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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
HEADQUARTERS, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC (FORWARD)
I MARINE AMPHIBIOUS CORPS (FORWARD)
FPO, SAN FRANCISCO 96601

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IN REPLY REFER TO:

7:TTW:inl

3480

Ser: 00166A66

15 JUN 1966

~~REDACTED~~ (Unclas upon removal of Enclosure (1))

From: Commanding General, FMFPac/I MAC (Fwd)

To: Commandant of the Marine Corps

Subj: Task Group Foxtrot, 3d Marine Division, Combat Operations after
Action Report

Encl: (1) Subject Report

1. Enclosure (1) was inadvertently mailed to this Headquarters and is forwarded for appropriate disposition.

S. S. Nicolay
S. S. NICOLAY
Chief of Staff

Copy to:
CG, III MAF (less enclosure)

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SECOND INCORPORATION on TASK GROUP FUXTROT After Action Report 3/11M/bag
over 3000 of 10Apr66

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
(Attn: MAAS SET)

Subj: After Action Report, Operation OREGON (0)

1. Forwarded.

J. M. PLATT
CHIEF OF STAFF

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3/NLB/pnc
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Ser: 00154-66
29 May 1966

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FIRST ENDORSEMENT on TASK GROUP FOXTROT After Action Report
3/NLB/bap over 3000 of 10 April 1966

From: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein) FMF
To: Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam
Via: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

Subj: After Action Report, Operation OREGON

Ref: (a) COMUSMACV DIR NR 335-8

1. Readdressed and forwarded in accordance with the provisions of reference (a).


W. B. KYLE

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TASK GROUP FOXTROT
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco 96602

3/RLB/bap
3000
10 April 1966

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report
Ref: (a) Task Group Foxtrot FragO 6-66
Encl: (1) Operation Overlay

1. NICKNAME. Operation OREGON, a search and destroy operation conducted against Viet Cong forces in conjunction with the 1st ARVN Division.
2. DATES OF OPERATION. 190715H to 231100H March 1966.
3. LOCATION. THUA THIEN Province/Sector bounded by coordinates YD 515474, YD 653387, YD 622310 and YD 482436.

4. COMMAND HEADQUARTERS.

Task Group FOXTROT

Col FISHER

1st Bn (-), 4th Marines

LtCol SULLIVAN

2d Bn (-), 1st Marines

LtCol HANIFIN

Prov Btry Group X, 4th Bn, 12th Marines

Maj SPIESSEL

5. TASK ORGANIZATION.

Task Group FOXTROT

Command Group

1st Bn (-), 4th Marines

Command Group

Company A, 1st Bn, 4th Marines

Company B, 1st Bn, 4th Marines

Company E, 2d Bn, 1st Marines

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2d Bn (-)(Rein), 1st Marines

H&S Company (-), 2d Bn, 1st Marines
 Company G, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines
 Company H, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines
 Company B, 1st Bn, 1st Marines
 3d Platoon, Company A, 3d Engineer Bn

Battery Group X, 4th Bn, 12th Marines

Battery C, 4th Bn, 12th Marines
 Battery Y, 4th Bn, 12th Marines (155mm towed)

6. SUPPORTING FORCES.a. Air Support.

(1) Aviation units planned for and used during Operation OREGON were helicopters from MAG-36 and MAG-16 and fixed wing attack aircraft from MAG-11 and MAG-12. Aerial reconnaissance was provided by O1 aircraft from the 220th Army Aviation Company.

(2) Due to the isolated area of operations, all troop movements and logistic requirements were accomplished by helicopter.

(3) Overall air support was satisfactory. However, low ceilings and poor visibility delayed scheduled helicopter assaults and precluded use of close air support to a marked degree. It should be noted that support scheduled by HMM-163 and the 220th Army Aviation Company was outstanding in all respects.

(4) Air communication nets for the operation were as follows:

(a) Tactical Air Request (TAR) Net (FM) was established utilizing PRG-25 radios from the area of operation to the Command Post rear at PHU BAI. A relay site was required to reach the Command Post rear. Requests for pre-planned fixed wing missions were submitted to the Division Air Officer (DAO) via telephone. Helicopter preplanned requirements that required supplementing HMM-163 assets were submitted to the Division Air Officer via telephone. On-call fixed wing support was submitted to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Tactical Air Direction Center via a 1st Marine Aircraft Wing gap-filler radar unit located at PHU BAI airfield. On-call helicopter requests were submitted to HMM-163 via landline from the Command Post rear.

(b) The Tactical Air Direction Net-1 was used to contact all fixed wing aircraft during the operation and proved to be satisfactory. However, it is recommended that a separate Tactical Air Direction Net be established for specific operations as this will preclude saturation of a common air net.

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(c) The Landing Zone Control Net was used to control all helicopters. Battalion Air Liaison Officers used PRG-25s to contact helicopters and submit Tactical Air Requests to the Task Group Air Liaison Officer.

(5) Reaction times for on-call helicopters was satisfactory. Fixed wing reaction time was satisfactory except for one instance on the 20th of March. In this case, it required one hour and thirty minutes to get a pre-planned helicopter escort flight from MAG-12, thus disrupting the helicopter assault schedule.

(6) The following is a summation of fixed and rotary wing air support rendered during Operation OREGON:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>FIXED WING SORTIES</u>	<u>TONS ORDNANCE</u>	<u>HELICOPTER SORTIES</u>	<u>AERIAL RECON SORTIES</u>
21 Mar	8	5	114	8
22 Mar	3	10	250	8
23 Mar	2	5	200	8

b. Naval Gunfire Support.

(1) USS Richard B. ANDERSON (DD-786) provided Naval Gunfire Support for Operation OREGON during the period 20-22 March 1966. Four (4) neutralization missions, against Viet Cong troop assemblies, bunkers, trenchlines and weapon emplacements, and two (2) illumination missions were fired. Three (3) VC were KIA and all targets silenced or otherwise neutralized.

(2) Total Missions.

	<u>OBS</u>	<u>UNOBS</u>	<u>H&I</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>ARVN</u>
155mm How	32	2	156	192	187	5
105mm How	15	3	292	310	307	3

(3) Ammunition Expended.

	<u>HE</u>	<u>ILLUM</u>	<u>WP</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
155mm How	551	18	45	614
105mm How	528	1	13	542
				1156

7. INTELLIGENCE.

a. Enemy.

(1) Strength. One Local Force and two Main Force companies were reported to be in the operation area.

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(2) Location and Disposition. One Local Force company was in the vicinity of YD 5044 and two Main Force companies were reported in the AP PHU AN and AP TAY HOANG hamlet complex in the vicinity of YD 5741 and YD 5841.

(3) Source. Information on the area of operations was obtained from the 1st ARVN Division and agent reports.

b. Enemy Encountered. One battalion and two companies were actually located in the operation area. Contact was made with elements from these units.

(1) VC Units Identified. The 802d Battalion and the K-105 Local Force Company were identified in the area of operations. However, interrogation reports of four VCC indicated the following:

(a) That the 802d Battalion which operated in both THUA THIEN and QUANG TRI had been redesignated the K-2 Battalion in November 1965.

(b) A new battalion designated K-500 with a strength of approximately 400 departed NVN on 26 January 1966 for South Vietnam.

(2) Other Intelligence. Local Force companies and elements of Main Force battalions had been coming into the Operation OREGON area to gather rice approximately every two weeks. The VC then moved through the village area to the southeast from YD 5742 and extending to YD 6636 then south to the mountain area.

8. MISSION. TASK GROUP FOXTROT to conduct operations to destroy enemy forces in the area of operations in coordination with the 1st ARVN Division.

9. CONCEPT OF OPERATION.

a. 1st Battalion, 4th Marines to land by helicopter in Landing Zones EAGLE (YD 547428) and ROBIN (YD 552435) and sweep southeast to destroy enemy reported to be located from YD 5742 to YD 6040.

b. Battery of 155mm Howitzer (towed) of the 4th Battalion, 12th Marines, to displace to vicinity of YD 5234 to be in position by L-Hour.

c. 2d Battalion, 1st Marines to have one company on 30-minute standby and a Command Group and second battalion on two-hour standby.

d. 3d Battalion, 3d Regiment of the 1st ARVN Division to standby for deployment either by helicopter or overland.

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10. EXECUTION.

a. 18 March 1966. At 1245 TASK GROUP FOXTROT was informed by 1st ARVN Division that USMC assistance was requested to destroy enemy forces located in the area of DONG HO, THUA THIEN Province. At 1400, Commanding General, 3d Marine Division ordered TASK GROUP FOXTROT to conduct operations in accordance with the 1st ARVN Division's request. A planning conference was held at the 1st ARVN Division Headquarters and an area of operations for TASK GROUP FOXTROT was agreed upon. The concept of operations was submitted to Commanding General, 3d Marine Division at 1952 and approved. A warning order was immediately issued to planned participating units.

b. 19 March 1966. Frag Order 6-66 was issued to all units at 0100. The weather was overcast with low ceiling and light rain. The helicopter lift was set back for periods of two hours at a time and finally postponed until the following day because of weather. Battery Y, 4th Battalion, 12th Marines proceeded by motor march to YD 5234 and was ready to fire at 0900. Missions were fired in support of ARVN forces.

c. 20 March 1966. The early morning weather was characterized by a 1200 foot ceiling. Fixed wing air escort was cancelled because of the low ceiling and the helilift was rescheduled for 1015, weather permitting. At 1015 the helicopters were unable to touch down due to non-arrival of fixed wing support. During this period, aerial observers reported receiving fire from automatic weapons in the vicinity of YD 534457. Additional intelligence information indicated that an enemy force was located in a village in YD 5345. The 1st ARVN Division placed forces in blocking positions to the north and west of the TASK GROUP FOXTROT operating area and 1st Battalion, 4th Marines was directed to sweep through YD 5345 before moving toward the original target area. Fixed wing escort became available at 1143 and 1st Battalion, 4th Marines commenced landing in Landing Zone ROBIN at 1220 with Companies A and B of 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, with no initial enemy contact. At 1325, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, made first contact with the enemy, receiving small arms fire from the vicinity of YD 556434. By 1440, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, was in heavy contact with enemy entrenched in the fortified village at YD 555435. At 1550, the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines requested reinforcement by one company. At 1640, Company E, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines commenced landing in Landing Zone ROBIN while 1st Battalion, 4th Marines remained in heavy contact. Enemy movement as reported by aerial and ground observation indicated the enemy was attempting to move northwest towards ARVN blocking forces. On 21 March, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines was directed to be prepared to land with three companies at Landing Zone DUCK (YD 527440), sweep YD 5345, and then move to the northwest. Initial reports of friendly and enemy casualties by the evening was: Friendly - 9 KIA, 41 WIA; Enemy - 34 KIA, 23 KIA (possible) ground, 17 KIA (air), 13 KIA (artillery). Battery Y, 4th Battalion, 12th Marines fired three (3) observed missions against VC targets. A total of 68 H&I fires were delivered during the night.

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d. 21 March 1966. The morning weather was characterized by dense ground fog delaying the landing of 2d Battalion, 1st Marines until 1130. At 0935, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines reported receiving heavy small arms fire and 60mm mortar fire from vicinity YD 555433. Artillery, naval gunfire, and close air support were used and 1st Battalion, 4th Marines searched through the village. The enemy had been able to withdraw the bulk of his forces during darkness and had apparently left only a delaying force. Contact was lost. 2d Battalion, 1st Marines completed landing at Landing Zone DUCK at 1410 with no enemy contact. TASK GROUP FOXTROT Command Group displaced to Landing Zone DUCK. 2d Battalion, 1st Marines commenced search and destroy operations in its assigned area. Neither battalion made contact during remainder of the day. At approximately 1830 an aerial observer reported observing enemy forces in YD 5741 and YD 5840. Artillery and air were delivered until dark with artillery continuing throughout the night. As a result of a thorough search of the fortified village at YD 555435 and interrogation of the local populace, enemy casualties were determined to have been: 42 KIA, 53 KIA (possible), 20 WIA (possible). Friendly casualties were: 10 KIA, 43 WIA. Provisional Battery Group X, 4th Battalion, 12th Marines and Battery C, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines moved by convey to YD 5234. The Battery Group assumed control of Battery Y and Battery C. Battery C was ready to fire at 0815. One preparation and 17 fire missions against VC targets were fired. Twenty-five H&Is were fired during the night.

e. 22 March 1966. 2d Battalion, 1st Marines continued to conduct search and destroy operations in northwest section of operating area with negative contact. 1st Battalion, 4th Marines commenced movement to the southeast conducting search and destroy operations to the vicinity of YD 5939 and YD 5940 while the 1st and 3d Battalions, 3d Regiment, 1st ARVN Division blocked from YD 595375 to YD 605405. The only contact was with stragglers; however, 39 VCS were apprehended. During the night Battery Group X, 4th Battalion, 12th Marines, received a total of 20 rounds of 81mm mortar fire resulting in 2 WIA. Provisional Battery Group X, 4th Battalion, 12th Marines fired one preparation and eight missions on VC targets. A total of 210 H&Is were fired during the night.

f. 23 March 1966. 2d Battalion, 1st Marines commenced detailed search operations toward the southeast and 1st Battalion, 4th Marines towards the northwest; the two battalions were to meet at YD 577418. At 1100, Operation ORDEON was terminated. 2d Battalion, 1st Marines and TASK GROUP FOXTROT Command Group returned to PHU RAI TAOR while 1st Battalion, 4th Marines remained in the operating area to conduct future operations. Provisional Battery Group X, 4th Battalion, 12th Marines fired two missions against VC targets and one mission in support of ARVN forces.

11. RESULTS.

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a. Enemy Losses:

- (1) KIA (Confirmed) - 99
- (2) KIA (Possible) - 53
- (3) WIA (Confirmed) - 4
- (4) WIA (Possible) - 100
- (5) VCC - 4
- (6) VCS - 40

b. Captured Material and Equipment:

- 1 ChiCom AK -50 SMG
- 1 Thompson SMG w/2/mag
- 1 60mm fuse
- 1 60mm mortar nose cap
- VC Documents
- Large Quantity of rice concealed in haystack
- 1 M-1 Rifle
- 1 Carbine
- 1 Helmet liner
- 1 Battery rigged detonator
- 1 U.S. entrenching tool
- 3 Magazines for Sk-50 - 500 rounds
- 3 Chinese stick grenades (destroyed)
- Empty .50 caliber cartridges belt-linked
- 50 rounds .30 caliber M-1
- 25 Firing devices with caps (destroyed)
- 8 lbs TNT (destroyed)
- 1 81mm mortar round lot 6-5 YKN14
- 1 Old type claymore mine lot 1-A
- 1 Loaded magazine foreign type .30 caliber
- 3 Packs
- 3 Cartridge belts
- 6 Light green uniforms w/matching belts
- 4 Bags of rice
- 3 Canteens
- Metal cups and bowls/mess gear
- 2 Entrenching tools
- 3 Hammocks green military
- 4 Green type grenade pouches
- 2 Military web belts
- 2 Pair rubber type sandals
- 1 82mm mortar round (destroyed)
- 3 RKT Pods, German type (destroyed)

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b. Friendly Losses.

(1) KIA - 12

(2) WIA - 43

12. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS. An Administrative Plan was not written for this operation due to the rapid commitment of units and the resupply of these units directly from the Force Logistics Support Unit at PHU BAI. Administrative plans for Operation OREGON were adequate and flexible enough to allow for changes in the operational situation as they occurred.

a. Supply. No shortages occurred to seriously affect the capabilities of the units involved. Resupply of the three companies initially involved in the operation was accomplished by helicopter directly from the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines rear Command Post. Prior to the commitment of TASK GROUP FOXTROT and additional units of 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, liaison was effected with Force Logistic Support Unit #2 and arrangements made for the overall support of field units direct from Force Logistic Support Unit #2. All requests for resupply were sent to TASK GROUP FOXTROT and relayed to Force Logistic Support Unit #2. Since unit positions were subject to change daily, a report would be submitted to TASK GROUP FOXTROT indicating the time the unit was ready for supply, the location of the landing zone and in what manner the landing zone would be marked. This information was relayed to Force Logistic Support Unit #2 and the TASK GROUP FOXTROT Air Officer who would request helicopter support for the resupply of forward units. Certain problems of a minor nature were encountered. In requesting water resupply, problems were encountered due to an insufficient amount of water cans on hand. This problem was solved by pooling the majority of rear unit water cans at the Force Logistic Support Unit. Requests for BB-451 batteries, candles and packboards were not honored due to unavailability at the Force Logistic Support Unit. The support provided to forward units by Force Logistic Support Unit #2 and the resupply methods employed were adequate except as indicated. Combat loads, ammunition and weapons, were adequate for the operation.

b. Maintenance. Exchange of BB-451 radio batteries was accomplished by evacuating the rundown batteries to the rear Command Post where they were exchanged for charged batteries, and facilities were available for recharging. Ordnance repair parts were requested from Force Logistic Support Unit #2 and delivered with the units' normal resupply. No additional maintenance support was required during the operation.

c. Casualties. All casualties were evacuated by helicopter to Company A, 3d Medical Battalion, after treatment in the forward Battalion Aid Station in the field.

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d. Transportation. Force Logistic Support Unit #2 provided truck transportation to and from the helicopter squadron airfield at the start and end of the operation.

e. Communications.

(1) Communications during Operation OREGON were constant and effective, with no problems encountered.

(2) The use of an FM Tactical Net with a relay to the rear Command Post proved exceptionally useful and carried a great part of the traffic load.

(3) The employment of long wire antennas on the HF Nets insured excellent communications on the Division and TASK GROUP Tactical Nets.

(4) Communication supply was adequate except for replenishment of batteries BB-451. Force Logistic Support Unit #2 was unable to supply the TASK GROUP Headquarters with BB-451s.

f. Medical Evaluation.

(1) The TASK GROUP FOXTROT Medical Officer was sent out to augment Battalion Aid Station (BAS), 1st Battalion, 4th Marines. The BAS functioned very well and handled the casualties smoothly and efficiently. When medical supplies were depleted, a resupply via MedEvac helicopter was accomplished. A slight problem of excess medical supplies resulted but these were sent back to the rear and staged for easy access. In all, the medical aspects of the operation were satisfactory.

(2) Evacuation of casualties from the company level was by litter to the Battalion Aid Station. Casualties were held at the BAS for approximately 30 minutes and were evacuated to Company A, 3d Medical Battalion by helicopters.

g. Artillery resupply was by road convoy by 4th Battalion, 12th Marines directly to Battery Group X.

13. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES. None

14. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS.

a. Operation OREGON was developed on the basis of information from normally reliable sources that a VC battalion was operating within the planned area.

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b. The purpose of the operation was to find and fix the enemy and then conduct appropriate operations to destroy VC personnel, equipment and installations.

c. The delay in accomplishing the initial landings, as scheduled, due to adverse weather precluded the forces of TASK GROUP FOXTROT from taking full advantage of available intelligence.

d. The delay on the second day, which resulted from lack of fixed wing support when the helicopters approached the landing zone, undoubtedly resulted in loss of surprise and afforded the VC an opportunity to withdraw the bulk of their forces and to deploy a small force in well prepared and camouflaged positions, thereby inflicting casualties on our forces, and causing sufficient delay to allow the bulk of the VC force to evade contact with TASK GROUP FOXTROT.

e. The initial force committed was composed of one light Bn (Bn Cnd Group plus two rifle Cos). Experience has shown this to be an ideal force for rapid deployment and exploitation of situations against a fixed enemy or one whose freedom of action is limited. Such a force suffers from lack of flexibility however when employed on a find and fix mission against an enemy with unlimited terrain in which to operate due to the lack of an immediate maneuver force once contact is made.

f. The operation was successful. However, more timely action would have resulted in a much greater number of VC casualties.

g. Psychological operations included the use of leaflets to explain the presence of Marine forces to the local population and surrender leaflets to lower enemy morale. Psychological operations also included the maximum utilization of village chiefs to accompany Marine forces and openly demonstrate the close GVN-USMC relationship. Medical attention provided the local people by battalion medical personnel also contributed to establishing warm relations between Marines and the local people. One hundred-forty Vietnamese people were treated by the medical personnel during the operation and liaison was established with two local priests who brought the people for treatment and furnished intelligence information on the movement of the VC.

15. RECOMMENDATION. In future find and fix and destroy operations it is recommended that a minimum of three companies be employed, particularly when the time and space factors in the employment of an additional company would be in excess of 45 minutes.


R. H. FISHER

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MARINE DIVISION

OPN OREGON

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FM TASK GROUP FOXTROT
TO CG THIRD MARDIV

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1. SCHEME OF MANUEVER FOR FIRST BN FOURTH MARINES (-) OPERATION 19 MAR. FIRST BN FOURTH MARINES WILL LAND BY HELO IN LZ, S EAGLE GC YD 040229 AND ROBIN YD553436 AND SWEEP SE TO DESTROY ENEMY REPORTED TO BE LOCATED FROM GS 5742 AND 6042. 1 HOUR 0815.
2. BTRY OF 155 HOW (TOWED) FOURTH BN TWELFTH MARINES WILL DISPLACE TO VIC GS 5234 TO BE IN POSITION BY 1-HOUR.
3. SECOND BN FIRST MARINES WILL HAVE ONE COMPANY ON 30 MIN STANDBY AND A CMD GROUP AND SECOND COMPANY ON TWO HOUR STANDBY.
4. 3/3 OF 1ST DIV ARVN WILL BE STANDING FOR DEPLOYMENT EITHER BY HELO OR OVERLAND

GP-4

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TAB-R

SECRETCOMMUNICATIONS CENTER
3D MARINE DIVISION

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FM TASK GROUP FOXTROT
TO FIRST BN FOURTH MAR
ZEN/ SECOND BN FIRST MAR
ZEN/FIRST BN FIRST MAR
ZEN/FOURTH BN TWELFTH MAR
INFO CG THIRD MARDIV
CG FIRST MAW

ZEN/FLSU-2

BT

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FRAG ORDER 4-66

A. TGF OPO 1-66

1. TASK ORGANIZATION: REMAINS THE SAME
SITUATION:

A. ENEMY FORCES: CURRENT ISUMS AND INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING

B. FRIENDLY FORCES: REMAINS THE SAME.

MISSION: TASK GROUP FOXTROT COMMENCING 19 MARCH CONDUCTS BN

(-) SIZE SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN THE HUE- QUANG TRI AREA.

3. EXECUTION

PAGE TWO SA7H **SECRET**

A. CONCEPT- TASK GROUP FOXTROT MOVES ONE BN(-) TO THE HUE- QUANG TRI AREA BY HELICOPTER TO CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION.

B. FIRST BN(-) FOURTH MAR

(1) UTILIZING A COMMAND GROUP AND 2 RIFLE COMPANIES MOVE BY HELICOPTER LOADING BY 0815 AT LZ, S SELECTED BY CO 1/4 TO CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS IN THE AREA BOUNDED BY YD 513473, 60425, 620315, 640390

C. SECOND BN FIRST MAR

(1) BE PREPARED TO REINFORCE FIRST BN, FOURTH MAR WITH ONE RIFLE COMPANY ON A 30 MINUTE NOTICE, AND ONE RIFLE COMPANY WITH A COMMAND GROUP (-) ON A TWO HOUR NOTICE, EFFECTIVE 190815.

(2) BE PREPARED TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENTIRE PHU BAI TAOR ON ORDER.

(3) PROVIDE ONE RIFLE PLT (PLUS) FOR SECURITY OF YANKEE BTRY, WILL BE PICKED UP BY BATTERY 190515.

D. FIRST BN FIRST MAR

CONTINUE ASSIGNED MISSION.

E. FOURTH BN TWELFTH MAR

(1) DESPLACE ONE 155 HOWITZER BATTERY (TOWED) TO VICINITY OF PHAUNG DIEN YD 530340 IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF 1/4, TO BE IN POSITION NLT 190815H.

CCN- 7280-03

OREGONCOORDINATED

MAR 19 1966

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TAB-R

SECRETCOMMUNICATIONS CENTER
3D MARINE DIVISION

NPAGE THREE SA7H S E C R E T

(2) PROVIDE NGF SPOT TEAM TO FIRST BN, FOURTH MAR HAVE REPORT
PHYSICALLY TO BN CP BY 190630H

F. INSTRUCTIONS

- (1) ORDER EFFECTIVE ON RECEIPT
- (2) UNCLASSIFIED CODE NAME FOR OPERATION (NOT ISSUED)
- (3) FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION, 1/4 RESPONSIBLE IN OPERATING AREA.
- (4) AIR SUPPORT - NORMAL PROCEDURES
- (5) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT REMAIN THE SAME
- (6) REPORTS: SUBMIT SITREP AND SPOT REPORTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE (A)

4. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS

- A. REQUEST RESUPPLY FROM FLSU-2
- B. AS PRESCRIBED BY COMMANDERS

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS

- A. REPORT COMMAND POST LOCATIONS WHEN ESTABLISHED.
- B. INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS
 - (1) FIRST BN FOURTH MAR-AS REQUIRED
 - (2) ATTACHED UNITS-AS REQUIRED
 - (3) FREQUENCIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIO 02000.2C

PAGE FOUR SA7H S E C R E T

C. EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS

- (1) ENTER TASK GROUP FOXTROT ADMIN NET (P) 5615, D-46 (S) 3464 D-21
- (2) TASK GROUP TAC NET (P) 43.7, D-214 (S) 40.1, D-192
- (3) TACTICAL AIR REQUEST NET NO 1 (P) 7995, D-64 (S) 2196, D-3 THIS NET NORMALLY OPERATES ON THE SECONDARY FREQUENCY.
- (4) TACTICAL AIR REQUEST NET NO 2 (P) 38.6, D-180
- (5) OTHER AIR/GROUND NETS IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIO 02000.2C AS REQUIRED.

D. CRYPTOGRAPHY

- (1) AUTHENTICATION KAA-60
- (2) NUMERICAL CODE (SHACKLE) - KAI 138

E. COORDINATION INSTRUCTING

- (1) U.S. ARMY ADVISORS
 - (A) SENIOR ADVISOR CALL SIGN STEWED 82 FREQUENCY 42.7
 - (F) EMERGENCY RESUPPLY AS REQUIRED.

GP-4
BY

TOP SECRET 181717Z/MAR 66/TGF

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3D MARINE DIVISION

"ACTION COPY"

G-3 W
G-3P R
G-3P map

Oregon

TZ87L D SATH NR 11/11
P 190100Z
FM TASK GRP "F"
TO CG THIRD MARDIV -

7461/aem

BT
CONFIDENTIAL

1ST BN 4TH MRINES OPERATION SET BACK TWO HOURS TO 191015H
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3D MARINE DIVISION

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6.32	W
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6.34	W
6.35	W
6.36	W
6.37	W
6.38	W
6.39	W
6.40	W
6.41	W
6.42	W
6.43	W
6.44	W
6.45	W
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6.47	W
6.48	W
6.49	W
6.50	W
6.51	W
6.52	W
6.53	W
6.54	W
6.55	W
6.56	W
6.57	W
6.58	W
6.59	W
6.60	W

1871 DE SA7H NR 02/02
 P 190240Z
 FM CPG "F"
 TO CG THIRD MARDIV
 BT

SECRET

1. OPERATION PLANNED FOR THIS DATE SLIPPED
 BACK TWO HOURS FOR TOTAL FOUR HOURS. 1-HOUR
 NOW 190215 HOTEL. DUE TO WEATHER CONDITIONS.
 2. IF UNABLE TO EXECUTE BY 191315H WILL
 POSTPONE OPERATION TWENTY FOUR HOURS.
 BEELE CP-4
 BT

7462/abm

43

MAR 19 1966

SECRET

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COMMUNICATION CENTER
3D MARINE DIVISION

G-3
G-3P
G-3A
Gymso
WATER
MAP NCO

"ADV"

Oregon Folder

T87L D SA7HNR 04/04

R 190200Z

FM TSK GRP "F"

TO CG THIRD MARDIV

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

BTRY "Y" SET IN AT 190830 IN SUPPORT
OF 1ST BN 4TH MARINES

GP-4

BT

7467/asm

40

MAR 19 1966

19/02583 MAR 1966

A-3

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