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Task Group 79.5 (SLF) Exercise SILVER BLADE Rpt, 15 - 24 Mar 1963

- 1) TG 79.5 (SLF) , Post Exercise report of PHIBLEX 1-63 (SILVER BLADE),  
\_\_\_Apr 1963 (S&C 249 418)
- 2) US Pacific Fleet, Cdr SEVENTH Flt, Letter of Instruction for US/GRC  
Coordinated PHIBLEX (SILVER BLADE), 8 Jan 1963. (S&C 245 622)
- 3) Pacific Command. Outline of Significant Exercise [SILVER BLADE/YEN-JEN],  
11 Jan 1963 (S&C 245 652)
- 4) CTG 132.8, Cdr LF U.S. and Cdr SLF, Operations Order 302-63, SILVER BLADE,  
1 Mar 1963 (S&C 248 315)

See also: Amphibious Group-1: Exercise SILVER BLADE Report. 13 - 24 Mar 1963

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AO2D-JWU-hjh

6 FEB 1964

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G-2 Comment on S&C 249418

Subj: PHIBLEX 1-63 (SILVER BLADE); Post Exercise Report

1. It is recommended that no action be taken with regard to pathfinder aspects of the report until such time as the final report of the CMCLFDC Pathfinder Conference has been received and acted upon by HQMC.

*Randolph C. Berkeley, Jr.*  
 RANDOLPH C. BERKELEY, Jr.

*TG 79.5 (SLE)*

*OP SILVER BLADE 1964*



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*15-241122 1963*

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14 JAN 1964

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on Comdr SLF (CTG 79.5) ltr 30/RLR/wkc  
Ser: 03A12063 undated

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code: AO3E)

Subj: PHIBLEX 1-63 (SILVER BLADE); Post Exercise Report of

1. Forwarded. Concurring in report as modified by the first endorsement.
2. The lack of an adequate pathfinder capability with the Special Landing Force has been of concern to this Headquarters. Paragraph 3.b. of the first endorsement provides for a partial capability. Page 7, paragraph 1.b. of enclosure 3 indicates the need for Force Reconnaissance Personnel to increase the capability of the Special Landing Force.
3. It is recommended that the Commandant of the Marine Corps consider the assignment of an additional Force Reconnaissance Platoon to the 3d Marine Division. This assignment will enable the Special Landing Force to have one platoon while the other platoon remains with the 3d Marine Division to support its operations.
4. The delay in the submission of this report was caused by the submission of the original document directly to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The original was returned to this Headquarters in late November 1963. By copy of this endorsement the Commanding General, 3d Marine Division is requested to comply with the provisions of reference (a) in submitting future reports.

  
C. A. ROBERTS

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Comdr CTF-79  
CG 3d MarDiv

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9 Aug 1963FIRST ENDORSEMENT on Commander Special Landing Force (CTG 79.5) ltr  
30/BLR/wkc Ser: 03A12063 of March 1963

011303

From: Commander, Fleet Marine Force, SEVENTH Fleet (TF 79)  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3E)  
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: PHIELEX 1-63 (SILVER BLADE) Post Exercise Report

1. Forwarded, concurring in substance with the report except as noted.
2. The following comments apply to selected items of enclosure (2) to the basic report:
  - a. Page 6, para 2. Test and evaluate the time required to land etc.

(1) The basic report presents sufficient evidence that SILVER BLADE was not wholly adequate as a test vehicle. However, considerable valuable experience was gained, and future planning will be more precise because of SILVER BLADE.

(2) The recommended addition of an LST to the Ready Group is not concurred in for three reasons. First, the steaming speed of the LST (10 Kts) would reduce reaction time. The Ready Group is required to be within four days steaming of BANGKOK. The presence of an LST would increase this steaming time to 6 (plus) days from Subic Bay, P. I. Second, the shipping available to MEB and larger contingency forces is minimal, particularly the number of LST's available. Adding an LST to the Ready Group would further aggravate the situation. Third, the loss of an LST from the shipping used in normal division training exercises would have an undesirable effect on routine training.

3. The following comments apply to enclosure (3) of the basic report:

a. Page 7, para 1a. Adequacy of forces involved. (Supporting ships, units, etc). The lack of small boat availability for on-call and non-scheduled waves is recognized and appreciated. However, the addition of an LST to compensate for a shortage of boats presents far-reaching complications that override SLF requirements (see preceding paragraph).

b. Page 7, para 1b. Adequacy of forces involved. (Landing Force units). The comment contained in the basic report is concurred in. However, the presence of only one pathfinder team in WESTPAC militates against regularly attaching pathfinders to the SLF. It is planned to attach pathfinders to one afloat BLT per year and temporarily deploy pathfinders to the SLF for operations such as SILVER BLADE.

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c. Page 7, para 2. Planning. Continuous attempts are made to schedule BLT afloat exchanges immediately after exercises thereby permitting maximum planning time for the next exercise. Factors such as transplacement schedules, relatively late exercise scheduling, etc., frequently preclude optimum BLT afloat exchange scheduling. In brief, the comment in the basic report is valid and efforts to provide maximum possible planning time will continue to be made, but a completely satisfactory schedule is not always possible.

d. Page 10, para 9. Command and Control. The comments contained in the basic report are valid. However, for reasons of overriding importance, CINCPAC does not desire joint staffs at this level, and none will be employed.

e. Page 11, para 10 (2). Fire Support. The inability of the BLT to provide sufficient personnel to man a SACC and simultaneously establish an FSCC ashore is an inherent weakness in the SLF structure. Providing additional personnel from 12th Marines on a full time basis to the BLT afloat would be wasteful, particularly from a man power viewpoint. Since an administrative landing rather than an over-the-beach assault is far more likely for the BLT afloat, and the present FSCC/SACC personnel situation can be made to work, no further action is contemplated.

f. Page 12, para 15 (1). Intelligence. The early injection of exercise intelligence data is contingent upon the activation date of the ECG. The ECG was activated approximately two weeks prior to the exercise, when the planning phase was well underway. Earlier activation by more than one week of an ECG for a BLT level problem is not considered practicable. Personnel situation permitting, the ECG for the next US/GRC exercise will be activated approximately three weeks prior to "D" Day.

g. Page 13, para 16 (2). Personnel. (Civil Affairs Team). In any exercise of this nature a requirement for a Civil Affairs capability can be expected. However, resultant Civil Affairs activities have proven minimal and do not require the services of a specially constituted team from sources external to the BLT. A most satisfactory solution to this problem was utilized by BLT 1/3 during COWLEX DARK MOON (KOREA, January 1963). BLT 1/3 ordered the Battalion Personnel Officer to the problem area about one week in advance of the exercise. The liaison he established with ROKMC Civil Affairs Teams and the Civil Authorities proved extremely valuable. In future SLF exercises, an officer of the BLT will be designated as the Civil Affairs Officer and sent to the problem area in advance of the exercise in order to establish necessary liaison.



J. M. MASTERS, SR.

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CTG 79.3  
CTG 79.5

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COMMANDER TASK GROUP 79.5  
 COMMANDER SPECIAL LANDING FORCE  
 USS PRINCETON (LPH-5)  
 SUBIC BAY, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

63 8237  
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 03A12063  
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From: Commander Special Landing Force (CTG 79.5)  
 To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03) №2103

Via: (1) Commander Task Force (CTF 79)  
 (2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: PHIBLEX 1-63 (SILVER BLADE); post exercise report of

Ref: (a) MGO 3480.1  
 (b) FMFPacO 5750.7A

Encl: (1) Training Objectives  
 (2) Tests and Evaluations  
 (3) Comments and Recommendations  
 (4) Task Organization  
 (5) Personnel and Material Casualties  
 (6) Helicopter Statistics

1. In accordance with instructions contained in references (a) and (b), the subject report is submitted herewith.

2. Operation "SILVER BLADE" was a coordinated United States and Government of the Republic of China amphibious training exercise conducted over beaches in the southern Taiwan area, during the period 15-24 March 1963. Each nation furnished its own Amphibious Task Force and Landing Force Commanders. Ground invader forces were used to oppose forces of their own nation. The US forces conducted a helicopter-borne and water-borne ship-to-shore assault and the GRC forces conducted a water-borne ship-to-shore assault. No combined amphibious task force or landing force staffs were organized.

3. Operation "SILVER BLADE" was designed to:

- a. Provide coordinated training with each nation's forces operating within its own resources and under its own commanders.
- b. To obtain experience in the planning and execution of amphibious landings and maneuvers ashore conducted in coordination with forces of other nations, and to increase the general combat efficiency of the SLF in all aspects of amphibious landings and limited warfare.
- c. To develop a close working relationship and better understanding between US and GRC forces.
- d. Achieve exercise training objectives contained in Enclosure (1) and conduct tests and evaluations contained in Enclosure (2).

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4. On 15 March 1963, one company was landed in the objective area by helicopter and pre-positioned as invader forces.
5. On 17 March 1963 (R-day), a rehearsal of the ship-to-shore movement was conducted in the FENG-CHIANG area of southwestern Taiwan. Six scheduled surface waves conducted a turnaway landing at the beach and three scheduled helicopter waves conducted a flyover of the beach.
6. On 19 March 1963 (D-day), the ship-to-shore movement was conducted as scheduled and planned with no major problems. The landing force landed in the FANG-LIAO area to seize, occupy and defend the best defensible terrain in the southern sector of the Force Beachhead, to provide secure beachheads for the landing of larger US and GRC forces. Two companies were surface landed over the beach at H-hour(0930) and one company was helicopter lifted into the landing zone at L-hour(H+20).
7. Operations ashore were conducted through D+2 by utilizing and employing all the SLF capabilities. The problem was terminated by 1200 on 21 March 1963 with a coordinated US/GRC attack on the invader who was threatening the boundary between the two landing forces in the Force Beachhead area.
8. Backloading operations were commenced at 1200 on 21 March 1963 by helicopter and surface means to the respective shipping. Backloading was completed to the LPH (at anchor) in approximately three hours and all backloading was completed by 2000 on 21 March 1963.
9. I believe this operation definitely achieved the basic mission and objectives it was designed to accomplish. The mutual respect and understanding between US and GRC forces has been greatly enhanced. Excellent coordination of supporting areas was conducted between the respective US/GRC FSCC's through their assigned liaison officers. The final coordinated attack against a common threat on D+2 certainly helped develop a closer working relationship and better understanding between US and GRC forces. It is regrettable that a closer relationship could not have been established at the landing force level during the planning phase, however, this was not practicable due to unit locations, etc. Further coordination was achieved with the Chinese Air Force who maintained excellent on-station availability, however, we need more experience with them on execution of CAS missions (See Encl 3). Better understanding and coordination was also greatly enhanced by the exchange of observers and liaison personnel.
10. I believe that the troop training objectives were all satisfactorily accomplished (See Encl 1). I do not believe that the test and evaluation of the time required to land the entire SLF by helicopter and surface means was typical or valid (See Encl 2).

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11. This exercise certainly typified the "Navy-Marine Corps Team" at its best. I have never experienced more outstanding cooperation, attitude or "can-do" spirit between Navy, Marine ground and Marine air units toward getting the job done.



R. L. RATHBUN

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 CG, 3rdMarDiv  
 CG, 1stMAW  
 CG, 2ndMAW  
 CG, 3rdMAW  
 CG, 1stMarBrig  
 MAG One Six  
 BLT 2/9  
 BLT 3/9  
 BLT 1/3  
 RLT 9

-3-

CONFIDENTIALTROOP TRAINING OBJECTIVES

1. Train in the planning and execution of amphibious landings with particular emphasis on:

- a. Developing further proficiency in the utilization of LVT in both tactical and logistic support during and subsequent to the landing. 1

COMMENT: This objective was achieved to a high degree through the employment of LVT's in the first two assault waves. Subsequent LVT employment included movement of a rifle company 4000 yards inland. Use of the LVT's for logistic support was minimal due to terrain limitations, but adequate to improve proficiency.

- b. Gaining additional experience in the employment of helicopter-borne forces.

COMMENT: This objective was achieved to a high degree by the employment of an assault company which was lifted into a landing zone to the rear of the force beachhead with all organic vehicles and supplies on D-day. Other D-day helicopter support included on-call missions for troop displacement, evacuation and reconnaissance flights. Subsequent D-day operations included troop lifts, reconnaissance, liaison and logistic support. Helicopters were also used to effect the backloading of all personnel, vehicles and equipment (including the invader company), to the LPH from three separate staging areas.

- c. Gaining additional experience in the coordination and control of all supporting arms and maneuver elements available in the landing force.

COMMENT: Good experience was gained with naval gunfire support by the assignment of DD-728, which enhanced the realistic play of the problem and provided excellent training. Fire support coordination was effectively controlled between US and GRC forces through the exchange of liaison officers. Control and coordination of CAS was established with aircraft provided by the Chinese AF. All maneuver elements were adequately exercised.

- d. Obtaining further training in the collection of information and the rapid production and dissemination of intelligence.

COMMENT: All companies were exercised extensively in the collection and reporting of enemy intelligence. Constant withdrawal and probing action by the enemy intensified intelligence requirements and necessitated continual reporting to Bn headquarters. Independently operating reconnaissance teams were utilized to the maximum extent, reporting directly to the Bn on the tactical net, monitored by each front line company. The resulting information was evaluated by the Bn and the intelligence derived disseminated to all units concerned. Periodic ISUM's were forwarded to higher headquarters.

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- e. Coordination and control of the landing force air defense in the objective area.

COMMENT: Camouflage discipline was emphasized and passive air defense was satisfactory. No simulated or actual enemy air attacks were introduced. All control of air defense was exercised by the TACC afloat.

- f. Obtain experience in the planning and execution of amphibious landings and maneuvers ashore conducted in coordination with forces of other nations.

COMMENT: No experience in planning of the separate amphibious landings or execution was gained at the landing force level. All plans were prepared separately and were not exchanged until shortly before the exercise. Coordinated maneuvers ashore included landing of GRC LST's over the US beach on D+1, fire support coordination and a coordinated US/GRC attack on the town of Chi-Hu-Ts'un. After invader forces were paradropped constructively, the town was secured by joint forces on D+2.

-2-

Enclosure (1)

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CONFIDENTIALTEST AND EVALUATE

1. Test and evaluate communications facilities between US and GRC forces.

COMMENT: This test was limited since landing force operations were not combined. However, excellent communications were maintained between the respective US and GRC FSCC's through the exchange of liaison officers.

2. Test and evaluate the time required to land the entire (personnel and equipment) US Special Landing Force (SLF) by helicopter and surface means.

COMMENT:

- a. This test was not valid for the following reasons: One company of the BLT was landed administratively as invaders and therefore were only offloaded constructively as reserves on D-day. No large quantities of ammunition were offloaded. The amount of ammunition required to support an assault operation by the BLT with all its supporting fire power is enormous. The current BLT assigned the SLF (3/9) has a total of 586 tons of contingency ammunition, of which 466 tons are on the LPH. The ammunition on the LPH consists of small arms ammo, 4.2 and 81 mm mortar ammo, 106, 105, 90 mm and 3.5 in. rocket ammo in addition to HE, Pyrotecnic, WP and Illumination grenades, and is for the support of the entire BLT and not just the helicopter lifted elements. It would take approximately 650 sorties to offload all this ammunition by helicopter or over 20 hours of flight time for 15 aircraft at a distance of 15 miles to the LZ.

RECOMMENDATION: That an LST be assigned to the Amphibious Ready Group in order to provide for better combat loading of the embarked SLF and thereby reduce the time required to conduct the ship-to-shore movement. See paragraphs 1.a.(1) and 3.(1), Enclosure (3) for additional justification.

- b. The wind conditions that required the ship to operate the helicopters up to 30 miles from the landing zone were not typical. Initial planning had been predicated upon much shorter distances. The time factor to offload was also extended since the LPH was at maximum distance from the LZ during the external lift phase, when the helicopters were restricted to 65-70 knots of airspeed.
- c. All vehicles and personnel were landed on D-day. Three days Class I, III and V (Blank and Pyrotecnics) were also landed. The LPH was offloaded by H+5 hours, the LSD offloaded by H+6 hours and the APA offloaded by H+7 hours. Selected loads Class I (Rations) and Class III (Drummed MoGas) were not offloaded until H+11 hours to enable the Shore Party and Beach Group to get training in night offloading.

Enclosure (2)

CONFIDENTIALCOMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS1. Adequacy of Forces Involved.a. Supporting ships, units and aircraft.

- (1) Comment: The present SLF shipping possesses a very limited number of landing craft to support an operation of this type. The availability of only 1 LCU, 2 LCM-8 and 1 LCM-6 greatly extends the time required to offload the on-call and non-scheduled waves.

Recommendation: That the SLF be provided with the services of an LST thus permitting the rapid offloading of heavy equipment and provide the LSD the capability of increasing the number of landing craft available. //

Action Taken: None

b. Landing Force units.

- (1) Comment: A pathfinder team would have enhanced the SLF reconnaissance capability and provided the helicopter squadron with an increased capability for the conduct of night operations. ✓

Recommendation: That a pathfinder team be attached to the SLF for future operations.

Action Taken: None

2. Planning.

- (1) Comment: Proper coordinated and combined planning was not possible at the landing force level due to the absence of the US Landing Force Commander and his staff until late in the planning phase.

Recommendation: That unit rotation and CLF responsibilities be effected at the termination of an exercise, rather than during the late planning phase prior to the commencement of an exercise.

Action Taken: None

- (2) Comment: Helicopters assigned the landing force were adequate. The squadron maintained a helicopter availability of over 90 per-cent throughout the operation and no mission requests were denied.

Recommendation: None

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- (3) Comment: No helicopter escort aircraft were initially planned for, but were subsequently scheduled by TACG for L-10 to L-30. These aircraft did not materialize, which was due to other priorities. //

Recommendation: That future planning should provide for helicopter escort. They are the only means the relatively slow unarmed helicopters have to combat enemy fire in the approach routes and landing zone during the critical initial assault phase. This has been borne out by helicopter tactics used in Vietnam.

Action Taken: Referred to TACRON for future planning.

### 3. Embarkation and Combat Loading.

- (1) Comment: There were no major difficulties encountered in embarkation or loading since the assault force was previously combat loaded as the 7th Fleet's SLF. However, present loading does not permit the use of the LSD flight deck for helicopter operations, since it is filled with vehicles.

Recommendation: Same as in Par 1.a.(1), this enclosure. Services of an LST should ease loading and permit the use of the LSD flight deck for helicopter operations.

Action Taken: None

### 4. Rehearsal.

- (1) Comment: A turnaway, flyover rehearsal was conducted in the FENG-CHIANG beach area south of the objective area. Helicopter approach routes were selected that did not duplicate D-day operations.

Recommendation: That helicopter approach and retirement routes for R-day be identical in heading and distances between check points as established for D-day, in order to rehearse timing and control patterns.

Action Taken: Referred to HDC and TACRON for future planning.

### 5. Ship-to-shore Movement.

- (1) Comment: The initial phase of the ship-to-shore movement went without incident, with all waves arriving at the beach in a timely fashion. One LVT in the first wave, which was on the right flank, became disabled enroute to the beach. The personnel were successfully transferred to an LCVP and came ashore with the third wave without a major disruption of tactical integrity.

CONFIDENTIALRecommendation: None

- (2) Comment: In the helicopter phase of the assault, initial waves landed on schedule, with the assault company being debarked and deployed successfully. However, subsequent waves which were to be landed in the vicinity of the beach, were delayed because the LPH was required to operate at extended ranges up to 30 miles from the LZ, due to unfavorable wind conditions. The operation had been planned for distances of 10 miles between the LPH operating area and the LZ.

Recommendation: That BLT planning anticipate this undesirable situation and design plans accordingly.

Action Taken: None

- (3) Comment: The initial wave of helicopters reached point "New York" which was the first land-fall, two minutes early. Rather than orbit this point, the flight leader used this time in a feint or deceptive landing up another canyon, prior to heading for the actual LZ. It is not desirable to orbit over an enemy shore line. HDC should use this time up at the wave rendezvous or departure point if possible.

Recommendation: That the HDC attempt to keep the helicopter assault wave at the wave rendezvous or departure point prior to the final approach to the shore line, thereby eliminating the requirement to orbit a flight over enemy territory.

Action Taken: Referred to HDC for future control technique.

- (4) Comment: After the initial assault wave of 16 helicopters, subsequent waves were reduced to 12 helicopters. This was predicted upon anticipated availability factors and was desirable during this operation due to the heavy administrative commitments immediately after L-hour. Availability after the initial assault wave is contingent upon many considerations (i.e. time available to get aircraft ready for D-day operations, training level of pilots, crew chiefs and maintenance personnel, overall condition of aircraft, spare parts availability, etc.). Experience with the present SLF squadron indicates a higher percentage of availability can be obtained.

Recommendation: That future planning with the current embarked squadron of 18 helicopters provide for an availability of 16 helicopters for the initial wave and 15 helicopters for subsequent waves. These figures consider the requirement for one additional helicopter to be provided for SAR duty.

Action Taken: Planning with current and subsequent BLT's assigned the SLF are requested to reflect this availability.

CONFIDENTIAL6. Backloading.

- (1) Comment: Backloading commenced at 1200, 21 March 1963 and was completed at 2000, 21 March 1963. Two beaches were used, one for the APA and one for the LSD. In addition, a staging area was designated back of the beach for external vehicle lifts by helicopter to the LPH. Personnel returning to the LPH were lifted from three separate landing zones. Backloading to the PRINCETON was completed in less than three hours. This was possible because of the ship being at anchor, close in, which permitted the helicopters to operate with light gas loads, over short distances.

Recommendation: None

7. Special Operations:a. Reconnaissance.

- (1) Comment: Reconnaissance teams working covertly behind invader's lines from D-4 until D+1 and proved highly successful in ascertaining the actual invader situation. This intelligence source of the BLT was tested and exercised extensively. Valuable experience was gained in dealing with the civil population and exercising the invader company in counter-intelligence precautions.

Recommendation: That similar use be made of BLT scout teams in subsequent operations. They can operate in pairs with independent supply and communications, for extended periods behind enemy lines. In this manner a BLT's potential in intelligence gained and counter-intelligence efforts is fully exploited.

Action Taken: None

8. NBC.

- (1) Comment: The invaders in this exercise were insurgents who did not have an NBC capability. Therefore, NBC considerations did not receive any play in the problem.

Recommendation: None

9. Command and Control.

- (1) Comment: The amphibious phase of the operation for the landing force presented no problems relating to Command and Control. There was no intergration or overall landing force commander (staff) at the landing force level. This resulted in two separate landing force operations being conducted simultaneously immediately adjacent to each other within a single contiguous force beachhead.

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Recommendation: That future coordinated amphibious operations between US Marine and allied forces provide for an intergrated staff at the landing force level. This would greatly enhance our experience in the planning and execution of amphibious landings and maneuvers ashore, conducted in coordination with forces of other nations.

Action Taken: None

#### 10. Fire Support.

- (1) Comment: The assignment of DD-728 USS MANSFIELD to support Exercise "SILVER BLADE" greatly enhanced the training received and further increased the realistic play of the problem.

Recommendation: That Naval Gunfire Support ships be assigned and participate in all future BLT and larger size amphibious operations.

Action Taken: None

- (2) Comment: During the preliminary phases of the operation, personnel of the BLT FSCC were employed in the SACC aboard ship. NWIP-22(A) established this procedure; however, insufficient personnel are available in the BLT to facilitate this operation and at the same time perform the echlonment necessary to have an operating FSCC established ashore prior to assuming control from SACC.

Recommendation: That personnel be included in the task organization for future operations to furnish sufficient BLT FSCC personnel to allow establishment of an FSCC ashore in a timely fashion.

Action Taken: None

#### 11. Air Defense.

- (1) Comment: Throughout the operation close air support was provided by the Chinese Air Force with a total of 361 sorties being scheduled and a total of 361 flown. Their reporting on-station was outstanding, however, many fundamentals of CAS, considered doctrine, were unfamiliar to the Chinese AF.

Recommendation: That these subjects continue to be emphasized at the MCEC, to make our allies aware of standard Marine Corps Close Air Support techniques and doctrines. Whenever possible, Marine aircraft be employed in such operations in the future.

Action Taken: None

CONFIDENTIAL13. Close Combat.

- (1) Comment: Close combat was not a significant feature of Exercise "SILVER BLADE". All aggressor action consisted of small groups, the largest of which was slightly more than platoon size. These groups were not able to consolidate and resist or make a determined effort. When closing with the aggressor, our forces were invariably far superior in number and they used insurgent tactics of dispersal and withdrawal.

Recommendation: None

14. Logistics.

- (1) Comment: "SILVER BLADE" presented no significant problems logistically. All supplies were landed as planned. Extensive use of the helicopter for resupply was used with excellent results.

Recommendation: None

- (2) Comment: Two external loads of palletized rations were dropped at sea. The loads were lost due to the twisting action of the pallet while in flight, suspended by rope sling. The sling was excessively long which aggravated the twisting action.

Recommendation: That wire baskets with universal slings be used in lieu of rope slings with conventional wooden pallets for external helicopter loads.

Action Taken: Referred to PRINCETON CGO Officer and SLF BLT CGO.

- (3) Comment: Night offloading of rations and drummed fuel was conducted. This was extremely useful training for the Shore Party. Very few of the Landing Support Detachment personnel had ever had the opportunity to work a beach at night. It was very successful and added considerable realism to the problem.

Recommendation: None

15. Intelligence.

- (1) Comment: Initial intelligence received was very limited. No details of enemy military doctrine, order of battle, capabilities or probable courses of action were given.

Recommendation: Standard information such as aerial photos, order of battle, tactical doctrine, capabilities and probable courses of action should be furnished as early in the planning phase as practicable.

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Requested

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- (2) Comment: The collection effort and intelligence discipline of line companies was exercised by TEC and the Invader Company in an excellent manner. Front line units demonstrated a continual awareness for timely intelligence by transmitting all enemy contacts and patrol reports, and forwarding the many invader documents and letters planted under the instructions of TEC. BLT intelligence was exercised in the evaluation of such documents.

Recommendation: None

16. Personnel.

- (1) Comment: BLT suffered two minor casualties during the operation. One EOD man suffered the loss of the ends of four fingers of his left hand as a result of an accidental explosion. One Marine was hit in the face and cut by a rifle barrel. Both men were expeditiously evacuated by helicopter to the USS PRINCETON. Investigations have shown both injuries to have been accidental.

Recommendation: None

- (2) Comment: As far as can be determined, the only incident involving the civilian population was some minor crop damage done by tanks. Chinese Foreign Affairs Officers were notified immediately in every case.

Recommendation: That a Civil Affairs Team be assigned the SLF to cope with similar problems arising from combined allied operations or contingency commitments.

Action Taken: None

- (3) Comment: Over 100 Marines were assessed as casualties and actually processed through BAS and C&C. From here they were further processed back into their units as replacements. While the training was effective, it is felt that the number assessed was excessive for a 48 hour training problem.

Recommendation: That casualties assessed for the training of casualty evacuation and reporting procedures, be kept to a minimum consistent with training requirements.

Action Taken: None

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TASK ORGANIZATION

CTG 132.8	Commander Landing Force, US	LtCol R.L. RATHBUN
CTU 132.8.1	Surface Force (BLT 2/9)	LtCol W.E. BARRINEAU
2d Bn 9th Marines (-)		
H&S Co (-)		Captain MAC DONALD
Co F (Rein)		1st Lt HOIM
Co G (Rein)		1st Lt RHODES
Co H (Rein)		Captain EDWARDS
Co E (Rein)		Captain HUTCHINSON
Btry E 2d Bn 12th Mar		Captain BOLVIS
81mm Mortar Platoon		1st Lt WHITAKER
106 RR Platoon		1st Lt HOWE
2d Platoon Co C, 3d AT Bn		2nd Lt CARR
3d Platoon Co C, 3d Tank Bn		2nd Lt BROPHY
Det BOD Platoon, 3d FSR		GySgt TEMPLEN
2d Platoon Co B, 1st AMTRAC Bn		1st Lt DUFFY
Det BMU # 1 WestPac		
CTU 132.8.2	Helicopter Unit (HMM-163)	LtCol R.L. RATHBUN

Enclosure (4)

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CONFIDENTIALPERSONNEL AND MATERIAL CASUALTIES1. Personnel.

- a. Injured ashore: SEAMAN, A.A., SSgt E6, USMC, Det HOD Plt 3d FSR; Amputation traumatic of distal phalanges of the thumb, index, middle and ring fingers of the left hand on 19 March 1963.
- b. Injured ashore: SNOW, W.R., Pvt E1, USMC, 9th Marines; Wound laceration of lower eye lid and face on 19 March 1963.
- c. One dental patient was evacuated to the LPH. All three evacuees were heli-lifted to the LPH.
- d. The above injuries had no effect on planned or scheduled operations.

2. Equipment.

- a. One "Mity-Mite" vehicle, while being heli-lifted externally, was inadvertently dropped in the landing zone from an altitude of approximately fifteen feet. There was no malfunction of the hook.
  - (1) Damage sustained:
    - (a) The vehicle was rendered inoperative as a result of the axels being bent and associated undercarriage damages.
  - b. Two palletized loads of 'C' rations were inadvertently dropped while being delivered externally from the LPH to the landing zone. These loads were a total of thirteen loads utilizing rope slings, in contrast to the universal sling. Due to the twisting action of the load in flight, the rope frayed and eventually broke. There was no malfunction of the hook.
    - (1) Damage sustained:
      - (a) The two loads were totally lost, as they were dropped over water.
  - c. The above losses had no effect on planned or scheduled operations.

Enclosure (5)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALHELICOPTER STATISTICS FOR OPERATION "SILVER BLADE"

1. Total Hours Flown	262	
2. Total Number of Sorties	958	
a. Supply	134	
b. Transport	662	
c. Admin	145	
d. Miscellaneous	17	
3. Tons of equipment and supplies carried:		84.7 (All External)
4. Number of troops put ashore and backloaded:		1577
5. Number of troops point to point (ashore):		867
6. Total number of troops carried:		2444
7. Total number of external lifts:		117—
8. Actual evacuations to LPH:		3—
9. Total number of LPH landings:		434 —

Enclosure (6)

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

FF/7/LWW:rc  
3500  
Ser: N32- 013  
8 January 1963

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

From: Commander SEVENTH Fleet  
To: Distribution List

Subj: Letter of Instruction for US/GRC Coordinated PHIBLEX (SILVER BLADE);  
promulgation of

Ref: (a) CINCPAC message 210436Z DEC 62 NOTAL  
(b) NWP-22  
(c) FXP-5

Encl: (1) Schedule of Events  
(2) Forces assigned

1. Purpose. This letter promulgates the instructions of the Officer Scheduling the Exercise (OSE) for the conduct of a United States/Government of the Republic of China amphibious landing exercise (US/GRC PHIBLEX) to be held during the period 15 to 24 March 1963 on the southwest coast of Taiwan.

2. General. In July 1962 Commander United States Taiwan Defense Command (COMUSTDC) proposed to Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) that a US/GRC amphibious training exercise be conducted on Taiwan during February-March 1963. CINCPACFLT concurred in the proposal and designated Commander SEVENTH Fleet (COMSEVENTHFLT) as Officer Scheduling the Exercise. CINCPACFLT also established guidance for the conduct of such an exercise. Subsequently, COMUSTDC proposed to the Ministry of National Defense (MND) that a small scale US/GRC coordinated amphibious landing be conducted and the MND concurred in the proposal.

3. Training and Test Objectives.

a. General:

(1) Provide coordinated training with each nations force within own resources and under own commanders.

(2) Provide training and experience for US/GRC planners on an Exercise Directors Staff.

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*101, 215 2100 2100 2100  
PHIBLEX (SILVER BLADE)*

*17 Jan 63*

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3500

(3) Improve coordination by the development of a close working relationship and better understanding between US and GRC forces.

b. Naval Training Objectives.

(1) Provide training in maneuvering and positioning of the amphibious and supporting forces enroute to and in the objective area.

(2) Provide training in mine operations in support of an amphibious operation.

(3) Provide training in planning and execution of a coordinated amphibious operation to include:

(a) Mutually supporting amphibious assaults over separate beaches.

(b) Constructive naval gunfire and simulated air support.

c. Troop Training Objectives.

(1) To train in the planning and execution of amphibious landings with particular emphasis on:

(a) Further developing proficiency in the utilization of the LVT in both tactical and logistical support during and subsequent to the landing.

(b) Coordination and control of the Landing Force air defense in the objective area.

(c) Coordination and control of all supporting arms and the maneuver elements of the Landing Force.

(d) Collection of information and the rapid production and dissemination of intelligence.

(2) To obtain experience in the planning and execution of amphibious landings and maneuvers ashore conducted in coordination with forces of other nations.

d. Test and Evaluate.

(1) Communication facilities between US and GRC forces.

(2) The time required to land the entire (personnel and equipment) U.S. Special Landing Force (SLF) by helicopter and surface means.

4. Concept.

a. Scenario. An aggressor nation has invaded southern Taiwan by airborne and amphibious assault and has advanced north along the west coast to

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the HSIA-TAN-SHUI CHI River line area where the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) armed forces have succeeded in containing the aggressor forces from further advances. The GRC has requested United States (US) assistance to drive aggressor from Taiwan. In response, Commander SEVENTH Fleet has been ordered to conduct a coordinated US/GRC amphibious assault south of the TUNG CHIANG area in order to gain beachheads for the landing of larger US and GRC forces that will conduct a coordinated all-out attack along with other GRC forces attacking from the north to destroy the aggressor nation's forces in southern Taiwan.

b. Execution. SILVER BLADE will be a controlled, coordinated US/GRC training exercise of two Battalion Landing Team size to be conducted over beaches in southern Taiwan (FANG LIAO and HSIA LIAO beach areas) during the period 15-24 March 1963. Exercise SILVER BLADE will include:

(1) Reconnaissance of US and GRC landing beaches by GRC forces.

(2) Prepositioning of aggressor force. One reinforced rifle company of the Special Landing Force will oppose the US ground forces. The GRC will be opposed by one reinforced GRC Marine Corps company. (Ground aggressor forces will oppose only forces of the same nation).

(3) Rehearsal.

(4) Movement to the objective area opposed by aggressor air.

(5) An amphibious operation to include:

(a) Simultaneous amphibious assault of US and GRC forces over separate beaches with mine countermeasures, simulated close air support and constructive naval gunfire. The US forces will conduct a surface assault and vertical envelopment and the GRC forces a surface assault.

(6) Critique.

(7) Re-embarkation.

c. Special.

(1) Nuclear play will not be exercised in SILVER BLADE.

(2) Safety of personnel, ships, aircraft and equipment will be paramount; however, operations will be conducted with as much realism as practical.

(3) Requests for units and personnel not provided for in this Letter of Instruction will be submitted to Commander SEVENTH Fleet (OSE).

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35005. Exercise organization.

- a. Commander SEVENTH Fleet is the Officer Scheduling the Exercise (OSE).
- b. Commander Amphibious Force SEVENTH Fleet (CTF 76) is designated as the Exercise Director/Officer Conducting the Exercise (OCE), CTF 132.
- c. The GRC has designated Rear Admiral CHEN CHENG-FU, CN as Deputy Exercise Director.
- d. The exercise coordination and control organization will be established in accordance with reference (c).
- e. The Exercise Director will coordinate all supporting arms in the objective area, as required.
- f. US and GRC forces will provide staff personnel for the Exercise Director's Staff.
- g. The Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, SEVENTH Fleet will designate the Troop Exercise Coordinator (TEC).

6. Task Organization.

- a. CTG 76.5 is designated as Commander Amphibious Task Force/US (CATF/US).
- b. The GRC has designated Captain CHIANG HOU-TA, CN as Commander Amphibious Task Force/GRC (CATF/GRC).
- c. CTG 79.5 is designated as Commander Landing Force/US (CLF/US).
- d. The GRC has designated Lieutenant Colonel CHU TUAN, CMC as Commander Landing Force/GRC (CLF/GRC).
- e. Command relationships will be in accordance with reference (b).

7. Assignment of Tasks.

- a. Exercise Director/OCE (CTF 132) will:
  - (1) Direct and coordinate planning and arrange through COMUSTDC for planning conferences with the GRC representatives.
  - (2) Exercise overall direction and coordination for the conduct of the exercise.
  - (3) Keep COMSEVENTHFLT (OSE) and COMUSTDC appropriately informed of the progress of planning and operations.

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- (4) Provide for an austere umpire control of respective components.
- (5) Exercise liaison with the JOG Taiwan through COMUSTDC and coordinate exercise air operations with that agency.
- (6) Establish an Exercise Intelligence Center (EIC) in accordance with reference (c) in order to provide coordinated intelligence play for SILVER BLADE.
- (7) Establish a Command Information Bureau (CIB) to coordinate all Public Information aspects of the exercise.
- (8) Conduct a critique of the exercise.
- (9) When appropriate, return forces to normal operational control.
- (10) Submit a post exercise report in accordance with reference (c).
- (11) Coordinate the exchange of observers for indoctrinational purposes between the US and GRC Commander Amphibious Task Force and Commander Landing Force staffs.

b. Amphibious Task Force Commanders and US and GRC Landing Force Commanders will:

- (1) Conduct operations in accordance with this Letter of Instruction under the overall coordination of the Exercise Director.
- (2) Assist the Command Information Bureau (CIB) in coordinating the activities of observers.
- (3) Exchange observers for indoctrinational purposes as directed by the Exercise Director.

c. Direct liaison is authorized between US subordinate commanders for the purpose of planning and conducting the exercise. Direct liaison between US and GRC Commanders is authorized but shall be effected through COMUSTDC.

8. Support by COMUSTDC. It is requested that COMUSTDC support the exercise as follows:

a. Provide local liaison and coordination between the Exercise Director and appropriate GRC commanders. Assign responsible coordinators to Exercise Director for coordination between US and GRC forces at various levels.

b. Assist in settlement of any possible claim against the US which may arise from the exercise.

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c. Advise and assist Exercise Director in establishing the necessary liaison and coordination with JOC Taiwan to insure non-interference in the air defense of the Republic of China.

d. Assist Exercise Director in acquiring necessary clearances for exercise communication (frequency) requirements.

e. Assist in Public Information matters pertaining to the GRC forces involved in the exercise.

f. Arrange with GRC for the use of the selected landing areas and the sea and air approaches thereto.

9. Logistics and Administration.

a. Logistics and administration will be normal for US Naval elements.

b. Forces of each nation will provide their own supplies and equipment.

c. The Commander Landing Force/US will appoint a Claims Officer who will be available to settle minor claims for damage which is directly attributable to the operations of US forces involved in this exercise. Claims which cannot be settled immediately will be submitted through national authorities in accordance with existing agreements.

10. Communications.

a. Amphibious Task Force and Landing Force commanders will submit their circuit/frequency requirements to the Exercise Director/OCE by 1 February 1963. Frequency requirements will be submitted giving the following information:

(1) Frequency

(2) Emission

(3) Power output

(4) Usage (net description or net title)

(5) Area in which frequency will be used.

b. The Exercise Director/OCE will submit consolidated requirements to COMUSTDC, with copies to COMSEVENTHFLT.

c. The task designator of TF 132 is effective upon receipt of this Letter of Instruction and will be dissolved upon completion of the exercise.

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d. All exercise communication will carry the unclassified nickname "EXERCISE SILVER BLADE" at the beginning of each message.

e. The meaning of the nickname "SILVER BLADE", which is US/GRC PHIBLEX, is classified CONFIDENTIAL.

11. Public Information.

a. The Exercise Director will establish a Command Information Bureau (CIB), to direct and coordinate all public information aspects of the exercise including handling of observers. The Command Information Bureau will be established and operated in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 11, U.S. Navy Public Information Manual (NAVEXOS P1035).

b. COMUSTDC is requested to invite GRC participation in the CIB.

c. The initial public release of the exercise will be coordinated with COMUSTDC and COMSEVENTHFLT.

d. Exercise publicity should be in consonance with scope and magnitude of a simple coordinated two Battalion Landing Team training exercise.

12. Cancellation. This Letter of Instruction is cancelled on 15 April 1963. It will be destroyed by burning. No report of destruction is required.

*T. H. Moorer*  
T. H. MOORER

Distribution:

CTF 76 (5)  
CTF 79 (5)  
CTG 76.5 (2)  
CTG 79.5 (2)  
COMUSTDC (30)

Copy to:

CNO (10)  
CNC (2)  
CINCPAC (2)  
CINCPACFLT (2)  
CG FMFPAC (1)  
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COMNAVFORJAPAN (1)  
COMNAVPHIL (1)  
COMNAVFORKOREA (1)  
(Continued next page)

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3500

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- CTG 70.5 (1)
- CTG 70.6 (1)
- CTG 70.8 (1)
- CTG 70.9 (1)
- CTF 72 (2)
- CTF 73 (2)
- CTG 79.2 (2)
- CTG 79.3 (2)
- CTU 79.3.4 (2)
- CG FMFWESTPACREP (1)
- ALUSNA TOKYO (1)
- ALUSNA SEOUL (1)
- ALUSNA TAIPEI (1)

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FF/7/LW:rc  
3500TENTATIVE SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

- Prior 15 March - Reconnaissance of US and GRC landing beaches by GRC forces.
- 15 March - US forces arrive off southern Taiwan. Positioning of aggressor forces.
- 16 March - Advance force operations and MINEX.
- 17 March - Rehearsal and rehearsal critique.
- 18 March - Movement to objective area.
- 19 March - D-Day.
- 20-21 March - Operations ashore.
- 22 March - Backload and exercise critique.
- 23-24 March - US forces visit Taiwan ports.

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Enclosure (1)

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3500

FORCES TO BE EMPLOYED

US

GRC

1 AGC

AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP

SLF (BLT and HMM)

LPH

APA

LSD

ELEMENTS MAG-11

1 MINDIV

(one reinforced company from SLF  
will act as US AGC forces)

1 AGC

2 DD

1 LSD

2 MSF

1 APD

1 PC

3 LST

2 LSM

2 LCU

1 CMC BN (REIN)

Elements CAF

1 CMC CO. (REIN) (will act as  
GRC aggressor)

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Enclosure (2)

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11 January 1963

PACIFIC COMMAND

OUTLINE OF SIGNIFICANT EXERCISE

1. Name: SILVER BLADE/YEN-JEN
2. Type: Small scale coordinated US/Republic of China Amphibious Training Exercise.
3. Aims: To provide coordinated training with forces of each nation operating within own resources and under own commanders; to provide experience and training to Republic of China planners on Exercise Director's staff.
4. Brief Outline:
  - a. Under supervision of US Exercise Director, both sides will prepare coordinated plans for Amphibious Operations over southern Taiwan beaches.
  - b. Chinese Marine Corps (CMC) Battalion conducts conventional ship to shore assault supported by Chinese Navy (CN).
  - c. US Special Landing Force conducts helicopter and surface ship to shore assault over separate beach supported by US forces.
  - d. CMC Landing Force aggressed by Chinese; Special Landing Force aggressed by company from Special Landing Force.
  - e. US provides close air support; Chinese AF provides aggressor air.
  - f. Advance force operations will be provided by the Mine Division (4 ships).
5. Geographical Area: Southwest coast of Taiwan, Hsia-Liao Beach area.

*Exec Comm*

*Definition of the Key Element  
in case - SILVER BLADE/YEN-JEN*

GROUP 4  
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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*(1 Jan 63)*

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
6. Dates: 15-24 March 1963.
7. Directing Headquarters:
  - a. Officer Scheduling Exercise: COMSEVENTHFLEET
  - b. Exercise Director/Officer Conducting Exercise: Commander Amphibious Force, Seventh Fleet.
8. Participating Forces:
  - a. US: Commander Amphibious Task Force - CTG 76.5; Commander Landing Force - CTG 79.5; 1 AGC, Seventh Fleet Amphibious Ready Group ( 1 LPH, 1 LSD, 1 APA); Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force (SLF) (1 Marine battalion (reinforced), 1 Marine helicopter squadron); elements MAG-11; Support Shipping for SLF; 1 Mine Division (4 mine sweeps).
  - b. GRC: CATF CAPT Chang Hou-Ta, Chinese Navy, CLF LTCOL Chu Tuan, Chinese Marine Corps. One Chinese Marine Corps Battalion (Reinforced), Support Shipping for Chinese Marine Corps Battalion; Elements Chinese AF.
9. Participation from other commands: None.
10. Political implications: Amphibious shipping concentration in Taiwan Straits could cause Chicom propaganda press reaction.
11. Coordination: American Embassy informed.
12. Public Information policy: Confidential until simultaneous MND/USTDC/COM7FLT release on 1 March 1963.
13. Remarks:
  - a. Deputy Exercise Director RADM Chen Chang-Fu, Chinese Navy; Exercise Director staff will be composed of US and GRC planners.
  - b. No combined CATF or CLF staffs will be organized but observers will be exchanged for indoctrination purposes.
  - c. No simulated nuclear weapons play.

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CTG 132.8

COMMANDER LANDING FORCE U. S.  
AND  
COMMANDER SPECIAL LANDING FORCE



SILVER BLADE

OPERATIONS ORDER 302-63

COMMANDER SPECIAL LANDING FORCE / CTG 79.5

*CTG 132.8  
SEC #2563*

248 315

COPY NO. 34 of 92

Downgraded at 3 Year  
Intervals, Declassified  
After 12: DOD DIR 5200.10

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*TG 132.8  
CPO 302-63, SILVER BLADE*

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INDEX OF ANNEXES

- A - Task Organization
- B - Intelligence
- C - Concept of Operations
- D - Operations Overlay
- E - Air Operations
- F - Naval Gunfire
- G - Artillery
- H - Fire Support Coordination
- I - Ship-to-Shore Movement
- J - Anti-Mechanized Plan
- L - Rehearsal Plan
- M - Communications-Electronics
- N - Administration/Logistics
- O - Medical
- Z - Distribution

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US SEVENTH FLEET  
 CTG 132.8 Commander  
 Landing Force US., CTG  
 79.5 Commander Special  
 Landing Force and  
 Commanding Officer HMM-  
 163, USS PRINCETON  
 (LPH-5) Subic Bay,  
 Republic of the Philippines  
 010800H March 1963

Operation Order 302-63

Ref: (a) Operation Order CTG 132 302-63  
 (b) Operation Order CTG 132.1 302-63

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

Task Organization: See Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order  
 302-63

1. SITUATION. This order is derived from references (a) and (b) and provides for a coordinated small scale PHIBLEX to be conducted in the southwestern TAIWAN area by forces of the United States (US) and Government of the Republic of China (GRC). The objective for the US force is the establishment of a beachhead in the FANG-LIAO area on 19 March 1963 to permit the landing of larger US forces. The tentative dates 15-24 March 1963 have been assigned for the exercise and the unclassified name is SILVERBLADE. Commander, Amphibious Force, Seventh Fleet (CTF 76) is Exercise Director. Permission has been granted by the Republic of China to conduct this exercise utilizing selected beach areas and the sea and air approaches thereto.

a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 302-63.
- (2) See current ISUM's and PIR's

4

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b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) Amphibious Task Force US (TG 132.1)
  - (a) Embark and conduct secure movement of Amphibious Task Force to the rehearsal and landing areas.
  - (b) Conduct a turnaway/flyover rehearsal in the FENG-CHIANG (FENG-KAY) area.
  - (c) Establish a beachhead by water-borne and helicopter-borne amphibious assault in the FANG-LIAO area.
- (2) Amphibious Task Force GRC (TG 132.2). Conduct advance force operations, including mine operations, underwater demolitions and reconnaissance of the US and GRC landing areas and simultaneously establish beachhead in HSIA-LIAO area on D-day.
- (3) Landing Force GRC (TG 132.9). Lands in HSIA-LIAO area to seize, occupy and defend the best defensible terrain in the northern sector of the Force Beachhead (FBH) to provide secure beachheads for the landing of larger US and GRC forces.
- (4) Elements of the GRC Air Force will provide this force with aircraft for Close Air Support (CAS) on D-2, possible strike missions on D-1, Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) protection D-1 and D-day, and CAS on D-day and subsequent operations.
- (5) DD 786 direct support BLT 2/9.

c. Attachments and detachments.

- (1) CTU 132.8.1 detach one rifle company (Rein) on 15 March 1963 to be positioned as US invader force in the area in coordination with TEC (TG 132.0.1).

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2. MISSION. TG 132.8 lands in FANG-LIAO area to seize, occupy and defend the best defensible terrain in the southern sector of Force Beachhead (FBH) to provide secure beachheads for the landing of larger US and GRC forces.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of operations. Landing Force US (TG 132.8) lands one company by helicopter and two companies in column by surface means over BEACH BLUE, in accordance with Annex I (Ship-to-Shore Movement), to attack and seize landing force objectives A and B in accordance with Annex D (Operation Overlay).

b. TU 132.8.1 (BLT 2/9).

- (1) Commencing at H-hour and L-hour on D-day land by surface means and helicopter in the FANG-LIAO area to seize, occupy and defend landing force objectives A and B in the southern sector of Force Beachhead (FBH) to provide beachheads for the landing of larger US and GRC forces.
- (2) Coordinate as directed, with visitors bureau established by GRC ashore.
- (3) Coordinate operations ashore as necessary, where mutual support is required.
- (4) Establish and maintain a controlling agency for the coordination of artillery and mortar fire between the US and GRC landing force. Coordination will be established through the exchange of liaison officers and the establishment of a fire support coordination radio net.

c. TU 132.8.2 (HMM-163).

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- (1) Commencing at L-hour land the helicopter-borne units of the landing force in accordance with Annex I (Ship-to-Shore Movement) and Annex E (Air Operations).
  - (2) Be prepared to support the landing force during subsequent operations ashore, as directed.
- d. Coordinating instructions.
- (1) This order is effective for planning upon receipt and for execution at 0001H, 13 March 1963 for operation and communications.
  - (2) D-Day. D-day is the day of the assault landing in the FANG-LIAO objective area and is set as 19 March 1963.
  - (3) R-Day. R-day is the day of rehearsal landing in the FENG-CHIANG (FENG-KAY) area and is set as 17 March 1963.
  - (4) H-Hour. H-hour is the time of the landing of the first surface-borne assault wave on R-day and on D-day and is set as 0930H.
  - (5) L-Hour. L-hour is the time for the landing of the first helicopter-borne assault wave on R-day and on D-day is set as H+20.
  - (6) The objective area is defined as that area within a 50 mile radius of FANG-LIAO with restrictions as set forth in Annex E (Air Operations).
  - (7) This exercise will be conducted to provide the most realistic training possible and to provide the following training, test and evaluation objectives:

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- (a) Developing further proficiency in the utilization of LVT in both tactical and logistic support during and subsequent to landing.
- (b) Gaining additional experience in the employment of helicopter-borne forces.
- (c) Gaining additional experience in the coordination and control of all supporting arms and maneuver elements available in the landing force.
- (d) Obtaining further training in the collection of information and the rapid production and dissemination of intelligence.
- (e) Coordination and control of the landing force air defense in the objective area.
- (f) Obtain experience in the planning and execution of amphibious landings and maneuvers ashore conducted in coordination with forces of other nations.
- (g) Test and evaluate the time required to land the entire (personnel and equipment) US Special Landing Force (SLF) by helicopter and surface means.
- (8) Exchange of observers and GRC personnel detachment is in accordance with Appendix IV to Annex N.
- (9) Direct liaison is authorized within the subordinate commands.
- (10) The use of the word "HOT POTATO" shall indicate the encountering of actual hostilities. Further action and

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reporting shall be in accordance with existing doctrine.

(11) Safety of personnel and equipment is paramount.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.a. Administration.

(1) Administration as set forth in Annex N.

b. Logistics.

(1) Logistics support will be provided in accordance with COMSEVENTH FLEET OP Ord. 201-60.

(2) CTU 132.8.1 will appoint a claims officer who will be guided by procedures as set forth in Ref (a) Annex J to CTF 132 Operations Order 302-63.

(3) Medical and Evacuation in accordance with Annex O (Medical).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION.

a. CTU 132.8.1 (BLT 2/9) is designated second in command.

b. Communications in accordance with MWP 16, NWIP 16-1, Joint Allied, appropriate GRC, US National publications, Annex E (Air Operations) and Annex M (Communications - Electronics).

c. Commander Landing Force US (CTG 132.8) in USS PRINCETON (LPH-5) until establishment of headquarters ashore in the objective area.

d. Commander CTU 132.8.1 (BLT 2/9) in USS PRINCETON (LPH-5) until establishment of headquarters ashore in the objective area.

e. Commander CTU 132.8.2 (HMM-163) in USS PRINCETON (LPH-5).

R. L. RATHBUN

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Commanding

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ANNEXES:

- A - Task Organization
- B - Intelligence
- C - Concept of Operations
- D - Operation Overlay
- E - Air Operations
- F - Naval Gunfire Support
- G - Artillery
- H - Fire Support Coordination
- I - Ship-to-Shore Movement
- J - Anti-Mechanized Plan
- L - Rehearsal Plan
- M - Communications - Electronics
- N - Administration and Logistics
- O - Medical
- Z - Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Order 302-63

OFFICIAL:

A. M. BLAYDES

Major, U. S. Marine Corps

S-3

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US SEVENTH FLEET  
 CTG 132.8 Commander  
 Landing Force US., CTG  
 79.5 Commander Special  
 Landing Force and  
 Commanding Officer HMM-  
 163, USS PRINCETON  
 (LPH-5) Subic Bay,  
 Republic of the Philippines  
 010800 H March 1963

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 302-63

Ref: None

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

<u>CTG 132.8 Commander Landing Force US</u>	LtCol RATHBUN
<u>CTU 132.8.1 Surface Force (BLT 2/9)</u>	LtCol BARRINEAU
<u>2ND Bn 9TH Mar (-)</u>	
<u>H&amp;S Co (-)</u>	Capt MACDONALD
<u>Co F (Rein)</u>	1stLt HOLM
<u>Co G (Rein)</u>	1stLt RHODES
<u>Co H (Rein)</u>	Capt EDWARDS
<u>Co E (Rein) Constructive</u>	Capt HUTCHINSON
<u>BTRY E 2ND Bn 12TH Marines</u>	Capt BOLVIS
<u>81MM Mortar Platoon</u>	1stLt WHITAKER
<u>106 RR Plt</u>	1stLt HOWE
<u>2ND Plt, Co C, 3RD AT Bn</u>	2ndLt CARR
<u>3RD Plt, Co C, 3RD Tank Bn</u>	2ndLt BROPHY
<u>Det BOD Plt, 3RD FSR</u>	GySgt TEMPLETON
<u>2ND Plt, Co B 1ST AMTRAC Bn</u>	1stLt DUFFY
<u>Det BMU #1 West Pac</u>	
<u>CTU 132.8.2 Helicopter Unit (HMM-163)</u>	LtCol RATHBUN

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Commanding Officer HMM-  
163, USS PRINCETON  
(LPH-5) Subic Bay,  
Republic of the Philippines  
010800H March 1963

Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 302-63.

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS L594 (1:250,000) TAIWAN; Sheet NF 51-5, Bilingual  
AMS L792 (1:50,000), TAIWAN; Sheets 2114 I, 2114 II,  
2213 IV, 2214 III, 2214 IV, Bilingual

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION.

- a. General. Invader landed by surprise in southern Taiwan on 27 February, and with approximately two (2) divisions moved rapidly north along the west coast. GRC Forces rallying at the HSIA-TAN-SHUI-CH'I river, approximately 50 kilometers north of our planned Force Beachhead, have succeeded in containing invader forces, which remain deployed to the south of the river. The invader is also pressing the GRC Forces with air attacks against the Penghus and amphibious and airborne assaults against the Chinmens and Matsus. The GRC has requested US assistance in coordination with a large-scale counterattack to drive the invader from Taiwan. In response, Commander Seventh Fleet has been ordered to conduct coordinated counter-landings behind the main enemy forces in order to secure a larger beachhead and inland blocking positions for the subsequent operation. Initial US/GRC forces will be landed in the vicinity of FANG-LIAO and HSIA-LIAO, securing the Force

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Beachhead to include critical terrain of mountain foothills inland, commanding the coastal plains.

b. Specific.

- (1) Invader originally landed an estimated two (2) divisions. The main force is presently deployed 30-50 kilometers north of the Force Beachhead. One regiment reinforced, one rifle battalion, one unidentified unit, and a division CP have been located. The enemy has airborne and amphibious capabilities and support available from naval gunfire and tactical air. GRC naval and air capabilities are largely diverted in support of the TAIWAN STRAIT islands.
- (2) Strength and disposition of enemy forces able to influence the Force Beachhead on D-day are undetermined. At this time they are known to have insufficient strength to successfully oppose the landing, and reinforcement from the north is not probable prior to D+1.
- (3) GRC Forces are successfully containing the invader along their MLR to the north and are preventing any large scale enemy reinforcement or seaborne logistical support. However, the invader is utilizing airfields at CHAO CHOU (TQ 4696) (constructive) and TUNG CHIANG (TQ 3686) to support his combat forces on a small scale.
- (4) It is known that the enemy has established beach defenses to an undetermined extent including extensive offshore mining in the

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beachhead area.

- (5) Further enemy situation will be promulgated by ISUM's as it is determined.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION.

- a. Determine the extent of enemy defenses at PEACH BLUE to include strength, disposition and weapons.
- b. Determine the extent of enemy defenses inland with specific attention to possible helicopter landing zones. Information must include strength, dispositions and weapons, specifically his mechanized, anti-tank and artillery capability.
- c. Determine the enemy's mobility and reinforcement capability.
- d. Determine the tactical air and helicopter capability of the enemy to include types of aircraft and armament.
- e. Determine the enemy's status of supply, supply point locations and source.
- f. Locate avenues of approach, friendly or enemy, and obstacles therein. Determine road and bridge conditions.
- g. Determine critical terrain inland.
- h. Determine if the enemy will employ guerrilla forces against us. If so, where? When? In what strength?

3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS.

a. Orders to subordinate units.

(1) TU 132.8.1.

- (a) Commencing D-day, conduct reconnaissance as required within area of responsibility to ascertain BEI's in paragraph

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2 and as ordered.

- (b) Earliest D-day, capture prisoners and interrogate.
- (c) Report location and estimated capability of potential helicopter landing zones.
- (d) Special surveillance teams enter covertly on D-2 and report enemy situation.

(2) TU 132.8.2.

- (a) Reconnaissance and observation missions as directed.

b. Requests to higher, adjacent and supporting units.

(1) Commander Amphibious Task Force U. S.

- (a) Provide or arrange for aerial photography as specified in Appendix 1 (Aerial Photography Plan).
- (b) Provide for a beach study of the objective area.
- (c) Night of D-2-D-1, land special surveillance teams to report enemy situation.
- (d) Provide current and predicted weather data.
- (e) Provide information as obtained on beach and surf conditions.
- (f) Provide information as obtained on enemy ground forces within the objective area.
- (g) Provide information as obtained on the movement of additional enemy forces into the objective area.
- (h) Provide information as obtained on enemy air forces within the objective area.
- (i) Provide information as obtained on enemy guerrilla capabilities within the objective area.

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CONFIDENTIALc. Coordinating instructions.

- (1) Normal reconnaissance and observation will be carried out by all units.
- (2) Disseminate information as obtained relative to enemy NBC preparation and activities.

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND CAPTURED MATERIAL.

- a. Normal POW procedures apply.
- b. Interrogation of prisoners at a level below battalion must be restricted to procurement of information of immediate tactical concern.
- c. Hostile irregulars and apparently friendly escapees or evaders should be treated as POWs and expedited to the POW collecting point for interrogation by interpreters.
- d. After interrogation by the battalion, captured personnel, documents and material of intelligence value will be helicopter evacuated to a point to be designated by the commander. Ambulances will be U. S.

5. MAPS, CHARTS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS.

- a. Reference (a) is designated as the standard maps for this operation.
- b. Maps and charts will be the responsibility of and issued by the individual units.
- c. Aerial photography will be provided as set forth in Appendix 1 (Aerial Photography Plan) to this Annex. Requests for aerial photography in accordance with instructions contained in Appendix 1.

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. See Appendix 5 (Counterintelligence Plan).CONFIDENTIAL

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7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION.

- a. Standard intelligence reports will be submitted.
- b. All units report to this Headquarters any EEI or other information acquired.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL RATHBUN

R. T. LEMMONS

Major, U. S. Marine Corps


Executive Officer

APPENDIXES:

1. Aerial Photography Plan
2. Beach Study
3. Helicopter Landing Zone Study - TO BE ISSUED
4. Target Information
5. Counterintelligence Plan

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Landing Force US., CTG  
79.5 Commander Special  
Landing Force and  
Commanding Officer HMM-  
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(LPH-5) Subic Bay,  
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010800H March 1963

Appendix 1 (Aerial Photography Plan) to Annex B (Intelligence) to  
Operation Order 302-63.

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS L594 (1:250,000), TAIWAN: Chest NF 51-5,  
Bilingual  
AMS L792 (1:50,000), TAIWAN: Sheets 2114I, 2114II,  
2213IV, 2214III, 2214IV, Bilingual.

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

1. Commande, Amphibious Task Force has been requested to provide the  
following serial photography and to deliver prints direct to this head-  
quarters for distribution.

a. Mission No. 1.

General area; vertical, B&W; scale 1:5,000 to 1:10,000, 60/40  
lap; area bounded by TQ 5481, 5780, 5577, 5677, 5778, reference  
(a).

b. Mission No. 2.

Beach area and inland terrain; low obliques, B&W; 60% lap in  
flight, scale 1:5,000 to 1:10,000 at center of photos, center of  
photography, beachline, direction of photography inland, extend-  
ing from TQ 510756 to TQ 500766, ASAP, D-1 (Constructive).

c. Mission No. 3.

Helicopter landing zone; verticals, B&W; scale 1:5,000, 60/40  
lap; area bounded by TQ 5476, TQ 5479, TQ 5779, TQ 5776; D-15,  
D-1 (D-1 camouflage detection (D-1 constructive)).

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d. Mission No. 4.

Helicopter approach and retirement routes: trimetrogon, B&W, scale 1:7,500 at vertical, 60% lap in flight, center line of photography, routes to and from Landing zone; D-15.

2. Eight complete sets of missions no. 1 and 2 and two complete sets of missions no. 3 and 4 have been requested.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL RATHBUN


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Appendix 2 (Beach Study) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order

302-63,

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS L594 (1:250,000), TAIWAN; Sheet NF 51-5,  
 Bilingual  
 AMS L792 (1:50,000), TAIWAN; Sheets 2214 I, 2214 II,  
 2213 IV, 2214 III, 2214 IV, Bilingual

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

1. BEACH BLUE.

- a. Location and extent. BEACH BLUE is located immediately to the left of the town of FANG-LIAO and extends approximately 800 yards between coordinates (TQ 509757) and (TQ 501766), reference (a). Total landing beach available left of FANG-LIAO is 1660 yards, and all is useable. The beach faces 230° true, and is straight without obstructions. The small village of TA-WULI is about 300 yards in from the BEACH BLUE left flank.
- b. Width. Beach width varies from 20-80 yards between MHHW and MLLW. Near shore average is 60 yards. Backshore average width is 20 yards.
- c. Gradients.
- (1) Nearshore gradient average 1:36.
  - (2) Backshore gradient average 1:35.
- d. Approaches. Offshore approaches to the beach are clear and

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unobstructed. An exposed anchorage is located approximately 900 yards from beach center in 30 foot depths with a mud and sand bottom. Nearshore bottom from MLLW to the 3 fathom line consists of sand and rocks. A submerged sandbar, 6-10 feet below surface at MLLW, runs parallel to the beach 175-200 yards off shore. Average distance from MLLW to the one fathom curve is 25 yards. Average nearshore gradient from the three fathom curve is 1:85.

- e. Surf and tidal range. The tidal range is at it's lowest in this part of the island - 1.5 to 2 feet. Surf is lowest here with the northeast monsoon.
- f. Material, firmness and exits. Nearshore trafficability is good on firm sand and pebbles. Backshore trafficability is good on firm pebbles.
- g. Communications inland. A small irrigation stream runs parallel to the beach about 200 yards behind it, a dirt road lies immediately behind the beach and unrestricted exits lead directly to FANG-LIAO and the bituminous coastal road.
- h. Terrain immediately behind the beach. The right flank of BEACH BLUE is marked by a school hours in the margin of FANG-LIAO, and the left flank is in the vicinity of an outlet from the irrigation stream flowing behind the beach. A narrow dune belt runs along the backshore. It is 15-75 yards wide and sparsely covered with scrub growth and ironwood trees. These exits leave the beach and enter this sparse cover, connecting with a dirt

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road running parallel to the beach and leading right to the bituminous coast road on the right flank. Beyond this exit road is the irrigation stream, and the plains of paddies and cane fields. The beach left flank exit crosses the stream on a dike and at TA-WULI turns right to the coastal road.


- i. Defensive installations. Fortifications known to be on BEACH BLUE include approximately 7 reinforced-concrete pillboxes, situated at regular intervals on the margin of the vegetated dune belt.

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 010800H March 1963

Appendix 4 (Target Information) to Annex B (Intelligence) To Operation  
 Order 302-63

1. CATF/US (CTG 132.1) will control the target list until the Landing Force Commander (CTG 132.8) moves ashore and assumes control of air and naval gunfire support. The original target list is contained in paragraph three of this Appendix. As additional target information becomes available it will be issued in the form of Target Bulletins. Target Bulletins will be numbered consecutively and the last bulletin issued by CTG 132.1 will contain the notation "Final Bulletin" in addition to the bulletin number assigned. CTU 132.8.1 will assign the next unused number to his first Target Bulletin.

2. The Target Bulletin will contain the following information:

- a. The Serial number of the bulletin.
- b. New targets discovered with target serial number, location, description, elevation and classification.
- c. Damage assessment of targets attacked since last bulletin.
- d. Cancellation and reactivation of targets.

Example: Target Bulletin Five. New targets Foxtrot 37 Dash 56027567 Dash Concrete Pill Box Dash 10 meters Dash Bravo. India 42 Dash 55062656 Dash Highway Bridge Dash 10 meters Dash Echo. Targets destroyed Foxtrot 2 India 3. Cancel Fotrot 22. This is Commander Amphibious Task Force/US Final Bulletin.

3. Original Target List:

Maps: TAIWAN, AMS L792, 1:50,000, Sheet 2214 III

Target Serial Number	Map Coord	Description	Elevation in meters	Priority
<u>CLASS I MISSIONS</u>				
F-1	TQ 51007559	Concrete Pill Box	2	B
F-2	50957583	Concrete Pill Box	2	B

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Target	Serial Number	Map Coord	Description	Elevation in Meters	Priority
F-3		50917602	Concrete Pill Box	2	B
F-4		50787639	Concrete Pill Box	2	B
F-5		50717650	Concrete Pill Box	2	B
F-6		50497630	Concrete Pill Box	2	B
F-7		50297651	Concrete Pill Box	2	B
F-8		50237650	Concrete Pill Box	2	B
F-9		55757750	Medium Bunker	410	B

CLASS II MISSIONS

G-1	TQ	55807748	Finger Knoll HLZ	400	B
G-2		55558215	Finger Knoll HLZ	210	C
G-3		54457780	Finger Knoll HLZ	188	C
G-4		56057705	Defensive Positions	422	C
G-5		54408160	Defensive Positions	166	C
G-6		54408135	Prepared Defenses	100	C
G-7		54457555	Heli-Lane Point	115	B
G-8		56257645	Heli-Lane Point	420	B
G-9		56007565	Heli-Lane Point	310	B

CLASS IV MISSIONS

I-1	TQ	44308235	Railroad Tressel	10	E
I-2		44308275	Coast Highway Bridge	10	E
I-3		47058615	Highway Bridge	20	E
I-4		47058625	Highway Bridge	20	E
I-5		51057920	Highway Bridge	15	E
I-6		50907875	Highway Bridge	15	E

CLASS V MISSIONS

J-1	TQ	57358065	Defensive Positions	610	C
J-2		57057980	Defensive Positions	510	C
J-3		57257895	Defensive Positions	490	C
J-4		57057835	Defensive Positions	450	C

LEGEND:

- Missions Class:
- I - Pre D-Day destruction
  - II - Pre D-Day neutralization
  - III - Pre D-Day harrassment and interdiction
  - IV - D-Day destruction
  - V - D-Day neutralization
  - VI - D-Day harrassment and interdiction

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Priority: A - Threat to Amphibious Task Force  
B - Threat to Landing Force  
C - Threat to maneuver ashore  
D - No fire pre-day  
E - Fire only on order

Target Serial No.: Foxtrot 1 through Foxtrot 999 - - - - Class I  
Golf 1 through Golf 999 - - - - - Class II  
Hotel 1 through Hotel 999 - - - - - Class III  
India 1 through India 999 - - - - - Class IV  
Juliett 1 through Juliett 999 - - - - Class V  
Kilo 1 through Kilo 999 - - - - - Class VI

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL RATHBUN

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US SEVENTH FLEET  
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 Landing Force US., CTG  
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 Landing Force and  
 Commanding Officer HMM-  
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 (LPH-5) Subic Bay,  
 Republic of the Philippines  
 010800H March 1963

Appendix 5 (Counterintelligence) to Annex B (Intelligence) to  
 Operation Order 302-63.

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS L594 (1:250,000), TAIWAN; Sheet NF 51-5,  
 Bilingual  
 AMS L792 (1:50,000), TAIWAN; Sheets 2214I, 2214II,  
 2214IV, 2214III, 2214IV, Bilingual

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

1. MILITARY SECURITY.

- a. Subordinate unit SOPs apply unless modified herein.
- b. Special care must be taken in the safeguarding of classified military information and equipment at headquarters and in the field.
- c. Passwords and countersigns will be used as prescribed by TU 132.8.1.
- d. The utmost care must be taken to utilize proper radio procedures as actual hostile forces may monitor out transmissions. Shackles will be used in accordance with CTF Operations Order 302-63 Annex N (Communications).
- e. Unnecessary disclosure of plans, orders, documents, or information of this operation must be strictly avoided.
- f. The security and control of press representatives will be assigned by CTF 132.
- g. Indigenous non-military personnel will not be allowed in command

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posts without authorization of this headquarters.

h. Reports of security violations will be immediately forwarded to this headquarters.

2. CIVIL SECURITY.

a. The primary responsibility for civil security remains a function of the sovereign governments concerned.

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Captain, U.S. Marine Corps

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US SEVENTH FLEET  
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 Landing Force US., CTG  
 79.5 Commander Special  
 Landing Force and Commanding  
 Officer HMM-163, USS  
 PRINCETON (LPH-5)  
 Subic Bay, Republic of the  
 Philippines  
 010800H March 1963

Annex C (Concept of Operations) to Operation Order 302-63.

Ref: (a) Map AMS L 594, (1:250,000), TAIWAN, Sheet NF 51-5, Bilingual

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

1. MISSION. Landing Force US (CTG 132.8) lands in the FANG-LIAO area to seize, occupy and defend landing forces objectives A and B in the southern sector of the Force Beachhead (FBH) to provide secure beachheads for the landing of larger US and GRC forces.
2. CONCEPT.
  - a. At H-Hour and L-Hour on D-Day, amphibious troops conduct helicopter and surface assaults on the objective area.
  - b. The helicopter landing force, one company (Rein), secures the high ground at vicinity TA558775, reference (a), to:
    - (1) Isolate the southern portion of landing force objective and to deny the invader the possession of the predominant terrain commanding BEACH BLUE.
  - c. At H-Hour on D-Day, the Surface Landing Force (TU 132.8.1) lands two companies in column over BEACH BLUE, secures immediate beachhead in zone, continues the attack to seize landing force objectives A and B. Effects juncture with helicopter landing forces. Conducts armored patrols in the northwest section of <sup>zone</sup> TAOR.

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3. SCHEME OF MANEUVERS.

- a. See Annex D (Operation Overlay) to Operation Order 302-63),
- b. H-Hour is set as <sup>0730</sup>~~1000H~~ and L-Hour is H+20. H-Hour is the time of the landing of the first wave and L-Hour is the time of landing of the first helicopter wave in the LZ.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL RATHBUN

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Major, U. S. Marine Corps

Executive Officer

Appendix:

- 1. Schedule of Events

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13th AVIATION FLEET  
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 Landing Force Us., 318  
 79.5 Commander Special  
 Landing Force and  
 Commanding Officer, HHL-103  
 USS PRINCETON  
 (LPH-5) Subic Bay,  
 Republic of the Philippines  
 010800 H March 1963

Appendix 1 (Schedule of Events) to Annex C (Concept of Operations)  
 to Operation Order 302-63.

Ref: None.

Time Zone: H(minus 8)

SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

<u>TIME</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
121400H	Pre-sail conference in PRINCETON
About 151300H	Administratively land the invader forces at FANG-LIAO
171000H	H-hour for rehearsal at FENG-CHIANG
About 171400H	Rehearsal Critique in PRINCETON
191000H	H-hour; D-day at FANG LIAO
About 220800H	Critique in PRINCETON and commence backloading
About 221400H	All ships underway to visit TAIWAN ports as assigned by CTF 76

BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL LEMMONS

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US SEVENTH FLEET  
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 Landing Force US., CGC  
 79.5 Commander Special  
 Landing Force and  
 Commanding Officer HMH-165  
 USS PRINCETON (LHA-5)  
 Subic Bay, Republic of the  
 Philippines  
 010300H March 1963

Annex E (Air Operations) to Operation Order 302-63.

Ref: (a) Map AMS L792, 1:50,000. TAIWAN, Sheets 2213IV, 2214I, 2214II,  
 2214III, 2214IV, Bilingual

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy forces. See Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 302-63.

b. Friendly forces.

(1) GRC Air Force will provide aircraft for Close Air Support (CAS)  
 on D-2 (R-Day), possible strike missions on D-1, and  
 CAS on D-Day and subsequent operations. See Tab A (Aircraft  
 Schedules) to Appendix 2 (Aircraft Schedules).

2. PROCEDURES.

a. All air operations in the objective area are under control of TACC.

b. All helicopter operations in objective area controlled by HDC  
 under overall supervision of TACC.

c. All air strikes within the bomblines must be under positive control  
 of TACC.

d. Units mark front line positions with red and yellow panels prior  
 to the conducting of air strikes.

e. The bomblines is established as a line coinciding with the FBH line.  
 Changes to the bomblines will be published as required through the  
 TACC.

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- f. All helicopters will report to HDC in accordance with Appendix 1 (Control, Approach and Retirement Procedures).
  - g. Use UMT grid for all air support missions, reference (a).
  - h. Mark targets for air strikes with smoke or white phosphorus when possible.
  - i. Submit all close air support missions requests to TACC.
  - j. Control, approach and retirement procedures. See Appendix 1 (Control, Approach and Retirement Procedures).
  - k. Aircraft schedules. See Appendix 2 (Aircraft Schedules).
  - l. Aircraft armament. See Appendix 3 (Aircraft Armament).
  - m. General instructions, safety precautions and special rules of engagement. See Appendix 4 (General Instructions, Safety Precautions, and Special Rules of Engagement).
  - n. Air communications. See Appendix 5 (Air Communications).
  - o. SAR. See Appendix 6 (Air Search and Rescue).
  - p. Helicopter landing sites to be marked with smoke or panels after initial assault, landing.
3. *Control of Air will not be passed as above -*  
COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.
- a. See Annex M (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 302-63.
  - b. Control agencies.
    - (1) TACC aboard ESTES,
    - (2) HDC aboard PRINCETON,
    - (3) FSCC vicinity BLT 2/9 CP,

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APPENDIXES:

- 1 - Control, Approach and Retirement Procedures
- 2 - Aircraft Schedules
- 3 - Aircraft Armament
- 4 - General Instructions, Safety Precautions and Special Rules of Engagement
- 5 - Air Communications
- 6 - Air Search and Rescue

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Order 302-63

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010800H March 1963

Appendix 1 (Helicopter Control, Approach and Retirement Procedures)

to Annex E (Air Operations) to Operation Order 302-63.

Ref: None

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

1. HELICOPTER CONTROL.

- a. All helicopters will be under the control of HDC on appropriate Helicopter Direction nets under the overall control of the TACC.
- b. Helicopters when launched are under control of PRINCETON until released to HDC. Helicopters arriving back in the LPH operating area will be controlled on an approach control or land/launch net by PRINCETON after being released by HDC.
- c. HDC will exercise control of all helicopters on the HD net from Departure Point (DP) along helicopter lanes to the Initial Point (IP) and return flight from the landing zone (LZ) to the LPH operating area.
- d. When helicopters are cleared to LZ control at the IP by the HDC, terminal control passes to the LZ control party on the LZ control net. Immediately after take-off from the LZ helicopters will revert to HDC control on the HD net.

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e. Clearance to approach routes and landing zones during the Ship-to-Shore Movement will be conducted as follows:

- (1) After rendezvous and reporting to HDC control, flights will be cleared by HDC to the LZ.
- (2) Authority to divert from primary to alternate routes or landing zones in accordance with Appendix 3 to Annex I (Ship-to-Shore Movement) to Operation Order 302-63.

2. EXECUTION.

a. After departing control of either LPH or LZ, flight leader or individual helicopters will make an initial report to HDC or HD as follows:

- (1) Call sign (event number)
- (2) Aircraft position and time.
- (3) Number of helicopters.
- (4) Destination (LZ call or LPH),  
(ie., " \_\_\_\_\_ ONE ALPHA ZERO, POINT/BOSTON AT 25. FLIGHT OF FOUR TO LANDING ZONE VULTURE.")

b. Flight leaders report to HDC over control and initial points as follows:

- (1) Call sign
- (2) Position
- (3) Time

c. Flight leaders of initial wave report time of touchdown in the LZ to HDC.

d. Altitudes.

- (1) Ship-to-Shore altitude for helicopters 700' above the surface.
- (2) Shore-to-Ship altitude for helicopters 500' above the surface.

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- (3) Helicopters will not fly over 700' above the surface at any time due to invader aircraft.
- e. Search and Rescue Point SAM is located at LAT 22° 20'N-LON 120° 11'E, the southwest corner of LIV - CHIV ISLAND.
- f. Approach and retirement routes for helicopter. See Tab A (Air Operation Overlay).
- g. Individual helicopters show IFF/SIF when in flights of two or more, only flight leaders will show IFF/SIF. IFF/SIF modes and codes to be issued.

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TAB: A - Air Operation Overlay.

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Appendix 2 (Aircraft Schedules) to Annex E (Air Operations) to  
 Operation Order 302-63.

Ref: None,

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

1. The aircraft flight schedules are listed in Tab A to this Appendix.
2. Event numbers (inclusive) for air operations are as follows:
 

1-10	CAP
11-19	Strike, armed recon
21-29	CAS/Interdiction
31-49	Helicopter
51-59	Special
61-69	SAR
71-79	Misc.
3. Aircraft conditions of readiness will be as follows:
  - Condition 1 - 2 minutes standby
  - Condition 2 - 5 minutes readiness
  - Condition 3 - 15 minutes availability
  - Condition 4 - 30 minutes at ease
  - Condition 5 - Aircraft and pilots not available until the specified time.
4. Condition alert aircraft (SAR) that are launched will be replaced as soon as possible. Replacement aircraft will assume the same event

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number with a letter suffix in sequence (e.g. 61A, 61B, 61C, etc.).

5. Notify TACC immediately when it becomes evident that any event will be cancelled, revised, or late arriving on station.

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
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TAB: A - Aircraft Schedules.

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Tab A (Aircraft Schedules) to Appendix 2 to Annex E (Air Operations) to Operations Order  
302-63

Ref: None

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

A Event No.	B Mission	C Number & Type A/C	D Provided By	E Time On Station	F Armament (Constructive)	G Entry Point	H Special Instructions
11	Strike	4 F-86	GRC	R-Day H-60 H+120	2 Skylark, 2 Dove	Dot	Cond 4
12	Beach Prep	4 F-86	GRC	H-60 H-35	2 Falcon, 2 Dove	Dot	
13	Beach Prep	4 F-86	GRC	H-35 H-20	2 Falcon, 2 Dove	Dot	
14	Beach Prep	4 F-86	GRC	H-10 H-5	2 Falcon, 2 Skylark	Dot	
15	Beach Strafe	4 F-86	GRC	H-3 H+2	Full Ammo	Dot	
31	Helo Assault	UH-34D as required	TG 132.8.2	L-30 to Completion	None		Note 3

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A Event No.	B Mission	C Number & Type A/C	D Provided By	E Time on Station	F Armament (Constructive)	G Entry Point	H Special Instructions
61	SAR	1 UH-34D	TU 132.8.2	L-30 to completion			Note 1
				D-1			
11	Strike	4 F-86	GRC	(D-1 Sunrise to Sunset	2 Skylark, 1 Falcon 1 Dove	Dot	Cond 4
1	CAP (USF)	2 F-100A	GRC	0800 - 1400	Pidgeon	Dot	Note 1
2	CAP (GRC/TF)	2 F-100A	GRC	0800 - 1400	Pidgeon	Dot	Note 1
				D-Day			
1	CAP (US TF)	2 F-100A	GRC	0800 - 1100	Pidgeon	Dot	Note 1
2	CAP (GRC TF)	2 F-100A	GRC	0800 - 1100	Pidgeon	Dot	Note 1
11	TAC (A)	1 T-28	GRC	H-60 H+120	Swan	Patsy	Note 1
12	Beach Prep	4 F-86	GRC	H-60 H-35	2 Falcon, 2 Dove	Dot	
13	Beach Prep	4 F-86	GRC	H-35 H-20	2 Falcon, 2 Dove	Dot	
14	Beach Prep	4 F-86	GRC	H-10 H-5	2 Falcon, 2 Skylark	Dot	
15	Beach Strafe	4 F-86	GRC	H-3 H+2	Full Ammo	Dot	
16	LZ Prep	2 F-86	GRC	L-20 L-Hour	1 Falcon, 1 Dove	Dot	
52	TAO	1 L-19	GRC	H-30 Sunset	None	Patsy	Note 1
				E-2-A-2			

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A Event No.	B Mission	C Number & Type A/C	D Provided By	E Time On Station	F Armament (Constructive)	G Entry Point	H Special Instructions
21	CAS	4 F-86	GRC	H-hour Sunset	2 Skylark, 2 Dove	Dot	Note 1 & Note 4
TBA	Helo Assault	UH-34D as required	TG 132.8.2	L-30 to Completion	None		Note 2
61	SAR	1 UH-34D	TU 132.8.2	L-30 to Completion  D+1 and D+2	None		Note 1
63	SAR	1 UH-34D	TU 132.8.2	Completion of lift to sunset	None		Cond 3
52	TAO	1 L-19	GRC	Sunrise to sunset	None	Patsy	Note 1
51	TAC (A)	1 T-28	GRC	Sunrise to sunset	Swan	Patsy	Note 1
21	CAS	4 F-86	GRC	Sunrise to sunset	2 Skylark, 2 Dove	Dot	Note 1
63	SAR	1 UH-34D	TU 132.8.2	Sunrise to sunset	None		Cond 2

Notes:

1. Relieve on station as necessary.
2. Leader of initial wave report time of touchdown to HDC.
3. Turnaway/Flyover.
4. Two aircraft to be assigned helo escort L-hour to L+30

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Appendix 3 (Aircraft Armament) to Annex E (Air Operations) to Operations  
 Order 302-63

Ref: None

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

1. GENERAL.

- a. All ordnance loading will be constructive.
- b. All aircraft with automatic weapons will carry maximum ammunition (constructive).
- c. After each close air support mission the flight leader or TAC (A) will report ordnance expended, and damage assessment.

2. AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT CODES.

AUSTIN - White phosphorus marking rocket  
 BUICK - 2.75" Rocket pod (19 rockets), GP heads  
 CORVETTE - 250 lb General purpose bomb  
 DART - 260 lb Fragmentation bomb  
 EDSEL - 500 lb General purpose bomb  
 FORD - 1000 lb Napalm tank

3. AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT LOADING CODES.

FALCON - 2 rocket pods and 2 260 lb Frag bombs  
 SKYLARK - 2 500 lb GP bombs and 2 250 lb GP bombs  
 DOVE - 2 Napalm and 2 rocket pods

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SWAN - 6 WP marking rockets

PIDGEON - 4 sidewinders

4. ARMAMENT FUSE SETTINGS.

GP bombs - Nose-instantaneous tail - .025 sec

Frag bombs - Influence (VT)

GP rockets - Instantaneous nose and tail

Napalm - WP ignitors

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Appendix 4 (General Instructions, Safety Precautions and Rules of Engagement) to Annex E (Air Operations) to Operations Order 302-63.

Ref: None

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

1. GENERAL.

- a. The following VFR minimums shall apply in the objective area:

Helicopter                      500 feet AGL/1 mile visibility

2. SAFETY PRECAUTIONS.

- a. Pilots shall be especially alert for itinerant and non-exercise aircraft, never approaching within 1000 feet and shall not fly directly toward such aircraft. Pilots will notify the controlling agency immediately of any itinerant aircraft.
- b. Aircraft shall remain VFR at all times in the objective area. Close Air Support missions will be limited to VFR attacks only.
- c. Invader aircraft shall remain at least 1000 feet above all ships and 1000 feet above ground level (AGL) overland.
- d. Minimum altitude for simulated attacks are:
- (1) Bombing - 1000 feet above the terrain.
  - (2) NAPALM, rockets, strafing <sup>1000</sup> - 500 feet above the terrain.
- e. Under no circumstances will aircraft without two-way radio communications participate in the exercise.

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f. All aircraft shall use navigation lights during the hours of darkness or in conditions of reduced visibility.

g. No strike will be made in the objective area except by the direction of the TACC.

h. No live ordnance will be carried on any flights into the objective area.

3. SPECIAL RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.

a. In the event of actual invader, the code word "HOT POTATO" will be used by all exercise aircraft and stations.

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Appendix 5 (Air Communications) to Annex E (Air Operations) to  
 Operation Order 302-63.

Ref: None

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

1. GENERAL. Air communications will be in accordance with this  
 Appendix and Annex I. (Communication-Electronics) to Operation  
 Order 302-63.

2. FREQUENCY PLAN.

a. Mobile aids to Air Navigation and Land/Launch frequencies:

<u>Station</u>	<u>ID</u>	<u>TACAN</u>	<u>UHF/LF</u>	<u>L/L Frequency</u>
ESTES	TB	2		
PRINCETON	XY	12	275.6/532 kcs	371.4 kcs

b. Air Frequencies. See Annex M (Communications-Electronics) to  
 Operation Order 302-63.

3. CALL SIGNS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Call Sign</u>
TACC	Planet
TADC	Happy Clock/CW-AQW
HDC	Echo Hotel
PRINCETON	Bull Horn
ESTES	

*Boundary Target*  
 E-5-1  
*Scopel*

*HMM-163*

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VMO-2

Dead Lock

GRC Aircraft

<sup>2010</sup>  
~~ALPHA~~ & Event Number

Air Control Center

Happy Ox/CW-WXI

- 4. Cryptographic, authentication and shackle procedures in accordance with Annex M (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 302-63.
- 5. INTERFERENCE, JAMMING AND IMITATION DECEPTION. There will be no jamming or tactical deception employed on aircraft or air control frequencies.

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Appendix 6 (Air Search and Rescue) to Annex E (Air Operations) to  
Operation Order 302-63

Ref: None.

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

1. Responsibility for all SAR coordination in the objective area has been assigned to CTF 132 under general SAR authority of Director, Chinese Joint Operations Center (JOC).
2. All SAR incidents occurring within the actual air maneuver area requiring assistance outside the task force will be coordinated with JOC TAIWAN by the Tactical Air Commander.
3. There will be no simulated SAR incidents.
4. In the event of an SAR incident, aircraft will be directed when to shift to the "On the Scene" frequency of 282.8 mcs by the controlling agency.
5. All pilots shall consider their aircraft available for SAR missions throughout the period of Exercise HELLERBLADE. Nothing in these instructions limits the responsibility of Commanders to engage in local rescue operations on their own initiative whenever it is apparent to them that sudden action is appropriate. Independent action must be reported to CTF 132 for coordination but on a not

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to interfere with the actual executor of the SAR.

6. SAR reference point is LIE-CH'IU HAU ISLAND (LAT 22°20'N - LON 120°22'E) designated SAR Point SAM. Report distress positions in magnetic bearing and nautical miles from SAR Point SAM. If not feasible (i.e., aircraft low alt) give radial and distance on ESTES TACAN CH 2 (TB).
7. SAR helicopters will be equipped with medical litters, hoist, slings and medical kit.
8. ACTUAL CASUALTY EVACUATION.
  - a. The following ships have helicopter landing capability:
    - (1) ESTES (ACG 12)
    - (2) ALAMO (LSD 33)
    - (3) PRINCETON (LPH-5)
9. PRECAUTIONARY SAR.
  - a. An aircraft desiring to establish communications with an unknown submarine or surface ship will do so by calling "LIFE GUARD" (rescue ship voice call).
  - b. Life Guard desiring to establish communications with an unknown aircraft in connection with SAR, will contact the aircraft by calling "RIALTO" (rescue aircraft voice call).
10. SAR reports in accordance with Appendix VII (Air Search and Rescue) to Annex E (Air Search and Rescue) to CTG 132.1 Operations Order 302-63.
11. IN-FLIGHT EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES.
  - a. When crash landing or ditching appears imminent, the pilot will attempt to establish radio contact by first calling on frequency of last contact, then on the international emergency frequencies.

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If communications are not established, transmit "in the blind" on international emergency frequency the following information: Call sign, position, type of aircraft, course and speed, altitude, nature of difficulties and intention of pilot.

b. Just prior to ditching:

(1) Transmit a distress call on appropriate emergency frequencies, endeavoring to maintain the transmission long enough to enable a D/F plot to be made of the aircraft's position.

(2) Turn IFF/SIF to EMERGENCY (Mode 1 Code 00, Mode 3 Code ~~88~~<sup>80</sup>)

c. Aircraft accompanying the distressed aircraft orbit the scene, switch IFF to EMERGENCY mode and transmit amplifying information as appropriate. At least one aircraft in flight will remain at the scene as long as possible or until arrival of the SAR rescue facilities.

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Annex F (Naval Gunfire Support) to Operation Order 302-63.

Ref: (a) Maps and Charts: Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order  
 302-63.

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy forces. See Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation 302-63.

b. Friendly forces.

(1) Elements of the GRC Air Force will provide this force with aircraft for Close Air Support (CAS) on D-2, possible strike missions on D-day, Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) protection on D-1 and D-day, and CAS on D-day and subsequent operations.

(2) Amphibious Task Force GRC (TG 132.2) will conduct advance force operations, including mine operations, underwater demolition and simultaneously establish a beachhead in the HSIA-LIAO area on D-day.

(3) Landing Force GRC (TF 132.9) lands in the HSIA-LIAO area to seize, occupy and defend the best defensible terrain in the northern sector of the Force Beachhead (FBH) for the landing of larger US and GRC forces.

2. MISSION. The Naval Gunfire Unit will be in direct support of the landing force US and will provide simulated fire support as required.

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- (1) Direct support BLT 2/9.
- (2) On D-day take the initial fire support station indicated Tab A of Appendix 1 to Annex I (Ship-to-Shore Movement) of CTF 132.1. Operation Order 302-63.
- (3) Schedule of fires, Appendix 4 to this Annex
- (4) Anti-mechanized fire be provided in accordance with Annex J (Anti-mechanized Plan) to Operations Order 302-63.
- (5) Call fire missions as requested by CTU 132.8.1 commencing H+30
- (6) FLAK Supression fire will be provided on call.

b. TU 132.8.1

- (1) Assure that friendly front lines are reported to CATF beginning at H+2 on D-day and hourly thereafter.
- (2) Furnish such personnel as directed to assist and coordinate with SACC.

c. Coordination instructions.

- (1) Naval gunfire will be simulated.
- (2) The UTM grid system, reference (a), will be used for target information.
- (3) UT or MTF fuzed projectiles will not be fired over the heads of friendly troops or near aircraft unless specifically requested.
- (4) Safety limits unobserved fires are 750 yards from friendly

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front lines for initial salvo.

(5) Restrictive Fire Plans will be in accordance with Appendix II of Annex G of CTG 132.1 Operation Order 302-63.

(6) Be prepared to repeat lift or modify scheduled fires in the event of a change in H-hour.

4. LOGISTICS. Ammunition reports will be submitted in accordance with Appendix IV of Annex G of CTG 132.1 Operation Order 302-63.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS.

a. Commander Amphibious Task Force (SACC): In PRINCETON.

b. CTG 132.8 afloat in PRINCETON.

c. Gunfire support control will be passed ashore in accordance with NWIP 22-7(A), when BLF 2/9 FSCC is established ashore.

d. Communications will be in accordance with Annex N of CTG 132.1 Operation Order 302-63.

e. The gunfire support ship is assigned a secondary mission of Search and Rescue by Annex G of CTG 132.1 Operation Order 302-63.

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APPENDIXES:

1. Naval Gunfire Support Operations Diagram
2. Restrictive Fire Plan
3. Schedule of Fire (D-day Bombardment)

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Subic Bay, Republic of the  
Philippines  
010800H March 1963

Annex G (Artillery) to Operation Order 302-63.

Time Zone: H(minus 8)

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 302-63.
- (2) See current ISUM's and PIR's.

b. Friendly forces.

- (1) Annex E (Air Operations) to Operation Order 302-63.
- (2) Annex F (Naval Gun Fire) to Operation Order 302-63.

2. MISSION.

- a. Concept of artillery employment. When established ashore one battery will support the landing force by providing direct support to BLT 2/9.
- b. Land over BEACH BLUE in accordance with Annex I (Ship-to-Shore Movement) to Operation Order 302-63.
- c. Counter battery and counter mortar policy is active.
- d. Coordination of artillery and mortar fire between the U. S. and GRC Landing Forces will be established through the exchange of liaison Officers and the fire support coordination radio net. See Appendix 1 to Annex N (Communications) to CTF 132 Operation Order 302-63.

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3. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. See Annex N (Administrative and Logistics ) to Operation Order 302-63.

4. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

a. See Annex M (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 302-63.

b. Command posts.

(1) Afloat. USS ALAMO (LSD-33),

(2) Ashore. Report location when established.

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- (7) Standard salvos for call fires unless otherwise requested will be:
  - (a) Two (2) guns in adjustment of fire.
  - (b) Two (2) guns, six (6) salvos of fire for effect.
- (8) Priorities of Fires (Destructive).
  - (a) Radar sites.
  - (b) Surface to surface missile.
  - (c) Coast defense installations.
  - (d) Surface to air missile sites.
  - (e) Block houses.
  - (f) Pill boxes.
  - (g) Enemy armor.
  - (h) Assembly areas.
- (9) Neutralization Fires.
  - (a) AA defense guns.
  - (b) Observation posts.
  - (c) Machine gun emplacements.
  - (d) Avenues of approach.

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Appendix 2 (Restrictive Fire Plan) to Annex F (Naval Gunfire Support)  
 to Operation Order 302-63.

1. General.


To prevent endangering friendly aircraft during helicopter assault, ships lookouts, forward artillery observers, air spotters, naval gunfire spotters, and pilots themselves must be alert to notify support ships and artillery if aircraft are likely to be in danger.

2. Description.

800' maximum altitude

400' minimum altitude

Coordinate point



Lengths of no fire zones are indicated by coordinate points.

Width is 450 meters either side of a line drawn between the coordinate points.

Effective from H+10 to H+135.

3. Coordinates of no fire.

LZ VULTURE

Boston - New York - Chicago - VULTURE (Approach)  
 497719 527728 561740 558775

VULTURE - Baltimore - New York - Boston (Return)  
 558775 548761 527728 497719

Alternate: New York - Baltimore - VULTURE

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## LZ CONDOR

New York - Trenton - CONDOR  
 527728      534760      543761

Alternate: New York - Baltimore - CONDOR  
 527728      548671      543761

## LZ EAGLE

Boston - Eagle  
 497719      507764

Alternate: Boston - New York - EAGLE  
 497719      527728      507764

## LZ BUZZARD

New York - Trenton - BUZZARD  
 527728      534760      545777

Alternate: New York - Baltimore - Buzzard  
 527728      548761      545777

NOTES: 1. No NGF in beach area with ordinate of projectile of 800' during the following periods of time.

H-60 to H-20

H-10 to H-5

No NGF H-3 to H+2

2. No NGF on LZ VULTURE (or desig L7) with maximum ordinate of projectile of 800' during specified period.

3. Air strikes minimum altitude 1000'.

4. Other Restrictive Fire Plans.

a. General. In order to avoid endangering friendly aircraft, a restrictive fire plan will be ordered into effect to prevent the trajectories of all fire support weapons from passing through a specified air space during a stated time interval.

b. Description.

(1) A rectangular air space will be defined by two coordinated points

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through the target and along the axis. In addition to the line of bearing of the corridor, these points will fix the forward and after limits (i.e. Length) of the rectangle. The width of the area is specified by a distance in meters on either side of the perpendicular to the axis. Altitude and deck will be specified in each instance in hundreds of feet above mean sea level. A time interval will be stated by the agency ordering the plan into effect during which time the trajectories of fire support weapons will be restricted from passing through the specified air corridor.

- (2) Codeword for restrictive fire plan will be "PLAN EIGHTBALL".
- (3) The PLAN EIGHTBALL in effect will be numbered. Numbering will be consecutive.

c. Example.

- (1) PLAN EIGHTBALL number 8 from COORDINATES (615480) to (614605) FIVE HUNDRED, ALTITUDE THIRTY, DECK TEN, FROM 0830 to 0845.
- (2) Meaning. Trajectories of fire support weapons are prohibited from passing through an area 500 meters either side of the line drawn between coordinates 615480 and 614605. The axis of attack is the direction from coordinates 615480 to coordinate 614605. The width of the area is 1000 meters (i.e. 500 meters either side of the axis of attack). The top of the area is 3000 feet MSL and the bottom of the area is 1000 feet MSL. The restrictive fire plan will be in effect for 15 minutes from 0830 to 0845.

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Appendix 3 (Schedule of Fires) to Annex F (Naval Gunfire Support) to  
Operations Order 302-63

SHIP	A&E	AMMO	BTRY - 180	-120	-60	-50
------	-----	------	------------	------	-----	-----

DD 728	2/9	<u>2100</u> 985	5"/38	A	B	G6	11	G5	9	10	D	G3	G2
	5860	KCS		40	40	25	60	30	40	40	40	25	25

Beach Preparation (AIR)

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-50	-30	-20		-7	-3	H	+2	+10	+20	+30
C F9 G1			F4 F5 F6 F7 2 3 4 F1 F2					F3 5 6	J1 J2	J3 J4
60 35 35			20 20 20 20 20 20 30 25 25					20 30	30 50 50	30 30
	<i>BEACH PREPARATION</i>						<i>BEACH STRAFF</i>			<i>CALL FIRE</i>

- Note 1. Target Co-ordinates listed in Appendix VI to Annex C, Areas found in Appendix I to this Annex.
2. Targets are defined by letter and number, number only, or letter only are target areas.

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Annex H (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 302-63.

Ref: (a) Map AMS L792, 1:50,000, TAIWAN, Sheets 2214IV, 2214I,  
 2214II, 2214III, 2214IV, Bilingual

Time Zone: H (minus ?)

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces.

(1) Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 302-63.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) Annex G (Artillery) to Operation Order 302-63.

(2) Annex E (Air Operations) to Operation Order 302-63.

(3) Annex F (Naval Gunfire) to Operation Order 302-63.

2. MISSION. Landing Force US (TG 132.8) lands in the FANG-LIAO area to seize, occupy and defend landing force objectives A and B in the southern sector of the Force Beachhead (FBH) reference (a) to provide secure beachheads for the landing of larger US and GRC forces.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Commander, Amphibious Task Force 132.1 coordinates fire delivered in support of operations conducted.

4. TARGET INFORMATION.

a. Target List.

(1) Maintained by S-2 and FSCC, BLT 2/9.

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CONFIDENTIALb. Restricted targets.

- (1) Every effort will be made to preserve religious, cultural, medical and public utility installations. Fire in heavily populated areas will be kept to a minimum.
- (2) Destruction of restricted targets is prohibited except on approval of the Landing Force Commander, or when failure to destroy immediately would jeopardize the mission of the BLT.

5. AIRCRAFT SAFETY.a. Air sentries and lookouts.

- (1) Air sentries will be stationed by artillery firing units and by naval gunfire support ships to check fire when friendly aircraft are observed approaching danger areas.
- (2) Artillery forward observers and naval gunfire spotters will check fires when trajectories of artillery and naval gunfire projectiles and missiles are observed near friendly aircraft.

b. Fire on helicopter approach and retirement lanes.

- (1) Fire on helicopter approach and retirement lanes in use is restricted to observed fire with an additional requirement that an observer be capable of insuring the safety of the helicopters.

c. Restrictive fire plans.

- (1) When necessary to provide an adequate degree of safety from friendly surface fires for aircraft, Restrictive Fire Plan EIGHTBALL will be used.

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(a) Plan EIGHTBALL. All surface fires are prohibited between prescribed maximum and minimum altitudes within the specified rectangular area during the stated time interval. The area is defined by indicating a given distance along a line connecting two coordinates and indicating a minimum and maximum altitude.

(2) Units requesting an air support mission will recommend a restrictive fire plan if required. Higher headquarters will not impose a restrictive fire plan contrary to the recommendation of a requesting unit unless the need is clearly indicated.

6. GROUND FORCES SAFETY.

a. No fire line.

- (1) No fire lines will be established by the FSCC of the landing force.
- (2) Initial and subsequent no fire lines will be reported to Commander, Amphibious Task Force.

b. Bombing.

- (1) The bomblines are established as coincident with the FBL line.
- (2) CTU 132.8.1 (BLT 2/9) will submit recommendations for changes in the bomblines as required.
- (3) All air strikes against enemy surface targets behind the bomblines must be controlled utilizing the TACC-TACP organization established.

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7. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS.

a. Annex M (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 302-63.

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Annex I (Ship-to-Shore Movement) to Operation Order 302-63.

Ref: (a) LFM-4  
 (b) NWP-22A

Time Zone: H (min s 8)

1. GENERAL SITUATION.

- a. See basic order.
- b. This Annex provides for the ship-to-shore movement of the landing force US on R and D-days.

2. MISSION. This force will land in assault over BEACH BLUE in the FENG-CHIANG area on R-day and over BEACH BLUE in the FANG-LIAO area on D-day, employing landing ships, landing craft, amphibious vehicles and helicopters.

3. EXECUTION.

a. TU 132.8.1 (BLT 2/9).

- (1) Landing two (2) companies in columns over BEACH BLUE.
- (2) Landing one (1) company by helicopter in a forward landing

4 (3) <sup>zone.</sup> Be prepared to land one company (Constructive) in reserve by surface means  
 (3) Landing of scheduled waves to be accomplished by LVT, LCVP on orders  
 and helicopter.

5 (4) Provide units and personnel for control of the ship-to-shore movement in accordance with Appendix IV to (Control Plan)

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to Annex M (Ship-to-Shore Movement) to CTG 132.1 Operation Order 302-63.

- (5) Provide personnel and equipment as required for cargo and personnel handling to Commander Helicopter Transport Unit (CTU 132.1.2) and to Commander Surface Transport Unit (CTU 132.1.2).
- (6) Provide Shore Party for logistic support ashore.
- (7) Provide Tactical Logistical Parties to Helicopter Transport Unit (TU 132.1.2) and Primary Control Ship USS ALAMO.
- (8) Be prepared to conduct pre-H-hour transfers as necessary to meet the schedules set forth in Appendix VI (Consolidated Landing and Approach Plan) to CTG 132.1 Operation Order 302-63.
- (9) TAC-LOG group organizes, embarks and functions in accordance with references (a) and (b).

b. CTU 132.1.2 (HMM-163).

- (1) Conduct ship-to-shore movement in accordance with Appendix 3 (Helicopter Ship-to-Shore Movement).
- (2) Be prepared to conduct medical evacuations as directed.
- (3) Be prepared to conduct backloading in accordance with Appendix 5 (Backloading Plan).
- (4) Provide troop life jackets and vehicle slings in accordance with LFB 26.

4. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS.

- a. Communications in accordance with Annex M (Communications-Electronics).
- b. Major Commands concerned in ship-to-shore movement are located;

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- (1) Commander Forces US (CTG 132.8) USS PRINCETON
- (2) Commander Helicopter Transport Unit (CTU 132.1.2)  
USS PRINCETON
- (3) Commander Surface Transport Unit (CTU 132.1.3) USS PRINCETON.

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APPENDICES:

- 1 - Assault Wave Diagram
- 2 - Landing Craft and Amphibian Vehicle Availability Table
- 3 - Helicopter Ship to Shore Movement
- 4 - Rehearsal Plan
- 5 - Backloading Plan

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Appendix 1 (Assault Wave Diagram) to Annex I (Ship-to-Shore Movement)  
 to Operation Order 302-63.

Ref: None.

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

H-HOUR-To be designated	BEACH BLUE
Wave 1 H-hour	ASSAULT PLATOONS HOTEL COMPANY (REIN) FAC TEAM #1 1-1 1-2 1-3 1-4 1-5 1-6 X X X X* X X
Wave 2 H plus 3	HOTEL COMPANY (REIN) MINUS ASSAULT PLATOONS DETACHMENT BMU #1 BREACHING TEAMS 2-1 2-2 2-3 2-4 2-5 X X X* X X
Wave 3 H plus 8	DETACHMENT LANDING SUPT COMPANY DETACHMENT 3RD PLATOON CHARLIE COMPANY 3RD TANK BN DETACHMENT BMU #1 3-2 3-1 3-3 Z Z U*
Wave 4	LEADING PLATOONS FOXTROT COMPANY (REIN) DETACHMENT COMM PLATOON H&S COMPANY 4-6 4-4 4-2 4-1 4-3 4-5 0 0 0 0* 0 0
Wave 5	FOXTROT COMPANY MINUS LEAD PLATOONS DETACHMENT COMM PLATOON H&S COMPANY 5-6 5-4 5-2 5-1 5-3 5-5 0 0 0* 0 0 0
Wave 6 H plus 28	DET 2ND PLATOON CHARLIE COMPANY 3RD PION BN ELEMENTS H&S COMPANY TACP (-) 6-4 6-2 6-1 6-3 0 0* 0 0

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FREE BOATS

OO-1 - - KO. BLE 2/9

OO-2 - - Det. BNJ #1

LEGEND

- X - - - - -LVTC
- X - - - - -LVTP
- O - - - - -LCVP
- N - - - - -LCM-6
- Z - - - - -LCM-8
- U - - - - -LCU
- \* - - - - -Wave Commander

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Appendix 2 (Landing Craft and Amphibian Vehicle Availability Table) to  
 Annex I (Ship-to-Shore Movement) to Operation Order 302-63.

Ref: None.

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

				LCM(g)	LVTC	LVTP
APA-222	19	2	2	0	0	0
LSD-33	2	1	0	2	1	10
LPH-5	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	21	3	2	2	1	10
LESS NAVAL REQUIREMENTS	4	3	1	0	0	0
TOTAL REQUIREMENTS	17	0	1	2	1	10

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Appendix 3 (Helicopter Ship-to-Shore Movement) to Annex I (Ship-to-Shore Movement) to Operation Order 302-63.

Ref: None

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

1. SITUATION.

- a. The ship-to-shore movement will include both vertical envelopment by helicopters from PRINCETON and surface movement from amphibious shipping. The helicopter-borne ship-to-shore movement will be conducted by one company from BLT 2/9 at L-hour in Landing Zone VULTURE.

2. MISSION. See Annex I (Ship-to-Shore Movement).

3. EXECUTION.

- a. Rehearsal. A rehearsal for SILVER BLADE will be held in the FENG-CHIANG area in order to familiarize personnel with the landing plan and to provide a time study of the scheduled assault operations.
- (1) A turnaway/flyover will be conducted in the rehearsal.
  - (2) R-day is 17 March 1963. L-hour is H+20.
  - (3) Helicopter control in accordance with this Appendix and Appendix IV to Annex H to CTG 132.1 Operation Order 302-63.
  - (4) R-day communications in accordance with Appendix VI to (Air Communications) to Annex H and Tab A (Landing Force Frequencies)

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to Appendix II (Radio Frequencies) to Annex N (Communications)  
to CTG 132.1 Operation Order 302-63.

helicopter waves.

- (1) Helicopter waves will consist of four (4) aircraft. Waves will be separated by a one (1) minute interval. Initial waves will retain the same voice call throughout the ship-to-shore assault.
- (2) Helicopter approach and retirement routes in accordance with Tab<sup>A</sup> ~~B~~ to ~~this~~ Appendix ~~1~~ TO ANNEX E (AIR OPERATIONS)

c. Assault.

- (1) CTU 132.8.1 (HMM 2/9).
  - (a) Provide a TACLOG party on PRINCETON to support helicopter-borne ship-to-shore movement.
- (2) CTU 132.8.2 (HMM-163).
  - (a) Provide helicopters for the ship-to-shore movement in accordance with this Appendix and Annex E (Air Operation) to Operation Order 302-63.

d. Ship-to-shore movement.

- (1) L-hour is H+20. L-hour is the time for landing the first helicopter-borne troops in the landing zone.
- (2) Helicopters will conform to the approach and retirement routes in accordance with Tab<sup>A</sup> (Overlay of Helicopter Approach and Retirement Routes) to ~~this~~ Appendix ~~1~~ To Annex E Air Operations.
- (3) Helicopter control in accordance with this Appendix and Annex E (Air Operations) to Operation Order 302-63.

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- (4) Helicopter flights one through <sup>Gov</sup> ~~five~~ will each consist of four (4) aircraft. Waves will be separated by a one (1) minute interval. Subsequent flights of not more than four (4) aircraft will be continued at a maximum rate, as required.

e. Coordinating instructions.

- (1) Authority to effect changes in helicopter employment is delegated as indicated below:

(a) CTU 132.8.1 or his designated representative may authorize changes to the landing sequence of helicopter-borne serials.

(b) If, prior to touchdown in the primary landing zone (LZ), the Commander of the helicopter-borne troop unit or his designated representative determines that the primary LZ is tactically unacceptable, he may designate an alternate zone. If the landing zone is changed the following action will be taken:

- (1) Flight leaders immediately notify HDC of change in LZ destination,
- (2) Subsequent flight leaders proceed on alternate routes as directed by HDC to alternate LZ
- (3) HDC will immediately contact TACC which will confirm supporting arms coordination for the alternate route and alternate zone. Alternate zones are LZs BUZZARD, CONDOR and E.

(c) In the event both the primary and the alternate zones are

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unacceptable, HDC will divert all helicopters seaward to control points and request further instructions from the CLF and CATF.

- (d) Flight leaders have authority to divert to the pre-determined alternate landing zone after coordinating with HDC when flight safety considerations (actual) preclude the use of the primary zone and will proceed in accordance with subparagraphs 1 and 2 of paragraph 3.e.(1)(b) above.
- (e) HDC is authorized to launch or divert helicopters for evacuation of actual casualties.
- (2) Weather minimums for helicopter operations are:  
500 foot ceiling and one mile visibility.
- (3) Inbound altitudes from flight rendezvous point to NEW YORK will be 700 feet. Outbound altitudes from NEW YORK to the breakup point will be 500 feet. All other portions of designated helicopter routes will be 700 feet above terrain inbound and 500 feet above terrain outbound. HDC may order deviation as required. When weather conditions approach minimums, HDC will implement horizontal separation of helicopter waves.
- (4) Casualty evacuation in accordance with Annex E (Operations) and Annex M (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 302-63.
- (5) Tactical and logistical helicopter requests in accordance with Tab D (Helicopter Logistical Request Procedures) to this Appendix.
- (6) All requests for observation/liaison helicopter missions will be requested through HDC. Observation/liaison helicopter check in with TACC on TAO not for control.

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- (7) All requests for transport helicopters to fly administrative missions will be requested for transport helicopters to fly administrative missions will be requested through HDC. When airborne, helicopters will check in with HDC for ship-to-shore control. HDC will direct administrative mission helicopters.
4. LOGISTICS. In accordance with Annex N (Administration and Logistics) to Operation Order 302-63.
5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS. In accordance with Annex M (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 302-63.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL RATHBUN

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TABS:

- A - Helicopter Availability Table
- B - Helicopter Approach and Retirement Routes - ~~DELETE~~
- C - Helicopter Employment and Assault Landing Table
- D - Helicopter Logistical Request Procedures
- E - Helicopter Request Form

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 Republic of the Philippines  
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Tab A (Helicopter Availability Table) to Appendix 3 (Helicopter Ship-to-Shore Movement) to Annex I (Ship-to-Shore Movement) to Operation Order 302-63.

Ref: None.

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

1. HELICOPTER AVAILABILITY.

<u>Helicopter Squadron</u>	<u>Number of Aircraft</u>	<u>Number of A/C Initial Landing</u>	<u>Available for Subsequent Ops</u>
HMM-163	18 UH-34D	16	16

2. MAXIMUM HELICOPTER LOADS.

<u>Internal Load</u>	<u>External Load</u>
2000 Pounds	2000 Pounds

3. HELICOPTER CRUISE SPEEDS.

<u>Internal Load</u>	<u>External Load</u>	<u>Empty</u>
80 Knots	60 Knots	90 Knots

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Tab C (Helicopter Employment and Assault Landing Table) to Appendix 3  
 (Helicopter Ship-to-Shore Movement) to Annex I (Ship-to-Shore  
 Movement) to Operation Order 302-63.

Ref: None.

Time Zone: H. (minus 8)

Wave Flight	No. UH-34D Helicopters	Launch Time	Landing Zone	Landing Time LZ	Troop Unit or Equipment
31A	4	L-10	VULTURE	L-hour	Assault Flt, Company C
31B	4	L-08	VULTURE	L plus 21	-do-
31C	4	L-06	VULTURE	L plus 42	CoG(-) plus FACH, Flames 81's, FDC
31D	4	L-04	VULTURE	L plus 63	CoG(-) plus 81's M2's, 2 LIWC 2/81's
	4		VULTURE		CoG(-) plus 106's, 2 LIWC w/106's
	4		VULTURE		CoG(-)
	4		VULTURE		CoG(-) plus Pion Sqd 1 LIWC (Pion)
	4		VULTURE		CoG(-) plus Arty FC
	4		VULTURE		CoG(-) plus 2 LIWC (CoG)
	3		VULTURE		1 LIWC (CoG) plus 2 M42's w/M100 CoG
	4		EAGLE		Driver plus 2 LIWC (CoG)
	4		EAGLE		1 LIWC (CoG) 1 LIWC (TACP) 1 M422 w/M100 (CoG)

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Wave Flight	No. UH-34D Helicopters	Launch Time	Landing Zone	Landing Time LZ	Troops Unit or Equipment
	4		EAGLE		1 M422 w/M100 (S-3) 1 M422 w/M100 (S-2)
	4		EAGLE		1 M422 w/M100 (S-1) 1 M422 w/M100 (S-4)
	4		EAGLE		1 M422 w/M100 (H&S) 1 M422 w/M100 (S1's)
	4		EAGLE		1 M422 w/M100 (106's) 1 M422 w/M100 (MT)
	4		EAGLE		1 M422 w/M100 (MT) 1 M422 w/M100 (Supply)
	4		EAGLE		1 M422 w/M100 1 LIWC (M2)

All times in minutes.

After initial waves loading will be spontaneous; being accomplished as expeditiously as possible.

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 Republic of the Philippines  
 010800H March 1963

Tab D (Helicopter Logistical Requirements Procedures) to Appendix 3 to Annex I (Ship-to-Shore Movement) to Operations Order 30-63.

Ref: None.

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

1. HELICOPTER SCHEDULED SERIALS. Helicopter scheduled serials will be loaded in accordance with Annex I (Ship-to-Shore Movement).
2. NON-SCHEDULED SERIALS. Non-scheduled helicopter serials will be landed without request as rapidly as helicopters become available, in accordance with the Consolidated Helicopter Assault and Landing Table.
3. ON CALL SERIALS. Request for "On Call" helicopter serials will be directed to the TA LOG via the HST over the HST logistics net.
4. SERIALS OUT OF SEQUENCE.
  - a. Commander Landing Force 132.8 or his designated representative may authorize changes to landing sequence of helicopter-borne serials.
  - b. Helicopter-borne unit requests for serials out of sequence are made through the HST to the TACLOG over the HST logistics net.
5. OTHER OPERATIONS.
  - a. Helicopter-borne troop units requiring helicopters for use which are not a part of the ship-to-shore movement will make requests directly to the HD. The HD will refer the request to CTG 132.1 and <sup>CLF</sup> ~~CTG~~, aboard PRINCETON. Upon approval, notify TACC for

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coordination of supporting arms.

- b. Water-borne units desiring helicopters for tactical use will make their requests through landing force command channels to CLF.

6. REQUEST FLOW PROCEDURES.

- a. CLF sends helicopter request to HHC on HR net.
- b. TACC monitors HR net and will:
- (1) Copy all helicopter requests.
  - (2) Coordinate with SAGC/FSOC as required.
  - (3) Inform HHC of restrictive fire plan if applicable.
- c. CLF stands HR net and will:
- (1) Copy and read back request for corrections.
  - (2) Assigns mission number.
  - (3) Request approval of mission from CLF and CATF.
  - (4) Upon receiving approval or disapproval of request from CLF and CATF, inform the originator and direct helicopter units to launch aircraft. Brief pilots on coordination information received from TACC.

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Tab E (Helicopter Request Form) to Appendix 3 to Annex I (Ship-to-Shore Movement) to Operation Order 302-63.

Ref: None.

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

Sample Request Form

Part I

ALFA	REQUEST UNIT	BRAVO	LOCATION	REQUESTING UNIT
ARLIE	TYPE MISSION			
	Troop <input type="checkbox"/>	Tact <input type="checkbox"/>	SAR <input type="checkbox"/>	Staff <input type="checkbox"/>
	Log <input type="checkbox"/>	Admin <input type="checkbox"/>	Recon <input type="checkbox"/>	Evac <input type="checkbox"/>
				VIP <input type="checkbox"/>
DELTA	NUMBER PERSONNEL			
	<input type="text"/> troops			
ECHO	CARGO			
	<input type="text"/> total lbs			
FOXTROT	LOADING SITE COORDINATES	DATE/TIME	REMARKS	
GOLF	LOADING SITE COORDINATES	DATE/TIME	REMARKS	
HOTEL	HELICOPTER ESCORT			
INDIA	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION			
Part II				
JULIET	ROUTE TO BE FLOWN			
KILO	RESTRICTIVE FIRE PLAN	TIME	REMARKS	

I-3-~~2~~-1  
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Part III

REMARKS		
APPROVED <input type="checkbox"/>	DISAPPROVED <input type="checkbox"/>	CANCELLED <input type="checkbox"/>
TIME MISSION COMPLETED	MISSION NO.	

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Appendix 4 (Rehearsal Plan) to Annex I (Ship-to-Shore Movement) to  
Operations Order 302-63.

Ref: None

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

Task Organization: See Annex A (Task Organization).

1. GENERAL.

- a. A rehearsal will be conducted on D-2 in the FENI-C HANG area of southern TAIWAN.
- b. The rehearsal will be conducted in accordance with D-day procedures and schedules as directed by Annex I (Rehearsal) to Operations Order 302-63, and as modified below.

2. EXECUTION.

- a. Conduct Pre H-hour transfers as directed.
- b. All scheduled assault waves (helicopter and surface) will participate.
- c. All troops, supplies, equipment and vehicles will load in landing craft and amphibious vehicles of assault waves.
- d. Troops and equipment will not be loaded in on-call waves.
- e. Troops will load into helicopters.

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
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Appendix 5 (Backloading) to Annex I (Ship-to-Shore Movement) to  
 Operation Order 302-63.

Ref: None

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

Task Organization: See Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation  
 Order 302-63.

1. All vehicles and supplies which were offloaded for the exercise will be backloaded in accordance with present loading plans.
2. CTU 132.8.1 will designate three vehicle staging areas on the beach, one for each ship. CTU 132.8.1 will coordinate all activity at these staging areas. Vehicles will be backloaded in inverse order of priority numbers for each particular hold; i.e., larger numbered vehicles backloaded first.
3. Before being boated at or helicopter lifted from the staging area, all vehicles must be properly marked as to priority number on the top and on both sides with chalk.
4. Communications will be maintained between the staging areas and the ships at all times during the backloading. Ships will be backloaded in accordance with Appendix XIV (Backloading Plan) to Annex I (Ship-to-Shore Movement) to CTG 132.1 Operation Order 302-63.

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Annex J (Anti-Mechanized Plan) to Operation Order 302-63.

Ref: None

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

1. SITUATION.

- a. Enemy forces. See Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 302-63.
- b. Friendly forces.
  - (1) Elements of the GRC Air Force will provide this force with aircraft for Close Air Support (CAS) on D-2, possible strike missions on D-1, Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) protection on D-1 and D-day, and CAS on D-day and subsequent operations.
  - (2) Amphibious Task Force GRC (TG 132.2) will conduct advance force operations, including mine operations, underwater demolitions and reconnaissance of the US and GRC landing areas and will simultaneously establish a beachhead in the HSIS-LIAO area on D-day.
  - (3) Landing Force GRC (TG132.9) lands in HSIA-LIAO area to seize, occupy and defend the best defensible terrain in the northern sector of the Force Beachhead (FBH) to provide secure beachheads for the landing of larger US and GRC forces.
  - (4) DD-786 direct support BLT 2/9.

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2. MISSION. All units capable of delivering anti-mechanized fires, exert maximum effort to detect, fix and destroy enemy armored forces in BLT area.
3. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.
  - a. TU 132.8.1 (BLT 2/9)
    - (1) Channelize enemy armor by means of natural and artificial obstacles and minefields.
    - (2) Concentrate all available fires on critical points of armor approach routes.
  - b. Coordination instructions.
    - (1) Forward Air Controller request priority for air strikes against enemy armored forces.
    - (2) Naval gunfire mass fires on enemy armored forces without delay.
    - (3) First target priority to enemy tanks for all weapons capable of bearing.
    - (4) Locate enemy minefields, including localities of gaps and/or lanes cleared.
    - (5) Forward Air Controllers, pilots and aerial observers be prepared to assist in directing anti-mechanized fires in the zone of action.
    - (6) Forward units mark front lines with red panels during anti-mechanized alerts, except when enemy aircraft are in immediate vicinity.

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- (7) All units take maximum advantage of available natural cover from enemy armor.
- (8) All units stress training of personnel in use of organic weapons in anti-tank defense, in laying anti-tank mine-fields and in vehicle recognition.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

- a. See Annex N (Administrative and Logistics) to Operation Order 302-63.
- b. (1) Tanks: 20 rounds per vehicle.  
(2) Anti-tanks: 16 rounds per vehicle.  
(3) 106RR: 6 rounds per vehicle.  
(4) Field Artillery: 6 rounds per piece.

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS.

- a. See Annex M (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 302-63.
- b. Report sightings of enemy armor by fastest means available.

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Executive Officer

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 Republic of the Philippines  
 010800H March 1963

Annex L (Rehearsal Plan) to Operation Order 302-63.

Ref: None

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

1. GENERAL SITUATION.

- a. Amphibious Task Force US (TG 132.1) will conduct a turnaway/flyover rehearsal on 17 March 1963 in the FENG-CHIANG area in preparation for an amphibious assault exercise in the FENG-CHIAO area.
- b. Enemy forces. None.
- c. Friendly forces.
  - (1) Elements of the GRC Air Force will provide aircraft for CAS on D-2 (R-day).

2. MISSION.

- a. Conduct a turnaway/flyover rehearsal in the FENG-CHIANG area, using procedures and techniques planned for the actual exercise landing.

3. EXECUTION.

- a. Concept. To execute applicable portions of this Operation Order to ensure efficient execution at a later date.
- b. CTU 132.8.1.
  - (1) Conduct a turnaway surface landing in accordance with this Annex and Annex I (Ship-to-Shore Movement) to Operation Order 302-63.

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(2) Conduct training enroute.

c. CTU 132.8.2.

(1) Conduct a flyover rehearsal in accordance with this Annex and Annex I (Ship-to-Shore Movement) and Annex E (Air Operations) to Operation Order 302-63.

d. Coordination instructions.

- (1) R-day is 17 March 1963.
- (2) H-hour is set as 1000H.
- (3) L-hour is set as H plus 20.
- (4) BEACH BLUE is the name assigned the rehearsal beach.
- (5) Conduct training enroute.
- (6) Helicopter turnaround point is designated as beach line.
- (7) Critique for rehearsal will be at a time indicated by CTG 132.1 Operation Order 302-63.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. See Annex N (Administration-Logistics) to Operation Order 302-63.

5. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS. See Annex M (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 302-63.

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010800H March 1963

Annex M (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 302-63.

- Ref: (a) FMFPac Comm Plan - 4.
- (b) 3rd Mar Div Comm SOP.
- (c) 3rd Mar Div COI.

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy forces.

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 302-63.

b. Friendly forces.

- (1) See Operation Order 302-63.
- (2) Command posts afloat.

CTG 132.1            USS PRINCETON

CTU 132.8.1        USS PRINCETON

CTU 132.8.2        USS PRINCETON

- (3) Command posts ashore.

CTG 132.8            Vicinity of TQ 540773

CTU 132.8.1        Vicinity of TQ 540773

- 2. MISSION. CTG 132.8 communications elements establish and maintain communications required in accordance with references (a) through (c).

3. EXECUTION.

CONFIDENTIALa. CTU 132.8.1.

(1) Be prepared on order to land, establish and maintain communication facilities as required for operations ashore.

(2) Reproduce and distribute to authorized units shackles codes and authentication tables in accordance with Annex N (Communications) to CTG 132 Operation Order 302-63.

b. CTU 132.8.2.

(1) Be prepared to provide communications as required for landing operations in accordance with Annexes H (Air Operations) and N (Communications) to CTG Operation Order 302-63.

(2) Reproduce and distribute shackles codes and authentication tables in accordance with Annex N (Communications) to CTG 132 Operation Order 302-63.

c. Naval gunfire support communications. See Annex N (Communications) to CTG 132 Operation Order 302-63.

d. Air support communications. See Annex N (Communications) to CTG 132 Operation Order 302-63.

e. Air frequency plan. See Annex N (Communications) to CTG 132 Operation Order 302-63.

f. Coordinating instructions.

(1) CTU 132.8.1 be prepared to provide communications guard for Commander, Landing Force (CTG 132.8) ashore.

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(2) All units report by an alternate means immediately all suspected or positive interference on any communication nets to Commander, Landing Force (CTG 132.8).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. Administration and logistics functions will be through normal channels within each subordinate unit.

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 CIO800H March 1963

Annex N (Administration and Logistics) to Operation Order 302-65.

Ref: None.

Time Zone: H(minus 8)

I. SUPPLY.

a. General.

- (1) PRINCETON is source of supply for CTU 132.8.2.
- (2) BLT 2/9 is source of supply for CTU 132.8.1.

b. Supplies and equipment available.

- (1) Class I. - (Three (3) days).
  - (a) As prescribed by TU Commanders.
- (2) Class II.
  - (a) TE/TA equipment as required.
  - (b) CTU 132.8.2 provides slings and baskets for external lifts.
- (3) Class III.
  - (a) Three (3) days for debarking units.
  - (b) AVGAS available from PRINCETON. (No aircraft refueling ashore).
  - (c) MOGAS, 9350 gallons in 170 drums be embarked with BLT 2/9.

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- (d) Diesel, 440 gallons in 8 drums be embarked with CTU 132.8.1.
  - (e) Vehicles embark with and extra gas cans 3/4 full.
  - (f) Units embark with special oils and grease as required to maintain equipment.
- (4) Class IV. Units embark with materials as prescribed by TU Commanders.
- (5) Class V.
- (a) Units embark with units of fire as prescribed by TU Commanders.
- (6) Water.
- (a) As prescribed by CTU 132.8.1.
  - (b) CTU 132.8.1 establish and maintain capacity to purify 2,500 gallons per hour after landing.
  - (c) Water purification tablets will be issued to all debarking troops prior to landing.
- c. Specially prepared supplies.
- (1) CTU 132.8.1 prepares vehicles, pallets and loose cargo for internal and external helicopter lifts.
- d. Control:
- (1) TAC-LOG will actuate aboard PRINCETON 2 hours prior to commencement ship-to-shore movement. *over Alamo*
  - (2) Levels of supply in objective area not to exceed three days.

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e. Distribution.

- (1) Unit distribution initially ashore be prepared to shift to supply point distribution on order.

f. Resupply.

- (1) Units ashore to be resupplied as prescribed by CTU 132.8.1.
- (2) Aerial resupply via helicopter available.

2. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION. See Annex O (Medical) to Operation Order 302-63.

3. TRANSPORTATION.

a. Highway.

- (1) Traffic control by units in assigned areas.
- (2) Traffic control in BSA responsibility of Shore Party Commander.
- (3) Traffic moving inland has priority over beach bound traffic except ambulances.
- (4) Blackout discipline will be strictly enforced when operating in tactical areas. Lights will be used on hard surface roads and in or near villages.

b. Tracked vehicles.

- (1) Tanks authorized on paved roads with caution. Guides will be used going through towns or at night.
- (2) Other tracked vehicles not authorized on paved roads except with approval of CTU 132.8.1.
- (3) Bridges to be by passed will be clearly marked.

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4. SERVICE.

a. TU 132.8.1.

- (1) Prepare Administration plan for operation ashore.
- (2) Provides supply and administration support for CTG 132.8  
CF ashore.
- (3) CP VIC CTG 132.8 CP vicinity CTU 132.8.1 CP.

5. PERSONNEL. See Appendix 2 to Annex N (Administration and Logistics).

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Uniform and equipment. As prescribed by TU Commanders.

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
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APPENDIXES:

1. Reports
2. Civil affairs
3. Personnel
4. GRC observers

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010800H March 1963

Appendix 1 (Reports) to Annex N (Administrative and Logistics) to  
Operation Order 302-63.

Ref: None

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

1. Reports will be submitted as indicated.

- a. Progress reports will be made in accordance with Annex O  
(Reports During Exercise) to CTF 132 Operation Order 302-63.
- b. Aircraft availability reports will be submitted not later than  
1400 daily to HDC. This report is to be on a sustained avail-  
ability basis rather than on a maximum effort availability and  
will be for the estimated availability for the following day.
- c. Daily summary of Air Operations report will be submitted to HDC  
by CTU 132.8.2 for the period ending 1800 daily using the format  
appearing in Tab A (Daily Summary of Air Operations Report Format)  
to this Annex.
- d. Units concerned make brief message report of any interference,  
jamming or attempted electronic deception.
- e. Post Exercise Reports will be made in accordance with Annex P  
(Post Exercise Reports) to CTF 132 Operation Order 302-63.
- f. SAR reports in accordance with Appendix VII (Air Search and Rescue)  
to Annex H (Air Search and Rescue to CTG 132.1 Operation Order 302-63.

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TAB:A: Daily Summary of Air Operations Report Format.

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Appendix 2 (Civil Affairs) to Annex N (Administration and Logistics) to  
Operation Order 302-63.

Ref: None.

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

1. GENERAL.

- a. The primary responsibility for civil affairs matters remains a function of the sovereign government concerned. The sovereignty of the local national government and the customs and traditions of the civilian population will be respected.
2. PROTECTION OF PROPERTY. Commanders will take positive and continuing action to insure:
  - a. That maximum protection is afforded to arts, monuments and other structures.
  - b. That churches or shrines are not used for military purposes.
  - c. That troops reserve maximum respect for the customs and traditions of the civilian population.
  - d. That all military personnel take precautions to avoid personal injury to civilian and damage to growing crops, food/stocks or any other civilian property.

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- a. Senior National Commanders will process claims generated by activities of their own forces in accordance with their national laws, policies and regulations.
- b. Accidents or incidents which might give rise to claims will be reported promptly to the representative of the force whose personnel are involved.
- c. CTU 132.8.1 will appoint a claims officer to take appropriate action on any claims which may arise.

4. PERSONNEL AND DISCIPLINE.

- a. Senior National Officers have primary responsibility for personnel matters, including records and reports, and for discipline of respective national forces.
- b. All leaves, except for emergency of compassionate reasons will be suspended during the exercise. Emergency and compassionate leaves may be granted when justified.
- c. Military police may apprehend members ~~if other forces for offenses~~ committed; however, any member of the forces of one nation apprehended by military polices of another nation will be delivered to his parent force as soon as practicable for action deemed appropriate by the Senior National Officer concerned.

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
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 010800 H March 1963

Appendix B (Personnel) to Annex N (Administrative and Logistics) to  
 Operation Order 302-63.

Ref: (a) 3dMar DivO 5000,30  
 (b) Manual Courts Martial, 1951  
 (c) MARCORPERREGAN

Time Zone: H (minus 3)

1. STRENGTH. Units will go ashore at on-board strength less a rear echelon to consist of administrative personnel.
2. REPORTS. As prescribed by TU Commanders.
3. REPLACEMENTS. Routine replacements will be constructive. Simulated casualties and POWs will be returned to BLT 2/9 CP for disposition.
4. DISCIPLINE, LAW AND ORDER. Normal procedure - references (a) and (b).  
 Military Police may apprehend members of other forces for offenses committed; however, any member of the forces of one nation apprehended by military police of another nation will be delivered to his parent force as soon as practicable for action deemed appropriate by the Senior National Officer concerned.
5. PRISONERS OF WAR.
  - a. POW compounds will be established by BLT 2/9.

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- b. Capturing units will transport and safeguard POWs until control is assumed by the DIFACW compound.
- c. No personnel or military effects shall be taken from actual POWs. Once captured, POWs shall make no attempt to escape. At no time shall physical force be used by either POWs or their captors.
6. GRAVES REGISTRATION. (Constructive) Disposition of remains and personal effects will be conducted as prescribed in Part E, Chapter 12, of reference (e).
7. MORALE AND PERSONNEL SERVICES. All leaves, except for emergency, will be suspended during the exercise. Emergency leaves may be granted in accordance with CTU SOP's. Mail to be delivered as received when feasible.
8. CIVIL AFFAIRS - MILITARY GOVERNMENT. See Appendix 2 (Civil Affairs) to Annex N (Administration and Logistics).
9. CLAIMS. Accident or incidents which might give rise to claims against the United States will be reported to designated unit claims officer.
10. PERSONNEL PROCEDURES. Normal.
11. INTERIOR MANAGEMENT. Normal.
12. CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES. None.

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 010800H March 1963

Appendix 4 (GRC Observers) to Annex N (Administration and Logistics)  
 to Operation Order 302-63.

Ref: None

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

1. GRC/Marine observers with US Landing Force:

- a. 1 S2/S3 observer.
- b. 1 S1/S4 and TACLOG observer.
- c. 1 BnHq observer.
- d. 2 Helicopter operation observers.
- e. 1 Shore party observer.

2. GRC Liaison personnel with US Landing Force:

- a. 3 Liaison officers with three (3) rifle companies. One (1)  
 for each company.
- b. 1 Liaison officer with shore party group.
- c. 1 Liaison officer with artillery battery.
- d. 1 Forward air controller with Bn Hq.

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
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010300H March 1963

Appendix 5 (Public Information) to Annex N (Administration and Logistics)  
to Operation Order 302-63

Ref: None

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

1. GENERAL: The Exercise Director has been designated to direct and coordinate all public information through the Command Information Bureau (CIB, CTU 132.0.4) located in ESTES (ACC 12). Direct Liaison between CTU 132.8.1 and CTU 132.8.2 is authorized with the CIB. All news media will be submitted to the CIB.
2. SECURITY. The policy of security at the source will apply to all public information activities. Prior to filing, all public information material will be reviewed by originators to insure that classified information is not inadvertently released.
3. ROSTERS. Task Units will have an up-to-date roster on file with Fleet Home Town News Center (FHTNC). CIB will submit master story. U. S. Forces will be identified in each release as being units of the U. S. SEVENTH FLEET.

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010800Z March 1963

TAB A (Daily Summary of Helicopter Operation Reports) to Appendix 1  
(Reports) to Annex N (Administrative and Logistics) to Operation Order 302-63.

Ref: None

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

i. FORMAT.

UNCLAS  
SILVERBLADE  
HECPTER OPSUM

ALFA - Number of supply sorties

BRAVO - Number of transport sorties

CHARLIE - Number of search and rescue sorties

DELTA - Number of evacuation sorties

ECHO - Number of administrative sorties

FOXTROT - Number of training sorties

GOLF - Total tons of equipment and supplies put ashore

HOTEL - Number of troops put ashore

INDIA - Number of troops moved point to point ashore

JULIET - Total tons of equipment moved point to point ashore

NOTE: Omit items not applicable.

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 010830H March 1963

TAB B (Final Exercise Report Contents) to Appendix 1 (Reports) to  
 Annex N (Administration and Logistics) to Operations Order 302-63

1. The Final Exercise report will contain information on the following subjects as applicable:
- a. Time required to land the landing force by helicopter and surface means.
  - b. Adequacy of amphibious and supporting ships, units and aircraft.
  - c. Planning. (Include any items of significant interest).
  - d. Pre-assault and supporting operations.
    - (1) Preparation of objective area and approaches.
    - (2) Protective measures.
    - (3) Additional items as appropriate.
  - e. Embarkation and combat loading.
  - f. Rehearsal.
  - g. Movement.
  - h. Ship-to-shore movement.
  - i. *Logistics*
  - j. *Communications*
  - k. *Intelligence*
  - l. *Personal*
  - m. *medical.*

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- n. Shipboard procedures.
- o. Backloading.
- p. Information as to personnel and material casualties which occurred during the exercise including their effect upon planned or scheduled operations.
- q. Anti-air Warfare.
- r. Public information.
- s. Coordination and Control of supporting arms.
- t. Additional items as appropriate.

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 010800H March 1963

Annex O (Medical) to Operation Order 302-63.

Ref: None.

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

1. TASK ORGANIZATION.

a. Medical Personnel.

- (1) Medical Officer - 3.
- (2) Dental Officer - 1.
- (3) Corpsman
  - (a) CTU 132.8.1 - 48.
  - (b) CTU 132.8.2 - 3.
- (4) Dental Technician - 1.

2. MISSION. To establish normal medical support for respective units.

3. SANITATION AND PREVENTIVE MEDICINE. As prescribed by TU Commanders.

4. EVACUATION OF CASUALTIES.

- a. Actual casualties will be treated by the nearest medical officer to the extent possible. Medical officers will make recommendations as to transfers for further treatment.
- b. Casualties will be evacuated as directed by Casualty Evacuation Control Officer.
- c. All actual casualties, will be reported to Casualty Evacuation Control Officer, information to CTF 132, CTG 132.1 and CTG 132.8.

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Start messages with "Actual Casualty" and include full name, rank/rate, service number, unit, diagnosis and recommendation.

5. MEDICAL ADMINISTRATION.

- a. TU medical officer determine that all personnel have been innoculated in accordance with current medical directives.

6. MEDICAL LOGISTICS.

- a. Snakebite kits and anti-venom serum for treatment of both hemotoxic and neurotoxic snakebite casualties available

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APPENDIXES:

1 - TAIWAN Medical Data

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010800H March 1963

Appendix 1 (TAIWAN Medical Data) to Annex O (Medical) to Operation  
Order 302-63.

Ref: None.

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

1. WATER. All water should be considered unsafe for drinking. There is only one complete sewage treatment plant in TAIWAN.
2. SEWAGE. The majority of sewage systems are open, and fresh night soil is widely used as fertilizer.
  - a. Vegetables, rice, sugar, tea, and fruits are abundant on TAIWAN. Poultry, pork and fish are also abundant. Dairy products are available, but the standards vary with the dairy and enforcement is difficult. Beer, wine and hot tea are potable.
3. INSECTS.
  - a. Mosquitos.
    - (1) Anophelline.
      - (a) A. Minimus - malaria vector.
      - (b) A. Hyrcanus senensis - potential malaria vector.
      - (c) A. Tesselatus - potential malaria vector.
      - (d) A. Maculatus - potential malaria vector.
      - (e) A. Pluviatilis - potential malaria vector.

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- (2) Aedes.
- (a) A. Aegypti - dengue fever vector.
  - (b) A. Albopictus - dengue fever vector.
- (3) Culicine.
- (a) C. Tritaeniorhynchus - Japanese B. Encephalitis vector.
  - (b) C. Fusocephalus - Japanese B. Encephalitis vector.
  - (c) C. Fatigans - filariasis vector.
- b. Flies. Phaenicia cuprina and Sarcophaga carinaria are the commonest carriers of the cysts of E. hystolytica, Balantidium coli, and the eggs of T. solium, E. vermicularis, T. tricharis, W. Americanus and D. Latum. Musca domestica and Chrysomia megacephala are the commonest carriers of bacillary dysentery, typhoid, and paratyphoid fever.
- c. Lice. The head louse and crab louse are common, but the body louse is uncommon on TAIWAN.
- d. Fleas. The oriental rat flea, Xenopsylla chepisi, which infests both rats and man, can carry the plague bacillus, Pasteurella pestis.
- e. Mites.
- (1) Trombicula akamushi - vector of scrub typhus.
  - (2) Liponyssus bacoti - vector of endemic typhus.
  - (3) Sarcoptes scabiei - Itch mite and the cause of scabies.
- f. Ticks. Although the Ixodid and Argassid ticks have been reported, their relationship to disease on TAIWAN is at present is unknown.

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- g. Scorpions and Centipedes. Species of these insects on TAIWAN can cause a painful wound.
- h. Urticating caterpillars are present on TAIWAN.
4. RODENTS. Rodents are abundant on TAIWAN and are reservoirs for plague, scrub typhus, Weil's disease, and endemic typhus.
5. FISHES. In the water about TAIWAN live sharks, moray eels and barracuda, all of which can inflict a severe wound with their teeth. Venomous marine animals include the stingrays, scorpions and stonefishes, jellyfish, molluscs, sea urchins, dogfish and sea snakes. Certain fish are poisonous to eat, especially the puffer fish.
6. POISONOUS SNAKES.
- a. Trimerisurus graminus - bamboo snake.
  - b. Trimeresurus mucrosquamatus - habu.
  - c. Naja naja atra - Taiwan Cobra.
  - d. Agkistrodon actus - hundred pacer.
  - e. Bungarus meuticinctus - banded krait.
  - f. Vipera russeli formosensis - Russel's viper. Not present in the area of operation.
- (1) The bamboo snake, the habu, and the hundred pacer have a hemotoxic venom: the cobra and the krait have a neurotoxic venom: and Russel's viper has a venom that is both neurotoxic and hemotoxic.
- (2) Anti-venoms to each snake listed above are available at the TAIWAN serum and vaccine laboratory, Shih Lin, Taipei, TAIWAN.

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7. ANIMALS. The boar and the bear are potentially dangerous animals.
8. PLANTS. A number of species of poisonous plants exist on TAIWAN including the common urticating plants such as poison ivy and stinging nettles.
9. DISEASES. Diseases of military importance are as follows:
  - a. Enteric diseases especially dysentery, typhoid, protozoan infestation, hepatitis and polio.
  - b. Venereal diseases especially syphilis, gonorrhea and chancroid.
  - c. Skin diseases especially the superficial fungus infections.
  - d. Malaris which has one peak extending from August through December and another peak extending from May through June.
  - e. Diseases of potential military importance are Japanese B. encephalitis, endemic and scrub typhus, heat injuries, epidemic keratoconjunctivitis, and respiratory diseases such as pneumonia, influenza, measles, mumps and chicken pox. Diseases of potential military importance that could be imported to TAIWAN are plague, epidemic typhus, dengue fever and cholera.
  - f. Diseases likely to affect small numbers of troops are tuberculosis, filariasis, flukes, and intestinal helminths.
  - g. Diseases likely to affect the local population on TAIWAN include trachoma, non-trachomatous viral conjunctivitis, bacterial conjunctivitis, leprosy, tetanus, goiter, spontaneous gangrene, leptospirosis, and yawa.

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RECORD OF CHANGES

1. As letter or message changes are received to CLF 132.8 OPOD 302-63, they will be recorded on this page and bound herein after the change has been entered.

Change No.	Authority	Date Entered	Signature
<del>1</del>		<del>3/1/63</del>	<del>J. L. Huff</del>
# 1	CTG 132.8	3/25/63	J. L. Huff
# 2	CTG 132.8	3/25/63	J. L. Huff

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