEIVED AT RECOMMENDED TIME FOR EXECUTION, ASSUME APPROVAL, AND ACT ACCORDINGLY, INFORMING ALCON.

9. SPECIAL INSTRUCTION:

A. SIF REQUESTED, WHEN FIRMLY ESTABLISHED ASHORE AND WHEN MUTUALLY AGREED BY CATF AND CG III MAF, REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF SLF CHOP TO CG III MAF.

B. UPON CHOP OF REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF SLF TO OPCON OF IN-COUNTRY COMMANDER, CATF REMAIN IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS ASHORE.

C. WITHDRAWAL IAW ANNEX B TO REF. A.

10. TERMINATION IAW ANNEX B TO REF A.

11. PUBLIC AFFAIRS IAW ANNEX V TO REF A.

12 ACTION ADDRESSEES ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT.

GP-4

BT

NNNN VTETPZCZCLC059ZCPA100VV FFD447V BFB501PHA882ZCAPB205

PP RUAUBJM

DE RUH/LA 3250 2400115

ZNY SSSSS

RUAUBJM-T-CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

-T-CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

RBKK-T-BLT ONE SLASH THREE

P 250115Z AUG 67

FM CG FIRST MARDIV

TO ZEN/JO PCI MAG

INFOZEN/CG PHAW

RUMHFL/CG FLC/FSH

ZEN/CG IF XRAY

RUAUBJM/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

RUAUBJM/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

ZEN/FIFTH MAR

RUAUBJM/BLT ONE SLASH THREE

BT

SECRET

CHOP OF BLT ONE SLASH THREE

1. BLT ONE SLASH THREE CHOPPED TO CG VII MAG LTF 201600H
AUG 67.

BP (F) 113

BT (M)

250115Z

250115Z AUG

*For: 10292/29 Aug
A-48 of*

SECRET

00 281604Z AUG 67

FM CG III MAF

TO CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

CG FMAW

INFO CG FIRST MARDIV

CTF SEVEN SIX

CTG SEVEN NINE

CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

BLT ONE SLANT THREE

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

OPCON BLT 1/3

A. CG 1ST MARDIV 280115Z AUG 67 (S) NOTAL

1. REF A PASSED OPCON BLT 1/3 TO CG III MAF EFFECTIVE 281600H.

2. CG III MAF PASSES OPCON BLT 1/3

TO CTG 79.4 EFFECTIVE 291200H AUG 67.

3. FOR CG FMAW: PASS OPCON HMM 362 TO CTG 79.4 AS MUTUALLY AGREED,
INFO THIS HQ.

GP-4

BT

VV TJM055
 PP RUMHAW RUMHAW RUABOL
 DE RUMFTJN 374 242131N
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 301312Z AUG 67
 FM CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 TO RUMHAW/CC FIRST MAJ
 INFO RUMHAW/CC III MAJ
 RUABOL/CTF SEVEN SEAL
 ZEN/CTF SEVEN SIX
 ZEN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 ZEN/RMM THREE SIX TWO

BT

SECRET

- A. CG III MAJ 201600Z AUG 67
 B. MARNEDRELCON THREE SIX TWO 291210Z AUG 67
 I. UNODIR LAW REF 3 4 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 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280304Z AUG 67

IN CTF SEVEN SIX

0 RUAUBJH/CIVQSEVEN SIX PT FOUR ✓

0 RUAUBJH/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR ✓

0 RUAUBJH/CTG SEVEN NINE

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SECRET

ARG/ULF EMPLOYMENT (U)

1. BASED ON DISCUSSIONS III MAF THRU MORNING IT APPEARS PROBABLE THAT
III MAF WILL REQUEST EMPLOYMENT ARG/SLK ALFA IN FIRST MARDIV AREA ON
1 SEP VICE THIRD MARDIV AREA.

2. DASIRE YOU ARRIVE DANANG AREA ASAP TO EXPEDITE PLANNING FOR THIS
EVENTUALITY.

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CN 0029767

COMMANDER
SPECIAL LANDING FORCE
ALFA
SEVENTH FLEET



AFTER ACTION REPORT
BEACON GATE/COCHISE

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

7-15 AUGUST 1967

Copies

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HEADQUARTERS
Task Group 79.4
Fleet Marine Force, SEVENTH Fleet
FPO San Francisco, 96601

3/OAN/jtl
Ser: 00250(A)-67
7 September 1967

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
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Combat After Action Report, Operation BEACON GATE/COCHISE

Encl: (1) Commander Task Group 79.4, After Action Report, BEACON GATE/
COCHISE
(2) HMM 362, After Action Report, BEACON GATE/COCHISE
(3) BLT 1/3, After Action Report, BEACON GATE
(4) Operations Overlay BEACON GATE

1. Enclosure (1) contains the Commander Task Group 79.4's After Action Report for Operation BEACON GATE/COCHISE.

2. Enclosures (2) through (4) amplify enclosure (1).


JOHN A. CONWAY

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COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT, BEACON GATE/COCHISE

Map Reference: VIETNAM, AMS Series L7014, Sheets 6640 I and 6640 II (BEACON GATE).
VIETNAM, AMS Series L7014, Sheets 6640 I, II, III and 6740 III (COCHISE).

1. Operation BEACON GATE was a unilateral amphibious operation utilizing waterborne assault forces and a heliborne reserve force. It was conducted in accordance with NWP-22(B). For Operation COCHISE TG 79.4, under OPCON of CG 1st Mar Div, supported BLT 1/3 from 110700H to 150600H August 1967.
2. The operation was conducted in the DUY XUYEN and THANG BINH Districts, QUANG NAM and QUANG TIN Provinces respectively which are located in southern I CTZ, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. The operation commenced on 7 August 1967 at 0638H with the landing of waterborne assault forces over BLUE BEACH. The heliborne reserve force was helilifted into LZ CROW after a beachhead had been secured and the LZ was selected. By 070935H all forces were ashore. The operation was terminated at 160001H August 1967. On 110700H August 1967, BLT 1/3 was helilifted from the BEACON GATE operating area and conducted a heliborne assault in the COCHISE operating area. TG 79.4's support of BLT 1/3 in Operation COCHISE terminated at 150600H when OPCON was passed to CG III MAF.

3. Task Organization

a. BEACON GATE

Commander Task Group 79.4	Colonel J. A. CONWAY
BLT 1/3	LtCol A. I. THOMAS
HMM 362	LtCol N. J. KAPETAN
Det, VMO-6 (UH-1E)	

b. COCHISE

Commander Task Group 79.4	Colonel J. A. CONWAY
HMM 362	LtCol N. J. KAPETAN
Det, VMO-6 (UH-1E)	

4. Intelligence

a. Terrain

- (1) General. The assigned AQA is predominately flat coastal

ENCLOSURE (1)

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lowlands, compartmented into riceland cultivation and open sandy areas. Numerous villages lie scattered throughout the area.

(2) Relief. The coastal lowlands consist of rolling plains with local relief less than 150 meters with slopes of 3% or less. Terrain configuration causes drainage to flow partly eastward but mostly to the south.

(3) Beach Study. The northern end of the beach is located at 15° 52' 40" N, 108° 24' 20" E (UTM BT 220565) and runs southeast to 15° 33' 30" N, 180° 35' 00" E (UTM BY 403220). The beach is slightly concave and is 39.7 kilometers long. All of the beach is usable. The beach is seventy to one hundred sixty meters wide at low water and thirty-five to ninety meters at high water. The offshore approach is partly obstructed by an island fourteen miles off the central part of the beach and by islands, shoals, and rocks five to ten nautical miles off the northwest portion of the beach. The beach is composed of loose white sand. Coastal Highway #1 runs northwest and southeast to within eight and one tenth miles, and three and five tenth miles from the coastline.

b. Enemy Situation

(1) Composition

(a) Ground. The units that had normally operated in the area of operations were the V25 Local Force Battalion and the V4 Main Force (Sapper) Company. It had been reported by reliable sources that the V25 Battalion was being trained by the V4 Company in sapper tactics. Strength of these two units numbered approximately 400 men. Elements of the Q12 Local Force and K51 Local Force Companies occasionally operated in the same area. Although not confirmed, there were strong indications that the 72nd Local Force Battalion had moved into the area prior to this operation.

c. Locally Available Strength

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>WEAPONS</u>
V25 LF Bn.	BT 1952	350	4 - 81mm mortars 5 - 60mm mortars 1 - 57mm recoilless rifle
V4 MF Co.	BT 1952	Unk	4 - 81mm mortars 2 - 82mm mortars
Q12 LF Co.	BT 1857	75	2 - 60mm mortars

ENCLOSURE (1)

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>WEAPONS</u>
K51 LF Co.	BT 1746	65	2 - 60mm mortars 1 - 57mm recoilless rifle 6 - machine guns

Although the exact number of weapons in each unit was unknown, the enemy was known to possess B40 and B90 anti-tank rocket launchers and also automatic and semi-automatic weapons of different calibers.

d. Enemy Contact

(1) On D-Day aerial observation spotted 20-30 enemy just east of the TRUONG GIANG River and CAS was called. The waterborne forces made an unopposed landing over BLUE BEACH. The heliborne forces also landed unopposed in LZ CROW. During the day sniper fire was received but no significant enemy contact was made. Bunkers, mines and surprise firing devices were encountered and destroyed.

(a) On D+1 sporadic sniper fire was received and bunkers and mines were discovered and destroyed. No significant enemy contact was made.

(b) On D+2 enemy activities followed the same course of action as the two previous days.

(c) On D+3 enemy sniper fire was received. Operational control of BIF 1/3 was passed to Task Force XRay.

(2) Anti-air. Helo received sporadic SAF throughout the operation. A total of three helicopters were hit, one being forced to land.

(3) Enemy Casualties. During Operation BEACON GATE the enemy suffered 16 KIA (confirmed), 4 KIA (probable), and 26 detainees.

e. Weather. The southwest monsoon continued to progress over the objective area during this period. The weather followed a somewhat daily pattern, with afternoon and late evening showers. The mean temperature was 84 degrees. The wind prevailed from the northeast and averaged about 5 kts. The visibility was around 10 miles.

5. Mission

a. BEACON GATE. As directed by COMSEVENTHFLT 040714Z Aug67, (Initiating Directive) the mission assigned to GATE was to conduct a search and destroy amphibious operation against VC/NVA forces in the AOM in I CTZ as mutually agreed upon with CG III MAF or his designated representative.

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b. COCHISE. TG 79.4 while under operational control of CG 1st Mar Div was given the mission of providing administrative and logistic support to BLT 1/3 or as otherwise directed by higher headquarters.

6. Concept of Operations

a. Operation BEACON GATE as directed by COMSEVENTHFLT was a unilateral amphibious operation conducted by TG 76.4/79.4. The operation was planned for a four day search and destroy period commencing with a waterborne assault landing followed by a reserve force to be helilifted into a suitable LZ upon being selected. Initially, the inherent mobility of TG 79.4 was to be used to the maximum extent possible in order to ensure a rapid build up of combat power ashore, thereby gaining surprise and fire superiority by shock action. Subsequently, aggressive search and destroy operations were to be conducted within the amphibious objective area. Employment of supporting arms was an essential part of this concept. Fire support was to be provided by the 4.2 mortar battery organic to the BLT and the naval gunfire ship USS PRESTON (DD-795). TG 79.4 was to be prepared to chop OPCON to CG III MAF, who, in turn was to pass OPCON to CG 1st Mar Div for further employment in conjunction with operations as required. CG 1st Mar Div was to retain OPCON of TG 79.4 and was to direct OPCON of BLT 1/3 be passed to Task Force XRay. The concept of operations provided for landing three companies over BLUE BEACH at H-hour and, when a suitable LZ was selected, helilifting the reserve force ashore. The beach was not to be prepared by fire. Fires were prearranged, on call in the event they were required.

b. For Operation COCHISE the concept of operations consisted of following:

(1) Repositioning of BLT 1/3 by helicopter from coordinates BT 235500 into the COCHISE operating area and assume blocking positions.

(2) Being prepared, on order, to execute a helilift to LZs to be determined in the vicinity of HEP DUC in order for assault forces to conduct a detailed search and destroy operation into the base area of the 2d NVA Division.

7. Execution

a. BEACON GATE

(1) Operation BEACON GATE as directed by COMSEVENTHFLT was executed in accordance with CTG 76.4 Op Order 311-67 and CTG 79.4 Op Plan 120A-67 supplemented by CTG 79.4 frag orders for operations in the amphibious objective area.

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(2) D-day was established as 7 August 1967 with H-hour at 0630H.

(3) TG 79.4 commenced landing its waterborne assault forces at 070638H August 1967 and helilifted reserve force at 070830H August 1967. By 070935H August 1967 the BLT was well established ashore and conducting S&D operations. CLF assumed responsibility for control and coordination of the supporting arms effective 071700H August 1967.

b. COCHISE

(1) On 10 August 1967 TG 79.4 was directed to conduct a helilift of BLT 1/3 into the COCHISE operating area in order for the BLT to occupy blocking positions.

(2) The tactical helilift commenced at 110630H August 1967. L-hour was established at 0700H. The tactical helilift was completed at 111027H. After the tactical helilift TG 79.4 continued to provide administrative and logistical support as required until 150600H August 1967 when CG 1st Mar Div passed OPCON TG 79.4 to CG III MAF.

8. Results. Enclosures (2) and (3).

9. Commanders' Analysis. This analysis is limited to matters on the TG 79.4 level. BLT and Squadron Commanders analyses are contained in their respective reports, enclosures (2) and (3).

a. Planning. Planning for Operation BEACON GATE began upon arrival of the ARG/SLF at DA NANG harbor on 1 August 1967 for rehabilitation of BLT equipment by Force Logistics Command. Immediate liaison was established between the SLF and 1st Mar Div. SLF and ARG representatives received a briefing from the staff 1st Mar Div and a draft operation order for Operation COCHISE on 2 August. Tentative D-day for Operation BEACON GATE was established as 7 August and 1st Mar Div requested appropriate modification of the ARG/SLF employment schedule. Planning was facilitated since the staffs of the ARG and SLF, BLT 1/3 and HMM 362 were all aboard the USS OKINAWA in DA NANG harbor with good communications and easy access to 1st Mar Div headquarters. Daily liaison visits with 1st Mar Div through 5 August permitted more detailed planning than usual. The operation plan for BEACON GATE was presented to CG 1st Mar Div and his staff by CTG 76.4 and CTG 79.4 on 5 August 1967. Planning was complicated by the fact that D-day for Operation COCHISE, which involved the SLF, was set for 11 August. The ARG and SLF staff therefore planned an amphibious assault for BEACON GATE to take place 7 August followed by a simultaneous amphibious withdrawal by helicopter and waterborne means from the AOA and a helicopterborne assault into the COCHISE operating area on 11 August.

b. Intelligence. Prior to Operation BEACON GATE, arrangements were

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made with III MAF and CG 1st Mar Div for area studies and intelligence summaries. Augmentation personnel in the form of IIT, APT, interpreters, and PF's, were requested along with rewards funds and pamphlets.

c. Command Relationships. Operation BEACON GATE was a unilateral amphibious operation with command relationships in accordance with NWP-22(B). Responsibility for control and coordination of supporting arms was assumed by CLF effective 071700H August 1967. OPCON of TG 79.4 was passed to an "in-country" commander during the operation. At 101200H August 1967, CTG 76.4 passed OPCON of TG 79.4 to CG III MAF (CTG 76.4 msg 100350Z Aug67). CG III MAF simultaneously passed OPCON of TG 79.4 to CG 1st Mar Div (CG III MAF msg 091442Z Aug67). CG 1st Mar Div directed CTG 79.4 to pass OPCON of BLT 1/3 to Task Force XRay (CG 1st Mar Div msg 100355Z Aug67). CTG 79.4 passed OPCON of BLT 1/3 to Task Force XRay effective 101200H August 1967 (CTG 79.4 msg 101214Z Aug67). At 150600H August 1967 CG 1st Mar Div passed OPCON of TG 79.4 to CG III MAF (CG 1st Mar Div msg 131515Z Aug67). CG III MAF passed OPCON of TG 79.4 (less BLT 1/3 and HMM 362) to COMSEVENTHFLT (CG III MAF msg 140708Z Aug67). Operation BEACON GATE was terminated at 160001H August 1967 (CTG 76.4 msg 150516Z Aug67).

d. Supporting Arms

(1) Naval gunfire support was provided by the USS PRESTON (DD-795) for the entire operation. NGF support was effective and timely.

(2) Artillery support was provided by the 4.2 mortar battery organic to the BLT and general support was provided by the U.S. Marine Corps General Support Group at HOI AN, QUANG NAM Province, RVN.

(3) TG 79.4 augmentation provided by the 1st MAW was a detachment of 3 UH-1E's from VMO-6 which were attached to HMM 362. The detachment of UH-1E's were all of armed configuration. Periodically one was unarmed to provide a platform for the TAO. Extensive suppressive fires were delivered by the detachment and invaluable assistance was rendered by the TAC(A) in calling in air strikes.

(4) Fire support procedures utilized were normal for operations conducted in RVN. U.S. Army advisors from QUANG NAM and QUANG TIN Provinces were located aboard the USS OKINAWA in SACC/FSCC where they could communicate with district headquarters in order to get clearance for fire missions requiring clearance under the rules of engagement.

(5) Responsibility for control and coordination of supporting arms was transferred from CATF to CLF on the afternoon of D-Day. The facilities of SACC were utilized after the transfer and the FSCC was established aboard the USS OKINAWA.

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e. Logistics

(1) Early liaison was made with the 1st Mar Div in order to establish logistic support procedures for Operation BEACON GATE. Since BEACON GATE was to immediately precede Operation COCHISE, which would also be participated in by BLT 1/3, the logistic support procedures established would support both operations. A Logistic Support Area had previously been established by Force Logistics Command at Hill 63, in the vicinity of the 5th Mar CP. This LSA was designated as the primary resupply point. By furnishing FLC with the density of weapons and vehicles to be landed, number of troops participating and a listing of Class II and IV supplies required during the operation, sufficient quantities of supplies were moved to the LSA so as to support the BLT in all classes of supply. Because it appeared that the range and depth of Class II support might be limited, selected Class II items from the BLT operating stocks were sent to the LSA for use, if required. Additional support was provided from supplies and equipment embarked aboard ARG shipping.

(2) In order to provide for necessary coordination at the LSA, a detachment from the Shore Party Platoon was positioned at Hill 63 on D-1. The functions of these personnel were to receive daily resupply requests from units of the BLT, draw required supplies from the LSA and load resupply helicopters. In order to ensure complete coordination of the logistic support effort, communications were established between the LSA and TAC LOG groups aboard all ships of the ARG. The BLT 3-4 was also located in the vicinity of the LSA.

(3) Resupply was accomplished daily by helicopter from the LSA direct to the using unit. No difficulties were encountered.

(4) TG 79.4 casualties were evacuated to the LPH, which was designated as the Casualty Evacuation Control Ship (CECS). KIA's were further evacuated to Graves Registration Section, 1st Medical Battalion, DA NANG.

(5) Civilian and VCS casualties were evacuated to the 1st Medical Battalion and/or the NSA Hospital, DA NANG.

(6) Chieu Hoi's and refugees were relocated by evacuation to the refugee center at HOI AN.

(7) After interrogation at the BLT level by attached IPT and APT personnel, detainees were evacuated to the 5th Mar POW compound located at the LSA.

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f. Casualty Reporting. Casualty reporting was conducted in accordance with current directives. The CRCC was located aboard the USS OKINAWA which was designated the CECOS. A total of 1 KIA, 26 WIA's, and 29 non-hostile casualties were evacuated to the CECOS. A BLT medical representative was positioned at Naval Support Activity Hospital, DA NANG, 1st Medical Bn, DA NANG, and 1st Hospital Co, CHU LAI to collect and pass information on BLT 1/3 casualties to the CRCC. No problems were experienced during the operation concerning handling of casualties.

g. Civic Action. A civic action team from the 29th Civil Affairs Co was assigned to BLT 1/3 during the operation.

h. ISO. Task Group 79.4 photographer and journalist were assigned to Co C, BLT 1/3 for informational service coverage.

i. Communications

(1) The following nets were established during Operation BEACON GATE/COCHISE:

Tac #1. (a) Covered (FM) voice between 1st Mar Div and TG 79.4, Div.

SPL PUR. (b) Backup (HF) voice between 1st Mar Div and TG 79.4, Div.

(c) (FM) voice between FSCC and SACC also on this net was TG 79.4 Liaison Officer, FSC net.

(d) Radio relay (voice) between 1st Mar Div and TG 79.4.
Channelization:

1 1st Mar Div COC and TG 79.4 S-3.

2 1st Mar Div CU and TG 79.4 S-3.

3 1st Mar Div DASC and TG 79.4 FSCC/SACC.

*4 1st Mar Div FSCC and TG 79.4 FSCC/SACC.

* After CHOP of BLT 1/3 to Task Force XRay strap through BLT 1/3 to TG 79.4 S-3.

(e) Secure radio teletype (RATT), 60 WPM, between 1st Mar Div and TG 79.4. III MAF was also entered in this net.

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(f) (FM) voice between BLT 1/3 S-4 and TG 79.4 (logistical support) TAC LOG.

(2) In order to eliminate some of the past problems encountered with radios interfering with one another, two AN/PRC-25 radios were deck mounted which seemed to help somewhat. However there was still considerable interference present between the radios located in SACC and those located in the comm center.

(3) An AN/PRC-25 (deck mounted and remoted to SACC) was provided to the Army Liaison officer for coordination with units in the field.

(4) Although ship power failures occurred their duration was never long enough to necessitate deck mounting radios to cover those nets using ships power.

(5) Radio relay seemed to work quite well as compared with previous operations. Operational working data was noted and improved radio relay communication is anticipated in the future.

(6) Adequate augmentation was provided by 9th MAB including four radio operators, two AN/PRC-25 radios and two RC 292 antennas. These men and their equipment were employed with liaison teams.

(7) Communication during operation BEACON GATE/COCHISE was fair to good. At times the ship passed out of range with 1st Mar Div and it was necessary to rely entirely on the HF net. At other times point to point comm was not possible and it became necessary to relay traffic through other units on the net. Several times it became necessary to change to secondary frequencies on various nets to eliminate interference.

(8) Communications security

(a) Communications security

(a) LAC PR/TBEC and KAC QX-7 codes and authentication were used for transmitting sensitive information during this operation. These codes proved to be time consuming, cumbersome, and generally unsuitable in a fast moving tactical situation.

(b) An alternative method of transmitting sensitive information would have been use of a secure circuit using the MRC-109/KY-8 secure voice capability. However the scheme of maneuver ashore did not allow employment of the MRC-109 in the objective area. It is further noted that the reliability of the KY-8 when mounted on a radio vehicle in the RVN environment has been exceptionally poor and precludes reliance on

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this secure system as a primary means of communications.

(c) A manpack secure voice capability that is suitable for employment with infantry units is sorely needed to enhance free exchange of information between the various components of the Special Landing Force. This capability would greatly enhance the ability of the CLF to command and control his subordinate units.

10. The following comments are included on subordinate commanders' combat after action reports:

a. HMM 362 After Action Report: None.

b. BLT 1/3 After Action Report:

1. Paragraph 9.a. The total indicates only 12 enemy KIA (confirmed) while 13 can be counted in the chronological sequence of events. CTG 79.4 reported a total of 16 enemy KIA (confirmed), 3 of which were results of armed UH-1B actions, of which the BLT was not aware. It is concluded that the BLT total should have been recorded as 13 KIA (confirmed), which when added to the 3 from UH-1B actions agrees with the TG 79.4 total of 16.

2. Paragraph 9.d. The BLT totals are in disagreement with those reported by TG 79.4. This is understandable when it is realized that TG 79.4 reported both WIA(B) and WIA(NE) whereas the BLT reported only WIA(E) in its total. It is concluded that the TG 79.4 total of 16 USMC WIA is correct.

3. Paragraph 5.b. Last sentence should read "Helicopter MED EVAC missions were fragged directly through the TG 76.4 SACC (TACP net)." All other missions were fragged using the TAC LOG net which is the standard procedure.

4. Paragraph 11 of enclosure (3). Concur.

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● 00346-67

COMMANDER
SPECIAL LANDING FORCE
ALFA
SEVENTH FLEET



COMMAND
CHRONOLOGY

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
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1-30 SEP 1967

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HEADQUARTERS
Task Group 79.4
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3/GFW/jrs
5750.1C
Ser: 003A289-67
16 October 1967

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
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade
Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 to 30 September 1967

#0013406

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8
(c) BrigO 5750.1C

Encl: (1) Commander Task Group 79.4 Command Chronology

1. Enclosure (1) is submitted in accordance with references (a), (b), and (c).


JOHN A. CONWAY

DISTRIBUTION:

CG 9th MAB	1-2
CG 1st Mar Div	3
CG 3d Mar Div	4
CG 1st MAW	5
CTG 76.4	6
CTG 79.4	7
RLT-26 Rear	8
MAG-15	9
BLT 1/3	10
HMM-163	11
Prov Serv Bn	12
S&C File	13-15

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COMMANDER TASK GROUP 79.4

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 September 1967 to 30 September 1967

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- PART II - NARRATIVE SUMMARY
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SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
- PART IV - SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

ENCLOSURE (1)

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PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. Designation

Commander

Task Group 79.4

Colonel J. A. CONWAY
1-30 September 1967

Subordinate Units

BLT 1/3
1-30 September 1967

LtCol A. I. THOMAS
1-30 September 1967

HMM-362
1-7 September 1967

LtCol N. J. KAPETAN
1-7 September 1967

HMM-163
8-30 September 1967

LtCol W. C. KELLY
8-22 September 1967
Major F. A. RUECKEL
Acting CO 23-30 September 1967

Attached Units

None.

2. Location

1-30 September 1967

USS OKINAWA (LPH-3)
USS DULUTH (LPD-6)
USS HERMITAGE (LSD-34)
USS TIOGA COUNTY (LST-1158)
USS BELLE GROVE (LSD-2)
USS WINSTON (AKA-94)

3. Staff Officers

Executive Officer

LtCol H. PRESTON
1-30 September 1967

S-1/Adjutant

1stLt J. C. SMITH
1-30 September 1967

S-2

Captain W. N. FOWLER
1-30 September 1967

Asst S-2/Aerial Observer

2ndLt S. E. DURHAM
1-30 September 1967

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S-3	LtCol H. PRESTON 1-30 September 1967
Asst S-3	Major G. F. WARREN 1-30 September 1967
Air Officer	Major T. E. FISH 5-30 September 1967
Asst Air Officer	Major G. E. BAILEY 5-30 September 1967
Fire Support Coordinator	Major R. F. MOODY 1-30 September 1967
S-4	Major R. M. BROWNE 1-30 September 1967
Asst S-4	Captain P. J. SAMUELS 21-30 September 1967
Communications Officer	1stLt L. M. ZWICK 1-30 September 1967
Awtg Assignment as ExecO	LtCol P. H. SIMPSON 28-30 September 1967
Awtg Assignment as S-3 Officer	LtCol J. ERWIN 29-30 September 1967

4. Average Monthly Strength

	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Hq, TG 79.4	11	25	0	0
BLF 1/3	61	1505	8	88
HMM-362	44	186	1	3
HMM-163	43	181	1	3

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PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

On 1 September Operation BEACON POINT commenced with the landing of BLT 1/3 units by landing craft and helicopters. Operation BEACON POINT was conducted 1-10 September in the THU THIEN Province which is located in Northern I CTZ, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. Responsibility for control and coordination of supporting arms was assumed by CLF, effective 011800H September 1967. On 1 September OPCON of TG 79.4 was chopped to CG III MAF who simultaneously passed it on to CG 3rd Mar Div. OPCON of BLT 1/3 was passed to CG 4th Marines on 3 September. OPCON of HMM-362 was chopped to CG III MAF on 4 September. On 7 September CTG 79.4 assumed OPCON of HMM-362 and finally passed it to CG 1st MAF on 8 September, when HMM-163 replaced HMM-362 by normal intratheater rotation. OPCON of BLT 1/3 was returned to CTG 79.4 on 9 September. Finally OPCON of TG 79.4 was chopped to CG III MAF and to CTG 76.4 concurrently on 10 September. COMSEVENTH Fleet terminated Operation BEACON POINT on 10 September. During the period 11-13 September, CTG 79.4 made three liaison visits to III MAF concerning the readiness posture of SLF ALFA. On 14 and 15 September, TG 79.4 commenced and completed planning for Operation BALLISTIC CHARGE. On 16 September Operation BALLISTIC CHARGE commenced when BLT 1/3 units were landed by landing craft and helicopters in QUANG NAM Province which is located in Southern I CTZ, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. Inclusive dates of Operation BALLISTIC CHARGE/SHELBYVILLE were 16-29 September. Responsibility for control and coordination of supporting arms was not assumed by the CLF. OPCON of TG 79.4 was not passed to an "in country" commander during this operation, however, OPCON of elements of SLF ALFA (BLT 1/3 Fwd) and HMM-163 was passed to "in country" commanders during the SHELBYVILLE portion of the operation. On 22 September OPCON of elements of SLF ALFA (BLT 1/3 Fwd) was chopped to CG III MAF who simultaneously passed OPCON to the CG First Mar Div. On 23 September CTG 79.4 passed OPCON of HMM-163 to CG III MAF who in turn, passed OPCON to CG First MAF concurrently. On 28 September OPCON of BLT 1/3 and HMM-163 was returned to CTG 79.4 and Operation BALLISTIC CHARGE was terminated on 29 September 1967.

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PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

- 1 Sep 1967 CTG 79.4 and party to 3d Mar Div and DONG HA for liaison visit and planning purposes as directed by CG III MAF. Capt J. R. WINGERT, Legal Officer, 9th MAB departed. LtCol B. F. MEYERS, G-3, 9th MAB departed.
- Operation BEACON POINT commenced with the landing of BLT 1/3 units by landing craft and helicopter into THUA THIEN Province which is located in Northern I CTZ, RVN.
- Ref: PART IV TAB E
- OPCON of TG 79.4 passed to CG III MAF and on to CG 3d Mar Div concurrently.
- Ref: CTG 76.4 010952Z Sep67
CG III MAF 010456Z Sep67
- 2 Sep 1967 CTG 79.4 to 4th Marines for liaison visit. CTG 79.5 aboard for liaison visit on helicopter support.
- 3 Sep 1967 CTG 79.4 to 4th Marines for liaison visit.
- CTG 79.4 passed OPCON of BLT 1/3 to CO 4th Marines.
- Ref: CG 3d Mar Div 021430Z Sep67
CTG 79.4 030300Z Sep67
- 4 Sep 1967 LtCol H. PRESTON, S-3, TG 79.4 and Major FLAGNAGAN, Executive Officer, HMM-362 to 3d Mar Div for liaison conference on helicopter utilization.
- CTG 79.4 passed OPCON of HMM-362 to CG III MAF.
- Ref: CTG 79.4 040850Z Sep67
- 5 Sep 1967 CTG 79.4 to 3d Mar Div for liaison visit. Major QUANG, ARVN, representative of PHONG DIEN District Chief, Lt CAN, ARVN, Artillery Liaison Officer and Lt(jg) ERNST, USN, NGF Liaison Officer, Military Advisory Group, HUE departed.
- LtCol H. PRESTON, S-3, TG 79.4 to III MAF for planning of squadron rotation.

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7 Sep 1967

Colonel W. A. BUTCHER, G-4, 9th MAB was aboard for a 1 day liaison visit. LtCol T. W. BURKE and Major L. C. WITT, G-3 representatives, 9th MAB aboard for liaison visit.

CTG 79.4 assumed OPCON of HMM-362.

Ref: CTG 79.4 080340Z Sep67

8 Sep 1967

LtCol T. W. BURKE, Assistant G-3, 9th MAB departed.

CTG 79.4 chopped OPCON HMM-362 to CG 1st MAW.

Ref: CTG 79.4 080340Z Sep67

CTG 79.4 assumed OPCON of HMM-163.

Ref: CTG 79.4 081420Z Sep67

9 Sep 1967

Major L. C. WITT, G-3 representative, 9th MAB departed.
Capt H. S. JOLLEY, G-2 representative, 9th MAB aboard for liaison visit.

OPCON of BLT 1/3 was returned to CTG 79.4.

REF: CG 3d Mar Div 091329Z Sep67

10 Sep 1967

Capt H. S. JOLLEY, G-2 representative, 9th MAB departed.

COMSEVENTHFLT terminated Operation BEACON POINT.

Ref: COMSEVENTHFLT 100542Z Sep67

11 Sep 1967

CTG 79.4 and staff with representatives of TG 76.4 to III MAF for liaison visit concerning readiness posture.

Received initiating directive for Operation BALLISTIC CHARGE.

Ref: COMSEVENTHFLT 111036Z Sep67

12 Sep 1967

CTG 79.4 and staff with representatives of TG 76.4 to 3d Mar Div for liaison visit concerning readiness posture.

13 Sep 1967

CTG 79.4 and LtCol H. PRESTON, S-3, TG 79.4 to III MAF for liaison visit concerning readiness posture. Capt J. E. DICKENS, G-3 representative, 9th MAB aboard for liaison visit.

14 Sep 1967

CTG 79.4 and staff with representatives of TG 76.4 to 1st Mar Div for planning conference in connection with

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Operation BALLISTIC CHARGE. Capt C. L. DAUGHERTY, CO Hq Co, 9th MAB aboard for liaison visit.

15 Sep 1967

BGen GLICK, CTF 79, Commander L. J. McDONALD, Chaplain, 9th MAB, Major W. M. OLIVER, CO, ProvServBn, Capt W. R. SMITH, G-4 representative, 9th MAB, and 1stLt KOHLER, Aide, CTF 79 arrived for and departed from liaison visit. Capt C. L. DAUGHERTY, CO, Hq Co, 9th MAB departed. CTG 79.4 and party to 1st Mar Div on planning visit for Operation BALLISTIC CHARGE. Lt J. D. KNABB, USA, aboard as Liaison Officer, QUANG DA Special Sector.

16 Sep 1967

Lt TRAN KHANH, ARVN, Liaison Officer QUANG DA Special Sector aboard.

Operation BALLISTIC CHARGE commenced with the landing of BLT 1/3 units by landing craft and helos into QUANG NAM Province which is located in Southern I CTZ, RVN.

Ref: PART IV TAB F

18 Sep 1967

CTG 79.4 and LtCol H. PRESTON, S-3, TG 79.4 to 1st Mar Div and III MAF for liaison and planning visit. Capt T. H. AIKENS aboard as Liaison Officer from 9th MAB.

19 Sep 1967

1stLt H. A. RENTZ, 9th MAB courier arrived and departed. Colonel HINH and LtCol JENKINS, QUANG DA Special Sector, arrived and departed, for liaison visit. LtCol H. PRESTON, S-3, TG 79.4 to 1st Mar Div for planning conference. Capt J. E. DICKINS, G-3 representative, 9th MAB departed.

20 Sep 1967

CTG 79.4 to III MAF for liaison visit.

21 Sep 1967

LtCol H. PRESTON, S-3, TG 79.4 to 1st Mar Div for planning conference Operation SHELBYVILLE. CTG 79.4 and LtCol H. PRESTON, S-3, TG 79.4 to III MAF for liaison visit concerning Operation SHELBYVILLE.

22 Sep 1967

Colonel J. A. ETHERIDGE, prospective CofS, 9th MAB, arrived and departed, for liaison visit. Capt P. J. SAMUELS aboard as relief for Major R. M. BROWNE, III, S-4, TG 79.4. 1stLt R. J. MARIZ, 9th MAB courier, arrived and departed. Lt J. D. KNABB, USA, QUANG DA Special Sector, Lt TRAN KHANH, ARVN Liaison Officer, QUANG DA Special Sector departed.

BLT 1/3 conducted a heliborne withdrawal from BALLISTIC CHARGE AOA and a heliborne assault into the SHELBYVILLE operating area.

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET-NOFORN

SECRET-NOFORN

OPCON of elements of SLF ALFA (BLT 1/3 Fwd) was passed to CG III MAF and on to CO 1st Marines.

Ref: CTG 76.4 210556Z Sep67
CG III MAF 211214Z Sep67

23 Sep 1967

OPCON of HMM-163 was passed to CG III MAF and on to CG 1st MAW.

Ref: CTG 76.4 210556Z Sep67
CG III MAF 211214Z Sep67

24 Sep 1967

OTG 79.4 to III MAF for liaison visit.

25 Sep 1967

CTG 79.4 to III MAF and 1st Mar Div for liaison visit.
LtCol R. M. STEWART, CEO, 9th MAB, arrived and departed, for liaison visit.

26 Sep 1967

OTG 79.4 to III MAF for liaison visit.

27 Sep 1967

OTG 79.4 to III MAF for liaison visit.

28 Sep 1967

LtCol H. PRESTON, S-3, TG 79.4 to III MAF for liaison visit. LtCol F. H. SIMPSON reported aboard for duty with TG 79.4.

OPCON of BLT 1/3 and HMM-163 passed to CTG 79.4.

Ref: CG III MAF 271340Z Sep67
CG III MAF 281526Z Sep67

29 Sep 1967

LtCol J. ERWIN, reported aboard for duty with TG 79.4.
Major W. L. LANG, Ordnance Officer, 9th MAB, Major J. P. CANTON, G-4 representative, 9th MAB and Capt C. WIEDEN, Jr., Adjutant, 9th MAB aboard for liaison visit.

COMSEVENTHFLT terminated Operation BALLISTIC CHARGE.

Ref: COMSEVENTHFLT 290006Z Sep67

30 Sep 1967

OTG 79.4, LtCol H. PRESTON, S-3, TG 79.4, LtCol J. ERWIN, 1stLt L. M. ZWICK and Cmdr FOSTER, TG 76.4 to 3d Mar Div for liaison visit. Capt C. WIEDEN, Jr., Adjutant, 9th MAB departed. Capt F. M. MORGAN, USN, Medical Officer, 9th MAB, Lt FURLIT, MC, USN aboard for liaison visit. Capt J. L. KERSHNER, ISO, 9th MAB aboard for liaison visit.

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET-NOFORN

SECRET-NOFORN

PART IV

CHRONOLOGY OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

TAB A

- 1 CTG 76.4 010952Z Sep67
- 2 CG III MAF 010456Z Sep67
- 3 CG 3d Mar Div 021430Z Sep67
- 4 CTG 79.4 030300Z Sep67
- 5 CTG 79.4 040850Z Sep67
- 6 CTG 79.4 080340Z Sep67
- 7 CTG 79.4 081420Z Sep67
- 8 CG 3d Mar Div 091329Z Sep67
- 9 COMSEVENTHFLT 100542Z Sep67
- 10 COMSEVENTHFLT 111036Z Sep67
- 11 CTG 76.4 210556Z Sep67
- 12 CG III MAF 211214Z Sep67
- 13 CG III MAF 271340Z Sep67
- 14 CG III MAF 281526Z Sep67
- 15 COMSEVENTHFLT 290006Z Sep67

TAB B ✓

Command Chronology, Sep 67

BLT 1/3

TAB C ✓

Command Chronology, 1-4 Sep 67

HMM-362

TAB D ✓

Command Chronology, 8-30 Sep 67

HMM-163

TAB E ✓

CTG 79.4 After Action Report, BEACON POINT, 1-10 Sep 67

TAB F ✓

CTG 79.4 After Action Report, BALLISTIC CHARGE, 16-29 Sep 67

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET-NOFORN

00 010952Z SEP 67
FM CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
TO CG III MAF

INFO CG THIRD MARDIV
CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

CTF SEVEN SIX
CTF SEVEN NINE
COMSEVENTHFLT

BT

S E C R E T

BEACON POINT CHOP (U)

A. COMSEVENTHFLT 240828Z AUG 67

B. CG III MAF 010456Z SEP 67

1. AS PROVIDED FOR BY REF A AND PROPOSED BY REF B, CATE AGREES TO
PROPOSED TIME OF 011800H SEP CHOP (CHANGED OF OPCON) OF REQUIRED
ELEMENTS OF SLF ALFA TO CG III MAF.

2. UPON CHOP OF REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF SLF ALFA TO CG III MAF, ABC ALFA
WILL REMAIN IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS ABHORE.

GP-4

BT

00 010456Z SEP 67
 FM CG III MAF
 TO CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 INFO COMUSMACV
 COMSEVENTHFLT
 CG THIRD MARDIV
 CG FIRST MAW

CG FLC

CTF SEVEN SIX

CTF SEVEN NINE

CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

BT
 S E C R E T

OPCON SLF ALPHA

A. COC THIRD MARDIV 010205Z SEPT 67 (S) NOTAL

1. REF A REPORTS RELIABLE INTELLIGENCE INDICATES POSSIBLE ENEMY
 ATTACK GIO LINH/CON THIEN AREA WITHIN 24 HRS.

2. IF THREAT MATERIALIZES IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY RESERVE FORCE
 WITH HELO LIFT CAPABILITY FOR REINFORCEMENT FWD OUTPOSTS CRITICAL
 THEREFORE REQUEST OPCON SLF ALPHA BE PASSED TO CG III MAF EFF

011800H.

3. IF APPD, CG III MAF PSSES OPCON SLF ALPHA TO CG 3RD MARDIV
 SAME TIME.

GP-4

BT

a-12

DECLASSIFIED

O 021430Z SEP 67

FM: CG THIRD MANDIV

TO: RUMFTJM/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

ZEN/FOURTH MAR

INFO RUMHNF/CG III MAF

RUMFTJG/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

RUMFTFH/BLT ONE SLANT THREE

BT

S E C R E T

OPCON 1/3

1. FOR CTG UGMC CHOP 1/3 TO FOURTH MARINES EFFECTIVE 030000H SEP 67.
2. FOR FOURTH MARINES. NOTIFY THIS HQ WHEN OPCON ASSUMED.
3. ARG/SLT MAR REMAINS IN SUPPORT OF BLT 1/3.

GP24

BT

DECLASSIFIED

O P 020300Z SEP 67
FM CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
TO CO FOURTH MARINES

INFO CG III MAF

CG THIRD MARDIV

CTF SEVEN NINE

CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

BLT ONE SLANT THREE

BT
SECRET

OPCON BLT 1/3

A. CG THIRD MARDIV 021430Z SEP 67

1. OPCON BLT 1/3 PASSED TO FOURTH MARINES AS OF 030800H SEP 67.

GP-4

BT

a-4

00 040850Z SEP 67

FM CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

TO CG III MAF

HMM THREE SIX TWO

INFO CG FIRST MAW

CG THIRD MARDIV

CTF SEVEN NINE

CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

CTF SEVEN SIX

BT

S E C R E T

A. CG III MAF 031542Z SEP 67

B. CG THIRD MARDIV 040259Z SEP 67 (NOTAL)

1. IAW REF A AND B OPCON HMM 362 PASSED EFFECTIVE 041800H SEP 67

GP-4

BT

a-15

VV TJM030
 OO RUMHAW
 DE RUMFTJM 050 2540710
 ZNY SSSSS
 BT
 S E C R E T SVC
 ZUI RUMPAW 026S 2531631
 ZDK RUMFTJM 026 2510340/080340Z
 DE RUMFTJM 026 2510340
 ZNY SSSSS
 O P 080340Z SEP 67
 FM CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 TO RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW
 INFO RUMHMF/CG III MAF
 RUABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE
 RUAUDB/MAG ONE FIVE
 RUMHVP/HMM THREE SIX TWO
 RUMHAW/MAG ONE SIX
 BT

S E C R E T
 CG III MAF 061438Z SEP 67
 B. CTG 79.4 062100Z SEP 67
 C. CG FIRST MAW 070925Z SEP 67
 HMM 362 ROTATION

1. IAW REF A, B, AND C CTG 79.4 ASSUMES OPCON HMM 362 AS OF 072200H.
2. UNODIR CTG 79.4 PASSES OPCON HMM 362 TO CG FIRST MAW AS OF 080700H.

GP-4

BT

NNNN

VAD
 NILB
 3547KCS
 07502/11 SEP 67

TJM116
 RUMHAW
 RUMFTJM 093 1511421
 SSSSS
 081420Z SEP 67
 CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 UABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE
 RUHMFMA/CG FMFFAC
 UABQL/CG FMAPAC (FMD)
 UHGUL/COMSEVENTHFI
 LAUDA/COMFAIRWESTAC
 UHMF/CG III MAF
 UHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 UHAW/CG FIRST MAW
 LAUDB/MAG ONE FIVE
 UHAW/MAG ONE SIX
 EN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 EN/HMM ONE SIX THREE

NCB
 3547
 MILB
 JO
 22242/850

E C R E T

• HMM 163 021334Z SEP 67
 • UNODIR CTG 79.4 ASSUMES OPCON OF HMM 163 AS OF 081159Z SEP 67.

P-4

A/T C RUMF 531K
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a-7

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GZCZC794

VDY

00 RUMFTJM

DE PUMHVP 2269D 2521329

EN: SSSSS

091329Z SEP 67

CG THIRD MARDIV

RUMFTJMI, :5& 3:3, ,8,3 05 1974 CTG 79.4

INFO ZEN/FOURTH MAR

EN/TWELFTH MAR

RUMFTJM/BLT ONE SLANT THREE ✓

SECRET

OPCON

BLT ONS SLANT THREE CHOPPED OPCON FROM FOURTH MARINES TO CTG
EVEN NINE PT FOUR AT 391523H SEPT 67

P-4

(M)

ewc/TF

091329Z

a-*8

DECLASSIFIED

P 130542Z SEP 67 ZFD
 FM COMSEVENTHFLT
 TO RUMFCR/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 RUENAAA/CNO
 RUMHQA/CINCPAC
 RUOPBRA/CINCPACFLT
 INFO RUMFCR/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 RUMFCR/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
 RUMHRR/CTF SEVEN SIX
 RUMHMA/COMUSMACV
 RUMHBB/COMNAFORV
 RUMHMF/CG III MAF
 RUMHKE/CTECS SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE
 RUMFCR/CTF SEVEN THREE
 RUMJNSA/COMPHIBPAC
 RUMHMA/CG FMFPAC
 RUABOL/CG FMFPAC (FVNL)
 RUMHVD/CTF ONE ONE FIVE
 RUMHBJ/CDR 7TH AIR FORCE
 RUMHRR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE

TDR 18428/10
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PAGE 1
 47 47) ; 641 SECRETIN
 RUMFC

DIRE

/CTF SEVEN SEVEN
 RUMHMH/CG THIRD MARDIV
 UMHLA/CG FIRST MARAGV
 RUMHAM/CG FIRST MAW
 RUMFCR/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
 RUMFCR/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
 RUMFCR/CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE
 RUMFCR/TU SEVEN ZE
 OIPT EIGHT PT NINE
 RUABOL/CTF SEVEN NINE
 BT

SECRET

CTE 78.2.1.1 PASS ADVANCED CO
 PY TO COMUSMACV

OPERATION BEACON IMINT (U)

1. FOR CTG 76.:

TERMINATE OPERATION BEACON POINT.

2. FOR CNO, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT: CANCEL NICKNAME BEACON POINT 10 SEP 1967.

GP-4

BT

1005420

a-9

125
 DE RUMSUL 2733 214100
 ZNY SSSSS

111336Z SEP 67

FM COMSEVENTHFLT

TO RUMFTJN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOURX

RUMFCR/SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

RUABULV/CTF SEVEN SIX

RUABOL/CTF SEVEN NINE

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV

RUMAXE/CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE FIANNE

RUMF07/CTF SEVEN THREE

RUMF08A/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT

RUMF08B/CG III MAZ

INFO RUMH12A/CIW SPAC

RUMH08A/CIWOPACFLT

RUMH08A/COMF12 PAC

RUMH08A/CG FV PAC

RUAB08/CG FV PAC (FV)

RUMVHD/CT ONE ONE FIE PT ONE

RUMF08B/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE

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CTE 70.27.1 PASS ADVANCED COPY TO COMUSMACV

BALLISTIC CHARGE INITIATING DIRECTIVE (U)

A. MY OPLAN 131-67

1. SITUATION. CG III MAZ HAS REQUESTED THE EMPLOYMENT OF AN ARGZBLF IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE I CTZ. COMSEVENTHFLT WILL PROVIDE TG 76.4/79.4 AND SUCH OTHER FORCES AS MAY BE NECESSARY FOR THIS OPERATION. INITIATING DIRECTIVE IS FOR PLANNING PURPOSES. THE OPERATION, WHEN EXECUTED, WILL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A.

2. MISSION. WHEN DIRECTED, CATF CONDILT A SEARCH AND DESTROY

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION AGAINST VICTIM FORCES IN AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA IN 1 CTZ OR OTHER OPERATIONS AS AGREED UPON WITH CG III MAF OR HIS DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE.

3. CTG 76.4 (COMPHRON FIVE) EMBARKED IN USS OKINAWA (LPH 3) DESIGNATED COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (CATF).

4. CTG 79.4 (COMMANDER CLF ALFA) EMBARKED IN USS OKINAWA DESIGNATED COMMANDER LANDING FORCE (CLF).

5. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IAW PARA 3X(2) AND (3) OF REF A.

6. COMUSMACV WILL PROVIDE ANTI-INFILTRATION/EXFILTRATION PATROL CRAFT FOR 1 US OPERATION AND WILL PROVIDE CAS AND OTHER SUPPORT AS AGREED UPON WITH CATF IAW PARA 1X(1) OF REF A.

7. AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA (AOA). THE AOA WILL BE PROMULGATED SEPARATELY.

8. NICKNAME FOR THIS OPERATION WILL BE BALLISTIC CHARGE WITH D-DAY ON CALL CG III MAF OR HIS DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE DEPENDING ON TACTICAL SITUATION. H AND L HOURS TO BE DETERMINED BY CATF AND D-DAY CONFIRMED BY CATF. UPON DETERMINATION OF CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND WHEN ALL FORCES ARE PREPARED, CATF REPORT TO ORIG STATE OF READINESS. FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING D-DAY, H AND L HOURS, AND OTHER

PAGE FOUR BURGUL 210215Z FEB 67

COMMITTEE RELATING TO THIS OPERATION. COMMAND OF EXECUTION WILL BE BY SEPARATE MESSAGE. SUBMIT FORMAL REQUEST FOR EXECUTION AS EARLY AS PRACTICABLE TO ALLOW FOR COMMUNICATIONS DELAYS. IF ORIGINAL EXECUTE MSG NOT RECEIVED AT RECOMMENDED TIME FOR EXECUTION, ASSUME AT GOAL, AND ACT ACCORDINGLY, INFORMING ALCON.

9. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

A. WHEN FIRMLY ESTABLISHED ASHORE AND WHEN MUTUALLY AGREED BY CATF AND CG III MAF, REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF SLF CHOP TO CG III MAF.

B. UPON CHOP OF REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF SLF TO OPCON OF IN-COUNTRY COMMANDER, CATF REMAIN IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS ASHORE.

C. WITHDRAWAL IAW ANNEX B TO REF A.

10. TERMINATION IAW ANNEX B TO REF A.

11. PUBLIC AFFAIRS IAW ANNEX V TO REF A.

12. ACTION ADDRESSES ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT.

GP-4

BT

(F) N3

(M)

000011F

111036Z Sep

VV UAM677
 PP RUMHVP
 DE RUMEUAM 036 2640556
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 210556Z SEP 67
 FM CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 TO RUMHMF/CG III MAF
 INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
 RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
 RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC
 RUAUBUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 RUMFLA/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUMFKRV/CTF SEVEN SIX
 RUABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE
 RUMHFL/CG FORLOGCMD
 RUMEUAG/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
 RUMEUAG/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
 ZEN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 RUMFCR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAF

BT

S E C R E T

BALLISTIC CHARGE SPCON SLF ALFA (CTG 79.4)

PAGE TWO RUMEUAM 036 S E C R E T

A. CG III MAF 210110Z SEP 67

B. COMSEVENTHFLT 111036Z SEP 67

C. COMSEVENTHFLT 141412Z SEP 67

1. REF A REQ SELECTED ELEMENTS SLF ALFA BE CHOPPED TO CG III MAF AND REQUESTED CTG 76.4/CTG 79.4 REMAIN IN SUPPORT.

2. CONCUR CHOP AS REQUESTED; WILL CONTROL FRIENDLY AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS IN BALLISTIC CHARGE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT AOA, REF 1 J11 01 01 01.

AOA DISESTABLISHED ABT 021002Z.

3. ARG ALFA, CTG 76.4/CTG 79.4 EMBARKED WILL REMAIN IN SUPPORT OF REQUESTED REF A.

4. CTG 79.4 CONCURS.

GP-4

BT

NNNN

a-11

VV MEA 1640V HGR 100
OO RUMEUAM

DE RUMHMF 2014 2641219
ZNY SSSSS

O 211214Z SEP 67

FM CG III MAF

TO ZEN/CG FIRST MAFDIV

ZEN/CG FIRST MAW

RUMEUAM/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUHNBRA/CINCPACFLT

ZEN/CG FMFPAC

RUAUBUL/COMSEVENTHFLT

ZEN/CG THIRD MAFDIV

RUMFKRV/CTF SEVEN SIX

RUABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE

ZEN/CG FORLDCMD

RUMEUAG/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

RUMEUAG/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

RUMEUAM/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

RUMFCR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE

BT

S E C R E T

OPCON SLT ALPHA (CGS 704)

DE TWO RUMHMF 2014 S E C R E T

A. CG III MAF 210113Z SEP 67

3. CTG 76.4 210555Z SEP 67

1. REF A AND B APPLY.

2. CG III MAF ASSUMES OPCON FOLLOWING

PASSES OPCON TO CG 1ST MAFDIV SAME TIME.

1ST BN 3RD MAR

W/2/12

1ST PLT (REIN), CG 2 3RD REGON BY

2ND PLT (REIN), CG 4 3RD REGON BY

DET, 2ND PLT, CG 3, 3RD REGON

3. CG III MAF ASSUMES OPCON MM 163 EFFECTIVE 1 SEP 67 AND PASSES

TO CG FMAW SAME TIME.

GP-4

BT

(F) N3
(17)

2101/77 000 00

2112/12

a-12

VV MEA159 FFC828
 OO RUMEDAM
 ZNY CCCCC ZCZ RUMF
 VV DDKE151
 OO RUMEDAM RUMEDAG
 DE RUMHMF 2640 2701340
 ZNY CCCCC
 O P 271340Z SEP 67
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMEDAM/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 RUMEDAM/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 INFO RUMHMF/CTC VACFLT
 RUAUBUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
 ZEN/CG FMF/AC
 ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV
 ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
 RUMFKGV/CTF SEVEN SIX
 RUABSL/CTF SEVEN NINE
 ZEN/CG FORLOGCMD
 RUMEDAG/CTG SEVENTEEN SIX PT FIVE
 RUMEDAG/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
 RUMFOR/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE
 BT
 CND N F I D E N T I A L
 OPCODE BLT 1/3
 1. CG 1ST MARDIV 272117Z SEP67 (C) NOTAL

TOP/115000/155
12-90

PAGE TWO RUMHMF 2640 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 1. REF A PASSES OPCODE BLT 1/3 TO CG III MAF UPON REQUAL TIER SHA
 AREA FOR BACKLOAD O/A 281400Z SEP67.
 2. CG III MAF PASSES OPCODE BLT 1/3 TO CTG 79.4 UPON COMMERCING.B/L.
 3. CTG 76.4/79.4 NOTIFY ALCON WHEN OPCODE BLT 1/3 ASSURED.
 GP-4
 BT

(F)N3 (va)

cwo/ur

ADD 11

271340Z

a-13

VV M3413VV FFB131
 OO RUMEUAM
 ZNY CCCCC ZDG RUMF
 V DDKE338
 OO RUMEUAM RUMEUAG
 DE RUMHMF 2721 2711526
 ZNY CCCCC
 O 28125Z SEP 67
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMEUAM/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 RUMEUAM/CTF SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
 RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
 RUABUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
 ZEN/CG FMFPAC
 ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV
 ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAW
 RUMFKRV/CTF SEVEN SIX
 RUABCL/CTF SEVEN NI
 ZEN/CG FORLOGCMD
 RUMEUAG/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
 RUMEUAG/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
 RUMFCR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHTHSUFVIE
 BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 OPCON HMM 163

TOR/12302/med 18-18
 A-44
 D. PR

PAGE TWO RUMHMF 2721 C O N F I D E N T I A L

1. CG 1ST MAW 281413Z SEPT67 (NOTAL)

1. REF A PASSES OPCON HMM-163 TO CG III MAF EFFECTIVE 281802H SEPT67

2. CG III MAF PASSES OPCON TO CTG 79.4 SAME TIME

3. CTG 76.4/79.4 NOTIFY ALCON WHEN OPCON HMM 163 ASSUMED.

GP-4

BC

...TO

a-11

0 290000Z SEP 67
FM COMSEVENTHFLT
TO CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

CNO

CINCPAC

CINCPACFLT

CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

CG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT

CTF SEVEN SIX

CTF SEVEN NINE

COMUSMACV

COMNAVFOR

CG III MAF

CG THIRD MARDIV

COMPHIBPAC

CG FUSPAC

FMFPAC (FOD)

CTF ONE ONE FIVE

CMDC SEVENTH AIR FORCE

CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE

TOR 0259Z/29 SEP 67

REC # 3

PAGE TWO RUAUBUL 1700 S E C R E T

CTF SEVEN SEVEN

CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT TWO

CG FIRST MARDIV

CG FIRST MAW

CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE

TU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE

CTG SEVEN THREE

CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE

CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE

BT

S E C R E T

CTE 76.2.1.1 PASS ADVANCED COPY TO COMUSMACV OPERATION

BALLISTIC CHARGE (U)

1. FOR CTG 76.4 TERMINATE OPERATION BALLISTIC CHARGE.

2. FOR CNO, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT: CANCEL NICKNAME BALLISTIC CHARGE

29 SEP 1967.

GP-4

BT

22N3 (m)

020/02R

ADD 020/02R

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET-NOFORN

00347-67

COMMANDER
SPECIAL LANDING FORCE
ALFA
SEVENTH FLEET



AFTER ACTION REPORT
BEACON POINT

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

1-10 SEPTEMBER 1967

Copies

SECRET-NOFORN

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
Task Group 79.4
FPO San Francisco, 96602

3/GFW/jtl
Ser: 003A280-67
8 October 1967

SECRET-NOFORN - Unclassified upon removal of enclosures (1) through (4)

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, SEVENTH Fleet
Subj: Combat After Action Report, Operation BEACON POINT

Encl: (1) Commander Task Group 79.4, After Action Report, BEACON POINT, 1-10-67
(2) HMM-362, After Action Report, BEACON POINT, 1-10-67
(3) BLT 1/3, After Action Report, BEACON POINT, 1-10-67
(4) Operations Overlay BEACON POINT

1. Enclosure (1) contains the Commander Task Group 79.4's After Action Report for Operation BEACON POINT.

2. Enclosures (2) through (4) amplify enclosure (1).


JOHN A. CONWAY

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COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT, OPERATION BEACON POINT

Map reference: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014, Sheet 6442 II.

1. GENERAL

a. Operation BEACON POINT was a unilateral amphibious operation using both waterborne and heliborne assault forces. The operation was conducted in accordance with NWP-22(B).

b. The operation was conducted in the HUONG DIEN AND QUANG DIEN THIEN Districts, THUA THIEN Province, which is located in Northern I CTZ, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

c. Inclusive dates of Operation BEACON POINT were 1-10 September 1967. Operational control of Task Group 79.4 was passed to an "in country" commander during the operation.

(1) At 010700H September 1967 a heliborne assault force landed in LZ SPARROW and a waterborne assault force made a simultaneous landing over GREEN BEACH.

(2) BLT 1/3 participated in Operation FREMONT commencing at 060600H September 1967.

(3) The Commander Amphibious Task Group 76.4 reembarked Co B and Btry A, 1/12 of BLT 1/3 during the evening of 5 September 1967 and debarked Co B at COL CO Ramp vicinity YD 827314 on the morning of 6 September 1967.

(4) BLT 1/3 was re-embarked on board ships of Amphibious Ready Group ALFA on 9 September 1967 and Operation BEACON POINT was terminated on 10 September 1967.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION.

Task Group 79.4

Colonel J. A. CONWAY

BLT 1/3

LtCol A. I. THOMAS

HMM-362

LtCol N. J. KAPETAN

3. INTELLIGENCE

a. Terrain

(1) General. The amphibious objective area was a portion of the seaward margin of the central coastal lowlands and delta plain. It consists of low lying, often flooded, poorly drained land. It is compartmented by three segments of terrain all generally aligned with the coast and paralleling one

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another. They progress inland from gently rolling sandy beaches and sand dunes, to an area of rice cultivation and dry land crops, to an open sandy area consisting of five lakes, or pools, running parallel northwest and southeast.

(2) Relief. The area from the coast to about 4000 meters inland is characterized by flat to gently rolling sandy beaches with some steep dunes averaging 2-3 meters with a maximum of 10 meters. The area behind the beach consists primarily of poorly drained level areas of wetland cultivation and dry crops. The local relief is generally less than 20 meters with slopes less than three per cent. The most prominent relief features are the dikes and roads which separate the rice paddies.

(3) Beach Study. The northern end of the beach is located at 16° 43'20"N 107°25'25"E (UTM YD 582499) and it runs southeast to 16°39'10"N 107°30'00"E (UTM YD 666432). The beach is straight and is 10,800 meters long. All of the beach is usable. The width of the beach is 82 to 275 meters wide at high water and 91 to 291 meters wide at low water. The gradient of the beach is 1:15 to 1:75 low water to high water, 1:10 to 1:15 high water zone. The beach is composed of fine white sand. It is firm when wet. Trafficability is fair to poor when wet and poor when dry. Exits are cross country along numerous trails throughout the countryside. The area directly behind the beach is covered with sand dunes having a maximum height of 10 meters. Huts, cemeteries, and religious pagodas are scattered throughout the area.

b. Enemy Situation. The units that had normally operated directly in the assigned amphibious objective area were the 802nd Main Force Bn, the 806th NVA Bn, and the C113 and C114 Local Force Co's. Total strength of these four units was estimated at about 550 men. Other elements of the 6th NVA Regt occasionally operated in the same area. This unit had the capability to reinforce any units in the objective area.

c. Order of Battle

Unit	Location	Strength	Weapons
806th NVA Bn	YD 5741	215	3 - 81mm mortars 6 - 60mm mortars 3 - heavy machine guns (12, 7) 3 - 75mm recoilless rifles 4 - B-90 rocket launchers 12 - B-40 rocket launchers 29 - automatic rifles
802nd MF Bn	YD 5342	215	12 - 60mm mortars 2 - 75mm recoilless rifles 3 - 57mm recoilless rifles 6 - B-90 rocket launchers 10 - B-40 rocket launchers 6 - antiaircraft guns

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Unit	Location	Strength	Weapons
C113 LF Co	YD 5245	60	1 - 81mm mortar 2 - 60mm mortars 6 - automatic rifles 12 - submachine guns
C114 LF Co	YD 5345	50	2 - 60mm mortars 9 - automatic rifles

d. Enemy Contact

(1) On D-day the waterborne forces made an unopposed landing over GREEN BEACH. The heliborne forces landed in LZ SPARROW and received light sniper fire. Throughout the day many surprise firing devices were encountered and friendly units received light sporadic enemy sniper fire. On D+1 and D+2 surprise firing devices and sniper fire continued to be encountered. Two units came under 60mm mortar fire and received a total of 12 rounds. Caches of rice totalling 35½ tons were discovered. On D+3 the enemy situation remained the same as the 3 previous days. Cumulative enemy losses for Operation BEACON POINT were 2 KIA confirmed, 1 KIA probable, and 25 detainees.

(2) Helos received small arms fire throughout the operation. A total of 5 helos received hits; all sustained minor damage.

e. Weather. Partly cloudy weather and occasional showers prevailed in the area. The visibility was excellent except during periods of precipitation. Winds were prevalent from the SW at about 8-12 knots. The temperature was 84-88° F.

4. MISSION. As directed by COMSEVENTHFLT msg 240328Z Aug67 (Initiating Directive), the mission assigned to the CATF (CTG 76.4) and CLF (CTG 79.4) was "When directed, conduct a search and destroy amphibious operation against VC/NVA forces in the amphibious objective area in THUA THIEN Province of I CTZ or other operations as agreed upon with CG III MAF or his designated representative".

5. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

a. Operation BEACON POINT as directed by COMSEVENTHFLT was an unilateral amphibious operation conducted by TG 76.4/79.4. The operation was planned for a 4-5 day period of search and destroy operations commencing with waterborne and heliborne assault landings.

b. The purpose of the operation was to prevent the Viet Cong from using the objective area as a base of operations from which they could disrupt the Vietnamese national elections. Initially, the inherent mobility of TG 79.4 was to be used to the maximum extent possible to insure a rapid build up of

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combat power ashore, thereby gaining surprise and fire superiority by shock action. Subsequently, aggressive search and destroy operations were to be conducted within the AOA.

c. Employment of supporting arms was an essential part of this concept. Fire support was to be provided by the artillery organic to the BLT and the naval gunfire ships USS WALDRON (DD-699) and USS ROBINSON (DDG-12). Close air support was to be on station during the assault landings.

d. CTG 76.4 was to CHOP OPCON of required elements of TG 79.4 to an "in country" commander as mutually agreed upon between CATF (CTG 76.4) and CG III MAF for further employment in conjunction with operations as required.

e. The concept of operations included the following: L-hour and H-hour were scheduled concurrently; landing zones were to be prepared by fire; fire support for GREEN BEACH was prearranged on call.

6. EXECUTION

a. Operation BEACON POINT as directed by COMSEVENTHFLT was executed in accordance with CTG 76.4 OP ORDER 310-67 and CTG 79.4 OP PLAN 120A-67 supplemented by CTG 79.4 frag orders for operations in the amphibious objective area.

(1) D-day was established as 1 September 1967 with L-hour and H-hour at 0700H.

(2) TG 79.4 landed its waterborne and heliborne assault forces at 010700H and by 011025H September 1967 BLT 1/3 was established ashore and conducting operations as required. CLF assumed responsibility for control and coordination of supporting arms effective 011800H September 1967.

(2) Due to an acute helicopter shortage in I CTG, CTG 79.4 was directed to pass OPCON of HMM-362 to CG III MAF effective 041800H. OPCON of HMM-362 was returned to CTG 79.4 at 072200H September 1967.

(3) During the period 041800H September 1967 to 072200H September 1967 when CTG 79.4 controlled neither the BLT nor the helicopter squadron, TG 79.4 remained under the OPCON of CG 3d Mar Div.

(4) On 8 September 1967 HMM-163 replaced HMM-362 as TG 79.4's helicopter squadron.

(5) OPCON of BLT 1/3 was chopped to CTG 79.4 at 091520H September 1967 and OPCON of TG 79.4 was passed to CG III MAF and CTG 76.4 concurrently at 100800H September 1967.

7. RESULTS. Enclosures (2) and (3).

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8. COMMANDERS ANALYSIS. This analysis is limited to matters at TG 79.4 level. BJT and squadron commanders' analyses are contained in their respective reports, enclosures (2) and (3).

a. Planning

(1) On 19 August 1967 CTG 79.4 and staff flew from NAS CUBI POINT, R.P. to VIETNAM in order to attend a 3d Mar Div planning conference. A second planning conference held at III MAF headquarters on 29 August was also attended by CTG 79.4 and his staff.

(2) Additional planning conferences were held at the 3d Mar Div headquarters, 1st ARVN Division headquarters and the 4th Marines CP on 30 August 1967 and again at the 3d Mar Div headquarters on 31 August.

(3) TG 79.4 planning was continuous and was conducted concurrently with the TG 76.4 staff. During the planning phase the following steps were accomplished:

(a) Maps, aerial photography, area analysis and enemy order of battle were obtained. Aerial reconnaissance of the proposed AOA was requested and obtained prior to commencement of the operation.

(b) Current intelligence was obtained from various "in country" sources, principally 3d Mar Div.

(c) Arrangements were made for processing and evacuation of VCS, refugees, civilian casualties and captured materiel.

(d) Arrangements were made for obtaining ITT teams, CIT personnel, APT teams, interpreters and a Popular Force squad to assist in the operation.

(e) Logistic support procedures were arranged.

(f) Radio frequencies were obtained and the communication operating instructions (COI) was published.

(g) The AOA was discussed, agreed upon and command relationships were finalized.

(h) Two naval gunfire ships and on station close air support were requested.

(i) Arrangements were made for additional helicopter support consisting of two armed and one unarmed UH-1E.

(j) Arrangements were made to exchange liaison parties with the 1st ARVN Division and to receive naval gunfire and district chief liaison officers.

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b. Command Relationships. Operation BEACON POINT was a unilateral amphibious operation with command relationships in accordance with NWP-22(B). Responsibility for control and coordination of supporting arms was assumed by CLF effective 011800H September 1967. OPCON of TG 79.4 was passed to an "in country" commander during the operation. At 011800H September 1967 CTG 76.4 passed OPCON of TG 79.4 CG III MAF (CTG 76.4 010952Z Sep67). CG III MAF simultaneously passed OPCON of TG 79.4 to CG 3d Mar Div (CG III MAF 010456Z Sep67). CG 3d Mar Div directed CTG 79.4 to pass OPCON of BLT 1/3 to CO 4th Marines at 030800H September 1967 while retaining control of CTG 79.4 (CG 3d Mar Div 021430 Sep67). CTG 79.4 passed OPCON of HMM-362 to III MAF effective 041800H (CTG 79.4 04353Z Sep67). OPCON of HMM-362 was assumed by CTG 79.4 at 072200H (CTG 79.4 080340Z Sep67) and was finally passed to CG 1st MAF at 080700H September 1967 (CTG 79.4 080340 Sep67). At 081159Z CTG 79.4 assumed OPCON of HMM-163 which replaced HMM-362 by normal intra-theater rotation (CTG 79.4 081420Z Sep67). OPCON of BLT 1/3 was returned to CTG 79.4 at 091530H (CG 3d Mar Div 091329Z Sep67). Finally, OPCON of TG 79.4 was transferred to CG III MAF and to CTG 76.4 concurrently at 100800H September 1967 (CG 3d Mar Div 091307Z Sep67 and CG III MAF 100158Z Sep67). COMSEVENTHFLT terminated Operation BEACON POINT on 10 September (COMSEVENTHFLT 100542 Sep67).

c. Intelligence

(1) Prior to Operation BEACON POINT arrangements were made with III MAF and CG 3d Mar Div for area studies, special intelligence studies and aerial photos. Also CO 4th Marines furnished up to date information concerning the amphibious objective area. Augmentation personnel in the form of ITT, APT, interpreters, and CIT were requested along with reward funds.

(a) ITT. An interrogation translation sub-team consisting of two Marine interpreter/translators and one Vietnamese interpreter were furnished from 3d ITT. This sub-team operated with the intelligence section of the BLT.

(b) APT. An armed propaganda team of squad size was furnished. It consisted of 3 Marines and 10 Vietnamese. This team was further broken down into 3 sub-teams and one was placed with each of the three assault companies.

(c) Interpreters. Six interpreters were requested but only three were furnished due to the shortage of trained personnel within the division. However, by using the interpreters assigned to the APT and ITT, TG 79.4 had the equivalent of 6 interpreters. A total of 6 interpreters are required in order to take advantage of information with an immediate tactical value.

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(d) CIT. TG 79.4 was also augmented with 1 member of a counter intelligence team and with an intelligence analyst. These men worked in conjunction with the interrogation translation team in the BLT intelligence section.

(e) Reward Fund. A total of 10,000 piasters was provided from the 3d Mar Div reward fund. This was distributed to the companies for use in obtaining information concerning the location of mines, surprise firing devices and possible NVA/VC weapon locations.

d. Supporting Arms

(1) Naval gunfire support for Operation BEACON POINT was provided by the following ships:

USS WALDRON (DD-699) - direct support

USS ROBISON (DDG-12) - direct support

Naval gunfire preparation fires were delivered on the periphery of LZ SPARROW. Prep fires ran from L-40 to L-5. All fires were observed and controlled by an airborne spotter. During the prep fires, USS WALDRON expended 133 rounds and the USS ROBISON 82, totaling 215 rounds. USS ROBISON was released as soon as the 105mm battery was ashore (0930 on D-day). USS WALDRON continued in direct support firing 12 rounds of H&I during the night. In the afternoon of D+2 USS WALDRON was reassigned and given another "in country" mission which terminated all naval gunfire support for this operation.

(2) Close air support was provided by 1st MAW. The VMO-6 detachment of armed and unarmed UH-1E's performed missions of helo escort, suppressive fires, TAC(a), and TAO throughout the operation in an effective manner.

(3) Artillery support was provided by the 105mm howitzer battery organic to the BLT. The 4.2 battery was not utilized. Support consisted of 13 observed missions, and 94 H&I's totaling 434 rounds expended.

(4) Coordination of supporting arms was controlled by CATF until 1800 on D-day. Once passed to CLF, the facilities of SAAC were utilized for coordination and control of fire. After chop of BLT 1/3 to the 4th Marines, CLF passed fire support coordination and control to the CO, 4th Marines.

e. Logistics

(1) Initial liaison was conducted with 3d Mar Div prior to the commencement of Operation BEACON POINT in order to establish and coordinate

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logistic support from "in country" sources. The logistic support area (LSA) established at the 4th Marines CP was designated as the primary resupply point for the SLF during the operation. Additional liaison was made with the 4th Marines in order to work out specific details concerning the support to be furnished. Arrangements were made to draw Class I, III, IV, V and limited Class II (consumables only) from the LSA. Further logistic support was provided from supplies and equipment embarked aboard ARG/SLF shipping.

(2) In order to provide for necessary coordination, a detachment from the Shore Party Platoon was positioned at the LSA on D-1. These personnel received daily resupply requests from units of the BLT, drew required supplies from supply dumps and loaded resupply helicopters. In order to insure complete coordination of the logistic support effort, communications were established between the Shore Party detachment at the LSA, the BLT S-4 located in the field and TAC LOG groups aboard the ships of the ARG/SLF shipping.

(3) Resupply was by unit distribution from the LSA using UH-34 helicopters. An exception to this was the resupply of 105mm artillery ammunition which was accomplished by LVT from the LPD. This was done in order to reduce the total amount of resupply to be lifted by helicopter. No unusual difficulties in resupply were encountered.

(4) All TG 79.4 casualties were evacuated to the LPH, which was designated as the Casualty Evacuation Control Ship (CECS). KIA's were further evacuated to Graves Registration Section, 1st Med Bn, DA NANG.

(5) Civilian and VCS casualties were evacuated to the 4th Marines CP for treatment and interrogation. If required, further evacuation to the RVN hospital in HUE had been arranged.

(6) After interrogation at the BLT level by attached IFT and APT personnel, detainees were evacuated to the 4th Marines POW compound.

(7) More than 35 tons of rice were captured by the BLT. After the rice was bagged, it was evacuated to the LSA for further disposition. Approximately 21 tons of rice were evacuated. This was a very time consuming process. After the advance of the BLT had been held up for two days because of the evacuation of rice, CG 3d Mar Div ordered the remaining rice destroyed to allow the BLT to continue its movement.

f. Casualty Reporting. Casualty reporting was conducted in accordance with current directives. The CRCC ALFA was located aboard the USS OKINAWA (LPH-3), which was designated the CECS. A BLT medical representative was positioned at 3d Med Bn, PHU BAI to collect and pass information on BLT 1/3 casualties to the CRCC. No problems were experienced during the operation concerning handling of casualties. The following is a breakdown of casualties:

Operation BEACON POINT	KIA	WIA(B)	WIA(HE)	NON-HOSTILE
BLT 1/3	2	26	8	34

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Operation BEACON POINT	KIA	WIA(E)	WIA(NE)	NON-HOSTILE
HMM-362	0	0	1	0
ADMITTANCE	0	0	0	0
Operation FREMONT				
BLT 1/3	0	2	1	13
HMM-362	0	1	0	0
ADMITTANCE	0	3	0	0
TOTAL	2	32	10	47

g. Civic Action. No major civic action program was conducted because of the tactical situation. The objective area was designated as a free fire zone and civilians had been previously evacuated from the area by government forces. Refugees were evacuated to the 4th Marines CP for interviews and further relocation by "in country" personnel.

h. ISO. A photographer was sent ashore with Co D, BLT 1/3 to provide photographic coverage.

1. Communications

(1) The following nets were entered or established during Operation BEACON POINT.

(a) Div Tac #2. Covered FM voice between 3d Mar Div and CTG 79.4 (Nestor Crypto System). Other units on this net were: CTG 79.5, 3d, 4th and 9th Marines.

(b) SLF Tac #1. FM voice radio between CTG 79.4 and BLT 1/3 (direct communication was not possible on this net, and an AN/MRC 109 was needed as a relay station on GREEN BEACH).

(c) FSC Net. FM voice radio between CTG 79.4, BLT 1/3 FSC, Btry A, 1/12 and the 4th Marines FSCC for fire support coordination.

(d) TAC LOG. FM voice radio between all ships of the ARG/SLF, the S-4 of BLT 1/3, and the LSA for logistic support.

(e) III MAF Cmd #2. Covered radio teletype (RATT, 60 WPM) on III MAF circuit. Available on this net were III MAF, 3d Mar Div, and CTG 79.5 (Orestes Crypto System).

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(f) 4th Marines TAC #1. After the chop of BLT 1/3 to the 4th Marines, CTG 79.4 monitored this net.

(g) Div Cmd #1. CTG 79.4 activated this net with 3d Mar Div for administrative traffic for a short period of time.

(2) Communications during Operation BEACON POINT ranged from poor to very good. CTG 79.4 did not have positive, reliable communications with the BLT over the SLF TAC #1 during a portion of the second day. During this period various alternate means of communicating with the BLT were available including the TAC LOG and the FSC nets. Communications were re-established over the SLF TAC #1 by placing a radio jeep (AN/MRC-109) at GREEN BEACH and using it as a relay station.

(3) Mutual interference between the various VHF/FM radios located on board the USS OKINAWA required extensive use of alternate frequencies. When the alternate frequency also resulted in mutual interference, it was often found that shifting back to the original frequency apparently eliminated the problem. No conclusions were reached concerning the specific causes of the frequency interference problems. Contributing factors appear to be the antenna configuration of the ship and the saturation of the area of operations with radios operating in the VHF frequency range. Strict adherence to the retransmission interference charts should help reduce mutual interference problems in future operations.

(4) Communications security continues to persist as a major problem area. There is no adequate method of passing sensitive information between the SLF and BLT commanders using available communications equipment. The terrain, the heavy lift requirement and the general unreliable operation of the AN/MRC-109/110 (KY-8) secure voice systems continue to preclude reliance on this capability for exchanging sensitive information. A second method, that of using crypto code sheets (KAK, PX/TSEC) has been attempted during this and recent operations. This method is time consuming, cumbersome and generally unsuitable for use in a fast moving tactical situation. Radio operators continually attempt to avoid using the KAK, PX/TSEC by relying on previously used brevity codes which have a high probability of having been compromised. This problem area is clearly recognized and positive steps are being taken to correct operator abuses. However, the general problem of exchanging sensitive information between field commanders is serious and continues to remain with us.

9. The following comments are included on subordinate commanders combat after action reports:

a. HMM-362 After Action Report

(1) Paragraph 2b. Last sentence should read "USS DULUTH (LPD-6)" vice "USS HERMITAGE".

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(2) Paragraph 2f. The recommendation has merit. There appears to be a need for members of the Shore Party Bn (HST teams) to be schooled in the four areas listed. To be of value the instruction should consist principally of practical application in various terrain types. In TG 79.4, after each operation, squadron and HST personnel discuss problem areas in order to develop workable solutions.

b. BLT 1/3 After Action Report

(1) Paragraph 11. Concur with the comments as stated. During the planning phase of future operations specific arrangements will be made for the removal of large quantities of food or weapons which might be captured.

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COMMANDER
SPECIAL LANDING FORCE
ALFA
SEVENTH FLEET



AFTER ACTION REPORT
BALLISTIC CHARGE/
SHELBYVILLE

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HEADQUARTERS
Task Group 79.4
FPO San Francisco, 96602

3/GFW/jtl
Ser: 003A283-67
11 October 1967

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, SEVENTH Fleet


Subj: Combat After Action Report, Operation BALLISTIC CHARGE/SHELBYVILLE

Encl: (1) - Commander Task Group 79.4, After Action Report, BALLISTIC
CHARGE/SHELBYVILLE, 16-29 Sep 67

Filed up w/c/chron (2) - HMM-163, After Action Report, BALLISTIC CHARGE/SHELBYVILLE, 16-22 Sep 67
(3) - BLT 1/3, After Action Report, BALLISTIC CHARGE/SHELBYVILLE, 16-22 Sep 67
(4) - Operations Overlay BALLISTIC CHARGE

1. Enclosure (1) contains the Commander Task Group 79.4's After Action Report for Operation BALLISTIC CHARGE/SHELBYVILLE.

2. Enclosures (2) through (4) amplify enclosure (1).


JOHN A. CONWAY

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COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT, OPERATION BALLISTIC CHARGE/SHELBYVILLE

Map reference: VIETNAM, 1:50,000; AMS Series L7014, Sheets 6640 I and II (BALLISTIC CHARGE); Sheet 6640 IV (SHELBYVILLE).

1. GENERAL

a. Operation BALLISTIC CHARGE was a unilateral amphibious operation using both waterborne and heliborne assault forces. The operation was conducted in accordance with NWP-22(B).

b. The operation was conducted in the DUY XUYEN, QUE SON and DIEN BAN Districts, QUANG NAM Province which is located in southern I CTZ, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

c. Inclusive dates of Operation BALLISTIC CHARGE were 16-29 September. Operational control of elements of SLF ALFA, that is, BLT 1/3 and HMM-163 was passed to "in country" commanders during Operation SHELBYVILLE.

(1) At 160700H a waterborne assault force landed over RED BEACH. At 160709H heliborne assault forces landed in LZ GOOSE (alternate) after a 9 minute delay for additional air preparation of the LZ.

(2) At 220900H elements of BLT 1/3 conducted a heliborne withdrawal from the BALLISTIC CHARGE AOA and a heliborne assault into the SHELBYVILLE operating area.

(3) Elements of BLT 1/3 participated in Operation SHELBYVILLE from 22 September to 28 September 1967. HMM-163 provided support as directed by 1st MAW from 23 September until 28 September 1967. TG 79.4 provided helicopter, communications and administrative support for BLT 1/3 during Operation SHELBYVILLE.

(4) Elements of BLT 1/3 were re-embarked on board ships of ARG/SLF ALFA on 28 September 1967 and Operation BALLISTIC CHARGE was terminated on 29 September 1967.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

a. Operation BALLISTIC CHARGE

Task Group 79.4

Colonel J. A. CONWAY

BLT 1/3

LtCol A. I. THOMAS

HMM-163

LtCol W. C. KELLY

Det, VMO-6 (UH-1E)

Det, VMO-2 (UH-1E)

ENCLOSURE (1)

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b. Operation SHELBYVILLE

Task Group 79.4

Colonel J. A. CONWAY

3. INTELLIGENCEa. Terrain

(1) General. The amphibious objective area was a portion of the seaward margin of the central flat coastal lowlands. It is compartmented into riceland cultivation and open sandy areas. Numerous villages lie scattered throughout the area.

(2) Relief. The coastal lowlands consist of rolling plains with local relief less than 25 meters and slopes of 3% or less.

(3) Beach Study. The northern end of the available beach is located at 15° 52' 48" N, 108° 24' 18" E (UTM BT 220565) and runs southeast to 15° 45' N, 108° 27' 06" E (UTM BT 269427). The beach is slightly concave and is 8.2 nautical miles long. All of the beach is usable. The beach is seventy to one hundred sixty meters wide at low water and thirty five to ninety meters wide at high water. The gradient is 1:25 to 1:50 low water to high water and 1:15 at the high water zone. The seashore bottom slopes moderate to flat shoreward of the 3 fathom depth contour. The tide fluctuates from 5.6 feet to 2.2 feet. Maximum rise is 3.4 feet. The currents generally flow parallel to the coast at moderate speeds but at times may reach maximum speeds of two to three knots. The beach is composed of white sand. The sand is firm when wet, soft when dry. Coastal Highway # 1 runs northwest and southeast to within eight and one tenth miles and three and five tenths miles of the beach. Terrain immediately behind the beach consists of sand dunes with brush and trees. Rice paddies lie directly behind, and extend to the TRUONG GIANG River.

b. Enemy Situation. The units that normally operated directly in the area of operations were the V26 Local Force Company, which is a part of the V25 Local Force Battalion, and the Q12 Local Force Company. Strength of these two units totaled approximately 150 men. It had been reported by different sources that this particular area was still being used by the V4 Main Force Company (sapper) as a training area to train elements of the V25 in sapper tactics. The remaining elements of the V25, K51 Local Force Company, and units of the 3d NVA Regiment were believed to be in close proximity and were capable of reinforcing the two local force companies in the amphibious objective area within a six hour period.

c. Order of Battle

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<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Weapons*</u>
V26 LF Co	BT 202508	75	Unk
Q12 LF Co	BT 194544	75	2 - 60mm mortar

*Although the exact weapons in each unit was unknown, the enemy was known to have B40 and B90 rocket launchers in addition to automatic and semiautomatic weapons of different calibers.

d. Enemy Contact

(1) On D-day the waterborne assault units landed unopposed over RED BEACH. The heliborne units which landed in LZ GOOSE received small arms fire. During the remainder of D-day sniper fire was received but no significant contact was made. Close air support was called on one enemy position. Company C found propaganda leaflets in English which had been left there a few hours before their arrival. On D+1 Company B engaged an estimated 15 VC. Artillery was called and the enemy broke contact. Light sniper fire was received throughout the day. One thousand pounds of rice was captured and approximately 1000 punji stakes were found and destroyed. On D+2 light sniper fire was received and a few punji traps were encountered. The enemy probed friendly night defensive positions and in one instance, mortar fire was directed at an estimated 20 VC. On D+3 light sniper fire was received but no significant enemy contact was made. Naval gunfire was called on 5 VC carrying a mortar. On D+4 light sniper fire was again received and a few surprise firing devices were encountered, however, no significant enemy contact was made. On D+5 sniper fire was received and surprise firing devices and two mines were encountered. The enemy probed the BLT's night defensive positions, however, again no significant contact was made. On D+6 the heliborne assault forces received small arms fire while landing in LZ QUAIL to initiate Operation SHELBYVILLE.

(2) Anti Air. Helicopters received sporadic small arms fire throughout the operation. A total of eight aircraft received hits, all with minor damage. One of the helicopters returning to the ship with minor damages went into ground resonance resulting in strike damage (total loss) to the helicopter and injury to two pilots and one crewman.

(3) Enemy Casualties. During Operation BALLISTIC CHARGE the enemy suffered 14 KIA (confirmed), 12 KIA (probable), 3 VC PW, and 60 detainees. Included in these totals but not appearing in the BLT after action report were one KIA (probable) reported by TG 79.4's TAO and 5 detainees which were picked up by Navy patrol craft.

e. Weather. The beginning of the northeast monsoon continued to progress over the amphibious objective area during this period. The weather followed a daily pattern, with afternoon and late evening showers. The mean temperature was 81°F. The wind prevailed from the northeast at an average of 10 knots. The visibility averaged about nine miles.

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET-NOFORN

SECRET-NOFORN

4. MISSION

a. BALLISTIC CHARGE. As directed by COMSEVENTHFLT 111036Z Sep67 (Initiating Directive), the mission assigned to CATF and CLF was "to conduct an amphibious operation to search out and destroy VC/NVA forces in the amphibious objective area or other operations as agreed upon with CG III MAF or his designated representative."

b. SHELBYVILLE. As requested by CG III MAF 210110Z Sep67, TG 76.4/79.4 remained in support of Operation SHELBYVILLE. CG 1st Mar Div requested CTG 76.4/79.4 to helilift elements of BLT 1/3 from the BALLISTIC CHARGE AOA and conduct a heliborne assault into the SHELBYVILLE operating area.

5. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

a. Operation BALLISTIC CHARGE was to be a unilateral amphibious operation conducted by TG 76.4/79.4. The operation was planned for a five day search and destroy period commencing with a waterborne and heliborne assault landing. Initially the inherent mobility of TG 79.4 was to be used to the maximum extent possible in order to insure a rapid build-up of combat power ashore, thereby gaining surprise and fire superiority by shock action. Subsequently, aggressive search and destroy operations were to be conducted within the amphibious objective area. Employment of supporting arms was to be an essential part of this concept. Fire support was to be provided by the 4.2" mortar battery organic to the BLT and the naval gunfire ships USS WALDRON (DD 699), USS HOPEWELL (DD-681), and the USS SMALL (DDR-838). TG 76.4/79.4 was to be prepared to chop OPCON of selected elements of BLT 1/3 to CG III MAF, who, in turn was to pass OPCON to CG 1st Mar Div for further employment in Operation SHELBYVILLE under OPCON of CO 1st Marines. The concept provided for landing two assault companies by waterborne means and one by helicopter. The reserve was to be landed by helicopter where needed. The beach and LZ were to be prepared by naval gunfire. In addition, the LZ was to be prepared by CAS.

b. Operation SHELBYVILLE was to consist of a helicopter assault into the SHELBYVILLE operating area by elements of BLT 1/3. TG 76.4/79.4 were to remain in support of the BLT during Operation SHELBYVILLE.

6. EXECUTIONa. BALLISTIC CHARGE

(1) Operation BALLISTIC CHARGE was executed in accordance with CTG 76.4 Operation Order 313-67 and CTG 79.4 OP PLAN 120A-67 supplemented by CTG 79.4 frag orders for operations in the amphibious objective area.

(2) D-Day was established as 16 September with H/L-hour at 0700H.

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET-NOFORN

(3) TG 79.4 commenced landing its waterborne assault forces at 160700H and heliborne assault forces at 160709H. The heliborne assault was delayed nine minutes for additional air prep of the LZ. By 160943H, the BLT was well established ashore.

b. SHELBYVILLE

(1) On 21 September 1967, CTG 76.4/79.4 was requested to conduct a helilift of elements of BLT 1/3 from the BALLISTIC CHARGE AOA and conduct a heliborne assault into the SHELBYVILLE area of operations.

(2) The heliborne withdrawal commenced at 220705H and the heliborne assault in the LZ QUAIL commenced at 220730H (L-Hour). Co A, tanks, 4.2" mortar btry, and LVPs conducted an amphibious withdrawal to ships of the ARG/SLF. At 221330H, Co A commenced landing in the SHELBYVILLE area of operations as the reserve. Subsequent to the heliborne assault landing into the SHELBYVILLE area of operations, TG 76.4/79.4 continued to provide administrative, communications and logistical support of BLT 1/3 for the duration of the operation.

8. RESULTS. Enclosures (2) and (3).

9. COMMANDERS ANALYSIS. This analysis is limited to matters at TG 79.4 level. BLT and squadron commanders' analyses are contained in their respective reports, enclosures (2) and (3).

a. Planning

(1) On 11, 12 and 13 September, CTG 79.4 accompanied by his Operations Officer and the Operations Officer of TG 76.4, made liaison visits to Hq III MAF to discuss the TG 76.4/79.4 readiness posture.

(2) A planning conference for Operation BALLISTIC CHARGE/SHELBYVILLE was attended by CTG 79.4, members of his staff, and representatives of CTG 76.4 on 14 September 1967 at Hq 1st Mar Div. Additional planning conferences were held at Hq 1st Mar Div on 18, 19 and 20 September 1967.

(3) TG 79.4 planning was continuous and was conducted concurrently with the TG 76.4 staff. During the planning phase, the following steps were accomplished:

(a) Maps, aerial photography, area analysis and enemy order of battle were obtained. Aerial reconnaissance of the proposed AOA was requested and obtained prior to commencement of each operation.

(b) Current intelligence was obtained from various "in country" sources, principally the 1st Mar Div.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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SECRET-NOFORN

(c) Arrangements were made for processing and evacuation of POW's, detainees, refugees, civilian casualties, and captured materiel.

(d) Arrangements were made for obtaining ITT teams, CIT personnel, APT teams, interpreters and civil affairs personnel to assist in the operation.

(e) Logistic support procedures were developed.

(f) Radio frequencies were obtained and the communication operating instructions (COI) was published.

(g) The AOA was discussed, agreed upon, and command relationships were finalized.

(h) Naval gunfire ships and close air support were requested.

(i) Arrangements were made for additional helicopter support consisting of four armed and one unarmed UH-1E.

(j) Arrangements were made to exchange liaison parties with the 3d Bn, 1st Marines and the QUANG DA Special Sector Headquarters.

(6) The extremely short period of time available for planning for Operation BALLISTIC CHARGE made it necessary for subordinate units of the TG to finalize many of their plans based on oral briefings and without the advantage of reference to a written frag order.

b. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. Operation BALLISTIC CHARGE was a unilateral amphibious operation with command relationships in accordance with NWP-22 (B). Responsibility for control and coordination of supporting arms was not assumed by the CLF. OPCON of HMM-163 and selected elements of BLT 1/3 was passed to "in country" commanders during Operation SHELBYVILLE. CTG 76.4 passed OPCON of elements of SLF ALFA to CG III MAF (CTG 76.4 210556Z Sep67). CG III MAF simultaneously passed OPCON of BLT 1/3 to CG 1st Marines (CG III MAF 211214Z). At 230001, CTG 76.4 passed OPCON of HMM-163 to CG III MAF (CTG 76.4 210556Z Sep67). CG III MAF simultaneously passed OPCON HMM 163 to CG First MAW (CG III MAF 211214Z Sep67). CG III MAF chopped OPCON of BLT 1/3 to CTG 79.4 upon commencement of re-embarkation aboard ARG/SLF shipping at 281730H Sep67. (CG III MAF 271340Z Sep67). OPCON of HMM-163 was passed from III MAF to CTG 79.4 at 281800H Sep67 (CG III MAF 281526Z Sep67). COMSEVENTHFLT terminated Operation BALLISTIC CHARGE on 29Sep67 (COMSEVENTHFLT 290006Z Sep67).

c. Intelligence

(1) Prior to Operation BALLISTIC CHARGE, arrangements were made with CG 1st Mar Div for acquisition of current intelligence. Augmentation personnel which included ITT, APT and interpreters were requested.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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(a) ITT. One Marine interrogator and one South Vietnamese interpreter were furnished by 1st Mar Div. This subteam operated with the intelligence section of the BLT.

(b) APT. Armed propaganda teams, consisting of two men each, were placed with each of the three assault companies.

(c) Interpreters. Although six interpreters were requested, only five could be furnished due to a lack of qualified personnel. Each rifle company was provided with an interpreter and the fifth was used by the BLT Command Group. Two of the five interpreters became sick and were evacuated. As a result, only two companies had interpreter support for the entire operation. More interpreters were requested as replacements, however they were never available.

d. Supporting Arms

(1) Naval gunfire support for Operation BALLISTIC CHARGE was provided by the following ships:

USS WALDRON (DD-699) - direct support (D-day - D+1)
 USS HOPEWELL (DD-681) - direct support (D-day - D+5)
 USS SMALL (DDR-838) - direct support (D+5 - D+6)

Naval gunfire preparation fires were delivered by the USS WALDRON and the USS HOPEWELL on areas bordering both RED BEACH and Landing Zone GOOSE. Fires on LZ GOOSE were controlled by an airborne spotter. Prep fires were delivered from L/H-60 to L/H-12. Naval gunfire ordnance expended during the entire operation included 443 rounds of prep fire, 61 rounds of on call fire, and 867 rounds of H&I fire, totaling 1371 rounds.

(2) Close air support was provided by 1st MAW. VMO-6 provided one unarmed and two armed HU-1E's for helo escort, suppressive fires, TAC(A), and TAO throughout the operation. VMO-2 provided two armed UH-1E's from L-hour to L+120. Support rendered was considered effective.

(3) Artillery support was provided by the 4.2" mortar battery organic to the BLT. Support included 22 observed missions, 1 unobserved mission, and 310 H&I's totaling 1056 rounds expended.

(4) Coordination of supporting arms was controlled by CATF throughout the operation.

e. Logistics

(1) Prior to the commencement of Operation BALLISTIC CHARGE/SHELBYVILLE, liaison was conducted with 1st Mar Div in order to establish logistic support procedures to be utilized. Previously, during all similar

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operations conducted in the 1st Mar Div TAOR, supply support was immediately available from a nearby logistic support area (LSA) already established. However, in this instance, the nearest LSA did not contain sufficient stocks at the time to support this operation. Therefore, all classes of supply were furnished from supplies embarked aboard ARG/SLF shipping until commencement of Operation SHELBYVILLE at which time supplies were transported from the LSA directly to the using unit.

(2) The USS DULUTH (LPD-6) was utilized as the primary logistic support ship due to its capability to deliver supplies ashore by surface craft, helicopter, or a combination of both as the situation required. All required items of supply were consolidated on the LPD and resupply was effected daily. In order to receive resupply requests, stage supplies, and to provide for necessary coordination, a detachment from the Shore Party Platoon was transferred to the LPD on D-1. Complete coordination of the logistic support effort was insured by providing communications between the Shore Party Detachment on the LPD, and BLT S-4 and the units of the BLT in the field. Additionally, communication was established between the BLT S-4 and the TAC LOG groups aboard all ships of the ARG/SLF,

(3) Resupply was by unit distribution primarily from the LPD using UH-34 helicopters. An exception to this was resupply of 4.2" mortar ammunition and diesel fuel for tanks which was accomplished by LVT. LVT's were refueled using a rigid fuel ferrying assembly carried by one of them. On one occasion, due to previously scheduled ship replenishment, the LPD was not available at the time the BLT Commander requested resupply. In this instance supplies were delivered by helicopter from the LPH using supplies embarked. No unusual difficulties in resupplying the BLT were encountered.

(4) SLF casualties were normally evacuated to the LPH which was designated as the Casualty Evacuation Control Ship (CECS). In two instances minor casualties were evacuated to "in country" medical facilities where they were treated and returned to duty. KIA's were further evacuated from the LPH to Graves Registration Section, 1st MedBn, DA NANG.

(5) Civilian and VC casualties were initially evacuated to a Collecting and Clearing Detachment established in the vicinity of the 5th Marines CP. This C&C Det was disestablished during Operation BALLISTIC CHARGE and evacuation was shifted to the 1st MedBn, DA NANG.

(6) After interrogation at the BLT level by attached ITT and APT personnel, detainees were initially evacuated to the 5th Marines POW compound. When this compound became overcrowded, detainees were sent to the POW compound established by the 1stBn 1st Marines.

f. Casualty Reporting. Casualty reporting was conducted in accordance with current directives. The CROC ALFA was located aboard the USS OKINAWA

ENCLOSURE (1)

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(LPH-3), which was designated the CECS. BLT medical representatives were positioned at NSA Hospital, DA NANG, 1st Medical Battalion, DA NANG, 1st Hospital Company, CHU LAI and the LSA to collect and pass information on BLT 1/3 casualties to the CRCC. No problems were experienced during the operations concerning handling of casualties. The following is a breakdown of casualties:

OPERATION BALLISTIC CHARGE

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA(E)</u>	<u>WIA(NE)</u>	<u>NON-HOSTILE</u>
BLT 1/3	2	7	13	35
HMM-163	0	3	1	0
ADMITTANCE	0	0	0	1
TOTAL	2	10	14	36

OPERATION SHELBYVILLE

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA(E)</u>	<u>WIA(NE)</u>	<u>NON-HOSTILE</u>
BLT 1/3	4	28	22	25
HMM-163	0	0	1	0
ADMITTANCE	1	2	0	1
TOTAL	5	30	23	26

g. Civic Action. A civic action/refugees control team was assigned to BLT 1/3. No major civic action program was conducted because of the tactical situation. The area was designated as a free fire zone and most of the civilians had been previously evacuated from the area by government forces.

h. ISO. A photographer was assigned to provide photographic coverage of the operation.

1. Communications

(1) Communications were established IAW CTG 79.4 OP PLAN 120A-67 COI, and with Frag Order #1 (CTG 79.4 150700Z Sep67). A message Center was maintained afloat in conjunction with Navy Comm Center with 79.4 assuming Comm Guard for BLT 1/3 and HMM-163. The following nets were entered or established during Operation BALLISTIC CHARGE:

(a) III MAF TAC #1. CTG 79.4 entered this net maintaining covered (NESTOR) communication with both III MAF and the 1st Mar Div.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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(b) III MAF Cmd #2. CTG 79.4 entered this net (RATT ORESTES 60 wpm) and experienced some difficulty because of an unknown station causing interference on the net.

(c) SLF TAC #1. CTG 79.4 established this net with BLT 1/3.

(d) FSC. CTG 79.4 established this net with 1st Mar Div FSCG, FSC, BLT 1/3, and W Btry, 2/12 in addition to two liaison officers from 79.4 located with 1st Marines and Hq. QUANG DA Special Sector.

(e) TAC LOG NET. CTG 79.4 established this net with the four ships of the ARG, the LSA, and with the S-4 of BLT 1/3 for logistic purposes.

(2) A relay was established by augmenting the USS DULUTH (LPD-6) with two TG 79.4 radio operators. By monitoring both the DIV TAC and SLF TAC, these men were able to relay messages between stations on the same net and could also be directed to assist communications on any other net. The primary reason that the LPD was chosen as a relay ship was because of the excellent communication facilities of the DULUTH, which helped considerably in avoiding many of the interference problems which seem to be inherent to the LPH. Furthermore the LPD is normally situated much closer to the beach than is the LPH, which improves communication. Overall, the technique provided for an improvement in SLF communications and will be employed on future operations.

(3) Communications during Operation BALLISTIC CHARGE ranged from fair to very good. Mutual interference between the various UHF/FM radios located aboard the USS OKINAWA, again required extensive use of alternate and spare frequencies. However, the relay station aboard the USS DULUTH helped considerably in coping with interference problems.

(4) In the area of communication security, a locally produced brevity code was used between TG 79.4 and BLT 1/3 in passing sensitive information between these units. This method worked very well and will be used on future operations. A different code will be used for each operation and use of this technique will reduce the possibility of compromise.

10. The following comments are included on subordinate commanders' Combat After Action Reports:

a. HMM-163 After Action Report: None

b. BLT 1/3 After Action Report:

(1) Paragraph 11. Concur in principle with that portion which discusses the desirability of both the squadron and the BLT Commanders being airborne in the same observation helicopter. Although the communications

ENCLOSURE (1)

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problem can no doubt be solved between the BLT and SLF Commander there still remains the considerable risk involved in having both the squadron and the BLT Commanders aloft in the same aircraft over hostile territory during this critical stage of the amphibious operation. This technique is one which offers many advantages and some disadvantages. It will be considered by the Commander in his estimate of the situation and a separate decision will be made on this matter for each amphibious operation.

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COMMANDER
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ALFA
SEVENTH FLEET



COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
1-31 OCTOBER 1967

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OTG 79.4

HEADQUARTERS

Task Group 79.4

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3/GFW/der
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SER: 0011-68
11 January 1968

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From: Commanding Officer

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To: Distribution List

Subs: Command Chronology for period 1 to 31 October 1967, supporting documents forwarding of

Ref: (a) Commander Task Group 79.4 Command Chronology for 1-31 October, 3/GFW/jtl, 5750.1C, SER: 00336-67 dtd 2 December 1967.

Encl: (1) BLT 1/3 Combat After Action Report (Operation MEDINA), 10-11 Oct 67
(2) BLT 1/3 Combat After Action Report (Operation LIBERTY II/FREMONT)

1. Reference (a) was forwarded prior to receipt of enclosures (1) and (2).
2. Enclosures (1) and (2) are to be included in TAB B to reference (a) immediately following the BLT 1/3 Command Chronology for 1-31 October 1967 as supporting documents.

John A. Conway
JOHN A. CONWAY

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MAG-15	9
BLT-1/3	10
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
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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade
Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 to 31 October 1967

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8
(c) BrigO 5750.1C

Encl: (1) Commander Task Group 79.4 Command Chronology

1. Enclosure (1) is submitted in accordance with references (a), (b), and (c).


JOHN A. CONWAY

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MAG-15	9
BLT-1/3	10
HMM-163	11
Prov Serv Bn	12
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COMMANDER TASK GROUP 79.4

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 October 1967 to 31 October 1967

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SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

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PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. Designation

Commander

Task Group 79.4

Colonel J. A. CONWAY
1-31 October 1967

Subordinate Units

BLT 1/3
1-31 October 1967

LtCol A. I. THOMAS
1-31 October 1967

HMM-163
1-30 October 1967

Major F. A. RUECKEL
Acting CO 1-30 October 1967

Attached Units

None

2. Location

1-31 October 1967

USS OKINAWA (LPH-3)
USS DULUTH (LPD-6)
USS BELLE GROVE (LSD-2)
USS WINSTON (AKA-94)
USS FORT MARION (LSD-22)
USS WASHTEENAW COUNTY (LST-1166)

3. Staff Officers

Executive Officer

LtCol H. PRESTON Jr.
1-6 October 1967
LtCol P. H. SIMPSON
7-31 October 1967

S-1/Adjutant

1stLt J. C. SMITH
1-31 October 1967

S-2

Captain W. N. FOWLER
1-31 October 1967

Asst S-2/Aerial Observer

1stLt S. E. DURHAM
1-31 October 1967

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S-3

LtCol H. PRESTON Jr.
1-6 October 1967
LtCol J. ERWIN
7-31 October 1967

Asst S-3

Major G. F. WARREN
1-31 October 1967

Fire Support Coordinator

LtCol R. F. MOODY
1-31 October 1967

S-4

Major R. M. BROWNE
1-4 October 1967
Captain P. J. SAMUELS
5-31 October 1967

Communications Officer

Captain L. M. ZWICK
1-31 October 1967

4. Average Monthly Strength

	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Hq, TG 79.4	10	26	0	0
BLT 1/3	60	1447	8	83
HMM-163	43	181	1	3

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PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

From 1-9 October TG 79.4 supervised the rehabilitation of BLT 1/3 personnel and equipment and planned forthcoming special operations. On 10 October Operation BASTION HILL commenced with the tactical helicopter movement of BLT 1/3 (-) from the USS OKINAWA to the MEDINA area of operations. Operation BASTION HILL was conducted 10-31 October in QUANG TRI and THUA TIEN Provinces in NORTHERN I CTZ, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. TG 76.4/79.4 remained off the coast of NORTHERN I CTZ, in support of Operations MEDINA, FREMONT and GRANITE. OPCON of BLT 1/3 (-) was passed to CG III MAF, CG 3d MarDiv and on to CO 1st Marines on 10 October. Upon completion of Operation MEDINA on 20 October, OPCON of BLT 1/3 (-) was passed to CO 4th Marines in order to participate in Operations FREMONT and GRANITE. Throughout Operation BASTION HILL, TG 79.4 provided helicopter and logistic support for BLT 1/3. Helicopters were also provided to support 3d MarDiv operations as requested by CG 1st MAF. HMM-163 debarked from USS OKINAWA on 30 October and was ordered to report to CG 1st MAF for command. Operation BASTION HILL was terminated on 31 October by COMSEVENTHFLT.

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PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

- 1 Oct 1967 Major G. E. BAILEY and Major T. E. FISH, who were TAD to this command, departed.
- Major W. L. LANG, 9th MAB Ordnance Officer; Major J. R. CATON, G-4 representative; Captain F. M. MORGAN, USN, Medical Officer, 9th MAB; Lt C. F. FIRLIT, MC, USN and Captain T. H. AIKEN, 9th MAB liaison officer departed.
- 2 Oct 1967 CTG 79.4 with TG 76.4/79.4 Operations Officers to III MAF for liaison visit.
- Captain J. L. KERSHNER, ISO, 9th MAB departed.
- LtCol P. R. FIELDS, G-4 representative, 9th MAB aboard for liaison visit.
- 3 Oct 1967 TG 79.4 Operations Officer and Operations Officer designate to III MAF for liaison visit.
- 4 Oct 1967 TG 79.4 Operations Officer, Executive Officer, Fire Support Coordinator, and Assistant Operations Officer to 1st Mar Div and III MAF concerning use of rifle range and transportation for BLT 1/3.
- 5 Oct 1967 CTF 79 and party aboard for one day liaison visit.
- 6 Oct 1967 CTG 79.4 and staff to III MAF for liaison visit.
- 7 Oct 1967 CTG 79.4 and staff with TG 76.4 Operations Officer to 3d Mar Div for planning conference.
- 9 Oct 1967 LtCol P. P. PIRHALLA, Comptroller, 9th MAB; LtCol J. A. COMO and Major W. T. COOK, G-4 representatives, 9th MAB aboard for liaison visit.
- 2nd Squad, MP Platoon (-), HqCo, 9th MAB reported to CTG 79.4 for duty.
- Ref: CTG 79.4 090900Z Oct 67
CTG 79.4 091126Z Oct 67

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TG 79.4 Operations Officer and Logistics Officer to 1st Marines for liaison conference.

10 Oct 1967 Operation BASTION HILL commenced with the landing of BLT 1/3 units by helicopter in QUANG TRI Province which is located in NORTHERN I CTZ, RVN.

Ref: PART IV, TAB D.

OPCON of BLT 1/3 was chopped to CG III MAF at 100826H Oct 67.

Ref: CTG 76.4 100110Z 67
CG III MAF 100705Z Oct 67
CG Third Mar Div 101415Z Oct 67

11 Oct 1967 TG 79.4/76.4 commenced support of Operation MEDINA which was being conducted by the 1st Marines.

LtCol P. P. PIRHALLA, Comptroller, 9th MAB, LtCol J. A. COMO and Major W. T. COOK, G-4 representatives, 9th MAB departed.

12 Oct 1967 LtCol T. W. BURKE, G-3 representative, 9th MAB and 2ndLt W. R. PAINTER, courier of classified material, 9th MAB aboard for liaison visit.

13 Oct 1967 LtCol T. W. BURKE, G-3 representative, 9th MAB, and 2ndLt W. R. PAINTER, courier of classified material, 9th MAB departed.

14 Oct 1967 CTG 79.4 with Operations and Intelligence Officers to BLT 1/3 field command post for liaison visit.

LtCol G. H. BENSKIN, ACofS G-1, 9th MAB aboard for liaison visit.

15 Oct 1967 LtCol G. H. BENSKIN, ACofS G-1, 9th MAB departed.

Col CODISPOTTI (USMC COMSEVENTHFLT Rep), TG 79.4 Executive Officer and Assistant Operations Officer to BLT 1/3 field command post for liaison visit.

16 Oct 1967 Col W. A. BUTCHER, ACofS G-4, 9th MAB aboard for liaison visit.

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TG 79.4 Operations Officer to III MAF for liaison visit in connection with disposition of helicopters in eventuality of typhoon evasion tactics by ARG/SLF shipping.

Ref: CG III MAF 161420Z Oct 67
CTG 79.4 180742Z Oct 67

17 Oct 1967 CTG 79.4 with Col BUTCHER, TG 79.4 Operations Officer and Fire Support Coordinator to BLT 1/3 field command post for liaison visit.

Col W. A. BUTCHER, ACofS G-4, 9th MAB departed.

20 Oct 1967 CTG 79.4 and staff to BLT 1/3 field command post for liaison visit.

21 Oct 1967 CTG 79.4 with TG 76.4 Operations Officer and TG 79.4 Fire Support Coordinator to III MAF and 1st MAF for planning conferences.

22 Oct 1967 Major J. V. KNAPP, ACofS G-2, 9th MAB and Captain H. W. HIGGINS, Adjutant, 9th MAB aboard for liaison visit.

23 Oct 1967 Major J. V. KNAPP, ACofS G-2, 9th MAB and Captain H. W. HIGGINS, Adjutant, 9th MAB departed.

TG 79.4 Operations, Logistics, and Administrative Officers to 3d Mar Div for liaison visit.

24 Oct 1967 CTG 79.4 and TG 79.4 Operations Officer to BLT 1/3 field command post for liaison visit.

26 Oct 1967 TG 76.4/79.4 commenced support of Operation GRANITE which was being conducted by the 4th Marines.

29 Oct 1967 CTG 79.4 and TG 79.4 Operations Officer to BLT 1/3 field command post for liaison visit.

30 Oct 1967 Captain W. L. SNYDER, MTO, 9th MAB; Major R. G. BUSTOS, Brigade Air Officer representative, 9th MAB; and 1stLt B. L. LLOYD, Supply Officer, HqCo, 9th MAB aboard for liaison visit.

OPCON of HMM-163 was chopped to CG 1st MAF at 301200H Oct 67.

Ref: CTG 79.4 300112Z Oct 67

ENCLOSURE (1)

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31 Oct 1967 Operation BASTION HILL was terminated at 312130Z Oct 67.

Ref: COMSEVENTHFLT 312130Z Oct 67

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET-NOFORN

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET-NOFORN

PART IV

CHRONOLOGY OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

TAB A ✓
1 CTG 79.4 090900Z Oct 67
2 CTG 79.4 091126Z Oct 67
3 CTG 79.4 100110Z Oct 67
4 CG III MAF 100705Z Oct 67
5 CG 3d Mar Div 101415Z Oct 67
6 CG III MAF 161420Z Oct 67
7 CTG 79.4 180742Z Oct 67
8 CTG 79.4 300112Z Oct 67
9 COMSEVENTHFLT 312130Z Oct 67

TAB B ✓ BMT 1/3 Command Chronology for 1-31 Oct 67

TAB C ✓ HMM-163 Command Chronology for 1-30 Oct 67

TAB D ✓ CTG 79.4 After Action Report, BASTION HILL/MEDINA/
FREMONT/GRANITE, 10-5-67

ENCLOSURE (1)

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IV
 PP RUM
 DE RUM
 IN: 55555
 P 090900Z OCT 67
 TO RUEBQL/CG NINTH MAB

now
 NILB / 2025KCE
 ju / 0912Z/9OCT67

SECRET
 SQUAD ARRIVAL REPORT
 CG 9TH MAB 282654Z SEP 67

1. IAW REG A IT IS REPORTED THAT THE 2D SQ, MP PLAT (-2), HQ CO,
 5TH MAB REPORTED TO THIS HQ FOR DUTY ON 9 OCT 67.
 GP-4
 ET

(P)

two/TF

090900Z OCT 67

a-21

VV TJM030
 PP RUABQL
 DE RUMFTJM 036 2821126
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 091126Z OCT 67
 FM CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR ✓
 TO ZEN/CO BLT ONE SLANT THREE ✓
 RUABQL/CG NINTH MAB

NILB / NON
 2023K15
 11462/90CT67

SECRET

ATTACHMENT OF MP SQUAD

1. EFFECTIVE 0800H 10OCT67 THE 2D SQUAD, MP PLAT (-), HQ CO, 9TH MAB IS ATTACHED TO BLT 1/3. THIS SQUAD WILL REMAIN ATTACHED TO BLT 1/3 AS LONG AS BLT 1/3 IS ASSIGNED AS A COMPONENT OF THE SLT. THE ATTACHMENT WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT WHEN OPCON OF BLT 1/3 IS PASSED TO AN "IN COUNTRY" CMDR WHEN IT IS ENVISIONED THAT ULTIMATELY OPCON WILL BE RETURNED TO CTG 79.4.
 2. THE 2D SQUAD, MP PLAT (-) IS PRESENTLY BILLETED ABOARD THE USS OKINAWA.

3. SUBMIT MSG EVALUATION RPT TO THIS HQ NLT 30 OCT. EVALUATION WILL INCLUDE AS A MINIMUM:

- A. THOSE FUNCTIONS WHICH THE MP SQUAD PERFORMED.
- B. THOSE FUNCTIONS WHICH IT IS ENVISIONED THAT THE SQUAD WILL BE EMPLOYED TO PERFORM IN FUTURE OPERATIONS, IF DIFFERENT FROM A ABOVE.
- C. A RECOMMENDATION AS TO THE DESIRABILITY OF THE BLT HAVING AN MP SQUAD PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED FOR BLT OPERATIONS.

(K)

ELWO/TF

NNNN

091126Z 0

a--

TJM006

RUMFT RUMHMF RUMGUL RUHFMA RUMKVP RUABQL RUMFKRV RUMHLA
RUMFTJM 007 2830110

SSSSS

MFT ZOK FFM

100110Z OCT 67

CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR ✓

RUMHMF/CG III MAF

RUMGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUHFMA/CG FMFPAC

RUMKVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE

RUMFKRV/CTF SEVEN SIX

RUMHLA/CO FIRST MARINES ✓

RUMBLT ONE SLANT THREE ✓

SECRET

OPCON OF BLT 1/3 (MINUS). BASTION HILL (U)

COMSEVENTHFLT 091120Z OCT 67

CG III MAF 090002Z OCT 67

OPCON BLT 1/3 MINUS PASSED TO CG III MAF AS OF 100826H.

CTG 79.4 CONCURS.

FIN3

(M)

CWO/TF

NNNN

100110Z OCT

a-23

ZCZC173P

00 RUMFIJN

DE RUMHMF 2354 2:30750

ZNY SSSSS

O 122705Z OCT 67 ZFD

FM CG III MAF

TO ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV

INFO RUABUL/COMSEVENTH

ZEN/CG FMFPAC

RUMFKRV/CTF SEVEN SIX

RUABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE

RUMFIJN/CTG SEVEN SIX P. FOUR

RUMFIJN/CTG SEVEN NINE AT FOUR

BT

S E C R E T

OPCON BLT 1/3 (-)

A. CIG 7:4 100112Z OCT 67 (S)

CG III MAF ASSUMES OPCON BLT 1/3 (AL) AT 100825H OCT 67 (L)

REF A AND, PASSES OPCON TO CG 3RD MARDIV SAME TIME.

GP-4

BT

DECLASSIFIED

ADVANCE
TO
FP
M

ZCZC144
OO RUMFTJM
DE RUMHVP 2757D 2831415
ZNY SSSSS
O 101415Z OCT 67
FM CG THIRD MARDIV
TO ZEN/CG III MAF
ZEN/FIRST MARINES
INFO RUMFUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUMFUV/CTF SEVEN SIX
RUABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE
ZEN/ADC THIRD MARDIV DHCB
RUMFTJM/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
RUMFTJM/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
BT

SECRET
OPCON BLI 1/3(-)
4. CG III MAF 100750Z OCT 67
1. CG THIRD MARDIV ASSUMES OPCON BLI 1/3(-) AS OF 100820Z OCT
67 IAW REF A AND PASSES OPCON TO FIRST MARINES SAME TIME.
3P-4
BT

NNNN

TOR/1920Z/1000Z/11
A-123

101415Z

a-25

DECLASSIFIED

ADVANCE
 TO
 SP
 5-13
 ZNY 55555
 P 151420Z OCT 67
 FM CG III MAF
 TO RUMFIJN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 INFO ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAF
 RUMFKRV/CTF SEVEN SIX
 RUABOL/CTF SEVEN NINE
 RUMFIJN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 BT

SECRET

HMM-163 ABOARD OKINAWA

A. LN VISIT LT COL. ERWIN S-3 SLF ALPHA TO III MAF 160CTG7

1. REF A REFERS. IN EVENT ARG ALPHA MUST PUT TO SEA TO WEATHER
 STORM CARLA, RECOMMEND HMM-163 REMAIN ON BOARD OKINAWA.

GP-4

BT

NNNV T01134
 OO RUMHVP RUMHAW RUMHMF
 DE RUMFTJM 067 2910742
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 180742Z OCT 67
 FM CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 TO RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW
 INFO RUMHMF/CG III MAF
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 RUMFUV/CTF SEVEN SIX
 RUABOL/CTF SEVEN NINE
 ZEN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

Tap
uac
S-3 *11113* *3697005*
U *213-2/1500*

BT
 O E O R E T
 HELO SUPPORT

- A. CG FIRST MAW 171548Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)
 B. CG III MAF 161420Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)
 1. REF A REQUESTED HELO SUPPORT INCLUDING MED EVAC ON A DAILY BASIS.
 2. IN VIEW OF TYPHOON EVASION STORM CARLA, WILL BE UNABLE TO FURNISH SUPPORT AFTER 181800H OCT.
 3. REF B RECOMMENDED RETENTION OF HMM-163 ON BOARD IN EVENT WAS NECESSARY FOR OKINAWA TO PUT TO SEA.
 4. WILL NOTIFY WHEN ABLE TO RESUME SUPPORT.
 5. CTG 76.4 CONCURS.

GP-4

BT

a-27

P 301127Z OCT 67
FM CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
TO RUMBAW/CG FIRST MAW
INFO RUMHOF/CG III MAW
RUMABJL/CTF SEVEN NINE
RUMAUDE/CO MAG ONE FIVE
RUMHAW/CO FPM ONE SIX THREE
RUMHAW/CO MAG THREE SIX
BT

SECRET

- A. CTF SEVEN NINE 140145Z OCT67
- B. CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR 230130 OCT67
- 1. IAW REF A AND B CTG 79.4 PASSES OPCOM HMM-163 TO CG
FIRST MAW AS OF 301200H.

GP-4

BT

(M) ONLY

011783
 01045-02 NOV 67
 IN CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 INFO TO SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 F 512130Z OCT 67
 IN COMSEVENFLT
 TO RUMFTJN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 RUENH/CTG
 RUHOB/CINCPAC
 RUHON/CINCPACFLT
 INFO TUMFTJN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 RUHON/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
 RUHON/CTG SEVEN SIX
 RUHON/CTG SEVEN NINE
 RUHON/COMUSMACV
 RUHON/COMNAVFORV
 RUHON/CG III MAF
 RUHON/CG THIRD MARDIV
 RUHON/COMPHIBTAC
 RUHON/CG FMFPAC
 RUHON/CG FMFPAC (FWD)
 RUHON/CTG ONE ONE FIVE
 RUHON/CTG AIR FORCE
 RUHON/CTG SEVEN SEVEN

Kw-7
 04462 / 100V
 0344P

2. 011783 RUHON 2200 SECRET
 RUHON/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE
 RUHON/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT TWO
 RUHON/CG FIRST MARDIV
 RUHON/CG FIRST MAW
 RUMFTJG/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
 RUHON/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
 RUMFTJG/CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE
 RUMFTJG/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE
 RUMFTJG/CTG SEVEN THREE
 RUMFTJG/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE
 RUMFTJG/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE

BT

CTE TO 2.1.1 PASS ADVANCED COPY TO COMUSMACV
 OPERATION BASTION HILL (U)

1. FOR CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR TERMINATE OPERATION BASTION HILL
2. FOR CNO, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT: CANCEL NICKNAME BASTION HILL

31 OCT 1967

GP-4

BT

(F) N3

(S) CO — XO — OPS/R

0000/TF 312130

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**COMMANDER
SPECIAL LANDING FORCE
ALFA
SEVENTH FLEET**



TG SPECIAL LANDING FORCE ALFA **79.4**

**AFTER ACTION REPORT
BASTON HILL/MEDINA/
FREMONT/GRANITE**

**DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
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10-31 OCTOBER 1967

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HEADQUARTERS
Task Group 79.4
FBO San Francisco, 96602

3/GFW/jra
Ser: 00335-67
1 December 1967

SECRET-NOFORN - Unclassified upon removal of enclosures (1) through (3)

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade


Subj: Combat After Action Report, Operation BASTION HILL/MEDINA/FREMONT/
GRANITE

Encl: (1) Commander Task Group 79.4, After Action Report, BASTION HILL/
MEDINA/FREMONT/GRANITE

f/w c/chron → (2) HMM-163, After Action Report, BASTION HILL/MEDINA/FREMONT/GRANITE
(3) Operations Overlay BASTION HILL 10-30 Sep 67

1. Enclosure (1) contains the Commander Task Group 79.4's After Action Report ~~for~~ Operation BASTION HILL/MEDINA/FREMONT/GRANITE.

2. Enclosures (2) and (3) amplify enclosure (1).


JOHN A. CONWAY

DISTRIBUTION:

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COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT, OPERATION BASTION HILL/MEDINA/FREMONT/GRANITE

Map reference: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014, Sheets 6442 II, III, and 6441 I.

1. GENERAL

a. Operation BASTION HILL was a unilateral amphibious operation using surface craft and helicopters to land the Landing Force. The operation included support of three follow-on "in country" operations. Inclusive dates of Operation BASTION HILL were 10-31 October 1967. The operation was conducted in accordance with NWP-22 (B).

b. Operation MEDINA was a search and destroy operation conducted southwest of the city of QUANG TRI. BLT 1/3 (-) was under the operational control of CO 1st Marines during this operation. This operation was coordinated with an adjacent ARVN operation. Assault battalions of both Marine and ARVN forces were helicopter-borne by a joint Marine/U. S. Army helicopter lift in which HMM-163 participated.

c. Operation FREMONT was a continuing search and destroy operation conducted by the 4th Marines in the QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN Provinces. BLT 1/3, under the operational control of CO 4th Marines participated in Operation FREMONT in conjunction with Operation LIBERTY II in order to protect the roads and populated areas from raids and acts of terrorism during a national election period. BLT 1/3 was assigned an operating area between the cities of HUE and QUANG TRI. Inclusive dates of BLT 1/3's participation in Operation FREMONT were 19-26 October 1967. HMM-163 supported operations ashore with troop lifts, resupply, command and control, and administrative flights.

d. Operation GRANITE was a search and destroy operation conducted northwest of the city of HUE in THUA THIEN Province. BLT 1/3 was under the operational control of CO 4th Marines during this operation. Operation GRANITE was a joint operation using Marine and ARVN ground forces and Marine and U. S. Army helicopters. Inclusive dates of Task Group 79.4's support of this operation were 26-30 October 1967. HMM-163 supported operations ashore with troop lifts, resupply, command and control, and administrative flights.

e. Operation BASTION HILL/MEDINA/FREMONT/GRANITE was conducted in the HAI LANG District of the QUANG TRI Province and the PHONG DIEN and NAM HOA Districts of the THUA THIEN Province.

f. The combined operation commenced with the landing of BLT 1/3 (-) by helicopter at 100826H October 1967. Operational control of BLT 1/3 (-) was passed to CG III MAF when the first helicopter wave landed in LZ HAWK.

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET-NOFORN

BLT Alpha (79 79.4) aka EASTRON W/BLT/MEDINA/FREMONT/GRANITE

10-30 Sep 1967

SECRET-NOFORN

The remainder of BLT 1/3 (-), 1st Plat, Co B, 3d Motor Transport Bn, was landed at DONG HA Ramp on 11 and 12 October 1967.

g. The Commander, Task Group 79.4, embarked aboard ARG/SLF shipping, retained operational control of HMM-163 and provided helicopter support to BLT 1/3 (-) and to 3d Mar Div operations. Medical evacuation and limited supply support was provided for BLT 1/3 (-) during operations MEDINA, FREMONT and GRANITE.

h. HMM-163 debarked from the USS OKINAWA on 30 October 1967. Commander, Task Group 79.4 chopped operational control of HMM-163 to CG 1st MAW at 301200H October 1967.

i. Operation BASTION HILL was terminated by the Commander, 7th Fleet on 31 October 1967 and Amphibious Ready Group Alfa with Task Group 79.4 embarked, departed for SUBIC BAY, R. P. on 1 November 1967.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

a. Operation BASTION HILL

Task Group 79.4

Colonel J. A. CONWAY

BLT 1/3

LtCol A. I. THOMAS

HMM-163

Major F. A. RUECKEL
Acting

b. Operations MEDINA, FREMONT and GRANITE

Task Group 79.4

Colonel J. A. CONWAY

HMM-163

Major F. A. RUECKEL
Acting

3. INTELLIGENCE

a. Terrain. The amphibious objective area was a portion of the central coastal lowlands and delta plains extending to the foot of the mountain range. It consists of low lying, often flooded, poorly drained land beginning with the coast and rising slightly as it approaches the foot of the mountains. The mountainous areas in which both Operations MEDINA and GRANITE, as a part of BASTION HILL, were conducted are characterized by their high canopy and thick underbrush. Operation FREMONT was conducted in

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET-NOFORN

SECRET--NOFORN

slightly rolling terrain between Highway #1 and the foot of the mountains.

b. Enemy Situation. Elements of the 9th NVA Regiment with its subordinate local and main force units traditionally operated in the area selected for Operation MEDINA. Detailed intelligence estimates for the "in country" operations were furnished to BLT 1/3 by the 1st and 4th Marines.

4. MISSION

a. BASTION HILL. As directed by COMSEVENTHFLT 091120Z Oct67 (Initiating Directive), the mission assigned to CATF and CLF was to "conduct a search and destroy amphibious operation against VC/NVA forces in the amphibious objective area in QUANG TRI Province of I CTZ or other operation as agreed upon with CG III MAF or his designated representative." CG 79.4's implementation of this mission was to conduct a helicopter-borne landing of BLT 1/3 (-) southeast of QUANG TRI in preparation for their participation in Operation MEDINA.

b. MEDINA, FREMONT and GRANITE. As mutually agreed between CATF and CG III MAF, CTG 76.4/79.4 were to remain in support of "in country" operations.

5. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

a. Operation BASTION HILL was to be a unilateral amphibious operation conducted by TG 76.4/79.4. The operation was to consist of a helicopter landing of BLT 1/3 (-) southwest of QUANG TRI in the MEDINA operating area. The plan also included the landing of the BLT 1/3 motor transport platoon by surface craft at the DONG HA Ramp.

b. TG 76.4/79.4 were to provide helicopter and limited logistic support to BLT 1/3 (-) during a series of "in country" operations.

6. EXECUTION

a. BASTION HILL

(1) Operation BASTION HILL was executed in accordance with CTG 76.4 Operation Order 314-67 and CTG 79.4 OP PLAN 120A-67 supplemented by a CTG 79.4 frag order for operations in the amphibious objective area.

(2) D-day was established as 10 October with H-hour at 0800H.

(3) TG 79.4 commenced landing its helicopter-borne forces at 100826H.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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SECRET-NOFORN

The landing was delayed 26 minutes due to the absence of the 1st Marines LZ control unit when the first wave arrived in the vicinity of the LZ. By 101645H the heliborne forces of BLT 1/3 (-) were well established ashore. The BLT motor transport platoon was landed at DONG HA Ramp on 11 and 12 October 1967.

b. MEDINA, FREMONT and GRANITE. During these "in country" operations TG 79.4 provided helicopter and limited logistic support for BLT 1/3 (-). TG 79.4 also provided helicopter support for 3d Mar Div operations during the period 11-30 October 1967.

7. RESULTS. See Enclosure (2).

8. COMMANDERS ANALYSIS. This analysis is limited to matters at the TG 79.4 level. The Squadron Commander's analysis is included in his report, enclosure (2).

a. Planning

(1) On 7 October CTG 79.4 and staff with TG 76.4 Operations Officer attended a planning conference at 3d Mar Div Command Post. A second planning conference was attended by the TG 79.4 S-3 and S-4 Officers at the 1st Marines Command Post on 9 October.

(2) Additional planning conferences were attended by CTG 79.4 and various staff officers throughout the period during which Operation BASTION HILL/MEDINA/FREMONT/GRANITE was conducted.

(3) TG 79.4 planning was continuous and was conducted concurrently with the TG 76.4 staff. During the planning phase the following steps were accomplished:

(a) Prior to Operation BASTION HILL arrangements were made with CG 3d Mar Div for area studies, special intelligence studies, and aerial photographs. Since operational control of BLT 1/3 was to be passed immediately to CG 3d Mar Div and then to the 1st and 4th Marines, all augmentation personnel were obtained through these organizations.

(b) Logistic support procedures were arranged.

(c) Radio frequencies were obtained and the Communication Operating Instructions (COI) was published.

(d) Arrangements were made to lift Btry A, 1st Bn, 12th Mar and the AN/MRC-110 radio jeep ashore using CH-53 helicopters.

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET-NOFORN

SECRET-NOFORN

(e) The AQA was discussed, agreed upon, and command relationships were finalized.

(f) Arrangements were made for additional helicopter support consisting of one unarmed and two armed UH-1E's.

(g) Arrangements were made to establish a liaison team at the appropriate regimental headquarters for coordination of casualty reporting and helicopter support.

(h) Arrangements were made for a TG 79.4 casualty liaison team to be positioned at "in country" sites for collecting and forwarding casualty reports to the 9th MAB CRCC-ALFA embarked aboard the USS OKINAWA.

(i) Liaison was established with 3d Mar Div to coordinate the logistic support procedures to be utilized.

b. Command Relationships

(1) Operation BASTION HILL was a unilateral amphibious operation with command relationships in accordance with NWP-22 (B). Responsibility for control and coordination of supporting arms was not assumed by CLF. OPCON of BLT 1/3 (-) was passed to an "in country" commander during the operation.

(2) At 100826H October 1967, CTG 76.4 passed OPCON of BLT 1/3 (-) to CG III MAF (CTG 76.4 100110Z Oct67). CG III MAF simultaneously passed OPCON of BLT 1/3 (-) to CG 3d Mar Div (CG III MAF 100705Z Oct67). CG 3d Mar Div chopped OPCON of BLT 1/3 (-) to CO 1st Marines concurrently. OPCON of HMM-163 remained under CTG 79.4 during Operation BASTION HILL/MEDINA/FREMONT/GRANITE. OPCON of HMM-163 was passed to CG 1st MAF at 301200H Oct67 (CTG 79.4 300112Z Oct67). Operation BASTION HILL was terminated at 312130Z Oct67 (COMSEVENTHFLT 312130Z Oct67).

c. Enemy Contact. Although elements of the 9th NVA Regiment with its subordinate local and main force VC units traditionally operated in this area no contact was made during the initial phase of Operation BASTION HILL. Significant contacts made by HMM-163 on Operation BASTION HILL/MEDINA/GRANITE are as follows:

141900H - One helicopter received automatic weapons fire from coor YD 396518. One hit was received on cabin door. Fire was returned with unknown results.

18 Oct - One aircraft received hit through its cabin while engaged in a MED EVAC mission. Fire was not returned.

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET-NOFORN

SECRET-NOFORN

280830H - At YD 502238 MED EVAC aircraft received 3 hits. One round hit the aft fuel cell, one round went through the cockpit, and one round hit the windshield. Fire was not returned.

NOTE: For other incidents involving contact by HMM-163 resulting in no aircraft damage see Chronology of Significant Events in Enclosure (2).

d. Supporting Arms

(1) No supporting arms were planned for or used during the landing of BLT 1/3 (-).

(2) Supporting arms for Operations MEDINA, FREMONT and GRANITE were arranged for and coordinated by "in country" units.

e. Logistics

(1) To provide for the necessary coordination of supply support for the BLT, a liaison team (Shore Party Plat) was established at the 1st Marines LSA, QUANG TRI on D-1 of Operation MEDINA. The truck platoon was utilized by the 1st Marines in transporting supplies from FLSU#1, DONG HA, to the LSA to maintain the required supply level. Daily unit distribution was accomplished by helicopter (UH-34 and CH-53).

(2) No real problem of resupply existed. However a critical shortage of 81mm mortar illumination ammunition from "in country" sources required LFORM stocks to be made available to the BLT.

(3) Casualties were evacuated to 3d Med Bn, DONG HA, and to the USS OKINAWA. Initially the former was designated the primary casualty receiving station for Operation MEDINA, however the latter was primarily utilized when the MED EVAC helicopters used came from the LPH.

(4) Limited maintenance capability was available from the LSA. As requirements were made known, contact teams were made available from FLSU#1, DONG HA. A number of portable T/E items requiring maintenance (i. e., PRC-25's and rifles) were evacuated to the LPH. Two 105mm howitzers were damaged in an attempt to externally lift them by CH-53's (broken slings) from the USS DULUTH. Three were successfully helilifted ashore. The two damaged howitzers were transported via ARG shipping to FLC, DANANG, where they were repaired and returned to the Battery within 72 hours. One M35, 2½ ton truck,

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET-NOFORN

SECRET-NOFORN

(A Btry 1/12) was severely damaged by a land mine and was evacuated by FLSU #1, DONG HA, to FLC, DANANG.

f. Casualty Reporting. Casualty reporting was conducted in accordance with current directives. The 9th MAB CRCC-ALFA was located aboard the USS OKINAWA (LPH-3), which was designated the CECS. A BLT 1/3 casualty liaison representative was positioned at "D" Med, DONG HA, RVN; "A" Med, PHU BAI, RVN; and Medical Facilities, DANANG, RVN to collect and pass on to the 9th MAB CRCC-ALFA information on BLT 1/3 casualties.

<u>Casualty Recapitulation</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>WIANE</u>	<u>NON-HOSTILE</u>
<u>Operation BASTION HILL/MEDINA</u>				
BLT 1/3	10	34	3	28
HMM-163	0	0	0	0
ADMITTANCE	0	8	0	0
<u>Operation FREMONT</u>				
BLT 1/3	0	2	0	27
HMM-163	0	0	0	0
ADMITTANCE	0	0	0	0
<u>Operation GRANITE</u>				
BLT 1/3	2	17	7	18
HMM-163	0	0	0	0
ADMITTANCE	0	0	0	1
TOTAL	12	61	10	74

g. Civic Action. On 21 October 1967 a MEDCAP program was conducted at DIEN SANH Village in the vicinity of YD 413477. Two Medical Officers, one Dental Officer, eight Corpsmen, and one Dental Technician treated 345 persons of which 30 received dental treatment and 315 received medical treatment. Due to operational commitments a follow-up MEDCAP program in the village of DIEN SANH was not conducted.

h. ISO. A photographer was sent ashore with BLT 1/3 to provide photographic coverage.

i. Communications

(1) Communications were established in accordance with CTG 79.4 OP PLAN 120A-67 and with the COI issued separately. A message center was maintained afloat in conjunction with the USS OKINAWA Naval Communications Center with TC 79.4 assuming communications guard for BLT 1/3 and HMM-163.

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET-NOFORN

SECRET-NOFORN

The following nets were entered or established during Operation BASTION HILL/MEDINA/FREMONT/GRANITE.

(a) III MAF CMD #2. TG 79.4 entered this net (RATT Orestes 60 WPM) and maintained direct communications with III MAF and 3d Mar Div.

(b) 3d Mar Div TAC #1. TG 79.4 entered this net maintaining communications with 3d Mar Div, III MAF, and various other units including TG 79.5.

(c) SLF TAC #1. Since BLT 1/3 was not OPCON to CTG 79.4 a liaison net was established to keep CTG 79.4 informed of the operation ashore. TG 79.4 personnel were employed on the four stations which entered the net. Besides the communications center on the USS OKINAWA a relay site was established at 1st Marines Command Post, QUANG TRI, employing a AN/MRC-110 radio jeep covered with the Nestor Crypto System (KY-8/TSEC). The liaison party at this station maintained contact with a liaison team located with the BLT, with Med Reps located at DONG HA and PHU BAI, and with the TG 79.4 communications center aboard the USS OKINAWA.

(2) For Operation FREMONT, the liaison party previously located at QUANG TRI moved to the 4th Marines CP at Camp Evans and continued to operate from this position during Operation GRANITE. The Med Rep team at DONG HA moved to PHU BAI to continue casualty reporting.

(3) The SLF TAC #1 proved to be invaluable, allowing spot and situation reporting and MED EVAC requests directly from the battalion, casualty reporting from Med Reps and relaying of information from the liaison party which was located at regimental command posts with the AN/MRC-110 radio jeep.

(4) The Nestor Crypto System also proved to be a valuable asset allowing secure voice between the liaison party and the TG 79.4 communications center aboard the USS OKINAWA. The modification to the KYK-12 seems to have eliminated many of the problems associated with the overheating previously experienced with the KY-8/TSEC system.

(5) Communications during this period were excellent to outstanding due primarily to the small number of nets that were established on the LPH which resulted in less mutual interference than has normally been experienced in past operations.

9. The following comment is included on the subordinate commander's combat after action report:

a. HMM-163 After Action Report:

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET-NOFORN

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET-NOFORN

(1) Paragraph 3 under analysis of helicopter operations. Concur.

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET-NOFORN

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

79.4 CN: 00403-6

SECRET-NOFORN

COMMANDER
SPECIAL LANDING FORCE
ALFA
SEVENTH FLEET



TG SPECIAL LANDING FORCE ALFA 79.4

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
1-30 NOVEMBER 1967

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

Copies

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DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
Task Group 79.4
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3/GFW/jrs
5750.1C
Ser: 00360A67
26 December 1967

SECRET-NOFORN - Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1)

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade
Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 to 30 November 1967

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8
(c) BrigO 5750.1C

Encl: (1) Commander Task Group 79.4 Command Chronology

1. Enclosure (1) is submitted in accordance with references (a), (b), and (c).


JOHN A. CONWAY

DISTRIBUTION:

	Copy#
CG 9th MAB	1-2
CG 1st Mar Div	3
CG 3d Mar Div	4
CG 1st MAW	5
CTG 76.4	6
CTG 79.5	7
RLT-26 Rear	8
MAG-15	9
BLT 1/3	10
HMM-361	11
Prov Serv Bn	12
S&C File	13-15

SECRET-NOFORN

DECLASSIFIED

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SECRET-NOFORN

COMMANDER TASK GROUP 79.4

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 November 1967 to 30 November 1967

INDEX

PART I - ORGANIZATION DATA

PART II - NARRATIVE SUMMARY

PART III - SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

PART IV - SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET-NOFORN

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DECLASSIFIED

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PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. Designation

Task Group 79.4

Commander

Colonel J. A. CONWAY
1-30 November 1967

SUBORDINATE UNITS

BLT 1/3
1-30 November 1967

LtCol A. I. THOMAS
1-17 November 1967

LtCol R. W. GOODALE
18-30 November 1967

HMM-361
15-30 November 1967

LtCol D. M. WILSON
15-30 November 1967

ATTACHED UNITS

None

2. Location

1-30 November 1967

USS OKINAWA (LPH-3)
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
USS DULUTH (LPD-6)
USS CLEVELAND (LPD-7)
USS FORT MARION (LSD-22)
USS WASHTENAW CTY (LST-1166)

3. Staff Officers

Executive Officer

LtCol PH. H. SIMPSON
1-30 November 1967

S-1/Adjutant

1stLt J. C. SMITH
1-30 November 1967

S-2

Captain W. N. FOWLER
1-30 November 1967

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET-NOFORN

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Asst S-2/Aerial Observer

Captain J. A. HATCHETT
17-30 November 1967

1stLt S. E. DURHAM
1-27 November 1967

S-3

LtCol J. ERWIN
1-30 November 1967

Asst S-3

Major G. F. WARREN
1-30 November 1967

Fire Support Coordinator

LtCol R. F. MOODY
1-30 November 1967

S-4

Captain P. J. SAMUELS
1-30 November 1967

Communications Officer

Captain L. M. ZWICK
1-30 November 1967

4. Average Monthly Strength

	USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
Hq, Task Group 79.4	10	26	0	0
BLT 1/3	58	1460	8	75
HMM-361	39	150	1	3

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET-NOFORN

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SECRET-NOFORN

PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

On 1 November, Headquarters, Task Group 79.4 and the uncommitted elements of BLT 1/3 departed RVN for Subic Bay, R. P. for ARG/SLF ALFA shipping upkeep period (BLT 1/3 (-) remained "in country" as a maneuver battalion in Operation GRANITE). On 7 November, Headquarters, Task Group 79.4 and those BLT 1/3 personnel embarked, with equipment and SLF LFORM, transferred from USS OKINAWA to USS IWO JIMA. HMM-361 was embarked on board the IWO JIMA on 15 November and CTG 79.4 assumed OPCON of the squadron at 151200H. Also on 15 November, those embarked troops and their equipment embarked on USS DULUTH were transferred to USS CLEVELAND when CLEVELAND relieved DULUTH in ARG ALFA. BLT 1/3 (-) was re-embarked on board ARG/SLF shipping on 16 November and CTG 79.4 assumed OPCON of BLT 1/3 at 160900H. CTG 76.4/79.4 received an initiating directive for Operation BALLISTIC ARCH from COMSEVENTHFLT on 20 November. D-day was delayed from 23 to 24 November due to a forecast for inclement weather on 23 November. On 24 November Operation BALLISTIC ARCH commenced with the landing of BLT 1/3 units by landing craft and by helicopter. Operation BALLISTIC ARCH was conducted 24-27 November in Northeastern QUANG TRI Province, I CTZ, RVN. CLF reported the landing force firmly established ashore on 26 November. On 27 November OPCON of BLT 1/3 was passed to CG III MAF, CG 3d Mar Div and 9th Marines concurrently. BLT 1/3 commenced participation in Operation KENTUCKY under the OPCON of the 9th Marines. CTG 76.4/79.4 remained off the northeast coast of QUANG TRI Province in support of operations ashore. OPCON of HMM-361 was retained by CTG 79.4 and helicopter support was provided to CG 3d Mar Div and BLT 1/3. Casualty reporting and medical evacuation responsibilities for BLT 1/3 remained with CTG 79.4 after OPCON of BLT 1/3 was chopped ashore.

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET-NOFORN

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PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

- 1 Nov 1967 Headquarters, TG 79.4 and uncommitted elements of BLT 1/3 departed RVN for upkeep period and LPH transfer at Subic Bay, R. P.
- 3 Nov 1967 Major R. G. BUSTOS, Assistant Air Officer, 9th MAB; Captain W. L. SNYDER, MTO, 9th MAB, and 1stLt B. L. LLOYD, Supply Officer, HqCo, 9th MAB, who were aboard for a liaison visit, departed.
- 7 Nov 1967 Headquarters, TG 79.4 and those troops with equipment and SLF LFORM embarked, transferred from USS OKINAWA to USS IWO JIMA.
- 11 Nov 1967 TG 79.4 Operations Officer departed for RVN to attend liaison conferences at III MAF and 3d Mar Div command posts.
- 14 Nov 1967 Major W. L. LANG, Ordnance Officer, 9th MAB, and party arrived for an ordnance technical inspection. Major R. C. HAGERTY, CO, HqCo, 9th MAB arrived for a liaison visit in connection with administrative matters.
- 15 Nov 1967 Major R. C. HAGERTY departed.
- Those troops and equipment embarked in USS DULUTH were transferred to USS CLEVELAND.
- HMM-361 embarked and CTG 79.4 assumed OPCON of squadron at 151200H.
- Ref: HMM-361 151150Z Nov67
CTG 79.4 151200Z Nov67
- 16 Nov 1967 CTG 79.4 and TG 79.4 Logistics Officer to BLT 1/3 for liaison visit.
- BLT 1/3 (-) re-embarked and CTG 79.4 assumed OPCON of the BLT at 160900H.
- Ref: CG 3d Mar Div 160555Z Nov67
CG III MAF 161340Z Nov67
CTG 79.4 162324Z Nov67
- 18 Nov 1967 CTG 79.4 and staff with representatives of CTG 76.4 to 3d Mar Div for a planning conference.
- 19 Nov 1967 CTG 79.4 and staff with representatives of CTG 76.4 to 3d Mar Div for a planning conference.
- 20 Nov 1967 Major W. L. LANG and party departed.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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Received initiating directive for Operation BALLISTIC ARCH.

Ref: ADMINO COMSEVENTHFLT 200356Z Nov67

CTG 79.4 and staff with CTG 76.4 and staff and CO BLT 1/3 attended presentation of proposed concept of operations for upcoming special operations. CG 3d Mar Div approved the basic concept.

21 Nov 1967 CTG 79.4 with Operations Officer, Fire Support Coordinator and representatives of CTG 76.4 to 3d Mar Div FWD command post to coordinate fire support procedures and to establish liaison with the 2d Regt, 1st ARVN Div.

22 Nov 1967 Captain J. M. ROSS and Captain J. W. LOWE, 9th MAB Liaison Officers for forthcoming special operations reported aboard.

TG 79.4 Liaison Officer sent to 9th Marines FSCC to coordinate supporting arms fire for planned special operations. Unable to exchange liaison teams with the 2d Regt, 1st ARVN Div due to inclement weather.

23 Nov 1967 LtCol G. H. BENSKIN, ACoS G-1, 9th MAB aboard for a liaison visit.

Exchanged liaison teams with the 2d Regt, 1st ARVN Div. SSgt ERVIN, USA advisor and Lt TRAN, ARVN, QUANG TRI Province Chief Representative aboard for forthcoming special operations.

Delivered rifle squad from BLT 1/3 to ARVN company which was scheduled to operate in support of BLT 1/3's movements.

BLT 1/3 exchanged liaison teams with the 1st AMTRAC battalion.

D-day for planned amphibious operation was delayed for 24 hours due to inclement weather forecast.

23 Nov 1967 Operation BALLISTIC ARCH commenced with the landing of BLT 1/3 units by landing craft and helicopters into northeastern QUANG TRI Province, I CTZ, RVN.

Note: Operation BALLISTIC ARCH continued throughout the remainder of this month and therefore the After Action

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET-NOFORN

SECRET-NOFORN

Report will be included in the Dec Command
Chronology.

CTG 79.4 with Operations Officer to BLT 1/3 command post for
liaison visit.

LtCol G. H. BENSKIN departed.

25 Nov 1967 CTG 79.4 with Operations Officer and CO USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
to BLT 1/3 command post for a liaison visit.

1stLt R. J. MARIZ, S&C Officer, 9th MAB, aboard in connection
with administrative matters.

26 Nov 1967 CTG 79.4 and staff to BLT 1/3 command post for a liaison
visit.

TG 79.4 Logistics Officer to 9th Marines command post for a
liaison visit.

1stLt R. J. MARIZ departed.

Landing Force is firmly established ashore.

Ref: CTG 79.4 260630Z Nov67

27 Nov 1967 CTG 79.4 and staff to 9th Marines for a liaison visit.

SSgt ERVIN and Lt TRAN departed.

OPCON of BLT 1/3 passed to CG III MAF, CG 3d Mar Div and 9th
Marines concurrently at 271200H.

Ref: CG 3d Mar Div 251413Z Nov67
ADMINO III MAF 261132Z Nov67
CTG 76.4 261540Z Nov67
CTG 79.4 262226Z Nov67
ADMINO III MAF 270508Z Nov67
9th Marines 271709Z Nov67

29 Nov 1967 CTG 79.4 with Operations Officer to 9th Marines command post
for a liaison visit.

Warrant Officer C. A. MARLOW, Brigade Awards Officer, 9th MAB,
arrived and departed on a liaison visit in connection with
administrative matters.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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30 Nov 1967 Captain J. M. ROSS and Captain J. W. LOWE departed.

Major H. S. JOLLEY, ACoS G-2 representative, 9th MAB;
Captain E. F. DUNNE, XO, HqCo, 9th MAB; Major E. L. DICKSON
and Major J. M. WINDBERG, Provisional Services Battalion;
aboard for a liaison visit.

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET-NOFORN

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SECRET-NOFORN

PART IV

CHRONOLOGY OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

TAB A

HMM-361 msg 151150Z Nov67
 CTG 79.4 msg 151200Z Nov67
 CG 3d Mar Div msg 160555Z Nov67
 CG III MAF msg 161340Z Nov67
 CTG 79.4 msg 162324Z Nov67
 ADMINSO COMNAVFORC msg 200356Z Nov67
 CG 3d Mar Div msg 251413Z Nov67
 CTG 79.4 msg 260630Z Nov67
 ADMINSO III MAF msg 261132Z Nov67
 CTG 76.4 msg 261540Z Nov67
 CTG 79.4 msg 262226Z Nov67
 ADMINSO III MAF msg 270508Z Nov67
 9th Marines msg 271709Z Nov67

TAB B

Command Chronology 16-27 Nov 1967 BLT 1/3

TAB C

Command Chronology 15-30 Nov 1967 HMM-361.

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET-NOFORN

DECLASSIFIED

P 151150Z NOV 67
FM CO HMM THREE SIX ONE
TO CTC SEVEN NINE FT FOUR
CO MAG ONE FIVE
INFO CG FMAW
CG 9TH MAB
CO MAG ONE SIX
BT

S E C R E T

A. ADMINO 9TH MAB MSG 300706Z OCT 67
FOR CTC 79.4 CO HMM 361 REPORTING FOR OPCON AS OF 151200Z JAN REF A.
FOR MAG ONE FIVE CO HMM 361 REPORTS FOR COMMAND LESS OPCON.
GP-4
BT

DECLASSIFIED

P 151200Z NOV 67
 FM CIG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 TO CG NINTH MAB
 INFO CG FMFPAC
 CG III MAP
 CG FIRST MAW
 CG FMFPAC (FWD)
 COMSEVENTHFLT
 CTF SEVEN SIX
 CTF SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 CO MAG ONE FIVE
 CO MAG ONE SIX
 CO FMW THREE SIX ONE
 BT

S E C R E T

- A. CG 1ST MAW 280251Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)
 - B. ADMINO 9TH MAB 300706Z OCT 67
 - C. ADMINO 9TH MAB 301905Z OCT 67 (NOTAL)
 - D. CO HMM-361 151150Z NOV 67 (NOTAL)
 - 1. IAW REFS OPCON OF HMM-361 ASSUMED EFFECTIVE 151200Z NOV 67
- GP-4
BT

DECLASSIFIED

O 160555Z NOV 67

FM CG THIRD MAR DIV

TO CG III MAF

INFO NINTH MARINES

CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

CTG SEVEN NINEPOINT FOUR

BLT ONE SLANT THREE

BT

S E C R E T

CHANGE OF OPCON BLT ONE SLANT THREE

1. EFF 160900H NOV 67 THIS HQ ASSUMES OPCON BLT ONE SLANT THREE AND CHOPS TO CG III MAF SAME D.T.G.

GP-4

BT

DECLASSIFIED

O P 161340Z NOV 67
FM CG III MAF DANANG
TO CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
INFO CG FMFPAC
COMSEVENTH FLT
CTF SEVEN SIX
CG THIRD MAR DIV
CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
CTF SEVEN NINE
BT

S E C R E T

OPCON BLT 1/3

REF: A. CG THIRD MAR DIV 160555Z NOV 67 (S) NOTAL

1. REF A PASSED OPCON BLT 1/3 TO CG IIIMAF EFF 160900H NOV 67.
2. CG III MAF PASSES OPCON BLT 1/3 TO CTG 79.4 SAME TIME

GP-4

BT

P 162324Z NOV 67
 FM CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 TO CG III MAF
 INFO CG EMPAC
 COMSEVENTHFLT
 CG THIRD MAR DIV
 CTF SEVEN NINE
 CTF SEVEN SIX
 CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 SO BLT ONE SLANT THREE
 BT

S E C R E T

OPCON OF BLT 1/3

A. CG III MAF 161340Z NOV 67

1. IAW REF A., CTG 79.4 ASSUMES OPCON OF BLT 1/3 EFFECTIVE 160900H NOV 67

GP-4

BT

O P 200356Z NOV 67
 FM ADMINO CONSEVENTHFLT
 TO RUMFCR/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 RUMFCR/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 RUMFCR/CTF SEVEN SIX
 RUABOL/CTF SEVEN NINE
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV
 RUMFKE/CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE
 RUABUZ/CTF SEVEN THREE
 RUMFKE/CG III MAF
 INFO CINCPAC
 CINCPACFLT
 COMPHIBPAC
 CG FMF PAC
 FMF PAC (FWD)
 FIRST MAW CG
 CTF ONE ONE FIVE
 CMDR SEVENTH AIR FORCE

PAGE TWO RUMGOL 1304 S E C R E T
 CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE
 CTF SEVEN SEVEN
 CG THIRD MAR DIV
 CG FIRST MAR DIV
 CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
 CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
 CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE
 TU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE
 CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE
 CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT TWO
 BT

S E C R E T

CTE 70.2.1.1 PASS ADVANCED COPY TO COMUSMACV
 BALLISTIC ARCH INITIATING DIRECTIVE (U)

A. MY OPLAN 1/1-67

1. SITUATION JW CG III MAF HAS REQUESTED THE EMPLOYMENT OF AN ARG/SLE IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS IN SHA I CZE. COMNAVFORV WILL PROVIDE CG 76.4/7914 AND SUCI GREEN FORCES AS MAY BE NECESSARY FOR SHL OPERATION. INITIATING DIRECTIVE IS FOR PLANNING PURPOSES. THE OPERATION, WHEN PERFORMED, WILL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AFR

PAGE THREE RUHGUL 1304 S E C R E T

2. MISSION. WHEN DIRECTED, CATF CONDUCT A SEARCH AND DESTROY AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION AGAINST VC/NVA FORCES IN AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE OR I CTZ OR OTHER OPERATIONS AS AGREED UPON WITH CIG III MAF OR HIS DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE.

3. CTG 76.4 (COMPHIBRON THREE) EMBARKED IN USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) DESIGNATED COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (CATF)

4. CTG 79.4 (COMMANDER SLP ALFA) EMBARKED IN USS IWO JIMA DESIGNATED COMMANDER LANDING FORCE (CLF)

5. COMMAND RELATIONSHIP IAW PARA 3X (2) AND EL OF REF A.

6. COMUSMACV WILL PROVIDE ANTI-INFILTRATION/EXFILTRATION PATROL CRAFT FOR THIS OPERATION AND WILL PROVIDE CAS AND OTHER SUPPORT AS AGREED UPON WITH CATF IAW 1B(1) OF REF A.

7. AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA (AOA). THE AOA WILL BE THE LAND AREA BOUNDED ON THE NORTH BY THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF DMZ FROM THE COASTLINE TO THE INTERSECTION OF HIGHWAY ROUTE ONE, THENCE SOUTH ALONG HIGHWAY ONE TO GRIDLINE YE 63/9, THENCE EAST TO THE COAST. THE AREA WITHIN THE AOA WITHIN 1500/6 YARDS RADIUS FROM THE CENTER OF GIO LINH RPT GIO LINH SHALL BE OMITTED FROM THE AOA. THE SEAWARD EXTENSION OF THE AOA SHALL BE A TWENTY-FIVE (25) NAUTICAL MILES CENTERED AT YE 343700/7 WITH THE ARC LOCATED ON THE NORTHERN LAT 160. THE AIR FROM

PAGE FOUR RUHGUL 2304 S E C R E T

ABOVE THE LAND AND SEA AOA SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THE AOA. APPROACHES TO ABOVE KAN DONG HA AIRPORT TO BE COORDINATED WITH DASC, DONG HA. SAFE REENTRY OF CIVIL AIRCRAFT TO BE PROVIDED BY NOTAM.

8. NICKNAME FOR THIS OPERATION WILL BE BALLISTIC ARCH WITH TENTATIVE D-DAY 0/A 22 NOV DEPENDING OF TACTICAL SITUATION. H AND L HOURS TO BE DETERMINED BY CATF AND D-DAY CONFIRMED BY CATF. UPON DETERMINATION OF CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND WHEN ALL FORCES ARE PREPARED CATF REPORT TO ORIG STATE OF READINESS, FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING D-DAY H AND L HOURS AND OTHER MATTERS RELATING TO THIS OPERATION. COMMAND OF EXECUTION WILL BE BY SEPARATE MESSAGE. SUBMIT FORMAL REQUEST FOR EXECUTION AS EARLY AS PRACTICABLE TO ALLOW FOR COMMUNICATION DELAYS. IF ORIGINATOR EXECUTE MSG NOT RECEIVED AT RECOMMENDED TIME FOR EXECUTION, ASSUME APPROVAL, AND ACT ACCORDINGLY, INFORMING ALCON.

9. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

A. WHEN FIRMLY ESTABLISHED ASHORE, AND WHEN MUTUALLY AGREED BY CATF AND CG III MAF. REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF SLP CHOP TO CG III MAF.

B. UPON CHOP OF REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF SLP CHOP TO ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~. OPCON OF IN-COUNTRY COMMANDER, CATF REMAIN IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS ASHORE.

C. WITHDRAWAL IAW ANNEX B TO REF A.

10. TERMINATION IAW ANNEX TO REF A.

11. PUBLIC AFFAIRS IAW ANNEX V TO REF A.

PAGE FIVE RUHGUL 2304 ~~XXX~~ S E C R E T

12. ACTION ADDRESS ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT.

GP-4

BT

BT

VV MEA878VV FFB713AVV CFA138MMZVA 356V PVA18G

RUMEUAK

RUMHVP 6477D 3291413

ZNY SSSSS

O 251413Z NOV 67

FM CG THIRD MARDIV

TO ZEN/CG III MAF

INFO RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV

RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW

RUMFUV/CTF SEVEN SIX

RUABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE

RUMEUAK/CTG SEVEN SIX POINT FOUR

RUMEUAK/CTG SEVEN NINE POINT FOUR

ZEN/NINTH MARINES

ZEN/TWELFTH MARINES

ZEN/FIRST AMTRAC BN

BT

SECRET

PCON OF BLT ONE SLANT THREE.

A. CTG 79.4 21233 8Z NOV 67 (NOTAL)

B. CG THIRD MARDIV 210625Z NOV 67 (NOTAL)

1. RECOMMEND TERMINATION EMPLOYMENT BLT 1/3 IN AOA OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION REFERENCE (A) (BALLISTIC ARCH) 270730H NOVEMBER 1967 AND REQUEST TRANSFER OPCON SELECTED ELEMENTS BLT ONE SLANT THREE (1/3)

PAGE TWO RUMHVP 6477D SECRET

TO THIRDMARDIV EFFECTIVE 271600H AT DONG HA RAMP.

2. ANTICIPATE SIMULTANEOUS PASS OPCON NINTH MARINES.

3. PRESENT PLANS ENVISION EMPLOYMENT BLT ON SLANT THREE (1/3) IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS ASHORE COMMENCING 29 NOVEMBER 1967. OPERALPON NEWTON REFERENCE (B).

4. RECOMMEND LIAISON BE ESTABLISHED 9TH MARINES AND BLT ONE SLANT THREE (1/3) EARLIEST TO DETERMINE SELECTED ITEMS REQUIRED ASHORE.

5. REQUEST ARG/SLF REMAIN IN SUPPORT BLT ONE SLANT THREE (1/3).

GP-4

BT

A-6676

TOR / RUMHVP / 08142/26

two

9/3

251413Z

CF-03

NNKQ

a-7

T
 VV UAK258
 PP RUMGUL RUMFUV RUABOL RUMMWAA
 DE RUMUAK 003 3300630
 ZNY SSSSS
 P 260630Z NOV 67
 FM CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 TO ZEN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 INFO RUMGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
 RUMFUV/CTF SEVEN SIX
 RUABOL/CTF SEVEN NINE
 RUMMWAA/CG III MAF

260630Z NOV 67

RUMFUV

BT

SECRET

BALLISTIC ARCH (U)

A. ADMIN SEVENTHFLT 200355Z NOV 67

1. THE LANDING FORCE IS FIRMLY ESTABLISHED ASHORE. REQUEST CONTROL OF SUPPORTING ARMS REMAIN WITH CATF.

2. CHOP OF REQUIRED ELEMENTS SLF ALFA TO CG III MAF WILL BE MADE AS DIRECTED.

CP-4

BT

M

N3

NNNN

chog

260630Z

a-2

NNNNVV MEA961VV FFB 8200683
 OO RUMEUAK
 ZNY SSSSS
 OTISZYUW RUMNWA2562 6301132-SSSS--RUMEUAK.
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 1132Z NOV 67
 FM ADMINO III MAF DARANG
 TO RUMEUAK/CTF SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

28 Nov 67 1419

A-89

INFO ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV
 BT

SECRET

EMPLOYMENT ARG/SLF ALPHA (CTG 76.4/79.4)

AC 16 THIRD MARDIV 251413Z NOV67

1. EC TERMINATION EMPLOYMENT BLT 1/3 IN AOA OP BALLISTIC ARCH.
 PRESENT INTENTIONS TO EMPLOY BLT 1/3 IN OP NEWTON (KENTUCKY AREA
 VIC CON THIEN)

BEGINNING 29NOV67.

2. REQ YOU PASS OFCON BLT 1/3 TO CG III MAF 270700H NOV67. ANTICIPATE
 OFCON BLT 1/3 PASSES TO CG THIRD MARDIV EFF SAME TIME.

3. REQ DIRLAUTH REC PARA 4 AND APPROVAL REQ CONTAINED PARA 5 REF A.

CP-4

BT

(F) N2

CWO/D
 26 1132Z

a-29

VV URGENT
 CC RUMHAW RUMHLL RUMHVF RUMHUV RUMHAG RUMHOL
 DS RUMHUAH 071 3301340
 ZNY 00000
 O 261540Z NOV 67
 FM CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
 TO RUMHAW/CG III MAF
 ZEN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
 INFO RUMHUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
 RUMHUP CO NINTH MARINES
 RUMHUV/CTF SEVEN SIX
 RUMHUAH/CTG CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
 RUMHUP/CG THIRD MARDIV
 ZEN/AT ONE SLANT THREE
 RUMHOL/CTF SEVEN NINE
 BT

SECRET

ALLISTIC ARCH CHOP (U)

A. ADMIN COMSE ENTHFLT 000300Z NOV 67

B. CG III MAF 261100Z NOV 67 (HOTAL)

1. REF A AND B PERTINENT. CATF AGREES TO CHOP (CHANGE OF POSITION) OF REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF SLF ALFA TO CG III MAF AT 271200H2 RPT 271200H2
2. UPON CHOP OF REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF SLF ALFA TO CG III MAF, AND ALFA WILL REMAIN IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS ASHORE
3. FOR CTG 79.4: REQ YOU CHOP REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF SLF ALFA IAW REF B AND REMAIN IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS ASHORE

4. **MOVEMENT OF BAT 1/3 TO DONG HA RAMP WILL COMMENCE**
 APPROXIMATELY 272730H9 RPT 272730H9 UPON COMPLETION MINE SWEEP
 OF SUB VIET RIVER
 OP-4 (C) 23 DEC 67
 BT

(F)-N3
 (M)

NNNN

cwo
 R

261540Z

a-#10

TO DIRECTOR, ARMY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

FROM: JAGC, WASHINGTON, D.C.

SUBJECT:

RE: JAGC, WASHINGTON, D.C.

FM: JAGC, WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO: DIRECTOR, ARMY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

INFO: JAGC, WASHINGTON, D.C.

RE: JAGC, WASHINGTON, D.C.

FM: JAGC, WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO: DIRECTOR, ARMY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

INFO: JAGC, WASHINGTON, D.C.

RE: JAGC, WASHINGTON, D.C.

FM: JAGC, WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

RE: JAGC, WASHINGTON, D.C.

FM: JAGC, WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

RE: JAGC, WASHINGTON, D.C.

FM: JAGC, WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

RE: JAGC, WASHINGTON, D.C.

FM: JAGC, WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

RE: JAGC, WASHINGTON, D.C.

FM: JAGC, WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

RE: JAGC, WASHINGTON, D.C.

FM: JAGC, WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

RE: JAGC, WASHINGTON, D.C.

FM: JAGC, WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

RE: JAGC, WASHINGTON, D.C.

FM: JAGC, WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

RE: JAGC, WASHINGTON, D.C.

FM: JAGC, WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

RE: JAGC, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Handwritten:
 TSD
 Rums/MS
 22348/26
 Now

Handwritten:
 CNOJ
 262226

NNNNVV MEA051 FFB9960297

00 RUMUUA

ZNY SSSSS

OTISZYUW RUMWAA2615 3310508-SSSS-RUMUAK.

ZNY SSSSS

O 270508Z NOV 67

FM ADMINO III MAF DANANG RVN

TO ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV

INFO RUMUAK/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

RUMUAK/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

RUMGUL/COM SEVENTHFLT

RUMFUV/CTF SEVEN SIX

RUABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE

RUMUAK/BLT ONE SLANT THREE

ZEN/NINTH MARINES

BT

S E C R E T

A. CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR 262226Z NOV67

1. IAW REF A III MAF PASSES UPON BLT 1/0 TO CG THIRD MARDIV EFF
271200H NOV67.

GP-4

BT

(F) K3

(M)

A-42

262226Z
270508Z

2-12

VV MEA320

200507 1 06GZ

VV UAG 762

RR RUMEUAK

ZNY SSSSS ZOV RUMEUAG

ZX7-4

VV MEA850VV FFB187VV CFA496 PVA546

RR RUMEUAK

DE RUMHUF 7107D 331170Z

ZNY CCCCC

R 271700Z NOV 67

FM NINTH MARINES

TO ZEN/06 THIRD MARDIV

INFO ZEN/FOURTH MARINES

ZEN/FIRST BN FOURTH MARINES

RUMEUAK/FIRST BN THIRD MARINES

BT

S E C R E T

OPCON

1. ASSUMED OPCON CMD GRP, CO'S B AND D1/4 FROM

3RD MARDIV EFFECTIVE 271230H NOV 67

2. ASSUMED OPCON 1/3 FROM 3RD MARDIV EFFECTIVE 271200H

NOV 67.

GP-4

BT

NNNN

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CTG 79.4
0042-68
9058

**COMMANDER
SPECIAL LANDING FORCE
ALFA
SEVENTH FLEET**



TG SPECIAL LANDING FORCE ALFA 79.4

**COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
1-31 DECEMBER 1967**

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

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HEADQUARTERS
Task Group 79.4
FPO San Francisco 96602

3/GFW/ajm
SER: 0020-68
20 January 1968

SECRET-NOFORN - Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1)

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade,
Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 to 31 December 1967

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8
(c) BrigO 5750.1C

Encl: (1) Commander Task Group 79.4 Command Chronology

1. Enclosure (1) is submitted in accordance with references (a), (b), and (c).


BRUCE F. MEYERS

DISTRIBUTION:

	Copy #
CG 9th MAB	1-2
CG 1st MAR DIV	3
CG 3d MAR DIV	4
CG 1st MAW	5
CTG 76.4	6
CTG 79.5	7
RLT-26 Rear	8
MAG-15	9
BLT 1/3	10
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SECRET-NOFORN

COMMANDER TASK GROUP 79.4

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 December 1967 to 31 December 1967

INDEX

PART I - ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

PART II - NARRATIVE SUMMARY

PART III - SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

PART IV - SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET-NOFORN

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET-NOFORN

PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. Designation

Task Group 79.4

Commander

Colonel J. A. CONWAY
1-31 December 1967

SUBORDINATE UNITS

BLT 1/3
1-31 December 1967

LtCol R. W. GOODALE
1-31 December 1967

HMM-361
1-31 December 1967

LtCol D. M. WILSON
1-31 December 1967

ATTACHED UNITS

NONE

2. Location

1-31 December 1967

USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
1-31 December 1967

USS CLEVELAND (LPD-7)
1-31 December 1967

USS COMSTOCK (LSD-19)
2-31 December 1967

USS FORT MARION (LSD-22)
1-2 December 1967

USS WASHTENAW CTY (LST-1166)
1-7 December 1967

USS TULARE (AKA-112)
7-19 December 1967

USS WEXFORD CTY (LST-1168)
19-31 December 1967

3. Staff Officers

Executive Officer

LtCol P. H. SIMPSON
1-31 December 1967

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ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET NOFORN

S-1/Adjutant

S-2

ASST S-2/Aerial Observer

S-3

ASST S-3

Fire Support Coordinator

S-4

Communications Officer

4. Average Monthly Strength

	USMC	
	OFF	ENL
Hq, Task Group 79.4	10	24
BLT 1/3	60	1423
EMM-361	46	149

1stLt J. C. SMITH
1-31 December 1967

Captain W. N. FOWLER
1-31 December 1967

Captain J. A. HATCHETT
1-31 December 1967

LtCol J. ERWIN
1-31 December 1967

Major G. F. WARREN
1-31 December 1967

LtCol R. F. MOODY
1-27 December 1967

Major R. M. BLACK
16-31 December 1967

Captain P. J. SAMUELS
1-31 December 1967

Captain L. M. ZWICK
1-31 December 1967

	USN	
	OFF	ENL
	0	0
	8	78
	1	3

SECRET-NOFORN

ENCLOSURE (1)

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PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

On 1 December, Task Group 79.4, engaged in Operation BALLISTIC ARCH with OPCON of HMM-361, was embarked aboard ARG/SLE ALFA shipping off the northeast coast of the Republic of South Viet Nam near the mouth of the Cua Viet River. Task Group 79.4 provided helicopter, medical and limited logistical support for BLT 1/3 which was in Operation KENTUCKY under the OPCON of the CO, 9th Marines. Helicopter support was also provided to the 3d MAR DIV during the period 1-29 December. The general off-loading of BLT 1/3 was completed on 22 December and embarkation of selected items of BLT 2/4 were loaded commencing on 24 December. COMSEVENTHFLT terminated Operation BALLISTIC ARCH at 290600H. The embarkation of selected items BLT 2/4 continued through the remainder of December.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET-NOFORN

PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

- 1 Dec 1967 Major H. S. JOLLEY, ACofS G-2 representative, 9th MAB, Captain E. F. DUNNE, ExecO, HqCo, 9th MAB, Major E. L. DICKSON and Major J. M. WINDBERG, ProvServBn, 9th MAB departed.
- 4 Dec 1967 CTG 79.4 and TG 79.4 S-3 Officer made a liaison visit to BLT 1/3 command group
- 5 Dec 1967 LtCol W. WEISE, CO, BLT 2/4 and members of his staff aboard for a liaison visit concerning forthcoming embarkation. LtCol L. C. WITT, ACofS G-3 representative, 9th MAB aboard for a liaison visit.
- 6 Dec 1967 LtCol L. C. WITT departed. 9th MAB Administrative Team aboard for instructional training in routine administrative matters.
- 7 Dec 1967 LtCol P. H. SIMPSON and Major G. F. WARREN, TG 79.4, departed TAD to Subic Bay, R. P. to observe BLT 3/1 rehab program.
- 8 Dec 1967 Representatives from BLT 2/4 Staff aboard for liaison visit concerning forthcoming embarkation. Major J. R. CATON, ACofS G-4 representative, 9th MAB, aboard for liaison visit. Captain P. J. SAMUELS, S-4 Officer, TG 79.4 made a liaison visit to 3d MAR DIV, Hq.
- 9 Dec 1967 9th MAB Administrative Team departed. CTG 79 and members of his staff arrived and departed on a liaison visit. Colonel W. A. BUTCHER, ACofS G-4, 9th MAB aboard for liaison visit. Major J. R. CATON departed.
- 10 Dec 1967 Representatives from BLT 2/4 staff aboard for liaison visit concerning forthcoming embarkation. Colonel W. A. BUTCHER departed.
- 14 Dec 1967 CTG 79.4 and members of TG 79.4 staff made a liaison visit to 3d MAR DIV, Hq. 2dLt W. R. PAINTER, Asst Adj/OinC RPS, 9th MAB aboard for liaison visit.
- 15 Dec 1967 Major R. G. BUSTOS, Aviation Logistic Officer, 9th MAB and 1stLt T. L. PRICE, Asst. Adj, 9th MAB aboard for liaison visit.
- 16 Dec 1967 Major R. G. BUSTOS and 1stLt T. L. PRICE departed.

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Major R. M. BLACK reported to CTG 79.4 for duty as relief for LtCol R. F. MOODY

- 17 Dec 1967 LtCol D. J. QUICK, Asst OpnsO, 9th MAB aboard for liaison visit. CTG 79.4, TG 79.4 S-4 Officer and BLT 1/3 ExecO made a liaison visit to 3d MAR DIV, Hq. LtCol P. H. SIMPSON and Major G. F. WARREN, returned from TAD.
- 18 Dec 1967 CTG 79.4 made a liaison visit to 3d MAR DIV, Hq. 2dLt W. R. PAINTER departed.
- 19 Dec 1967 LtCol D. J. QUICK departed. Major J. L. KERSHNER, ISO, 9th MAB; Capt O. M. THOMPSON, Asst G-1, 9th MAB; and Capt H. W. HIGGINS, Adj, 9th MAB aboard for liaison visit.
- 20 Dec 1967 Major J. L. KERSHNER, Capt O. M. THOMPSON, Capt H. W. HIGGINS departed. Capt B. J. BORCHETT, Combat IntelO, 9th MAB and 1stLt R. D. TEMPLETON, Combat IntelO, 9th MAB aboard for liaison visit.
- 21 Dec 1967 Capt B. J. BORCHETT and 1stLt R. D. TEMPLETON departed. Representatives from BLT 2/4 staff aboard for liaison visit concerning forthcoming embarkation. CTG 79.4 made a liaison visit to 3d MAR DIV, Hq. LtCol R. F. MOODY, and Major R. M. BLACK, TG 79.4, FSC Officers made a liaison visit to TG 79.5.
- 22 Dec 1967 LtCol W. WEISE, CO BLT 2/4 and members of his staff aboard for liaison visit. General off-loading of BLT 1/3 equipment completed.
- 24 Dec 1967 Major R. D. BLOOMFIELD, Asst CEO, 9th MAB, and Capt N. J. LADUCA, LogO, 9th MAB aboard for liaison visit. CTG 79.4 and party to III MAF Hq for a liaison visit. LtCol B. F. MEYERS, ACofS, G-3, 9th MAB aboard for liaison visit. Commenced embarkation of selected items of equipment from BLT 2/4. Major G. F. WARREN, TG 79.4, Asst S-3 Officer, Major L. DELMORE II and Capt J. E. LUBY Jr., HMM-361, departed on TAD for Subic Bay, R. P. in connection with advance party for rehab period at Subic.
- 26 Dec 1967 LtCol P. R. FIELDS, LtCol B. F. MEYERS, and Capt N. J. LADUCA departed. LtCol R. F. MOODY, departed on PCS orders.
- 27 Dec 1967 CTG 79.4 to III MAF Hq and Hq 79.5 on a liaison visit.

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- 28 Dec 1967 Major R. D. BLOOMFIELD departed. LtCol J. ERWIN, TG 79.4, S-3 Officer to TG 79.5 on a liaison visit. Capt P. J. SAMUELS, TG 79.4, S-4 Officer to BLT 2/4 Hq on a liaison visit. Major W. L. LANG Jr. , Ordnance Officer, 9th MAB and Ordnance Team aboard in connection with Ordnance matters.
- 29 Dec 1967 LtCol G. H. BENSKIN, ACoS G-1, 9th MAB aboard from liaison visit Operation BALLISTIC ARCH terminated by COMSEVENTHFLT at 290600H.
- Ref: COMSEVENTHFLT 280512Z
- 31 Dec 1967 LtCol G. H. BENSKIN departed.

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PART IV

CHRONOLOGY OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

TAB A ✓

COMSEVENTHFLT 280512Z Dec67

TAB B ✓ *See page*

Command Chronology 1-31 Dec 1967, HMM-361

TAB C -

CTG 79.4 After Action Report BALLISTIC ARCH/
KENTUCKY, *28 Dec 67 - 29 Dec 67*

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DEC 28 08 36 '67

71 YEAG58VV RGA1B4
EV NMSA532VV ULD 32
00 RUYEUAK
00 RUAUBUL 1895 3620512
00 38888

0 280512Z DEC 67 ZYC RUAUBA
FM CONSEVENTINFLT
TO RUYEUAK/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
RUMHQA/CINCPAC
RUMAAA/CNO
RUMHRA/CINCPACFLT
INFO RUYEUAK/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
RUMJO/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
RUMIV/CTF SEVEN SIX
RUMHNA/COMUSMACV
RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV
RUMHWA/CG III MAF
RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV
RUMFUC/CTF SEVEN SEVEN
RUMABCL/CTF SEVEN NINE
RUMJMSA/COMPHIBPAC
RUMHFA/CG FMFPAC
RUMABCL/CG FMFPAC (FWD)
RUMHVD/CTF ONE ONE FIVE
RUMSBJ/COMDR SEVENTH AIR FORCE

A-46

00 TWO RUAUBUL 1895 S E C R E T
00 RUYEUAK/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE
00 RUMSBB/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT TWO
00 RUMHVD/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE
00 RUMHNA/CG FIRST MAR DIV
00 RUMHNA/CG FIRST MAR

N
RUMHQA/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
RUMHRA/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
RUMHVP/CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE
RUMHVP/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE
RUMHRA/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE
RUMHQA/CTG SEVEN THREE

S E C R E T
00 70.2.1.1 NFGS ADVANCE COPY TO COMUSMACV
OPERATION BWSLISTIC ARCH (U)
00 FOR CTG 76.1: TERMINATE OPERATION BA

00 FOR CNO, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT: CANCEL NICKNAME BALLISTIC ARCH.

280512Z

Tab A

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TAB "0"

COMMANDER
SPECIAL LANDING FORCE
ALFA
SEVENTH FLEET



TG SPECIAL LANDING FORCE ALFA 79.4

AFTER ACTION REPORT
BALLISTIC ARCH/KENTUCKY
4 NOVEMBER-24 DECEMBER 1967

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

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Handwritten notes on the right margin, including "TG 79.4" and "79.4".

Handwritten date "14 Dec 1967" at the bottom right.

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HEADQUARTERS
Task Group 79.4
FPO San Francisco 96602

3/GPW/der
SER: 0021-68
21 January 1968

SECRET-NOFORN - Unclassified upon removal of enclosures (1) through (4)

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade

Subj: Combat After Action Report, Operation BALLISTIC ARCH/KENTUCKY

Encl: (1) Commander Task Group 79.4, After Action Report, Operation
BALLISTIC ARCH/KENTUCKY

(2) - BLT 1/3, After Action Report, Operation BALLISTIC ARCH, 24-27 Jan 68
(3) - HMM-361, After Action Report, Operation BALLISTIC ARCH, 24-27 Jan 68
(4) - Operations Overlay, BALLISTIC ARCH

1. Enclosure (1) contains the Commander Task Group 79.4's After Action Report for Operation BALLISTIC ARCH/KENTUCKY.

2. Enclosures (2) through (4) amplify enclosure (1).

Bruce F. Meyers
BRUCE F. MEYERS

DISTRIBUTION:

	Copy #
TG 79.4 Cmd Chronology	1-15
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S&C File Copy	50

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Map reference: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, AMS Series L 7014, Sheets 6442 I and IV

1. GENERAL

a. Operation BALLISTIC ARCH was a unilateral amphibious operation using surface craft and helicopters to land the Landing Force. The operation included support of a follow-on "in-country" operation. Inclusive dates of BALLISTIC ARCH were 24-27 November 1967. The operation was conducted in accordance with NWP-22(B).

b. Operation KENTUCKY was a search and destroy operation conducted by the 9th Marines in QUANG TRI Province in the vicinity of the southern border of the Demilitarized Zone. BLT 1/3 was under the operational control of the CO 9th Marines during the operation. This operation utilized three Marine Battalions and was coordinated with an adjacent ARVN operation. While BLT 1/3 was participating in Operation KENTUCKY operational control of two of its companies was passed to the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion and they participated in Operation NAPOLEON.

c. Operation BALLISTIC ARCH/KENTUCKY was conducted in the GIO LINH and CAM LO districts of the QUANG TRI Province.

d. The operation commenced with the landing of BLT 1/3 by helicopter at 240658H and by surface craft at 240700H November 1967. Operational control of BLT 1/3 was passed to CG III MAF at 271200H November 1967.

e. The Commander, Task Group 79.4, embarked aboard ARG/SLF shipping, retained operational control of HMM-361 and provided helicopter support to BLT 1/3 and to 3d MAR DIV operations. Medical evacuation and limited supply support was provided for BLT 1/3 during Operation KENCUTKY and for the two companies from BLT 1/3 who participated in Operation NAPOLEON.

f. Operation BALLISTIC ARCH was terminated by the Commander, 7th Fleet at 290600H December 1967.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

a. Operation BALLISTIC ARCH

Task Group 79.4

Colonel J. A. CONWAY

BLT 1/3

LtCol R. W. GOODALE

HMM-361

LtCol D. M. WILSON

b. Operation **KENTUCKY**

Task Group 79.4

Colonel J. A. CONWAY

HMM-361

LtCol D. M. WILSON

ENCLOSURE (1)

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3. INTELLIGENCEa. Terrain

(1) General. The study area is a portion of the seaward margin of the central coastal lowlands and delta plain, consisting of low lying, often flooded, poorly drained land. It is compartmented by four segments of terrain, all generally aligned with the coast and paralleling one another. They progress inland from gently rolling sandy beaches and dunes to a low area of rice cultivation with a network of deep steep-banked streams, canals, and ditches, then to a flat and sandy plain with no significant relief, and finally to another strip of rice cultivation with numerous settlements, the houses surrounded by thick hedges of shrubs and trees, lying adjacent to National Highway #1.

(2) Relief. Except for the narrow strip of rice cultivation immediately behind the beach the area from the coast to 4 kilometers inland is characterized by flat to gently rolling sand dunes. The ground slopes are normally less than 10 percent and elevations up to 25 meters. This strip of sand dunes rises toward the northwest forming a ridge (average elevation 20 meters) which is contiguous to a strip of paddy land averaging 3 kilometers in width and paralleling the beach. This coastal lowland plain consists primarily of poorly drained, level areas of rice cultivation. The most prominent relief features are the dikes that are commonly 0.5 to 2.0 meters high and 0.5 to 2.5 meters wide. Locally, the ground is rough and considerably dissected by steep-banked streams, canals and ditches. From the ricelands, terrain inland changes to a flat sandy level plain having a width of 2,000 meters. This plain is virtually flat and interlaced with basins of water. Immediately adjacent to National Highway #1, another strip of rice-land extends inland 4,000 meters wide to the north and south and having the sandy plain in its center. The highest elevation in the study area is a point at YD 214743 being 51 meters high.

(3) Drainage. Except for the sand dune area in the east, most of the coastal plain is poorly drained and is affected by seasonal rains. The principal drainage media is the Cua Viet and Ben Ngu rivers. The Ben Ngu River drains the ricelands flanked by sandy plains and flows in two directions connecting the Cua Viet River and the Ben Hai River to the north. It runs parallel to the coast, approximately 6 kilometers inland. These two rivers are navigable to small craft.

(4) Beach Study. The beach is located at center at 16°57'40"N 107°08'54"E (UTM YD 286764). The beach is 13,000 meters long with 10,000 meters being useable. The average width of the beach at low tide is 46 meters to 230 meters and at high tide is 22 meters to 91 meters. The gradient is 1:30 to 1:60 low water to high water and 1:10 to 1:15 high water zone. All approaches to the beach are clear for LCM's and LVT's although sand bars are prevalent at low tide. A surf of four feet or greater can be expected 38% of the time. The tidal range runs from a minimum .3' to a maximum rise of 4.0'. The mean tidal range is .3' in the fall. The current is negligible except during high surf conditions. The mouth of the Cua Viet River has a very fast current due to the

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tremendous amount of water flowing from the mountains. The beach is comprised of fine white sand and trafficability is generally good. Exits are cross country and along trails from the beach. Numerous trails and roads inland from the beach run perpendicular and parallel to National Highway #1. There were no noted defensive installations on the beach. The best point of landing on the beach is from coordinates 16°55'50"N, 107°10'39"E (UTM YD 314730) to 16°54'24"N, 107°12'00"E (UTM YD 336709). The trafficability for off-loading LCM's and LVT's is good.

b. Enemy Situation

(1) General. Intelligence prior to the operation indicated that elements of the 270th NVA Regiment, the 27th LF Battalion and the K-400 LF Company were operating in the AQA. However, there was a marked decrease in activity during the month prior to Operation BALLISTIC ARCH, which suggested these units were possibly operating in a different area. The combined strength of these units number approximately 2,000 men. The VAN AN Artillery Regiment, located north of the DMZ, has the capability of supporting any of the units in our amphibious objective area.

(2) Order of Battle

UNIT	LOCATION	STRENGTH	WEAPONS
270th Regt (NVA)	YD 256749	Hq 200	Unk
4th Bn	YD 249725	425	Unk
5th Bn	Unk	425	Unk
6th Bn	YD 2766	425	6 82mm Mort
27th Indep Bn (LF)	YD 2464	400	4 120mm Mort, Unk B-40 rcts, AK's, HMG's, 60mm Mort
K-400 Co (LF)	YD 2575	95	3 60mm Mort, 2 B-40 rcts, 6 BAR's

4. MISSION

a. BALLISTIC ARCH. As directed by COMSEVENTHFLT 200356Z NOV 67 (Initiating Directive), the mission assigned to CATF and CLF was to "conduct a search and destroy amphibious operation against VC/NVA forces in amphibious objective area in QUANG TRI Province of I CTZ or other operations as agreed upon with CG III MAF or his designated representative."

b. KENTUCKY. As mutually agreed between CATF and CG III MAF, CTG 76.4/79.4 were to remain in support of operations ashore.

5. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

a. Operation BALLISTIC ARCH was to be a unilateral amphibious operation conducted against VC/NVA forces located north of the Cua Viet

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and south of the southern boundary of the DMZ (see operations overlay, enclosure (4) to the basic letter). The operation was to be conducted in two phases.

(1) Phase I was to consist of a simultaneous helicopter-borne and waterborne assault into the amphibious objective area (AOA) followed by a rapid sweep southwestward to seize and occupy the first of three Task Group objectives. On order, the attack was to turn towards the northwest to seize the second objective. This movement was to be characterized by a deliberate search of the area for enemy rockets and logistic caches. The attack was then to continue on order to the northwest to seize the third objective and other objectives to be designated.

(2) Phase II was to consist of an amphibious withdrawal by surface and/or helicopters from the AOA in preparation for BLT 1/3 participation in an "in country" operation.

a. TG 76.4/79.4 were to provide helicopter and limited logistic support to BLT 1/3 during follow-on operations ashore.

6. EXECUTION

a. BALLISTIC ARCH.

(1) Operation BALLISTIC ARCH was executed in accordance with CTG 76.4 Operation Order 315-68 and CTG 79.4 OP PLAN 120A-67 supplemented by CTG 79.4 frag orders for operations in the amphibious objective area.

(2) D-day was established as 23 November but was delayed one day due to inclement weather until 24 November with H and L hour at 0700.

(3) TG 79.4 commenced landing its helicopter-borne assault forces at 240658H November and its waterborne assault forces at 240700H. All assault elements of the Landing Force were ashore by 241120H.

(4) BLT 1/3 moved toward TG 79.4 Objective A with negative enemy contact and the objective was secured by 241400H. BLT 1/3 established and occupied night defensive positions in the vicinity of Task Group Objective A.

(5) At first light on 25 November, BLT 1/3 advanced toward TG 79.4 Objective B and seized it by 251200H without opposition. Night defensive positions were established and occupied in the vicinity of Task Group Objective B.

(6) Based on an intelligence report indicating a possible rocket storage area the direction of attack was changed on 26 November and BLT 1/3 advanced toward the southwest. The search of the suspected storage area produced negative results and the BLT was ordered to continue to advance towards the north bank at the mouth of the CUA VIET river. CTG 79.4 (Cdr) reported the Landing Force firmly established

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ashore on 26 November and requested control of supporting arms remain with CATF.

(7) Phase II commenced at 270715H from White Beach (vic YD 339700) when the lead elements of BLT 1/3 loaded aboard landing craft to move to DONG HA. The amphibious withdrawal was completed by 271145H.

b. KENTUCKY. During this "in country" operation TG 79.4 provided helicopter, medical, and limited logistic support for BLT 1/3. TG 79.4 also provided helicopter support for 3d MAR DIV operations ashore during the period 27 November to 29 December 1967.

7. RESULTS. See enclosures (2) and (3).

8. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS. This analysis is limited to matters at the TG 79.4 level. The BLT and HMM commander's analyses are included in their reports, enclosures (2) and (3) respectively.

a. Planning

(1) On 18 November CTG 79.4 and staff with representatives of CTG 76.4 attended a planning conference at 3d MAR DIV Command Post. A second planning conference was held at the 3d MAR DIV Command Post on 19 November which involved the same personnel.

(2) CTG 79.4 and staff with CTG 76.4 and staff and the CO BLT 1/3 attended presentation of the proposed concept of operations for the upcoming special operations. CG 3d MAR DIV approved the basic concept.

(3) Additional planning and liaison conferences were attended by various TG 79.4 staff members on 21 and 22 November.

(4) TG 79.4 planning was continuous and was conducted concurrently with the TG 76.4 staff. During the planning phase the following was accomplished:

(a) Arrangements were made with CG 3d MAR DIV for area studies, special intelligence studies and aerial photographs. Current information was also obtained from the 9th Marines and the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion.

(b) Augmentation personnel in the form of an Interrogator Translator team, an Armed Propaganda team and Interpreters were requested in addition to reward funds.

(c) Radio frequencies were obtained and the Communication Operating Instructions (COI) was published.

(d) Arrangements were made for augmented helicopter support consisting of one unarmed and four armed UH-1E's.

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(e) Arrangements were made to establish a liaison team at the 9th Marines headquarters for coordination of medical evacuation, casualty reporting and helicopter support during the follow-on "in country" operations.

(f) Arrangements were made for a TG 79.4 casualty liaison teams to be positioned at "in country" sites for collecting and forwarding casualty reports to the 9th MAB CRCC-ALFA embarked aboard the USS IWO JIMA.

(g) The AOA was discussed, agreed upon, and command relationships were finalized.

(h) Exchanged liaison parties with the 2d Regt 1st ARVN DIV and the QUANG TRI Province Chief.

(j) Logistic support for Operation BALLISTIC ARCH would initially be provided from supplies embarked aboard ARG shipping. Upon completion of that phase of the operation in the coastal region north of the Cua Viet river, the 9th Marines would then assume OPCON of BLT 1/3 and provide logistic support. All classes of supplies, with the exception of Class II non-consumable items were to be available to the BLT from the LSA at DONG HA Combat Base at this time. The ARG/SLF would be available to provide support as requested.

(k) Prior arrangements were made to utilize the Class I, III, and V assets of 1st AmTrac Battalion for resupply of the BLT AmTrac platoon and 105 Btry which were located within the AmTrac battalion perimeter.

b. Command Relationships

(1) Operation BALLISTIC ARCH was a unilateral amphibious operation with command relationships in accordance with NWP-22(B). Responsibility for control and coordination of supporting arms was not assumed by CLF. However, CLF reported to CATF that the Landing Force was firmly established ashore on 26 November. OPCON of BLT 1/3 was passed to an "in country" commander during the operation.

(2) At 271200H November 1967, CTG 79.4 passed OPCON of BLT 1/3 to CG III MAF (CTG 79.4 262226Z NOV 67). CG III MAF simultaneously passed OPCON of BLT 1/3 to CG 3d MAR DIV (AdminO CG III MAF 270508Z NOV 67). CG 3d MAR DIV chopped OPCON of BLT 1/3 to CO 9th Marines concurrently. OPCON of HMM-361 remained under CTG 79.4 during Operation BALLISTIC ARCH/KENTUCKY. Operation BALLISTIC ARCH was terminated at 290600H (COMSEVENTHFLT 280512Z NOV 67).

c. Enemy Contact. There was no significant enemy contact during the three days of the amphibious portion of Operation BALLISTIC ARCH. One VCS was apprehended. HMM-361 helicopters received light to moderate anti-aircraft fire throughout Operation BALLISTIC ARCH resulting in 3 aircraft receiving hits with minor damage.

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d. Supporting Arms

(1) Naval gunfire support for Operation BALLISTIC ARCH was provided by the following ships:

USS NEWPORT NEWS (CA 148)
 USS ROBISON (DDG 12)
 USS GOLDSBOROUGH (DDG 20)
 USS COLLETT (DD 730)
 USS NEW (DD 818)
 USS DUPONT (DD 914)

There were no preparation fires of LZ ROBIN or GREEN BEACH because of the proximity of friendly forces. Suppressing fires were on call but not executed for suspect targets south of the DMZ that effected LZ ROBIN and GREEN BEACH. Suppression fires were executed on known and suspect NVA artillery positions in the DMZ and north of the DMZ up to the CAPE LAY area from L-hour-90 to L-hour+30. Naval gunfire ordnance expended during the entire operation included 1600 rounds of neutralization fire, 390 rounds of call fire, 46 rounds of counter battery, and 986 rounds of H&I fire, totaling 3022 rounds.

(2) Close air support was provided by 1st MAW initially. Two fixed wing aircraft were on station from H/L-15 to H/L+30. Subsequently 2 aircraft were on call. VMO-3 provided 4 armed and 1 unarmed UH-1E's for helo escort, suppressive fires, TAC(A), and TAO throughout the operation. No suppressive fire missions were actually executed.

(3) Artillery support was provided by the 105mm howitzer battery organic to the BLT. In addition a platoon of LVTH-6 105mm howitzers organic to the 1st AmTrac Bn were in direct support for the operation. General support reinforcing fires from 12th Marine assets at DONG HA and GIO LINH were available but not called upon by the BLT. Artillery support included 1 observed mission, 0 unobserved missions and 36 H&I missions totaling 133 rounds expended.

(4) Coordination of supporting arms was controlled by CATF throughout the operation.

e. Logistics

(1) To provide for the necessary coordination of supply for the BLT, the Shore Party Team was initially positioned on the USS CLEVELAND. All supplies were consolidated on this ship to provide the dual capability of utilizing LCM-8's or UH-34 helicopters in re-supplying the BLT. A Shore Party Liaison Team was also positioned at the north ramp of the Cua Viet river mouth to handle any supplies arriving by LCM-8's. LVTP's were available for unit distribution from the ramp. In as much as the weather permitted helo operations, the use of LCM-8's was not necessary.

(2) During the period the BLT was under OPCON of the 9th Marines the Shore Party Team was relocated from the USS CLEVELAND to the

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LSA at DONG HA to continue processing resupply for the BLT.

(3) Poor weather conditions commencing D plus 6 greatly restricted the use of the helicopters aboard the IWO JIMA. Helo resupply continued with CH-46's and UH-34's from "in country" squadrons. Resupply flights were limited to a few hours each day due to the low ceiling and rain during most of the day. No critical problems developed.

(4) The USS IWO JIMA was designated the Primary Casualty Evacuation Receiving Station (PCRS). When weather conditions prevented helo MED-EVAC's to return to the USS IWO JIMA, casualties were evacuated to Co "D", 3d Med Bn, DONG HA by "in country" helos.

(5) "In country" maintenance facilities were available. No major problems existed.

f. Casualty Reporting. Casualty reporting was conducted in accordance with current directives. The 9th MAB CRCC-ALFA was located aboard the USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2), which was designated the Primary Casualty Evacuation Receiving Ship. BLT 1/3 and TG 79.4 casualty representatives were positioned at "D" Co, 3d Medical Bn, DONG HA, RVN and "A" Co, 3d Medical Bn, PHU BAI, RVN to collect and pass on to the 9th MAB CRCC-ALFA, information on Special Landing Force ALFA casualties.

Casualty Recapitulation

Operation BALLISTIC ARCH	KIA	WIA	WIANE	NON-HOSTILE
BLT 1/3	0	0	0	4
HMM-361	0	0	0	0
ADMITTANCE	0	0	0	0
Operation KENTUCKY				
BLT 1/3	9	57	8	59
HMM-361	0	2	0	0
ADMITTANCE	0	4	0	0
Operation NAPOLEON				
BLT 1/3	1	9	0	0
HMM-361	0	0	0	0
ADMITTANCE	0	0	0	0
.TOTAL	10	72	8	63

g. Civic Action. No civic action program was conducted due to the area of operation and the operational commitments.

h. ISO. A photographer and journalist were sent ashore with BLT 1/3 to provide informational services coverage.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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i. Communications

(1) Communications were established IAW CTG 79.4 OP PLAN 120A-67 and with the COI issued separately. A message center was maintained afloat in conjunction with Navy comm center with 79.4 assuming communications guard for BLT 1/3 and HFM-361. The following nets were entered or established during operation BALLISTIC ARCH:

(a) 3d MAR DIV TAC #2

CTG 79.4 entered this net maintaining covered (Nestor) communication with the 3d MAR DIV.

(b) III MAF CMD #2

CTG 79.4 entered this net (RATT, Orestes, 60 WPM) employing it for lengthy reporting to III MAF.

(c) SLF TAC #1

CTG 79.4 established this net with BLT 1/3.

(d) FSC Coord

CTG 79.4 established this net with ALFA Btry 1/12 FSCC, BLT 1/3, and a liaison officer located at the 9th Marines FSCC in DONG HA. Some difficulty was encountered on this net during the first few hours due to mechanical problems. This problem was rectified by remoting an AN/PRC-25 from the flight deck to SACC.

(e) TAC LOG

CTG 79.4 established this net with the four ships of the ARG, the LSA, and the S-4 of BLT 1/3 for logistics purposes.

(2) During Operation KENTUCKY the FSC Coordination net was secured and traffic on 3d MAR DIV TAC #2 was nominal. Also during Operation KENTUCKY a AN/MRC-110 with the Nestor Crypto System was employed at DONG HA with a liaison officer and two radio operators. This radio jeep served as a relay to another radio operator and a SNCO who were collocated with BLT 1/3. Another operator was positioned at Delta Med, DONG HA for administrative casualty reporting. All these 79.4 personnel maintained communications on this net with personnel aboard the USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) which acted as net control. This net was used for situation, spot, casualty and administrative reporting as well as being used for Med Evac requests. Heavy reliance has been placed on the Nestor Crypto System (KY-8/TSEC) and has proved to be invaluable in fixed positions as when employed on Operation KENTUCKY.

(3) Communications during Operation BALLISTIC ARCH/KENTUCKY ranged from good to very good. Mutual interference between the various

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UHF/FM radios aboard the USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2), again required extensive use of alternate and spare frequencies to circumvent the problem.

9. The following comments are included on the subordinate commanders' combat after action report:

a. BMT 1/5 After Action Report:

(1) Concur with recommendation of paragraph 13.a. Frequency coordination and assignment is a very critical problem and is caused by a number of factors, among them being the relatively long range of the PRC-25, use of the PRC-25 in place of the PRC-47 and the PRC-41 (FAC communicates with AO instead of directly with aircraft), operations conducted in areas occupied by allied forces who are using radios in the same frequency range and use of high gain antennas with the PRC-25 in order to increase its range. All of these factors, and others, contribute significantly to the mutual interference problems that continue to plague both ground and air units. Light weight HF and UHF equipment would induce the ground units to rely more on those radios and would provide some relief for the frequency crowding in the VHF range. However in the immediate future there would seem to be no relief other than more articulate frequency allocation to units operating in close proximity to each other. The problem is more difficult in the case of SLF units because of rapid redeployment to various areas within I CTZ.

(2) The recommendation of paragraph 13. b. is considered inappropriate. The sea conditions were known and discussed with the AmTrac platoon commander prior to the operation who indicated that his AmTracs could negotiate the surf as predicted. Safety of personnel landing in amphibious vehicles was a prime and continuing consideration throughout the planning and execution of the ship-to-shore movement. An analysis of the landing suggests that if the LVT's had remained buttoned up and personnel remained inside the situation described in paragraph 12.b. would not have occurred.

(3) Paragraph 12.c.. The intelligence reports of all recent operations have indicated a larger concentration of VC/NVA forces than has been actually encountered in the AOA. The intelligence is based on information gathered from many sources, including infantry units, and is keyed to receipt of accurate information from these various sensors. Perhaps a re-evaluation of the reliability of the sources might produce a clearer intelligence picture for future amphibious operations.

b. HMM-361 After Action Report

(1) Paragraph 2.b. of enclosure (3). The statement concerning inexperienced operators is incongruous with statements of previous

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helicopter squadrons who supported BLT 1/3. It would seem more likely that the pilots of HMM-361 were just not accustomed to the procedures in use by the BLT even though conferences were held prior to the operation in order to work out helicopter control procedures.

(2) Paragraph 3 of enclosure (3). Concur with the statement that the problems encountered were relatively minor. A closer working relationship between the ground control radio operators and the helicopter pilots is constantly being promoted and encouraged.