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NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
MESSAGE CENTER

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CALL 53337  
FOR NMCC/MC  
SERVICE

RR RUEOJFA  
DE RUHHHQA4108 3352046  
ZNY CCCCC ZDK CTG RUEACSA 6311 3360555  
R 302050Z NOV 68  
FM CINCPAC  
TO RHMSMVA/COMUSMACV  
INFO RUHHRGA/CINCUSARPAC  
RUEOJFA/JCS  
BT

L 01 05 397  
1 17 13'68  
MARINE CORPS  
HEADQUARTERS  
CAMP LEWIS  
PACIFIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L  
CAPACITY OF PW CAMPS (U)

- A. COMUSMACV 35077/101140Z NOV 68
- 1. ANALYSIS OF REF A, THE TWENTY-SEVENTH MONTHLY REPORT OF VN DETAINEES AND PW'S, AS WELL AS PREVIOUS REPORTS IN THAT SERIES, SHOWS A PRISONER POPULATION TREND WHICH WILL EXCEED PLANNED CAMP CAPACITY (NORMAL CONDITIONS) SOMETIME IN MID-1969. THIS IS BASED ON THE PLANNED END CAPACITY OF 20,000 (NORMAL) FOR THE PHU QUOC CAMP, AND A TOTAL OF 29,000 (NORMAL) FOR ALL CAMPS.
- 2. REQUEST INFO ON MEASURES PLANNED BY RVNAF TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PRISONER ACCOMMODATIONS AFTER PW POPULATION REACHES PLANNED NORMAL CAMP CAPACITY. GP-4

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#4108  
NNNN

INFO: CJCS-1 DJS-3 J1-2 J3-8 J5-2 SACSA-3 NMCC-1 S/DEF-7 ASD/ISA-9  
GC-1 ASD/PA-1 ASD/COMP-1 M&RA DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1 CMC-7  
FILE-1 (67) JMR/HK  
REF A IS 31369  
ADV TO NMCC

1 OF 1

*Post Phu Quoc Camp*  
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MAILING OFFICE  
COMNAVFORV

Nov 28 10 50 '68

CMC	Hand
ACMC	Hand
MILSEC	
CoS	Hand
DC/S(P&P)	Hand
Port Asst	Hand

31 FMF 941

Q08SXV0756FMF'041G  
 PP RUEBHOA  
 DE RUHKFMA4066 3331101  
 ZNY SSSSS  
 P 281101Z NOV 68  
 FM CG FMFPAC  
 INFO RUEBHOA/CMC  
 P 260752Z NOV 68  
 FM COMSEVENTHFLT  
 TO COMUSMACV  
 INFO CINCPACFLT  
 CG FMFPAC  
 COMPHIBPAC  
 CG III MAF  
 CTF SEVEN SIX  
 CTF SEVEN NINE  
 FIRST SEA LORD  
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AC

402  
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ARG/SLF OPERATION (U)

A. COMNAVFORV 230642Z NOV 68 - AC 402, 403, 404, AA, 47A

B. CG III MAF 251554Z NOV 68

1. THE OPERATION DESCRIBED REF A IS FEASIBLE. THE RELATIVE DESIRABILITY OF THE PHU QUOC ISLAND OPERATION VERSUS THE SCHEDULED EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARG/SLF IN THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN SET FORTH REF B IS CONSIDERED A MATTER UNDER YOUR JURISDICTION.
2. COMSEVENTHFLT IS WAGERED TO UTILIZE THE UNIQUE CAPABILITIES OF THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE IN ANY AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION WHERE SUITABLE OBJECTIVES ARE LOCATED.

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*TAFF X - MISSION*

VV FMF876

PP RUEBHOA  
DE RUHHFMA3590 329231  
ZNR UUUUU  
P 242313Z NOV 68  
FM CG FMFPAC  
TO RUEBHOA/CMC

BT

UNCLAS

WIRENOTE FOR COL BARRETT, DIRECTOR MCCC, FROM COL HALL, G73 FMFPAC.

ARG/SLF EMPLOYMENT (U)

A. COMNAVFORV 230642Z/NOV68 (S) (NF) (PASEP)

1. REF A BEING PASSED TO CMC FOR INFORMATION.

2. WILL ADVISE CONCERNING SEVENTHFLT COMMENTS IN THIS REGARD WHEN KNOWN. REGARDS.

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2. (SNF) THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PROVIDED IWA REF A:
- A. PROPOSED MISSION. CONDUCT AN AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT AGAINST THE VC ON PHU QUOC ISLAND TO DESTROY HIS FORCES, NEUTRALIZED HIS HEADQUARTERS, AND PERMIT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GVN CONTROL OVER THE ISLAND.
  - B. PROPOSED DATES. BEGINNING 10 DEC FOR A PERIOD OF ABOUT SIX DAYS.
  - C. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE, ENEMY SITUATION AND

PAGE THREE RUYGSAF1981 S E C R E T NOFORN L I M D I S  
CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRAIN AND HYDROGRAPHY.

1. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE. THE VC HAVE ABOUT 250-300 ARMS-CARRYING MEN WHO RANGE IN AGE FROM 18 TO 35 YEARS. THEY ARE DIVIDED IN THREE LOCATIONS:

(A) THE VC ISLAND HEADQUARTERS AT US 8636 WITH SECURITY FORCES OF ABOUT 75 MEN. ONE SMALL UNIT OPERATES VIC US 8434/US 8433.

(B) THE NORTHERN PLATOON/COMPANY OF ABOUT 60 MEN WHICH OPERATES IN THE GENERAL AREA OF US 8141.

(C) THE 'GOVERNMENT KILLER' PLATOON OF 60 MEN OPERATING IN THE AREA US 9020.

(D) THE BALANCE OF THE VC OPERATE AS HAMLET SQUADS AND IN SMALL GROUPS.

2. ENEMY SITUATION. THERE HAS BEEN INCREASED ACTIVITY NEAR THE PRISON CAMP. FROM JAN-AUG 68 THERE WAS ONE ENEMY INITIATED ACTION. SINCE AUGUST, 14 SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS HAVE OCCURRED INCLUDING SEVERAL EXTENDED FIREFIGHTS BETWEEN VC AND RF TROOPS IN THE SWAMP NORTH OF THE PRISON CAMP. THE VC HAVE NOT BEEN CHALLENGED IN THEIR HEADQUARTERS OF NORTHERN AREA EXCEPT BY SEALS IN

PAGE FOUR RUYGSAF1981 S E C R E T NOFORN L I M D I S  
OCT-NOV68. KNOWN VC ARMAMENT INCLUDES THE USUAL ARRAY OF SMALL ARMS, A LIMITED NUMBER OF AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, 2 TO 5 RPG-2 ROCKET LAUNCHERS AND AN UNKNOWN BUT LIMITED NUMBER OF CHICOM 60MM MORTARS.

3. TERRAIN AND HYDROGRAPHY

(A) THE TERRAIN RANGES FROM HILLY TO MOUNTAINOUS WITH DENSE VEGETATION. CROSS-COUNTRY MOVEMENT CONDITIONS ARE GENERALLY FAIR TO POOR FOR FOOT AND VEHICULAR MOVEMENT IN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS. COASTAL LOWLANDS ARE SANDY, COVERED WITH SCRUB AND GRASS AND OFFER GOOD LATERAL MOVEMENT. HELICOPTER LANDING ZONES, THOUGH NOT EXTENSIVE IN SIZE, ARE AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT LANDINGS AROUND THE MAJOR OBJECTIVE AREAS. DISTANCES FROM THE SIX FATHOM CURVE TO PROSPECTIVE LANDING ZONES RANGE FROM 2 TO

6 MILES.

(B) THREE MAJOR LANDING BEACHES ARE LOCATED ON THE WESTERN SIDE OF THE ISLAND (NIS 80, 81 AND 82). DISTANCES FROM THE SIX FATHOM CURVE TO THESE BEACHES RANGE FROM LESS THAN A MILE TO 2.5 MILES.

1. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. ON D-DAY ONE SLF CONDUCTS A SURPRISE HELICOPTER BORNE AND SURFACE ASSAULT ON PHU

PAGE FIVE RUYGSAF1981 S E C R E T N O F O R N L I M D I S  
QUOC USLAND TO DESTROY VC FORCES IN THE HEADQUARTERS AREA, CENTER-OF-MASS US 870 370, AND TO NEUTRALIZE THE VC HEADQUARTERS. FOLLOW UP ATTACKS TO BE CONDUCTED INTO VC OPERATING AREAS, CENTER-OF-MASS US 895 205 AND US 805 405. COMMITMENT OF ALL FOUR RIFLE COMPANIES WOULD BE FEASIBLE SINCE THE VC HAVE NO SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITY TO REINFORCE THERE WILL BE NO PRE H-HOUR FIRES. THE APPROACH TO THE OBJECTIVE AREA MUST BE MADE UNDER COVER OF DARKNESS AND THE ASSAULT LAUNCHED AT FIRST LIGHT IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE VC FROM ESCAPING INTO THE MOUNTAINS/JUNGLES. THE NATURE OF LOCAL FRIENDLY OPERATIONS IS SUCH THAT THIS LANDING COULD BE LAUNCHED WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF ANY PERSONS ON PHU QUOC EXCEPT THE SENIOR ADVISOR AND DISTRICT CHIEF.. THIS INFORMATION COULD BE WITHHELD FROM THOSE TWO OFFICIALS UNTIL THE PREVIOUS DAY. SUCH EXTREME SECURITY PRECAUTIONS ARE CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL. SA IV CORPS CONCURS SELECTION OF HELICOPTER LANDING ZONES COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED CLANDESTINELY BY THE LOCAL NAVAL INTELLIGENCE LIAISON OFFICER AND NAVFORV AMPHIB OPS OFFICER.

2. RECOMMENDED AOA. AN ARC OF TEOFLUTICAL CNFAYES INLAND AND 60 NAUTICAL MILES SEAWARD FROM US 862 290,

PAGE SIX RUYGSAF1981 S E C R E T N O F O R N L I M D I S  
WITH NO FIRES ZONES AROUND DUONG DONG (US 8629) AND CUA CON (US 8137).

E. IN-COUNTRY FORCE TO BE EMPLOYED:

1. TACTICAL AIR AND FAC'S ARE REQUIRED ON D-DAY FOLLOWING H-HOUR. AFTER D-DAY ORGANIC SLF SUPPORTING ARMS WOULD BE EMPLOYED WITHOUT FURTHER IN-COUNTRY FORCE ASSISTANCE.

2. PHU QUOC RF AND PG UNITS TO ATTACK THE SOUTHERN VC OPERATING AREAS. IN ORDER TO INSURE SECRECY, THEIR COMMITMENT WOULD BE ARRANGED AFTER H-HOUR.

F. TITLE AND LOCATION OF IN-COUNTRY COMMANDER. NOT APPLICABLE. OPERATION WOULD REMAIN UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (CATF).

G. COMMUNICATIONS DETAILS. TO BE RESOLVED AT

INITIAL PLANNING CONFERENCE.

3. (SNF) CG, III MAF HAS INDICATED HE COULD NOT CONCUR  
IN ANY OPERATION WHICH WOULD REMOVE THE SLF FROM I CORPS  
AND IS THEREFORE REQUESTED TO COMPEND DIRECTLY TO  
COMUSMACV CONCERNING THIS RECOMMENDATION.

4. SA IV CORPS CONCURS.

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