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Ser: 00907 66

30 AUG 1966


~~NOFORN~~ (unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1))

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CO, SLF ltr 3:BMC:jkr over 5750, Ser:
007-66 dtd 15 July 1966

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)

Subj: Command Chronology, submission of (U)

1. Forwarded.


M. C. DALBY
By direction

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3:WCC:bb
5750
Ser:0097-66
28 July 1966

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on SLF ltr 3:BMC:jkr over 5750, Ser:
007-66 dtd 15 July 1966

From: Commanding General, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMF
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology; submission of

1. Forwarded.

Herman Hansen Jr.
HERMAN HANSEN Jr.
Chief of Staff

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#0010188

HEADQUARTERS
Special Landing Force
USS Princeton (LPH-5)
FPO San Francisco 96601

3:BMC:jkl
5750
Ser: OC7-66
15 July 1966

SECRET - NORFORM

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)
Via: (1) Commanding General, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMF
(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology; submission of

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) BrigO 5750.1

Encl: (1) Command Chronology

1. This Command Chronology is submitted in accordance with references (a) and (b).

2. The period was extended through 4 July in order to include the termination of Operation NATHAN HALE on 2 July and the rotation of HMM 363 and 364 on 4 July.


R. A. BRENNEMAN

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY1. Organizational Data

a. Designation. The Special Landing Force had the Task Designator of Task Group 79.5.

b. Composition. The Special Landing Force was composed of the following:

1 June - 4 July 1966

SLF - Col R. A. BRENNEMAN

BLT 3/5 - LtCol E. J. BRONARS

HMM 364 - LtCol D. A. SOMERVILLE

c. Location. The Special Landing Force was embarked aboard the Amphibious Ready Group, consisting of the USS PRINCETON (LPH-5), USS PICKAWAY (APA 222), and the USS ALAMO (LSD 22).

d. Average Monthly Strength

SLF Staff:	USMC Off - 11	USMC Enl - 19	USN Off - 0	USN Enl - 0
BLT:	USMC Off - 64	USMC Enl - 1562	USN Off - 5	USN Enl - 69
HMM:	USMC Off - 53	USMC Enl - 171	USN Off - 1	USN Enl - 3

e. Commanding Officer and Staff

R. A. BRENNEMAN	Colonel	Commanding Officer
T. E. GLEASON	Lt Colonel	Executive Officer
L. M. DUFFY	Lt Colonel	S-1/S-4
H. B. CROSBY, III	Major	S-3
E. W. LOCKARD	Major	S-2
C. ALBANS	Captain	Asst S-2
J. L. CONWAY	Captain	Asst S-2 (2 July 1966)
W. H. HORNER	Captain	CommO (1 June - 3 July 1966)
R. A. AYERS	Captain	CommO (3 July 1966)
		Asst CommO (18 June - 3 July 1966)
B. S. MCKENNA	1st Lieutenant	Air Observer/Asst S-3
D. C. SCHULTZ	2nd Lieutenant	Asst S-4

2. Chronology of Significant Events During the Period 1 June to 4 July 1966

a. The events related depict the activities of the Special Landing Force during the period indicated. Detailed information on BLT 3/5 and HMM 364 assigned to the SLF during this period is shown in the appropriate subordinate command chronology. The details of Operation DECK HOUSE ONE and Operation NATHAN HALE are contained in the enclosed After Action Reports.

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b. 1 - 17 June 1966. On 1 June 1966, the ARG/SLF was in Subic Bay, R. P. for maintenance and training ashore after completing exercise HILLTOP V on 27 May 1966. CTG 79.5 made a visit to Admiral BAER, COMNAVBASE Subic on 2 June. On 4 June, Ambassador BLAIR was helo lifted by HMM 364 helicopters from Manila to U. S. Naval Station Subic. On 6 June, Brig General RYAN, CTF 79, and his staff representatives visited CTG 79.5 and CTG 76.5 in Subic Bay, R. P. and observed BLT 3/5 training ashore. From 7 June through 11 June CTG 79.5 and staff representatives of TG 79.5 and TG 76.5 conducted extensive planning and liaison with CG, I FFORCEV at Nha Trang, II CTZ, RVN for future special operations. The ARG/SLF departed Subic Bay, R. P. on 8 June and arrived off Qui Nhon, II CTZ, RVN on 10 June. CTG 79.5 and representatives conducted an aerial reconnaissance of the II CTZ littoral from Nha Trang to I CTZ boundary on 9 June, with special interest to the Song Cau area (CQ 0788). The ARG/SLF was positioned off Quang Ngai on 12 June for possible commitment in support of the 2nd ARVN Division. ¹ Liaison was effected with CG III MAF at Danang and CG 2nd ARVN Div at Quang Ngai on 13 June regarding the possible commitment which was relaxed on 13 June and the SLF/ARG continued with its planning for DECK HOUSE ONE. ² On the 16th and 17th of June CTG 79.5/CTG 76.5 and staffs completed planning and preparations with I FFORCEV at Nha Trang. An aerial reconnaissance of the Song Cau area (CQ 1092), II CTZ was conducted on 16 June by the CO of BLT 3/5, the SLF S-2A, and SLF Air Observer.

c. 18 June - 1 July 1966. The Special Landing Force conducted Operation DECK HOUSE ONE in the Song Cau area (CQ 0788), Phu Yen Province, II CTZ, RVN from 18 June until 1200H on 27 June. Upon termination of DECK HOUSE ONE the SLF was CHOPPED to CG 1st Air Cavalry Division for Operation NATHAN HALE also in Phu Yen Province, II CTZ, RVN. The SLF was returned to OPCON of CTG 76.5 for withdrawal on 1 July. Extensive liaison with I FFORCEV units was maintained during the period. On 20 June, Major General LARSEN, CG I FFORCEV, visited CTG 79.5 and CTG 76.5 aboard the USS Princeton and the BLT CP ashore. On 21 June, the Song Cau District Chief and U. S. Advisor visited CTG 79.5 and CTG 76.5. On 22 June, CG of the 22nd ARVN Division visited CTG 79.5 and CTG 76.5 aboard the USS Princeton. Brig General RYAN, CTF 79, and Colonel EMILS, ACofS, G-3, were aboard the USS Princeton from 22 to 25 June to observe SLF operations. On 23 June, Colonel PARRY, representative from COMUSMACV, came aboard the Princeton and discussed SLF operations. On 25 June, Lt General HIENGGENS, Deputy COMUSMACV, visited CTG 79.5/76.5 and BLT 3/5 CP ashore. On 26 June, General WESTMORELAND visited CTG 79.5 and the BLT CP ashore, following the conference at Dong Tre. On 27 June, Brig General FRIEDMAN, CG USA Support Command, visited CTG 79.5 and CTG 76.5 aboard the USS Princeton to determine SLF logistic support requirements for Operation NATHAN HALE. Capt HANSSTON, BLT 1/26 representative, liaisoned with the SLF 27-29 June, concerning BLT rotation. On 29 June, Major General NORTON, CG 1st Air Cavalry Division, and Brig General JONES, USMC, COC COMUSMACV, visited CTG 79.5/CTG 76.5. Withdrawal of SLF forces began on 1 July.

¹ COMSEVENTHFLT message 121642Z - SLF directed to be stationed off Quang Ngai.

² COMSEVENTHFLT message 150230Z - Directed the SLF to proceed with Operation DECK HOUSE ONE with D-Day on 18 June.

Enclosure (1)

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d. 2 - 4 July 1966. On 2 July the SLF had completed withdrawal and was re-embarked aboard assigned ARG shipping. The ARG/SLF departed the Song Cau area, II CTZ, RVN on 2 July. The USS Pickaway and USS Alamo departed enroute to Subic Bay, R. P. The USS Princeton arrived off Chu Lai, I CTZ, RVN on 3 July and completed rotation of HMM 364 and HMM 363 on 4 July 1966. Major General ROBERTSHAW, CG 1st MAW, visited CTG 79.5 and CTG 76.5 aboard the USS Princeton on 3 July. The detachment of 3 UH-1E aircraft from VMO-6 returned to Chu Lai on 3 July. The USS Princeton departed Chu Lai, RVN enroute to Subic Bay on 4 July.

Enclosure (1)

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LIST OF REFERENCES

1. COMSEVENTHFLT message 121642Z June.
2. COMSEVENTHFLT message 150230Z June.
3. CTG 79.5 message 151333Z June. (Frag Order Number One for Operation DECK HOUSE ONE to CTG OpOrder 328-66)
4. Command Chronology - BLT 3/5.
5. Command Chronology - HMM 364.
6. SLF After Action Report - Operations DECK HOUSE ONE and NATHAN HALE.

Appendix A
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TABULATION OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

TABS: ~~A-1~~ Command Chronology - BLT 3/5. *3/5 - 3/5*
~~B-2~~ Command Chronology - HMM 364. *1 Jan - 4 Feb (filed as mm-364)*
~~C-3~~ SLF After Action Report - Operations DECK HOUSE ONE and NATHAN HALE.

Appendix B

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
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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

AFTER ACTION REPORT

OPERATIONS DECK HOUSE ONE & NATHAN HALE



*2/12/85
NATHAN HALE*

18 June 85

CTG 79.5

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- HEADQUARTERS
Special Landing Force
USS Princeton (LPH-3)
FPO San Francisco 96601

Ol:RAB:jkf
Ser: 004-66
13 July 1966

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Seventh Fleet
Subj: Combat After Action Reports, Operations DECK HOUSE ONE and
NATHAN HALE

Encl: (1) ✓ Operation Overlay DECK HOUSE ONE
(2) ✓ Operation Overlay NATHAN HALE
(3) ✓ BLT 3/5 After Action Report, DECK HOUSE ONE and NATHAN HALE
(4) ✓ HMM 364 After Action Report, DECK HOUSE ONE
(5) ✓ Detachment VMO-6 After Action Report, DECK HOUSE ONE
(6) ✓ HMM 364 After Action Report, NATHAN HALE (SC) → added, HQ S.C. #296 954
(7) ✓ Detachment VMO-6, After Action Report, NATHAN HALE

1. The subject reports are submitted herewith. For clarity and ease of reference the SLF basic report is covered in two parts; Part I, the After Action Report for Operation DECK HOUSE ONE, and Part II, the After Action report for Operation NATHAN HALE.

2. Enclosures (1) through (7) amplify this report. Comments on appropriate portions of the BLT and HMM After Action Reports, enclosures (3) through (7), are contained in paragraph 11 of the basic SLF After Action Report.

R. A. Brennehan
R. A. BRENNEMAN

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PART I Combat After Action Report, Operation DECK HOUSE ONE.

Map Reference: AMS L701 6850 I, II, III, IV (1:50,000)
6851 III, IV (1:50,000)

1. Operation DECK HOUSE ONE was a unilateral amphibious operation combining surfaceborne and heliborne assault forces conducted in accordance with NWP-22(A).

2. This operation was conducted in the area of SONG CAU, PHU YEN PROVINCE, II CTZ RVN (vic CQ 1092). The operation commenced on 18 June 1966 at 0630H with the landing of water assault forces on Red Beach (CQ 107785) and a helo lifted assault force into LZ CROW (CQ 062082) two miles inland. The operation terminated at 1200H on 27 June 1966 when COMSEVENTHFLT directed the SLF to CHOP to CG I FFORCEV for employment in Operation NATHAN HALE.

3. Command headquarters was located aboard the USS Princeton (LPH-5) until established ashore on 27 June prior to termination of the amphibious portion of the operation.

4. Task Organization

Special Landing Force (Landing Force)

- Col R. A. BRENNEMAN

HMM 364 (Rein)

- LtCol D. A. SOMMERVILLE

HMM 364

DET VMO-6 (3 UH-1E's)

BLT 3/5

- LtCol E. J. BRONARS

5. Intelligence

a. The Song Cau area is characterized by low rolling rice paddy areas with numerous villages near the coast giving way to high rugged mountainous terrain. The dominating feature is Vung Chao Peninsula which runs in a NW-SE direction and forms Vung Chao Bay. Highway #1 runs N-S along the coast and Highway #6 runs NW-SE through the AOA. Vehicular movement both on the highways and cross country was virtually impossible because of extensive paddies, rugged terrain, and numerous road blocks and cuts. Key terrain features are the hill on the right flank of NIS Beach #31 which dominates the HLZ's, and the high terrain dominating Highways #1 and #6.

b. Red Beach (vic CQ 106791), a part of NIS Beach #31, is approximately 2,000 yards long and entirely useable. It is 35 to 50 yards wide at low tide, decreasing to 15 to 25 yards at high tide. Composition is soft sand, but firm where wet. Offshore approaches to this slightly concave beach are gentle to moderate and partially obstructed by a small island and a rocky shoal located 82° (magnetic) 4,200 yards from beach center. Nearshore approaches are clear but flanked on the north by a rocky headland and on the south by a sand bar. A sand bar fronts the beach but presented no problem to amphibious landing craft or vehicles.

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c. Terrain immediately behind the beach consists of a low berm line averaging approximately 6 feet, bush covered dunes backed by a row of trees and terraced, cultivated fields, and a series of foot hills. Highway #1 is located at the base of these hills and runs in a E-W direction. The terraced, cultivated fields extend from the base of the foothills to brush covered high ground. The brush covered high ground is backed on a higher elevation by more terraced, cultivated fields.

d. Pre-D Day intelligence reports indicated that the 95th Regiment, 85th Battalion, elements of the 83rd Regiment, the K317th Battalion, and several Local Force companies were operating in the Song Cau area.

e. No substantial contact was made with elements listed above during the operation. Resistance ashore consisted primarily of sniper and sporadic small arms fire. There was no positive identification of any enemy units.

6. Mission. As directed by COMSEVENTHFLT message 140350Z JUNE (Initiating Directive), the mission of the Landing Force was to conduct a unilateral amphibious operation in the Song Cau area (CQ 0788) of RVN to clear area of VC/NVA forces and base areas.

7. Concept of Operations. The operation was planned as a three to seven day search and destroy operation. The concept provided for the SLF to conduct a simultaneous helicopterborne and surface landing to conduct search and destroy operations, and to conduct a tactical withdrawal. In addition to the organic artillery of the BLT, fire support was provided by NGF consisting of one CA, one DE, one LSMR, and close air support by Seventh Fleet.

8. Execution. Operation DECK HOUSE ONE was executed in accordance with CTG 79.5 OpOrd 328-66 supplemented with a Frag Order published for the Song Cau area. The Frag Order facilitated timely and efficient execution throughout the operation. The SLF established its CP ashore on 27 June and reported to CATF the firm establishment of the landing force ashore with necessary command and control facilities. Termination of the amphibious portion of DECK HOUSE ONE was requested by CATF, and subsequently directed by COMSEVENTHFLT. See enclosures (3) through (7), After Action Reports of BLT 3/5 and HMM 364, for details of the execution.

9. Results

a. Casualties

U. S.; KIA-4, WIA-27, MIA-0, Captured-0.

VC; KIA-51, KIA(PCSS)-70, WIA-8, VCC-31, VCS-116.

b. Material and Food Supplies Captured or Destroyed

(1) 24.5 tons of rice (Destroyed).

(2) One ton of corn.

(3) One ton of grain.

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- (4) Two tons of miscellaneous uniforms and medical supplies.
- (5) 30 gallons of gasoline.
- (6) 40 gallons of molasses.
- (7) 125 lbs of salt.
- (8) 3.5 tons of rice (Evacuated to Song Cau).

10. Commander's analysis. This analysis is concerned with those matters at the Special Landing Force level. Reports of significant events at the BLT and Squadron level are shown in enclosures (3) through (7).

a. Planning

(1) Planning for the operation in II CTZ was initiated on receipt of CINCPACFLT message 060806Z June which authorized direct liaison with CG I FFORCEV. CTG 79.5, the S-3, the S-2, and a representative from CTG 76.5 effected liaison with CG I FFORCEV at Nha Trang, RVN 8-10 June. Aerial reconnaissance was made of the Song Cau area, and hand held aerial photos taken of the landing beach and HLZ's on D-2. An Interrogator/Translator team, and liaison advisors (ARVN) were requested from I FFORCEV, and subsequently attached to the SLF for the duration of Operation DECK HOUSE ONE.

(2) Additionally on the initial visit with CG I FFORCEV, plans were made which included the following significant areas:

(a) The friendly OOB, current operations, and future intentions were determined and SLF operations integrated into the overall CTZ operations. (For example, the 47th ARVN Regiment was in effect providing a blocking force by their S and D operations immediately to the south of the AOA.)

(b) Red Haze and SPAR missions were arranged.

(c) Communication frequencies were coordinated and arrangements made to draw 25 PRC 25 radios for SLF use.

(d) A direct secure teletype circuit between Headquarters I FFORCEV and the ARG/SLF was established.

(e) Pre-D Day reconnaissance was arranged using the long range recon groups from the Dang Tre and Lai Hai Special Forces Camps.

(f) Provisions were made for a reaction force (2ndBn, 327th) in the event it was required for additional support or to exploit a profitable target.

(g) Logistic support arrangements were made to draw supplies at Qui Nhon if required.

(3) Special attention was directed toward the coordination and mutual support of the SLF and the 47th ARVN Regiment, and a boundary was established

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within the AOA. An SLF liaison officer was with this regiment from D minus 2 until the end of the operation. Also discussed was the capability of the SLF to assist this force if the tactical situation dictated. The procedure for obtaining both emergency and routine employment of the SLF in support of adjacent units was resolved, e.g. the SLF would react in emergencies as appropriate to support an adjacent unit.

(4) During this visit plans were made to establish liaison with the following commands:

- (a) I FFORCEV.
- (b) 47th ARVN Regiment.
- (c) Sector Headquarters Tuy Hoa
- (d) 2nd Battalion, 327th Regiment, 101st Airborne Brigade (Initial Reaction Force).
- (e) District Headquarters Song Cau.

(5) Subsequent liaison was established as necessary with the following commands as DECK HOUSE ONE progressed and phased into Operation NATHAN HALE:

- (a) 1st Air Cavalry Division.
- (b) 3rd Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division.
- (c) 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, 1st Air Cavalry Division.
- (d) District Headquarters, Tuy An.
- (e) Lai Hai Special Forces Camp.

(6) The SLF further requested from CTF 79 that four TAC(a)/TAO aircraft be attached to the SLF on 15 June for a period of about 10 days. On 15 June, two armed UH-1E aircraft and one unarmed UH-1E were assigned by CG, III MAF from VMO-6, MAG 36.

b. Intelligence. Prior to the operation, Liaison was established with I FFORCEV and arrangements were made for maps, aerial photography, ITT Red Haze missions, TAO missions, I FFORCEV daily ISUM, and for pre-D Day reconnaissance of the objective area by long range reconnaissance teams (US Special Forces and CIDG).

(1) Intelligence material furnished by I FFORCEV was accurate and timely. Aerial photography was especially timely and contained valuable information for the selection of HLZ's, CP locations, and lines of communications.

(2) There were two new units identified in addition to the units previously indicated by intelligence reports. These new units, reported by POW's,

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were the C385 Recon element (new unit unconfirmed) and a mobile provincial company (unidentified).

(3) The enemy exhibited the ability to monitor and to jam tactical radio nets. Jamming was done by voice and was ineffective. The enemy did not defend in strength, but harassed and sniped throughout the operation. Weather was typical for the period with high temperatures and only a trace of precipitation.

c. Command Relationships. Operation DECK HOUSE ONE was a unilateral amphibious operation with command relationships in accordance with NWP-22(a) and UNAAF, para 30278-30279.

d. Supporting Arms. Control of supporting arms during Operation DECK HOUSE ONE remained afloat on the Princeton, and coordination was provided by the FSCC ashore. Artillery support was provided by Battery F, 2/11 and the 107 Howtar Battery, 2/12. Fire missions were controlled by FO's and TAO's. Naval gunfire support was provided by the heavy cruiser St Paul, the destroyer J. W. Thomason, and the LSMR Clarion River. On D plus 5 the J. W. Thomason was relieved by the Basilone, and on D plus 6 the Clarion River was detached from Operation DECK HOUSE ONE. Close air support was provided by CTF 77 with A4 and A6 aircraft under the control of SLF TAC(A). When UH-1E's were not available, TAC(A) was provided by in-country airborne controllers operating out of Sector Headquarters at Tuy Hoa. Due to limited contact by the Landing Force with sizeable VC units in the AOA, close air support was employed for the most part against targets of opportunity located by the TAO and TAC(A) beyond the established bomblines. Ordnance employed included 250 pound fragmentation bombs, napalm, rockets, and 20mm cannon fire.

e. Logistics. Prior to the commencement of Operation DECK HOUSE ONE liaison was established with I FFORCEV to coordinate logistic support required. Arrangements were made to procure selected items of Class I, II, V, and VA from II Corps Log Spt Cmd resources located at Qui Nhon. During the operation supplies of both the SLF and in-country sources were used. The use of LFORM was held to a minimum in order to retain a maximum combat readiness capability. All supplies were delivered directly to units ashore by helo from ARG shipping. Evacuation of WIA and KIA from the LPH was accomplished through the 85th Evacuation Hospital located at Qui Nhon. Logistic support to the BLT ashore was adequate and responsive to requirements.

f. Communications. Communications were good to excellent during the entire operation.

(1) The twenty-five AN/PRC 25 radios obtained from CG I FFORCEV prior to the operation were invaluable for the extended operating distances. A secure on-line circuit was maintained between USS Princeton and CG I FFORCEV during the planning and operation phases. This reliable circuit permitted rapid exchange of information.

(2) Ship to shore communications between the SLF and the BLT ashore was maintained on CLF TAC #1 utilizing a RT 68 aboard ship and a PRC-25

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ashore, and on CLF TAC #2 utilizing a URC-32 aboard ship and a PRC-47 ashore. Reliable communications were maintained throughout the operation.

(3) Radio Relay was established on D plus 1 utilizing a GRC 10 ship-board gear and AN/MRC 62 van ashore with very good success. A generator loss ashore at one time caused the circuit to be down several hours, but was repaired and proved to be a significant asset in the beach support area. Wire lines could not be maintained between the beach support area and the BLT CP, one and one half miles inland, until D plus 5 due to their being cut. After clearing the area between the beach and the BLT CP, wire lines were maintained and excellent communications were experienced.

(4) On D plus 7 problems arose with the BB451 power supply for the AN/PRC 47. The batteries were being used faster than the battery chargers could recharge. 18 BB451's and 4 PP3240 battery chargers were borrowed from the 1st Marine Division to alleviate the problem on an interim basis. Based on this extended employment of the SLF a request was submitted to CTF 79 for a special allowance of 5 PP3240's and 20 BB451's for the SLF Headquarters. This special allowance will permit augmentation to the BLT while assigned to the SLF.

g. Tactical Air Observation. During Operation DECK HOUSE ONE tactical air observation was employed extensively in support of the Special Landing Force and its supporting arms.

(1) The SLF air observer was utilized in both the attached UH-1E (slick) aircraft from MAG 36 and Army Ol-D aircraft (on-call support) from the 219th Aviation Company, Tuy Hoa, RVN. TAO missions during the operation accounted for 51.0 flight hours and provided an important source of information on the friendly and enemy situation as well as effective control of supporting arms.

h. Psychological Warfare Operations

(1) The BJU Detachment was employed to assist BLT 3/5 with loud-speaker operations ashore. The types of missions included both live and taped broadcasts directing civilians to assemble for screening and interrogation, curfew instructions, appeals to the VC to surrender, and warnings to villages that sniper fire received from villages would result in immediate retaliation. Broadcasts were made both from ground and helicopter. This was an effective utilization of the BJU and assisted the BLT in population control.

(2) Two leaflet drops were conducted warning Vietnamese not to interfere with operations and not to run from Marines. There was no interference by civilians during the operation.

i. Civic Action. Four Civic Action visits were made during Operation DECK HOUSE ONE in coordination with the Chiefs of Song Cau District.

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(1) A Civic Action Team composed of SLF staff and medical/dental personnel from the USS Princeton and BLT 3/5 visited the Song Cau hospital on 20 and 21 June. Approximately 600 patients were treated for a variety of diseases and approximately 450 infected teeth extracted. Soap, vitamins, and other medication were distributed to the patients. Village medical workers were instructed on medical procedures and tooth extraction.

(2) On 22 June, after learning that approximately 95 refugees at Song Cau were in need of medical treatment, the Civic Action Team visited the refugee camp there, and treated all of the refugees for a variety of ailments and injuries. The dentist extracted numerous infected teeth. Food, medicines, and soap were distributed.

(3) On 26 June the Civic Action assistance requested was provided during search and clear operations at Ha Binh Thank (1) at CQ 101802. Injured and sick civilians were treated and approximately 100 infected teeth extracted.

(4) In addition to the Civic Action visits, the District Chief's wife was helo lifted to the Princeton and given blood transfusions subsequent to a miscarriage which she had suffered. This action probably saved her life. Also a wounded refugee child was flown to the Princeton with her mother, treated, and returned to their home and family from which they had been separated for several days.

(5) Medical and dental supplies were furnished from ARG/SLF assets. All actions were well received by the Vietnamese.

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PART II Combat After Action Report, Operation NATHAN HALE

1. Operation NATHAN HALE was a search and destroy operation in which the Special Landing Force was under the OPCON of CG, 1st Air Cav Div. It was in essence a continuation of DECK HOUSE ONE with no time gap between termination of DECK HOUSE ONE and initiation of Operation NATHAN HALE. The area was generally the same with the SLF being assigned an area of operations (AO) slightly south of the previously established AOA. The AO caused only minor repositioning and reorientation of units.

a. The participation of the SLF in Operation NATHAN HALE came as a result of a rapidly developing situation in the area to the south of the AOA. CG I FFORCEV requested initially that the period of operations ashore of the SLF be extended beyond 23 June in order that the SLF could be utilized to block possible VC exfiltration. This was approved and the period extended through 30 June. CG I FFORCEV subsequently considered that in order to more fully coordinate and control operations within the area that the SLF should be placed under his OPCON. This was requested through the chain of command and ultimately approved with OPCON of the SLF passing to CG I FFORCEV and then to CG, 1st Air Cav Div. The specifics in the situation as it developed are outlined below:

(1) On 18 June representatives of 2/327, 101st Airborne (the reaction force) reported aboard the Princeton to coordinate planning for possible employment with the SLF. If committed this battalion would be under OPCON of the SLF. At this time also, plans were discussed which had been developed with CG I FFORCEV concurrence, and SLF cognizance, for 2/327 to conduct a battalion size search and destroy operation south of the AOA, attacking in a north easterly direction to the SLF boundary. (This plan had been developed based on intelligence that elements of the 95th NVA were currently in the vic of BQ 9869.) This plan was subsequently executed and 2/327 with two companies being helo lifted into this area on 191200H to conduct S&D operations northeast to the SLF boundary. (At this time 1/8 was designated as the reaction force on a two hour alert for both the SLF and 2/327.) Subsequent actions included commitment of 1/8, 3rd Brigade, and finally the 1st Air Cav Div in this area to exploit this initial contact by 2/327; to fix and destroy the remaining elements of the 18th B Regiment, NVA.

(2) 1st Air Cav Div intelligence indicated that the enemy would move to the south avoiding contact or break up into small units and attempt to exfiltrate to the northwest and north.

b. Messages summarizing the transition from DECK HOUSE ONE to NATHAN HALE are as follows:

(1) I FFORCEV message 221308Z - requested that COMUSMACV take actions necessary to extend Operation DECK HOUSE ONE for an indefinite period in order that I FFORCEV would have "considerable flexibility" in the pursuit of Operation NATHAN HALE.

(2) COMUSMACV message 221730Z - requested approval from CINCPAC for continuation of Operation DECK HOUSE ONE.

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(3) COMSEVENTHFLT message 230746Z - directed CTG 76.5 to extend Operation DECK HOUSE ONE through 30 June unless released earlier by higher authority.

(4) COMUSMACV message 261240Z - recommended to CINCPAC that Operation DECK HOUSE ONE be terminated and Operation DECK HOUSE TWO be initiated with the ARG/SLF in close support of the 1st Air Cavalry Division.

(5) COMSEVENTHFLT message 270032Z - terminated Operation DECK HOUSE ONE and directed the SLF to CHOP at 270400Z to CG, I FFORCEV.

(6) CTG 76.5 message 270620Z - directed SLF CHOP to CG I FFORCEV.

(7) CTG 79.5 message 270632Z - SLF reported OPCON to CG I FFORCEV.

(8) I FFORCEV message 271245Z - OPCON of SLF passed to CG, 1st Air Cavalry Division.

2. SLF command headquarters for Operation NATHAN HALE was located ashore with the BLT CP initially in the vicinity (CQ 083788) and then relocated at (CQ 072714).

3. Task Organization. The task organization of the SLF remained the same as for Operation DECK HOUSE ONE.

4. Intelligence. The Tuy An area is characterized by low, rolling rice paddy areas near the coast, giving way to rugged hills and mountains within 8,000 meters. A salt water lake, Dam O Loau, is the dominating terrain feature in the eastern portion of the AO. Highway #1 runs through the flat area and generally follows the coast line. It is a hard surfaced (black top) all weather road. Cross country vehicular movement is restricted due to extensive paddies. The railroad, which generally parallels Highway #1 is not usable. Dominating peaks are: Hill 308 (CQ 060695), Hill 42 (CQ 045695), and Hill 172 (BQ 991683).

a. Intelligence reports indicated that the major VC units operating in the area were; the 85th Bn, 328 MF Bn, K 317th Bn, 4th Bn 95th Regt, and the 18B NVA Regiment. No substantial contact was made by the SLF with any of the units listed above; however, one VC stated that he was a member of the 18B Regiment.

5. Mission. CG, 1st Air Cavalry Division assigned the Special Landing Force the mission of conducting search and destroy operations in the assigned area of operation, and to establish blocking ambush positions on principal avenues of approach along the southern boundary of the assigned area of operations.

6. Concept of Operations. The SLF concept of operations during Operation NATHAN HALE was to conduct search and destroy operations within the assigned zone, to establish blocking forces along the principal routes of entrance and exit along the southern boundary, to establish patrols and ambushes during hours of darkness, and to conduct coordinated attacks with 1st Air Cavalry units in the event positive enemy contacts were made. Fire support was provided by organic artillery units and by naval gun fire and CAS obtained through the 1st Air Cavalry Division. Tactical withdrawal was to be conducted on release of

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OPCON by CG, I FFORCEV.

7. Execution. See enclosures (1) through (7), Operation Overlays, and After Action Reports of BLT 3/5, HMM 364, and Det VMO-6.

8. Results

a. Casualties

U. S. KIA-1, WIA-12, MIA-0, Captured-0.

VC KIA-14, WIA-12, VGC-41, VCS-19, RALLIER-1.

b. Material and Food Supplies Captured or Destroyed

- (1) 186.5 tons of rice (destroyed).
- (2) 1,020 rounds of small arms ammunition.
- (3) 11 booby traps.
- (4) Two 81mm mortar shells.
- (5) Two PRC-25 batteries.
- (6) Two claymore mines.
- (7) Seven hand grenades.
- (8) One anti-personnel mine.
- (9) Two trip flares.

9. Commander's Analysis. This analysis is concerned with those matters at the Special Landing Force level. Reports on problems encountered and lessons learned at the battalion and squadron level are contained in enclosures (3) and (6).

a. Planning. Planning for integration into Operation NATHAN HALE commenced during a conference held on 26 June in the CP of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division at Dong Tre. During this conference (attended by COMUSMACV, CG I FFORCEV, CG 1st Air Cav Div, CTG 79.5, and CO BLT 3/5) CG, 1st Air Cavalry Division stated that it would be desirable to relocate the boundary of the SLF further to the south to better support his operations. COMUSMACV concurred implying that he would request OPCON of the SLF. On establishment of the Landing Force ashore the following day, termination of DECK HOUSE ONE, and CHOP to CG, 1st Air Cav Div, a planning conference was conducted at the 1st Air Cav Div Command Post (Tuy Hoa North) to establish the command relationship, fire support, and logistic support and to ensure a smooth transition to control by CG, 1st Air Cav Div. The SLF was accorded the same relationship as another brigade in the division. Fire support, logistics, and communications are discussed in the

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following paragraphs. An SLF liaison officer was assigned. Additionally, staff visits were made daily. No problems of any nature were encountered and a spirit of willingness and mutual confidence prevailed.

b. Intelligence. Intelligence support from the 1st Air Cavalry Division included aerial photography, maps, and "Red Haze" reports. Intelligence support which had been provided to the SLF during Operation DECK HOUSE ONE by CG I FFORCEV continued. The enemy continued to evade contact and to exfiltrate the area. Weather was typical for the period, with high temperatures and humidity, and only a trace of precipitation.

c. Command Relationships. Operation NATHAN HALE developed from the CG I FFORCEV commitment of the 2/327, 101st Airborne Division south of the DECK HOUSE ONE AOA. OPCON of the SLF was passed by COMSEVENTHFLT to COMUSMACV concurrent with the termination of DECK HOUSE ONE with OPCON of the SLF ultimately passing to CG, 1st Air Cavalry Division.

d. Supporting Arms. During NATHAN HALE, control of supporting arms resided in the FSCC of the 1st Air Cav Div with the SLF FSCC providing coordination of fires within the assigned AO. Artillery support remained the same for the SLF and in addition Battery C, 5/27 had the mission of general support reinforcing in the SLF AO. Naval gunfire ships, (St Paul and Basilone) were released by CATF to provide normal in-country support to the 1st Air Cav Div under Gun 10 procedures. HMM 364 helos continued to provide direct support to the SLF in the AO augmented as required by CAS from in-country resources through 1st Air Cav Div FSCC. No problems were encountered and fire support was responsive to all requests.

e. Logistics. Prior to the completion of DECK HOUSE ONE and the commitment of the SLF to NATHAN HALE, liaison was established with logistics representatives of the II Corps LOGSUP Cmd and 1st Air Cav Div to coordinate logistic support requirements. An LSA containing two days supply of selected items of Class I, II, V, and VA was established by the SLF in the vicinity of Tuy An District Headquarters (CQ 109677). Resupply to the LSA was accomplished by surface means provided by the II Corps LOGSUP Cmd. Distribution to units from the LSA was by SLF helos. This procedure proved most satisfactory and more responsive to SLF needs than total resupply from afloat. Supplies not held in the LSA were provided from assets aboard the LPH. Evacuation of casualties continued through the USS Princeton to the 85th Evacuation Hospital, Quan Nhon.

f. Communications. Communications were maintained with the 1st Air Cav Div from the Flagship via the 1st Air Cav command net #2, a voice FM circuit, utilizing a PRC-25, and over CMD#3 an online teletype circuit. The existing communications between the Flagship and BLT ashore were continued. In addition, the BLT activated the 1st Air Cav Div command net #2 and #3, utilizing a team and equipment provided by the 1st Air Cav Div Signal Officer. The BLT was also on 1st Air Cav Air, Naval Gunfire, and Artillery Nets. Excellent communications were maintained throughout NATHAN HALE.

g. Civic Action. One civic action visit was conducted. A team composed of SLF civic action and medical personnel along with medical and dental personnel of the USS Pickaway visited the hamlet of Phu Tan (CQ 1068) on 1 July.

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(1) The District Chief, Tuy An had heard of the SLF civic action team visits to Song Cau and was most anxious for a local visit. Because the District Chief had publicized this visit, a large number of Vietnamese from surrounding villages arrived for treatment. The medical officers treated approximately 350 villagers for a number of ailments, injuries, wounds, and burns. The dental officer extracted approximately 250 infected teeth. Soap was distributed to the villagers and certain medical supplies were provided to the U. S. Army Medical Corpsman attached to the Advisory Team for use by the villagers. Of the many civic action visits made by the SLF team, this was the most enthusiastically received.

h. Withdrawal. Although CG 1st Air Cav Div had indicated that the time of CHOP would be no earlier than the 2nd, the effective time of CHOP was established at 010800H July. At that time elements of the BLT were conducting search and destroy operations which placed them in an optimum position for withdrawal. In this regard W Hour was taken as the hour of CHOP to CATF. The SLF, after commitment to Operation NATHAN HALE, was oriented to the south of the original AOA conducting search and destroy operations. Disposition of forces were such that withdrawal, with the exception of two rifle companies, could be made from one secure area (vic CQ 088788 secured by elements 47th RVN Regt) in the AO to a secure beach (at Tuy Hoa South secured by elements of the Log Spt Cmd) for subsequent backloading. Withdrawal plans provided for the initial extraction of these companies while the SLF was in position to provide the necessary tactical support and cover. The 1st Air Cavalry Division provided the necessary cover to the SLF throughout the withdrawal even though the SLF was in fact under OPCON of the CATF. This was the reverse of the process that was followed when the SLF CHOPPED to the 1st Air Cavalry Division, wherein the CATF retained control of its supporting arms until control could be effectively passed to the 1st Air Cavalry Division. Accordingly, at 011500H July one company was helo lifted by HMM 364 from positions in the AO to the secure beach at Tuy Hoa South for backloading. On 020700H July U. S. Army Helos lifted one company from the AO to Tuy Hoa South while HMM 364 lifted a second company to the USS Princeton. The 1st Air Cavalry Division provided motor transport for the movement of the SLF artillery and other elements from positions secured by the 1st Bn, 47th ARVN Regiment to Tuy Hoa South. This move was covered by supporting arms (Air, NGF, Arty) of the 1st Air Cavalry Division and proceeded without incident. In addition, CATF Air support was on one hour call as back up, if required. Upon departure of the convoy, the remaining elements within the SLF/BLT CP were lifted to the USS Princeton by HMM 364 and by 021515H July backloading was completed and the SLF reconstituted aboard ARG shipping.

10. Comments on Enclosures (3) through (7). The following comments are made to clarify or amplify certain statements, opinions, and recommendations contained in the After Action Reports of BLT 3/5 and HMM 364.

a. TAC LOG/Resupply Operations. (Para 6a(2)(d), 6a(2)(e), Encl (3) and Item

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I encl (4) pertain)

(1) TACLOG operations and procedures were responsive and were considered satisfactory in all but a few isolated cases. Routine resupply was normally planned for late afternoon delivery to facilitate better utilization of helicopters for tactical deployment of units during the day. Emergency resupply was minimal and presented no problems. Resupply items were staged on the flight deck of the LPH immediately upon receipt of requests from the BLT ashore; however, there were occasions when helicopter resupply missions were launched out of pre-planned sequence. This caused some delay in loading, but was not considered excessive. Some delay is automatically inherent when supplies are moved from the flight deck staging area and loaded aboard helicopters. This would also be applicable in an ISA ashore. Continuing emphasis is placed on the requirement to return excess or unuseable items during return flights from BLT positions. The establishment of an ISA ashore during Operation NATHAN HALE proved most satisfactory.

(2) It is considered that the recommendation to establish an ISA ashore for those operations in excess of five days is a sound proposal; however, for shorter operations or if flexibility of movement is required, supply directly from ships to using units has been determined to be a sound practice. With a minimum of two days supply of selected items of class I, II, III, and V positioned in this ISA, response time would be lessened and the overall effectiveness materially increased both from the point of view of helicopter employment and ease of control by the BLT.

b. Selections of Landing Zones. (Item 2, encl (4)) Selection of landing zones involves consideration of both the ground and helicopter commanders. Emphasis will be placed on the coordination required between the ground and helicopter elements in order to select landing zones which are both tactically sound and yet meet helicopter standards.

c. Communications

(1) (Item 3, encl (4)) It was recognized that the use of a battalion tactical net for coordination and control of helicopter operations is unacceptable. This situation obtained due to shortage of PRC-25 radios in BLT 3/5. The establishment of a BLT Command Net will eliminate this problem. BLT 3/5 received a full allowance of PRC-25 radios subsequent to this operation.

(2) (Para 6f(2), encl (3)) The monoblocks and electrolite are currently on order and when received will bring the BLT up to its operational T/E level. In addition, the Special Landing Force has received approval from FMFPAC to hold twenty (20) BB 451's and two (2) PP 4567/VU to be utilized in support of future BLT's.

(3) (Para 6f(5), encl (3)) It is planned for future operations to assign a frequency for a BLT Command Net to facilitate the passing of administrative traffic and control and coordination of helicopter resupply missions.

(4) (Para 7b(2), encl (3)) With the employment of the An/PRC 25 radios

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it is anticipated that this problem will be alleviated.

(5) (Para 7c(1), encl (3)) These frequency assignments were made by I FFORCEV. Every effort is made during planning to insure separate frequencies for all SLF nets. If separate frequencies are not available close coordination, to minimize operational interference, is the only solution.

(6) (Para 7c(2), encl (3)) Do not concur that the AN/PRC 47 is unsatisfactory for use on the Naval Gun Fire Spot for all of the reasons stated. The light weight of the PRC-25 is the major factor in its favor; for this reason it should be considered as a possible replacement for all man-pack radios. The AN/PRC 47 was used throughout the operation on other nets without problems and it can be used for communications while on the move if necessary.

(7) (Para 7c(3), encl (3)) During future operations when problems are developing and it is believed due to equipment drifting off frequency net control will tune to the AN/PRC 47. With the addition of BB 451's and recharging capabilities provided the SLF prior problems with the AN/PRC 47 will be minimized to a large extent by utilization of fully charged batteries.

(8) (Para 7c(4), encl (3)) The USS Princeton is aware of existing problems with HF equipment, remotes, antenna locations, and employment. The ship is making every effort to enhance communications while at sea and during overhaul periods.

(9) (Para 7c(5), encl (3)) A limited number of FM frequencies are available to the SLF for all operations and some interference cannot be eliminated due to distance separation of units and MCS separation. Prior to assigning frequencies to units the tactical, administrative, and frequent usage are given much consideration so as to minimize interference.

d. Identification of Friendly Positions. (Item 4, encl (4)) Concur in the recommendation that positive means must be utilized for marking enemy and friendly positions. The established procedures set forth in SLF OpOrd 328-63 will be emphasized.

e. Fire Support Coordination Center (Para 7b(4), encl (3))

(1) The procedure utilized during DECK HOUSE ONE provided for the SACC upon receipt of artillery or naval gunfire missions to pass this information immediately to HDC who in turn alerted all aircraft of the nature of the fire so that helicopters could stay clear of the gun target line. The instances of helicopters flying through these gun target lines were few, and possibly resulted from a delay in BLT FSCC reporting fires to SACC. Pilot error in failing to stay clear of the designated areas was also a contributing factor.

(2) It is considered that the established procedures are sound but require proper and rapid execution by all agencies to ensure success. This will be re-emphasized in forthcoming training exercises.

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f. Naval Gunfire.

(1) (Para 7c(6), encl (3)) Concur that close in fires should be under control of the BLT. The concern of SACC was not over the safety of the unit requesting the fires, but rather with the safety of other friendly units in adjacent areas (e.g. 47th RVN Regt, Local, Regional, and Special Forces units). In future operations SACC will continue to approve missions by remaining silent upon receipt of CANDY report.

(2) (Para 7c(7), encl (3)) As long as control of air remains afloat it will be necessary for a BLT FSCC representative to be present in SACC monitoring the artillery FD net in order that missions in progress can be monitored in the SACC. This will be implemented in the next SLF operation. Paragraph 10e discusses procedures utilized during operations by SACC to coordinate aircraft and other supporting arms.

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
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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

5 JULY - 4 AUGUST 1966

USMC



SPECIAL LANDING FORCE

CTG 79.5

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16 SEP 1966

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SECOND ENDORSEMENT on SLF ltr 3/BSM/lpp over 5750
Ser 0012-66 dtd 9Aug66

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (AO3D)

Subj: Command Chronology; submission of

1. Forwarded.

W. E. Barrineau
W. E. BARRINEAU
By direction

T.G. 79.5 (SLF)

4 Jul 50 by 1966

#0010430a

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S E C R E T


3:WWC:jta
5750
Ser:00125-66
31 Aug 1966

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on SLF ltr 3/BSM/lpp over 5750, Ser: 0012-66
dtd 9Aug66

From: Commanding General, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMF
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology; submission of

1. Forwarded.


HERMAN HANSEN Jr.
Chief of Staff

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS
Special Landing Force
USS Princeton (LPH-5)
FPO San Francisco 96601

3/BSM/lpp
5750
Ser: 0012-66
9 Aug 1966

SECRET-NOFORN

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)
Via: (1) Commanding General, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMF
(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for period 5 Jul - 4 Aug 1966; submission of

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) BrigO 5750.1
(c) CG FMFPac msg 261950Z July

Encl: (1) Command Chronology - SLF
del sep (2) ✓ Command Chronology - BLT 3/5 *2 Jul - 1 Aug*
" " (3) - Command Chronology - HMM 363 *+ Jul - 4 Aug*
(4) SLF After Action Report - Opns DECK HOUSE II and HASTINGS

1. In accordance with references (a) through (c), the Command Chronology for the Special Landing Force is submitted herewith as enclosures (1) through (4).

2. The period covered begins on 5 July due to the extended period covered by the previous Command Chronology. The period for this Command Chronology was extended through 4 August in order to include the rotation of BLT 3/5 in-country on 1 August and reconstitution of the SLF in the new ARG Shipping at Subic Bay on 3 August.


R. A. BRENNEMAN

SECRET-NOFORN

SECRET-NOFORN

SPECIAL LANDING FORCE
COMMAND CHRONOLOGY1. Organizational Data.

a. Designation. The Special Landing Force had the Task Designator of Task Group 79.5.

b. Composition. The Special Landing Force was composed of the following:

5 July - 4 August 1966

SLF - Col R. A. BRENNEMAN

BLT 3/5 - LtCol E. J. BRONARS

HMM 363 - LtCol J. MCGOUGH

c. Locations. The Special Landing Force was embarked aboard the Amphibious Ready Group, consisting of the USS Princeton (LPH-5), USS Pickaway (APA 222), and the USS Alamo (LSD 22).

d. Average Monthly Strength.

SLF STAFF: USMC OFF - 10; USMC ENL - 20

BLT USMC OFF - 64; USMC ENL - 1570; USN OFF - 6; USN ENL - 70

HMM USMC OFF - 56; USMC ENL - 174; USN OFF - 1; USN ENL - 3

e. Commanding Officer and Staff

R. A. BRENNEMAN, Colonel

Commanding Officer

T. E. GLEASON, Lt. Colonel

Executive Officer

L. M. DUFFY, Lt. Colonel

S-1/S-4

D. R. BRIMMER, Lt. Colonel

S-3 (14 July 1966)

H. B. CROSBY III, Major

S-3, Asst S-3 (14 July 1966)

E. W. LOCKARD, Major

S-2 (5-26 July 1966)

C. ALBANS, Captain

Asst S-2 (5-6 July 1966)

J. L. CONWAY, Captain

Asst S-2 (5-10 July 1966)

SECRET-NOFORN

Enclosure (1)

SECRET-NOFORN

R. A. AYERS, Captain	CommO
B. S. MCKENNA, 1st Lieutenant	Air Observer/Asst S-3
D. C. SCHULTZ, 2nd Lieutenant	Asst S-4
C. G. OSGOOD, 2nd Lieutenant	Asst S-2, S-2 (26 July 1966)

2. Chronology of Significant Events During the Period 5 July to 4 August 1966.

a. The following events relate the activities of the Special Landing Force during the period reported. Detailed information on BLT 3/5 and HMM 363 is shown in the appropriate subordinate command chronologies, enclosures (2) and (3) and in enclosure (4), the After Action Report for Operations DECK HOUSE II and HASTINGS. Appendix A contains a list of appropriate references.

b. 5-15 July 1966.

(1) On 5 July 1966, the ARG/SLF was in Subic Bay, R. P. for maintenance and training ashore after Operations DECK HOUSE I and NATHAN HALE.

(2) On 6 July Brigadier General RYAN, CTF 79, and members of his staff visited CTG 79.5 and CTG 76.5. General RYAN was briefed on the conduct of Operations DECK HOUSE I and NATHAN HALE and he presented Purple Hearts to the wounded from these operations.

(3) On this same date a team of two officers and seven enlisted arrived from 9th MAB to assist the SLF in resupply, ordnance and electronic areas. This team assisted the BLT in the receipt of AN/PRC-25 radios and related equipment and picked up the replaced radios for return to 9th MAB. No other significant supply/maintenance problems were encountered by the team during this visit.

(4) During the period 9 through 12 July the SLF maintained liaison with III MAF for possible operations in the I CTZ, RVN. On 13 July CTC 79.5 and staff representatives proceeded to RVN to effect liaison with CG, III MAF, CG 3rd MarDiv, CG, 1st MAW for operations in I CTZ, RVN. Personal liaison continued through 15 July and included coordination with Task Force Delta Headquarters at Cam Lo and the U. S. advisors of the Quang Tri Sector and Goi Tinh District for the forthcoming special operations in RVN.

(5) The ARG/SLF departed Subic Bay, R. P. on 13 July arriving off Danang, RVN on 14 July in preparation for Operations DECK HOUSE II and HASTINGS.²

¹ CG III MAF msg 120715Z July - requested SLF supporting operation commencing 16 July.

² COMSEVENTHFLT msg 141742Z July - directed the SLF to conduct Operation DECK HOUSE II.

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(6) From 12-15 July, the 9th MAB Ordnance Officer, Lt MADDEN, conferred with the SLF concerning SLF ammunition requirements and usage data.

(7) Lt SMITH, 9th MAB ISO and CWO GRIGGS, 9th MAB Personnel Officer reported to the SLF for temporary duty for Operation DECK HOUSE II.

c. 16 July - 2 August 1966.

(1) On 14 July the ARG/SLF commenced Operation DECK HOUSE II in the area of Dong Ha, Quang Tri Province, I CTZ, RVN (vic YD 2561). The operation terminated on 18 July when the SLF chopped to CG III MAF for employment in Operation HASTINGS under OpCon Task Force Delta.³

(2) On 18 July, Vice Admiral HYLAND, COMSEVENTHFLT visited CTG 79.5 and 76.5 aboard USS Princeton and BLT 3/5 CP ashore.

(3) On 24 July Brigadier General ENGLISH, CG, Task Force Delta, and Colonel THUONG, Commander, 1st ARVN Division visited CTG 79.5 and CTG 76.5 aboard the USS Princeton.

(4) On 27 July Major General ROBERTSHAW, CG, 1st MAW, and Colonel HUNT, CO, MAG-16, visited CTG 79.5 and CTG 76.5 aboard the USS Princeton.

(5) On 27 July Major CROSBY, SLF Asst S-3, departed for Subic Bay for planning Exercise HILLTOP VI and to effect liaison with COM-NAVPHIL and BLT 1/26 for Exercise HILLTOP VI. Liaison was also effected with the USS Iwo Jima for transfer of the SLF Headquarters from PRINCETON to IWO JIMA.

(6) The SLF reverted to OpCon CTG 76.5 on 29 July and commenced backloading aboard assigned ARG shipping. Backloading was completed on 30 July and the ARG/SLF departed for Chu Lai, RVN to offload BLT 3/5.

(7) On 31 July, Major General FIELDS, CG, 1st MarDiv, greeted BLT 3/5 and visited CTG 79.5 and CTG 76.5 aboard the USS Princeton.

(8) Offloading of BLT 3/5 commenced on 31 July and was completed on 2 August with OpCon passing to CG, III MAF at the completion of off-loading.

(9) The SLF/ARG departed for Subic Bay, R. P. on 2 August and BLT 1/26 chopped to CTG 79.5 at 021200H August 1966.

(10) The SLF Staff commenced the transfer from PRINCETON to IWO JIMA upon arrival in Subic Bay, R. P. on 3 August. The staff transfer was accomplished by helo within four hours and on the morning of 4 August the SLF was reconstituted with BLT 1/26 and HMM 363 embarked in the ARG shipping; IWO JIMA, VANCOUVER and THOMASTON.⁴

³ COMSEVENTHFLT msg 141742Z July - directed SLF to chop to CG, III MAF when firmly established ashore.

⁴ CTG 79.5 msg 040540Z August - reported reconstitution of SLF to CTF 79.

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LIST OF REFERENCES

1. CG III MAF message 120715Z July which requested SLF supporting operations commencing 16 July.
2. COMSEVENTHFLT message 141742Z July which directed the SLF to conduct Operation DECK HOUSE II.
3. CTG 79.5 message 150444Z July (Frag Order Number One for Operation DECK HOUSE II to CTG 79.5 OpPlan 328-66).
4. Command Chronology - BLT 3/5.
5. Command Chronology - HMM 363.
6. SLF After Action Report - Operation DECK HOUSE II and HASTINGS.

Appendix A
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
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AFTER ACTION REPORT
OPERATIONS DECK HOUSE TWO & HASTINGS



CTG 79.5

encl (4)
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HEADQUARTERS
Special Landing Force
USS PRINCETON (LPH-5)
FPO San Francisco 96601

01:RAB:jds
Ser: 009-66
27 July 1966

SECRET-NOFORN

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Seventh Fleet
Subj: Combat After Action Reports, Operations DECK HOUSE TWO and
HASTINGS

Encl: (1) Operation Overlay DECK HOUSE TWO (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) (K) (L) (M) (N) (O) (P) (Q) (R) (S) (T) (U) (V) (W) (X) (Y) (Z) (AA) (AB) (AC) (AD) (AE) (AF) (AG) (AH) (AI) (AJ) (AK) (AL) (AM) (AN) (AO) (AP) (AQ) (AR) (AS) (AT) (AU) (AV) (AW) (AX) (AY) (AZ) (BA) (BB) (BC) (BD) (BE) (BF) (BG) (BH) (BI) (BJ) (BK) (BL) (BM) (BN) (BO) (BP) (BQ) (BR) (BS) (BT) (BU) (BV) (BW) (BX) (BY) (BZ) (CA) (CB) (CC) (CD) (CE) (CF) (CG) (CH) (CI) (CJ) (CK) (CL) (CM) (CN) (CO) (CP) (CQ) (CR) (CS) (CT) (CU) (CV) (CW) (CX) (CY) (CZ) (DA) (DB) (DC) (DD) (DE) (DF) (DG) (DH) (DI) (DJ) (DK) (DL) (DM) (DN) (DO) (DP) (DQ) (DR) (DS) (DT) (DU) (DV) (DW) (DX) (DY) (DZ) (EA) (EB) (EC) (ED) (EE) (EF) (EG) (EH) (EI) (EJ) (EK) (EL) (EM) (EN) (EO) (EP) (EQ) (ER) (ES) (ET) (EU) (EV) (EW) (EX) (EY) (EZ) (FA) (FB) (FC) (FD) (FE) (FF) (FG) (FH) (FI) (FJ) (FK) (FL) (FM) (FN) (FO) (FP) (FQ) (FR) (FS) (FT) (FU) (FV) (FW) (FX) (FY) (FZ) (GA) (GB) (GC) (GD) (GE) (GF) (GG) (GH) (GI) (GJ) (GK) (GL) (GM) (GN) (GO) (GP) (GQ) (GR) (GS) (GT) (GU) (GV) (GW) (GX) (GY) (GZ) (HA) (HB) (HC) (HD) (HE) (HF) (HG) (HH) (HI) (HJ) (HK) (HL) (HM) (HN) (HO) (HP) (HQ) (HR) (HS) (HT) (HU) (HV) (HW) (HX) (HY) (HZ) (IA) (IB) (IC) (ID) (IE) (IF) (IG) (IH) (II) (IJ) (IK) (IL) (IM) (IN) (IO) (IP) (IQ) (IR) (IS) (IT) (IU) (IV) (IW) (IX) (IY) (IZ) (JA) (JB) (JC) (JD) (JE) (JF) (JG) (JH) (JI) (JJ) (JK) (JL) (JM) (JN) (JO) (JP) (JQ) (JR) (JS) (JT) (JU) (JV) (JW) (JX) (JY) (JZ) (KA) (KB) (KC) (KD) (KE) (KF) (KG) (KH) (KI) (KJ) (KK) (KL) (KM) (KN) (KO) (KP) (KQ) (KR) (KS) (KT) (KU) (KV) (KW) (KX) (KY) (KZ) (LA) (LB) (LC) (LD) (LE) (LF) (LG) (LH) (LI) (LJ) (LK) (LM) (LN) (LO) (LP) (LQ) (LR) (LS) (LT) (LU) (LV) (LW) (LX) (LY) (LZ) (MA) (MB) (MC) (MD) (ME) (MF) (MG) (MH) (MI) (MJ) (MK) (ML) (MM) (MN) (MO) (MP) (MQ) (MR) (MS) (MT) (MU) (MV) (MW) (MX) (MY) (MZ) (NA) (NB) (NC) (ND) (NE) (NF) (NG) (NH) (NI) (NJ) (NK) (NL) (NM) (NN) (NO) (NP) (NQ) (NR) (NS) (NT) (NU) (NV) (NW) (NX) (NY) (NZ) (OA) (OB) (OC) (OD) (OE) (OF) (OG) (OH) (OI) (OJ) (OK) (OL) (OM) (ON) (OO) (OP) (OQ) (OR) (OS) (OT) (OU) (OV) (OW) (OX) (OY) (OZ) (PA) (PB) (PC) (PD) (PE) (PF) (PG) (PH) (PI) (PJ) (PK) (PL) (PM) (PN) (PO) (PP) (PQ) (PR) (PS) (PT) (PU) (PV) (PW) (PX) (PY) (PZ) (QA) (QB) (QC) (QD) (QE) (QF) (QG) (QH) (QI) (QJ) (QK) (QL) (QM) (QN) (QO) (QP) (QQ) (QR) (QS) (QT) (QU) (QV) (QW) (QX) (QY) (QZ) (RA) (RB) (RC) (RD) (RE) (RF) (RG) (RH) (RI) (RJ) (RK) (RL) (RM) (RN) (RO) (RP) (RQ) (RR) (RS) (RT) (RU) (RV) (RW) (RX) (RY) (RZ) (SA) (SB) (SC) (SD) (SE) (SF) (SG) (SH) (SI) (SJ) (SK) (SL) (SM) (SN) (SO) (SP) (SQ) (SR) (SS) (ST) (SU) (SV) (SW) (SX) (SY) (SZ) (TA) (TB) (TC) (TD) (TE) (TF) (TG) (TH) (TI) (TJ) (TK) (TL) (TM) (TN) (TO) (TP) (TQ) (TR) (TS) (TT) (TU) (TV) (TW) (TX) (TY) (TZ) (UA) (UB) (UC) (UD) (UE) (UF) (UG) (UH) (UI) (UJ) (UK) (UL) (UM) (UN) (UO) (UP) (UQ) (UR) (US) (UT) (UU) (UV) (UW) (UX) (UY) (UZ) (VA) (VB) (VC) (VD) (VE) (VF) (VG) (VH) (VI) (VJ) (VK) (VL) (VM) (VN) (VO) (VP) (VQ) (VR) (VS) (VT) (VU) (VV) (VW) (VX) (VY) (VZ) (WA) (WB) (WC) (WD) (WE) (WF) (WG) (WH) (WI) (WJ) (WK) (WL) (WM) (WN) (WO) (WP) (WQ) (WR) (WS) (WT) (WU) (WV) (WW) (WX) (WY) (WZ) (XA) (XB) (XC) (XD) (XE) (XF) (XG) (XH) (XI) (XJ) (XK) (XL) (XM) (XN) (XO) (XP) (XQ) (XR) (XS) (XT) (XU) (XV) (XW) (XX) (XY) (XZ) (YA) (YB) (YC) (YD) (YE) (YF) (YG) (YH) (YI) (YJ) (YK) (YL) (YM) (YN) (YO) (YP) (YQ) (YR) (YS) (YT) (YU) (YV) (YW) (YX) (YY) (YZ) (ZA) (ZB) (ZC) (ZD) (ZE) (ZF) (ZG) (ZH) (ZI) (ZJ) (ZK) (ZL) (ZM) (ZN) (ZO) (ZP) (ZQ) (ZR) (ZS) (ZT) (ZU) (ZV) (ZW) (ZX) (ZY) (ZZ)

1. The subject reports are submitted herewith. For clarity and ease of reference the SLF basic report is covered in two parts, Part I, the After Action Report for Operation DECK HOUSE TWO, and Part II the After Action Report for Operation HASTINGS.

2. Enclosures (1) through (4) amplify this report. Comments on appropriate portions of the BLT and HMM After Action Reports, enclosures (3) and (4), are contained in paragraph 10, Part II of this report.

PART I COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT OPERATION DECK HOUSE TWO

Map Reference: AMS 7014, 1:50,000 Sheets 6342 I, II, 6442 I, III, IV.

1. Operation DECK HOUSE TWO was a unilateral amphibious operation combining surfaceborne and heliborne assault forces and conducted in accordance with NWP-22(A).

2. This operation was conducted in the area of Dong Ha, Quang Tri Province, I CTZ RVN (vic YD 2561). The operation commenced on 16 July 1966 at 0630H with the landing of surface assault forces on Blue Beach (YD 319727) and a helo lifted assault force in IZ STORK (YD 290701) three miles inland. The operation terminated at 172300Z when the SLF chopped to CG III MAF for employment in Operation HASTINGS under OPCON Task Force Delta.

3. Command headquarters for Operation DECK HOUSE TWO was located aboard the USS PRINCETON (LPH-5).

4. Task Organization.

SPECIAL LANDING FORCE (LANDING FORCE)	- Col R. A. BRENNEMAN
HMM 363	- LtCol J. MCGOUGH
BLT 3/5	- LtCol E. J. BRONARS

5. Intelligence.

a. The objective area is characterized by poorly drained low lands terminating at the coastline in a wide belt of massive dunes. The coastline consists of low, sandy shore interrupted by mouths of rivers and lagoons. A narrow transitional zone of rounded hills parallels the coastline 15 to 20 miles inland and separates the lowlands from the Annam

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Mountains. Trafficability is fair to poor throughout the area, becoming extremely difficult during heavy rains. Highway 1 runs north and south about 10 miles inland. Highway 9 commences at Dong Ha (YD 239608) and runs west.

b. Key terrain features are the Hieu Giang and Thach Han rivers which form the Cua Viet river at YD 267625 and from there runs to the sea. The dune belt which extends inland 2.4 miles consists mostly of sandy ridges up to 20 feet in height with patches of dry land crops.

c. Blue Beach (YD 319727) is a straight beach extending in a northwest-southeast direction, and is 600 meters long. The beach averages 155 yards in width. Composition is soft sand, but firm when wet. The beach gradient of the foreshore is 1:35, low water line to one fathom is 1:56, 1 to 2 fathoms is 1:43. The 6 fathom contour is approximately 2.5 miles from the beachline. The beach is obstructed by two submerged longshore sandbars, located 40 to 60 yards and 190 to 270 yards off the low water line. Trafficability was fair to poor on dunes.

d. Pre-D-Day intelligence reports indicated that the 324th B Division CP, the 90th regiment, the 812th regiment and the 803rd regiment were located in a mountainous complex 20 miles inland. Only local force platoons were reported to be operating within the AOA.

e. No substantial contact was made with any known organized elements during the operation. Resistance ashore consisted of sporadic small arms sniper fire.

6. Mission. As directed by COMSEVENTHFLT message 141742Z July (Initiating Directive) the mission of the Landing Force was to conduct a search and destroy amphibious operation against VC/NVA forces in the amphibious objective area in Quang Tri Province, RVN and establish a beach support area in order to assist CG III MAF within I CTZ.

7. Concept of Operation. Operation DECK HOUSE TWO was a unilateral amphibious operation conducted by the ARG/SLF. The operation was planned as a seven to ten day search and destroy operation. The concept provided for the SLF to conduct simultaneous helicopterborne and surface landings to conduct search and destroy operations; to establish a beach support area in order to assist III MAF in I CTZ, and to conduct a tactical withdrawal. Fire support was provided by the organic artillery of the BLT; NGF consisting of one DD and one LSMR; and CAS from 1st MAW.

8. Execution. Operation DECK HOUSE TWO was executed in accordance with CTG 79.5 Operation Order 328-66 supplemented with a Frag Order published for this operation. See enclosures (3) and (4), After Action Reports of BLT 3/5 and HMM 363, for details of execution.

9. Results.

a. Casualties.

U. S. NONE

VC KIA - 3

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b. Materiel Captured.

- 1 pistol, Smith and Wesson .38 Caliber
- 1 Mauser rifle, 7.92mm (Chinese Nationalist copy)
- 1 M-14 rifle, U.S., 7.62mm
- 1 Submachine gun, French M1949 9mm
- 1 Submachine gun, Soviet PPSH M1941 (ChiComm type 50)
- 2 Submachine guns, U.S. M3A1 (Grease gun)
- 1 Bayonet (U.S. M4)
- 9 Magazines for French M1949 submachine gun
- 2 Drum magazines for Soviet PPSH M1941 (Burp gun)
- 1 U.S. BAR magazine
- 310 rounds small arms ammunition
- 5 Blocks TNT, (1 lb)
- 1 Hand grenade (U.S. fragmentation)

10. Commanders Analysis. This analysis is limited to those matters at the Special Landing Force level. BLT and squadron level matters are discussed in their respective reports, enclosures (3) and (4).

a. Planning.

(1) The planning for Operation DECK HOUSE TWO was characterized by an extremely brief period in which to conduct necessary coordination, effect liaison, and publish and issue required orders; the above was completed in two days.

(2) Planning was initiated on receipt of CG III MAF message 120715Z July which requested use of the SLF/ARG commencing 16 July. CTG 79.5 accompanied by staff representatives and TG 76.5 representative departed for Danang on 13 July and effected liaison with CG III MAF, CG 3rd Marine Division, CG 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, CG, Task Force Delta and the Quang Tri Sector and Goi Linh District Advisors during the period 13-14 July.

(3) During the initial liaison the following significant details were accomplished:

- (a) Aerial reconnaissance was conducted of the tentative AOA as well as other possible areas of operations.
- (b) Procurement of maps of area.
- (c) Communication frequencies assigned and coordinated.
- (d) Determination made of the enemy order of battle in area.
- (e) Pertinent Task Force Delta orders obtained.
- (f) Determination of where captured VC and VCS would be processed.
- (g) Information on arc light strikes.
- (h) Coordination on casualty evacuation.
- (i) Information on details of air support provided by 1stMAW.
- (j) Provisions for emergency reaction force between the SLF and adjacent units.

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(k) Establishment of command relationships as provided for by NWP 22(A).

(1) Provisions for logistic support by III MAF if required.

(4) Plans were also made for establishing liaison with the following commands:

- (a) III MAF.
- (b) 3rd MarDiv.
- (c) Task Force Delta.
- (d) 1st ARVN Div.
- (e) District Headquarters Gio Linh.

b. Intelligence. Prior to the operation, liaison was established with III MAF and arrangements were made for maps, aerial photography, ITT and TAO missions.

(1) Intelligence material provided by III MAF was accurate and included, Road and Bridge overlays; beach exits and obstacle overlays; enemy activity overlay; and leaflets.

(2) The enemy exhibited the ability to evade contact and ex-filtrate the area of operations. Weather was typical for the period, with high temperature and humidity.

c. Command Relationships. Operation DECK HOUSE TWO was a unilateral amphibious operation with command relationships in accordance with NWP 22(A)/LFM-01.

d. Logistics. Prior to commencement of Operation DECK HOUSE TWO liaison was established with III MAF to coordinate additional logistic support if required. Logistic support for Operation DECK HOUSE TWO was provided solely from the assets of SLF. All supplies were delivered directly to units ashore by helo from ARG shipping. Logistic support to the BLT ashore was adequate and responsive to requirements with minimal expenditures of all classes of supply.

e. Civic Action.

One Civic Action visit was planned for 18 July, but was cancelled due to OPCON passage of the SLF to Task Force Delta and subsequent re-positioning of BLT 3/5 from the original AOA.

f. Psychological Warfare.

As a result of liaison effected with District Chief, Gio Linh, it was determined that there was no necessity for BJU employment or the dropping of leaflets during DECK HOUSE TWO. Both of these capabilities were available if their need had become evident.

g. Communications.

(1) All communications nets were activated at H-1 on D-Day with no delay and were maintained throughout Operation DECK HOUSE TWO with minimum outage. Radio relay was established at H plus 15 on D-Day. This

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circuit consisted of an AN/MRC-62 van ashore and an AN/GRC-10 aboard ship. The radio relay remained in operation throughout the operation and again proved to be the major means of communications between BLT and Hqs SLF.

(2) The increased range of the AN/PRC-25 radio series over the AN/PRC-8,9 and 10 series has greatly enhanced the command and control of the BLT by the SLF commander. Interference by other stations was encountered on all nets for short periods of time and in some instances the duration of the operation. This problem could not be eliminated due to .05 MCS separation of frequencies, the large number of frequencies assigned within I CTZ and the numerous frequencies assigned to units within the area of operation. A partial solution to this problem was accomplished by close supervision of radio operators, radio transmission discipline, reduction in radio nets to individual commands, reduction in message traffic, and elimination of repeats of messages when initially understood.

(3) Communications problems were encountered between ground elements and the helicopters on various occasions. With the recent introduction of the AN/PRC-25 into WestPac and the minimum communications problems between ground units over extended distances gives reason to conclude that the helicopters FM radios are possibly in need of a close maintenance check.

(4) The USS PRINCETON radios assigned to the SLF were unsatisfactory for this short operation. Both FM and HF circuits had continuous problems. The ship experienced numerous coupler problems on the two HF circuits and the FM circuit was never operational. Back up equipment erected on the flight deck was utilized throughout the operation to ensure adequate communications. The PRINCETON has been made aware of these problems.

(5) The two AN/PRC-47's and radio operator provided by the Ninth MAB on a temporary basis were employed during the operation to provide communications for the liaison officer assigned to Task Force Delta. This relieved the BLT of providing additional equipment and operators.

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PART II: Combat After Action Report, Operation HASTINGS

1. Operation HASTINGS was a search and destroy operation in which the Special Landing Force operated under the OPCON of Task Force Delta. Operation HASTINGS was being conducted concurrently with Operation DECK HOUSE II and upon termination of DECK HOUSE II OPCON of the Special Landing Force passed to CG Task Force Delta.

a. Messages which resulted in the passage of OPCON to CG TF Delta are as follows:

(1) COMSEVENTHFLT 141742Z - Initiating Directive, directed SLF when firmly established ashore to CHOP to CG III MAF.

(2) CTG 79.5 171245Z - Reported landing force firmly established ashore and recommended termination of amphibious operation.

(3) CTG 76.5 171247Z - Terminated amphibious phase DECK HOUSE II and directed SLF CHOP to CG III MAF effective 172300Z.

(4) CTG 79.5 171325Z - Reported to OPCON CG III MAF effective 172300Z.

(5) CG III MAF 171426Z - Upon reporting to CG III MAF for OPCON SLF further assigned OPCON to 3rd Marine Division.

(6) CG 3rdMarDiv 171535Z - Requested CTG 79.5 report to CG TF Delta.

(7) CTG 79.5 171638Z - Reported to OPCON TF Delta effective 172300Z.

(8) CG TF Delta 172010Z - CG TF Delta assumed OPCON CTG 79.5 effective 172300Z.

2. SLF command headquarters for Operation HASTINGS were located ashore initially with the BLT CP vic YD 310728 then subsequently relocated vic YD 075605.

3. Task Organization. The task organization of the SLF was unchanged from that for Operation DECK HOUSE II.

4. Intelligence

a. The objective area comprises a section of the lesser heights of the Annam Mountains located in the Cam Lo District of Quang Tri Province. The area consists mostly of steep, rugged mountainous terrain covered with dense vegetation. The valley of the Song Cam Lo river forms the southern boundary of the objective area, with Highway 9 paralleling the course of the river in close proximity to its southern shore. Vehicular movement (tracked and wheeled) is impossible due to the steep terrain and dense vegetation. Key terrain feature is Dong Ha mountain (549 meters) located at YD 019593.

b. Preliminary intelligence reports indicated that the 324th B Division (NVA) CP with subordinate regiments, the 90th, 812th, 803rd operating in the Cam Lo - Dong Ha area.

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5. Mission. The mission assigned was to conduct search and destroy operations within assigned TAOR and search Arc Light strike areas in zone.

6. Concept of Operations. The concept of operations provided for helolifting all elements of BLT 3/5 from positions within the AOA to landing zones in the TAOR assigned by TF Delta. The BLT was then to conduct search and destroy operations within the TAOR. Phase lines and zones of action were assigned as primary tactical control measures. Fire support was provided by artillery of TF Delta augmented by the 105mm HowBtry of BLT 3/5, and air support by First Marine Aircraft Wing. HMM 363 aircraft were provided to MAG 16 as requested on a daily basis. Helo support for all committed battalions including BLT 3/5 were then provided for by MAG 16.

7. Execution. See enclosures (1) through (4), operation overlays, and After Action Reports of BLT 3/5 and HMM 363.

8. Results

a. Casualties

U. S.	KIA	52	WIA	165	MIA	0	Captured	0
VC	KIA	155	KIA(Prob)	167	WIA	12	WIA(Prob)	45
NVA	Captured	7						

b. Material and Supplies Destroyed or Captured. (See enclosure (3))

9. Commander's Analysis. This analysis is limited to those matters at the Special Landing Force level. BLT and Squadron level reports are discussed in their respective reports, enclosures (3) and (4).

a. Planning

(1) Prior to and during Operation DECK HOUSE II, close liaison, joint briefings, and coordination were effected with the CG 3rd Marine Division and CG Task Force Delta in anticipation of possible OPCON shift to CG TF Delta and subsequent employment in Operation HASTINGS. At the Task Force Delta briefing on 17 July 1966 it was indicated that there was a positive identification of the NVA 324th B Division in the Operation HASTINGS area, and the overall importance of the operation was stressed at this meeting. CG 3rd Marine Division also stated a positive requirement for the SLF to participate in Operation HASTINGS.

(2) As a result of this meeting, detailed plans were developed with CG TF Delta for the integration of the SLF into Operation HASTINGS. These plans included tentative selection of landing zones and objectives. This was followed by a detailed aerial reconnaissance of the assigned TAOR for confirmation of the objectives and landing zones. Plans also included provisions for fire support, logistic support, communications and the necessary coordinating measures to ensure an orderly transition when OPCON shifted to TF Delta.

(3) An SLF liaison officer was assigned to TF Delta, and in addition daily staff visits were conducted.

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b. Intelligence. Task Force Delta provided intelligence support directly to BLT 3/5 throughout Operation HASTINGS including maps and SPAR reports.

c. Command Relationships. The SLF operated under OPCON of CG TF Delta until released on 300715Z at which time OPCON reverted to CATF (CTG 76.5).

d. Logistics

(1) Initial liaison with TF Delta established procedures whereby the majority of logistic support would be provided from in-country resources of Task Force Delta. Only limited medical supplies were requested and provided to BLT 3/5 from SLF assets.

(2) On the night of 22-23 July a TF Delta emergency resupply request for 600 rounds (DODAC C-222 ctg) 81mm HE and 600 rounds (DODAC C-704 ctg) 4.2" HE was received. This ammunition was immediately transported by helicopters of the SLF directly to BLT 2/1.

(3) Casualty evacuation of BLT 3/5 personnel was coordinated through TF Delta facilities. Casualty reporting for SLF was accomplished by the SLF CRCC. An SLF liaison NCO was established at Delta Med at Dong Ha in order to assist in expediting reports of casualties to the SLF CRCC aboard the LPH. In addition daily visits were made to the TF Delta CRCC location at Phu Bai and the hospital ship, USS Repose in order to ensure strict accounting of all casualties.

e. Communications

(1) On being CHOPPED to Task Force Delta, the SLF established communications contact on Task Force Delta TAC #1 (FM) with an AN/PRC-25 radio. This net remained in operation the duration of Operation HASTINGS.

(2) A liaison net (SSB) was established between Task Force Delta CP (SLF Liaison Officer), the SLF, and BLT 3/5. This net proved beneficial for passing administrative traffic and relieved some of the burden from the tactical nets.

(3) Outage time of the above nets was minimal and there was no backlog in message traffic.

f. Air Observation. The SLF air observer was assigned to the 4th Marines Air Observation Section at Phu Bai on 19 July. The AO's flew in support of Task Force Delta, with Ol-D aircraft and pilots provided by the 220th Army Aviation Company. The air observers were used primarily for control of strike air in support of Marine ground units.

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10. Comments on Enclosures (3) and (4). The following comments are made to clarify or amplify certain statements, opinions, and recommendations contained in the After Action Report of BLT 3/5 and HMM 363.

a. Artillery. (Par 7a(2)(d), Encl (3)) The conduct of Fire Net should not be utilized for administrative traffic. This will be emphasized in future operations.

b. Air. (Par 7c, Encl (3))

(1) Concur with the recommendation. Every effort will be made to improve fire support coordination, air support requests, and the coordination between the BLT FSCC and the SACC. Landing Force representatives will be utilized in the SACC to ensure satisfactory coordination.

c. Communications.

(1) Par 6d(1)(e) Encl (3). A copy of COI was requested from Task Force Delta, but none were available. Call signs and frequencies of units participating in Operation HASTINGS were obtained by copying those required from the 3d Marine Division COI.

(2) Par 6d(1)(f), Encl (3). Do not concur that all HF nets be replaced by FM nets. This is not considered feasible due to the large number of subscribers presently requiring more FM frequencies than are available. Also the AN/PRC-25 does not have as great a range as the AN/PRC-47.

(3) Par 6d(3)(b), Encl (3). Do not concur that the AN/PRC-47 be replaced by the AN/PRC-25 due to rugged terrain, intense heat, and additional complications caused by battery recharging and resupply. Experience with the AN/PRC-47 radio indicated that it is a satisfactory radio for long distance communications, and when properly employed will provide satisfactory communications under adverse conditions.

(4) Par 7c(1)(c), Encl (3). Do not concur. It is not always possible to determine in advance if the tactical situation will provide ideal terrain with units disposed such that they will be within the range capability of the AN/PRC-25.

d. BLT Commander's Analysis. (Par 8, Encl (3))

(1) The analysis made by the BLT Commander should provide excellent information for future SLF operations against NVA forces. Significant areas included: positive location of friendly frontlines and positions; the immediate need for supporting arms; the necessity for positive and quick reactions to ambushes; the value of friendly ambushes; and the requirement to minimize the number of helicopter resupply missions to preclude pinpointing unit positions.

R. A. Brenneeman
R. A. BRENNEMAN

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SECOND ENDORSEMENT on SLF ltr 3/BSM/lpp over 5750 ser 0016-66 undated

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To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)

Subj: Command chronology for the period 5-31 August 1966; submission of

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By direction

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
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To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology; submission of

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RICHARD R. AMERINE
Chief of Staff

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To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: (1) Commanding General, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMFPac
(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
Subj: Command Chronology for the period 5-31 August 1966; submission of

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) BrigO 5750.1A
(c) CG, FMFPac msg 261950Z July

Encl: (1) Command Chronology - SLF
(2) Command Chronology - BLT 1/26
(3) Command Chronology - HMM 363
(4) SLF After Action Report - Operations DECKHOUSE III, Phase I and II

1. In accordance with references (a) through (c), the Command Chronology for the Special Landing Force is submitted herewith as enclosures (1) through (4).

2. The period covered begins on 5 August due to the extended period covered by the previous Command Chronology.


H. D. WORTMAN

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SPECIAL LANDING FORCE
Command Chronology1. Organizational Data.

a. Designation. The Special Landing Force had the Task Designator of Task Group 79.5.

b. Composition. The Special Landing Force was composed of the following:

5-31 August 1966

SLF - Col R. A. BRENNEMAN
- Col H. D. WORTMAN

BLT 1/26 - LtCol A. A. MONTI

HMM 363 - LtCol J. MCGOUGH

c. Locations. The Special Landing Force was embarked aboard the Amphibious Ready Group, consisting of the USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2), USS Vancouver (LPD-2), and the USS Thomaston (LSD-28).

d. Average Monthly Strength.

SLF Staff: USMC Off - 10; USMC Enl - 18

BLT: USMC Off - 67; USMC Enl - 1648; USN Off - 8; USN Enl - 91

HMM: USMC Off - 57; USMC Enl - 175; USN Off - 1; USN Enl - 3

e. Commanding Officer and Staff.

R. A. BRENNEMAN, Colonel	Commanding Officer (5-30Aug66)
H. D. WORTMAN, Colonel	Commanding Officer (31Aug66)
T. E. GLEASON, Lt. Colonel	Executive Officer (-5Aug66)
J. M. LANDRIGAN, Lt. Colonel	Executive Officer (5Aug66)
D. R. BRIMMER, Lt. Colonel	S-3
H. B. CROSBY III, Major	Asst S-3

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R. A. AYERS, Captain	CommO
B. S. MCKENNA, 1st Lieutenant	Air Observer/Asst S-3
D. C. SCHULTZ, 2nd Lieutenant	S-4
C. G. CSGOOD, 2nd Lieutenant	S-2

2. Chronology of Significant Events During the Period 5-31 August 1966.

a. The following events relate the activities of the Special Landing Force during the period reported. Detailed information on BLT 1/26 and HMM 363 is shown in the appropriate subordinate command chronologies, enclosures (2) and (3), and in the After Action Report for Operation DECKHOUSE III Phase I and II, enclosure (4). Appendix A contains a list of appropriate references.

b. 5-12 August 1966.

(1) On 5 August 1966, the ARG/SLF was in Subic Bay, R. P. for training ashore and to prepare for Exercise HILLTOP VI. The SLF modified the concept of HILLTOP Operations to include seizure of deep inland objectives to reflect recent SLF operations in Vietnam, and issued the "Frag" order for Exercise HILLTOP VI.

(2) On 6 August the ARG/SLF conducted a CASEX/FIREX at Tabones Firing Range, Subic Bay, R. P.. Destroyers USS Bole and USS O'Hare fired eight naval gun fire missions, and aircraft from USS Roosevelt flew five close air support missions.

(3) On 7 August the ARG/SLF conducted HILLTOP VI rehearsal at Green Beach, Subic Bay, and then departed Subic Bay for San Jose, Mindoro Island, R. P. on 8 August.

(4) From 9-12 August the ARG/SLF conducted Exercise HILLTOP VI near San Jose, Mindoro Island, R. P.

(5) On 9 August Brigadier General RYAN, CTF 79, and his staff representatives observed BLT 1/26 during Exercise HILLTOP VI, and visited CTG 79.5 and CTG 76.5 aboard the USS Iwo Jima. Twenty Philippine military personnel observed BLT 1/26 during the morning of D-Day. Brigadier General RYAN, CTG 79.5 and CTG 76.5 visited the Mayor of San Jose.

(6) On 10 August, CTG 79.5 and staff representatives from CTG 79.5 and CTG 76.5 departed San Jose, Mindoro Island, R. P. for Long Binh, RVN to effect liaison with CG, II FFORCEV and CG, 173rd Airborne Brigade for operations in III CTZ, RVN (DECKHOUSE III, Phase I and II).

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Personal liaison continued through 14 August and included coordination with CG, 173rd ABN BDE at Gia Ray, and the U. S. Advisors of the Tinh Binh Sector at Ham Tan.

(7) On 12 August the ARG/SLF departed San Jose, Mindoro Island, R. P. for special operations in RVN¹.

c. 13-20 August 1966.

(1) On 14 August the ARG/SLF arrived off Vung Tau, III CTZ, RVN. A detachment of three UH-1E aircraft from VMO-6 embarked aboard the USS VANCOUVER (LPD-2) off Chu Lai, I CTZ, RVN.

(2) From 14-15 August the ARG/SLF prepared for DECKHOUSE III. The SLF conducted Pre D-day transfers and embarked ARVN advisors, ITT, and Ham Tan Sector liaison personnel aboard the USS Iwo Jima.

(3) From 16-20 August the ARG/SLF conducted Operation DECKHOUSE III in vicinity of YS 8269, MAY TAO Secret Zone, Binh Tuy Province, III CTZ, RVN.²

(4) On 17 August Brigadier General SMITH, CG, 173 ABN BDE, visited CTG 79.5 and CTG 76.5 aboard the USS Iwo Jima to further coordinate Operation TOLEDO and Operation DECKHOUSE III.

(5) On 20 August the ARG/SLF conducted tactical withdrawal of the Landing Force³ and returned advisors, ITT, and liaison personnel to parent organizations.

(6) On 20 August Lieutenant General HEINTGES, Deputy COMUSMACV and Brigadier General RYAN, CTF 79, visited CTG 79.5 and CTG 76.5 aboard the USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2).

d. 21 August 1966.

(1) On 21 August CTG 79.5 and CTG 76.5 and staff representatives liaised with CG II FFORCEV, and CG, 173rd ABN BDE for Phase II of Operation DECKHOUSE III.

(2) From 22-29 August the ARG/SLF conducted Operation DECKHOUSE III Phase II in the vicinity of YS 6258, Phuoc Tuy Province, III CTZ, RVN.³

¹ COMUSMACV msg 091202Z requested the ARG/SLF be alerted for a special operation in conjunction with Operation TOLEDO in III CTZ, RVN.

² COMSEVENTHFLT msg 140424Z directed the SLF to conduct Operation DECKHOUSE III.

³ COMSEVENTHFLT msg 210948Z - directed the ARG/SLF to conduct DECKHOUSE III, Phase II.

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(3) On 23 August Major General SEAMAN, CG, II FFORCEV, and Major General KANH, CMC VNMC, visited CTG 79.5 and CTG 76.5 aboard the USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2) and BLT 1/26 ashore.

(4) On 24 August the SLF was chopped to CG, II FFORCEV for Operation TOLEDO, thus terminating DECKHOUSE III Phase II.¹ Lieutenant General HEINTGES, Deputy COMUSMACV visited the SLF/BLT CP.

(5) On 26 August General WESTMORELAND, COMUSMACV, paid a visit to the SLF/BLT CP.

(6) On 27 August Colonel WORTMAN, future Commanding Officer of the Special Landing Force, departed for orientation and liaison with CG, III MAF.

(7) On 29 August the SLF conducted a tactical withdrawal and OPCON of the SLF returned to CTG 76.5.² The ARG/SLF commenced return to Subic Bay, R. P.

(8) On 30 August the detachment of three UH-1E aircraft were offloaded from the USS Vancouver (LPD-2) at Chu Lai and returned to VMC-6.

(9) On 31 August the USS Iwo Jima with elements of the SLF embarked, arrived in Subic Bay in preparation for the Philippine Marine Helo Exercise scheduled on 1 September in Manila Bay.

(10) On 31 August Colonel WORTMAN arrived at Subic Bay from DaNang, I CTZ, RVN after completing orientation/liaison visit with CG III MAF.

(11) On 31 August Colonel H. D. WORTMAN relieved Colonel R. A. BRENNEMAN as Commanding Officer of the Special Landing Force.

(12) On 31 August the USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2) departed Subic Bay for Manila, R. P.


¹ CTG 76.5 msg 240342Z - terminated Operation DECKHOUSE III Phase II and directed the SLF CHOP to CG, II FFORCEV.

² CTG 76.5 msg 281508Z - Assumed OPCON of SLF and reconstituted AOA for withdrawal.

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AFTER ACTION REPORT DECK HOUSE THREE



CTG 79.5

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Enclosure (4)

T.G. 79.5 (SLE) 42 AUG 1964 III/104530

16-29 Aug 1964

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US SEVENTH FLEET
 CTG 132.8 Commander
 Landing Force US., CTG
 79.5 Commander Special
 Landing Force and
 Commanding Officer LHA
 163, USS PRINCETON
 (LHA-5) Subic Bay
 Republic of the Philippines
 010000H March 1963

Annex L (Rehearsal Plan) to Operation Order 302-63.

Ref: None

Time Zone: H (minus 8)

1. GENERAL SITUATION.

- a. Amphibious Task Force US (TG 132.1) will conduct a turnaway/flyover, rehearsal on 17 March 1963 in the FENG-CHIANG area in preparation for an amphibious assault exercise in the FENG-LIAO area.
- b. Enemy forces. None.
- c. Friendly forces.
 - (1) Elements of the GRC Air Force will provide aircraft for CAS on D-2 (R-day).

2. MISSION.

- a. Conduct a turnaway/flyover rehearsal in the FENG-CHIANG area, using procedures and techniques planned for the actual exercise landing.

3. EXECUTION.

- a. Concept. To execute applicable portions of this Operation Order to ensure efficient execution at a later date.
- b. CTU 132.8.1.
 - (1) Conduct a turnaway surface landing in accordance with this Annex and Annex I (Ship-to-Shore Movement) to Operation Order 302-63.

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4. Intelligence.

a. Terrain. The amphibious objective area is characterized by jungle, swamps, and brush covered plains. Elevation varied from 100 to 200 meters until the mountainous area of the MAY TAO Mountain is reached in the northwest and NUE BE Mountain in the northeast. Several streams are interspersed throughout the area and are usually overflowing during the month of August. Lowland areas are flooded and make trafficability poor for ground troops. Vegetation consists of one and two canopy jungle with thick secondary brush and along the coast there is heavy brush and swamp grass. A dirt road parallels the beach approximately 1,000 meters inland. The trail network in the area was heavily used but could not be seen from the air. Trafficability throughout the AOA is fair to poor.

b. Beach Study. Blue Beach (YS 831699) is a straight beach extending in a northwest - southeast direction and is 800 meters long. The beach averages 85 meters in width and the offshore and nearshore approaches are unrestricted. Composition of the beach is soft sand which is firm in wetted areas. The beach gradient of the foreshore is 1:37. The beach is backed by high massive dunes, 20 to 35 feet, dropping almost vertically to an extensive swampy and marshy area. The swamp and marsh extends inland 500 to 600 meters to low cultivated rice paddies which is further backed by dense vegetation that extends well inland. Troops could move by foot across the beach to a foottrail located at the left flank. This trail leads through the swamp and marsh areas to the rice paddies eventually connecting with the loose surfaced road. Numerous foot tracks lead further inland. There were no track or wheeled vehicle exits off the beach.

c. Pre-D-Day Intelligence. Intelligence indicated that the amphibious objective area had been under absolute control of the VC for at least one year. No RVN or U. S. military operations had been conducted in this area for the past year and a half. The 5th VC Division Headquarters, located in the MAY TAO Secret Zone, has two subordinate Main Force Regiments, the 274th and 275th, each with three battalions. The base area in the MAY TAO Secret Zone, being a major supply and training installation, allows Main Force units to operate freely in BINH TUY, PHUOC TUY, and LONG KHANH Provinces. Infiltration routes have been reported along the east from vicinity of coordinates YS 814688 to 827699. These routes run in a northerly direction, following numerous trails, to the MAY TAO Secret Zone. The base area (YS 820920) is believed to have sufficient food stored to feed 10,000 troops for one year. All persons in the area were considered VC or VCS.

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d. Order of Battle.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATIONS</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>WEAPONS</u>
5th VC Div CP	YS 780815	6Aug66	
274th Regt	YS 810790	6Aug66	12-60mm Mortars 8-81mm Mortars
1st En	YS 700755	6Aug66	12-LMG 5-57mm RR
2nd En	YS 815735	6Aug66	3-75mm RR 3-12.7mm MG
3rd En	Unknown		Assorted small arms & automatic weapons
275th Regt	YT 770091	6Aug66	6-81mm Mortars 16-60mm Mortars
1st En	Unknown		10-57mm RR 12-12.7mm MG
2nd En	Unknown		18-50 Cal MG 8-30 Cal MG
3rd En	Unknown		Assorted small arms & automatic weapons

e. Enemy Contact. No substantial contact was made with elements listed above during the operations. There was no positive identification of any enemy units. Resistance ashore consisted of sporadic sniper fire.

5. Mission. As directed by COMSEVENTHFLT msg 140424Z (Initiating Directive), the mission of the Landing Force was to conduct search and destroy amphibious operations against VC/NVA forces in the amphibious objective area in Tinh Binh Thuy Province and/or other operations as agreed with CG, II FFORCEV in conjunction with Operation TOLEDO. In conjunction with CG, II FFORCEV the mission was further refined to include the establishment of blocking positions to support the 173rd Airborne Brigade.

6. Concept of Operation. The operation was planned as a seven to ten day search and destroy operation. The concept provided for waterborne and heliborne amphibious assault to rapidly seize assigned Landing Force Objectives and establish blocking positions in support of the 173rd Airborne Brigade. Execution was to be characterized by inherent shock capability, aggressive mobility of maneuver elements, and utilization of maximum supporting fires. Upon conclusion of the operation, the Landing Force was to conduct a tactical withdrawal.

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7. Execution. Operation DECKHOUSE THREE was executed in accordance with CTG 79.5 OpOrd 328-66 supplemented with a Frag Order published for the Binh Thuy area. By D plus 1 the Landing Force had established blocking positions in the northern portion of the AOA. (See enclosures (1) and (2) After Action Reports of BLT 1/26 and HMM 363 for details of this execution.)

→ 8. Results. See enclosure (1)

9. Commanders Analysis.

a. Planning.

(1) Planning for DECKHOUSE THREE was initiated upon receipt of COMUSMACV msg 091202Z Aug66. During the period 11-15 August CTG 79.5/76.5 and staff representatives established liaison with CG, II FFORCEV, Long Binh, RVN. Additional liaison visits were made to Headquarters, 10th ARVN Division, 173rd Airborne Brigade and U. S. Advisors at the Ham Tan Sector Headquarters. Aerial reconnaissance of the AOA was conducted during this period, this included selection of the landing beach, HIZ's, and Landing Force Objectives.

(2) On D-Day minus one HMM 363 and BLT 1/26 conducted an aerial reconnaissance of the AOA.

(3) During the planning phase, and until early on D-Day the source of CAS for the operation had not been confirmed. Accordingly, plans were prepared to accomodate CAS from either in-country or SEVENTHFLT sources. The delay in confirming source of CAS eventually resulted in delaying H and L Hour by one hour.

b. Intelligence. Prior to DECKHOUSE THREE arrangements were made for maps, aerial photography, ITT, Red Haze, SPAR, and distribution of II FFORCEV and 173rd ABN BDE daily ISUMs.

(1) As previous intelligence had indicated, the 5th VC Division and subordinate units had moved to the west. This was evident by the lack of enemy activity in the AOA. The only significant contact occurred on D plus 3 when the Div ReconPlt engaged an estimated 30 VC at YS 753725. After a short intense fire fight the VC broke contact.

c. Command Relationships. Operation DECKHOUSE THREE was a unilateral amphibious operation with command relationships in accordance with NWP-22 (A) and JCS Pub 2, UNAAF.

d. Supporting Arms.

(1) Due to the deep inland objectives, NGF support was essential during the operation. A heavy cruiser provided the ATF adequate NGF

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coverage in the AOA and in addition provided NGF support to the 173rd Airborne Brigade operating north of the AOA. Additionally, one destroyer and a LSMR were assigned as NGF support ships.

(2) The source of Close Air Support for DECKHOUSE THREE was not identified until H minus 4 on D-Day. At that time the 7th Air Force was assigned responsibility for providing CAS. The effectiveness of AF CAS was satisfactory from the standpoint of aircraft provided, control of air when on station, and accuracy of fire. Communications aspects were less than satisfactory. The TAR net to home base proved to be unreliable and communications by any other circuit with home base was slow. A summary of communications performance on the LPH TAR Net indicates that during 50% of the period of the operation there was no communications between 7th AF and the ARG, 30% of the time period communications between 7th AF and ARG TACC was via relay and 20% of the time period ARG TACC and 7th AF were in direct communications on the TAR Net. An adequate opportunity for early planning/coordination with the Air Force, exchange of liaison officers, and the employment of airborne communications relay would diminish the problem.

e. Logistics. Prior to commencement of Operation DECKHOUSE THREE (Phase I) liaison was established with II FFORCEV to coordinate possible SLF logistical support requirements. Logistic support during Phase I was provided solely from the assets of the SLF. All supplies were delivered directly to units ashore by helo from ARG shipping. Logistic support of the BLT ashore was adequate and responsive to requirements with minimal expenditure of all classes of supply. Evacuation of the one KIA from the LPH was accomplished through the 93rd Evacuation Hospital located at Long Binh.

f. Communications.

(1) Communications nets were activated at H-1 on D-Day with no delay and were maintained throughout DECKHOUSE THREE with a minimum downtime. Communications between the ARG; CG, II FFORCEV; and the 173rd ABN BDE, via the secure on-line circuit was intermittent and an unreliable means of providing a rapid exchange of information.

(2) The radio sets AN/PRC-25 and remote sets AN/GRC-39A were invaluable. This equipment was employed on spot nets aboard the NGF support ships, in the Supporting Arms Coordination Center, and as back up for the VHF/FM radio equipment employed by the SLF aboard ship.

(3) Radio Relay was established at H plus 12 on D-Day. This circuit consisted of an AN/MRC-62 ashore and an AN/GRC-10 aboard ship. The radio relay remained operative throughout the operation and facilitated rapid and reliable communications between the SLF Headquarters and the BLT.

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The numerous VHF/FM frequencies assigned the SLF often caused interference and sometimes cancelled out the radio relay circuit. This required frequent changes of assigned frequencies in order to maintain the radio relay circuit on a non interference basis.

(4) Communications between the SLF Headquarters and the BLT ashore was maintained on Landing Force Tactical Net #1 and 2 and BLT Tactical Net #1. Landing Force Tactical Net #1 (VHF/FM) was programmed to utilize shipboard receiver-transmitter 524/VRC or a receiver-transmitter-68/GRC and an AN/PRC-25 ashore. The equipment aboard ship proved unsatisfactory as the RT-524/VRC was not operational and the RT-68/GRC could not effectively receive or transmit due to the long operating distance between the ship and forces ashore. A back-up radio set AN/MRC-109 or AN/PRC-25 was required to keep this net operational. The Landing Force Tactical Net #2 (HF/SSB) utilized a URC-32 aboard ship and a AN/PRC-47 ashore. Minor problems arose with ship board equipment and back up radio equipment and the AN/MRC-83/87 or an AN/PRC-47 was employed until shipboard equipment was operational. The BLT Tactical Net #1 (VHF/FM) employed a receiver-transmitter 524/VRC with either an AN/MRC 109 or AN/PRC-25. This net was monitored by the SLF Headquarters.

(5) One problem persists with every operation, and that is obtaining frequencies from those assigned to the SLF that are propagative during that month. This is further complicated by the fact that the ship is capable of employing only a portion of these accepted frequencies due to the limitations imposed by the transmitter coupler system aboard the present flag ship. In addition, the close proximity of the HF/AM/SSB Transmitters aboard ship creates much interference and may further reduce the effectiveness of usable frequencies.

(6) Interference by other nets was encountered on all VHF/FM assigned frequencies for brief periods of time and in some instances during the entire operation. This will continue to be a problem due to the numerous subscribers and limited number of frequencies within the AN/PRC-25 range.

(7) Had a more demanding requirement existed for HF/SSB nets and radios ashore the BB 451/U power supply for the AN/PRC-47 radio sets would have been critical. The twenty BB 451/U power supply provided the SLF as a special allowance arrived less electrolyte required for activation.

g. Tactical Air Observation. During Operation DECKHOUSE THREE (Phase I) tactical air observation was employed extensively in support of the Special Landing Force and its supporting arms. The SLF air observer utilized the UH-1E aircraft provided by MAG 36. Because of

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the wide separation of units and the double canopied jungle terrain, the TAO not only provided necessary control of supporting arms but also assisted in providing orientation and direction to tactical units during the ground maneuvers.

h. Psychological Warfare Operation. The BJU Detachment assisted the 173rd ABN BDE in providing loudspeaker operations in the area north of the SLF AOA. One mission was flown on D plus 2 broadcasting surrender appeals to suspected VC units.

i. Civic Action. The entire AOA was designated a Specified Strike Zone by COMUSMACV. No villages or populated areas were located in the AOA thus precluding civic action programs during DECKHOUSE THREE (Phase I).

PART II DECKHOUSE THREE PHASE II/OPERATION TOLEDO

Map Reference: AMS L701 1:50,000 Sheets 6442, I, II, III, IV

1. Phase II of Operation DECKHOUSE THREE commenced 40 hours after completion of SLF withdrawal from the phase I AOA with a combined surface-borne and heliborne assault approximately 20 kilometers south of the Phase I beach. Phase II was a unilateral amphibious operation in continued support of CG, II FFORCEV Operation TOLEDO and resulted from heavy contact by the 1st Australian Task Force (1st ATF) with elements of the 5th VC Division in the vicinity of YS 479672.

2. The operation commenced on 22 August, 1966, at 0800H with the landing of surfaceborne assault forces on Green Beach (YS 688589) and a helo lifted assault force into LZ Dove (YS 645645) at 0830H. At 1200H on 24 August 1966, the SLF was CHOPPED to CG, II FFORCEV. At 2400H on 28 August 1966 OPCON of the Special Landing Force reverted to CATF in order to execute the withdrawal of the Special Landing Force. Operation DECKHOUSE THREE Phase II terminated at 291630H upon completion of the withdrawal.

a. Messages which resulted in the initiation of DECKHOUSE THREE Phase II and the subsequent passage of OPCON to CG, II FFORCEV for participation in Operation TOLEDO are as follows:

(1) COMUSMACV 201317Z - Request ARG/SLF continue Operation DECKHOUSE THREE Phase II approximately 20KM Southwest of Phase I landing area.

(2) CINCPACFLT 201738Z - Approved COMUSMACV request making ARG/SLF available during period 22-25Aug66.

(3) CG, II FFORCEV 210902Z - Frag Order to Op 27-66 (Op TOLEDO).

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(4) COMSEVENTHFLT 210948Z - Initiating directive for DECKHOUSE THREE Phase II.

(5) COMSEVENTHFLT 231626Z - Extended ARG/SLF until 27 August 1966.

(6) COMUSMACV 240023Z - Requested that SLF be CHOPPED OPCON to CG, II FFORCEV effective 241200H.

(7) CTG 79.5 240122Z - Reported Landing Force firmly established ashore and recommended termination of the amphibious operation.

(8) CTG 76.5 240342Z - Terminated amphibious portion of DECKHOUSE THREE Phase II and directed SLF CHOP to CG, II FFORCEV effective 241200H.

(9) COMSEVENTHFLT 240630Z - Confirmed CTG 76.5 termination message and provided guidance for reconstitution of the SLF.

(10) CTG 76.5 281508Z - Assumed OPCON of SLF effective 282400H and reconstituted AOA for withdrawal.

3. Task Organization. The task organization of the SLF remained unchanged from DECKHOUSE THREE Phase I.

4. Intelligence.

a. Terrain. The area of operations is characterized by a brush and swamp covered plain. Numerous levees and dikes varying two to three feet in height are located throughout the lowland areas. Many streams and swamps back the beach area. Most streams have steep banks and low natural levees. Two large rivers located in this area, the RACH SONG CAI and SONG BA DAP, flow seaward and converge at coordinates YS 585575. Lowland areas are mostly flooded June through December and make trafficability poor for ground troops. Vegetation is thick secondary brush with heavy swamp grass. A dirt road parallels the beach approximately 6 miles inland.

b. Beach Study. Brown Beach (YS 664580) is a slightly concave beach 1100 meters long all of which is usable. The right flank (east) terminates at a rocky point from which numerous rocks extend out into the surf. The left flank (west) of the beach terminates at a less defined sandy point. The average width of the beach is 85 meters and is composed of soft sand which is firm in wetted areas. The beach gradient is 1:30 to 1:45 from low water to high water increasing to 1:10 to 1:20 at high water. The nearshore approach is partially obstructed by partly drying shoals as far as 15 nautical miles from beach center. Brown Beach is backed by sparse

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brush covered dunes that extend inland for approximately 600 meters followed by dense vegetation which extends well inland. Troops and vehicles (wheeled and tracked) are able to exit the beach at the right flank by an unimproved dirt road leading inland from a village located in the same area. Green Beach (YS 685587) is located east of the rocky point marking the right flank of Brown Beach and has the same general characteristics as Brown Beach. The seaward approaches to Green Beach were unrestricted; however, the beach is backed by massive dunes which drop off sharply on the inland side to dense vegetation. Exits over the dunes are limited to foot troops and vehicles had to travel laterally along the shore to the exit on the right flank of Brown Beach.

c. Pre-D-Day Intelligence. Intelligence indicates elements of the 5th VC Division were operating in Phuoc Tuy Province. On 10 and 11 August elements of the 274th VC Regiment attacked Phu My (YS 2574) and withdrew eastward to vicinity YS 5388. The 275th VC Regt withdrew east and northeast following the 18th of August attack on the Australian Task Force at YS 4967. It is believed that a good percentage of the 5th VC Division is comprised of North Vietnamese Army personnel. The NVA 721st Anti-Aircraft Company has been infiltrating from the Cambodian border area for the past few months and are integrating with the 5th Division units.

d. Probable Enemy Locations.

(1) On 20Aug66 SPAR reports placed the CP or elements of the 274th Regt at coord YS 530880.

(2) On 21Aug66 SPAR reports placed the CP or elements of the 275th Regt at coord YS 530720.

e. No substantial contact was made with the enemy indicating the enemy's determination to evade contact and to exfiltrate the area of operations.

5. Mission. The assigned mission was to conduct a waterborne and heli-borne amphibious assault to conduct search and destroy operations within the AOA and establish blocking positions on the east bank of the SONG RAI river.

6. Concept of Operation. The concept of operations provided for a waterborne and heliborne assault to rapidly seize landing force objectives and establish blocking positions along the SONG RAI river from vicinity of YS 575680 to YS 615720. Subsequently, to conduct extensive S&D operations within the AOA. Fire support was provided by artillery from a position inland that provided all around support of the AOA.

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Deep fires in the AOA were provided by naval gunfire ships assigned to CATF and air support was furnished by the 7th Air Force. Helo support was provided by HMM 363 operating from the USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2).

7. Execution. See enclosure (1) through (3).

8. Results. See enclosure (1).

9. Commanders Analysis.

a. Planning. The planning period available for the execution of Phase II was extremely limited. No major problems were encountered in developing the landing plan or re-establishing liaison with II FFORCEV. CTG 79.5 OpPlan 328-67 provided basic guidance for subsequent Frag Orders and BLT OpO 328-66 for DECKHOUSE III Phase I was modified by Frag Order as required. An exchange of liaison personnel was arranged on D-minus 1 with II FFORCEV.

b. Intelligence. Prior to the operation intelligence of the intended AOA was up-dated by II FFORCEV and additional maps and aerial photography were obtained. ITT support, Red Haze, and SPAR reports were requested from II FFORCEV.

(1) Liaison was established and maintained throughout the operation with the District Chief at Xuyen Moc. The intelligence information provided by him was timely and accurate.

c. Command Relationships. Command relationships during Phase II were in accordance with NWP 22(A)/LFM-01 until 241200H Aug66 when the SLF was CHOPPED to OPCON of the CG, II FFORCEV. At 282400H Aug66 OPCON reverted to CATF (CTG 76.5).

d. Supporting Arms.

(1) The supporting arms available to the amphibious task force remained essentially as it was for Phase I, i.e., organic artillery of the BLT; NGF consisting of one CA, one DD and one LSMR; and CAS from 7th AF.

(2) Control of artillery and naval gunfire was passed ashore when the Landing Force was firmly established ashore. During the period when SLF was under OPCON CG, II FFORCEV, the SACC afloat monitored the supporting arms nets and acted as a relay when required.

(3) Control of CAS remained with CATF until the SLF was CHOPPED to II FFORCEV. As a result of a liaison visit to Tan Son Nhut it was determined that communications with the DASC located there would be more

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effective than with the previously designated Paris Control used during Phase I. Communications were established between CTC 76.5 TACC and the DASC at Tan Son Nhut and was satisfactory and positive.

(4) During the period SLF was under OPCON of CG, II FFORCEV and control of air was under COMUSMACV, the ATF TACC functioned as a communications relay between SLF ashore and the DASC at Tan Son Nhut.

e. Logistics. Prior to the commencement of Operation DECKHOUSE III Phase II/TOLEDO liaison was established with II FFORCEV to coordinate additional logistic support if required. Arrangements were made to procure selected items of Class I and V from Vung Tau Sub Area Command resources. Resupply to the LPD was accomplished by LCU provided by Vung Tau Sub Area Command. The use of LFORM was held to a minimum in order to retain maximum contingency posture. All supplies were delivered directly to units ashore by helicopters from ARG shipping. Evacuation of 3 KIA's from the LPH was accomplished through the 93rd Evacuation Hospital located at Long Binh.

f. Communications. See Phase I paragraph 9.f.

g. Psychological Warfare Operation. Psychological warfare operations were not employed during Phase II of DECKHOUSE III due to lack of a sizeable enemy force encountered.

h. Civic Action. Two civic action visits were made during Operation DECKHOUSE III Phase II in coordination with the Chief of Xuyen Moc District.

(1) A team composed of SLF Staff and medical/dental personnel from the USS IWO JIMA and BLT 1/26 visited the village of Xuyen Moc (YS 6568) on 23 and 24 August 1966. Approximately 275 patients were treated for a variety of diseases and approximately 50 infected teeth extracted. Soap, clothing, and other medical supplies were distributed.

(2) In addition to the civic action visits, one seriously wounded friendly civilian (wounded by VC) was helo lifted to the LPH for medical treatment.

(3) Medical and dental supplies were furnished from SLF assets. All actions were well received.

10. Comments on Enclosures (1) and (2). The following comments are made to clarify or amplify certain statements, opinions, and recommendations contained in the After Action Report of BLT 1/26 and HMM 363.

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a. Fire Support Coordination Center. (Para 7b) encl (1). Helicopters must obtain the current status of artillery/NGF fire missions prior to entering the AOA. Two sources of information are available to the pilot. First, and most current, is from the BLT ALO located in the BLT FSCC. Second is through HDC since all supporting arms missions (air, artillery and NGF) are passed to HDC for this express purpose.

b. Helicopter operation. (para 7d) encl (1) and Para 2, encl (2) to encl (2).

(1) Two direct support helicopters are normally assigned to the BLT for intra-battalion operations. The increase of two additional helicopters during the initial and final two daylight hours is not warranted since all available helicopters are engaged in resupply during these periods.

(2) It should be noted that prior to assignment to the SLF, BLT 1/26 did not have an opportunity to conduct the requisite helicopter training. The experience gained on DECK HOUSE THREE should eliminate the discrepancies mentioned in enclosure (2).

c. Communications.

(1) Do not concur with the proposal that the BLT be augmented with additional radio personnel to maintain the ship-to-shore tac-log. There are adequate personnel within the BLT to fulfill this requirement.


(2) Both LF Tac #1 and Tac #2 must be activated at all times in order to utilize the advantages inherent in both AM and FM transmissions. The maneuvering of the LPW during flight operations changes distances, antenna attitude, and ship range making it impossible to rely on one means of modulation and wattage output.

(3) During past operations there has been no requirement to employ the radio relay set AN/TRC-27. If the radio relay AN/TRC-27 is to be employed in the future, one man can satisfactorily operate and maintain the AN/GRC-10 aboard ship.

(4) Two radio sets RT 524's are available for use by the Special Landing Force. One RT 524 was employed on the Battalion Tactical Net and one RT 524 was not operational. It is planned to use one of the two radio sets RT 524's on the LF Tac #1 when both are operational.

(5) The radio relay set AN/MRC-62 is required ashore on each operation as the most rapid and reliable means of communication. When the situation arises where it is not feasible for the BLT to lay lines to the radio relay van the artillery battery normally can accomplish this.

(6) Due to limited numbers of frequencies available it was not possible to assign each unit a frequency that would net with the aircraft radio equipment.


H. D. NORTHMAN

#00-10776

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66 A202

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 SEPT TO 30 SEPT 1966

USMC



CTG 79.5

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66 # 202


3: PWOB: cbm
5750
27 Oct 1966

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on SLF ltr 3/BSM/lpp over 5750 Ser: 0019-
66 dtd 1 Oct 1966

From: Commanding General, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMF
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology; submission of

1. Forwarded.


RICHARD R. AMERINE
Chief of Staff

5A/MCD/rap

00127366

14 DEC 1966

SECRET NOFORN - Unclassified upon removal of basic correspondence

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on SLF ltr 3/BSM/lpp over 5750
Ser: 0019-66 dtd 1 October 1966

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO3D)

Subj: Command Chronology; submission of

1. Forwarded.


M. C. DALBY
By direction

302182

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
Special Landing Force
USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2)
FPO San Francisco 96601

3/BSM/lpp
5750
Ser: 0019-66
1 Oct 1966

SECRET-NOFORN

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A03D)
Via: (1) Commanding General, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMF
(2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1-30 September 1966; submission of

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) BrigO 5750.1A
(c) CG, FMFPac msg 261950 July

Encl: (1) Command Chronology - SLF
(2) - Command Chronology - BLT 1/26, 1-26 Sep
(3) - Command Chronology - HMM 363, 1-28 Sep
(4) - Command Chronology - HMM 362, 28-30 Sep
(5) SLF After Action Report - Operations DECKHOUSE IV and PRAIRIE

1. In accordance with references (a) through (c), the Command Chronology for the Special Landing Force is submitted herewith as enclosure (1) through (5).


H. D. WORTMAN

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SPECIAL LANDING FORCE
Command Chronology1. Organization Data.

a. Designation. The Special Landing Force had the Task Designator of Task Group 79.5.

b. Composition. The Special Landing Force was composed of the following:

1-30 September 1966 - SLF - Col H. D. WORTMAN

1-26 September 1966 - BLT 1/26 - LtCol A. A. MONTI

1-28 September 1966 - HMM 363 - Col J. MCGOUGH

28-30 September 1966 - HMM 362 - Maj M. B. ARMSTRONG

c. Locations. The Special Landing Force was embarked aboard the Amphibious Ready Group, consisting of the USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2), USS Vancouver (LPD-2), and the USS Thomaston (LSD-28).

d. Average Monthly Strength.

SLF Staff: USMC Off - 10; USMC Enl - 22

BLT: USMC Off - 65; USMC Enl - 1543; USN Off - 8; USN Enl - 90

HMM: USMC Off - 55; USMC Enl - 170; USN Off - 1; USN Enl - 3

e. Commanding Officer and Staff.

H. D. WORTMAN, Colonel - Commanding Officer

J. M. LANDRIGAN, Lt. Colonel - Executive Officer

D. R. BRIMMER, Lt. Colonel - S-3

H. B. CROSBY III, Major - Asst S-3

R. A. AYERS, Captain - CommO

B. S. MCKENNA, 1st Lieutenant - Air Observer/Asst S-3

D. C. SCHULTZ, 2nd Lieutenant - S-4

C. G. OSGOOD, 2nd Lieutenant - S-2

SECRET-NOFORN
Enclosure (1)

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f. TAD to the SLF Staff for Special Operation

11-30 September 1966 - A. W. KELLER, Major - OJT from MB, Subic Bay, R. P.

7-30 September 1966 - R. E. BOWD, Captain (Royal Australian Armoured Corps) - INVITATIONAL DUTY from 9th MAB, Okinawa.

2. Chronology of Significant Events During the Period 1-30 September 1966.

a. The following events depict the activities of the Special Landing Force. Detailed information on BLT 1/26, HMM 363 and HMM 362 is shown in the appropriate subordinate command chronologies, enclosures (2) through (4), and in the After Action Report for Operations DECKHOUSE IV and PRAIRIE, enclosure (4).

b. 1-14 September 1966.

(1) On 1 September 1966, the USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2), with CTG 79.5, HMM 363 and elements of BLT 1/26 embarked, was in Manila Bay, R. P. hosting the Philippine Marine Helicopter Exercise for the period 1-2 September. HMM 363 supported the Philippine Marine Exercise. The USS Thomaston, with elements of BLT 1/26 embarked arrived in Subic Bay, R. P. on 1 September from III CTZ, RVN.

(2) On 2 September the USS Vancouver with elements of BLT 1/26 embarked arrived in Subic Bay, R. P. from Chu Lai, I CTZ, RVN.

(3) On 3 September the USS Iwo Jima returned to Subic Bay from Manila Bay, R. P.

(4) From 5-12 September, the ARG/SLF remained in Subic Bay, R. P. for maintenance and training ashore. CTG 79.5 and staff representatives liaised with CG III MAF, CG 3rd Marine Division and CO, 4th Marines prior to conducting Operation DECKHOUSE IV in conjunction with Operation PRAIRIE. The SLF Staff continued preparation and planning for a RIVERINE Exercise ("MUDPUFFY I") to be conducted in October on Mindoro Island R. P.

(5) On 7 September, six representatives from BLT 3/26 arrived aboard the USS Iwo Jima for liaison in preparation for BLT 3/26 joining the SLF in October. Capt. BOWD, Royal Australian Armoured Corps, reported to the SLF from 9th MAB for Invitational Duty.

(6) On 8 September Admiral HYLAND, COMSEVENTHFLT, visited CTG 79.5 and CTG 76.5 aboard the USS Iwo Jima.

(7) On 10 September Colonel WOESNNER, G-3 FMFPAC, came aboard the USS Iwo Jima to observe the SLF and Operation DECKHOUSE IV.

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Enclosure (1)

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(8) On 12 September, the ARG/SLF departed Subic Bay enroute to I CTZ, RVN.

(9) On 14 September, the ARG/SLF arrived off Danang, I CTZ, RVN for final preparations for Operation DECKHOUSE IV. A NGF Spot Team from 3/12, one Army SNCO and 12 ARVN liaison/advisor personnel were brought aboard the ARG from GIC LINH District Headquarters, Quang Tri Province, I CTZ, RVN.

c. 15-25 September 1966.

(1) From 15-18 September the ARG/SLF conducted Operation DECKHOUSE IV in the vicinity YD 3073, Gio Linh District, Quang Tri Province, I CTZ, RVN. (See enclosure (5)).

(2) On 15 September Admiral HYLAND, COMSEVENTHFLT, and Major General KYLE, CG 3d Marine Division conferred with CTG 79.5, CTG 76.5 aboard the USS Iwo Jima, and with the CO of BLT 1/26 ashore.

(3) On 16 September Major General ROBERTSHAW, CG 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, visited CTG 79.5 and the CO of HMM 363 aboard the USS Iwo Jima.

(4) On 17 September Lieutenant General WALT, CG III MAF, and Brigadier General RYAN, CTF 79, visited CTG 79.5 and CTG 76.5 aboard the USS Iwo Jima.

(5) On 18 September the SLF CHOPPED to CG 3rd Marine Division for inclusion in Operation PRAIRIE, Quang Tri Province, I CTZ, RVN. (See enclosure (5) for details of command relationships and pertinent messages).

(6) From 18-25 September the SLF participated in Operation PRAIRIE. (See enclosure (5), Part II for details).

(7) On 25 September the SLF was returned to the OPCON of CTG 76.5 and conducted a tactical withdrawal. The ARG/SLF departed Quang Tri Province for Danang, I CTZ, RVN.

d. 26-30 September 1966.

(1) From 26-27 September BLT 1/26 was off loaded from the ARG at Danang. At 2400H on the 26th, the SLF CHOPPED BLT 1/26 to CG, III MAF. Offload of the BLT was completed on 27 September and the USS Iwo Jima, with the SLF embarked, departed for Chu Lai, I CTZ, RVN. The remainder of the ARG departed for Okinawa.

3.

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Enclosure (1)

SECRET-NOFORN

(2) On 26 September CTG 79.5 and staff representatives departed Danang for Okinawa for planning and liaison with COMPHIBRON One, prior to their embarkation aboard the ARG.

(3) On 28 September HMM 363 was off loaded at Chu Lai and at 1200H CHOPPED to CG, III MAF. HMM 362 was loaded aboard the USS Iwo Jima and CHOPPED to CTG 79.5. The executive officer and S-4 of the SLF departed Chu Lai for Okinawa to assist BLT 3/26 in its preparations for embarking aboard the Amphibious Ready Group. The USS Iwo Jima, with the SLF staff and HMM 362 embarked, departed Chu Lai for Okinawa.

(4) On 29 and 30 September the ARG/SLF was enroute to Okinawa for the embarkation of BLT 3/26 and reconstitution of the SLF.

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AFTER ACTION REPORT OPERATIONS

DECK HOUSE IV AND PRAIRIE



CTG 79.5

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Encl(5)

HEADQUARTERS
Special Landing Force
USS Valley Force (LPH-8)
FPO San Francisco 96601

3/BSM/lpp
Ser: 0018-66
30 Sep 1966

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Combat After Action Reports, Operations DECKHOUSE IV and PRAIRIE

Encl: (1) - Units Daily Movement Overlay Operations DECKHOUSE IV and PRAIRIE
(2) - BLT 1/26 After Action Report, DECKHOUSE IV and PRAIRIE
(3) - HMM 363 After Action Report, DECKHOUSE IV and PRAIRIE
(4) - Results of Operations DECKHOUSE IV and PRAIRIE

1. The subject report is submitted herewith. The SLF basic report is covered in two parts, Part I - After Action Report Operation DECKHOUSE IV, Part II - After Action Report, Operation PRAIRIE.

2. Enclosures (1) through (4) amplify this report.

PART I COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT DECKHOUSE IV

Map Reference: AMS 7014, 1:50,000 Sheet 6442 IV. AMS 18020, 1:25,000, Sheet 6442 IV.

1. Operation DECKHOUSE IV was a unilateral amphibious operation combining surfaceborne and heliborne assault forces and conducted in accordance with NWP-22(A).

2. This operation was conducted in the area of GIO LINH, Quang Tri Province, I CTZ, RVN (Vic YD 3073). The operation commenced on 15 September 1966 at 0700H with the landing of the surface assault forces on Blue Beach (YD 303747) and helo lifted assault forces in LZ Sparrow (YD 195695) approximately seven miles inland. The operation terminated at 181200H when the SLF CHOPPED to CG III MAF for employment in Operation PRAIRIE under OPCON 3rd Marine Division.

3. Task Organization.

Special Landing Force (Landing Force)

HMM 363

BLT 1/26

Col H. D. WORTMAN

Col J. D. MCGOUGH

LtCol A. A. MONTI

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~~SECRET-NOFORN~~4. Intelligence.

a. Terrain: The objective area includes part of the Central Vietnam lowlands. Originating in the foot hills of the Annam Mountains, terminates at the coastline in a wide belt of massive dunes and low sandy shores continuous except where interrupted by the mouths of rivers and lagoons. A narrow transitional zone of rounded hill parallels the coastline 15 to 20 miles inland and separates the lowlands from the Annam Mountains. Trafficability is fair to poor throughout the area. During heavy rains cross-country movement is extremely difficult on the Coastal Plain. The land is devoted to wetland rice paddies throughout the plain and beginning about 8 miles inland are scattered stands of woodland and brush. Highway 1 runs north-south about 10 miles inland. Highway 9 commences at Dong Ha (YD 23608) and runs west. The Song Hieu Giang and Song Thach Ham Rivers, which originate in the Annam Mountains, are the major tributaries which meet and form the Cau Viet River at YD 267625. The Cau Viet River from this point runs to the sea. LCH's can navigate the Cau Viet to where it joins the Thach Hau and from there to Quang Tri, only LCP's can navigate. A stream parallels the beach approximately 4.2 miles inland. Highways 1 and 9 cross numerous bridges of various structures throughout the area. The dune belt which extends inland 4.2 miles consists mostly of sandy ridges up to 20 feet in height with patches of dryland crops. Avenues of approach are unrestricted on the coastal plain.

b. Beach Study. Blue Beach (YD 299749) is a straight beach extending in a northwest-southeast direction, and is 1.5 miles long. The beach averages one hundred feet in width. Composition is soft sand, firm when wet. Beach gradient of the foreshore is 1:12. Nearshore approach to the beach is partially restricted by submerged sand bar located 225 yards offshore and paralleling beach. Clearance over sand bar center is 6 to 10 feet at low tide. Nearshore gradient is 1:30.

c. Enemy Situation.

(1) General. The exact current location and disposition of the NVA forces in and around the DMZ cannot be determined at this time. However, there are indications of elements of these forces currently operating as far south as route 9. Since the withdrawal of the 324 B Div at the end of Operation HASTINGS, reconnaissance and air crews have reported extensive supply activity in the DMZ area, including dispersed supply points, road traffic and movement of material by sea. There has been over 130 secondary explosions reported resulting from air strikes in or north of the DMZ.

d. Order of Battle. There has been no recent significant activities in the ACA, although this area is suspected to be a highly used infiltration area and probably many caches may be uncovered. Most recent and accepted OOB for the Quang Tri area include but is not limited to the following:

324 B Div

DMZ

Vic YD 030720

90th Regt

Vic YD 050650

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803rd Regt

Vic YD 990600

808th Bn

Vic YD 370570

The 341st NVA Div is dispersed into rural and forested areas in or north of the DMZ. This unit is the southernmost NVA Div in North Vietnam. The most recent area of operation for the 341st Div is an area in the vicinity of Vinh Linh north of the DMZ.

e. Enemy Contact. Substantial contact was made with elements of the 324th B Div. On D-Day Div Recon encountered an estimated company size unit vicinity coordinates YD 173635. Enemy was dressed in black and khaki uniforms. Contact was broken after four hours, when supporting fire forced the enemy to withdraw. Late afternoon on D plus 1, Company B enroute to Objective 5 (YD 152718), received small arms fire from an estimated 30-40 enemy coordinates YD 153716. Enemy broke contact after 50 minutes due to supporting fires. At approximately the same time, Company D received small arms fire from estimated 12-20 enemy coordinates YD 153732. Artillery called and contact was broken. Company D and helicopters then received fire from village coordinates YD 153735. S/A fire caused one helicopter to land in the company area. Air strike called and fire ceased. Company A, during early morning on D plus 2, was attacked by an estimated company size unit vicinity coordinates YD 180645. The enemy, wearing helmets and grass camouflage uniforms, retreated under supporting arms fire. Probes of friendly positions, harrassing small arms and mortar fire was experienced throughout DECKHOUSE IV.

5. Mission. As directed by COMSEVENTHFLT message 140626Z (Initiating Directive) the mission of the Landing Force was to conduct a search and destroy amphibious operation against VC/NVA forces in AOA in Quang Tri Province and/or operations as agreed upon with CG, III MAF in conjunction with Operation PRAIRIE.

6. Concept of Operation. Operation DECKHOUSE IV was a unilateral amphibious operation conducted by the ARG/SLF. The operation was planned as a seven to ten day search and destroy operation. The concept provided for the SLF to conduct waterborne and heliborne assault landings to conduct search and destroy operations; to seize Landing Force Objectives; to establish blocking positions south of the DMZ and to conduct a tactical withdrawal. The concept was characterized by mobility, maximum utilization of supporting fires, surprise and shock action. Fire support was provided by the organic artillery of the BLT; NGF consisting of one DD, one 8 inch cruiser, one 6 inch cruiser, and one LSMR; and CAS from the 1st MAW. The SLF was to be prepared to CHOP to CG, III MAF or his designated subordinate commander for employment in Operation PRAIRIE.

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7. Execution. Operation DECKHOUSE IV was executed in accordance with CTG 79.5 Operation Order 328-66 supplemented with a Frag Order published for the Gio Linh area. (See enclosure (3) and (4) After Action Reports of BLT 1/26 and HMM 363 for details of this execution.).

8. Results. See enclosure (5).

9. Commander's Analysis. This analysis is limited to those matters at the Special Landing Force level. BLT and squadron level matters are discussed in their respective reports, enclosure (3) and (4).

a. Planning.

(1) The planning phase for Operation DECKHOUSE IV continued over an unusually long period due to the programmed build-up envisioned by 3rd MarDiv in the Quang Tri area. The additional time available to the SLF permitted the liaison group to provide daily SitReps to the CATF and ultimately to publish a warning order to the BLT and HMM which assisted materially in preparation of their operation orders for DECKHOUSE IV.

(2) Planning was initiated on receipt of CG III MAF message 022354Z Sep66 which requested the use of the ARG/SLF for the period 15-26 September. CTG 79.5 accompanied by staff representatives and TG 76.5 representatives departed for Danang on 5 September and effected liaison with CG, III MAF, CG, 3rd Marine Division, CG, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, CO, 4th Marine Regiment and the Gio Linh District Advisors during the period 5-10 September.

(3) During the initial liaison the following planning steps were accomplished:

- (a) Aerial reconnaissance of the tentative AOA.
- (b) Procurement of maps, area analysis and enemy order of battle.
- (c) Communication frequencies assigned and coordinated.
- (d) Arrangements made for disposition of captured VC/NVA and VCS.
- (e) Coordination on casualty evacuation.
- (f) Details of air support provided by 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.
- (g) Establishment of command relationships as provided for by NWP 22(A).
- (h) Provisions for emergency reaction force between the SLF and the 4th Marines.

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- (i) Provisions for logistic support by 3rd MarDiv, if required.
- (4) Plans were made for establishing liaison with the following commands:
 - a 3rd Marine Division.
 - b 4th Marines.
 - c District Headquarters, Gio Linh.

b. Intelligence. Prior to DECKHOUSE IV, arrangements were made for maps, area studies, aerial photography, SPAR and RED HAZE reports and ARVN liaison personnel for use as interpreters.

(1) Intelligence material provided by III MAF was accurate and included area studies, SPAR reports, aerial photography and ORDER of BATTLE. Enemy activity and RED HAZE overlays were provided by CICV.

(2) As previous intelligence had indicated, units of the 324th B Div were operating south of the DMZ. The enemy units in contact, being of company size, appeared to be in a training status and/or to control the local population.

c. Command Relationships. Operation DECKHOUSE IV was a unilateral amphibious operation with command relationships in accordance with NWP-22 (A).

d. Supporting Arms.

(1) Due to the deep inland objectives and strong enemy positions consisting of trenches and concrete bunkers, NGF support was an essential supporting arm during the operation. The USS Saint Paul (CA 73) and the USS Oklahoma City (CLG 5) provided the Landing Force with exceptionally accurate and timely fires. Additionally, one destroyer and one LSMR were assigned as NGF support ships.

(2) Close Air Support was provided by 1st MAW. Strike air was scheduled on condition four, and no problems were encountered. CAS was timely and accurate.

(3) Fire Support Coordination for DECKHOUSE IV was often inefficient and inadequate. The BLT ALO frequently failed to notify support helicopters of friendly artillery and naval gunfire in the area and when requested there was often a delay in providing this information. The BLT did not man the TAC net on a continuous basis which resulted in delays in accepting control of CAS by TAC(A) when time was a critical factor. On one occasion both artillery and naval gunfire was continued even though CAS, which had been requested for the same target, reported on station with a

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limited station time. Throughout the operation the 105mm howitzer battery was employed in the attack of targets which were well within the range of the 107mm Howtar battery resulting in an inequitable expenditure of ammunition.

e. Logistics. During the planning phase of DECKHOUSE IV arrangements were made with 3rd Marine Division for logistical support, if required. Logistics support for Operation DECKHOUSE IV was provided solely from the assets of SLF. All supplies were delivered directly to units ashore by helo from ARG shipping. Logistic support to the BLT ashore was adequate and responsive to requirements.

f. Communications.

(1) Communications nets were activated at H-1 on D-Day with no delay. After the BLT arrived ashore it encountered problems with the AN/PRC-47 and was not able to maintain this radio set on Landing Force Tactical Net #2. Throughout D-Day atmospheric interference was encountered on all VHF/FM and HF/SSB frequencies. Advance propagation information predicted strong atmospheric interference during the month of September. Atmospheric interference decreased significantly after D-Day except for certain periods during the day, especially in the early morning hours.

(2) Communications between the ARG, CG, III MAF, CG, 3rd MarDiv and 4th Marines, via the secure on-line circuit was intermittent to non-existent and an unreliable means of providing a rapid exchange of information. This was the second operation in which the LPH could not maintain communications via a secure on-line circuit with the units ashore even though the units ashore were able to maintain reliable communication among themselves.

(3) Radio relay was established early on D plus one. This circuit consisted of a radio relay set AN/MRC-62 ashore and a radio relay set AN/GRC-10 aboard the LPH. The relay remained operative throughout the operation and facilitated rapid and reliable communications between the SLF Headquarters and the BLT. Closer coordination of VHF/FM frequencies prior to the operation eliminated the interference on the radio relay circuit that had been encountered on previous operations.

(4) It was planned to maintain communications between the SLF Headquarters and the BLT ashore over Landing Force Tactical Net #1 and 2 and BLT Tactical Net #1.

(a) Landing Force Tactical Net #1 (VHF/FM) utilized a ship-board receiver-transmitter 524/VRC and a radio set AN/PRC-25 ashore.

(b) Landing Force Tactical Net #2 (HF/SSB) planned for a radio set VRC-32 aboard ship and a radio set AN/PRC-47 ashore. However, due to equipment problems ashore and maximum employment of remaining AN/

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PRC-47s' on more critical nets, this net was placed in a stand-by emergency status.

(c) BLT Tactical Net #1 (VHF/FM) employed a radio set AN/PRC-25 remote aboard the LPH and radio set AN/PRC-25 ashore. This net was monitored by the SLF Headquarters.

(5) The KY-8's were employed on Landing Force Tactical Net #1 during this operation. Communications were established with the USS Iwo Jima, USS Vancouver, and USS Thomaston. Communications via this covered voice circuit could not be established with the unit ashore as the radio set AN/MRC-109 developed a faulty receiver. This equipment failure could not be corrected and resulted in utilizing Landing Force Tactical Net #1 as an uncovered circuit for the remainder of the operation.

g. Tactical Air Observation. During DECKHOUSE IV tactical air observation was employed in support of the Landing Force. UH-1E aircraft were provided from 1st MAF for TAO/TAC (A) missions. Due to the relatively flat, open terrain the SLF TAO was able to provide the ground units with position reports, directions and distances to objectives, and the locations of bunkers, trenches and possible enemy strong points in the advance of ground units. The SLF Air Observer supported the maneuver companies by bringing artillery, naval gunfire and CAS upon enemy units with which they were engaged. The BLT also employed the SLF TAO for visual reconnaissance of suitable objective areas, night defensive positions and helicopter landing zones.

h. Psychological Warfare Operation. The BJU Detachment was tasked for population control in direct support of BLT 1/26. Four BJU personnel with loudspeakers were attached to Company D, while the remainder of the BJU Detachment remained aboard the Iwo Jima on an on-call basis for helicopter loudspeaker operations and leaflet drops. Due to the tactical situation, the BJU Detachment was not called upon for population control; however, assistance was provided in recovery of two downed pilots in the vicinity YD 1473 grid square.

j. Civic Action. One civic action visit was planned for 17 September, but was cancelled due to pressing requirements on medical personnel aboard the LPH.

~~SECRET NOFORN~~PART II COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT OPERATION PRAIRIE

Map Reference: AMS L7014 1:50,000 Sheet 6442 I, III and IV, 6342 I and II

1. Operation PRAIRIE was a search and destroy operation in which the Special Landing Force was fragmented rather than employed as an integrated air/ground team. Operation PRAIRIE was being conducted concurrently with Operation DECKHOUSE IV and upon termination of DECKHOUSE IV operational command of the Special Landing Force passed to CG, 3rd Marine Division. Operational control of BLT 1/26 and HMM 363 was further passed by 3rd Marine Division/1st Marine Aircraft Wing to the 4th Marine Regiment and MAG-16 respectively. Throughout Operation PRAIRIE the SLF staff had no official responsibility or connection with operation PRAIRIE.

a. Messages which resulted in the participation of the Special Landing Force in Operation PRAIRIE and the subsequent disposition of its subordinate elements - BLT 1/26 and HMM 363 are as follows:

(1) CTG 79.5 160526Z SEP66 - Landing Force firmly established ashore. Recommend termination of the amphibious phase of DECKHOUSE IV and CHOP of SLF to CG, III MAF.

(2) CTG 76.5 160606Z SEP66 - Informed COMSEVENTHFLT intentions of terminating amphibious operation DECKHOUSE IV when SLF CHOPS to CG, III MAF.

(3) CG, III MAF 180204Z SEP66 - Recommended CTG 76.5 chop SLF to III MAF effective 181200H. Directed CTG 79.5, upon chop to III MAF, to report to CG, 3rd Marine Division for operational control.

(4) CTG 79.5 180210Z SEP66 - Recommended SLF chop to III MAF and be assigned an area of operations in anticipation of ground maneuver outside AOA, and to insure maximum utilization of SLF assets in support of Operation PRAIRIE.

(5) CTG 76.5 180300Z SEP66 - CTG 79.5 and SLF chop to CG, III MAF at 181200H.

(6) CTG 79.5 180342Z SEP66 - SLF reports to OPCON CG, 3rd Marine Division effective 181200H.

(7) CG 3rd Marine Division 180423Z SEP66 - Assumed OPCON of BLT 1/26 effective 181200H. Fourth Marines - Assumed OPCON of BLT 1/26 effective at time of receipt this message. BLT 1/26 - Report to CO, 4th Marines for OPCON.

(8) CG, III MAF 180852Z SEP66 - Directed CG, 3rdMarDiv to pass OPCON of HMM 363 to CG, 1st MAF and be prepared to reconstitute SLF on order. Directed CG, 1st MAF assume OPCON HMM 363, be prepared to pass OPCON to SLF on order.

(9) CG, 3rd MarDiv 181027Z SEP66 - Directed HMM 363 report OPCON 1st MAF. Directed 4th Marines to be prepared to reconstitute SLF for withdrawal operation on order.

(10) CG, First MAF 181043Z SEP66 - Directed MAG-16 assume OPCON HMM 363 effective 181200H. Be prepared to pass OPCON direct to CTG 79.5 on order.

(11) CG, First MAF 240328Z SEP66 - Directed MAG-16 to chop HMM 363 to CTG 79.5 effective 241200H.

(12) CG, 3rd MarDiv 241516Z SEP66 - BLT 1/26 chopped to CTG 79.5 241200H. Directed CTG 79.5 to report to OPCON CTG 76.5 effective 250700H SEP.

(13) CTG 76.5 241140Z SEP66 - Assumed OPCON of SLF effective 250700H and reconstituted AOA for withdrawal.

2. The SLF commenced participation in Operation PRAIRIE on 18 September. By this time the SLF had penetrated to the western limit of the AOA and two companies were in contact with NVA units at YD 151719 and YD 145732. BLT 1/26, under OPCON of 4th Marines, conducted search and destroy operations west and southwest of this area maintaining continuous contact with elements of the 324th B NVA Division. On 24 September, 1966, the SLF was reconstituted and began to reposition for withdrawal. The SLF was CHOPPED to CATF at 250700 September and the Landing Force commenced tactical withdrawal. By 251600H withdrawal was completed and SLF embarked aboard ARG shipping.

3. Task Organization. The task organization of the Special Landing Force was radically changed from that of DECKHOUSE IV. The SLF ground element (BLT 1/26) reported to the in-country ground commander and the air element (HMM 363) reported to the in-country air commander. The SLF staff was not utilized during Operation PRAIRIE.

4. Intelligence.

a. There were no significant changes to intelligence from DECKHOUSE IV. The hedge rows throughout the area were used extensively by the enemy to conceal trench's and fighting positions. The pattern used was "L" shaped to provide flanking fire in either direction. The area being comparatively flat and open made this system very effective due to the large number of hedge rows.

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b. Enemy Contact. Contact was maintained with elements of the 324th B Division. Enemy activity was characterized by heavy mortar and automatic weapons fire, in addition to the use of 57mm anti-tank weapons. The NVA prisoner captured on 23 September, 1966, upon final interrogation, was determined to be a member of the 4th Battalion, 812th Regiment. In an area bounded by coordinates YD 120710 to YD 120740 and YD 150710 to YD 150740 an extensive trench, bunker and tunnel system was encountered. These positions were used to a great extent by the enemy in delaying and harassing friendly units. Heavy supporting fire forced the enemy to flee these positions north into the DMZ.

5. Mission. The mission assigned BLT 1/26 was to continue search and destroy operations within the assigned area of operations. HMM-363 was assigned the mission of providing helicopter support to all elements engaged in Operation PRAIRIE.

6. Concept of Operations. The concept of operations provided for BLT 1/26 to continue search and destroy operations south of the DMZ utilizing maximum supporting fires. Fire support was provided by the 105mm Howitzer Battery and the 107mm Howtar Battery of BLT 1/26; CAS by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing; and NGF support by one 8" cruiser and one destroyer. Helicopter support for all battalions committed to Operation PRAIRIE was provided by MAG-16.

7. Execution. See enclosures (1) through (4).

8. Results. See enclosure (5).

9. Commander's Analysis. This analysis is limited to those matters at the Special Landing Force level as it pertains to Operation PRAIRIE. BLT and squadron level matters are discussed in their respective reports, enclosures (3) and (4).

a. Planning.

(1) Prior to and during Operation DECKHOUSE IV, close liaison, joint briefings and coordination were effected with III MAF, 3rd Marine Division and 4th Marine Regiment in anticipation of OPCON shift to CG, 3rd MarDiv or CO, 4th Marines Regiment and subsequent employment of the SLF further west in support of Operation PRAIRIE. On 18 September 1966 OPCON of the BLT and HMM was passed to 4th Marines Regiment and MAG-16 and it was indicated, at that time, that BLT 1/26 would remain in their general area of operations (NW portion of AOA) south of the DMZ rather than move west to a new TOAR. The 4th Marine Regiment was to continue operations approximately 10 miles SW of BLT 1/26

(2) A Special Landing Force liaison officer was assigned to the 4th Marine Regiment. In addition, the SLF maintained close liaison and conducted daily staff visits with the 4th Marine Regiment in an effort to keep 76.5/79.5 apprised of the situation ashore and to insure continued utilization of ARG assets. Communications remained essentially as during DECKHOUSE IV with the exceptions that the BLT was instructed to submit requests for CAS, additional artillery support, and resupply through the 4th Marines. The mission of the BLT and its AO did not change significantly subsequent to the passage of operational control.

b. Intelligence. Previous intelligence had indicated an unidentified NVA Regiment operating in the vicinity coordinates YD 045705. Based on the interrogation of the NVA prisoner captured 23 September, 1966, it is believed that this Regiment is the 812th NVA Regiment. Enemy units operating in and around the DMZ cannot be specifically located as they continue to move unobstructed throughout the DMZ area and send units into RVN to guard and maintain LOC's and infiltration routes.

c. Command Relationships. The SLF operated under the OPCON of the 3rd Marine Division after CHOP to CG, III MAF. At 0700H on 25 September 1966 OPCON of the SLF was passed to CTG 76.5 for withdrawal and command relationships were then in accordance with NWP 22 (A)/LFM-01.

d. Logistics.

(1) Initial liaison with the 4th Marines established in-country logistics support during Operation PRAIRIE, as the primary means of resupply of the BLT. Landing Force Class V was available if required and on 23 September 600 rounds of HE 105mm howitzer ammunition was transported from the USS Vancouver to Dong Ha by LCM.

(2) Casualty evacuation of BLT 1/26 personnel was coordinated through the 4th Marines facilities at Dong Ha. Casualty reporting for SLF units was accomplished by the SLF CRCC. Liaison was established at Dong Ha in order to assist in expediting reports of casualties to the SLF CRCC located aboard the LPH. In addition, liaison visits were made to Dong Ha, "A" Med at Phu Bai and the USS Repose in order to insure current and complete accounting of all casualties. In so far as possible all SLF casualties were evacuated directly to the LPH for sorting, determination of need for further evacuation and institution of resuscitation measures, as necessary.

f. Communications. See Part I para 9.f.

g. Tactical Air Observation. During Operation PRAIRIE TAO was provided by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and maintained in condition IV.


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h. Psychological Warfare. No psychological warfare operations were conducted during SLF participation in Operation PRAIRIE.

i. Civic Action. One civic action visit was made during Operation PRAIRIE in coordination with the Chief of Gio Linh District.

(1) A team composed of SLF Staff and medical/dental personnel from the USS Iwo Jima and BLT 1/26 visited the hamlet of Gio Linh (YD 232722) on 23 September 1966. Approximately 183 patients were treated and 64 infected teeth extracted. Soap, clothing and other medical supplies were distributed.

(2) Medical and dental supplies were furnished from SLF assets. All actions were well received.


H. D. WORTMAN

DECLASSIFIED

1. RESULTS OF OPERATION DECKHOUSE IV

a. The following is an assessment of NVA/VC casualties inflicted by BLT 1/26:

NVA/VC 56 KIA
64 KIA (POSS)
5 WIA
62 WIA (POSS)

b. The following is a compilation of enemy equipment captured or destroyed:

7.62 Carbine sks Chicom type 56	7
7.62 Sub-MG AK-47 Chicom type 56	5
7.62 Light MG RPD Chicom type 56	1
AT Launchers	4
82 MM Mortars	3
U. S. Frag Grenade	13
Stick Type Grenade	85
Booby Trap Kit	1
Booby Traps	9
A.P. Mine	6
Magazines	20
S/A Ammo	400
40 MM AT Ammo	12
Homemade Gas Mask	1
Packboards and Pouches	30
Assorted Clothing	40 lbs.

2. RESULTS OF OPERATION PRAIRIE

a. The following is an assessment of NVA/VC casualties inflicted by BLT 1/26:

NVA/VC 186 KIA
249 KIA (POSS)
9 WIA

b. The following is a compilation of enemy equipment and material captured or destroyed:

7.62 Sub-MG AK-47 Chicom type 56	17
7.62 Carbine sks Chicom type 56	12
7.62 Light MG RPD Chicom type 56	1
AT Launchers	5
Stick Type Grenades	68
Magazines	11
S/A Ammo	4,500 rounds
40 MM AT Ammo	10
Homemade Gas Mask	1
Medical Supplies (Assorted)	10 lbs
Documents	156 lbs
Penicilin	2 cases
Sodium Chloride	2 cases

UNCLASSIFIED

1.

SECRET-NOFORN
ENCLOSURE (4)

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Distilled Water
Huts

1/2 case

7

A tunnel system was discovered in village coordinated YO 121733. Tunnels were 12 feet wide and some 45 feet long. Appeared tunnels were used as Medical Aid Station due to supplies found. Tunnel system was destroyed.

c. Following is a compilation of captured personnel:

3-VCC
12-VC suspects
1-NVA

SECRET-NOFORN

2.

ENCLOSURE

(7)

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