

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS  
Special Landing Force (TG 79.5)  
FPO San Francisco 96602

1:CGC:wdm

5750

Ser: 0034-67

#0013209 11 September 1967

UNCLASSIFIED


~~SECRET~~ NOFORN (Downgraded to unclassified upon removal of Enclosure (1))

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade  
Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1 August - 5 September 1967,  
submission of

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2  
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8  
(c) BrigO 5750.1G

Encl: (1) Special Landing Force (TG 79.5) Command Chronology

1. In accordance with references (a) through (c), the Command Chronology for the Special Landing Force (TG 79.5) is submitted as Enclosure (1).

  
J. G. DIONISOPOULOS  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS  
Special Landing Force (TG 79.5)  
FPO San Francisco 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 August - 5 September 1967

INDEX

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EVENTS  
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GP-4

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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PART IORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. DESIGNATIONCOMMANDERSpecial Landing Force  
(TG 79.5)

Col J. G. DIONISOPOULOS

1 Aug-5 Sep 1967

SUBORDINATE UNITS

BLT 2/3

LtCol E. W. HERICH

1-22 Aug 1967

Major W. O. BEARD

23 Aug-5 Sep 1967

HMM 265

LtCol W. R. BEELER

1-23 Aug 1967

HMM 262

Major G. A. CORLISS

23 Aug-5 Sep 1967

ATTACHED UNITSNONE2. LOCATION

USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10)

1 Aug-5 Sep 1967

USS OGDEN (LPD-5)

1-11 Aug 1967

USS PAUL REVERE (APA-248)

11 Aug-5 Sep 1967

USS MONTICELLO (LSD-35)

1 Aug-5 Sep 1967

USS TERRELL COUNTY (LST-1157)

1 Aug-5 Sep 1967

3. STAFF OFFICERS

Executive Officer

LtCol R. L. CHRISTIAN Jr.

1-20 Aug 1967

LtCol R. A. MASON

21 Aug-5 Sep 1967

AO/S-1

2ndLt C. G. COMER

1 Aug-5 Sep 1967

S-2

Capt C. A. AUSTIN

1 Aug-5 Sep 1967

Asst S-2

1stLt J. D. CHAPMAN

1-8 Aug 1967

Capt W. B. MAYBERRY

21 Aug-5 Sep 1967

Asst S-2/AO

1stLt R. T. WALLACE

1 Aug-5 Sep 1967

S-3

LtCol R. L. CHRISTIAN Jr.

1-24 Aug 1967

LtCol R. A. MASON

25 Aug-5 Sep 1967

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Asst S-3/FSC	Major W. A. WESTON	1 Aug-5 Sep 1967
Asst S-3	Major L. J. NAQUIN	28 Aug-5 Sep 1967
	Capt I. J. CAHILL (RAIC)	25 Aug-5 Sep 1967
S-4	Major J. F. SHOVAR	1 Aug-5 Sep 1967
CommO	Capt F. E. HEURING	1-8 Aug 1967
	Capt C. C. ENTWISTLE	9 Aug-5 Sep 1967
Asst CommO	Capt C. C. ENTWISTLE	1-8 Aug 1967

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

SLF Staff:	USMC Off - 10	USMC Enl - 31	USN Off - 0	USN Enl - 0
BLT:	USMC Off - 60	USMC Enl - 1375	USN Off - 8	USN Enl - 88
HMM:	USMC Off - 40	USMC Enl - 186	USN Off - 1	USN Enl - 3

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PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

On 1 August Operation KANGAROO KICK commenced with the landing of Battalion Landing Team 2/3 into Quang Tri/Thua Thien Province, I CTZ, RVN. Operational control of BLT 2/3, less AmTracPlt, was passed to CG III MAF thence to CG 3d Marine Division and Det "A" HMM 265 to CG First Marine Air Wing by CG III MAF on 3 August 1967. Operation KANGAROO KICK was terminated on 3 August 1967 by COMSEVENTHFLT.

The ARG/SLF sailed to Subic Bay, R. P. for upkeep arriving on 5 August and remained in Subic Bay until 18 August. On 18 August the ARG/SLF sailed to I CTZ, RVN.

During the period 20-22 August Det "A" HMM 265 and BLT 2/3, less AmTracPlt, was backloaded aboard ARG shipping and reported OPCON to CTG 79.5 thereby reconstituting the SLF.

On 23 August HMM 265 and HMM 262 effected intra-theatre rotation with HMM 265 reporting command to CG First MAF and HMM 262 reporting command less OPCON to CG 9th MAB and OPCON CTF 79 at 231400H thence command less OPCON to MAG-15 and OPCON to CTG 79.5.

Operation BELT DRIVE commenced on 27 August 1967 with BLT 2/3 landing in Quang Tri Province, I CTZ, RVN. On 5 September 1967 BLT 2/3 was backloaded and Operation BELT DRIVE terminated.

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PART IIISEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

The following is a review of the activities of the Special Landing Force (TG 79.5). Detailed information of BLT 2/3, HMM 265 and HMM 262 is shown in the appropriate Command Chronology in PART IV. Detailed information on KANGAROO KICK and BELT DRIVE is contained in PART IV.

DATEEVENT

1 Aug Operation KANGAROO KICK commenced with the landing of BLT 2/3 by helicopter and landing craft into Quang Tri/Thua Thien Provinces, I CTZ, RVN.

3 Aug The off load of Det "A" HMM 265 and BLT 2/3, less AmTracPlt, completed and OPCON of BLT 2/3 and Det "A" HMM 265 passed to CG III MAF. CG III MAF CHOPPED BLT 2/3 to CG 3d MarDiv and Det "A" HMM 265 to CG First MAF. Operation KANGAROO KICK terminated on 3Aug67.

Ref: CG III MAF msg 031354Z AUG67  
COMSEVENTHFLT msg 031428Z AUG67

4 Aug The ARG/SLF sailed for Subic Bay, R. P. for upkeep.

5 - 17 Aug In-Port, Subic Bay, R. P., for upkeep.

18 Aug The ARG/SLF sailed for I CTZ, RVN.

20 Aug CTG 79.5 and representatives at Hq, III MAF for planning Operation BELT DRIVE.

22 Aug BLT 2/3, less AmTracPlt, and Det "A" HMM 265 backloaded aboard the ARG shipping reconstituting the SLF and OPCON passed to CTG 79.5 at 220600H AUG67.

23 Aug HMM 265 off-loaded and reported command to CG First MAF and HMM 262 reported command less OPCON to CG 9th MAB and OPCON CTF 79 at 231400H thence command less OPCON to MAG-15 and OPCON to CTG 79.5 for intra-theatre rotation.

Ref: CTG 79.5 msg 221125Z AUG67  
HMM 262 msg 231414Z AUG67  
CG 9thMAB msg 240648Z AUG67

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26 Aug D-Day postponed due to marginal weather for air operations.

27 Aug Operation BELT DRIVE commenced with the landing of BLT 2/3 by helicopter and landing craft into Quang Tri Province, I CTZ, RVN.

29 Aug OPCON SLF passed to CG III MAF at 290900H AUG67 thence to CG 3d MarDiv at the same time.

Ref: CTG 76.5 msg 290106Z AUG67  
\* CTG 79.5 msg 290202Z AUG67

1 Sep OPCON BLT 2/3 passed to 4th Marines at 010800H SEP67.

Ref: CG 3d MarDiv msg 301201Z AUG67

4 Sep OPCON BLT 2/3 CHOPPED to SLF at 042000H SEP67

Ref: CG 3d MarDiv msg 040647Z SEP67

5 Sep OPCON SLF passed to CG III MAF at 050001H SEP67 thence to CTG 76.5 at the same time. BLT 2/3 completed backloading at 052000H SEP67 aboard ARG shipping, thereby reconstituting the SLF and Operation BELT DRIVE terminated.

Ref: CG III MAF msg 041238Z SEP67  
CTG 79.5 msg 051402Z SEP67

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Enclosure (1)

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PART IVCHRONOLOGY OF SUBORDINATE COMMANDS  
AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

## Appendix 1

- 1 CG III MAF msg 031354Z AUG67
- 2 COMSEVENTHFLT msg 031428Z AUG67
- 3 CTG 79.5 msg 221125Z AUG67
- 4 HMM 262 msg 231414Z AUG67
- 5 CG 9thMAB msg 240648Z AUG67
- 6 CTG 76.5 msg 290106Z AUG67
- 7 CTG 79.5 msg 290202Z AUG67
- 8 CG 3d MarDiv msg 301201Z AUG67
- 9 CG 3d MarDiv msg 040647Z SEP67
- 10 CG III MAF msg 041238Z SEP67
- 11 CTG 79.5 msg 051402Z SEP67

## Appendix 2

✓ Command Chronology, BLT 2/3, 1 Aug - 5 Sep 67

## Appendix 3

✓ Command Chronology, HMM 265, 1 - 23 Aug 67

## Appendix 4

✓ Command Chronology, HMM 262, 25 Aug - 5 Sep 67

## Appendix 5

✓ SLF, After Action Report, KANGAROO KICK, 1 - 3 Aug 67

## Appendix 6

✓ HMM 265, After Action Report, KANGAROO KICK, 1 - 3 Aug 67

## Appendix 7

✓ BLT 2/3, After Action Report, KANGAROO KICK, 1 - 3 Aug 67

## Appendix 8

✓ SLF, After Action Report, BELT DRIVE, 27 Aug - 5 Sep 67

## Appendix 9

✓ HMM 262, After Action Report, BELT DRIVE, 27 Aug - 5 Sep 67

## Appendix 10

✓ BLT 2/3, After Action Report, BELT DRIVE, 27 Aug - 5 Sep 67

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Enclosure (1)



VV MMSA092VV FBC031 DDKE229  
 CG RUABJG  
 DE RUMHMF 214 215135Z  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 O 031354Z AUG 67  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO ZEN/ CG THIRD MARDIV  
 ZEN/ CG FIRST MAW  
 INFO RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT  
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
 ZEN/CG FMFPAC  
 RUABUL/COMSEVENTHFLT  
 ZENCG FMFPAC  
 RU BUL/COMSEVENTHFLT  
 ZEN/CG FLC  
 RUMFUV/CTF SEVEN SIX  
 RUABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE  
 RUMFOR/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE  
 RUMSBB/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE  
 RUABJM/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR  
 RUABJG/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE  
 RUABJM/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR  
 RUABJG/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
 RUMFOR/CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE  
 BT  
 S E C R E T

PAG. T10 RUMHMF 214 S E C R E T  
 OPCON BLT 2/3 AND DET "A" HMM 265  
 A. CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE 020820Z AUG 67  
 1. REF A REFERS. CG III MAF ASSUMES OPCON BLT 2/3, (LESS 3D PLAT,  
 CO B 1ST AMTRAC BN) AND OPCON DET "A" HMM 265 AS OF 030800H AUG 67  
 AND PASSES OPCON BLT 2/3 (MINUS) TO CG THIRD MARDIV, AND OPCON  
 DET "A" HMM 265 TO CG FIRST MAW AT SAME TIME.  
 GP-4  
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App 1-1

P 031428Z AUG 67  
 COMSEVENTHFLT  
 RUMFCR/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
 RUENAAA/CNO  
 RUHHHQA/CINCPAC  
 RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT  
 INFO RUMFCR/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE  
 RUMFCR/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR  
 RUMFCR/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR  
 RUMFCR/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT  
 RUMFCR/CTG SEVEN SIX  
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
 RUMFKB/COMNAVFORV  
 RUMHMF/CG III MAF  
 RUABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE  
 RUMFKE/CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE  
 RUMFCR/CTF SEVEN THREE  
 RUMMSA/COMPHIBPAC  
 RUJFMA/CG FMFPAC  
 RUABQL/CG FMFPAC (FWD)  
 RUMNVHD/CTF ONE ONE FIVE  
 RUMSBJ/CMDR SEVENTH AF  
 RUMECR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE  
 RUMFCR/CTF SEVEN SEVEN  
 RUMFCR/CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE  
 RUMFKH/CG THIRE MARDIV  
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW

BT  
 S E C R E T  
 KANGAROO KICK (U)  
 1. FOR CTG 76.5: TERMINATE OPERATION KANGAROO KICK.  
 2. FOR CNO, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT: CANCEL NICKNAME KANGAROO  
 KICK 04 AUGUST.

GP  
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App 1-#2

64030

TO: DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF RESEARCH, BUREAU OF BUREAU, BUREAU OF BUREAU, BUREAU OF BUREAU  
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FROM: BUREAU

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DO RUABQL RUHMBRA RUHMFMA RUMGUL RUMHMF RUMHVP RUMHAW RUAUDB  
 DE RUMFTJG 102 2351414  
 ZNY SSSSS

O 231414Z AUG 67  
 FM HMM TWO SIX TWO  
 TO RUABQL/CG NINTH MAB  
 RUABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE  
 INFO RUHMBRA/CINCPACFLT  
~~RUHMFMA/CG FMFPAC~~  
 RUMGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT  
 RUMHMF/CG III MAF  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MAR DIV  
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW  
 RUMHAW/MAG THREE SIX  
 RUAUDB/MAG ONE FIVE  
 ZEN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE  
 ZEN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

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S E C R E T

COMMAND HMM 262 (U)

A. CG FIRST MAW 070009Z AUG67 (NOTAL)

B. CTF-79 110014Z AUG67 (NOTAL)

1. IAW REF A & B HMM 262 RPTS TO COMMAND LESS OPCON CG NINTH MAB  
 OPCON CTF-79 EFFECTIVE 231400H.

GP-4

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app 1-++

INN  
A077

DE MILB 076

KK  
PP RUMFTJG  
ZNY SSSSS ZOV RUAUBA  
ZOPHA319ZCIPC400  
PP RUAUBJG  
DE RUABQL 1128B 2360648  
ZNY SSSSS

P 240648Z AUG 67

CG NINTH MAB

TO RUAUBJG/HMM TWO SIX TWO

INFO RUHHEDA/CG FMFPAC

RUHGUL/COMMSEVENTHFLT

ZEN/CG FMFPAC (FWD)

RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW

RUAUDB/MAG ONE FIVE

RUAUBJG/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

RUAUBJM/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

BT

S E C R E T

COMMAND OF HMM 262

A. HMM 262 231414Z AUG 67 (NOTAL)

1. BY REF A HMM 262 REPORTED TO THIS HQ FOR COMMAND LESS OPCON  
AND TO CTG 79 FOR OPCON.

2. REPORT TO MAG 15 FOR COMMAND LESS OPCON AND TO CTG 79,5 FOR  
OPCON.

BT-4

BT

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TOR 25/0710H

5/3 HMM

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App 1-#5

00 RUMGUL RUMHMF RUMFUV RUABQL RUMSMA RUMSBB RUMFUZ RUHHHQA RUMFKE  
 RUMFUA RUHGBRA RUWJMSA RUHHFMA RUMFKB RUMSAL RUMFUE RUMECR RUMHVP  
 RUMHAW RUMFTJM RUAUDB RUMFCR RUMGCR RUMNVHE  
 JE RUMFTJG 007 241010G

ZNY SSSSS

O 290100Z AUG 67

M CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

TO RUMGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUMHMF/CG III MAF

ZEN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

INFO RUMFUV/CTF SEVEN SIX

RUABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV

RUMFUZ/CTF SEVEN THREE

RUHHHQA/CINCPAC

RUMFKE/CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE

RUMFUA/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT

RUHGBRA/CINCPACFLT

RUWJMSA/COMPHIBPAC

RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

RUABQL/CG FMFPAC (FWD)

RUMFKB/CTF ONE ONE FIVE

RUMSAL/CDR SEVENTH AF

RUMFUE/CTF SEVEN SEVEN

RUMECR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE

RUMXVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUMHAW/CG FIRST MARDIV

RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW

RUMFTJM/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

RUMFTJM/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

RUAUDB/CTG SEVEN NINE PT THREE

RUMFCR/CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE

RUMGCR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE

RUMNVHE/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE

For: 291005H

5/3

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S E C R E T

BELT DRIVE (U)

A. COMSEVENTHFLT 231006Z AUG 67

B. CTG 79.5 281258Z AUG 67 NOTAL

1. LANDING FORCE FIRMLY ESTABLISHED ASHORE. IAW PARA 9 REF A, AS MUTUALLY

AGREED UPON BY ORIG AND CG III MAF, OPCON SLF BRAVO (CTG 79.5) PASSED TO  
 CG III MAF EFFECTIVE 290900H AUG 67. ADA DISSOLVED AND CONTROL OF  
 SUPPORTING ARMS PASSED ASHORE TO CG III MAF AT THAT TIME.

2. ORIG REMAINS IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS ASHORE.

GP-4

BT

App 1-#6

00000019

00 RUMHVP RUMHBP RUMHBRA RUMGUL RUMHMA RUMHAW RUMEXRV RUABQL

00 RUMFTJG 019 241020Z

ZNY SSSSS

000000Z AUG 67

00 CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

00 RUMHMF/CG III MAF

00 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

00 RUMHBRA/CINCPACFLT

00 RUMGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT

00 RUMHMA/CG FMFPAC

00 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW

00 RUMEXRV/CTF SEVEN SIX

00 RUMHVP/CTF SEVEN NINE

00 CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

BT

S E C R E T

BELT DRIVE (U)

A. CTG 76.5 290100Z AUG 67

B. CG III MAF 280526Z AUG 67

1. IAW REF A&amp;B SLF CONSISTING OF SLF HDQ, BLT 2/3 AND HMM 262 RPTS TO

OPCON CG 3DMARDIV EFFECTIVE 290900H.

GP-4

BT

App 1-7

01206177CPC361VV FFD706V CFA052MFA311

FM RUMFTJG

TO RUMHVP 7819D 2411201

THY SSSSS

291201Z AUG 67

FM CG THIRD MARDIV

TO RUMFTJG/SLF BRAVO CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

GEN/FOURTH MARINES

INFO RUMHVP/CG III MAF

BT

SECRET

UNCLAS

FM CG THIRD MARDIV 291225 AUG 67

1. CHANGE EFFECTIVE DATE OF BLT 2/3 CHOP IN REF A TO 010800 SEPT 67.

ZAL02

FOR 31/04/68

S/3

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App 1-28



844

1 040647Z SEP 67

FM CG THIRD MARDIV

TO ZEN 6, 6745 -48, 3

BT 15° &amp; CTG SEVSS NINE PT FIVE ✓

BT

BT

VXR E T

1. FOR FOURTH MAR.

a. CHOP BLT 2/3 TO CTG 79.5 EFFECTIVE 042000, 30.

b. OR CTG 79.5

XX. COMMENCE BACKLOAD TO ARG SHIPPING

MPMOST EFFECTIVE DK MEANS.

RECOMMENDED TO THIS HQ EFFECTIVE TIME OF CHOP TO CTG 76.5.

GP-4

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-10R 041850H

5-3

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App 1-29

VA104

CG RUMFTJG RUMFTJM  
 DE RUMHMF 274 2471238  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 O 041238Z SEP 67  
 FM CG III MAF  
 TO RSXFTJG/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
 INFO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC  
 RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT  
 RUMIA/COMUSMACV  
 RUMGOL/COMSEVENTHFLT  
 RUMFKRV/CTF SEVEN SIX  
 RUABOL/CTF SEVEN NINE  
 TEN/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 TEN/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 TEN/CG FIRST MAW  
 TEN/CG FMFPAC  
 RUMFTJG/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE  
 RUMFTJM/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR  
 RUMFTJM/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR  
 RUMFCR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE  
 RUMFKE/CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE

BT  
SECRET

PAGE TWO RUMHMF 274 SECRET  
 OPCON SLF BRAVO (CTG 79.5)  
 A. CG 3RD MARDIV 040255Z SEPT 67 (S) NOTAL  
 REF A PASSES OPCON SLF BRAVO (CTG 79.5) TO CG III MAF EFF  
 030001H SEPT 67. CG III MAF PASSES OPCON TO CTG 79.5 SAME  
 TIME.  
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JNN

051402Z SEP 67

CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
 TO RUMGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT  
 INFO ZEN/TG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
 RUMNVHE/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE  
 ZEN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE  
 RUMFUV/CTF SEVEN SIX  
 RUABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE  
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV  
 RUMFKE/CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE  
 RUMFUZ/CTF SEVEN THREE  
 RUMFUA/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT  
 RUMHMF/CG III MAF  
 RUHHHQ/CINCPAC  
 RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT  
 RUWJMSA/COMPHIBPAC  
 R 4FMA/CG FMFPAC  
 RUABHI/CG FMFPAC (FWD)  
 RUMNVHD/CTF ONE ONE FIVE

*TOR 052258H*  
*4-3*  
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PAGE TWO RUMFTJG 193 S E C R E T L  
 RUMSBJ/CDR SEVENTH AIR FORCE  
 RUMECR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE  
 RUMFUE/CTF SEVEN SEVEN  
 RUMFKH/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW  
 RUMFTJM/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR  
 RUMFTJM/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR  
 RUMGCR/CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE  
 RUMGCR/TU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE  
 R NVHD/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE

S E C R E T

BELT DRIVE (U)

- A. COMSEVENTHFLT OPLAN 10-67
- B. COMSEVENTHFLT 231006Z 17 (NOTAL)
- C. COMSEVENTHFLT 301504Z AUG 67 (NOTAL)
- D. CG THIRD MARDIV 030814Z SEP 67 (NOTAL)
- E. CTF 76 MSG 030752Z SEP 67 (NOTAL)
- F. AMPHIBIOUS WITHDRAWAL COMPLETED AT 051200Z SEP 67. IAW

PAGE THREE RUMFTJG 193 S E C R E T

ANNEX BRAVO TO REF A AND REF B RECOMMEND TERMINATION AMPHIBIOUS  
 OPERATION BELT DRIVE

1. TG 76.5, LESS TRIPOLI, PROCEEDING DANANG ON 6 SEP IAW REF C TRIPOLI  
 REMAINING OFF DMZ VICINITY DONG HA PROVIDING EMER REFUELING AND  
 LOGISTICS SUPPORT IAW REF D AND E.

4

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COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT - OPERATION KANGAROO KICK

Map Reference: AMS, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L-7014 Sheets 6442 I thru IV.

1. GENERAL.

a. Operation KANGAROO KICK was a unilateral amphibious operation conducted in accordance with NWP 22(A), utilizing helicopterborne assault forces. The operation was conducted 12 miles south of Quang Tri City, the AOA being centered on the Quang Tri/Thua Thien Province boundary, I Corps Tactical Zone, Republic of Vietnam.

b. The inclusive dates of Operation KANGAROO KICK were 1-3 August 1967.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

Special Landing Force  
BLT 2/3  
HMM 265

Colonel J. G. DIONISOPOULOS  
LtCol E. W. HERICH  
LtCol W. R. BEELER

3. INTELLIGENCEa. Enemy Situation and Capabilities Prior to Operation KANGAROO KICK.

(1) Enemy Situation. Enemy ground forces in the objective area had been identified as the 416th Battalion, 5th NVA Regiment; 802nd Battalion, 6th NVA Regiment, and the C.11 Intelligence Company. One unidentified Battalion and three unidentified companies were also reported in the area.

(2) Enemy Capabilities. The enemy could attack or defend at any time and place with a force of up to two NVA Battalions (416th and 802nd) and two unidentified Battalions; reinforce within eight to ten hours with a force of up to three NVA Battalions (806th, 814th and 3rd) and one MF Battalion (808th) or evade direct contact and resort to spoiling attacks, ambushes and harassment with mines and surprise firing devices.

b. Enemy Contacts and Tactics During Operation KANGAROO KICK.

(1) Enemy Contacts. First contact with the enemy occurred on

BLF (7979.5)

C/Lt. KANGAROO KICK

1-2 Aug 67

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D-Day when Grey Rebel Foxtrot received four rounds of small arms fire from vicinity YD485445. The remaining contacts consisted of light to moderate small arms, automatic weapons and 60mm mortar fire. Out of the 17 fire incidents reported during the two day period, seven were directed at helicopters resulting in minor damage to three.

(2) Enemy Tactics. During Operation KANGAROO KICK, the enemy selected those tactics usually associated with a well organized guerrilla force, i.e., sniper fire from concealed locations to halt the advance of troops by day and mortar missions from well placed positions to harass the defensive positions by night.

c. Weather and Terrain.

(1) Weather. The objective area was under the influence of the SW monsoon which resulted in afternoon and evening thunderstorms in the mountains causing overcast skies over the AOA. This overcast provided a better lift capability for helicopters as well as a shield from the sun for the maneuvering forces.

(2) Terrain. The terrain in the AOA consisted of a coastal plain of wetland rice and some dry crops. The area was generally well drained by numerous streams. Observation and fields of fire were generally good throughout. The major obstacles to movement inland were the tree lines and hedgerows surrounding the village and huts within the village.

d. Interpreters, Interrogators and Translators. Interpreters, interrogators and translators were requested for this operation because of the heavy civilian population within the AOA. They were provided by COMUSMACV Advisory Group Quang Tri, on D minus 1 and proved invaluable assisting in processing captured documents, innocent civilians, VCS and captured equipment.

4. Mission. SLF conduct helicopterborne assault into designated landing zones. Conduct search and destroy operations within the AOA, conducts other operations as agreed upon with CG III MAF. A waterborne feint to be conducted concurrently in support of the helicopterborne assault.

5. Concept of Operations

(a) The inherent mobility of the SLF was to be maximized to insure a rapid buildup of forces ashore thereby gaining surprise and shock action. The operation was conducted in two phases:

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(1) An amphibious helicopterborne assault and waterborne feint to block avenues of access and egress from the area. This phase was characterized by aggressive movement on the small unit level.

(2) A rapid search and destroy operation was conducted within the AOA to locate and destroy enemy forces.

## 6. Execution

a. Operation KANGAROO KICK was initiated by COMSEVENTHFLT 280456Z July 1967. Execution was in accordance with CTG 79.5 Operation Plan 120A-67 implemented by CTG 79.5 290728Z July 1967, Frag Order for Operation KANGAROO KICK.

b. D-Day was established and confirmed as 1 August 1967 with L and H Hours at 0630H. Company H in the first helicopter wave touched down in LZ SWAN (YD 530460) at 0633. The LVT waterborne feint turned away seaward of the Green Beach surf line at 0630H. Companies E and F landed after Company H in LZ's GULL (YD 514463) and EAGLE (YD 490462) respectively. All landings were unopposed with the exception of light sniper fire in LZ EAGLE. The landing force met with little resistance, secured initial objectives and was firmly established ashore by 030800H August 1967. At that time OPCON of Detachment Alpha, HMM 265, consisting of five aircraft and BLT 2/3 less 3d Platoon, Company B, 1st AMTrac Battalion was passed to CG III MAF. OPCON of Detachment Alpha was further passed to CG First MAW. OPCON of BLT 2/3, less AMTrac Platoon, passed to CG Third Marine Division thence to Fourth Marines. Upon completion of off load of these units at 032000H Operation KANGAROO KICK was terminated and remaining SLF units embarked in ARG shipping sailed for upkeep period at Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines.

## 7. Commanders Analysis

### a. Planning

(1) On 26 July 1967 the SLF backloaded aboard ARG shipping having completed Operation BEAR CHAIN. The SLF was requested to report to First Marine Division for the planning of Operation COCHISE. While the ARG/SLF was refurbishing at Da Nang, CG III MAF requested SLF planners report to CG Third Marine Division vice First Marine Division.

(2) On 27 July 1967 SLF Planners reported to CG Third Marine Division for preliminary planning for an amphibious operation and the subsequent off load of BLT 2/3.

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(3) Planning continued through the issuance of final orders on 29 July 1967. During planning the following steps were accomplished.

(a) Since Operation BEAR CHAIN was conducted in the same AOA it was only necessary to receive an up-dated brief on the enemy order of battle and current intelligence.

(b) Arrangements were made for processing and evacuation of POW'S, detainees, refugees, civilian casualties and captured material.

(c) Arrangements were made for the use of one RF/PF Squad from each district. (Hai Lang and Phong Dien)

(d) Logistic support procedures were arranged.

(e) Radio frequencies were obtained and assigned and the communication plan was issued.

(f) The AOA was agreed upon and command relationships were finalized.

(g) A naval gunfire support ship was requested and requirements for close air support were determined and requested.

(h) Additional helicopter support was requested consisting of four armed and one unarmed UH-1E, and two CH-53's for the landing of the artillery battery.

(i) Arrangements were made to provide liaison with the Fourth Marines and to exchange liaison officers with district headquarters at Hai Lang and Phong Dien.

b. Command Relationships.

(1) Operation KANGAROO KICK was a unilateral amphibious operation with command relationships in accordance with NWP 22(A). The Landing Force was firmly established ashore and OPCON of BLT 2/3 (less the AMTrac Platoon) and Detachment Alpha, HMM 265 (5 A/C) was passed to CG III MAF effective 030800H. This was in accordance with the KANGAROO KICK initiating directive (COMSEVENTHFLT 280456Z July 1967 as modified by COMSEVENTHFLTS 290822Z and 292232Z July 67)

c. Supporting Arms. The following Supporting Arms were available to the SLF during Operation KANGAROO KICK.

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(1) Air Support

(a) Fixed wing air support was readily available. LZ's were not prepped; however CAS was on station until completion of the landing at which time aircraft were placed on strip alert and could be obtained in 30 minutes.

(b) Two armed and one unarmed UH-1E were assigned to the SLF and based aboard the LPH. These provided escorts for CH-46 flights, on call support to the ground forces and aerial observation of the operating area.

(c) Two CH-53's were made available to the SLF for the landing of the artillery battery.

(2) Artillery

(a) In addition to Battery B, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines, attached to the SLF, the 3d Battalion 12th Marines was available to the SLF, on request, for reinforcing fires.

(3) Naval Gunfire

(a) The USS G. K. MACKENZIE (DD 836) provided naval gunfire support for Operation KANGAROO KICK until released 020001H August 1967.

(4) Coordination

Coordination of supporting arms was in accordance with current doctrine. During the operation, district representatives from Hai Lang and Phong Dien were present in the SACC to provide clearance on designated targets.

d. Communication

(1) Operation KANGAROO KICK was characterized by extended communications considering the type equipment employed. Terrain and type of operation prevented employment of Radio Relay and High Power Vehicular mounted equipment. Being unable to employ Radio Relay placed the additional burden of traffic normally passed through Radio Relay upon Radio, thereby saturating radio circuits to a near maximum capacity.

(2) Reliability of communications to higher headquarters and adjacent units was excellent while communications to the BLT was difficult throughout the operation. In the majority of instances, it was necessary to relay through one of the three liaison teams, provided by SLF communication Section, located with units adjacent to and within the AOA.



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(3) The KY-8 (Nestor Crypto System) was employed on Third Marine Division and Fourth Marine Regiment tactical nets with excellent results throughout the operation. This system has proven extremely reliable in providing the Landing Force Commander with a secure means of communications for command and control of the landing force.

(4) The Communications Section provided personnel and equipment for three liaison teams located at Fourth Marine Regiment, Phong Dien and Hai Lang. The AN/PRC-25/RC-292 was employed with each team providing the SLF Commander with an excellent means of communications for liaison and coordination with units adjacent to and within the AOA.

(5) Frequencies allocated by Third Marine Division were more than adequate in quantity. However, during the operation it was determined that several of these frequencies were previously assigned to other units in relatively close proximity to the AOA creating confusion and requiring several frequency shifts by this Command.

(6) During this operation, two FM circuits, Helicopter Direction #3 and Landing Zone Control, were combined into one circuit. The combining of these two circuits satisfactorily filled the requirements of each circuit, eliminated the requirement of 1 FM frequency and released one piece of FM equipment for other use. It is recommended that these circuits remain combined for future operations.

#### e. Logistics

(1) During Operation KANGAROO KICK, all resupply was from the LPH and all casualties were evacuated to the LPH. The class V basic allowance was reconstituted and cargo and equipment were off loaded without incident.

#### f. Civic Affairs

(1) Provisions were made to evacuate all refugees to the LSA at Camp Evans (YD 534417). Civilian medevac's were evacuated to the LPH for initial treatment then to the civilian hospital at Hue.

#### 8. Readiness of the SLF

(1) SLF Bravo, embarked in ARG Bravo shipping (USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10), USS OGDEN (LPD-5), USS MONTICELLO (LSD-35) and USS TERRELL COUNTY (LST 1157)) is prepared to respond to any contingencies which may arise within the Seventh Fleets area of operation. Upon arrival Subic an expeditious

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transfer will be made from the USS OGDEN (LPD-5) to the USS PAUL REVERE (APA 248). Continuous emphasis is being placed on personnel, training, supply and equipment readiness. BLT 2/3 (less AMTrac Platoon) and HMM 265 Detachment Alpha are prepared to reembark aboard ARG shipping on short notice.

9. The following comments on BLT 2/3 and HMM 265 After Action Reports are included.

(a) BLT 2/3

(1) Para 5c(2) If there was any long response time for night Med Evacs other than that inherent in that type mission it was caused by the poor state of training of the Landing Support Team. A situation which is presently being corrected.

(2) Para 13(a) is concurred in; however, as stated in previous After Action Reports, when an area is swept clear of enemy but the tactical situation does not permit permanent occupancy, it is highly probable the enemy will filter back in.

(b) HMM 265

(1) Para 3a. This is a problem known to all levels of command; and appropriate measures are being taken to ease the situation.

(2) Para 3b. The problems and hazards of preparing for a maximum launch during hours of darkness are known and the extra effort put forth is appreciated. Experience has shown that the best time to achieve maximum surprise effect on the enemy is at dawn. Therefore to take advantage of this surprise most landings will be made at first light.

(3) Para 3c: is completely concurred in, and as stated in Para 9(a)(1) above, a program has been established to correct this problem.

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COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT - BELT DRIVE

Map Reference: AMS, Vietnam, 1:50,000 Series L-7014 Sheets 6442 I through IV.

1. GENERAL.

a. Operation BELT DRIVE was a unilateral amphibious operation conducted in accordance with NWP 22(A), employing waterborne and heliborne assault forces. The operation was conducted 10 miles south of QUANG TRI CITY, the AOA being centered on the QUANG TRI/THUA THIEN PROVINCE boundary, I Corps Tactical Zone, Republic of Vietnam.

b. The inclusive dates of Operation BELT DRIVE were 27 August through 5 September 1967. During the period 290900H August to 042000H September 1967 the SLF operated under the CPCON of CG THIRD Marine Division.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

Special Landing Force  
BLT 2/3  
HMM 262

Colonel J. G. DIONISOPOULOS  
Major W. O. BEARD  
Major G. A. CORLISS

3. INTELLIGENCE

a. Enemy Situation. Information received prior to Operation BELT DRIVE indicated that the HAI LANG Forest was used by the enemy for training and rest centers, resupply and replacement areas, and base camp sites. The HAI LANG Forest accommodated the Headquarters, 416th Battalion, 5th NVA Regiment; the Headquarters, 800th Battalion, 6th NVA Regiment; two Main Force Battalions (800th and 808th); and one Local Force Company (H.99)

b. Enemy Capabilities. The enemy was capable of:

- (1) Attacking with a force of up to two NVA Battalions, or
- (2) Defending at a time and place of his choosing with a force of up to two NVA Battalions, or
- (3) Evading direct contact and resorting to spoiling attacks, ambushes and harassment with mines and surprise firing devices, and/or
- (4) Reinforcing within four to ten hours with a force of up to one NVA Battalion, two Main Force Battalion, one Sapper Battalion and one Local Force Company.

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(c) Enemy Tactics. During the operation one mortar attack was made on the Battalion CP, and eight to thirteen man squads armed with small arms/automatic weapons conducted perimeter probes against company and platoon positions. It is believed that the enemy used TNT blocks to simulate a mortar attack to cover his assault on friendly positions while friendly troops sought cover from the TNT. Significantly one enemy weapon was captured for each enemy killed. Also in one instance the enemy apparently relaxed his efforts to recover his KIA, WIA, and weapons. On or about 312330H a squad from Company E ambushed approximately 10 enemy at YD 373462. The squad reported seeing four enemy bodies in the area of ambush before withdrawing. A search conducted in the area the following morning recovered three enemy KIA one enemy WIA, one PRC-25 radio, one complete Battalion-aid type medical kit, four AK-47 carbines, 90 one-pound blocks of TNT, 14 loaded AK-47 magazines, 4 grenades, two boxes of blasting caps, ammunition and assorted equipment and supplies.

(d) Interpreters, Interrogators and Translators. The following was received from 3rd Marine Division:

- (1) Seven Interpreters. (1 officer, 6 enlisted)
- (2) One Interrogator/Translator Team. (3 enlisted)
- (3) One Counter intelligence Team. (1 officer, 2 enlisted)
- (4) One Intelligence NCO (on-the-job training)

(5) The Army Advisory Group located at Headquarters, QUANG TRI District provided an American civilian and one Vietnamese civilian from the National Police Unit located in QUANG TRI.

6. The availability and appropriate employment of these specialists during Operation BELT DRIVE reaffirmed their positive contribution to the overall effort.

4. Mission. Special Landing Force Bravo (SLF Bravo) was to conduct a heli-borne and waterborne amphibious assault in order to conduct search and destroy operations against NVA/VC forces in the AOA and to conduct screening and interdiction operations to deny enemy forces routes of access into populated areas and prevent their interference with the Vietnamese National Elections. In addition SLF Bravo was to conduct such other operations as agreed upon with CG III MAF, and on order to conduct an amphibious withdrawal.

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5. Concept of Operations

Operation BELT DRIVE was a unilateral amphibious operation conducted by the ARG/SLF BRAVO. The operation was planned as a search and destroy operation employing both waterborne and heliborne assault landings. Initially, the inherent mobility of the SLF was to be exploited to the maximum to ensure a rapid buildup of combat power ashore in order to gain surprise and shock effect. Operation BELT DRIVE was conducted in two phases:

a. A deliberate search and destroy operation within the HAI LANG Forest, the area of primary interest, to locate and destroy enemy forces and emplacements, and to locate and recover caches of ammunition and other supplies. This phase (27-31 Aug67) was characterized by aggressive maneuver at the small unit level to locate and destroy enemy forces in the area.

b. A screening and interdiction (1-5 Sep67) along routes of access from the HAI LANG Forest area to the populated areas (QUANG TRI - HAI LANG CITIES) along Highway #1 in order to prevent enemy interference with the Vietnamese National Elections.

6. Execution

a. Operation BELT DRIVE was initiated by COMSEVENTHFLT 231006Z Aug67. Execution was in accordance with CTG 79.5 OPLAN 120A-67 as supplemented by CTG 79.5 232007Z Aug67, the frag order for this operation.

b. D-Day was established as 26 August 1967 with L/H Hours at 0645H. However, adverse weather conditions in the AOA forced a postponement of D-Day to 27 August 1967, with L/H Hours at 0645H.

c. Company 'E' 2/3 landed at 0645H in LVT's over BEACH BLUE (YD 486571) without enemy contact. Company 'H' in the first helicopter wave of 16 CH-46 landed in LZ CARDINAL (YD 377464) at 0654H and Company 'G' landed subsequently in LZ WREN (YD 392452) without enemy opposition. Company 'F' landed at 1105H in LZ CARDINAL.

7. Commander's Analysisa. Planning

(1) The ARG/SLF returned from upkeep period at Subic Bay 20 August and commenced backload of BLT 2/3 and Detachment "A", HMM 265. Backload was completed and both units reported to OPCON CTG 79.5 effective 220600H August 1967. At this time the SLF was requested to report to CG Third Marine Division for planning.

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(2) On 21 August 1967 SLF planners reported to CG III MAF, as requested, for preliminary planning for an amphibious operation. Planning continued through the issuance of final orders on 24 August. During planning the following steps were accomplished.

(a) Maps, aerial photograph, area analysis and enemy order of battle were obtained and limited aerial reconnaissance of the AOA was conducted.

(b) Current intelligence was obtained from Third Marine Division and from U.S. Army Advisors at Quang Tri City.

(c) Arrangements were made for processing and evacuation of POW's, detainees, refugees, civilian casualties, and captured documents and supplies.

(d) Arrangements were made for the use of RF/PF personnel from Hai Lang District.

(e) Logistic support procedures were arranged.

(f) Radio frequencies were obtained and assigned, and the communications plan was issued.

(g) The AOA was agreed upon and command relationships were finalized.

(h) A naval gunfire support ship was requested and requirements for close air support were determined and requested. Additional helicopter support was requested consisting of four armed and one un-armed UH-1E.

(i) Arrangements were made to provide liaison to the Third Marine Division(Fwd), to Fourth Marines and to exchange liaison parties with the 1st ARVN Division Headquarters at Quang Tri City.

b. Command Relationships.

(1) Operation BELT DRIVE was a unilateral amphibious operation with command relationships in accordance with NWP-22(A). CTG 76.5 passed OPCON of the SLF to CG III MAF at 290900H August 1967 who simultaneously passed it to CG 3rd Marine Division. OPCON of Company F/2/3 was passed to 1st AMTRAC Battalion effective 311700H August 1967. 2ndBn 3rd Marines, less Company "F", and with Battery B/1/12, Recon Platoon and Shore Party Platoon CHOPPED to 4th Marines effective 010800H September 1967. At 042000H September 1967 Company "F" was CHOPPED to 2ndBn 3rd Marines and at that time 2d Battalion(Rein), Third Marines CHOPPED to the SLF. SLF Bravo CHOPPED to CTG 76.5 effective 050001H September 1967. SLF Bravo conducted an amphibious withdrawal by surface means. On completion of the amphibious withdrawal

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Operation BELT DRIVE was terminated at 052000H September 1967.

(2) Special Landing Force Bravo provided liaison officers to Third Marine Division(Fwd), 4th Marines, and exchanged liaison officers with Province Headquarters, QUANG TRI.

c. Supporting Arms.

(1) Air

(a) Fixed Wing air support was readily available and was used when required. Landing Zones CARDINAL and WREN were each prepped by four aircraft from 1st Marine Aircraft Wing prior to landing of heliborne troops. The preparation was controlled by TAC(A) in armed UH-1E helicopters. After the landing, close air support aircraft were on station until L+2. During BELT DRIVE, secondary targets within the AOA were selected for unexpended ordnance when aircraft on-station time was exhausted. Fixed wing aircraft provided 16 missions with 32 sorties during BELT DRIVE.

(b) Four armed UH-1E helicopters were assigned to SLF BRAVO on D-Day. Thereafter, two armed UH-1E's were provided until the end of the operation. These helicopters provided control for air strikes, support for ground action, and in several instances, conducted emergency evacuation of wounded.

(c) One UH-1E (Unarmed) was provided to SLF BRAVO for command and control. This helicopter was also used extensively for aerial observation.

(2) Artillery. Artillery attached to SLF BRAVO, Battery "B", 1st Battalion, 12th Marines, provided light artillery support to the SLF. Medium Artillery of ARVN was available for reinforcing fires from Hai Lang and Quang Tri. Heavy artillery support, 175mm, was available from Dong Ha if required.

(3) Naval Gunfire. USS DUPONT (DD 941) was assigned to support the landing. The landing over the beach was unopposed and forces soon moved beyond effective range of DUPONT. As a result, she was released on D+1 after firing several H&I missions on the night of D-Day. USS WALDRON (DD 699) and USS BOSTON (CAG 1) covered the amphibious withdrawal.

(4) Coordination. Coordination of supporting arms was in accordance with current amphibious doctrine. Coordination was afloat until 0900 on D+2. At that time the SLF Fire Support Coordinator moved ashore and coordinated supporting fires until 010800H September when 2nd Battalion

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(-)(Rein), 3d Marines CHOPPED to 4th Marines. Coordination was returned afloat during the amphibious withdrawal.

d. Communication

(1) During Operation "BELT DRIVE" communications were very good to the battalion ashore and to higher headquarters. Technical difficulties were revealed during the operation which forced the SLF to use the MRC-110 radio vehicle aboard ship. Only minor circuit outage was experienced, and this outage occurred during maneuvers when the ship's hull masked some of the lower antennas.

(2) The KY-8 (Nestor Crypto System) proved sufficient, and the collocation of the crypto system with the VRC-46 radios allowed a rapid changeover from clear to covered means of transmissions. Covered circuits were used only to a limited extent to higher headquarters. However, they functioned well throughout the operation. The battalion ashore did not have a covered transmission capability as the MRC-109 radio vehicle was not taken ashore due to the rapidly changing tactical situation.

(3) Radio Relay was not employed during the operation. The shipboard GRC-10 terminal was tested during the operations with other ships in the Task Group, and functioned poorly. The antenna terminals were cleaned and the equipment is currently scheduled for further testing.

(4) Personnel for liaison teams were provided by 9thMAB and radio relay personnel. Three liaison teams were provided to adjacent unit headquarters and communications were reliable over a range of about twenty miles. The 4th Marine Regiment is to be complimented for the excellent relay assistance they provided for the liaison teams, particularly during periods when the ship operated in offshore night steaming areas.

(5) The Electronics Maintenance Company, 1st FSR, once again provided outstanding support in repairing SLF radios prior to D-Day.

(6) Operation "BELT DRIVE" reiterated problem areas which are currently under study by the Phibron and SLF Staffs. These problems include relocation of horizontally mounted antennas, replacement of certain transmission lines, and overhaul of the shipboard radio relay antenna and provision for adequate VRC-46 spare parts. All these factors have contributed to the heavy use of the MRC-110 aboard ship. Corrective action is being taken which will obviate its use aboard ship.



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e. Logistics

(1) During the planning conference at Third Marine Division, arrangements were made for resupply of the BLT from in-country assets at the LSA at 4th Marines CP. Resupply from the LSA commenced on D+1 and continued throughout the operation. Certain food-stuffs and water, packaged in 6 gallon plastic containers, were supplied daily by helicopters from the LPH-10 to the using units.

(2) A detachment of Shore Party and BLT Supply representatives were positioned at the Operation Center of the LSA for coordination of resupply.

(3) Resupply was conducted by HMM 262 until grounding of all CH-46 helicopters on 1 Sep67. Subsequently resupply as well as casualty evacuation was accomplished by two UH-34 helicopters provided daily by CTG 79.4.

(4) The USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10) was designated as the casualty evacuation control ship. BLT 2/3 casualties were evacuated by helicopter direct to TRIPOLI.

(5) During the period 3-8 September 1967 the flexibility and value of the mobile sea base concept was clearly demonstrated. After facilities at the Marine Base Dong Ha had been severely damaged by artillery and rocket fire, medical and surgical facilities of SLF Bravo and ARG Bravo were made available to treat casualties from that base. In addition the LPH provided a safe haven for 1stMAW helicopters stationed at Dong Ha during the emergency.

f. Civic Affairs

(1) Provisions were made to evacuate all refugees to the LSA. Civilian medevac's were to be evacuated to the LPH for initial treatment and then to the civilian hospital at Hue.

(2) The tactical situation and the area of operations was not conducive for a MEDCAP program.

8. Readiness of the SLF

(A) SLF BRAVO, embarked in ARG BRAVO shipping USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10), USS PAUL REVERE (APA 246), USS MONTICELLO (LSD-35) and USS TERRELL COUNTY (LST-1157) is prepared to respond to any contingencies which may arise within the Seventh Fleets area of operation. Upon arrival Da Nang troops and equipment will be transferred quickly from the USS MONTICELLO (LSD-35)

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to its relief, the USS TORTUGA (LSD-26). Loading plans will be revised and cargo relocated to take advantage of the USS WINDHAM COUNTY (LST 1170) a recent addition to ARG BRAVO. Continuous emphasis is being placed on personnel, training, supply, and equipment readiness.

(B) The continued readiness of the SLF was again emphasized when HMM 262 was able to relieve HMM 265 on 23 Aug 1967 without causing a delay in the scheduled landing.

9. The following comments on BLT 2/3 and HMM 262 After Action Reports are included.

A. BLT 2/3

(1) Para 13d is concurred in. On several previous occasions prisoners were evacuated to in-country commands for interrogation but no results of the interrogation were ever received. Requests have been made to these commands that interrogation reports be furnished promptly to the SLF in future operations.

(2) Para 13e is concurred in. Requests have been initiated thru supply channels for sufficient containers to sustain SLF operations.


B. HMM 262

(1) Para 4a. This particular movement was ordered by CG Third Marine Division on an emergency basis. It is agreed that the more detailed the mission briefing, the better the execution. However, this is not always possible.

(2) Para 4c is concurred in. Action has been taken to correct this situation.

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**SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED**

**COMMAND CHRONOLOGY**  
**6 - 30 SEP 1967**



#0 013340

**CTG 79.5**

SLF Task Group 79.5  
S&C Control No. 00564

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TG 79.5 (SLF)

6-30 Sep 67

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HEADQUARTERS  
Special Landing Force (TG 79.5)  
FPO San Francisco 96602

1/CGC/wdm  
5750  
Ser: 0039-67  
16 October 1967

SECRET-NOFORN (Downgraded to unclassified upon removal of Enclosure (1))

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade

Subj: Command Chronology for the period 6 - 30 September 1967, submission of

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2  
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8  
(c) BrigO 5750.1C

Encl: (1) Special Landing Force (TG 79.5) Command Chronology

1. In accordance with references (a) through (c), the Command Chronology for the Special Landing Force (TG 79.5) is submitted as Enclosure (1).

*M. W. Schmidt*  
M. W. SCHMIDT

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS  
Special Landing Force (TG 79.5)  
FPO San Francisco 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

6 - 30 September 1967

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GP-4

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. DESIGNATION

COMMANDER

Special Landing Force  
(TG 79.5)

Col J. G. DIONISOPOULOS

6 - 30 Sep 1967

SUBORDINATE UNITS

BLT 2/3

Major W. C. BEARD

6 - 30 Sep 1967

HMM 262

Major G. A. CORLISS

6 - 30 Sep 1967

ATTACHED UNITS

NONE

2. LOCATION

USS TRIFOLI (LPH-10) ✓

6 - 30 Sep 1967 ✓

USS MONTICELLO (LSD-5)

6 - 8 Sep 1967

USS PAUL REVERE (APA-248) ✓

6 - 30 Sep 1967 ✓

USS TERRELL COUNTY (LST-1157)

6 - 20 Sep 1967

USS WASHOE COUNTY (LST-1165) ✓

18 - 30 Sep 1967 ✓

USS WINDHAM COUNTY (LST-1170)

7 - 30 Sep 1967 ✓

USS TORTUGA (LSD-26) ✓

6 - 30 Sep 1967 ✓

3. STAFF OFFICERS

Executive Officer

LtCol R. A. MASON

6 - 30 Sep 1967

AO/S-1

2ndLt C. G. COMER

6 - 30 Sep 1967

S-2

Capt C. A. AUSTIN

6 - 11 Sep 1967

Capt W. B. MAYBERRY

12 - 30 Sep 1967

Asst S-2

Capt W. B. MAYBERRY

6 - 11 Sep 1967

Asst S-2/AO

1stLt R. T. WALLACE

6 - 30 Sep 1967

S-3

LtCol R. A. MASON

6 - 18 Sep 1967

Major L. J. NAQUIN

19 - 30 Sep 1967

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Asst S-3/FSC	Major W. A. WESTON	6 - 30 Sep 1967
Asst S-3	Major L. J. NAQUIN	6 - 18 Sep 1967
	Capt I. J. CAHILL (RAIC)	6 - 30 Sep 1967
S-4	Major J. F. SHOVAR	6 - 30 Sep 1967
CommO	Capt C. C. ENTWISTLE	6 - 30 Sep 1967

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

SLF Staff:	USMC Off - 11	USMC Enl - 30	USN Off - 0	USN Enl - 0
BLT:	USMC Off - 59	USMC Enl - 1447	USN Off - 9	USN Enl - 77
HMM:	USMC Off - 40	USMC Enl - 186	USN Off - 1	USN Enl - 3

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PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

From 6 thru 8 September 1967 the USS Tripoli remained off the coast of RVN, near Dong Ha, to accept medical evacuations from the Dong Ha area and to provide a helicopter refueling capability for aircraft in the area. The remainder of the ARG shipping was in Da Nang, RVN for rehabilitation. On 8 September the USS Tripoli sailed for the Da Nang area arriving in Da Nang Harbor early on 9 September for rehabilitation. On 10 September the ARG/SLF sailed from Da Nang, RVN. From 11 thru 16 September the ARG/SLF remained in a 24 hour reaction status for I CTZ, RVN.

Operation FORTRESS SENTRY commenced on 17 September with the landing of BLT 2/3 by landing craft in Quang Tri Province, I CTZ, RVN, and continued through 27 September. On 25 and 26 September the remainder of BLT 2/3 (less C&C Plt, ONTOS and LSU) was offloaded into Dong Ha and BLT 2/3 was CHOPPED to CG III MAF.

On 27 September the ARG/SLF sailed for Subic Bay, R.P. for upkeep, arriving there on 29 September.

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PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

The following is a review of the activities of the Special Landing Force (TG 79.5). Detailed information of BLT 2/3 and HMM 262 is shown in the appropriate Command Chronology in PART IV. Detailed information on FORTRESS SENTRY is contained in PART IV.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
6 - 7 Sep	The USS Tripoli remained off the coast near Dong Ha, I CTZ, RVN, to provide a helicopter platform for refueling and medical evacuation facilities. The remainder of the ARG shipping sailed to Da Nang for rehabilitation.
8 - 9 Sep	The USS Tripoli sailed for Da Nang, arriving early on 9 Sep for rehabilitation.
10 Sep	CTG 79.5 and representatives at Hq, III MAF for operation planning. The ARG/SLF sailed from Da Nang, I CTZ, RVN.
10 - 15 Sep	The ARG/SLF remained in a 24 hour reaction status off the coast of I CTZ, RVN.
16 Sep	D-Day for Operation FORTRESS SENTRY was delayed due to marginal weather and high seas.
17 Sep	Operation FORTRESS SENTRY commenced with the landing of BLT 2/3 by landing craft in Quang Tri Province, I CTZ, RVN. OPCON 1st AmTracBn and 3d Plt, 1st Armored AmTracCo passed to CTG 79.5.  Ref: CG 3d MarDiv msg 160127Z Sep67
25 Sep	OPCON of BLT 2/3 (less C&C Plt, ONTOS and LSU), 1st AmTracBn and 3d Plt, 1st Armored AmTracCo passed to CG III MAF at 250800H Sep67.  Ref: CTG 76.5 msg 241830Z Sep67
25 - 26 Sep	Remaining elements and equipment of BLT 2/3 (less C&C Plt, ONTOS and LSU) offloaded at Dong Ha, RVN.

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27 Sep            Operation FORTRESS SENTRY terminated. The ARG/SLF sailed  
for Subic Bay, R.P. for upkeep.

Ref: COMSEVENTHFLT msg 270912Z Sep67

29 Sep            Arrived Subic Bay, R.P.

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PART IVCHRONOLOGY OF SUBORDINATE COMMANDS  
AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

- Appendix 1 ✓ 1 CG 3d MarDiv msg 160127Z Sep67  
2 CTG 76.5 msg 241830Z Sep67  
3 COMSEVENTHFLT msg 270912Z Sep67
- 3iled  
sep* { Appendix 2 ✓ Command Chronology, BLT 2/3, 6-30 Sep  
 Appendix 3 ✓ Command Chronology, HMM 262, 4-30 Sep
- Appendix 4 SLF, After Action Report, FORTRESS SENTRY, 10-27 Sep 67
- f/w c/char* { Appendix 5 BLT 2/3, After Action Report, FORTRESS SENTRY, 17-25 Sep 67  
 Appendix 6 ✓ HMM 262, After Action Report, FORTRESS SENTRY, 17-25 Sep 67

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**SECRET**

O 16/127Z SEP 67  
FM CG THIRD MAF  
TO ZEN/CG III MAF  
INFO ZEN/FIRST AMTRAC Bn  
ZEN/TWELFTH MARINES  
RUMPTJG/CTG SEVENTY NINE POINT FIVE  
BT  
S E C R E T  
OPERATION FORTRESS SENTRY  
A. NY 151331Z FT67  
1. CHANGE EFFECTIVE TIME OF CHOP IN REF A P.O. 160001H to 170001H  
SEP1967.  
GR4  
BT

NNNN

**DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10**

**SECRET**

RUMFKE  
 DE RUMFUAG 279 267183Z  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 O 241832Z SEP 67  
 FM CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
 TO RUAUBUL/COMSEVENTHFLT  
 ZEN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE  
 INFO RUHHRQA/CINCPAC  
 RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT  
 RUMSBB/COMUSMACV  
 RUMSAL/CDR SEVENTHAF  
 RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC  
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW  
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC (FWD)  
 ZEN/BLT TWO SLANT THREE ✓  
 ZEN/MARMEHELRON TWO SIX TWO ✓  
 RUMHNA/COMNAVFORV  
 RUWJMSA/COMPHIBPAC  
 RUMFKRV/CTF SEVEN SIX  
 RUMEUAM/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR  
 RUMFCR/CTG SEVEN SIX PT EIGHT

TOR 2503384/mg

S/3, HMM, A.

COPY OF C.M.

PAGE TWO RUMFUAG 279 S E C R E T  
 RUAUBUL/CTF SEVEN NINE  
 RUAUDE/CTG SEVEN NINE PT THREE  
 RUMEUAA/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR  
 RUMFUE/CTF SEVEN SEVEN  
 RUMFUZ/CTF SEVEN THREE  
 RUMFCR/CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE  
 RUMHVHD/CTF ONE ONE FIVE  
 RUMNVHE/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE  
 RUMFUAA/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT  
 RUMFCR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE  
 RUAUDD/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT NINE  
 RUMECR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE  
 RUMFKE/CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE  
 BT

S E C R E T

FORTRESS SENTRY LANDING FORCE CHOP ASHORE (U)

A. COMSEVENTHFLT 101310Z SEP 67

B. ADMINO III MAF 241522Z SEP 67

1. LANDING FORCE FIRMLY ESTABLISHED ASHORE.

2. IAW PARA 9 REF A, AND AS MUTUALLY AGREED UPON BY CATF AND

PAGE THREE RUMFUAG 279 S E C R E T

CG III MAF, OPCON BLT 2/3 (LESS COL AND CLR PLT, ONTOS, AND LSU);

1ST AMTRAC BN; AND 3RD PLT, 1ST ARMORED AMTRAC COMPANY PASSES

TO CG, III MAF EFFECTIVE 250300H5 SEP 67. AOA DISSOLVED  
 AND CONTROL OF SUPPORTING ARMS PASSES TO CG, III MAF AT THAT  
 TIME.

3. ORIG REMAINS IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS ASHORE UNTIL  
 COMPLETION OF GENERAL OFFLOADING ON OR ABOUT 0100H.

App 1-2

GUSA NR 14162  
 O 270912Z SEP 67  
 FM COMSEVENTHFLT  
 TO RUMUAG/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
 RUENAAA/CNO  
 RUHHHQA/CINCPAC  
 RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT  
 INFO RUMUAG/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE  
 RUMFUA/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT  
 RUMFKRV/CTF SEVEN SIX  
 RUABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE  
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
 RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV  
 RUMHMF/CG III MAF  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUWJMSA/COMPHIBPAC  
 RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC  
 RUABQL/CG FMFPAC (FWD)  
 RUMNVHD/CTF ONE ONE FIVE  
 RUMSBJ/CMDR SEVENTH AIR FORCE  
 RUMECRJY"8 733, "349 05 3;3, 05 9,3

TOR: 280145H/302/77

S/3

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PAGE TWO RUAUBUL 1604 SE C R E T  
 RUMFUE/CTF SEVEN SEVEN  
 RUMFT/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT TWO  
 RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAF  
 RUMUAM/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR  
 RUMUAM/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR  
 RUMFCR/////CTG SEN HR  
 RUMFCR/TU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE  
 RUMFUZ/CTF SEVEN THREE  
 RUMFKE/CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE  
 RUMNVHD/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE  
 BT  
 S E C R E T  
 CTE 70.2.1.1 PASS ADVANCED COPY TO COMUSMACV  
 OPERATION FORTRESS SENTRY (U)  
 1. FOR CTG 76.5: TERMINATE OPERATION FORTRESS ENTRY.  
 2. FOR CNO, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT: CANCEL NICKNAME FORTRESS SENTRY2  
 SEP 1967.  
 GP-4  
 BT

701111

App 1-#3

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COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT - FORTRESS SENTRY

Map Reference: AMS, Vietnam 1:50,000 Series L7014 Sheets 6442 I and IV and 6443 III.

1. GENERAL.

a. Operation FORTRESS SENTRY was a unilateral amphibious operation conducted in accordance with NWP 22(A) employing waterborne assault forces. The operation was conducted in the GIO LINH District, QUANG TRI Province I Corps Tactical Zone, Republic of Vietnam. The area was bounded generally by the CUA VIET River to the south, highway #1 to the west, the BEN HAI River to the north and the coast to the east.

b. The inclusive dates of Operation FORTRESS SENTRY were 10-27 September 1967. COMSEVENTHFLT'S 101310Z September 1967, FORTRESS SENTRY Initiating Directive, assigned SLF BRAVO the mission of III MAF Reserve, prepared for possible employment in First Marine Division area of operations during the period of 10-14 September 1967. On request of CG III MAF and upon receipt of COMSEVENTHFLT'S 141230Z September 1967, FORTRESS SENTRY Initiating Directive Addendum, CTG 79.5 was directed to conduct an amphibious operation in the Third Marine Division area of operations.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

Special Landing Force  
BLT 2/3  
HMM 262

Colonel J. G. DIONISOPOULOS  
Major W. O. BEARD  
Major G. A. CORLISS

3. INTELLIGENCE

a. Enemy Situation. Information received prior to Operation FORTRESS SENTRY indicated that the AOA contained rocket and artillery positions, arms caches and supplies. The enemy strength within the AOA was estimated to be 1,365 consisting of the following units: HQ, 270th Regiment NVA; 6th Battalion 270 Regiment NVA; 1st Battalion, 31st Regiment NVA; K.400 Local Force Company. The enemy fire support consisted of numerous artillery pieces positioned in and north of the DMZ area. This artillery consisted of 85MM, 100MM, 122MM and 130MM field pieces. 122MM and 140MM Rockets could be employed to support attacks against friendly units.

79-11-1  
2/12  
FORTRESS SENTRY  
10-27-67  
p 47

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b. Enemy Capabilities. The enemy was capable of:

(1) Attacking with a force of over two NVA Battalions with artillery support or

(2) Defending at a time and place of his choosing with a force of over two NVA Battalions with artillery and rocket support, or

(3) Evading direct contact and resorting to spoiling attacks, harassment with mines, artillery, and rockets.

c. Enemy Tactics.

Enemy contact was negligible from D-Day through D+5. However the area of operations contained numerous mines which caused moderate to severe damage to several LVTP5s. The enemy also employed surprise firing devices and sporadic mortar attacks. Significant enemy contact began on 22 September 1967 and continued until the enemy broke contact on 24 September 1967. Up until this period it was apparent that the enemy chose not to engage our forces directly and relied primarily on 60MM mortars, which were displaced frequently, and upon medium and heavy artillery from and north of the DMZ. However, when our forces engaged the enemy in the vicinity of Hill 31 (YD 269733) and several hours later in the vicinity of the village of AN MY (YD 257748) his defensive actions indicated a well trained and organized force. It was later learned through the interrogation of villagers by PRU that the swift maneuver of the ELT had caught this NVA force by surprise. It was learned that the unit expected an attack from the west and south west and had so oriented its positions in that direction. When the attack came from the northeast, the NVA unit was unprepared. This action accounted for 129 NVA KIA confirmed and 19 KIA probable and 1 NVA POW and 3 detainees. Forty one graves were uncovered by ARVN Forces shortly after SLF Forces had withdrawn from the area and the above totals include this number. The detainees were interrogated by ITT sub team for tactical intelligence and then were delivered to 3rdMarDiv (Fwd). Numerous weapons and equipment were captured, along with the one NVA POW, a wounded hospital corpsman. This POW was treated aboard the LPH and then evacuated to the NSA hospital at Da Nang. Interrogation was not possible because the POW was under heavy sedation. Documents captured revealed information relative to the activities of the C4 Company, 4th Battalion, (probably AKA 4th Battalion) 270th Regiment and the C2 Company, D4 Battalion, 270th Regiment.

d. Terrain and Weather(1) Terrain Features

The terrain was compartmented by four segments, all generally



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aligned with the coast and paralleling one another. The coastal lowland and delta plain progressed inland from gently rolling, sandy beaches and dunes to a low area of rice cultivation adjacent to National Highway #1. Ground slopes were less than 10 percent and the highest point in the area was 46 meters (YD 214743). The area was poorly drained and large areas were inundated as a result of heavy rains. The soft sand and rice field areas made movement by foot and by tracked vehicles difficult.

## (2) Weather

The AOA on 16 September 1967 was under the influence of the "Northeast Monsoon" and as a result, Operation FORTRESS SENTRY had to be postponed until 17 September. The Northeast monsoon persisted until the 18th and then weakened and passed to the North. Skies remained generally overcast for most of the operation. From the 19th through the 22nd, and on the 25th and 26th ceilings were generally 7000 feet except in scattered showers. During the rest of the period, low ceilings prevailed, frequently below 1000 feet.

## 4. Mission.

Special Landing Force Bravo was to execute an amphibious assault, landing by surface means in QUANG TRI Province to conduct search and destroy operations east of highway #1 between the CUA VIET River and the DMZ to destroy VC/NVA forces, locate and destroy rocket positions, uncover arms caches, and clear the area for the construction of a Strong Point/Battalion Patrol Base.

## 5. Concept of Operations

Operation FORTRESS SENTRY was a unilateral amphibious operation conducted by the ARG/SLF BRAVO. The operation was planned as a search and destroy operation by executing surface assault landings into the area of operation. Initially, Operation FORTRESS SENTRY was to be conducted in three phases:

### a. Phase I

SLF Bravo to conduct an amphibious assault and in conjunction with ARVN forces conduct a rapid search and destroy operation to eliminate interference with navigation from the north bank of the CUA VIET and BO DIEN Rivers.

### b. Phase II

SLF Bravo to conduct a deliberate search and destroy operation in

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the AOA to destroy the enemy, locate and destroy rocket and artillery positions, discover arms caches and supplies, and to provide security for construction of a Strong Point/Battalion Patrol Base.

c. Phase III

SLF Bravo to execute an amphibious withdrawal.

6. Execution

a. Operation FORTRESS SENTRY was initiated by COMSEVENTHFLT 101310Z Sep67 which was modified by COMSEVENTHFLT 141230Z, FORTRESS SENTRY Initiating Directive Addendum. Execution was in accordance with CTG 79.5 OPLAN 120A-67 as supplemented by CTG 79.5 msg 111706Z Sep67, Frag Order for Operation FORTRESS SENTRY.

b. D-Day was established as 16 September 1967 with H-Hour at 0500H. However, adverse weather conditions in the AOA forced a postponement of D-Day to 17 September 1967, with H-Hour at 0500H.

c. On D-Day SLF Bravo executed a surface assault on GIO LINH District, QUANG TRI Province. Prior to H-Hour Naval Gunfire bombardment commenced against artillery and coastal defense batteries located in the vicinity of the DMZ.

d. Sea conditions delayed H-Hour and E/2/3 landed over BEACH RED (YD 336708) in LVTS at 0630H, secured beach area with no enemy contact and established a defensive perimeter at BEACH RED. G/2/3 landed at 0635H and F/2/3 at 0700H over BEACH BLUE (YD 341699) and joined with the 1st AMTRAC Battalion. The Tank Platoon landed over BEACH ORANGE (YD 338700) and prepared to move with LVTS in armored column to seize Landing Force Objective #1 (YD 280760). H/2/3 landed over BEACH BLUE, boarded AMTRACS and moved by armored column to seize Landing Force Objective #2 (YD 299680). Elements of the 1st ARVN Div established blocking positions in the vicinity (YD 2474).

7. Commander's Analysis

a. Planning

(1) SLF BRAVO reported to CG 1st MarDiv on 10Sep67 as III MAF Reserve and upon receipt of FORTRESS SENTRY Initiating Directive Addendum, SLF BRAVO planners reported to CG 3rd MarDiv for planning for Operation FORTRESS SENTRY. During planning the following steps were accomplished:

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(a) Maps, aerial photographs, area analysis and enemy order of battle were obtained and aerial reconnaissance of the AOA was conducted.

(b) Current intelligence was obtained from Third Marine Division, U.S. Army Advisors and National Police Advisors at QUANG TRI.

(c) Arrangements were made for an Interrogation Translator subteam. A Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) was obtained from the U.S. Army Advisory Group at QUANG TRI City.

(d) Arrangements were made for processing and evacuation of POW'S, detainees, refugees, civilian casualties, and captured documents and supplies.

(e) Logistic support procedures were established.

(f) Radio frequencies were obtained and assigned, and the communications plan was issued.

(g) The AOA was agreed upon and command relationships were finalized.

(h) Naval gunfire ships were requested and requirements for close air support were determined and requested. Additional helicopter support consisting of four armed and one unarmed UH-1E was requested.

(i) Arrangements were made for the First AMTRAC BN and 3D Platoon, 1st Armored Amphibian Company to operate under OPCON of CTG 79.5. The time of CHOP was to be 0001H on D-Day.

(j) Arrangements were made to provide liaison teams to the Third Marine Division (Fwd), and the 2d ARVN Regiment at Dong Ha.

b. Command Relationships.

Operation FORTRESS SENTRY was a unilateral amphibious operation with command relationships in accordance with NWP-22(A). Liaison was established with Headquarters Third Marine Division Forward and Headquarters Second ARVN Regiment at Dong Ha. 1st AMTRAC Battalion, and 3D Platoon, 1st Armored Amphibian Company reported to OPCON CTG 79.5 at 170001H September 1967. At 250800H September 1967 the above units were returned to OPCON of their parent unit. BLT 2/3 (less 2D Platoon, Company A, 3rd Anti Tank Battalion, Detachment LSU, Force Logistics Command, and 2D Clearing Platoon, Company B, 3D Medical Battalion) was chopped to CG III MAF thence to CG Third Marine

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Division at 250800H. Control of supporting arms was passed at the same time. Upon the completion of selective off loading of BLT equipment from ARG shipping, Operation FORTRESS SENTRY was terminated on 27 September 1967.

c. Supporting Arms.

(1) Air

a. Fixed wing air support was to be provided by First Marine Air Wing, however adverse weather conditions during D-Day and D+1 precluded fixed wing employment. Fixed wing air support was provided on call and utilized throughout the operation when weather conditions permitted. Fixed wing aircraft provided 18 missions with 36 sorties during Operation FORTRESS SENTRY.

b. Two Armed UH-1E were assigned to SLF BRAVO on D-Day. These helicopters provided control for fixed wing air strikes, and provided direct and effective support to ground units, and in several instances, conducted emergency evacuation of wounded Marines.

c. One UH-1E(unarmed) was assigned to SLF BRAVO for command and control. This helicopter was used extensively for aerial observation, and when required, for emergency evacuation of wounded, and for planning and liaison missions.

(2) Artillery.

Battery "B", 1st Battalion, 12th Marines, the artillery battery attached to BLT 2/3, landed by boat over BLUE BEACH in the late afternoon of D-Day. Prior to the landing of Battery "B", the 3d Platoon, 1st Armored Amphibian Company supported the landing from a position on the south bank of the Cua Viet. This platoon was placed under the operational control of the SLF at 0001 on D-Day and entered the Battery "B" Conduct of Fire Net. After Battery "B" was emplaced, the LVTH-6 platoon was passed to the operational control of BLT 2/3 for groupment with Battery "B". Thereafter, the fires of the LVTH-6 platoon were controlled by Battery "B". The 3d Platoon, 1st Armored Amphibian Company was replaced by the 2d Platoon on D+1. Medium and heavy artillery reinforcing fires were available from 12th Marines units positioned at Gio Linh and Dong Ha.

(3) Naval Gunfire.

The requirement for naval gunfire support of FORTRESS SENTRY was greater than for most of the recent operations of SLF BRAVO. It was considered mandatory that a heavy caliber ship be available for counterbattery fire against the numerous enemy artillery guns known to exist in the northern sector of the AOA and across the Ben Hai River in North Vietnam.

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The landing would be within easy range of many of these guns. Commander Landing Force requested a heavy Cruiser and a 5"/38 caliber destroyer. Commander Amphibious Task Force requested a 5"54 destroyer as added support for naval units. Ships were provided as requested. USS BOSTON (CAG-1), USS MORTON (DD-948) and USS PHILLIPS (DD-498), were on station on D-Day to provide gunfire support. All enemy artillery positions known to have been active during the month of September in the area immediately to the north of the area of operations were placed on the target list for pre-H-Hour neutralization and harassing fires. With the addition of several suspected enemy positions, the target list contained 42 targets for pre-H-Hour fires. The majority of the fires were delivered by the 8" guns of the USS BOSTON with 144 eight inch rounds being delivered in the 90 minutes before H-Hour. The BOSTON was relieved on D+2 and the direct support destroyer was relieved on D+4. The USS MORTON was assigned to the control of 12th Marines and thereafter, naval gunfire support was requested through the 12th Marines. The USS MORTON was used frequently in the latter days of the operation, primarily in the counterbattery-counter mortar role.

#### (4) Fire Support Coordination.

Coordination of supporting arms was in accordance with current amphibious doctrine. Coordination was afloat until 1600 on D+4. At that time the SLF Fire Support Coordinator moved ashore and established an austere FSCC in the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion COC. Control of supporting arms, less air, was passed ashore. Communications were established on the BLT Artillery FD Net, 12th Marines FD Net which was monitored in the Dong Ha FSCC, and the TAR Net. Communications with the USS TRIPOLI were also available by direct line through the radio relay established at the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion Command Post. Communications to the FSCC at Dong Ha were also possible through radio relay which was the primary means of communications with that FSCC. Although the SLF does not have the personnel or equipment to establish a full scale FSCC, the passage of control and coordination ashore ensures more positive communications with the supported unit and a more rapid response to their fire support requirements. This is particularly true when operating in an area such as that around Dong Ha where many units are in a relatively small area and coordination between adjacent units is a continuing problem. It is recommended that the SLF be augmented with a minimum of one additional officer trained in fire support coordination, three additional radio operators and additional radio equipment consisting of 1-PRC25, two RC-292 Antennas, and two remote units when operations are planned in which an SLF FSCC is to be established.

#### d. Communication

(1) Communications during Operation FORTRESS SENTRY were excellent,

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both to higher and lower echelons. The VRC-46 and KY-8 equipment utilized by SLF BRAVO proved highly reliable. Minor circuit outages occurred when antennas were masked by the ship's hull. However, this condition existed only for brief periods. Prior to Operation FORTRESS SENTRY, the Electronics Maintenance Company, FSR, Da Nang, inspected, adjusted, and repaired equipment. This excellent service ensured the reliable performance of communication equipment throughout this operation.

(2) Two liaison teams were deployed with PRC-25 and RC-292 equipment. Communications with the teams were excellent and the essential coordination link between SLF and in-country commands was maintained.

(3) The KY-8(Nestor Crypto System) afforded a reliable means for secure voice communications. The KY-8 usage included traffic to in-country commands and by relay from them to liaison teams.

(4) On D+5 control of supporting arms moved ashore. A MRC-110, three PRC-47 radios and three operators were moved ashore to provide required communications.

(5) Radio relay was installed on D+5, by positioning a MRC-62 van at the 1st AMTRAC Battalion. Existing links to the Third Marine Division telephone system were entered and provisions were made to tie-in the BLT 2/3 Command Group whenever feasible, however, the rapidly changing tactical situation precluded implementation of this service.

(6) Four radio operators were requested from, and were provided by, Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade to meet the communication requirements of the operation.

#### e. Logistics

(1) Prior to the commencement of Operation FORTRESS SENTRY planning conferences were attended at 3rd Marine Division Headquarters at PHU BAI and at 3rd Marine Division (FWD) at DONG HA. It was determined that all resupply would come from ARG/SLF shipping. In order to ensure that adequate supplies were available to support the operation, the USS WINDHAM COUNTY (LST 1170) was dispatched to Da Nang late in the afternoon of D-Day to embark 5 days of Class I, IV and V supplies and to return to area of operations on D+1.

(2) An LSA was established at BEACH BLUE and one day of supply was delivered by landing craft. Initially resupply from the LSA to the BLT was accomplished by LVTP5s. As the operation progressed the LSA continued to be resupplied by landing craft and unit distribution from the LSA was accomplished by helicopters.

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(3) On D+2 emergency resupply was delivered by helicopter from the LPH to company positions ashore. In order to ensure maximum flexibility of resupply, all supplies on the LST were moved to the LPH. Concurrent with this movement Class II supplies previously requisitioned were receipted for at DONG HA and transported to the LPH by CH-53 aircraft.

(4) On D+3 normal BLT resupply was accomplished by landing craft to the LSA and from the LSA to the BLT by helicopter.

(5) By D+4, two days of supplies were developed in the LSA and a B/A plus 2 DOA was positioned at Battery "B". At this time the B/A and normal prescribed loads were reconstituted on each ship of the ARG. Class II supplies received on D+2 were delivered to assigned ships for storage.

(6) On D+8 two rifle companies and the Alpha Command Group of 2nd Battalion 3rd Marines (-) (Rein) were ferried by landing craft from BEACH ORANGE to 3d Marine Division (FWD) CP at DONG HA. The remainder of the Battalion and the Tank Platoon was ferried to DONG HA on D+9. The artillery battery and AMTRAC Platoon remained in the vicinity of BEACH BLUE, within the perimeter of the 1st AMTRAC Battalion. Resupply for these units was coordinated between the BLT and 1st AMTRAC Bn.

(7) Supplies were moved from BEACH BLUE to DONG HA and the LSA was dissolved. By D+10 required personnel, supplies, and equipment embarked in ARG ships were off-loaded and transported to DONG HA.

(8) There were no insurmountable logistic problems during operation FORTRESS SENTRY.

8. The following comments on BLT 2/3 and HMM 262 After Action Reports are included.

A. BLT 2/3

(1) Concur with Para's 13a thru f.

B. HMM 262

(1) Para 3a. During an amphibious operation when control of supporting arms is afloat, it is necessary that aircraft operating within the AOA remain in almost constant contact with the SACC. When equipment availability permits, SACC will monitor the Landing Force FM Landing Zone control frequencies which will allow the Helicopters to secure from HD-1 while they are operating with Landing Force units.

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**SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED**

# COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

## 10 OCT - 5 NOV 1967

USMC



70-79.5 (SLF)

**CTG 79.5**

SLF Task Group 79.5  
S&C 60-1-1, NO 00868

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1 Oct - 5 Nov 67

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HEADQUARTERS

Task Group Seventy Nine Point Five (TG 79.5)  
PFC San Francisco 96602


1/CGC/rdj  
5750  
Ser: 6047-67  
17 November 1967

SECRET-NOFORN (Downgraded to unclassified upon removal of Enclosure (1) )

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade  
Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1 Oct-5 Nov 1967, submission of  
Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2  
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8  
(c) BrigO 5750.1C

Encls (1) Special Landing Force (TG 79.5) Command Chronology

1. In accordance with references (a) through (c) the Command Chronology for the Special Landing Force (TG 79.5) is submitted as Enclosure (1).

  
M. W. SCHMIDT  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS  
Task Group Seventy Nine Point Five (TG 79.5)  
FPO San Francisco 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 October-5 November 1967

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PART II	NARRATIVE SUMMARY
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PART IV	SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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PART IORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. DESIGNATIONCOMMANDERSpecial Landing Force  
(TG 79.5)Col J. G. DIOMISOPoulos  
Col M. W. SCHMIDT1-13 Oct 1967  
14Oct-5Nov 1967SUBORDINATE UNITS

BLT 2/3

LtCol H. ENGLISH

10Oct-5Nov 1967

HMM 262

LtCol G. A. CORLISS

1-11 Oct 1967

Det "A" HMM 262

Major J. W. ALBER

12Oct-5Nov 1967

ATTACHED UNITSNONE2. LOCATION

USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10)

10Oct-5Nov 1967

USS PAUL REVERE (APA-248)

10Oct-5Nov 1967

USS WASHOE COUNTY (LST 1165)

10Oct-5Nov 1967

USS WINDHAM COUNTY (LST 1170)

10Oct-4Oct 1967

USS TORTUGA (LSD-26)

10Oct-5Nov 1967

USS HERMITAGE (LSD-34)

5Oct-5Nov 1967

3. STAFF OFFICERS

Executive Officer

LtCol R. A. MASON

10Oct-5Nov 1967

AO/S-1

1stLt C. G. COMER

10Oct-5Nov 1967

S-2

Capt W. B. MAYBERRY

10Oct-5Nov 1967

Asst S-2/AO

1stLt R. T. WALLACE

10Oct-5Nov 1967

S-3

LtCol L. J. NAQUIN

10Oct-5Nov 1967

Asst S-3/FSC

LtCol W. A. WESTON

10Oct-5Nov 1967

Asst S-3/Air Officer

Capt W. B. MCFALL

10Oct-5Nov 1967

Asst S-3

Capt J. P. SHEEHAN

21Oct-5Nov 1967

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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Asst S-3	Capt I. J. CAHILL (RAIC)	10Oct-5Nov 1967
S-4	Major J. F. SHOVAR	10Oct-5Nov 1967
Comm O	Capt C. C. ENTWISTLE	10Oct-5Nov 1967

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

SLE STAFF:	USMC Off - 11	USMC Enl - 31	USN Off - 0	USN Enl - 0
BLT:	USMC Off - 58	USMC Enl - 1390	USN Off - 8	USN Enl - 80
HMM:	USMC Off - 41	USMC Enl - 183	USN Off - 1	USN Enl - 3
DET HMM:	USMC Off - 19	USMC Enl - 31	USN Off - 0	USN Enl - 2

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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PART IINARRATIVE SUMMARY

From 1 through 4 October the ARG/SIF remained in Subic Bay, R. P. for upkeep.

On 5 October the ARG/SIF sailed for I CTZ, RVN. CTG 79.5 and representatives departed Subic Bay, R. P. via air on 5 October for Hq III MAF and Operational Planning.

Arriving vicinity DaNang I CTZ, RVN on 7 October the ARG/SIF remained in support of BLT 2/3 ashore until 14 October at which time BLT 2/3 was backloaded aboard ARG shipping, thereby reconstituting the Special Landing Force.

Operation FORMATION LEADER commenced on 17 October and OPCON of BLT 2/3 was passed to CG III MAF on 18 October. The ARG/SIF sailed for typhoon evasion on 18 October returning to the operating area on 20 October and remained in support of operations ashore through 5 November.

Operation KNOX commenced on 24 October in conjunction with elements of 1st Marine Division and terminated on 4 November.

Operation FORMATION LEADER was terminated on 5 November by COMSEVENTHFLT.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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PART IIISEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

The following is a review of the activities of the Special Landing Force (TG 79.5). Detailed information of BLT 2/3, BHM 262 and DET "A" RM 262 is shown in the appropriate Command Chronology in PART IV. Detailed information on operation FORMATION LEADER/KHGX is contained in PART IV.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
1-4 Oct	The ARG/SLF remained in Subic Bay, R. P. for upkeep.
5 Oct	The ARG/SLF sailed for I CTZ, RVN. CTG 79.5 and representatives departed via air for Hq, III MAF for operational planning.
7 Oct	The ARG/SLF arrived I CTZ, RVN and CTG 79.5 and representatives returned from Hq, III MAF.
14 Oct	OPCON BLT 2/3 (less C&C Flt, CNVOS and LSU) passed to CTG 79.5 at 141200H.  Ref: CG III MAF 140344Z OCT 67
17 Oct	Operation FORMATION LEADER commenced with the landing of BLT 2/3 by helicopter in Thua Thien Province, I CTZ, RVN.
18 Oct	OPCON BLT 2/3 (less C&C Flt, AMTRAC Flt, Tank Flt, AT Flt and LSU) passed to CG III MAF at 180100Z OCT 67. The ARG/SLF sailed southwest for typhoon evasion.  Ref: CTG 76.5 180036Z OCT 67
20 Oct	The ARG/SLF returned to the DaNang area I CTZ, RVN.
24 Oct	Operation KHGX commenced in Phu Loc District in conjunction with 1st MarDiv.
4 Nov	Operation KHGX terminated and OPCON BLT 2/3 (less C&C Flt, AMTRAC Flt, Tank Flt, AT Flt and LSU) passed to CTG 79.5 at 041000H.
5 Nov	Operation FORMATION LEADER terminated.  Ref: COMSEVENTHFLT msg 041834Z NOV 67

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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PART IVCHRONOLOGY OF SUBORDINATE COMMANDS  
AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

Appendix 1 ✓ CG III MAF msg 140344Z OCT 67

2 CTG 76.5 msg 180036Z OCT 67

3 CG 1st MarDiv msg 040250Z NOV 67

Appendix 2 ✓ Command Chronology BLT 2/3, 1 Oct - 5 Nov 67

Appendix 3 ✓ Command Chronology HMM 262, 1-11 Oct 67

Appendix 4 ✓ Command Chronology DET "A", HMM 262, 12 Oct - 5 Nov 67

Appendix 5 ✓ SLF, After Action Report, FORMATION LEADER, LIBERTY II/KNOX,  
17 Oct - 5 Nov 67Appendix 6 ✓ BLT 2/3, After Action Report, FORMATION LEADER, LIBERTY II,  
17-24 Oct 67

Appendix 7 ✓ BLT 2/3, After Action Report Operation KNOX, 24 Oct - 4 Nov 67

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ENCLOSURE (1)

NNNNVV MMSF910 FBC390DKE889  
 OO RUAUBJN  
 DE RUMMF 1251 2870344  
 Y SSSSS  
 P 140344Z G

T 67

FM CG III MAF  
 TO ZEN/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUAUBJN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE  
 INFO RUMSMA/CG  
 RUMHBA/CINCPAC  
 ZEN/CG FMFPAC  
 ZEN/CG FIRST MARDIV  
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAW  
 RUMH SEVEN SIX  
 RUABGL/CTF SEVEN NINE  
 IN/CG FORLOGCMD  
 RUMFTJM/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR  
 RUAUBJN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE  
 RUMFTJM/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

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OPCON BLT 2/3 (-)

A. CG THIRD MARDIV 130245Z OCT 67 (S) NOTAL

1. REF A RECONSTITUTED BLT 2/3 (-) UNDER OPCON CG 3RD

PAGE TWO RUMMF 1251 SECRET

MARDIV AND COMMENCED BACKLOAD AS OF 140920H OCT 67.

2. CG III MAF ASSUMES OPCON BLT 2/3 (-) AT 141200H OCT 67 AND  
 PASSES OPCON TO CTG 79.5 AT SAME TIME.

GP-4

BT

STAD **DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS,****DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS****DOD DIR 5200.10**

140344Z



DECLASSIFIED

RUMHVP RUABQL RUABPO RUMSBB RUHHLEA RUMFUV RUMFTJM RUAUBAC RUMFUN  
RUMGUZ RUMNHUE RUMNVHD RUMFUAD RUMFCR RUAUDD RUMECR RUMFKE RUMFT  
RUMFTJG 005 2910036

ZNY SSSSS

RUMFT ZOK FFM

O 180036Z OCT 67

FM CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

TO RUMHMF/CG III MAF

RUMHUL/COMSEVENTHFLT

ZEN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

ZEN/TG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

INFO RUHKA/CINCPAC

RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUMSBJ/CDR SEVENTH AF

RUHHFMA/CG FMFPAC

RUMHAW/CG FIRST MAW

RUMHLA/CG FIRST MARDIV

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUABQL/CG FMFPAC (FWD)

ZEN/ BLT TWO SLANI THREE

ZEN/MARMEDELRON TWO SIX TWO DET ALFA

RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV

RUHHLEA/COMPHIBPAC

RUMFUV/CTF SEVEN SIX

*For 181100H/mar/67*

*9/3 14m DET "A" BLT*

*copy of copy*

PAGE TWO RUMFTJG 005 S E C R E T

RUMFTJM/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

RUAUBAC/CTG SEVEN SIX PT EIGHT

RUABQL/CTF SEVEN NINE

RUMFTJM/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

RUMFUN/CTF SEVEN SEVEN

RUMGUZ/CTF SEVEN THREE

RUMGUZ/CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE

RUMNHUE/CTF ONE ONE FIVE

RUMNVHD/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE

RUMFUAD/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT

RUMFCR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE

RUAUDD/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT NINE

RUMECR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE

RUMFKE/CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE

BT

S E C R E T

FORMATION LEADER LANDING FORCE CHOP ASHORE (U)

1. COMSEVENTHFLT 150300Z OCT 67

1. LANDING FORCE FIRMLY ESTABLISHED ASHORE.

2. IAW PARA 9.A REF A, AND AS MUTUALLY AGREED UPON BY CATF AND

PAGE THREE RUMFTJG 005 S E C R E T

CG III MAF, OPCON BTL 2/3 LESS 3D PLT CO & 1ST AMTRAC BN, 2D PLT  
CO A 3D TANK BN, 3D PLT CO A 3D AT BN, DET 2D C/C PLT 31A  
MED BN, DET 15TH DENTAL CO, LSU PASSES TO CG III MAF EFFECTIVE  
180100Z OCT 67. AOA DISSOLVED AND CONTROL OF SUPPORTING ARMS  
PASSES TO CG III MAF AT THAT TIME.

3. FOR CG III MAF, CG THIRD CONCURS.

4. ORIG PROCEEDING SOUTHEAST WITH TG 76.5 FOR TYPHOON EVASION.

GP-4

BT

NNNN

HMSF171VV FBB095 BFC267NCZCPMB378ZCIPC6

PP RUAUBJN  
 DE RUMHLA 0387 3080250  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 RUMHIE T FIRST HOSP CO  
 P 040250Z NOV 67  
 FM CG FIRST MARDIV REIN  
 TO ZEN/CG III MAF  
 ZEN/CG FIRST MAW  
 RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV  
 RUMHFTVXCG FLC  
 ZEN/FIRST MARDIV OPCON  
 RUADQL/CTF SEVEN NINE  
 RUMFUV/CTF SEVEN SIX  
 RUAUBJN/CTG SEVEN SIX POINT FIVE  
 RUAUBJN/CTG SEVEN NINE POINT FIVE  
 RUMHVN/SA I CORPS ADV GROUP  
 RUMHVN/SA QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE  
 BT

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OPERATION KNOX

A. CG III MAF 281530Z OCT 67

B. CG FIRST MARDIV 290859Z OCT 67

1. OPERATION KNOX TERMINATES 041000H NOV 67. FIRST MARDIV PASSED  
 OPCON BLT 2/S (-) TO CG III MAF AT SAME TIME.

GP 4

BT

*for 14452/01 Oct 67/SL*  
**SECRET**  
*#169/05*

GROUP - 4

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COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT - OPERATION FORMATION LEADER/LIBERTY II/KNOX

Map Reference: AMS, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L7014 Sheets 6541 I-IV and 6641 III, IV.

1. GENERAL.

a. Operation FORMATION LEADER was a unilateral amphibious operation conducted in accordance with NWP 22(A) employing helicopterborne assault forces. The operation was conducted in the VINH LOC and PHU LOC Districts, THUAN THIEN Province, I Corps Tactical Zone, Republic of Vietnam. The AOA was bounded generally by the South China Sea to the North, BACH MA to the South, the Song Bu Lu River to the East and the Song Truoi River to the West.

b. The inclusive dates of Operation FORMATION LEADER was 17 October through 5 November 1967. COMSEVENTHFLT's 150300Z October 1967, FORMATION LEADER Initiating Directive, assigned Special Landing Force Bravo the mission to conduct Search and Destroy Operations in the AOA. During the period 18 October to 4 November 1967 selected elements of the Landing Force were under the OPCON of III MAF and participated in operations from 18 October to 24 October 1967 with the Third Marine Division and from 24 October to 4 November 1967 with the First Marine Division.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION.

Special Landing Force  
BLT 2/3  
DET ALPHA HMM 262

Colonel M. W. SCHMIDT  
Lieutenant Colonel H. ENGLISH  
Major J. W. ALBER

3. INTELLIGENCE

(a) Enemy forces known to operate in the AOA and contiguous areas were the 804th Bn. (MF); K.4B Bn. (MF); C.116 Co. (LF); C.117 Co. (LF); C.118 Co. (LF) and C.119 Co. (LF). Enemy strength was estimated to be approx. 1,000 men. Weapons consisted of 81mm, 82mm, 60mm mortars; 57mm, 75mm recoilless rifles, automatic weapons and normal small arms. These units had no fixed positions and were not restricted to a specific operating area.

(b) Enemy Capabilities. The enemy was capable of;

(1) Attacking friendly forces and installations at a time of his choosing supported by mortars and recoilless rifles, or

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- (2) Defending in positions at a time and place of his selection, or
  - (3) Delaying friendly units with locally available forces, or
  - (4) Reinforce capabilities 1 thru 3 with units from outside the AOA.
- (c) Enemy Tactics.

Apparently the enemy did not desire to fight. The majority of contacts were attacks by fire, sightings and small unit engagements of a brief nature. No large groupings of enemy personnel were reported. Some defensive positions, mostly bunkers, were located and were destroyed. Much evidence of recent enemy activity in the area was noted. Some miscellaneous pieces of equipment were found.

(d) Terrain and Weather

(1) Terrain

The terrain in the AOA consisted generally of a narrow strip of coastal lowlands which ended abruptly in a series of mountains. These mountains rose to a height of over 1,400 meters.

(2) Weather

The weather remained favorable during the period of operations. The normal and expected monsoon precipitation did not appear.

4. Mission.

SLF Bravo conducts an amphibious operation in THUA THIEN Province, against VC/NVA forces in the AOA and such other operations as may be agreed upon with CG III MAF or his designated representatives.

5. Concept of Operations.

Operation FORMATION LEADER was a unilateral amphibious operation conducted by ARG/SLF Bravo. The operation was planned as a search and destroy operation by executing a helicopterborne assault into the area of operation. Initially, Operation FORMATION LEADER was to be conducted in three phases:

a. Phase I

SLF Bravo conduct a helicopterborne assault and commence screening and interdiction operations to deny the enemy access to populated areas east of highway NR 1, to prevent enemy interference with the National Vietnamese elections, and to assist the PHU LOC District headquarters if subjected to attack.

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## b. Phase II

SLF Bravo conduct search and destroy operations to destroy enemy forces, locate and seize enemy supply caches and to interdict enemy rice collection operations.

## c. Phase III

SLF Bravo conduct an amphibious withdrawal.

6. Execution.

a. Operation FORMATION LEADER was initiated by COMSEVENTHFLT 150300Z October 1967, the Initiating Directive. Execution was in accordance with CTG 79.5 OPLAN 120A-67 as supplemented by CTG 79.5 msg 161616Z October 1967, Frag Order for Operation FORMATION LEADER.

b. D-Day was established and confirmed as 17 October 1967 with L-Hour at 0800H.

c. On D-Day SLF Bravo conducted a helicopterborne assault into the assigned AOA by CH-53's. Elements of Second Battalion, Twenty-Six Marines secured the Landing Zones. A delay of over one hour was experienced during the troop lift because of adverse weather. The delay had no significant effect on the landing or subsequent operations.

d. Second Battalion, Third Marines (-) landed in LZ's OWL (YD 994044) and CARDINAL (YD 998043) and B/1/12 and the motor transport platoon moved by surface craft to HUE for further movement across highway NR 1 to the battalion command post.

e. On 24 October 1967 the BLT made a motor march south on highway NR 1 to a new area of operation to participate in an operation with the Seventh Marine Regiment. The BLT phased into the new area in the following order; B/1/12, H/2/3, G/2/3, E/2/3, EN CP, and F/2/3. The move was completed on 25 October 1967 when F/2/3 arrived in position.

7. Commander's Analysis.a. Planning

(1) The ARG/SLF returned from an upkeep period at Subic Bay on 7 October 1967 and commenced backloading BLT 2/3. The backload was completed and the BLT reported OPCON CTG 79.5 effective 14 October 1967. On 12 October 1967 the SLF was requested to report to CG Third Marine Division for planning purposes.

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(2) Planning continued through the issuance of final orders on 16 October 1967. During the planning Phase, the following steps were accomplished.

(a) Maps, area analysis and the enemy order of battle were obtained and a limited aerial reconnaissance of the AOA was conducted.

(b) Current intelligence was obtained from the Third Marine Division; Second Battalion, Twenty-Sixth Marine Regiment; U.S. Army sector advisors at PHU LOC; and during the latter phase from the Seventh Marine Regiment.

(c) Arrangements were made for processing and evacuation of POW's detainees, refugees, civilian casualties and captured material.

(d) Arrangements were made for the use of Intelligence Interrogator Translator Teams.

(e) Logistic support procedures were arranged.

(f) Radio frequencies were obtained and assigned and the communication plan was issued.

(g) The AOA was agreed upon and command relationships were finalized.

(h) Coordination with 2/26 was established and the relief of elements of 2/26 was made without a mishap.

(i) A naval gunfire support ship was requested and requirements for close air support were determined and requested.

(j) Additional helicopter support was arranged for, consisting of three armed and one unarmed UH-1E, and two CH-53 for the landing of the BLT.

(k) Arrangements were made to provide liaison parties with 2/26 and District Headquarters at PHU LOC. BLT 2/3 exchanged liaison parties with 2/26.

#### b. Command Relationship

(1) Operation FORMATION LEADER was a unilateral amphibious operation with command relationships in accordance with NWP-22(A). CTG 76.5 passed OPCON of selected elements of the LF to CG III MAF at 180900H October 1967 who simultaneously passed it to CG 3d Marine Division. At 240800H October 1967 CG 1st Marine Division assumed OPCON of the selected elements of the LF. CG III MAF assumed OPCON of the LF elements at 041000H November 1967 simultaneously passing it to CTG 76.5 who simultaneously passed it to CTG 79.5.

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(2) Due to adverse weather conditions in the seaward AOA caused by a typhoon North of DONG HA an amphibious withdrawal was not conducted at this time. Instead a vehicle move was made by the LF elements ashore to DA NANG for backloading. Operation FORMATION LEADER was formally terminated on 5 November 1967 by COMSEVENTHFLT msg 041834Z November 1967.

(3) SLF Bravo provided liaison officers to BLT 2/3 and PHU LOC District Headquarters.

c. Supporting Arms. The situation ashore and the conditions of weather and terrain presented a series of unique problems for supporting arms.

(1) Air.

(a) Fixed wing air support was requested even though the helicopter landing was to be made into a secure zone. The request made to 1st Marine Air Wing was for two VA/VF on station from L-30 to L plus 90 minutes. Aircraft were provided as requested. Alternate targets in the mountainous area to the south and west of the landing zones were selected for unexpended ordnance.

(b) Three UH-1E armed helicopters and one UH-1E unarmed helicopter was requested. Only two Armed helicopters could be provided. Three helicopters were used to escort CH-53 into the landing zones and as TAC(A) for fixed wing strikes.

(2) Naval Gunfire. It was planned to land a part of the landing force over the beach in the Vinh Loc area. A naval gunfire ship was requested to provide support for the surface assault. The surface assault was cancelled. The destroyer provided for gunfire support was not used and was released at noon on D-Day. During the period 24 October to 4 November 1967 naval gunfire was used extensively firing over 1,000 rounds in support of the LF during Operation KNOX.

(3) Artillery. The final landing plan provided for an all-helicopter landing, and the logistic plans and extended scheme of maneuver ashore made it mandatory that the artillery have its prime movers ashore for mobility and ammunition resupply. As a result, the artillery battery was landed over Hue ramp and moved overland into position near the helicopter landing zone. The size of the area of operations and the nature of the terrain made it impossible for a single 105MM Howitzer battery to support all companies after they deployed along highway 1. There was a two-gun ARVN 105MM battery located at Phu Loc and companies located in the southern-most part of the area of operation would have to rely on it for artillery support. Companies nearest Phu Bai could obtain reinforcing fires from 155MM guns and 155MM howitzers of 4/12 located near 3d Division Headquarters at Phu Bai.



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(4) Coordination. Supporting arms coordination was in accordance with current amphibious doctrine with control and coordination of all supporting arms under CATF in the Supporting Arms Coordination Center of the flagship. Arrangements were made for 3d Marine Division FSCC to enter the SLF Artillery Fire Direction Net for passing information of mutual interest. Because of range and equipment limitations, contact between the SACC and 3d Division FSCC was never established although the firing battery ashore could communicate with 3d Division on the net. Coordination was complicated by the inclusion of 1st Marine Division units within the area of operations. A 105MM howitzer battery supporting this unit was located at Phu Gia Pass. The most satisfactory coordination that could be effected with this unit was between liaison officers at Phu Loc District Headquarters where both the 1st Division Artillery unit and the LF had representatives. Coordination and control of all supporting arms was passed ashore to 3d Marine Division at 0900 on D plus 1 when it became necessary for ARG shipping to depart for typhoon evasion.

d. Communications.

(1) Communications during Operation FORMATION LEADER were good to excellent, both to higher and lower echelons. The VRC-46 and KY-8 equipment utilized by SLF Bravo were highly reliable. Two antennas mounted on the LPH developed "Open" circuits and required deck mounted operation of the SLF MRC-110 radio vehicle for a short time. Rapid repair of one antenna and an abbreviation of shipboard circuits limited the use of the MRC-110. Electronics Maintenance Company, PSR, Da Nang provided excellent maintenance support during the operation.

(2) OPCON of the BLT ashore passed from CG, Third MarDiv to CG, First MarDiv during the operation. This necessitated a shift in frequencies used by the BLT.

(3) Two liaison teams were employed during the operation and one additional radio link was provided to the First Marine Division Casualty Reporting Center. Communication with the liaison teams was good to excellent.

(4) The KY-8 (Nestor Crypto System) provided reliable means for secure voice communications. Modification inserts for the KYK-12 cards were installed prior to the operation. This modification eliminated faulting and warping of the KYK-12 cards.

(5) Two radio operators were requested from, and were provided, by Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade to meet the communications requirements of the operation.

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e. Logistics

(1) During the planning Phase of the FORMATION LEADER/LIBERTY II Operations arrangements were made with the concurrence of CG Third Marine Division to provide resupply requirements for BLT 2/3 from in country assets located at the LSA in Phu Bai. Realizing the shortages of helicopters and the uncertainty of weather, along with close proximity of the LSA to the AOA surface transportation would be primary means of resupply. The Artillery Battery along with the Motor Transport Platoon was landed at Hue and proceeded to the AOA for support of the operation. An LSA with two DCS was established in the vicinity of the BLT Command Post. A detachment of the Shore Party Platoon operated the LSA in the AOA while a detachment of LSU reported to the operations Officer at the LSA at Phu Bai for coordination of supply management.

(2) Prior to the termination of Operation FORMATION LEADER/LIBERTY II under the operational control of Third Marine Division, a planning conference was conducted at First Marine Division for Operation KNOX. Operation KNOX was a continuation of FORMATION LEADER/LIBERTY II in the First Marine Division TAOR. During the conference it was determined that 7th Marines, the Operation Commander, would establish an LSA in the vicinity coordinates 175013 to service both BLT 2/3 and 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines(-). To ensure rapid response to needs of the BLT, the Shore Party detachment and Service Platoon(-) H&S Co, BLT 2/3 augmented the LSA. Unit distribution from the LSA was accomplished by otter/helo/man-carry to the companies. The LSU detachment remained at the LSA in Phu Bai to draw and prepare for shipment the supplies requested by the 7th Marine LSA. Upon completion of Operation KNOX the BLT was moved by motor march south to Da Nang for reembarkation. A five day rehabilitation of equipment was afforded the BLT and all equipment was restored to a combat readiness posture. No problems were encountered during the period.

(3) Evacuation and hospitalization of all casualties was executed according to plan and all casualties returned to CECS aboard the USS TRIPOLI.

f. Civil Affairs.

(1) During the period 18-24 October 1967 while operating with the Third Marine Division the LF took no part in civil affairs in its OA. This was due entirely to the fact that 2/26 had an excellent program in effect and the LF was not to remain in the area for an extended period. The LF took all precautions possible not to hinder in anyway the efforts of 2/26 or the local CAP units.

(2) A limited MEDCAP program was instituted while operating with the First Marine Division from 24 October - 4 November 1967. Also the Beach

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Jumper Unit of CTG 76.5 was used to full advantage during this period. They played both American and Vietnamese music in local village while company corporals and the Bn doctors provided medical treatment to villagers.

8. Readiness of the SLF.

(1) SLF Bravo, embarked in ARG Bravo shipping (USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10), USS PAUL REVERE (APA-248), USS HERMITAGE (LSD-34), USS TORTUGA (LSD-26) and USS WASHOE COUNTY (LST-1165) is prepared to respond to any contingencies which may arise within the Seventh Fleet area of operation. Continuous emphasis is being placed on personnel, training, supply and equipment readiness. The short time frame between the backload of the BLT and the amphibious landing for Operation FORMATION LEADER and the subsequent success of the operation reflected the continuous readiness of the SLF.

9. The following comments on BLT 2/3 After Action Reports are included.

A. Operation FORMATION LEADER/LIBERTY II

(1) Para 5D: The Phrase "administrative helicopter movement ashore" is incorrect. An AOA was established and the landing zones were prepped. This was a helicopterborne amphibious operation.

(2) Para 5F: Believe the paragraph was ~~meant~~ for the Operation KNOX After action Report. Naval gunfire was not employed during Operation FORMATION LEADER/LIBERTY II, but was used extensively during Operation KNOX.

B. Operation KNOX


(1) Para 7a(1): Should read 1st Marine Division TACR Vice 3d Marine Division TACR.

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# COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

6 NOV - 1 DEC 1967



76 79.5 (SLF)

## CTG 79.5

6 Nov-1 Dec 67

SLF Task Group 79.5  
S&C Control No 00960

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HEADQUARTERS  
Task Group Seventy Nine Point Five (TG 79.5)  
FPO San Francisco 96602

3:JPS:dsa  
5750  
Ser: 0053-67  
31 Dec 1967

SECRET-NOFORN (Downgraded to unclassified upon removal of Enclosure (1) )

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade  
Subj: Command Chronology for the period 6 November - 1 December 1967;  
submission of  
Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2  
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8  
(c) BrigO 5750.10

Encl: (1) Special Landing Force (TG 79.5) Command Chronology

1. In accordance with references (a) through (c), the Command Chronology for the Special Landing Force (TG 79.5) is submitted as enclosure (1).

M. W. SCHMIDT  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

#0013712

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HEADQUARTERS  
Task Group Seventy Nine Point Five (TG 79.5)  
FPO San Francisco 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

6 November - 1 December 1967

INDEX

PART I \_\_\_\_\_ ORGANIZATIONAL DATA  
PART II \_\_\_\_\_ NARRATIVE SUMMARY  
PART III \_\_\_\_\_ SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT  
EVENTS  
PART IV \_\_\_\_\_ SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

GP-4

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

SECRET-NOFORN

ENCLOSURE (1)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET-NOFORN

PART IORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. DESIGNATIONCOMMANDERDATESSpecial Landing Force  
(TG 79.5)

Col M. W. SCHMIDT

6Nov-1Dec 1967

SUBORDINATE UNITS

BLT 2/3

LtCol H. ENGLISH

6Nov-1Dec 1967

BLT 3/1

LtCol M. MCQUOWN

1Dec 1967

Det ALPHA, HMM-262

Major J. W. ALBER  
Major D. L. ALTHOFF6-23 Nov 1967  
24Nov-1Dec 1967ATTACHED UNITSNONE2. LOCATION

USS TRIPOLI ✓

6Nov-1Dec 1967

USS VALLEY FORGE (LPH-8) ✓

30Nov-1Dec 1967

USS PAUL REVERE (APA 248) ✓

6-10Nov 1967

USS NAVARRO (APA 215) ✓

7-20Nov 1967

22Nov-1Dec 1967

USS TORTUGA (LSD 26) ✗

6-10Nov 1967

USS HEBMATTAGE (LSD 34) ✗

6-9Nov 1967

USS BELLE GROVE (LSD 2) ✓

9-19Nov 1967

USS ALAMO (LSD-33) ✓

19Nov-1Dec 1967

USS WASHOE COUNTY (LSD 1165) ✓

6Nov-1Dec 1967

USS WINDHAM COUNTY (LST 1170) ✓

12Nov-1Dec 1967

3. STAFF OFFICERS

Executive Officer

LtCol R. A. MASON

6Nov-1Dec 1967

AO/S-1

1stLt C. G. COMER

6Nov-1Dec 1967

S-2

Maj W. B. MAYBERRY

6Nov-1Dec 1967

Asst S-2/AO

1stLt R. T. WALLACE

6Nov-1Dec 1967

S-3

LtCol L. J. NAQUIN

6-30Nov 1967

LtCol W. M. OLIVER

1Dec 1967

SECRET-NOFORN

Asst S-3/FSC	LtCol W. A. WESTON	6-30Nov 1967
	Maj E. P. RICHTER Jr.	1Dec 1967
Asst S-3/Air Officer	Maj W. T. MC FALL	6Nov-1Dec 1967
Asst S-3	Maj J. P. SHEEHAN	6Nov-1Dec 1967
Asst S-3	Capt J. H. STRASSER	17Nov-1Dec 1967
S-4	Maj J. F. SHOVAR	6Nov-1Dec 1967
CommO	Capt C. C. ENTWISTLE	6Nov-1Dec 1967

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

SIF STAFF:	USMC Off - 13	USMC Enl - 41	USN Off - 0	USN Enl - 0
BLT:	USMC Off - 57	USMC Enl - 1405	USN Off - 8	USN Enl - 80
DET ALPHA				
HMM 262	USMC Off - 15	USMC Enl - 54	USN Off - 0	USN Enl - 2



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PART IINARRATIVE SUMMARY

From 6 through 10 November 1967 the ARG/SLF underwent a REHAB period in Da Nang, RVN. On 11 November the ARG/SLF sailed from Da Nang, RVN. From 11 through 12 November the ARG/SLF remained in a 24 hour reaction status for operations in I CTZ, RVN.

Operation BADGER HUNT/FOSTER commenced on 13 November with the landing of BLT 2/3 by helicopters in DUC DUC and Dai Loc District, Quang Nam Province, RVN and continued through 29 November 1967. During this period selected elements of the Landing Force were OPCON 1st Mar Div who further passed OPCON at various times to both the 7th Marine and the 5th Marine Regiments.

On 1 December 1967 BLT 2/3 was rotated in-country and came under the command of the 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division. On 1 December BLT 3/1 commenced embarkation in ARG shipping.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET-NOFORN

PART IIISEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

The following is a review of the activities of the Special Landing Force (TG 79.5). Detailed information of BLT 2/3 and Det ALPHA HMM 262 is shown in the appropriate Command Chronology in PART IV. Detailed information on Operation BADGER HUNT/FOSTER is contained in PART IV.

DATEEVENT

6-10 Nov	The ARG/SLF underwent a REHAB period in Da Nang, RVN. Planning was accomplished for Operation BADGER HUNT which was to have been conducted in the Third Marine Division area with D-Day tentatively set for 12 December 1967.
11 Nov	CG III MAF requested planners for new amphibious operation with tentative D-Day 13 Dec 67.  Ref: III MAF 110907Z Nov67.
12 Nov	CTG 79.5 and representatives meet with planners from 7th Mar Regt. and 1st Mar Div. and planning commenced for Operation BADGER HUNT to be conducted in the First Marine Division Area of Operations
13 Nov	Operation BADGER HUNT commenced with the landing of BLT 2/3 by helicopters in QUANT NAM Province, I CTZ, RVN. OPCON BLT 2/3 (Less AmTrac Plt, Tank Plt, AT Plt, C & C Plt) passed to CG III MAF at 131400H Nov 67.  Ref: CTG 76.5 130620Z Nov67
13-29 Nov	ARG/SLF remained in support of the LF elements ashore.
29 Nov	Operation BADGER HUNT terminated  Ref: COMSEVENTHFLT 290146Z Nov67
1 Dec	BLT 2/3 rotated in-country under command of CG III MAF  Ref: CTG 79.5 281604Z Nov67 BLT 3/1 passed to OPCON CTG 79.5  Ref: CG III MAF 271146Z Nov67

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PART IV

CHRONOLOGY OF SUBORDINATE COMMANDS  
AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

Appendix 1 ✓

- 1 COMSEVENTHFLT 290146Z Nov67
- 2 III MAF 110907Z Nov67
- 3 III MAF 271146Z Nov67
- 4 CTG 76.5 130620Z Nov67
- 5 CTG 79.5 281604Z Nov67

*Sited  
app* { Appendix 2 -  
Appendix 3 -

Command Chronology BLT 2/3, 6 Nov - 1 Dec 67

Command Chronology Det ALPHA HMM 262, 6 Nov - 1 Dec 67

Appendix 4

SLF, After Action Report, BADGER HUNT, 15-29 Nov 67

*Sited  
sep* { Appendix 5  
Appendix 6

BLT 2/3, After Action Report BADGER HUNT/FOSTER, 15-29 Nov 67

Det ALPHA, HMM-262, After Action Report, BADGER HUNT/  
FOSTER, 13-28 Nov 67

2 P 280146Z NOV 67

FM JCS/COMUSMACV

TO RUEUAG/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

RUEHAAA/CNO

RJHHQA/CINCPAC

RHHBRO/CINCPAC

INFO RUEUAG/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

RUMFUAD/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT

RUMUN/CTF SEVEN SIX

RUMQL/CTG SEVEN NINE

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUMSBB/COMNAVFORV

RUMIWA/CG III MAF

RUMHVP/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUMJMSA/COMPHIBPAC

RUAUBHT/CG FMFPAC

RUABOL/CG FMFPAC FWD

RUMVHD/CTF ONE ONE FIVE

RUMSBJ/CMDR 7TH AIR FORCE

RUMECR/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE

RUAUBAC/CTF SEVEN SEVEN

RUMT/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT TWO

RUMHIA/CG FIRST MARDIV

RUMHAW/CG FIRST LAW

RUMJAK/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

RUMKAK/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

RUMCCR/CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE

RUMCCR/TU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE

RUMSUZ/CTF SEVEN THREE

RUMKE/CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE

BT

SECRET

CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE PASS ADVANCE COPY TO COMUSMACV

OPERATION BADGER HUNT (EBL)

1. FOR CTG 76.5: TERMINATE OPERATION BADGER HUNT.

2. FOR CNO, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT: CANCEL NICKNAME BADGER HUNT

29 NOV 67.

GP-4

BT

App 1-21

**SECRET**

ZNY 83358

O 110907Z NOV 67

FM III MAF COC

TO CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

INFO CTF SEVEN SIX

CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

FIRST MARDIV COC

BT

S E C R E T

ARE/SIF BRAVO (CTG 76.5/79.5) EMPLOYMENT

1. IT IS REQUESTED THAT CTG 79.5, CO BLT 2/3, AND PLANNERS PROCEED TO  
1ST MARDIV CP TO ARRIVE 120830H NOV2. THIS CONT FOR AMPHIB OPS TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR AM 13 NOV VIC  
AT 8147.

RE-4

BT

**SECRET**

073146Z NOV 67

Y-ADMINO III MAF DANANG  
TO RUEBUAG/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE  
INFO RUHHEHA/CG FMFPAC  
RUHHEQA/POCCPAC  
RUHHEBRA/CINCPACFLT  
RUMGUL/COMSEVENTH FLT  
RUADQL/CG NINTH MAB  
RUADQL/CTF SEVEN NINE  
ZEN/BLT THREE SLASH ONE

BT

SECRET

OPSELT DATA BASE

A. CG 1ST MARDIV 260804Z NOV 67

D. ADMINO III MAF 270240Z NOV 67 (NOTAL)

1. REQ YOU TAKE REF A FOR ACTION

2. IAW REF B III MAF PASSLS OPCON BLT 3/1 TO CTG 79.5 EFF

010600H NOV 67

GP-4

BT

1. 130000Z NOV 67

FM CTF SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

TO RUMHUA/CG CINCPACFLT

ZEN/IG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

ZEN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

RUMHUA/CG III MAF

INFO RUMHUA/CTF SEVEN SIX

BQL/CTF SEVEN NINE

RUMHUA/COMUSMACV

RUMHUA/COMNAVFORV

RUMHUA/CTF SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE

RUAUBU2/CTF SEVEN THREE

RUMFUAD/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT

RUMHUA/CINCPAC

RUMHUA/CINCPACFLT

RUMHUA/COMPHIBPAC

RUMHUA/CG FMFPAC

RUAUBU2/CG FMFPAC (FWD)

RUMHUA/CG FIRST MAF

RUMHUA/CTF ONE ONE FIVE

TOB 13/17411/KS/TT

S3

copy — of — copy

2. TWO RUMHUA 090 S E C R E T

RUMHUA/COMDR SEVENTH AF

RUMHUA/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE

RUMHUA/CTF SEVEN SEVEN

RUMHUA/CG THIRD MARDIV

RUMHUA/CG FIRST MARDIV

RUMFUAK/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

RUMFUAK/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

RUMHUA/CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE

RUMHUA/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE

RUMHUA/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE

RUMHUA/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT TWO

BT

S E C R E T

BADGER HUNT/FOSTER LANDING FORCE CHOP ASHORE (U)

1. CONSEQUENTLY 280400Z NOV 67

LANDING FORCE FIRMLY ESTABLISHED ASHORE.

2. IAW PARA 9.A REF A, AND AS MUTUALLY AGREED BETWEEN CG, III MAF AND CATF, OPCON BLT LESS 3D PLT CO B 1ST AMTRAC BN, 2D PLT CO A 3D TANK BN, 3D PLT CO A 3D AT BN, DET 2D C/C PLT 5TH MED BN, DET 15TH DENIAL CO PASSES TO CG III MAF EFFECTIVE 130600Z NOV 67, AOA

3. THREE RUMHUA 090 S E C R E T

DISSOLVED AND CONTROL OF SUPPORTING ARMS PASSES TO CG III MAF AT THAT TIME.

3. FOR CG III MAF: CG FIRST MARDIV CONCURS.

4. ORIG REMAINS IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION BADGER HUNT/FOSTER.

GP-4

BT

app 1-4

1. SITUATION  
 2. MISSION: RELOCATE BLT 2/3 FROM SLF BRAVO TO TAOR OF THIRD BN FIRST MARINES.  
 3. EXECUTION:  
 A. CONCEPT  
 (1) REMAINING ELEMENTS OF BLT TWO SLANT THREE WILL BE OFFLOADED FROM ARG SHIPPING NLT 30NOV67.  
 (2) BLT THREE SLANT ONE WILL BE ENBARKED AND RECONSTITUTE SLF BRAVO IAW REF C.  
 B. COORDINATION INSTRUCTIONS  
 (1) MAINTAIN STRICT SECURITY REGARDING MOVE  
 (2) SUBMIT NECESSARY OPSTAT WITHIN 24 HOURS AFTER CHOP  
 (3) ENSURE CG FLIPPAC, CTF 79 AND CTG 79.5 ARE ADDEES ON ALL MOVREPS AND CHOP MESSAGES  
 (4) MAINTAIN COMBAT READINESS DURING ROTATION  
 (5) THIS ORDER EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT  
 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

SECRET

MOVEMENT ORDER (U)

AM ADMIRAL NINTH MAB 270728Z NOV67 (NOTAL)

B. ADMIRAL NINTH MAB 280500Z NOV67 (NOTAL)

C. CG 1ST MAR DIV 231010Z NOV 67

1. SITUATION

THIS ORDER PROVIDES FOR THE RELIEF OF BLT 2/3 FROM SLF BRAVO BY BLT 3/1 FOR ROUTINE INTRA-THEATER ROTATION IN RVN IN ACCORDANCE WITH

PAGE TWO RUHBUAG 273 SECRET

REFERENCES (A) AND (C)

A. ENEMY FORCES: SEE CURRENT INTSUMS

B. FRIENDLY FORCES: BLT 3/1 ROTATES TO SLF BRAVO AS DIRECTED BY CG FIRST MAR DIV.

2. MISSION: RELOCATE BLT 2/3 FROM SLF BRAVO TO TAOR OF THIRD BN FIRST MARINES.

3. EXECUTION:

A. CONCEPT

(1) REMAINING ELEMENTS OF BLT TWO SLANT THREE WILL BE OFFLOADED FROM ARG SHIPPING NLT 30NOV67.

(2) BLT THREE SLANT ONE WILL BE ENBARKED AND RECONSTITUTE SLF BRAVO IAW REF C.

B. COORDINATION INSTRUCTIONS

(1) MAINTAIN STRICT SECURITY REGARDING MOVE

(2) SUBMIT NECESSARY OPSTAT WITHIN 24 HOURS AFTER CHOP

(3) ENSURE CG FLIPPAC, CTF 79 AND CTG 79.5 ARE ADDEES ON ALL MOVREPS AND CHOP MESSAGES

(4) MAINTAIN COMBAT READINESS DURING ROTATION

(5) THIS ORDER EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

app 1-45



PAGE THREE RUMUAG 273 S E C R E T

A. ADMINISTRATION

(1) BLT FILES AND ORDERS ROTATE WITH BLT. FILES AND ORDERS PECULIAR TO NINTH MAB, CTG 79 AND CTG 79.5 REMAIN IN PLACE.

(2) SUBMIT TO CTG 79 BY MSG BY 30 NOV 67 AN OFFICER ROSTER BY NAME, RANK, SERVICE NO/MOS AND RTD, PLUS A RANK/MOS SUMMARY OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL - INFO CG FIRST MARDIV AND CG FMFPAC.

(3) SUBMIT MAIL ROUTING REQUESTS IAW FMFPACO 2708/3D AND CG NINTH MAB MSG 250803Z MAY67.

(4) SUBMIT UNIT DIARIES IAW FMFPACO 1080.4

(5) COMMAND CHRONOLOGY WILL BE IAW BRIGO 5750.7A. ENSURE REPORT OF MOVE IS INCLUDED.

5. COMMAND AND COM ELECT

A. OPCON OF REMAINING ELEMENTS BLT 2/3 WILL BE PASSED TO FIRST MAR-DIV UPON COMPLETION OF DEBARKATION FROM ARG SHIPPING.

B. COMMAND BLT 2/3 PASSES TO CG III MAF EFFECTIVE 010600H DEC 67

C. ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT.

GP  
31

2423

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# AFTER ACTION REPORT BADGER HUNT



S & C FILAS  
HEADQUARTERS  
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF

**68 0270**

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**SPECIAL LANDING FORCE**

## CTG 79.5

LF Task Group 79.5  
S&C Control No 00962

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HEADQUARTERS

Task Group Seventy Nine Point Five (TG 79.5)  
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3:JPS:dsa  
Ser: 001-68  
3 Jan 1968

SECRET-NOFORN (Downgraded to Unclassified Upon Removal of Enclosures)

From: Commanding Officer

To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Seventh Fleet

Subj: Combat After Action Report, Operation BADGER HUNT/FOSTER

Encl: (1) SLF Bravo After Action Report, Operation BADGER HUNT/FOSTER  
      (2) BLT 2/3 After Action Report, Operation BADGER HUNT/FOSTER  
      <sup>Sub</sup>  
      <sup>Sup</sup> (3) Det ALPHA HMM 262, After Action Report, Operation BADGER HUNT/FOSTER

1. Enclosure (1) contains Special Landing Force BRAVO After Action Report for Operation BADGER HUNT/FOSTER. Enclosures (2) and (3) amplify enclosure (1).

*M. W. Schmidt*  
M. W. SCHMIDT

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COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT - BADGER HUNT/FOSTER

Map Reference: AMS, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L7014 Sheets 6640 I thru IV and 6540 I and II.

1. GENERAL.

a. Operation BADGER HUNT was a unilateral amphibious operation conducted in accordance with NWP 22(A) employing helicopter assault forces. The operation was conducted in the DUC DUC and DAI LOC DISTRICTS, QUANG NAM Province, I Corps Tactical Zone, Republic of Vietnam.

b. A total of 115 hours elapsed from the commencement of initial planning with the Third Marine Division to the eventual landing with the First Marine Division. The planning phase of the operation with the First Marine Division spanned 36 hours.

c. In view of the land AOA being completely land locked, 22 miles inland, a helicopter approach and retirement route was established. This linked the seaward AOA with the land AOA and was approved by COMSEVENTHFLT 121430Z November 1967, Operation BADGER HUNT Initiating Directive Addendum. The AOA was bounded generally by the Song Vu Gia to the north, the Song Tinh Yen and the Song Thu Bon to the south and east, and the highground to the west.

d. The rotation of BLTs 2/3 and 3/1 was effected upon completion of the operation and therefore no amphibious withdrawal was conducted. COMSEVENTHFLT 290146Z Nov67 terminated Operation BADGER HUNT on 29 November 1967.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION.

Special Landing Force BRAVO  
BLT 2/3  
DET ALPHA HMM 262

Colonel M. W. SCHMIDT  
LtCol H. ENGLISH  
Major J. W. ALBER  
Major D. L. ALTHOFF

3. INTELLIGENCE

(a) Reported enemy order of battle within the AOA consisted of R-20 Force Battalion, and the Q-14 Local Force Company. No confirming intelligence was discovered.

1

Enclosure (1)

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ALF (77-115)

410

BADGER HUNT/FOSTER

13- 29 Nov 67

SECRET-NOFORN

(b) Enemy Capabilities. The enemy was capable of;

- (1) Attacking friendly forces and installations at a time of his choosing supported by mortars and recoilless rifles, or
- (2) Defending in positions at a time and place of his selection, or
- (3) Delaying friendly units with locally available forces, or
- (4) Reinforcing capabilities 1 thru 3 with units from outside the AOA.

(c) Enemy Tactics.

During the operation no new or unusual tactics were encountered. The large number of refugees apparently had been awaiting an opportunity to flee the area and were not used by the enemy to distract friendly forces. Although sightings of up to 30 NVA/VC were made, contact was generally light to moderate, consisting of snipers, small probes and moderate amounts of AW/SA fire against helicopters. Several small tunnels and bunker complexes were located and destroyed evidencing prior preparation for defense by small units, probably near sensitive areas. Probably due to superior forces and fire power no prolonged defense was encountered. Final enemy casualties were 47 KIA (Confirmed), 184 KIA (Probable), 4 POW and 51 VCS.

(d) Terrain and Weather(1) Terrain

The terrain in the AOA consisted generally of rice paddies with forested high ground to the west and southwest.

(2) Weather

The weather remained favorable during the entire period and the expected monsoon precipitation did not appear.

4. Mission. Special Landing Force BRAVO conducts an amphibious operation in QUANG NAM Province to capture or destroy enemy forces and supplies and destroy all enemy facilities located within the AOA.

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5. Concept of Operations. Operation BADGER HUNT was a unilateral amphibious operation conducted by the ARG/SLF BRAVO. The operation, planned and executed as a search and destroy mission, commenced by a heloborne assault into DUC DUC and DAI LOC District, QUANG NAM Province, Republic of Vietnam.

6. Execution.

a. Operation BADGER HUNT was initiated by COMSEVENTHFLT 080408Z November 1967 which was modified by COMSEVENTHFLT 121046Z November 1967, BADGER HUNT Initiating Directive Addendum. Execution was in accordance with CTG 79.5 OPLAN 120A-67, as supplemented by CTG 79.5 121302Z November 1967, Frag Order Nr 2 for Operation BADGER HUNT.

b. D-Day was established as 13 November 1967 with L-Hour at 0900H. Due to weather in the AOA fixed wing aircraft were unable to adequately prep the LZ's causing L-Hour to be delayed 70 minutes. This had no adverse effect on D-Day or subsequent operations ashore.

c. On D-Day SLF BRAVO executed helicopter assaults into LZ's HAWK (AT 818473) and EAGLE (AT 807508). A troop build up and logistic base was accomplished in LZ FALCON (AT 875475). F/2/3 landed in LZ HAWK at 1010H and was immediately followed by E/2/3. By 1130H both companies were moving towards their objectives. G/2/3 landed in LZ EAGLE and by 1200H was moving towards its objective. All men and supplies had been moved ashore by 1300H and the Landing Force was firmly established in the AOA. At 131400H OPCON of selected elements of the LF was passed to CG III MAF thence to CG First Marine Division who simultaneously passed it to the Seventh Marine Regiment (CTG 76.5) msg 130620Z Nov67).

d. During this operation the LF also took part in Operation FOSTER in conjunction with the Seventh Marine Regiment. This operation was characterized by the rapid movement of the LF in response to the tactical situation and a large refugee evacuation effort on the part of the LF. The refugees were moved primarily by CH-46 helicopters to a refugee center as well as all rice captured in the AO.

7. Commander's Analysis.

a. Planning

(1) The initial planning for Operation BADGER HUNT was with the Third Marine Division. The planning has been completed and orders issued when CG III MAF requested SLF BRAVO send representatives to the First Marine Division for a planning conference (III MAF msg 110907Z Nov67). This was accomplished on 12 November 1967. As a result of this conference a new AOA and

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mission were agreed upon and forwarded to COMSEVENTHFLT for approval. All prior plans, orders and requests for assistance were cancelled and new ones promulgated.

(2) During the final planning phase the following steps were accomplished:

(a) Maps, aerial photographs, area analysis and the enemy order of battle were obtained.

(b) Current intelligence was obtained from the First Marine Division.

(c) Arrangements were made for an interrogation translator subteam and interpreters.

(d) Arrangements were made for processing and evacuation of POW's, detainees, refugees, civilian casualties, and captured documents and supplies.

(e) Logistic support procedures were established.

(f) Radio frequencies were obtained and assigned, and the communications plan was issued.

(g) The AOA was agreed upon and command relationships were finalized.

(h) Requirements for close air support were determined and requested. Additional helicopter support consisting of 3 CH-53, 2 armed UH-1E and 1 unarmed UH-1E was requested.

b. Command Relationships. Operation BADGER HUNT was a unilateral amphibious operation with command relationships in accordance with NWP-22(A).

(1) The tactical situation necessitated OPCON of selected elements of the LF being passed to CG III MAF thence to CG 1st Mar Div who simultaneously passed it to 7th Mar Regt effective 131400H.

(2) During the period these elements were OPCON to CG First Marine Division it became necessary for them to be OPCON to both the 5th and 7th Regiments for periods as shown below.

(a) 131400H to 251700H

7th Marines

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(b) 251700H to 270955H

5th Marines

(c) 270955H to 291700H

7th Marines

(3) In view of BLT 2/3 rotating permanently to a III MAF Command, no amphibious withdrawal was conducted. On 1 December 1967 the remaining BLT 2/3 elements, upon debarking from ARG shipping were chopped to CG III MAF thence to CG First Marine Division, who simultaneously passed OPCON to their parent commands within the division.

c. Supporting Arms.

(1) Air

(a) Fixed wing air support was readily available and was used extensively as the tactical situation dictated. Adverse weather forced the delay of the landing zone prep. However, this had no effect on the operation and LZ EAGLE and HAWK were each prepped by four aircraft from First Marine Aircraft Wing prior to landing of heloborne troops. The preparation was controlled by TAC(A) in armed UH-1E helicopters. After the landing, close air support aircraft remained on station until L plus 2 and remained in support on an on-call basis throughout the operation. Fixed wing aircraft provided 16 missions with 32 sorties during BADGER HUNT.

(b) Two armed UH-1E helicopters were assigned to SLF BRAVO on D-Day. Two additional armed UH-1E helicopters were provided by 1stMAW in general support until L plus 3. Armed UH-1E's remained in general support on an on-call basis.

(c) One unarmed UH-1E was assigned SLF BRAVO for command and control. The A/C was also used extensively for aerial observation.

(2) Artillery. During planning with Third Marine Division it was determined that it would be impractical to land the artillery battery by boat. Therefore it was decided that B/1/12 upon completion of rehab would motor march to Phu Bai and be prepared to move into firing position from there. The battery had arrived at Phu Bai when the area for the operation changed. The battery then was required to motor march back to DA NANG and thence to a position from where they could support the operation arriving on D plus 1. The position assigned B/1/12 permitted them to support the BLT on only one day of the operation and the majority of their fires were in support of the 7th Marines. K/4/11 was assigned the direct support role for BLT 2/3 with E/2/11 in general support. All artillery units were used extensively and the support they provided was outstanding.



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(3) Naval Gunfire. Naval Gunfire was not required for the operation due to the inland location of the land AOA.

(4) Fire Support Coordination. Supporting arms coordination was in accordance with current amphibious doctrine. Coordination and control of all supporting arms was passed ashore to CG III MAF at 1400H on D-Day as agreed upon by CATF.

d. Communications.

(1) Operation BADGER HUNT/FOSTER was characterized by medium range communications. Reliability of communications, both to the BLT and higher headquarters was good. The AN/VRC-46 and KY-8 installations in SLF operating spaces provided a secure and rapid means for coordination and control of the operations.

(2) One liaison team was employed utilizing SLF equipment.

(3) The radio relay team and equipment assigned to the SLF was used for direct communication between FSCCs at BLT 2/3 and 7th Marines.

(4) Excellent repair support for both SLF and TG 76.5 equipment was rendered by Electronic Maintenance Co, 1st FSR.

e. Logistics On 12 November 1967 a planning conference was conducted concerning the logistical support for Operation BADGER HUNT. First Marine Division chaired the conference. SLF Bravo, 7th Marines and Force Logistics Command were represented. It was determined that logistical support would come from the established LSA at AN HOA. BLT 2/3 landed with a prescribed load and a basic allowance of Class V. The Shore Party Platoon was sent ashore early in order to handle all resupply requests from LSA due to immediate CHOP to 7th Marines. Casualties were evacuated to the LPH in accordance with SOP. No logistical problems were encountered during this operation.

8. Readiness of the SLF.

(1) As BLT 2/3 was relieved of SLF responsibility and BLT 3/1 was assigned these responsibilities a training/rehab was programed for BLT 3/1 in Subic Bay, Republic of Philippines. During this period the ARG/SLF maintained a 96 hour readiness posture.

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9. The following comments on BLT 2/3 and Det ALPHA HMM 262 After Action Reports are included.

A. BLT 2/3

(1) PARA 5A: The information set forth in this paragraph is incorrect and should read K/4/11 was assigned mission of direct support for BLT 2/3 with E/2/11 in general support. B/1/12 provided artillery support when the BLT was operating within range of their position.

(2) PARA 13A-D are concurred in. However, to amplify Para 13b the destruction of all dwelling in the villages was done at the request of the District chief.

(3) On page 24 the entry "251700H BLT 2/3 Chops to 7th Marines". should read ... "to 5th Marines".

B. Detachment ALPHA HMM 262

(1) PARA 4a: This problem was caused when a reaction force was inserted into an area where a TPQ had previously been requested. The battalion ALO tried to cancel the TPQ however communications with DASC failed. This is not a common practice and steps will be taken insure no recurrence.

(2) PARA 4b: It has been and will continue to be the policy of the SLF to weigh carefully the tactical necessity against the inherent hazards when deploying helicopters in adverse weather conditions.

(3) PARA 4c is strongly concurred in and a request for permanent assignment of a UH-1E detachment to the SLF is presently being prepared and will be forwarded through proper channels when completed.

(4) The term Incidents under Intelligence/Counter Intelligence on page 4 means aircraft damage not as a result of battle.

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# COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

## 2 DEC 67 — 2 JAN 68

**USMC**

0013926



*Ty 79.5 (SLF)*

*2 Dec 67 - 2 Jan 68*

# CTG 79.5

SLF Task Group 79.5  
S&C Control No 0010032

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HEADQUARTERS  
Task Group Seventy Nine Point Five (TG 79.5)  
FPO San Francisco 96602

3:JPS:dsa  
5750  
Ser: 003-68  
12 Jan 1968

SECRET-NOFORN (Downgraded to unclassified upon removal of Enclosure (1) )

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade

Subj: Command Chronology for the period 2 December 1967 through 2 January 1968; submission of

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2  
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8  
(c) BrigO 5750.10

Encl: (1) Special Landing Force (TG 79.5) Command Chronology

1. In accordance with reference (a) through (c) the Command Chronology for the Special Landing Force (TG 79.5) is submitted as enclosure (1).

*M. W. Schmidt*  
M. W. SCHMIDT

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HEADQUARTERS  
Task Group Seventy Nine Point Five (TG 79.5)  
FPO San Francisco 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

2 December 1967 through 2 January 1968

INDEX

PART I \_\_\_\_\_ ORGANIZATIONAL DATA  
PART II \_\_\_\_\_ NARRATIVE SUMMARY  
PART III \_\_\_\_\_ SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT  
EVENTS  
PART IV \_\_\_\_\_ SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

GP-4

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1

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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PART IORGANIZATIONAL DATA1. DESIGNATIONSpecial Landing Force  
(TG 79.5)COMMANDER

Col M. W. SCHMIDT

DATES

2Dec67-2Jan68

SUBORDINATE UNITS

BLT 3/1

LtCol M. MCQUOWN

2Dec67-2Jan68

Det "A" HMM 262

Major D. L. ALTHOFF

2Dec67-2Jan68

ATTACHED UNITSNONE2. LOCATION

USS VALLEY FORGE (LPH-8)✓  
 USS NAVARRO (APA-215)✓  
 USS ALAMO (LSD-33)✓  
 USS WHETSTONE (LSD-27)~  
 USS WASHOE COUNTY (LST-1165)✓  
 USS WINDHAM COUNTY (LST-1170)✓  
 USS VERNON COUNTY (LST-1161) -

2Dec67-2Jan68  
 2Dec67-2Jan68  
 2Dec67-2Jan68  
 25Dec67-2Jan68  
 2Dec-7Dec67  
 2Dec-27Dec67  
 2Dec67-2Jan68

3. STAFF OFFICERS

Executive Officer

LtCol R. A. MASON

2Dec67-2Jan68

AO/S-1

1stLt C. G. COMER

2Dec67-2Jan68

S-2

Major W. B. MAYBERRY

2Dec67-2Jan68

Asst S-2/AO

1stLt R. T. WALLACE

2Dec67-2Jan68

S-3

LtCol W. M. OLIVER

2Dec67-2Jan68

Asst S-3/FSC

Major E. P. RICHTER Jr.

2Dec67-2Jan68

Asst S-3/Air Officer

Major W. T. MC FALL

2Dec67-2Jan68

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Asst S-3	Major J. P. SHEEHAN	2Dec67-2Jan68
Asst S-3	Capt J. H. STRASSER	2Dec67-2Jan68
S-4	Major J. F. SHOVAR	2Dec67-2Jan68
CommO	Capt C. C. ENTWISTLE	2Dec67-2Jan68

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

	USMC OFF	USMC ENL	USN OFF	USN ENL
SLF STAFF:	12	41	0	0
ELT 3/1	58	1596	8	87
Det "A" HMM 262	16	55	1	2

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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PART IINARRATIVE SUMMARY

On 2 December 1967 ARG/SLF with BLT 3/1 and Det ALPHA HMM 262 embarked sailed for Subic Bay, R. P. for upkeep and a REHAB/TRAINING Program.

From 4 through 17 December 1967 the ARG/SLF remained in Subic Bay, R. P. The BLT conducted extensive training and all organic equipment was subject to a REHAB program. This period replaced the normal TRAINING/REHAB period conducted on Okinawa for Inter-Theater Rotation Units. A Landing Exercise was conducted on 15 and 16 December 1967 testing the results of training and the BLT's Landing Plan.

On 16 December 1967 ARG/SLF Bravo planners departed Subic Bay R. P. by air for III MAF Headquarters. On 17 December 1967 the ARG/SLF sailed for I CTZ RVN arriving vicinity Da Nang on 19 December at which time the planners reembarked.

Operation FORTRESS RIDGE commenced on 21 December 1967 and was terminated on 24 December 1967 by COMSEVENTHFLT. Also on the 24th CG III MAF requested planners from the ARG/SLF meet with CG 3rd Mar Div in preparation for a new operation. The BLT backloaded on the 24th and spent the Christmas standdown on board ARG shipping.

Operation BADGER TOOTH commenced on 26 December 1967 and was terminated on 2 January 1968 by COMSEVENTHFLT.

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ENCLOSURE (1)



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PART IIISEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

The following is a review of the activities of the Special Landing Force (TG 79.5). Detailed information of BLT 3/1 and Det ALPHA HMM 262 is shown in the appropriate Command Chronology in PART IV. Detailed information on operations FORTRESS RIDGE and BADGER TOOTH is contained in PART IV.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
2 Dec	The ARG/SLF with BLT 3/1 and Det ALPHA HMM 262, sailed for Subic Bay, R. P.
4-17 Dec	The ARG/SLF remained in Subic Bay, R. P. for upkeep and REHAB/TRAINING.
8-13 Dec	BLT 3/1 and Detachment ALPHA HMM 262 conducted training.
15-16 Dec	ARG/SLF conducted Landing Exercise.
16 Dec	ARG/SLF representatives departed Subic Bay, R. P. via air for Hq, III MAF for operational planning.
17 Dec	ARG/SLF departed Subic Bay, R. P. for I CTZ, RVN.
19 Dec	The ARG/SLF arrived I CTZ, RVN and representatives returned from Hq, III MAF.
21 Dec	Operation FORTRESS RIDGE commenced with the landing of BLT 3/1 by surface craft and helicopters in QUANG TRI Province, RVN.
24 Dec	Operation FORTRESS RIDGE terminated. Planners from ARG/SLF met with CG 3d Marine Division for for operational planning.
	Ref: COMSEVENTHFLT 250030Z Dec67
26 Dec	Operation BADGER TOOTH commenced in QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN Province, RVN.
2 Jan 68	Operation BADGER TOOTH terminated.
	Ref: COMSEVENTHFLT 021008Z Jan68

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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PART IVCHRONOLOGY OF SUBORDINATE COMMANDS  
AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

- Appendix 1 ✓  
 1 COMSEVENTHFLT 250030Z Dec67  
 2 COMSEVENTHFLT 021008Z Jan68
- Appendix 2 ✓ Command Chronology BLT 3/1, 1 Dec 67 - 2 Jan 68
- Appendix 3 ✓ Command Chronology Det ALPHA HMM 262, 1 Dec - 3 Jan 68
- Appendix 4 ✓ SLF, After Action Report, FORTRESS RIDGE, 21-24 Dec 67
- Appendix 5 ✓ BLT 3/1, After Action Report FORTRESS RIDGE, 21-24 Dec 67
- Appendix 6 ✓ Det ALPHA, HMM 262, After Action Report, FORTRESS RIDGE, 21-24 Dec 67
- Appendix 7 ✓ SLF After Action Report BADGER TOOTH, 26 Dec 67 - 2 Jan 68
- Appendix 8 \* BLT 3/1, After Action Report BADGER TOOTH, 26 Dec 67 - 3 Jan 68
- Appendix 9 ✓ Det ALPHA, HMM 262, After Action Report, BADGER TOOTH, 26 Dec 67 - 3 Jan 68

\* See here, inasmuch as they also in C/Chronology

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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**SECRET**

FM NR 022/2

NR 133995

P 250030Z DEC 67 ZYU RUAB

FM COMSEVENTHFLT

TO CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

CNO

CINCPAC

CINCPACFLT

INFO CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT

CTF SEVEN SIX

CTF SEVEN NINE

COMUSMACV

COMNAVFORV

CG III MAF

CG THIRD MARDIV

COMPHIBPAC

CG FMFPAC

CG FMFPAC (FWD)

ONE ONE FIVE

CDR SEVENTH AIR FORCE

CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE

CTF SEVEN SEVEN

CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT TWO

CG FIRST MARDIV

CG FIRST MAW

CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE

CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE

CTF SEVEN THREE

CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE

BT

**SECRET**

NOTE 70.2.1.1 PASS ADVANCE COPY TO COMUSMACV

OPERATION FORTRESS RIDGE (U)

1. FOR CTG 76.5: TERMINATE OPERATION

2. FOR CNO, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT: CANCEL NICKNAME FORTRESS RIDGE.

GP-4

BT

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001 55855

O 021008Z JAN 68 ZYO RUAUBAA

FM COMSEVENTHFLT

TO CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

CNO

CINCPAC

CINCPACFLT

INFO CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT

CTF SEVEN SIX

CTF SEVEN NINE

COMUSMACV

COMNAVFORV

CG III MAF

CG THIRD MARDIV

COMPHIBPAC

CG FMFPAC

CG FMFPAC FWD

CTF ONE ONE FIVE

CDR SEVENTH AIR FORCE

CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE

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PAGE TWO RUAUBUL 0086 S E C R E T

CTF SEVEN SEVEN

CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT TWO

CG FIRST MARDIV

CG FIRST MAW

CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE

TU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE

CTF SEVEN THREE

CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE

CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE

BT

S E C R E T

CT 70.2.1.1 PASS ADVANCED COPY TO COMUSMACV

OPERATION BADGER TOOTH (U)

1. FOR CTG 76.5:TERMINATE OPERATION BADGER TOOTH 2 JAN 68

2. FOR CNO, CINCPAC, TIINCPACFLT: CANCEL NICKNAME BADGER TOOTH

CGP-3

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SIF BRAVO AFTER ACTION REPORT - OPERATION FORTRESS RIDGE

Map Reference: AMS, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheets 6342 I and 6442 I and IV.

1. GENERAL.

a. Operation FORTRESS RIDGE was a unilateral amphibious operation conducted in accordance with NWP 22(B) employing both helicopter and surface craft assault forces. The operation was conducted in the GIO LINH District, QUANG TRI Province, I Corps Tactical Zone, Republic of Vietnam. The AOA was generally bounded by the southern boundary of the DMZ to the north, National Route #1 to the west, grid line YD63 to the south and the South China Sea to the east.

b. An Area of "Primary Interest" was agreed upon within the AOA. It was generally bounded to the north by a line from the coast running parallel to the southern boundary of the DMZ and 3,500 meters south of the boundary. On the west and south by a line along the creek with no name, generally referred to as "Jones's Creek" to the CUA VIET RIVER thence east along the CUA VIET to the DAM CHO CHUA thence to the village LE XUYEN and thence a straight line to the coast running through the village of TUONG VAN THUONG. The east, boundary was the South China Sea. The operation was conducted within the Area of Primary Interest.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION.

Special Landing Force BRAVO  
BLT 3/1  
DET ALPHA HMM 262

Colonel M. W. SCHMIDT  
LtCol M. MCQUOWN  
Major D. L. ALTHOFF

3. INTELLIGENCE

a. Enemy Situation. Information received prior to Operation FORTRESS RIDGE indicated that the AOA contained rocket sites, fortified positions, arms caches, and supplies. Enemy personnel strength within the AOA was estimated to be 1,000 from the following units: 2d Bn 803d Regt NVA, K.400 Co LF VC, U/I Bn MP VC. Enemy fire support included numerous artillery positions well dispersed in and north of the DMZ area. This artillery consisted of 85MM, 100MM, 122MM and 130MM field pieces. 122MM and 140MM rockets were also used in the area.

Enclosure (1)

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A/C (79 11.5)

C/LA, FORTRESS RIDGE

21 - 24 Dec 1967

App 4

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b. Enemy Capabilities. The enemy was capable of:

- (1) Attacking with a force of up to two battalions with artillery support, or
- (2) Defending at a time and place of his choosing with a force of up to two battalions with artillery and rocket support, or
- (3) Delaying in prepared positions with forces locally available, or
- (4) Reinforcing with any or all forces within the AOA or contiguous areas to the north or west.

c. Enemy Tactics.

Enemy contact was made within two hours after landing. The enemy chose to defend from a fortified position located in a destroyed village at coord (YD 3074). He employed mortars and artillery in support of his defense. The enemy used snipers from vantage points within his fortifications. These fortifications consisted of bunkers, trenches, and fighting holes running along existing tree lines. The enemy appeared to be well trained, in good morale, and competent. Against friendly tanks the enemy employed RPG rockets from the off hand position hitting one tank and causing friendly casualties. After the first day the enemy changed from a defensive position into one of delay and withdrawal. Enemy arms and armament were found in abundance, the arms were forwarded to 3rd Mar Div along with one type of each explosive item. The remaining explosives were destroyed in place. Captured material consisting of documents including a suspected passport, propaganda booklets, one map and miscellaneous papers were turned over to the sub team of the 17th ITT for transportation to the translation center.

d. Terrain and Weather.(1) Terrain Features

The terrain was compartmented by four segments, all generally aligned with the coast and paralleling one another. The coastal lowland and delta plain progressed inland from gently rolling, sandy beaches and dunes to a low area of rice cultivation adjacent to National Highway #1. Ground slopes were less than 10 percent and the highest point in the area was 46 meters (YD 214743). The area was poorly drained and large areas were inundated as a result of heavy rains. The soft sand and rice field areas made movement by foot and tracked vehicles difficult.

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## (2) Weather

The operating area was under the influence of the northeast monsoon during the period 21-24 Dec67. Mornings were characterized by some fog and overcast skies which persisted throughout the period. Rain showers occurred during the period and restricted visibility to some degree.

4. MISSION. Special Landing Force BRAVO conducts an amphibious operation in QUANG TRI Province to locate and capture/destroy enemy forces and rocket/logistic caches, obtain intelligence and be prepared to conduct such other operations as agreed upon with CG III MAF or his designated representative.

5. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. Operation FORTRESS RIDGE was a unilateral amphibious operation conducted by the ARG/SLF BRAVO. The operation was planned and executed as a search and destroy mission commencing with a waterborne and then heliborne assault into GIO LINH District, QUANG TRI Province, Republic of Vietnam.

6. EXECUTION.

a. Operation FORTRESS RIDGE was initiated by COMSEVENTHFLT 191304Z December 1967. Execution was in accordance with CTG 79.5 201316Z December 1967, Frag Order No #1 for Operation FORTRESS RIDGE.

b. D-Day was established as 21 December 1967 with H-Hour at 0930H and L-Hour 1000H. D-Day was confirmed and H and L-Hours were made on schedule.

c. On D-Day at H-Hour SLF BRAVO executed a surface assault over both RED Beach (YD 328715) and PURPLE Beach (YD 305678). At L-Hour a helicopter assault was executed into LZ's HAWK (YD 295730), ROBIN (YD 288716) and EAGLE (YD 313718). M/3/1 landed by LVT's over RED Beach and proceeded to LF Obj #2 (YD 303729). L/3/1 landed by landing craft over PURPLE Beach and proceeded to LF Obj #3 (YD 272704). I/3/1 landed by CH-46's in LZ HAWK and proceeded to LF Objective #1 (YD 300738). K/3/1 landed by CH-46's in LZ ROBIN and proceeded to LF Objective #4 (YD 285689). G/1/11 landed by landing craft over BLUE BEACH (YD 344699) and set up within the First AMTRAC Battalion perimeter, at the mouth of the CUA VIET River. 107MM Mortar Battery 2/11 landed by CH-46's in LZ EAGLE and established a firing position near BLT 3/1 CP in vicinity of the LZ. The Third Platoon, Company "C", First Tank Battalion landed over ORANGE Beach (YD 340700) and remained within the supply base perimeter on the north bank of the CUA VIET River until employed in support of the BLT. Obj #2, #3 and #4 were secured without incident. I/3/1 made contact with the enemy while moving to secure Obj #1. M/3/1 reinforced with the tank platoon and in conjunction with I/3/1 attacked the Objective and secured it by 211830H.

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d. On D plus 1 the BLT continued its search and destroy operation working primarily in the northern portion of the area of primary interest. M/3/1 with tanks and I/3/1 made contact with a well fortified enemy and a tank was hit with a rocket round. The tank continued to operate but was restricted in its traversing capability. K/3/1 moved across the sand dunes to the coast area and L/3/1 remained in position conducting a search and destroy operation in the vicinity of Objective #3 and #4.

e. On D plus 2 the BLT consolidated on the coast and continued its search of assigned areas.

f. The amphibious withdrawal was conducted in accordance with NWP 22(B) on E plus 3 and Operation FORTRESS RIDGE was terminated.

## 7. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS.

### a. Planning

(1) On 13 December 1967 CG III MAF requested planners from ARG/SLF BRAVO meet with CG Third Marine Division earliest, to coordinate planning for the proposed employment of SLF BRAVO between 19 December 1967 to 2 January 1968.

(2) Three members of the SLF Staff (S-2, S-3 and Fire Support Coordinator), two members of the PHIBRON STAFF (Ops Officer and Comm Officer) and a TACRON representative departed SUBIC BAY, P.I. on 16 December 1967 for the requested conference.

(3) The ARG/SLF BRAVO departed SUBIC BAY, P.I. on 17 December 1967 with BLT 3/1 and Det ALPHA, HMM 262 embarked. The BLT had completed a limited Rehab/Training Program during its 10-day stay in the Philippine Islands.

(4) The ARG/SLF arrived off Da Nang, RVN on 19 December 1967 and detailed planning for the operation commenced with the return of the ARG/SLF planners.

(5) Planning continued through the issuance of final orders on 20 December 1967. During the planning phase, the following steps were accomplished.

(a) Maps, area analysis, and the enemy order of battle were obtained and limited aerial reconnaissance of the AOA was conducted.

(b) Current intelligence was obtained from the Third Marine Division and First AMTRAC Bn.



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(c) Arrangements were made for processing and evacuation of POW's, detainees, refugees, civilian casualties and captured material.

(d) Arrangements were made for the use of Interrogator Translator Teams.

(e) Logistic support procedures were arranged.

(f) Radio frequencies were obtained and the communication plan was issued.

(g) The AOA was agreed upon and command relationships were finalized.

(h) Liaison with 1st AMTRAC Battalion was established and arrangements were finalized for the Amphibian Howitzer Platoon (LVTH-6), located at (YD 345698), to provide artillery support during the initial phases of the landing.

(i) A naval gunfire support ship was requested and requirements for close air support were determined and requested.

(j) Additional helicopter support was arranged for, consisting of four armed and one unarmed UH-1E. Two armed UH-1E were returned upon completion of the landing.

(k) Arrangements were made to provide a liaison party to Third Marine Division (FWD) COG.

b. Command Relationship.

(1) Operation FORTRESS RIDGE was a unilateral amphibious operation with command relationships in accordance with NWP-22(B). Liaison was established with Headquarters Third Marine Division Forward and 1st AMTRAC Battalion. Liaison with the First ARVN Division was established through Third Marine Division Forward.

c. Supporting Arms.

(1) Artillery.

(a) The organic BLT Artillery, Battery C 1stBn 11th Marines (105mm) and Mortar Battery 2ndBn 11th Marines (107mm) along with the 2nd Plt, 1st Armored Amphibian Company (LVTH-6), attached to the 1st AMTRAC Bn, Third Mar Div, provided artillery support for the Landing Force.

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(b) The 2ndFlt, 1st Armored Amphibian Company on D-Day was initially assigned the mission of Direct Support of the Landing Force. Upon the landing of Battery C, 1stBn 11th Mar over BLUE BEACH on the afternoon of D-Day, the LVTH-6 platoon reverted to a reinforcing role, answering fires for both the Landing Force and the 1st AMTrac Bn. Battery C on emplacement assumed direct support of the Landing Force and tactical control of the LVTH-6 Platoon's fires.

(c) At L plus 5 Mortar Btry 2ndBn, 11th Mar landed via helicopter in Landing Zone EAGLE and assumed a reinforcing support role for the Landing Force under the tactical control of Battery C.

(d) Medium and heavy artillery reinforcing fires were available from units of the 12th Marines located at GIO LINH and DONG HA.

(e) The following is a recap of missions fired and rounds expended by caliber during the duration of the operation.

	Mission			Rounds Expended
	Observed	Unobserved	H&Is	
105	14	1	39	692
107	6		4	325
Total	20	1	43	1117
				(1017)

(2) Naval Gunfire.

(a) To provide Naval Gunfire support for the Landing Force and to suppress artillery/rocket fires from suspected/known positions within the AQ, and across the Ben Hai River in North Vietnam, the USS NEWPORT NEWS(CA 148) and USS O'BANION (DD 450) were assigned to the Amphibious Task Force for direct and general support of the Landing Force.

(b) Thirty-Four suspected/known enemy artillery/rocket positions were taken under fire on a schedule from H-60 to H plus 90, with a total of 924 rounds being expended. The following is a recap of missions fired and rounds expended by caliber during the remaining portion of the operation:

	Mission		Rounds Expended
	Observed	H&I	
8"	4	-	93
5"/54	1	20	270
5"/38	5	81	881
Total	10	101	1244

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## (3) Air.

(a) Fixed wing air support was provided by First Marine Aircraft Wing and was effectively employed when required. Landing Zones ROBIN and HAWK were each prepped by four aircraft prior to the landing of heliborne troops. The prep was controlled by a TAC(A) in UH-1E aircraft. After the landing, close air support aircraft were on station until L plus 90 and reverted to on call at that time. On station aircraft not utilized in support of the operation were released to III MAF control agencies in time to be diverted to secondary targets. Fixed wing aircraft provided 8 missions with 16 sorties during FORTRESS RIDGE.

(b) Four armed UH-1E helicopters were assigned to SLF BRAVO for D-Day. There after two armed UH-1E's were provided until the end of the operation. These aircraft provided transport helicopter escort, support for ground action, control for air strikes and in many cases emergency evacuation of wounded.

(c) One unarmed UH-1E was provided and was utilized for aerial observation, control of naval gunfire and artillery fire missions, planning and liaison trips and command and control missions by the Landing Force Commander.

## (4) Fire Support Coordination.

(a) Coordination of supporting arms was in accordance with current amphibious doctrine with control and coordination under the CATF in the supporting arms coordination center of the Flagship.

(b) Liaison was established in the Third Marine Division FSCC at DONG HA to coordinate the fires of the 12th Marines into and over the AOA and for liaison and coordination of ARVN supporting arms with the 1st ARVN Regt. Except for the Landing Forces area of primary interest, ground clearance to fire within the AOA required coordination with, and final ground clearance by the 1st ARVN Regt. This was due to the location of friendly ARVN forces in and around A-1 (YD 269732), to the southeast around GIC LINH and the movement of ARVN patrols throughout most of the AOA, less the area of primary interest.

(c) No unusual problems were encountered or exceptionally long delays experienced in the clearing or coordinating of supporting fires for the Landing Force.

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## d. Communications

1. Operation FORTRESS RIDGE was characterized, by short range communications. Reliability of communications to the BLT and higher headquarters was good. During the operation, the high frequency antennas aboard the LPH were found to be poorly located, resulting in low power output and mutual interference. This problem has been rectified by relocating many of the antennas.

2. The AN/VRC-46 radios installed by SRF Subic Bay were satisfactory after SLF and VALLEY FORGE communicators corrected the antenna installation. The three AN/VRC-46 with KY-8 crypto systems installed in SLF operating spaces worked with excellent results. This system provided the SLF with a secure and rapid means of coordination and control of all phases of the operation.

3. One liaison team utilizing an AN/MRC-109 was employed at 3d Mar Div Forward FSCC.

e. Logistics. Planning conferences for operation FORTRESS RIDGE were conducted at 3rd Marine Division at Phu Bai and 3rd Marine Division (Forward) at the Dong Ha Combat Base. It was agreed that all resupply would come from the ARG shipping during the amphibious operation and thence upon chop, to Third Marine Division, from the LSA at Dong Ha. However, the chop never occurred. On D-1 SLF and BLT 3/1 supply representatives were dispatched to FLC at Da Nang to reconstitute supplies expected to be expended in support of the operation. Resupply of BLT 3/1 was conducted by both helicopter and surface landing craft from ARG shipping. Initial resupply requests were untimely however by the evening of D-Day this situation was corrected and no further problems were encountered. On 25 December 1967 all embarked units of the ARG/SLF had their basic allowance reconstituted and were ready for the future operations.

f. Civil Affairs. No Civil Affairs Plans were formulated as there were no civilians within the Area of Primary Interest.

8. READINESS OF THE SLF

a. SLF BRAVO, embarked in ARG BRAVO shipping (USS VALLEY FORGE (LPH-8), USS NAVARRO (APA-215), USS ALAMO (LSD-33), USS WINDHAM COUNTY (LST-1170),

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USS VERNON COUNTY (LST-1161)) is prepared to respond to any contingencies which may arise within the Seventh Fleet area of operation. Continuous emphasis is being placed on personnel, training, supply and equipment readiness.

9. The following comments on BLT 3/1 and Det ALPHA HMM 262 After Action Reports are included.

A. BLT 3/1

(1) Throughout the report BLT 3/1 refers to HMM 262 as providing helicopter support. This should read Detachment Alpha HMM 262.

(2) Para 11e: Frequencies used by the SLF are assigned from limited III MAF assets. Every effort is made to have wide frequency separation on high usage nets. Para 7d of this report covers the problem of ship to shore range limitation and the corrective action that was taken.

(3) Para 13 a. and b. are concurred in.

(4) Para 13c. refers to PreH-Hour fires on Objective 1 being cancelled due to reported friendly activity in area early on D-Day. Supporting arms fires were used as requested in connection with the assault on Objective 1.

(5) Para 13d is concurred in however do not feel this had any adverse effect on the operation.

(6) Para 13e. The problems of fire support delays, can be attributed to all personnel not completely understanding amphibious fire support procedures. All personnel concerned have met, discussed the problem and solution at length, no recurrence of the problem is anticipated.

B. Detachment Alpha HMM 262

(1) Para 2b2. This problem was the result of improper coordination prior to the operation. SLF Communications Officer has taken corrective action and on future operations all units will be consulted prior to issuance of COI.

(2) PARA 3A: This is a continuing problem, augmentation personnel and liaison teams are normally exchanged on D-1. The SLF makes a continuing effort to keep trips of this nature to a minimum. However concur that 25 hours is an excessive amount of administrative flying time and that it adversely affected the squadron maintenance effort and availability.

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(3) Para 3b. This problem was handled concurrently with that set forth in Paragraph A(6) above. Do not anticipate any recurrence.

(4) Para 3c. The recommendation will be forwarded to the USS VALLEY FORGE Via CTG 76.5 for their consideration.

(5) Para 3d. It is agreed that the safest and most expeditious way to resupply is by carrying external loads. However once the supplies are staged for external lifts it is extremely time consuming when they must be changed to internal loads. The majority of times this change is necessitated by the non availability of operative external hooks. Therefore concur with the problem/solution set forth Para 3c.

(6) Para 3f. Concur that slings, pennants and nets should be provided well in advance of scheduled move. It should be noted that the 30 minute delay referred to was not caused by lack of slings etc., but that the tactical situation required the Mortar Battery to remain in firing position until the commencement of the withdrawal.

(7) Para 3g Concur, action has been taken to insure compliance with these procedures.

3 Bn, 1	Master SIC No. 00524-67
Copies 1	of 90 copies

## HEADQUARTERS

Battalion Landing Team 3/1  
FPO, San Francisco, 96602

SLF Task Group 79.5  
&C Control No 00961

03/DBH/rmh  
3000

6 Jan 1968

Serial No. 0001-68

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commander, Special Landing Force Bravo

Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operation FORTRESS RIDGE).

Ref: (a) MAPS: VIETNAM, AMS 1:50,000 Series L7014, Sheet 6442 IV.  
(b) Frag Order for Operation FORTRESS RIDGE.

Encl: (1) Operation Overlay, Phase I.  
(2) Operation Overlay, Phase II.

1. Operation FORTRESS RIDGE.

2. Dates of Operation

- a. Phase I Operation FORTRESS RIDGE, 210928H-211500H Dec 1967.
- b. Phase II Operation FORTRESS RIDGE, 21-24 Dec 1967.
- c. Phase IV Operation FORTRESS RIDGE, 24 Dec 1967.

3. Location

- a. Phase I was conducted in Gio Linh District, Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam.
- b. Phase II was conducted in the same area as Phase I.
- c. Phase IV was conducted from the same area.

4. Task Organization

BLT 3/1

H&S Co (-) (Rein)

Lt. Col. MCQUOWN

Det, Hq Bn

Det Comm Plt, Hq Co, 1st Mar

Det Btry C, (Rein), 1st Bn, 11th Mar

Det Dental Co, 9th MAB

2d Plt, (Rein), Co C, 1st Med Bn

3d Plt, (Rein), Co A, 1st Eng Bn

Det LSU, For Log Cmd

1st Plt, (Rein), Co A, 1st MT Bn

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

3/1

2/2, FORTRESS RIDGE

2/2, FORTRESS RIDGE

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Co I (Rein)

Capt MORAN

Co I  
 Det H&S Co  
 FAC Tm  
 Det Med Plt  
 FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plt  
 1st & 2d Sec, 81mm Mort Plt  
 Det Btry C (Rein), 1st Bn, 11th Mar  
 Tm, 3d Plt, (Rein), Co A, 1st Eng Bn

Co K (Rein)

Capt REGAL

Co K  
 Det H&S Co  
 FAC Tm  
 Det Med Plt  
 FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plt  
 3d & 4th Sec, 81mm Mort Plt  
 Det Btry C (Rein), 1st Bn, 11th Mar  
 Tm, 3d Plt, (Rein), Co A, 1st Eng Bn

Co L (Rein)

Capt HUBBLE

Co L  
 Det H&S Co  
 FAC Tm  
 Det Med Plt  
 FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plt  
 Det Btry C, (Rein), 1st Bn, 11th Mar  
 Tm, 3d Plt, (Rein), Co A, 1st Eng Bn

Co M (Rein)

Capt THOMAS

Co M  
 Det H&S Co  
 FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plt  
 Det Btry C (Rein), 1st Bn, 11th Mar  
 Tm, 3d Plt, (Rein), Co A, 1st Eng Bn

106mm RR Plt

Lt THOMPSON

Btry C (Rein) (-), 1st Bn, 11th Mar

Capt MCLAUGHLIN

Btry W, 2d Bn, 11th Mar

Capt WINKLER

3d Plt, (Rein), Co C, 1st Tk Plt

Lt PARISH

4th Plt, (Rein), Co B, 3d AmTrac Bn

Lt METZIGER

1st Plt, (Rein), Co D, 1st Recon Bn

Lt YOUNG

3d Plt, (Rein), Co C, 1st AT Bn

Lt BROWN

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5. Supporting Forces

- a. The variety and quantity of supporting forces during Operation FORTRESS RIDGE were those normally task organized to a BLT, and those assigned missions of general and direct support of a BLT. Air, artillery, naval gunfire, and 107mm mortar battery and 81mm mortars all played an important part in the execution of FORTRESS RIDGE.
- b. Artillery. Artillery support was available and utilized by the battalion during the operation. All missions were either immediate or preplanned. The preplanned missions consisted of H&I and night defensive fires around company positions. The immediate missions were fired on suspected and known enemy positions and on targets of opportunity.
- c. A total of 692, 105mm rounds were expended on this operation. Also, 325, 107mm rounds were fired.
- d. Air Support. Air support was utilized in both phases of FORTRESS RIDGE. Fixed wing fighter attack aircraft were from 1st MAW and VNAF. Both LZ Robin and Hawk received prep air strikes. Fixed wing support was considered to be adequate. A total of 80, 500 lbs bombs, 62, 250 lbs bombs, 14, 500 lbs napalm, 380, 2.75 rockets, and 2950, 20mm rounds were expended by air support. One UH-1E gunship claimed 3 KIA (P). A total of 6 flights A-4's, 5 flights A-1's and 1 flight of F-4's comprised the fixed wing support. Helicopter support was provided by HMV 262 which initially supplied three CH-46 helicopters for the ship to shore movement. Later a fourth helicopter joined in the build up ashore. The withdrawal was more rapid and smoother due to the fact that we had seven helicopters. Helicopter escort, command and control, and visual reconnaissance was provided by VMO-3 which provided two armed UH-1E's and one slick throughout the operation; and by VMO-6 who assisted with two additional armed UH-1E's for a one-half day period during the operation.
- e. Naval Gunfire. Naval gunfire was available and on station throughout the operation FORTRESS RIDGE. Support ships were: USS Newport News (CA 148), USS Manley (DD 940), and USS O'Bannon (DD 450). Missions fired consisted of prep fire, H&I fired at suspected enemy troop positions, and mortar positions. During the withdrawal of the BLT the USS Manley and O'Bannon fired covering fire. A total of 93, 8 inch and 578, 5 inch rounds was fired. Naval gunfire provided valuable support throughout the operation.

6. Intelligence

- a. Enemy Strength, Situation and Capabilities prior to Operation FORTRESS RIDGE.
  - (1) Enemy Strength. Prior to Operation FORTRESS RIDGE and within the primary area of interest the following units were identified: the 3d Battalion of the 803 EVA Regiment with an estimated strength of 450, the K.400 Local Force Company with an estimated strength of 95, and an unidentified Main Force Battalion with an unknown strength.

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- (2) Enemy Situation. Prior to Operation FORTRESS RIDGE there were reports of numerous NVA sightings and contacts. There were several instances of enemy SA fire coupled with incidents of finding rocket launching sites and mortar sites. The enemy had limited defensive capabilities, although the terrain favored him, and the disposition of his troops aided him in sustaining defensive positions and supply caches. The enemy was expected to attack with mortars and rockets at any time, and with small units when activity was to their advantage. Their tactics were expected to be to delay our advance with small unit ambushes, interdictions of LOC's, terrorism, sabotage, as well as the utilization of mines and surprised firing devices.
- (3) Enemy Capabilities. The units mentioned above, utilizing their organic weapons, had the following capabilities:
- To attack at a time of his choosing within the AOA with force and armament at his disposal.
  - To defend in present positions in our area of responsibility.
  - To delay in present positions with forces locally available.
  - To reinforce with any or all of the forces in the contiguous area to the north and west.

b. Enemy Strength and Situation During Operation FORTRESS RIDGE

- (1) 21 December, 1967. At 1324H India Company received enemy mortar fire at LZ Hawk believed to be 81mm or 82mm mortars. At 1500H India Company reported: receiving SAF, AWF, and hand grenades from a fortified position (YD 3074). At 1600H India Company reported receiving several rounds 82mm from an unknown position. At 1800H India Company reported coming under intense 82mm mortar fire after landing, and approximately 3500 rds AWF from an estimated company sized enemy force. There were 7 USMC KIA's and 9 WIA's; 4 of the KIA's were shot in the head, indicating highly efficient sniper fire. India found 1 AK-47 and a cave containing 60mm rounds. India captured gear including one Chicom light machine gun type 56 Ser. No. 932402, Chicom type 56 Assault rifle with markings of left side of stock (2 1/2 inch circle of white paint with numerals 4 over three horizontal lines between numerals), believed to be a unit identification. At 1750H M Company received 5 rds 82mm fire which impacted to the south of their position. At 1808H M Company received an additional 7 rds 82mm fire at (YD 302735). At 1815H M Company received 20-30 rds SA from a heavily fortified position. While assaulting the position, M Co received 16-20 rds 82mm fire. The enemy position was assaulted and overrun with tank fire.
- (2) 22 December, 1967. At 0130H CTG 79.5 sent an Intelligence Report to BLT 3/1 that C-4 will be attacked soon, no time was designated Rating B-2 (YD 3172). At 0830H M Company found a hole (YD 297746) containing 50 rds 60mm Chicom mortar rds and the remains of 3 bodies. At 0930H M Company (YD 298750) found 4 dud 250 lb bombs, 30 rocket sites, and 2 B-40 rockets loaded and aimed. Engineers destroyed the material.

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At 1020H I Company (YD 289750) after moving 100 meters into the treeline passed the boundary line and came under AWF of approximate 300 rounds. They also received approximately 35 rds of 82mm and 1 Russian type rocket. There were 2 VC KIA's and the following gear was captured: 1 AK-47 Ser. No. (202512), 1 K-44 Ser. No. (289574) and assorted photos, documents and individual gear.

At 1415H (YD 301741) set in CPB for afternoon position and found numerous heavily secured bunkers and gear.

At 1730H L Company (YD 284678) received 80 rds AWF-SAF from an estimated 6 enemy forces across the river. There was 1 VC KIA.

At 2130H 1st AmTrac Bn detected digging noises at (YD 316723) and attempted observance with PPS-6 and Starlight scope. The area was illuminated and checked for possible friendlies in the area. The results were negative.

- (3) 23 December 1967. At 0730-1100 I Company (YD 296745) found and destroyed the following items: 3 dud 105 rds, 1 dud 250 lb bomb, 2,500 lb bombs, 2 60mm rounds, and 3 bunkers. Also, 15 holes were destroyed with E-tools. Three enemy bodies were found at (YD 231743).

At 0300-0800H (YD 231745) 2 NGF missions were fired which were observed by an AO. There were 5 bunkers destroyed and 1 small secondary explosion. The other NGF mission was not observed for a bomb damage assesement.

At 0830H M Company (YD 292749), while searching the area, found 1 dud 250 lb bomb.

At 1325H M Company found 1 Russian flag, 1 rally banner, letters, and various propaganda papers in a foxhole at (YD 296745).

At 1530H M Company (YD 317736) found a Soviet AT mine, weighing approximately 100 lbs and was 14 inches in diameter. The mine was destroyed with 2½ lbs of C-4.

At 1645H I Company (YD 296745) observed 2 VA soldiers moving into the area.

7. Mission. BLT 3/1 conducts amphibious assaults in Quang Tri Province to locate and destroy/capture enemy forces, rocket/logistics caches, obtain intelligence, and be prepared to conduct other operations on order.

8. Concept of Operation

a. Phase I. (Enclosure 1)

- (1) On D-Day BLT 3/1 conducts a rapid build up of the landing forces ashore and aggressive movement by all units to secure the landing force objective.
- (2) Commencing at H-Hour (210930H Dec) L Company is to be landed by landing craft over Purple Beach, attack and seize objective (4). On order conduct S&D operations.
- (3) Commencing at H-Hour (210930H Dec) M Company lands by LVT over Red Beach, attacks and seizes objective (2), and conducts S&D operations on order.

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- (4) Commencing at L-Hour (211000H Dec) I Company is to land in LZ Hawk, to attack and seize objective (3), and on order conduct S&D operations.
  - (5) Commencing at L-Hour (211000H Dec) K Company is to land in LZ Robin, to attack and seize objective (3), and on order conduct S&D operations.
  - (6) C Btry (Rein), 1st Bn, 11th Mar landed over Blue Beach by LCU and LCM 8 and established a firing position within the 1st AmTrac Bn compound and fired in general support.
  - (7) 3rd Plt, (Rein), Co C, 1st Tk Bn landed over Orange Beach by landing craft and moved into LSA perimeter, and was ordered to be prepared to reinforce other units on order.
  - (8) W Btry, 2nd Bn, 11th Mar were ordered to set up firing positions within the perimeter of the Provisional Company area.
  - (9) 4th Plt, (Rein), Co B, 3rd AmTrac Bn provided the ship to shore movement for M Company.
  - (10) The Provisional Company was to supply security for the Command Group and W Btry.
- b. Phase II (Enclosure 2)
- (1) Contact was established with what was thought to be the 3rd Bn, 803 Regt in the northeastern part of the area of primary concern.
  - (2) Because of this contact BLT 3/1 was ordered to continue its S&D of the area and then remain in the same general area.
- c. Phase IV Commencing at 240700H Dec the tactical withdrawal of BLT 3/1 began. By 241100H Dec the withdrawal was complete.
9. Execution
- a. Operation FORTRESS RIDGE--Below are significant events listed in chronological sequence.
- (1) 210928H Co M lands by LVT over Red Beach.
  - (2) 211000H Co L lands by LCM over Purple Beach.
  - (3) 211000H Co K begins landing in LZ Robin.
  - (4) 211050H Co I begins landing in LZ Hawk.
  - (5) 211235H Co M arrives obj (2)--no contact.
  - (6) 211324H Co I receives incoming 60mm mortar rounds in LZ Hawk.
  - (7) 211345H Co I receives 6 to 8 82mm mortar rounds.
  - (8) 211355H Co L swept through obj (4), and is holding position. Awaits further orders.
  - (9) 211410H Co I received 6-8 rds 82mm.
  - (10) 211435H Alpha Command Group departed USS Valley Forge.
  - (11) 211500H Co K secured obj (3).
  - (12) 211500H Command Group Alpha touched down in LZ Eagle.
  - (13) 211515H Co I received automatic and semi-automatic weapons fire and hand grenades from a fortified position.
  - (14) 211520H Co I taking increased fire, have wounded and are maneuvering toward fortified position.
  - (15) 211530H Gunship reports man in green uniform apparently hiding in a hole (YD 295737). Also five persons observed in treeline (YD 305741). Request investigation.
  - (16) 211530H AO reports bunker complex (YD 303734). AO reports 15 individuals at (YD 304743). Request investigation.

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- (17) 211610H Co I reports incoming mortars (82mm) on their own 81mm mortar section from unknown area. Request more AO's to fix enemy mortar position.
- (18) 211710H Sent tanks up beach to join M Company to move on obj (1).
- (19) 211750H Co M received 5 rds 82mm mortar fire.
- (20) 211808H Co M received an additional 7 rds of 82mm mortar fire.
- (21) 211820H Co M swept through obj (1) and will sweep back toward beach.
- (22) 211830H Co M and Co I establishing night defensive position on obj (1).
- (23) 211830H Co I summarizes days contact, stating they received 100 incoming 82mm and 60mm mortar rounds and approximately 3500 rds SA fire. Casualties were 7 USMC KIA's, 9 USMC WIA's. Four KIA's shot in head indicating sniper fire.
- (24) 212120H Co M summarized days contact, stating they received 16 to 20 rounds 82mm mortar, 20-30 rounds SA. Assaulted through obj with tanks, sustained casualties of 12 USMC WIA's.
- (25) 212350H BLT 3/1 requests authority to conduct S&D 1000 meters north of obj (1) (YD 300738) and inland 1000 meters from beach. Request is due to contact with enemy force over company size. (YD 301744 and YD 300739).
- (26) 220155H Request to go 1000 meters north was approved by SLF.
- (27) 220315H CTG 79.5 flashed secret intelligence report that C-4 position was to be attacked soon. Rate B-2.
- (28) 220808H Co I in contact at obj (1). Permission granted to go 1000 meters further north.
- (29) 220900H Co M found 3 NVA bodies, and 50 rds 60mm mortar Chicom.
- (30) 220905H Co I captured two weapons, 27 rds 60mm mortar, grenades, rockets and assorted enemy 782 gear.
- (31) 221035H One tank assigned to M Co and I Co was hit by a RR rd. Crew casualties listed as 2 WIA's USMC, and 1 KIA USMC. Tank damage was to turret and search light.
- (32) 221040H Co M found 4 dud 250 lb bombs, 30 rocket site positions with aiming stakes, 2 rds 140mm rockets loaded and aimed.
- (33) 221155H India Co came under heavy fire. Returned NGF, SA fire and 90mm tank fire. Found weapons, 782 gear, photos and documents and small arms ammunition. Had 2 NVA's KIA (C). Also, 1 KIA USMC and 4 WIA's USMC.
- (34) 221203H Tank is able to move under own power. As a result of action, reports 2 NVA KIA's (C).
- (35) 221450H Co I found numerous heavily secured bunkers. Search revealed large amounts of enemy 782 gear, bloody battle dressings.
- (36) 221540H Co I found large amounts of MG ammo, and small arms ammo. Also, they found 10 60mm mortar rounds.
- (37) 221935H Co L while returning from S&D received 80 rds SA and auto wps fire from west, across river. Est. 3-6 enemy. Returned 150 rds 5.56, 25 rds M-79 rds, 8 rds 60mm mortar, 24 rds 105mm. One NVA KIA (C).
- (38) 222340H 1st AmTrac Bn reported hearing digging noise (YD 316723). Searched area with PPS-6 and Starlite scope with negative results.
- (39) 230924H Co M found one dud 250 lb bomb, one dud 82mm round.

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- (40) 231020H Co I called in NGF observed by AO. Five bunkers destroyed (YD 292748) with one small secondary explosion.
- (41) 231105H Co I while on S&D found and destroyed 3 dud 105 rds, 2 dud 250 lb bombs, 2 dud 500 lb bombs, 20 rds 60mm mortar and 3 bunkers and large amounts of enemy 782 gear.
- (42) 231530 Co M moving tactical formation with tanks, hit AT mine of about 15 lbs. It blew off a portion of the tread; will continue our move on obj (1) as soon as it is repaired.
- (43) 231550H Co M found one dud 105mm rd (YD 312729). Destroyed with 2 1/2 lbs C-4.
- (44) 231715 Co I saw two NVA soldiers (YD 296745). Fired 20 rds 5.56 and an arty mission with negative results.
- (45) 231755 Co M found 1 Soviet AT mine approximately 100 lbs of charge. Mine was blown in place.
- (46) 231800H Co M and Co L in position on Orange Beach to begin Phase IV on the following day.
- (47) 231815H Co I and Co K in position for Phase IV.
- (48) 240700H Began Phase IV.
- (49) 241230H Phase IV completed.

10. Resultsa. Friendly Losses

OFFICER				ENLISTED			
KIA	WIA	MIA	DOW	KIA	WIA	MIA	DOW
0	0	0	0	9	27	0	1

OFFICER				ENLISTED			
KIA	WIA	MIA	DOW	KIA	WIA	MIA	DOW
0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0

There were no major items of equipment or material losses.

b. Enemy Losses

CATEGORY	TOTAL
NVA KIA (C)	10
NVA KIA (P)	5
Weapons Captured	6
Fortifications Destroyed	8
Fighting Holes Destroyed	15
Grenades	106
Mortar Rounds (60mm, 81mm, 82mm)	153
AP Mines	35
Rockets	22
Dud 250 lb Bombs	6
Dud 500 lb Bombs	2
Dud 105 Rounds	4
Large Amount of Assorted Enemy 782 gear including 38 gas masks, photos and document.	

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11. Administrative Matters. At the start of the operation it was anticipated that BLT would be ashore for about two weeks. An LSU was planned in the 9th Marine CP. After it was established that Phase III of the operation would not be put into effect, all logistical and administrative functions were performed from the Valley Forge.

a. Supply Techniques, Combat Loads, Ammunition and Weapons by Assault Troops.

- (1) All classes of supply were available through the LSA on the USS Valley Forge, however Class II items, i. e., repair parts for vehicles took some time to assemble for issue due to the lack of FSN numbers and proper nomenclatures for parts required. Resupply was conducted primarily by helicopter; however landing craft were available should conditions permit their use. Because the availability of helicopters was limited, and in an effort to restrict flights to daylight hours, supply requests were called in prior to 1400 the day before the supplies were needed. This left time to process and frag all emergency resupply requests. Water was supplied to the companies in disposable water containers. No real problems were encountered with resupply, except on occasions when resupply requests were received too late to process for that day.
- (2) Battalion Supply conducted normal supply functions throughout the period. The supply "warehouse" was aboard the Valley Forge. During the period of operation all resupply requests were handled in a professional manner with no problems except for the lack of operating space.
- (3) Helicopter support teams handled the resupply points ashore. The S-4 and a detachment from Shore Party aboard the Valley Forge coordinated and fraged the resupply from the ship.
- (4) During the operation, the assault troops carried the prescribed load in accordance with Administrative Plan 1-67 and the Battalion SOP for Operations.

b. Maintenance. Normal organizational maintenance was conducted throughout the operation. Acceptance checks were performed on new vehicles. Combat damage assessments were made on vehicles prior to backloading. One tank was sent to 1st FSR in DaNang for repair.

c. Medical Evacuation, Treatment and Hospitalization.

- (1) First echelon medical care was provided by the corpsman in each line company and with the command group. Attached units were provided first echelon care by their unit corpsman. First echelon care consisted of first aid, evaluation of wounds for possible evacuation and care of minor medical problems.
- (2) Second echelon care was provided by the BAS medical officers. This consisted of routine sick call, continued treatment for minor illness referred from the field, and disposition of more major illnesses.
- (3) Third echelon care was provided by 2nd Plt (Rein), Co C, 1st Med Bn aboard the Valley Forge. This group was able to provide medical and hospital care in a permanently established facility.

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- (4) Medevac for this operation was performed by HMM 262 Squadron and all casualties were flown directly to the Valley Forge.
- (5) There were no Med Can Programs during this operation.
- (6) Casualties were as follows:

	USMC		USN	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
KIA's	0	9	0	0
DOW	0	1	0	0
WIA's (evac)	0	27	0	1
WIA's (non evac)	0	5	0	0
Non Hostile	0	3	0	0

d. Transportation

- (1) Helicopters were used to move troops to their area of operation and for the resupply of troop positions.
- (2) Operation FORTRESS RIDGE concluded as the backload of the BLT commenced. The backload was carried out by using HMM Squadron 2.
- (3) All transportation requirements during Operation FORTRESS RIDGE were met satisfactorily. No problems in this area developed.

- e. Communication. Communications were established utilizing an abbreviated version of the concepts set forth in FMFM 10-1. Problems revolved around the limited frequency spectrum available with current FM radio equipment (i.e., PRC-25, MRC 109). The result was mutual interference between several nets which were within one megacycle of each other. Another problem (involving only the ship to shore nets) was that the distance between stations occasionally exceeded the effective range of FM radio equipment.

12. Special Equipment & Techniques. None.

13. Command Analysis

- a. Operation FORTRESS RIDGE provided the confidence and experience needed for a newly formed BLT to perform as a professional combat unit.
- b. Ship to shore movement was executed smoothly and according to plan.
- c. Preparation fires on objective (1) from which we received mortar, anti-tank, and small arms fire were not fired because a friendly activity from C-4 outpost was reported to be in the area. It is probable that this activity did not actually reach objective (1) as extensive defense positions and numerous enemy were found in the area.
- d. Maneuver in the area of objective (1) was restricted by its proximity to the area of primary concern boundary.
- e. Fire support was responsive and more than adequate for the situation. However, check fires of long duration, in one case for one hour, were applied by SACC denying the Battalion needed fire support when no planes were in the area. This will have to be resolved for future operations if we are to have close continuous coordinated fire support as well as air support fire for medevac and resupply.


M. MCQUOWN

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding



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ENCLOSURE (1)  
SECRET

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ANNEX 3 (OPERATION OVERLAY)  
TO FRAG ORDER 2-68

MAP REF: 6442 IX (QUANG TRI)  
1:50,000 Scale

35  
72

S & D  
"K"

S & D  
"K"

S & D  
"L"

S & D  
"M&I"

27  
66

ENCLOSURE (2)  
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Copy 1 of 43

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COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT - BADGER TOOTH

Map Reference: AMS, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheets 6442 I and III.

1. GENERAL

a. Operation BADGER TOOTH was a unilateral amphibious operation conducted in accordance with NWP 22(B) employing both helicopter and surface craft assault forces. The operation was conducted in the QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN Provinces, I Corps Tactical Zone, Republic of Vietnam. The landward AOI was that area encompassed by a line drawn from the coast at YD 600486 thru YD 570430 thru YD 480430 thru YD 450510 to the coast at YD 500560. On 281400H the AOI was adjusted by deleting the land area south and west of a line from YD 452512 southeast along the north bank of the TAN VINH DINH and SONG O LAU and terminating at a point in vicinity YD 581449.

b. The inclusive dates of Operation BADGER TOOTH were 26 December 1967 through 2 January 1968. COMSEVENTHFLT 240126Z December 1967, BADGER TOOTH Initiating Directive, assigned SLF BRAVO the mission to conduct search and destroy operations within the AOI. COMSEVENTHFLT 021125Z January 1968 terminated the operation.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

Special Landing Force  
BLT 3/1  
DET ALPHA HMM 262

Colonel M. W. SCHMIDT  
LtCol M. MCQUOWN  
Major D. L. ALTHOFF

3. INTELLIGENCE

a. Intelligence developed from external sources prior to execution of the operation indicated no fixed enemy units within the AOI. The latest data reported two units located in the AOI on 3 Dec 1967. These were the 808th Battalion, 5th NVA Regt, and the C-113th (LF) Company. Other units were known to have been operating to the southeast of the AOI in the area along highway 555, but their location was not fixed.

b. Enemy Capabilities

(1) Capability #1. ATTACK within the AOI with all or any of the elements of the 808th Bn, 5th NVA Regt, and the C-113th Co.

(2) Capability #2. DEFEND at a time and place of his choosing with any or all elements of the 808th Bn, 5th NVA Regt and the C-113th Co.

1

Enclosure (1)

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d/c (79:9.5)

a/a 240600Z 700TH

6 Dec 67 - 2 Jan 68

app 7

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(3) Capability #3. EVADE direct contact with our superior forces and resort to small unit actions, mining, surprise firing devices, sniper harassment and ambushes in an effort to inflict maximum casualties on our forces and decimate small units operating beyond effective friendly support or reinforcing distances.

(4) Capability #4. withdraw all or part of his forces prior to or at the onset of our operations, utilizing snipers, mines and surprise firing devices whenever possible to delay our forces while he disperses and conceals his vital equipment and supplies.

c. Enemy Tactics. In the hamlet of THAM KHE vicinity (YD 539527) the enemy forces had prepared extensive defensive positions in the northwestern portion and other less extensive positions in the southeast portion. These portions consisted of well camouflaged log and sand bunkers, partially covered "L" shaped fighting holes, rifle pits and spider holes and communications/connecting trenches. Friendly units made a rapid sweep of the hamlet on D-Day and apparently observed only a small number of these positions due to approaching darkness and rapidity of movement. Indications are that at least a portion of the enemy forces were hiding in the positions during the initial sweep and did not desire to initiate any action. It is very probable that a large remnant of an enemy force which had been severely mauled by ARVN forces in the vicinity of YD 5457 on 26 Dec had moved into THAM KHE during the night of 26-27 Dec. The morning of 27 Dec as the Marine unit approached the hamlet from the northwest it was taken under fire. When the unit began moving towards the enemy he withheld his fire until the attacking unit had moved to within 30 to 75 meters of his position, then began delivering a devastating volume of fire against the unit. The enemy occupied well prepared positions with excellent fields of fire. Through the day light hours on D plus 1 the hostile fire was well regulated and accurate, as is apparent from the 26 friendly casualties who were killed by bullet wounds in the neck and head. After maintaining the battle position until dark on D plus 1 the enemy apparently policed his casualties, weapons, and withdrew from the area leaving a delaying force of an estimated squad. A wounded NVA soldier before dying stated that the unit commander and other personnel had left by boat, moving to the southeast along the coast. The wounded enemy soldier stated his unit was the 116th Battalion 7/6 Regiment. On D plus 2 the hamlet was secured, a small number of enemy dead were found. Indications are that the defense of the THAM KHE hamlet was a deliberately conducted operation, where the enemy fought a planned battle in prepared positions, had superior fire discipline and control of his forces. The battle area was policed removing casualties and material, after which the enemy withdrew, probably in accordance with a planned maneuver.

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## d. Terrain and Weather

1. Weather had no effect on this operation.

2. Terrain. The terrain in the vicinity of THAM KHE hamlet consists of sand dunes crossed by several intermittent streams and ponds. It is generally open, except in the hamlet where numerous treelines and hedgerows provided very good cover and concealment. Loose sand throughout the area hinders movement by foot troops. Numerous foot paths and intermittent streambeds facilitate movement, but channelize such movement. These offer concealed routes into and out of the hamlet during hours of darkness. Access to the hamlet by sea is extremely easy and facilitated by numerous small boats available in the area.

4. MISSION. Special Landing Force BRAVO conducts an amphibious operation in QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN Province to destroy/capture enemy forces and logistic caches, disrupt enemy routes of communications and supply, obtain intelligence and be prepared to conduct such other operations as agreed upon with CG III MAF or his designated representative.

5. CONCEPT OF OPERATION. Operation BADGER TOOTH was a unilateral amphibious operation conducted by the ARG/SLF BRAVO. The operation was planned and executed as a search and destroy mission of short duration commencing with a waterborne and then a heloborne assault into QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN Province, Republic of Vietnam. Initially the operation was to be of short duration as it was planned ultimately to CHOP elements of the LF to the 4th Marine Regiment via III MAF and 3d MarDiv. The regiment in turn had certain objectives for the Bn to secure west of the AO. This area was mostly rice paddy area and the population centers were along the SONG THAC MA which generally runs from the southwest to the northeast. This area is not conducive to tracked vehicle operations, particularly during this time of year. After a careful evaluation of these facts it was decided not to land the tanks or ontos and to position the artillery battery in such an area as to enable it to support the Bn in the assault on LF Obj #1 and all subsequent operations west of that area. The only position available for this purpose had the disadvantage that the battery could not support LF operations east of LZ FINCH. This was evaluated but the advantages far outweighed the disadvantages and C/1/11 was moved to a position in vicinity EZ 4689.

6. EXECUTION.

a. Operation BADGER TOOTH was initiated by COMSEVENTHFLT 240126Z December 1967. Execution was in accordance with CTG 79.5 241433Z December 1967, Frag Order #1 for Operation BADGER TOOTH.

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b. D-Day was established as 26 December 1967 with H-Hour at 1100H and L-Hour to be established. D-Day was confirmed and H-Hour was made on time. L-Hour was later established as 1230H and made on time.

c. The basic plan for Operation BADGER TOOTH was to execute a surface assault over GREEN BEACH (YD 549524) and then secure LZ FINCH (YD 524496). Upon securing LZ FINCH the remaining elements of 3/1 were to land by helicopter in the LZ and then attack towards LF Obj #1 (YD 502460), conducting a river crossing enroute. Upon securing LF Obj #1 it was planned to CHOP selected elements of the LF to III M.F.

d. On D-Day at 0830H C/1/11 landed by CH-53's at Camp Evans (YD 536325) for further movement overland to a firing position vic (YD 466392). At H-Hour L/3/1 landed in LVT's over GREEN BEACH and secured LZ FINCH. Upon accomplishing this, L-Hour was set at 1230H and remaining assault elements of 3/1 commenced landing in LZ FINCH. After the BLT CP was established ashore and K/3/1 was sweeping towards objective #1 intelligence was received from the 4th Marines that an enemy unit was located in vic YD 484513. As a result the Bn was directed to move northwest along the axis of NR #555 towards THON KIM LONG (YD 484513). L/3/1 commenced a move in that direction with M/3/1 in trace. Later intelligence received from the First ARVN Div. indicated an enemy unit might be located at THON THAM KHE (YD 5352). L/3/1 was dispatched to check this area and moved on to the village THON THUNG AN (YD 5253) where M/3/1 joined them late on D-Day.

e. On D plus 1, L/3/1 was returning to THON THAM KHE when contact was made with an enemy force occupying strong defensive positions in and around the village. L/3/1 assaulted the village and became heavily engaged sustaining heavy casualties. M/3/1 was moved to reinforce L/3/1 and Mortar Btry 2/11 and the tank platoon were landed. Additionally K/3/1 was moved to reinforce L and M/3/1. The assault continued on the landward sides of the village and the outer most defenses on the northwest and southeast sides of the village were penetrated. The Battalion was unable to secure the village prior to darkness and attempted to disengage, evacuate wounded and position forces to prevent the enemy from evacuating the village during the night. Due to close contact the battalion was unable to disengage until after dark. Flare ships and NGF illumination were available, however, due to the time required to disengage and position forces the battalion was unable to utilize illumination until approximately 2400. NGF and artillery fires were used to support the disengagement and to restrict enemy movement during the night. On D plus 2 following an extensive Air, NGF and Artillery preparation I and K/3/1 assaulted and secured the village.

f. On D plus 6 an amphibious withdrawal was scheduled but adverse weather forced a delay and only the AMTRAC Plt and K Co. were extracted on this day. On 2 January 1968 the withdrawal was completed.

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7. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS

## a. Planning

(1) On 23 December 1967 III MAF requested planners from ARG/SLF BRAVO to meet with CG Third Marine Division earliest, and coordinate planning for a proposed employment of SLF BRAVO between 26 and 31 December 1967.

(2) Planners arrived at Headquarters Third Marine Division on 24 December 1967 and the planning phase of Operation BADGER TOOTH commenced.

(3) Planning continued through the issuance of final orders on 25 December 1967. During the planning phase, the following steps were accomplished.

(a) Maps, area analysis aerial photography, rice route overlays and the enemy order of battle were obtained and limited aerial reconnaissance of the AOA was conducted.

(b) Current intelligence was obtained from the Third Marine Division, and 4th Marine Regiment.

(c) Arrangements were made for processing and evacuation of detainees, refugees, civilian casualties and captured material.

(d) Arrangements were made for the use of an IT-SubTeam and an APT of 3 USMC and 7 Vietnamese.

(e) Logistic support procedures were arranged.

(f) Radio frequencies were obtained and the communication plan was issued.

(g) The AOA was agreed upon and command relationships were finalized.

(h) Arrangements were made for the establishment of a Liaison Team at Fourth Marines CP.

(i) A naval gunfire support ship was requested and requirements for close air support were determined and requested.

(j) Additional helicopter support was arranged and consisted of four armed and one unarmed UH-1E. Two armed UH-1E were returned upon completion of the landing.

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b. Command Relationship.

(1) Operation BADGER TOOTH was a unilateral amphibious operation with command relationship in accordance with NWP-22(B). Liaison was established with the Fourth Marines and visits were made to the 1st ARVN Regiment.

c. Supporting Arms.(1) Artillery.

(a) Artillery Support for the Landing Force was provided initially by a provisional 155 How Platoon of the 3rdBn 12th Marines (YD 4639) and an ARVN 155 How Platoon located at HAI LANG Village. Control and coordination of the two platoons was affected by a Provisional Artillery Group established for the operation by the 3rdBn 12thMar.

(b) Battery C, 1stBn 11thMarines BLT 3/1 was helo lifted on the morning of D-Day by CH-53 aircraft to Camp Evans where on arrival the battery was provided further transportation by 3/12 to a position north of Camp Evans in the vicinity of the Prov Artillery Group and Prov 155 How Plt. at Grid YD 4639. Modification of the Landing Force's original scheme of maneuver on D plus 1, caused by enemy activity within the north eastern sector of the AOA, prevented utilization of this battery in support of the Landing Force. Consequently when the AOA was adjusted at 1400 on D plus 2, Battery C along with the Provisional Artillery Group and 155 Platoon were returned to Camp Evans.

(c) Mortar Battery, 2nd Bn, 11th Marines, BLT 3/1 was helo lifted ashore late on D plus 1 and assumed the direct support mission for the Landing Force. At that time the ARVN Platoon at HAI LANG and the Prov 155 How Platoon of 3/12 reverted to a general support/reinforcing role. A total of 310 rounds were expended during the operation in support of the Landing Force.

(2) Naval Gunfire

(a) The USS O'BANNON (DD 450) was assigned in direct support of the Amphibious Task Force. Pre H-Hour fires were not planned or conducted due to restrictions imposed by the Rules of Engagement. No fires were conducted in support of the amphibious assault as no opposition was encountered.

(b) Commencing with the morning of D plus 1 NGF played a major role in the support of the Landing Force, who at this time had firmly engaged a well protected enemy in the village of THON THAM KHE. THON THAM KHE, located just north of GREEN BEACH some 100 meters in from the water's edge presented an excellent NGF target. Extensive fires were utilized during the assault and seizure of the village.



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(c) 712 Rds of 5"/38 ordnance were expended in support of the Landing Force during the operation by the USS O'BANNOON.

(3) Air

(a) CAS by fixed wing aircraft was extensive even though no landing zone prep was necessary as the helicopter landing zone was secured by friendly troops. Late on D-Day two sections of aircraft were used on fortified positions. Twenty more sorties were flown on the next two days against the fortified village of THOM THAM KHE. A total of twenty-five attack sorties were flown in support of Operation BADGER TOOTH with an ordnance expenditure of 38,000 pounds of bombs and 37 napalm tanks.

(b) Two C-130 and two C-117 aircraft were utilized to provide night illumination on the nights of D plus 1 and D plus 2 to aid observation and restrict enemy movement.

(c) Four armed UH-1E helicopters were assigned to the Landing Force on D-Day. Thereafter, two armed UH-1E were provided until the operation terminated. These aircraft were utilized for TAC(A), assault support and transport helicopter escort.

(d) One unarmed UH-1E helicopter was provided for command and control, tactical aerial observation including naval gunfire and artillery spotting, and area reconnaissance.

(e) Two CH-53 helicopters were provided for a pre H-Hour transfer of the 105mm artillery battery from the USS ALAMO to the 4th Marines GP (Camp Evans).

(f) All aircraft requested were provided by CG 1stMAW.

(4) Fire Support Coordination.

(a) Coordination of supporting arms was in accordance with current amphibious doctrine with control and coordination under the CATF in the Supporting Arms Coordination Center of the flagship.

(b) The requirement for strict compliance with the rules of engagement within the ACA necessitated close coordination and clearance of supporting arms with the 1st ARVN Div and the District Chiefs of HAI LAND and PHONG DIEN. To effect coordination, liaison was established in the 4th Marine FSCC at Camp Evans. Ground clearance from the District Chiefs and 1st ARVN Div was obtained through 4th Marines FSCC. Supporting fires were cleared quickly and no unusual problems were encountered.

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## d. Communications

(1) Communications during Operation BADGER TOOTH were characterized by short range circuits and good reliability although an in-country relay was required on the artillery nets. Minor circuit outage occurred on the "Orestes" teletype circuit with III MAF; however, these problems have been eliminated. Short circuits occurred in the MRC-110 radio jeep provided to the SLF liaison team. Mutual interference and antenna location problems, previously encountered on the USS VALLEY FORGE, did not cause any serious problems.

(2) Covered voice communications employing the KY-8 (Nestor Crypto System) were used extensively to the Third Marine Division. The system was not employed within the ELT or within the Task Group shipping during the operation.

(3) Radio Relay was not used since the shipboard GRC-10 equipment was inoperable. Excellent support, both to SLF "B" and ARG "B" has been has been rendered by Electronics Maintenance Company, and Motor Transport Maintenance Company, First FSR in repairing and rebuilding communications equipment.

(4) One liaison team, located at Fourth Marines CP, was equipped with an MRC-110, a KY-8, and an RC-292. With the exception of the short circuit noted above, communications with the liaison team were excellent.

e. Logistics. Planning conferences with Third Marine Division and the Fourth Marines commenced on 24 December 1967. It was mutually agreed that resupply would be provided from LSI at Fourth Marines CP. On D plus 1 the tactical situation ashore required that the total resupply support be provided from supplies embarked in ARG shipping. Some minor problems developed due to untimely resupply requests and excessive packaging time. By D plus 2 all problems were solved and resupply worked smoothly. Upon termination of operation BADGER TOOTH all equipment requiring third echelon repair was off-loaded at Da Nang. Within seventy-two hours all equipment had been repaired with the exception of one M 4843 tank that was submerged. While in stand-down at Da Nang, all supplies expended were reconstituted on ARG ships.

f. Civil Affairs. Armed propaganda teams were employed and were helpful in obtaining information on the enemy encountered in THON THAM KHE. An extensive program was planned for the portion of the operation around Objective #1 but a change in mission cancelled that portion of the operation.

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8. READINESS OF THE SLF

a. Upon termination of the operation, SLF BRAVO, embarked in ARG BRAVO shipping USS VALLEY FORGE (LPH-8), USS NAVARRO (APA-215), USS ALAMO (LSD-33), USS WHETSTONE (LSD-27), USS VERNON COUNTY (LST-1161), was prepared to respond to any contingencies that might arise within the Seventh Fleet area of operations.

9. The following comments on BLT 3/1 and Det ALPHA HMM-262 After Action Reports are provided.

## a. BLT 3/1

(1) Throughout the report the BLT refers to HMM-262 as providing helicopter support. This should read Detachment ALPHA, HMM-262.

(2) Para 5d. In view of the amount of other supporting arms available the amount of artillery available was considered adequate for the mission.

(3) Para 5e. The landing zone was swept and secured by the waterborne assault force and there was no need for a landing zone prep.

(4) Para 13e is concurred in and can be directly attributed to the superb efforts of Detachment ALPHA and the embarked Surgical Evacuation Team BRAVO.

(5) Para 14a. Objectives 2 and 3 were projected Fourth Marine objectives and were not assigned by the landing force commander.

(6) Para 14b: Concur that continued patrols in this specific area would have precluded the extensive build up. However without knowing the in country commander's tactical situation throughout the TAOB it is difficult to comment on the practicability of this suggestion.

(7) Para 14d. Concur that more tanks would have had a significant impact on the operation. The tank in Da Nang was being repaired for battle damage received on Operation FORTRESS RIDGE. The tank submerging was caused by a lack of experience on the part of the boat coxswain and tank platoon leader. It should be noted that the lack of communications between the tanks was not a result of damage incurred during landing, but a problem that existed prior to landing.

(8) Para 15a: The mission assigned the landing force by CG Third Marine Division was a search of the river running south west from XD 514472. A Chop to Fourth Marines would be dictated by the proximity of forces. The landing force concept of operation was based on the above mission and the BLT prepared their landing plan accordingly. Subsequent to the landing but

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prior to the chop, intelligence obtained from 1st ARVN Division indicated a build up of forces in the beach area and a sweep of the beach area was made prior to continuing the original mission. The landing force became engaged with the enemy to a point that a chop was not feasible. The decision not to land the 107 Mortar Battery, Tanks and Ontos platoons was made by the BLT Commander, and was a sound decision based on the mission assigned and the projected mission with the Fourth Marines.

(9) Paras 15b-d: Concur with lesson learned.

b. Det ALPHA, HMM-262

(1) The BLT SPARROW HAWK reaction force was a platoon vice company.

(2) The Mortar Btry was also landed by helicopters on 27Dec67.

(3) Par 2.a.(1) - LZ FINCH was secured by the waterborne assault company and no zone prep was required.

(4) Para 3a and 3b. were problems caused by a lack of close coordination between the BLT and ships combat cargo personnel. This problem has been remedied.

(5) Para 4a-b Conclusions set forth are concurred in; action has been taken to insure compliance with these procedures.

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Bn, Marines S&C No. 00526-68  
Copies 1 of 65 copies

HEADQUARTERS  
Battalion Landing Team 3/1  
FPO, San Francisco, 96602

03/THS/rmh  
3000  
16 Jan 1968  
Ser. No. 0002-68

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer  
To: CTG 79.5

Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operation BADGER TOOTH)

Ref: (a) CTG 79.5 Prog Order - Operation BADGER TOOTH  
(b) MAPS: VIETNAM 1:50,000, AMS Series 6442 II, 6442 I

Encl: (1) Operation Overlay  
(2) Sketch Map - Thon Tham Khe Hamlet

1. Operation BADGER TOOTH.
2. Dates of Operation. 261100 Dec 1967 - 021100 Jan 1968.
3. Location. Operation BADGER TOOTH took place in Hai Lang District, Quang Tri Province, and in Huong Dien District, Thua Thien Province.
4. Task Organization

BLT 3/1

Lt. Col. MCQUOWN

H&S Co (-) (Rein)

Det, Hq Bn, 1st Mar Div  
Det, Hq Co, 1st Mar  
Det, C Btry (Rein), 1st Bn, 11th Mar  
Det, Comm Plt, Hq Co, 1st Mar  
Det, Dental Co, 9th MAB  
2d Plt (Rein), Co C, 1st Med Bn  
3d Plt (Rein) (-) Co A, 1st Eng Bn  
Det, LSU, For Log Cmd  
Det, Co A, 1st SP Bn  
1st Plt (Rein), Co A, 1st MT Bn

SLF Task Group 79.5  
S&C Control No 00987

Co I (Rein)

Capt MORAN

Co I  
Det, H&S Co  
FAC Tm  
Det, Med Plt  
FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plt  
Det, Btry C (Rein), 1st Bn, 11th Mar  
Tm, 3d Plt (Rein), Co A, 1st Eng Bn  
HST Tm, Det Co A, 1st SP Bn

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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SECRET

Co K (Rein)

Capt REGAL

Co K  
 Det, H&S Co  
 Det, Med Plt  
 FAC Tm  
 FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plt  
 Det, Btry C (Rein), 1st Bn, 11th Mar  
 Tm, 3d Plt, Co A, 1st Eng Bn  
 HST Tm, Det Co A, 1st SP Bn

Co L (Rein)

Capt HUBBLE 26-27 Dec  
 Capt HEMPLE 28 Dec-2 Jan

Co L  
 Det, H&S Co  
 Det, Med Plt  
 FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plt  
 FAC Tm  
 NGF Spot Tm  
 Det, Btry C (Rein), 1st Bn, 11th Mar  
 Tm, 3d Plt (Rein), Co A, 1st Eng Bn  
 HST Tm, Det Co A, 1st SP Bn

Co M (Rein)

Capt THOMAS

Co M  
 Det, H&S Co  
 Det, Med Plt  
 FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plt  
 Det, Btry C (Rein), 1st Bn, 11th Mar  
 Tm, 3d Plt (Rein), Co A, 1st Eng Bn

81mm Mortar Plt

Lt HAGGERTY

106mm RR Plt

Lt THOMPSON

Btry C (Rein) (-), 1st Bn, 11th Mar

Capt MCLAUGHLIN

Btry W, 2d Bn, 11th Mar

Capt WINKLER

3d Plt, (Rein), Co C, 1st Tk Bn

Lt PARISH

4th Plt, (Rein), Co B, 3d AmTrac Bn

Lt METZIGER

1st Plt, (Rein), Co D, 1st Recon Bn

Lt YOUNG

3d Plt, (Rein), Co C, 1st AT Bn

Lt BROWN

SECRET

5. Supporting Forces

- a. As originally planned, Operation BADGER TOOTH called for the BLT to be landed in LZ Finch and to then advance southwesterly, crossing the Song O Lau River, to objectives 1, 2, and 3. As objectives 2 and 3 are 12000 and 14000 meters inland and the anticipated route of advance was not trafficable to vehicles, it was decided to position C Btry at 468388 within range of objectives 1, 2, and 3. W Btry was to be left on board the Valley Forge in an on call status. Any required Artillery support outside the range of Btry C was to be provided by a platoon of ARVN 155mm howitzers at Hai Lang. As the Song O Lau River was not crossed and operations were concentrated in the coastal area, Btry C was not used in the operation. Btry W was landed on the afternoon of D+1. Required artillery support was provided by Btry W and the ARVN 155mm Howitzer platoon.
- b. Each rifle company was provided a team of combat engineers.
- c. An armed propaganda team was utilized in dealing with the local population.
- d. Artillery. Fire support during operation BADGER TOOTH consisted of fourteen observed fire missions, nine of which were fired by W Btry and five by the ARVN 155mm howitzer platoon. Fourteen H&I fires were fired by W Btry for a total round expenditure of 310 rounds. The effectiveness of the ARVN artillery was hampered because the missions were fired at extreme range. The volume of fire was inadequate because only one or two guns were available for support of the Battalion.
- e. Air Support. On D-Day no fixed wing support was requested for LZ preps since the rules of engagement for the area prohibit its use. However, it was on call for H and L-Hour. One flight of A-4's was used for CAS dropping twelve 500 lb bombs, and several rounds of 20mm fire.  
 On 27 Dec three flights of A-4's flew CAS missions in support for Co L between 1215H and 1406H. They dropped twelve 500 lb bombs, twenty 250 lb bombs, eight 500 lb napalm, 580 rounds of 20mm cannon fire, and two four shot packs of 5 inch Zuni rockets.  
 On 28 Dec four flights of A-4's and two of F-4's flew CAS missions in support of the battalion between 0720H and 1015H. They dropped four 1000 lb bombs, four 500 lb bombs, sixty 250 lb bombs, twenty-eight 500 lb napalm, and over 1000 rounds of 20mm cannon fire.  
 Due to weather restrictions no other fixed wing support was used on the operation.  
 As many as eight UH-1E's were available for TAOC, TACA, AO and cover for the slower and more vulnerable CH-46's. However, no more than four UH-1E's were used at one time. These UH-1E's were also used on several ground targets and knocked out at least one automatic weapon position with their M-60's and 2.75 rockets.  
 HMM 262 provided CH-46's for troop movement, medevacs, and resupply missions. Many of their flights were flown in marginal weather conditions.  
 The 1st MAW provided three C-117's and one C-130 for flare drops on the evening of the 26th and 27th dropping over 380 flares.

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- f. Naval Gunfire. Throughout operation BADGER TOOTH naval gunfire support was provided by USS O'Bannon (DD 450) firing in direct support of BLT 3/1.

Initially O'Bannon fired H&I's on the night of 26 Dec expending fifty-nine rounds of 5 inch ammunition. The following day O'Bannon fired in support of Co L during the early stages of their action. At 271030H O'Bannon fired on a target at YD 542525 expending nine rounds of 5 inch, and again at 271130H in support of L Co firing eighty-four rounds of 5 inch against enemy automatic weapons position (YD 538526). On the evening of 27 Dec H&I's were fired along with an extensive mission against enemy positions in the vicinity of YD 540525 expending 308 rounds of 5 inch ammunition. When flare ship illumination was exhausted O'Bannon provided thirty-nine rounds of illumination in the same target area.

At 281100H fifty rounds of 5 inch prep fire was provided as K and I Companies moved into the same area. In total O'Bannon fired 712 rounds of 5 inch ammunition during operation BADGER TOOTH.

## 6. Intelligence

### a. Enemy Strength, Situation, and Capabilities Prior to Operation BADGER TOOTH

#### (1) Enemy Strength

The coastal plains in and adjacent to the AOA was the normal operating area of elements of the following units: 800th (MF) Battalion; 802nd (NVA) Battalion; 416th (NVA) Battalion; and the C.113 LF Company. The total strength of these units was estimated at approximately 1700 personnel.

#### (2) Enemy Situation

The enemy utilized a number of routes for the movement of rice from the rice growing area within the AOA. The area was heavily populated, with the majority of the population believed sympathetic to the enemy cause, either from political belief or fear of enemy terrorist activities.

Prior to the operation, the enemy had harassed friendly lines of communications within the area, while strengthening his capability to move rice supplies.

#### (3) Enemy Capabilities

Enemy capabilities prior to the operation consisted of:

- (a) To attack friendly forces with up to one reinforced battalion, employing all organic weapons.
- (b) Defend at a time and place of his choosing with up to one reinforced battalion.
- (c) To evade major contact with friendly forces, while conducting delaying actions utilizing small units, surprise firing devices, and boobytraps.

### b. Enemy Strength and Situation During Operation BADGER TOOTH

#### (1) Enemy Strength

The major enemy unit contacted during the operation was a force estimated at one NVA Battalion. The contacted enemy unit was identified by a wounded POW (who later died) as the 116th NVA Battalion.

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This was the first reported contact with this enemy unit, indicating the designation as the "116th" may be an alternate for one of the enemy units normally operating in this area, most probably the 116th NV Battalion.

Other contacts during the operation consisted of isolated incidents involving enemy units of less than squad size, indicating the enemy had dispersed his major forces in the area in an effort to avoid contact with superior friendly forces.

(2) Enemy Situation

The enemy conducted a sustained defense of the village of Thon Them Khe (YD 532529), employing a defensive force estimated at one BVA Battalion armed with small arms, automatic weapons, and mortars. The defense was conducted from well-camouflaged, fortified bunkers utilizing terrain features to good advantage in the selection and placement of fields of fire.

Elsewhere within the AOA, the enemy conducted a more passive defense against friendly actions consisting of sniper fire, surprise firing devices, and boobytraps.

7. Mission. Conduct an amphibious operation in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces to destroy/capture enemy forces and logistics caches, disrupt enemy routes of communication and supply, obtain intelligence, and be prepared to conduct other operations as directed.

8. Concept of Operations

a. On D-Day BMT 3/1 was to conduct a helicopterborne and waterborne assault landing one company by LVT to secure the LZ and landing the remainder of the BMT by helicopter. The operation was to be in four phases:

- (1) Phase I - Rapid buildup of the landing force ashore.
- (2) Phase II - S&D operations, conducting a river crossing and securing objective 1.
- (3) Phase III - Be prepared to conduct other operations as directed.
- (4) Phase IV - On order conduct an amphibious withdrawal.

b. Because of the unexpected enemy contact in the early part of the operation, Phase II was not completed and Phase III was omitted.

c. See enclosures 1 & 2.

9. Execution

a. Operation BADGER TOOTH

261100H-Co L landed by LVT's over Green Beach and is heading for LZ Finch.

261237H-First wave of Co K touched down at LZ Finch.

261315H-Recon team received S&F from church steeple at (YD 537479)

261320H-Recon team received S&F from bunkers at (YD 542524) and observed 2 men running away from bunkers.

261325H-Co M units are all at LZ Finch.

261330H-Command Group Alpha touched down at LZ Finch.

261400H-3d Flt of Co I arrived at LZ Finch and set in LZ perimeter defense.

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261405H-Channer pilot reported receiving incoming rounds.  
 Co M was contacted by radio; will send coordinate of fire.  
 261415H-Last elements of Co I touched down in LZ Finch.  
 261425H-Co K found three sets of utilities, 1 pair ARVN jungle  
 boots. Gear sent to S-2.  
 261530H-Co K at YD 506493 while moving through assigned area  
 found 1 VCS, age 30-35 years old, without ID card. Detainee  
 was forwarded to S-2.  
 261600H-Co M at LZ Finch found 1 M-26 grenade without pin.  
 It was blown in place.  
 261615H-Co K at YD 500502 received 30 rls ARF from tree line at  
 YD 498503. Returned fire, and suffered one KIA (non evac).  
 261616H-The commanding officer, SLF, arrived at this position  
 with U. S. Army representative with information relating to  
 an ARVN operation to our north. BLT 3/1 was ordered to assist  
 the ARVN operation by sweeping hamlets at YD 539515 and YD  
 521539. Co L was given the mission to sweep the hamlet at  
 YD 539525 with Co M in support.  
 261630H-Recon platoon dispatched to recon approach to river.  
 261700H-Co K position reported at YD 487507. Co K was then  
 ordered to return to YD 517490 and set up a night defensive  
 position.  
 261705-Co L jumps off on LVT's to make sweep of hamlet YD  
 539525.  
 261720H-Co L at edge of objective, and LVT's return to pick  
 up Co M.  
 261730H-Co L 2d Flt (YD 528534) was in a blocking position for  
 Co L sweep. Co L 2d Flt observed 1 VC escaping from Thon Tham  
 kho (YD 532529) carrying a rifle. VC was taken under fire,  
 and area was searched uncovering 1 VC KIA (G), 1 Chinese bolt  
 action rifle, 2 M-26 grenades, and other personal gear.  
 261730H-armed propaganda team attached to Co L at (YD 504525)  
 was questioning people living in hut. Meanwhile a female, 19  
 years old without ID card ran from hut. People who live there  
 said she was VC. Girl is being detained.  
 261733H-Co L commencing sweep of hamlet.  
 261756H-Co M arrived at objective area in support of Co L.  
 261822H-Co L completed sweeping first hamlet and is now  
 sweeping the second.  
 261825H-Recon team returned to this position.  
 261830H-Co L reported two VC KIA YD 515495.  
 261835H-Co L reported VC KIA and 1 male and 1 female detainee  
 at 524538.  
 261842H-Received Co M's position report YD 537523.  
 261845H-Co M ordered to move up and coordinate with Co L in  
 selecting night defensive position.  
 261940H-Co M and Co L in night position at 525518.  
 261940H-Received frag order 2 from 79.5.  
 262055H-Issued frag order to companies on next day's activities.  
 270540H-POW held in CP attempted to escape and was killed,  
 1 VC KIA.  
 270700H-Co M and Co L beginning S&D of hamlets at 539525 and  
 521539.

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270800H-Ordered recon platoon on LVT's to investigate reported antenna on ship wreck located 565513.

270850H-Co M reported finding 16 foot traps in hamlet at 521539.

270900H-Co I reported killing one female VC suspect at 543493.

271040H-Recon Platoon returns from checking reported antenna. It was a piece of screen metal resembling an antenna.

271045H-Position reports from Co M and Co L. Co L had been in wrong hamlet 521539 and was now moving toward their original S&D objective at 539525. Co L entered the northern most hamlet in error from the north and only realized the error when they met Co M in the southern part of the village.

271100H-Co L called for WGF on enemy positions 542525.

271230H-Co L called for air strike on hamlet - taking heavy casualties.

271300H-Co I (-) moves to blocking position at southern end of hamlet 545525.

271320H-Co L called for second air strike.

271347H-Air strike in progress.

271350H-Co K moves out from CP to position to south of hamlet.

271355H-Co M ordered to move up on Co L's left flank.

271400H-Co M and Co L report receiving heavy mortar fire.

271400H-SLF CO & CG 3rd Mar Div visit CP location.

271400H-End of effective communications with Co L.

271415H-Tanks are requested to be landed.

271418H-Request for Sparrowhawk platoon to be landed in LZ Finch.

271418-Co V taking heavy small arms fire as they move into position at the southeast end of the hamlet.

271430H-Co M delivering maximum fire to take pressure off Co K at the other end of the village.

271440H-Co K reports right flank pinned down by enemy fire.

271500H-Co K receives incoming mortar fire. Only comm with Co L is over company net. Platoon on net are not sure of other platoon locations.

271530H-Artillery mission fire on hamlet for Co K.

271600H-Sparrowhawk Plt mounted LVT's to move to beach for security of downed helicopter. Comm with Co L is erratic and Lima 6 cannot be located.

271630H-81's are down to 30 rounds, resupply has been requested.

271640H-CP and 81's with one platoon Co I mounts LVT's and displaces to 548522.

271645H-Tanks have landed, one is inoperable on beach. Other two are DS Co K. Receive incoming mortars and anti-tank rockets.

271645H-Request Mortar Btry be landed in new CP location at 550520.

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271745H-Co K reports all dead and wounded have been evacuated. Reported 2 VC KIA confirmed.

271800H-Frag order issued to companies. Co K ordered to pull back and tie in with I Co's left flank and cover the southern and western flanks of the hamlet tying in with L Co on left flank. L and M Co unable to pull back because of close contact with enemy and presence of dead and wounded in front of the lines. It was decided at this time to concentrate on extracting dead and wounded and attempt to hold the enemy inside the hamlet during the night.

271808H-Co M receives twelve rounds incoming rounds 82mm mortar fire.

271830H-Resupply 81 ammo received. Mortar Btry and ammunition landed.

271900H-Began firing 81 and 107mm missions to cover for M Co and L Co to remove dead and wounded.

272025H-Received frag order from 79.5 for night activities.

272145H-Co L reported Lima 6 was a KIA.

272330H-Co L and Co M report all known casualties and KIA's extracted and begin to pull back to night position.

272400H-Co L and Co M in position and in contact with Co K. Flare drops and WGF missions commenced.

280105H-Co M sends report summarizing contact for the day. 13 USMC KIA, 22 USMC WIA, and 5 NVA KIA.

280140H-Received msg from 79.5 directing max use of supporting fires prior to tomorrow's attack.

280210H-Received corrected casualty reports from Co I, K, L, and M describing very heavy casualties for the days fighting.

280510H-Flare ship goes off station, WGF and W Btry prepared to provide any requested illumination.

280510H-Frag order to companies on next day's activities.

280800H-Air strikes commence on objective.

280830H-Resupply by helicopter commences.

281100H-Resupply complete, WGF prep fires on objective begin.

281130H-Co I and Co K move out in the attack report only sporadic SA fire.

281153H-Co K has 1 WIA.

281200H-Co I and Co K report they have swept through the objective with no solid contact.

281212H-Co I finds 1 KIA NVA and 1 KIA VC with one weapon and various equipment at 537524.

281218H-Co I finds 2 KIA NVA floating in ocean at 540532.

281307H-Co K finds 8 USMC KIA and 2 USMC WIA and weapons at 536527.

281310H-Co I finds 2 USMC KIA with wans.

281315H-Co K finds 3 NVA KIA at 537528.

281428H-Co M finds 4 VC KIA and various equipment at 535528.

281653H-Co M completes evac of all USMC KIA and equipment.

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281850H-Frag orders issued for tonight and tomorrow's activities.  
 281906H-Co L captures 1 NVA KIA at 539528 identified unit as 116th NVA Bn - prisoner died, 1 NVA KIA.  
 290330H-Co L takes incoming grenades at 536526. Returns fire. 1 USMC KIA.  
 290800H-Co K finds VC map at 536525.  
 290830H-Co K finds one VC KIA w/3M26 at 536528.  
 291000H-Co L finds one VC hiding in family shelter. He could not be talked out. 1 VC KIA at 535526.  
 291000H-Receive word that ships will be unable to backload tanks due to adverse weather.  
 291100H-Co I reports lead elements receiving SAF at 499501. Returned 3.5 and SA - called artillery mission. Request AO. 1 USMC KIA.  
 291200H-Move Bn CP to 536527.  
 291230H-Co L reports Marine tripped chicom grenade rigged as mine at 510536. 1 USMC KIA.  
 291315H-Co M finds 1 LHM, cocked at 542525. Destroyed in place.  
 291410H-Co M finds 1 VC KIA at 540526.  
 291515H-Co K finds 1 VC KIA on bench at 538531.  
 291515H-Co M finds 2 VC KIA in bunker at 541527.  
 291535H-Co I spotted 2 VC w/wpns at 501501. Took under fire with negative results.  
 291728H-Recon Platoon apprehended one VCS at 538531.  
 291800H-81mm Mortar platoon found 1 VC KIA in shallow grave at 535527 killed by shrapnel.  
 291920H-Frag order to companies on night activities.  
 291925H-Received frag order from 79.5 on activities for tonight and tomorrow.  
 292345H-Co L recon patrol saw 7 VC moving toward friendly lines at 531529. Called 81 mission search area w/neg results.  
 292350H-Co L LP saw 3 VC. Threw 3 M-26 grenades and changed positions. Original position 538539.  
 300815H-Co L searched area where LP saw 3 VC. They found a bloody shirt and drag marks - 2 VC KIA probable.  
 301000H-Co K finds 2 NVA KIA at 545525.  
 301015H-Co M reports Engineer wounded while destroying 250 lb bomb and 1 USMC KIA (non hostile) medevac.  
 301030H-Co K finds 1 NVA KIA w/wpn at 541526.  
 301120H-Co K finds 1 VC KIA burned by napalm at 539514.  
 301450H-Co L finds fighting bunker containing assorted SA ammo, 182mm round, six 82mm fuzes.  
 ( ) 301750H-Frag order issued for night activities.  
 ( ) 301817H-Received frag order #6 from 79.5.  
 ( ) 310800H-All units test fire weapons.

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311145H-Boats are coming ashore to pick up tanks.  
 311200H-Co K finds 2 old women in hamlet. Women had been in hamlet for several days gave much info on VC and NV activity within the hamlet.  
 311215H-Co L saw 3 Vietnamese males north on beach, challenged and fired on - negative results.  
 311300H-Co L finds 4 M-26 grenades rigged as mines, punji pits and bunkers at 520538.  
 311430H-Co M finds bunkers and fighting holes at 572501.  
 311431H-Tank loaded on landing craft and returning to ship.  
 311700H-79.5 C.O. and 79.5 S-3A at CP. Discuss plans for tomorrow's withdrawal.  
 311800H-Truce in effect.  
 312000H-Verbal frag order issued to companies.  
 011000H-All units positioned for withdrawal at 555520.  
 011500H-Establish Bn positions at 565509 to await withdrawal.  
 011615H-Withdrawal of LVT's commences.  
 011700H-Co K withdrawn by hole to Valley Forge.  
 011800H-Issued frag orders for tonight's activity.  
 020900H-Withdrawal by landing craft and helicopter commenced.  
 021130H-Withdrawal completed.

10. Resultsa. Friendly Losses

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>USN</u>	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>		<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
KIA	2	46		0	0
VIA	0	86		0	2
ML	0	0		0	0
DOW	0	0		0	0

EQUIPMENT

One M48 tank was partially submerged during landing on 27 Dec.

b. Enemy Losses

	<u>Total</u>
NVA/VC KIA (Confirmed)	31
NVA/VC KIA (Probable)	2
Detainees	13
Weapons Captured	3
Ammunition Captured/Destroyed	10 Grenades
	1000 Rls S. A.
	8 B-40 Rkts
	6 82mm Fuzes
Uniforms & Individual Equipment	50 Items
Fortifications Destroyed	60 Bunkers
	220 Fighting Holes
	60 Shelter Type Bunkers

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11. Administrative Matters. It was anticipated that on D+1 the BLT would chop to the operational control of the 4th Marines. An LSA was planned at the 4th Marines CP. As the change in operational control never came about, logistical and administrative functions were performed on the Valley Forge. One resupply mission was conducted from the 4th Marines LSA. This was an initial resupply of 81mm mortar ammo on D+1.
12. Logistic Matters
  - a. Combat Loads
    - (1) On D-1 rations and ammunition were staged and issued to assault units aboard assigned ships. Each Marine was issued his basic allowance with the exception of hand grenades and pyrotechnics, and three meals.
    - (2) On D-Day prior to H-Hour the remaining Class V items were issued to assault troops. The troops were landed carrying the prescribed load in accordance with administrative plan 1-67.
    - (3) On D+1 the howitzer battery was moved ashore in response to a directive from the beach. They carried a basic allowance and three meals ashore.
  - b. Resupply
    - (1) The original plan was to establish an LSA at Camp Evans and resupply the BLT from that point. However, due to tactical situations it became apparent that this would not be an acceptable solution. On D+1 the LSA was reestablished aboard the LPH and all resupply was carried out from that position for the duration of the operation.
    - (2) There was some initial confusion on D+1 when the site of the LSA was changed. This was caused by the change itself and the tempo of the operation ashore.
    - (3) In subsequent days the resupply request were received in sufficient time to permit the supplies to be staged that night and delivered by helicopter the next day. Due to the weather conditions only one routine resupply was possible for the last 4 days of the operation.
  - c. Backloading
    - (1) Backloading was hampered by two things; rough seas and an inoperable tank. The backloading of the tanks was completed on 31 December 1967.
    - (2) The weather cleared sufficiently on 1 January 1968 to extract Kilo Company to the LPH by helicopter and the Antrac Platoon to the LST.
    - (3) On 2 January 1968 the remaining elements of the BLT were returned to their assigned shipping.

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- d. Equipment Damaged/Losses
  - (1) Major items requiring repair:
    - (a) Two tanks M48A3; one was submerged and the other had electrical problems.
    - (b) One howitzer M98 needs a new left shock spring.
    - (c) One LVTP-5 will require 3rd Echelon maintenance.
  - (2) Small Arms
    - (a) One 50 cal. machine gun, one M-60 machine gun, three 3.5 rocket launchers, one flame thrower and 12 M-16 rifles will require 3rd Echelon maintenance.
    - (b) Seven M-16 rifles were damaged and will be replaced.
- e. Motor Transport. The BLT did not land any vehicles. Vehicles aboard assigned shipping were started at least once during the operation.

### 13. Medical Evacuation, Treatment, and Hospitalization

- a. First echelon medical care was provided in the field by corpsmen attached to each rifle company and supporting units. This consisted of treatment of minor ailments, first aid and initial evaluation of wounds, and the evaluation of casualties for evacuation by helicopter to the USS Valley Forge (LPH-8) for definitive treatment.
- b. Second echelon (Collecting and Clearing Platoon) and third echelon (Surgical Team) care was combined with the assistance of the BAS medical officers and corpsmen aboard the USS Valley Forge. Immediate treatment was provided for all casualties except those requiring the specialized skills of neurosurgery, ENT, ophthalmology, and urology. Laboratory, X-Ray facilities, a blood bank, 2 surgical suites, and a holding capacity of approximately 100 beds enabled the USS Valley Forge to function as an independent hospital facility.
- c. At 1600 on 28 December 1967, it became necessary to suspend the receiving and treating of casualties because of the burden imposed on the medical team and facilities by the large number of casualties received during the previous 30 hours. Further casualties were re-routed to the USS Iwo Jima which remained in the immediate vicinity. By 0800 on 29 December 1967, the USS Valley Forge resumed its function receiving and treating casualties.
- d. The predominant wounds treated were those inflicted by high velocity missiles.
- e. No casualty received and treated aboard the USS Valley Forge expired during the course of the operation. All casualties who received definitive treatment and were considered unable to return to full duty in 30 days were transferred by helicopter to 22nd CSF.
- f. Medevac for the operation was performed by HMM Squadron 262.

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14. Command Analysis

- a. Operation BADGER TOOTH initially called for a landing by air and waterborne means into an area adjacent to the Song O Lau River with a rapid river crossing and seizure of SLF Objective #1. The river crossing was to be made by river craft or LVT. Once the river crossing was made and objective #1 secured, the BMT was to Chop OpCon to the 4th Marines and continue S&D operations to the southwest until highway #1 was reached. Terrain analysis, and the assigned objectives dictated the types of combat support that would be used. The coastal plain where the initial waterborne landing and heliborne landing took place had good trafficability for all types of combat equipment. The coastal plain extends inland about 5000 meters. The terrain across the Song O Lau River southwest to highway #1 was completely inundated and trafficable only by foot or by use of riverine craft. Assigned objectives required crossing the Song O Lau River and traversing the inundated terrain discussed above. Objective #1 was located 4000 meters from the LZ and approximately 2500 meters from the planned river crossing site. Objectives 2 and 3 were 3500 and 5000 meters from objective #1. Because of the terrain and the location of the assigned objectives and the plan for rapidly crossing the river, the decision was made to preposition the 105mm Howitzer Btry at YD 470388 to support attack on obj #1, and to leave the 107mm Howitzer Btry, the Tank Platoon, and the Ontos aboard ARG shipping on call. Tanks, Ontos, and Howitzers could not ford the river and had the original concept been followed, they would have been ineffective in supporting the landing force. In addition, it was considered that there would be adequate fire support available from the air and naval gunfire for the initial phase of the amphibious operation. The concept for BADGER TOOTH was modified on D-Day to the extent that the landing force would conduct S&D operations in two villages, Thon Tham Khe and Thon Trung An located on the coast and then would continue with the river crossing and planned operations. This modification was the result of information provided to the SLF by a U. S. Army Liaison Officer working with ARVN forces that possibly the ARVN had chased some enemy forces into those hamlets. Subsequently late in the afternoon of D-Day, Company L was assigned the mission of sweeping through the two hamlets. To carry out the mission, Company L was transported to the south end of Thon Tham Khe by LVT and commenced the move through the hamlets at 1735. Company M was moved by LVT to support Company L. By 1900 Company L had swept through both villages reporting no evidence of organized enemy units. As Company L had swept through the hamlets very rapidly, it was decided to conduct a detailed search operation the next day. Company L was assigned Thon Tham Khe and Company M Thon Trung An. Company L became disoriented in their pre-dawn move and began searching Thon Trung An. When the mistake was realized Co L moved toward Thon Tham Khe approaching from the northwest. As they entered the hamlet, they were taken under intense automatic weapons and mortar fire and sustained heavy casualties.

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Despite the use of CAS and naval gunfire and several attempts to assault the enemy position, Company L was unable to advance or pull back for the remainder of the day. In an attempt to relieve Company L and successfully attack the village, Company M was ordered to move up on Company L's left flank. Company K was positioned at the south end of the village with a light section of tanks--in direct support. Company M went into the attack and was taken under heavy fire at close range and was pinned down. When Company M was unable to advance, Company K was ordered to attack from the south. The use of supporting fires was hindered because of the proximity of friendly units and the closeness of contact with the enemy. After the Company L CO was killed, communications with Company L were non-existent for a considerable period of time and when communication was regained, it was sporadic. Added to this was the inability of Co L to accurately find their location or to call fire missions giving the correct coordinates.

There were two alternatives the late afternoon of the attack. First, all available fire power could have been called on the objective and the remaining company, India, could have been sent in against the eastern or western side of the hamlet in an attempt to secure the objective. Second, we could commence extracting the wounded and attempt to tie in a complete cordon around the hamlet and seal the enemy off from escape from the village, and at first light, following a thorough preparation from all available supporting arms, resume the attack. The confused situation with Company L, the close proximity of Companies L, M, and K to the enemy and oncoming darkness weighed against the first alternative and I decided on the second alternative and ordered all companies to commence extracting their dead and wounded and for Company I to take a position on the south side of the village, and Company K on the west. This was done with ease.

Company K was directed to swing around and tie in on the north-western side of the village with Company L. The inability of Company L to rapidly extract their dead and wounded delayed completing the cordon for several hours and the western side of the perimeter remained open.

It is my opinion that the bulk of the enemy made good their escape early in the evening in the gap between Company L and Company K.

- b. Intelligence. The fact that the enemy completely fortified a village with well constructed mutually supporting bunkers set up in an all around defense in depth in our TACOR indicates the need for more extensive reconnaissance activities of greater frequency.
- c. Fire Support. Fire support available to the BCT on operation BADGER TOOTH was that available during the initial phases of any amphibious operation, that is air, NCF, and 81mm mortars. However, maximum utilization of supporting arms became impossible because Company L and ultimately Company M and Company K were in such close contact with the enemy and with each other that to use air or naval gunfire would have jeopardize the lives of the Marines of those companies.

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- d. Tanks. Of the five tanks in the BLT, only two saw action. One was being repaired in Danang. Another could not be started prior to the landing and was not brought ashore. A third was submerged on landing. The other two received water damage on landing. Neither had effective communications. The two operable tanks were extremely valuable even though lacking communications. Had all four tanks been landed in good condition, their impact on the battle would have been significant.
- e. Helicopter Support. The support received from HMM 262 was outstanding. There was no delay in medevac and resupply flights in spite of intense enemy fire and marginal weather.
- f. Naval Gunfire. USS O'Bannon provided excellent naval gunfire support during the entire operation. All fires were extremely accurate and responsive to the needs of the BLT.

#### 15. Lessons Learned


- a. The landing of an amphibious force to conduct non-amphibious operations is a faulty and wasteful concept. As no significant contact was expected prior to conducting S&D operations in an inland area, the landing was designed to facilitate inland operations. Tanks, Ontos, and the 107mm Mortar Btry were not initially landed as the area of principal concern was not suitable for their use. Btry C was prepositioned inland, out of range of the beach area, and the LSA was planned for an inland area. When heavy contact was made in the beach area, valuable time was wasted landing Tanks and the Mortar Btry. Critically needed 81mm mortar ammunition was late in arriving because of difficulties encountered at the forward LSA. If the mission is not an amphibious mission, it should not be assigned to an amphibious force.
- b. Every defensible position must be assumed to be defended in strength by the enemy. The VC/NVA has the remarkable ability to conceal his presence in an area when it is to his advantage to do so. Company L went through Thon Than Kho hamlet at 1730 on 26 Dec seeing no evidence of enemy activity. Eighteen hours later the same area was defended by a large force from preconstructed positions. Extreme care must be exercised in approaching defensible areas particularly across open ground. In areas where rules of engagement prohibit prep fires and recon by fire, small reconnaissance units should move well ahead of the main body ensuring the area is clear before the main body is within small arms range. Squads or platoons can be used to secure approaches to dangerous areas during darkness prior to the arrival of the main body after daylight. Under no circumstances should commanders allow themselves to be pinned down on unfavorable terrain.
- c. The wide spread practice of attaching crew served weapons to rifle platoons is not always advisable.

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Units of the BMT lost machine guns and rocket launchers early in the battle because they were attached to platoons which were pinned down under close range enemy fire. Had these weapons been in general support, they would have been in the rear and could have been positioned to provide effective support. It must be remembered that the M-60 machine gun has a significantly longer range than the M-16 or the medium velocity automatic weapons used by the enemy. They should be employed to utilize this advantage.

- d. Naval gunfire support ships can be relied on to provide illumination. The number of rounds available is greater than is usually available to Artillery units.




M. MCQUINN

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

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SKETCH MAP SHOWING  
DISPOSITION OF FORCES  
271800H

SCALE 1:12500

ENCLOSURE (2)

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DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

BLT 3/1  
OPERATION OVERLAY  
FOR BADGER TOOTH  
MAP REF; 6442 II, SERIES L 7014  
SCALE; 1:50,000

52 ACTORS  
52

FINCH

DAYS

49

3

48 CARS  
47

PL BRANDY

PL WHISKEY

BLACK

WHITE

54 GIRL  
46

LZ SPARROW

40

50

3 0 12  
1 2 4

Enclosure 1

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