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Hon. Wellings  
7/25/967*

PROJECT TAKEOFFSUMMARY

**Objective:** To use available resources more effectively to accelerate the progress of Revolutionary Development during the remainder of CY 67.

**Concept:** TAKEOFF is comprised of 13 Action Programs considered as key to accelerating pacification. Eight programs have been identified as first priority (Category I) and five others may be added later (Category II). Direction is to be accomplished through an overall Project Manager and separate program managers in Saigon, with a duplicative arrangement in each corps. Province and District advisory teams are to develop implementing action plans. Program managers will submit monthly reports; and a quarterly evaluation and review procedure is to be established.

Action Programs

## Category I (Being Initiated)

1. Improve 1968 Pacification Planning
2. Accelerate Chieu Hoi Program
3. Mount Attack on VC Infrastructure
4. Expand and Improve RVNAF Support
5. Expand and Supplement RD Team Effort; Employ Substitute Techniques
6. Increase capability to Handle Refugees
7. Revamp Police and PFF
8. Press Land Reform (In Conjunction with USAID)

## Category II (Possible Add-Ons)

1. Push Anti-Corruption Program
2. Revamp PsyOps

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3. Improve Local Government
4. Develop Follow-on Phase to Pacification
5. Stress Training and Motivation of Officials  
at both National and Local Levels

Status: Lt Colonel Warner of Ambassador Leonhart's office reports preliminary GVN reaction to project TAKEOFF has been lukewarm. The GVN order of priorities appears to be (1) the Elections; (2) Reorganization of the GVN RD structure to mirror CORDS; and (3) Project TAKEOFF. However, two action programs have been completed in Saigon and disseminated to the field for implementation:


- (1) Attack on the Infrastructure
- (2) Chieu Hoi Action Program

References:

Project TAKEOFF, Vol II, Assessment of Pacification (Vols I and III not yet received)	- TAB A
Briefing on Project TAKEOFF	- TAB B
SACSA Briefing to Joint Staff on Status of RD as of 31 August	- TAB C

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**UNITED STATES  
MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND  
VIETNAM**



**PROJECT TAKEOFF**

**VOLUME II**

**ASSESSMENT OF PACIFICATION**

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11 August 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Project TAKEOFF

1. Attached for your information is a copy of Volume II. Project TAKEOFF. This volume is an assessment of the status of pacification in South Vietnam as of 31 May 1967. The assessment was prepared by CORDS, with the assistance of other staff sections of MACV and US civil agencies. It is based on historical records, field reports and the collective knowledge and views of the MACV staff and participating agencies.

2. Volumes I and III of Project TAKEOFF will be distributed at a later date.

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as



L. WADE LATHRAM  
ACofS, CORDS

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- 2 - Sp Asst to President, The White House, Wash, DC, ATTN: Amb Wm. Leonhart (Cy 242-243)
- 1 - Gen Maxwell D. Taylor, The White House, Wash, DC (Cy 244)
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- 1 - Amb at Large Henry Cabot Lodge, Dept of State, Wash, DC (Cy 248)
- 2 - DOD, Wash, DC, ATTN: Mr. Thomas Thayer (Cy 249-250)

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MACCORDS

17 June 1967

PROJECT TAKEOFF

Volume II

PART ONE

ASSESSMENT OF PACIFICATION

IN SOUTH VIETNAM

AS OF 31 MAY 1967

Prepared by

ACofS, CORDS  
Headquarters MACV

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**UNCLASSIFIED**TABLE OF CONTENTS -- PART ONE

- I. Introduction
- II. Brief Analysis of Past Pacification Programs
- III. 1967 Pacification Planning
- IV. Status of Military Support
- V. Assessment of Current Situation
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- VII. Status of the Different Elements and Programs of Pacification
- VIII. Management Analysis Techniques
- IX. Preliminary US 1968 Pacification Planning
- X. Impact on RD of Developments Outside the RD Program
- XI. US Influence -- The Necessity, Feasibility and Desirability  
of Asserting Greater Leverage
- XII. Recapitulation of Major Conclusions

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**UNCLASSIFIED**I. (U) INTRODUCTION

A. Part One of PROJECT TAKEOFF is an assessment of pacification in South Vietnam as of 31 May 1967. The assessment forms the basis for Part Two which contains a series of action programs designed to intensify the pacification effort and increase its momentum.

B. The assessment was made by ACoFS, CORDS, with assistance from other staff sections of MACV and from US civil agencies in South Vietnam. It was done at the direction of the Deputy for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support to COMUSMACV. It is based on historical records, field reports and the collective knowledge and views of ACoFS, CORDS, and the other contributors mentioned.

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PROJECT TAKEOFFINTRODUCTION

On 9 May 1967 the President assigned to General Westmoreland the responsibility for all US civil and military pacification activities. Ambassador Komer was assigned as Deputy COMUSMACV for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support. The Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, CORDS, was formed within MACV on the J-staff level by combining the Office of Civil Operations, then in the Embassy under the Deputy Ambassador, and the former MACV Revolutionary Development Support Directorate.

One of the first tasks undertaken by the new CORDS organization was to respond to Ambassador Komer's requirement for an assessment of the status of the pacification effort. On the basis of this assessment, a set of action programs were developed to intensify the pacification effort and increase its momentum during the remainder of 1967.

The assessment and action programs form Project Takeoff, which is in three volumes. Volume I is a summary statement of the new CORDS organization; of the assessment of pacification as of 31 May 1967; and of the action programs. Also included in the summary is an "overview" statement that expresses Ambassador Komer's own views of the pacification effort in the summer of 1967.

Volume II is the assessment.

Volume III contains the action programs.

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II. (U) BRIEF ANALYSIS OF PAST PACIFICATION PROGRAMS

A. Under the Diem regime. During the early part of the Diem regime, pacification was conducted in roughly two phases. The first effort from 1954-1956 was directed primarily towards reoccupation of former Viet Minh territory with limited attempts to identify and destroy Communist infrastructure and initiate normal government programs. GVN human and material resources were inadequate and US and Free World assistance marginal. During the second phase, beginning before 1956, the GVN launched its first coherent pacification program. Population was used consciously to secure certain strategic objectives. This was evidenced clearly in the Montagnard land development centers which straddled the highlands, the location of agrovilles along border areas or near insurgent bases, and the resettling of northern refugees along key lines of communication. All of these plans were essentially Vietnamese both in concept and execution. They were relatively selective and were carried out during the incipient stages of the insurgency. US assistance was limited to some technical advice but principally increased material support. They failed mainly because they offered nothing really positive in terms of social justice and opportunity. They were partial, disjointed attempts and were poorly planned and lacking in resources.

B. The Strategic Hamlet Program (1962-1963) was the first national program which involved relatively heavy US advice and support. It was initiated when the dangers, although not the extent, of the insurgency were clear to everyone. The US provided commodities, some civil field personnel, and 10 million dollars in piasters along with armaments,

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barrier materials, radios, and other counterinsurgency tools to support the strategic hamlets. However, the program was still essentially Vietnamese and was given the Diem regime's full political direction and leadership. We have never seen, since that time, such a degree of organizational and managerial skill marshalled on the part of the Vietnamese leadership at the national level in pursuit of pacification objectives. This was the program's great strength (although central control and measures introduced by Diem to modify local governmental institutions resulted in weak local leadership and a general breakdown of local government -- a result that still adversely affects pacification efforts today). Many reasons are cited for the downfall of the Strategic Hamlet Program: corruption, too hasty implementation resulting in "paper pacification" and false reporting, and the forced nature of the plan which put peasants in artificial communities and aroused their resentment. These facts are true, but they do not address the main point. The Strategic Hamlet Program failed because it bore little relationship to the military situation and planning, and was being implemented at a time when the military balance was going against the GVN.

As enemy infiltration mounted and enemy forces were targeted against the strategic hamlets, they were toppled effortlessly like card houses.

C. After the November 1963 revolution, several successor pacification programs were adopted and actively urged upon the GVN by Americans interested in pacification strategy and its possibilities. The names are of little consequence (Rural Construction, Rural Reconstruction, Chien Thang, Hop Tac, etc.). However, during 1964-1965,

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and during part of 1966, GVN leadership never became interested in or really supported a pacification strategy. There was considerable justification for its not doing so. Pacification is a strategy which can be carried out only from a position of strength. Until late 1965, however, the total military situation was deteriorating and was saved only by the introduction of US combat troops into the country. Quite simply, therefore, the time was not appropriate.

D. By 1966, the military situation had changed sufficiently to permit again an aggressive pacification strategy. Interestingly, it was during this year that the Vietnamese once more began to respond to a pacification program which we call Revolutionary Development. During 1966, the program began to take on an accretion lacking since 1963. Nevertheless, the 1966 program was planned hurriedly, with General Thang taking over the Ministry for RD (MRD) in August 1965 after the planning process already had begun. The concepts still were evolving. A major management effort was required in developing a new cadre organization capable of absorbing the members of nearly 40 different cadre groups. Financial and budgeting procedures and the planning process still were developing. The US planning effort was not coordinated. With US influence, however, the budget was approved and funds released in the first month of the year for the first time in the history of pacification in SVN, but this had little effect on the concept and plans.

E. The concept of pacification had refined slowly so that, by 1966, sound theories were incorporated into the RD program. There

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remained, however, little relationship between concept and execution, with the latter focused primarily on a wide range of physical improvements, giving little attention to the more important but intangible aspects of promoting social cohesion and local government. Not until planning for the 1967 program began would concepts of social and economic reform be included in the program. Before that time, there was no specific provision for attack on social injustices.

F. The 1966 RD program had few resources, and only the beginning of some cohesion around the newly conceived 59-man RD teams. Military support was included in planning, although security generally was inadequate throughout the year, especially during the first two quarters. There was no meaningful ARVN support. The program was not appreciated or understood at the local level. Provincial officials were not interested. Execution was spasmodic, uncoordinated and generally uninspired. 1966 plans, perhaps because they were loosely conceived and developed, were far too ambitious. This was aggravated by terrific pressure from Saigon to show demonstrable results. The net effect was an upsurge in activity toward the end of the fiscal year which resulted in the obligation of much more money and the starting of many more projects than could be used or finished prior to the end of the year. Consequently, a considerable portion of the effort expended in the first quarter of 1967 was on completing the 1966 program. 1966 achievement of 444 new hamlets was only 24% of the goal of 1,830.

G. In sum 1966 was the first time since 1963 that the GVN had a coherent program. Military and civilian resources were specified and

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concentrated on very limited objectives. The majority of local and national officials were beginning to understand the rules if not the spirit of the effort. The population, especially that in target areas, was becoming increasingly aware of the program.

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A. While 1967 pacification planning was greatly improved in some respects over 1966, it was not conducted as a unified effort, and no one pacification plan per se exists. Individual planning documents and plans focus primarily on MRD and related programs and not on pacification as a whole. These include the RD Guidelines and 44 province RD plans, the Combined Campaign Plan, AB 142, and supporting military plans, and the USAID Country Assistance Program (CAP). RD and military plans were developed separately at the Saigon level. Sector security plans and a directive establishing RD campaigns were developed later as amplifying documents.

B. The Ministry for RD Guidelines provide conceptual planning and programming guidance to the provinces. The 44 province RD plans are based on the RD Guidelines and guidance supplied by corps and division commanders stating the availability of military resources. The plans are focused on securing 1103 hamlets through the employment of RD teams which bring with them material and technical resources provided by the "RD Budget." The RD plans are essentially provincial hamlet construction plans and are the successors to previous pacification programs. ( These plans for 1967 incorporate the sounder concepts of previous programs, including attempts to stimulate developmental activities and to rectify social injustices.)

C. Coordination of Effort. Much greater emphasis also was placed on concentrating resources into selected hamlets (Ap Doi Moi) in order to produce fundamental changes in the community and to cluster the

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Ap Doi Moi into target areas. 1967 RD planning focused on areas of dense population and economic centers in all 44 provinces. Major efforts were planned in 26 priority provinces -- the rice-producing provinces in the Delta (in large measure the eastern delta provinces), the provinces around Saigon, the central coastal areas: Phu Yen and Binh Dinh, and Quang Ngai Provinces, and in the Hue-Danang-Quang Nam complex.

## HAMLETS TO BE CONSTRUCTED OR CONSOLIDATED IN 1967

	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
No. hamlets to be constructed or consolidated in 1967	247	391	217	248	1,103
Ap Doi Moi	(118)	(174)	(115)	(159)	(566)
Ap Binh Dinh	( 25)	(119)	( 37)	( 35)	(216)
Ap Cung Co	(104)	( 98)	( 65)	( 54)	(321)

D. By the end of 1966, some 4,401 of Vietnam's approximately 12,000 hamlets were rated secure. 1967 RD plans include 1,103 hamlets to be constructed or consolidated during the year. Of these, 327 are among the 4,401 hamlets already classified as secure at the end of 1966; 766 are to be secured for the first time. This will leave approximately 7,000 hamlets to be secured after 1967.) The following table shows hamlet status on a regional basis.

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STATUS OF HAMLETS SECURED TO GVN CONTROL

	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
No. hamlets in SVN	2,401	3,063	1,799	4,904	12,167
No. hamlets secured as of end 1966	483	976	997	1,945	4,401
No. hamlets insecure at end of 1966	1,918	2,087	802	2,959	7,766
No. hamlets to be secured in 1967	147	311	134	174	766
No. hamlets remaining to be secured after 1967	1,771	1,776	668	2,785	7,000

E. AB 142 provides general guidance to corps and divisions on military support for RD and on resources control. JGS and MACV jointly formulated AB 142 and supporting military plans, which were coordinated with MRD (although RD Minister Thang did not personally review them and subsequently changed the RD hamlet concept for 1967 from that contained in AB 142). Although portions of AB 142 were coordinated with the Joint US Agency Planning Group, it was not coordinated fully with the US Mission.

F. The USAID attempt to build its Country Assistance Program (which includes pacification related activities in the fields of agriculture, health, education, etc., in addition to support to RD) from province level up faltered in the last phases. However, coming as it did just prior to the MRD planning exercise, it improved the quality of the US planning for RD at all levels. In addition, the 1967 effort laid the necessary foundation for greatly improved planning in 1968 and beyond.

G. Coordination of pacification planning between the GVN and US improved during 1966. Nevertheless, US influence ultimately was negligible

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at the national level. US agencies developed proposed NPA, RD concepts and planning principles and detailed guidelines, and a planning cycle. The GVN accepted and generally followed the planning cycle throughout and accepted the other elements initially, or so it seemed. However, only the NPA and a part of the guidelines on budget items eventually were used. Minister Thang made major revisions at the last minute in the concept for hamlet development, based largely on the thoughts of the commandant of the Vung Tau National Training Center, and incorporated them into the RD Guidelines without meaningful reference to the US. A major problem was not only real communication between Vietnamese and Americans; as it turned out principal Vietnamese were not really communicating with each other. US corps/region involvement was nominal. US civilian/military provincial advisors had the best opportunity to influence RD plans, but this influence varied from substantial to negligible. US provincial coordination was helped by Saigon reviews held in November 1966. RD and other ministries' programs were not integrated. Consequently, a coordinated pacification effort to include follow-up of hamlets pacified before 1967 was not achieved. In sum, there was no meaningful combined US/GVN planning.

H. Conclusion. Although 1967 RD plans leave much to be desired, major adjustments should be confined to those required to effect a more meaningful concentration of resources. The reviews carried out quarterly by the four MRD central teams will permit an opportunity to push for any shifts in the program that may be required during the last half of the

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year. In addition, military support aspects of the program can be monitored in the quarterly combined reviews of the implementation of AB 142 and through MACV's evaluation capability. However, more closely coordinated reviews would be far more preferable and we should urge this on the GVN. Emphasis for the remainder of 1967 should be on execution, greater attention to areas considered secure and not receiving RD resources, and a better application of the principles of concentrating resources where earlier results can be obtained (see Section VI, paragraphs H and I). With regard to the broader program of pacification, there are a number of areas where planning is inadequate and needing immediate attention (see Section XII).

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IV. STATUS OF MILITARY SUPPORTA. (S) Overall Security Status and Adequacy of Military Forces.

1. General. A major new development in pacification has been that the advent of major US forces, which has taken over most of the anti-main force role, has permitted the GVN to direct a growing part of RVNAF to pacification related security tasks. By 1967, the buildup of US/FW forces and their successes against VC/NVA forces permitted a substantial part of ARVN (currently 53 battalions) to be employed in direct support of RD. Further, a number of US/FW and ARVN units support RD indirectly. Nevertheless, the drawdown of US forces in II and III CTZ to meet the enemy main force threat in I CTZ lessened indirect support significantly. If the enemy successfully steps up his main force effort, it will be necessary to withdraw more US forces from an indirect support role. It may even be necessary to withdraw some ARVN forces from a direct support role. There are sufficient military forces to permit pacification progress in some areas but overall, given the foregoing, it is questionable whether military forces are adequate to support an aggressive pacification effort.

2. The situation in I CTZ is least satisfactory. Security is tenuous throughout the corps area. VC/NVA attacks against province and district towns are frequent and the VC incident rate in populated areas is the highest in all four corps. Military forces to support pacification are not sufficient.

3. The situation in II CTZ is most promising especially in populated areas in the coastal provinces. Assuming no increase occurs

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in enemy activity or capability, military forces to support pacification are sufficient to permit steady progress.

4. In III CTZ, the security situation is poor in Hau Nghia, Long An and Bien Hoa. Elsewhere, the security ranges from fair to good. Although there are sufficient military forces in III CTZ to support pacification and permit some progress, many ARVN units are ineffective.

5. The security situation in IV CTZ has improved significantly in 1967 and is continuing to improve. Security forces are inadequate in An Xuyen, Chuong Thien, Kien Phung and Kien Tuong. Security is tenuous in these provinces. Forces are adequate in the remaining areas to permit some meaningful pacification progress to be made.

B. (C) Current Status of Employment of Military Forces. From reports and field liaison visits (see Annex IV-1 for reporting procedures), the current status of military forces employed in support of pacification is as follows:

1. ARVN Battalions in Support of Pacification.

a. Employment by Corps.

(1) I Corps. Twelve of 28 ARVN infantry battalions in I Corps are reported to be in direct support of RD. (The 4th Bn, 51st Regt, in Quang Nam Province is reported to be in direct support of RD but actually is conducting search and destroy operations which should be considered as indirect support of RD.) The remaining 16 ARVN infantry battalions have missions which support RD indirectly through the conduct of static security, search and destroy, and mobile reserve/reaction operations. ARVN search and destroy operations are conducted in areas

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adjacent to RD priority areas. The number and extent of offensive operations by both ARVN and US/FW forces has increased recently.

(2) II Corps. Ten of 23 ARVN battalions in II Corps are reported to be in direct support of RD. (The 3d Bn, 47th Regt, in Phu Bon Province is reported to be in indirect support of RD but actually is used for road security and search and destroy operations.) Of the remaining 13 ARVN infantry battalions, 8 have a mission which supports RD indirectly. Four battalions secure political and economic centers and one secures Highway #20 in Lam Dong Province. The primary forces which are in indirect support are the Capital ROK Infantry Division and the 9th ROK Infantry Division whose TAOR include three of the five priority provinces in II Corps.

(3) III Corps. Sixteen of 34 ARVN infantry battalions in III Corps are reported to be in direct support of RD. (The 4th Bn, 48th Regt, in Bien Hoa Province is reported to be in direct support of RD, but the area of operations of this battalion is not in the province RD plan as an RD area.) The remaining 18 are engaged in securing political and economic centers and lines of communication.

(4) IV Corps. Fifteen of 36 ARVN infantry battalions in IV Corps are in direct support of RD. (The 4th Bn, 11th Regt, in Kien Tuong Province is carried in direct support of RD. One rifle company conducts security operations in support of RD. The remainder of the battalion is providing security for an engineer unit which is constructing a road from Ap Bac to the RD area at Nhon Ninh.) The remaining 21 have missions which support RD indirectly. The introduction of

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the US 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, has increased the security of National Highway #4 and the RD areas adjacent to its area of operations.

b. Breakout of ARVN Battalions in Direct Support of RD by Province (See Annex IV-2).

c. Assessment of ARVN Battalions in Direct Support of RD (See Annex IV-3).

2. RF/PF in Support of Pacification. There are 681 RF Companies and 3,212 PF platoons probably supporting pacification. This is an estimate only and based on the number of platoons and companies that do not have a mission of securing urban areas or military installations (See Annex IV-4 for a corps breakout of RF companies and PF platoons). The actual role and effectiveness of RF/PF in support of pacification needs much greater study.

3. US/FWMAF in Support of Pacification.

a. Direct Support. Operation LAM SON II in Binh Duong Province, now called LAM SON 67, began in May 1966. This operation has resulted in the pacification of Tan Phuoc Khanh Village of 6 hamlets with a population of approximately 10,000 inhabitants. The III MAF Combined Action concept places a squad of Marines with a Vietnamese popular force platoon. Seventy-three combined action platoons have been formed, but only five are considered direct support elements. These five platoons protect RD teams and hamlets near Danang and elsewhere in Thua Thien and Quang Nam Provinces. US/FWMAF also provide direct support for RD through artillery support and reserve/reaction forces.

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b. Indirect Support. Indirect support to the pacification effort is provided by US/FW units as follows: I Corps -- 13 USMC battalions, II Corps -- 8 US Army battalions and 18 ROK battalions, III Corps -- 10 US battalions and 2 Australian/New Zealand battalions; IV Corps -- 1 US battalion.

c. (C) Measures Taken by RVNAF to Improve Military Support For Pacification.

1. ARVN/RF/PF Mobile Training Teams (MTT). MTT were initiated in December 1966 to train ARVN and RF/PF units in military/civil techniques of supporting RD. As of 1 June 1967, 47 ARVN battalions and 229 RF companies had completed training. PF began training on 15 May. All corps report that, in general, units which have completed MTT training support RD more effectively. The refresher training in small unit tactics included in the MTT training has improved small unit operations. ARVN soldiers have displayed a better attitude toward civilians because of improved understanding of the RD program and its purposes and techniques. Civic action has improved.

2. RVNAF Training Concurrent With RD Operations. On 5 May 1967, JGS established an on-site unit training program for ARVN battalions in support of RD.

3. Field Expedients to Supplement RD Teams. Defense Minister Vien recognized the need to capitalize on unforeseen military successes. A directive published 3 February 1967 authorizes province chiefs, in the absence of nationally trained RD teams, to establish RD type teams locally. The directive also outlines funding and support procedures for

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these unscheduled RD type activities. Examples of efforts to use this authority to improve the program are:

a. ARVN RD Workers. The 5th ARVN Division developed a concept for the organization of selected ARVN soldiers into RD type teams. The division plans to organize and train ARVN personnel along the lines of Vung Tau instruction, emphasizing the fundamentals of RD work. These "ARVN RD Teams" are to be used in suitable hamlets which, although not scheduled in the 1967 RD program, appear to afford fertile development grounds. This concept has not been evaluated.

b. Civil/Military Teams in Binh Dinh. Following Operations THAYER and IRVING, there were insufficient RD teams to organize effectively the territory newly freed from VC control. Civil/military teams were organized as a substitute. These teams, organized with personnel from PF, RF, NP and provincial and district governmental seats, have re-established GVN presence in Phu My and have enhanced the psychological situation substantially. Refugees are returning to their homes more rapidly than anticipated and economic activity has revived.

4. Organization of the Office for Pacification and Territorial Affairs (OPTA). On 21 September 1966, RVNAF established OPTA as an agency to develop policies and concepts for RVNAF military activities in support of RD. RD Minister Thang, was appointed Chief, OPTA, on 23 September 1966 in addition to his other duties. The OPTA was authorized a total strength of 21 officers and 30 enlisted personnel. A deputy, Brigadier General Ngo Dzu, physically occupies the OPTA at the JGS Compound and manages the office for Minister Thang. There are no

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organizational and functional directives published to guide the OPTA.

However, it has been subdivided into functional division, i.e., administrative, planning and inspection. The four inspection divisions correspond to the four CTZ and function as the focal point in giving direction to the inter-ministerial inspection teams. These teams are made up of representatives from the JGS, OPTA, MACV, and MRD and other ministries concerned with administering the pacification effort. The teams conduct regular inspections of RD field activities.

5. RD Campaigns. In March 1967, RD campaigns were established to improve the control, coordination and integration of military forces, RD teams and administrative elements in provincial RD areas (See Annex IV-5).

6. Sector Security Plans. In February 1967, JGS directed all provinces to prepare sector security plans. Plans for all except three provinces in II Corps (Kontum, Binh Dinh and Pleiku) have been completed. Plans for these provinces were rejected by the corps staff and are being revised. An evaluation of the sector security plans has not been made. JGS has not taken any known positive action to obtain the overdue plans from II Corps. A review of the plans received reveals a lack of information in the following areas of functional responsibility: administration, logistics, signal communications, fire support and employment of reaction forces. Generally, the sector security plans have not had a significant impact on the RD program. A preponderance of the provinces already had a sector security plan in effect, but it did not conform, in most cases, to the prescribed form. The sector security plan serves

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as a valuable means to determine the total assets available in the province and how they are employed to support RD activities.

7. CTZ Coordination. To improve the coordination of GVN and US military-civil programs, I Corps formed a Joint Coordinating Council to monitor RD, Chieu Hoi, Public Health and Agriculture. II Corps established the US/ARVN Hop Luc program which includes a combined daily search and destroy operation around the Binh Thuan RD area and the Phan Thiet Airfield complex. Both III and IV Corps have RD councils and support the RD program with command emphasis and direction.

D. (C) RVNAF Effectiveness. The RVNAF combat effectiveness against the VC as measured by average kill ratios for the first four months of 1966 compared to 1967 reflects a decrease from 3.7:1 to 2.9:1 for ARVN, an increase from 3.7:1 to 4.1:1 for RF, and no change from 1.7:1 for the PF.

E. (C) Logistic Support for Units in Support of Pacification. The logistic system of RVNAF is improving but remains relatively weak. ARVN battalions in direct support of RD receive essentially the same support as other battalions. RF/PF are supported by the same system and usually receive a lower priority of logistic support. Specific problem areas are: shortage of barrier and fortification material in all CTZ, shortage of provincial and commercial trucking in all CTZ, and lack of knowledge and/or ability of provincial technical service chiefs in the mechanics of obtaining material and funds.

F. (C) Assessment of Military Redeployments.

1. COC, J32, J5 and CORDS coordinate to assess the impact on

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RD security of major military redeployments. Security problems have arisen because ROK forces redeployed battalions unilaterally. Recently, ROKFV has taken steps to ensure that future deployments of ROK forces will be coordinated appropriately.

2. The following courses of action are suggested to minimize the impact on RD of a sudden withdrawal of security forces.

a. Raise Local Security Force Ceiling. Within recruiting limits, increases in local security forces will reduce the degree of reliance on the security provided by maneuver units in TAOR.

b. Develop a Province RF Reserve. A designated province reserve, provided with appropriate transportation and strategically spotted about the province, will permit greater flexibility in the re-deployment of other security forces.

c. Utilize RVNAF General Reserve to Fill Security Gaps. The US/FWMAF presence in Vietnam reduces the requirement for a centrally located general reserve. The JGS should be persuaded to commit elements of the general reserve to corps commanders on a permanent basis.

G. (C) Forecast of Capability.

1. The capability to provide local security for RD activities is projected to decline in the latter half of 1967. Projected RD team deployments will generate requirements for local security at a rate which will reduce the ratio of RF/PF available per RD team. This is true in spite of the MACV approved increase of 50,000 spaces for RF/PF and in spite of RD team deployments being slightly behind schedule. The 50,000

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figure is based on the recruiting and training capability. One solution, increasing the percentage of RF/PF committed to direct support of RD, is limited by the continuing requirement for RF/PF in such RD-related roles as protection of LOC and previously secured areas. Some previously secured areas might be protected with police. However, this is seldom practical, based on the present police strength and 1967 strength goals. In any event, a military rather than a police force will be required in most areas in the foreseeable future. Thus the RF/PF must remain in RD areas after the MRD programs have been completed.

2. At present, our ability to estimate closely the forces required to provide adequate security for pacification efforts is limited by the lack of solid experience factors. This ability should improve with experience. Also, as we recruit and deploy more RD teams and follow their work on-the-ground, we will be able to refine our projections of feasible rates of RD expansion which will in turn aid in better estimates of the security force requirement.

3. ARVN's contribution to the overall security picture somewhat parallels that of the RF/PF. The roles being performed by ARVN not in direct support of RD are vital roles, even though their contributions to RD are indirect. Any effort to increase the number of ARVN battalions in direct support of RD must recognize the concurrent requirement to provide forces to perform other pacification tasks.

4. Ultimately the requirement for providing adequate security for RD evolves to the following alternatives:

- a. Reduce the expansion of RD target areas.

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- b. Selectively allocate fewer security forces per team.
- c. Increase concentration of RD target areas to improve security effectiveness.
- d. Increase RVNAF and expand training capabilities.
- e. Commit more out-of-country military forces.

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ANNEX IV-1

REPORTING PROCEDURES

1. (C) The status of military support for RD has been measured by an analysis of military forces committed using terms that were based upon the definitions of "direct" and "indirect" support as prescribed by AB 142. The main emphasis has been on ARVN, RF and PF in their direct support role. Direct support has been accepted as being those actions taken by military forces to provide security in and around the areas where RD teams were working. This is a narrow interpretation and action is underway to refine the reporting categories to obtain definitive information which will allow a quantification of the total war effort in more meaningful terms. This refinement should allow a specific analysis to be made of the forces committed to the total pacification effort. In terms of the operations being conducted by battalion size units of ARVN/US/FWMAF, a test report is being used which requires subordinate commands to submit a report on a weekly basis on operations conducted in the following categories:

a. Search and Destroy (Regional). This type operation has been defined as the effort to destroy VC/Main and guerrilla-forces, base areas and supply points. (Note: This definition would apply to those operations being conducted along the DMZ and in the border areas to counter NVA infiltration of major forces.)

b. Search and Destroy (Provincial). This type operation has been defined as the effort expended contiguous to populated areas under GVN control or to areas in which RD is in progress. The specific

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purpose of this type operation is to provide a secure environment by destroying or neutralizing a potential threat to the populated areas.

c. Search and Destroy (Local). This has been defined as an operation conducted in or adjacent to the areas where RD is taking place for the purpose of destroying VC guerrillas and infrastructure.

d. Security Operations. Operations whose purpose is to protect political, economic and military resources and installations such as district capitals or populated areas; lines of communication; food stores and production areas; and friendly depots and base areas.

2. (U) Quantifying military operations in terms enumerated above will allow measurement of the military resources committed to the pacification effort in its entirety. All military forces committed to accomplishing search and destroy (provincial), search and destroy (local) and certain security operations would be considered as being committed to the pacification effort. Analysis of the effectiveness of the military effort then could be undertaken on a geographical basis considering the effort expended by all ARVN/US/FWMAF battalions.

3. (C) Refinement of the current reporting procedures is required also to provide a more definitive and meaningful analysis of the utilization of RF/PF. An evaluation of the employment of RF/PF units throughout SVN reveals that the mission of these units can be described in six categories as follows:

a. Intra-Hamlet Security. This is the immediate security and defense of a hamlet and its population. This mission includes the establishment of protective population and resources control measures and

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the organization and preparation of the hamlet and its population for conduct of defense of the hamlet. This mission by its nature is static and defensive and must be executed within the hamlet complex.

b. Inter-Hamlet Security. Those units performing security in the areas between and around hamlets. The mission includes the execution of small saturation patrols and ambushes in the inter-hamlet area. This mission by its nature is mobile but defense oriented.

c. Exterior Security. This is the security mission performed on the outer perimeter of the hamlet or village complex. This mission involves the establishment and maintenance of a security screen outside of the inter-hamlet area and is directed at preventing the penetration by organized, mobile VC units into the area undergoing pacification. Exterior security by its nature is mobile and offensive in character.

d. Lines of Communication Security. This mission involves those units that occupy outposts and fixed positions at bridges and other key locations along principal lines of communications, i.e., roads, railroads or waterways.

e. Fixed Military Installations Security. Self-explanatory.

f. Provincial/District Capitals and Other Political Centers Security. Self-explanatory.

4. (U) MACV Directive 335-10, Monthly Report on Revolutionary Development, is being revised to require a report on RF/PF utilization in the categories enumerated above. Using these categories, the extent and effectiveness of the commitment of RF/PF to the pacification effort

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can be analyzed, and adjustments of force dispositions can be made  
based on this analysis.

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ANNEX IV-2

ARVN BATTALIONS IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF RD

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>
<u>I CORPS</u>		
Quang Tri	2	2
Thua Thien	2	2
Quang Nam	4	4
Quang Tin	0	2
Quang Ngai	2	2
<u>II CORPS</u>		
Pleiku	0	0
Tuyen Duc	0	0
Khanh Hoa	0	0
Ninh Thuan	1	1
Darlac	1	1
Binh Dinh	2	2
Phu Yen	1	1
Phu Bon	1	1
Kontum	0	1
Lam Dong	2	1
Binh Thuan	2	2
Quang Duc	1	0
<u>III CORPS</u>		
Binh Duong	1	4
Binh Long	1	2
Phuoc Long	1	1
Binh Tuy	1	1
Long Khanh	0	0
Tay Ninh	0	0
Hau Nghia	1	2
Bien Hoa	1	2
Phuoc Tuy	1	1
Gia Dinh	0	0
Long An	0	3

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IV CORPS

Go Cong	1	1
Dinh Tuong	1	1
Kien Tuong	1	1
Kien Hoa	2	2
Vinh Binh	0	2
Vinh Long	0	2
Kien Phong	0	2
Kien Giang	0	0
Phong Dinh	0	1
Ba Xuyen	1	1
Chau Doc	1	1
Bac Lieu	0	0
An Giang	1	1
Chuong Thien	0	0
Sadec	1	1
An Xuyen	0	0
	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTAL	38	53

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ANNEX IV-3

ASSESSMENT OF ARVN BATTALIONS IN DIRECT  
SUPPORT OF RD

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>INITIAL RATING</u>	<u>SUBSEQUENT RATING</u>
<u>I CORPS</u>			
Quang Tri	3d Bn, 1st Regt, 1st Div	GOOD	
Quang Tri	4th Bn, 1st Regt, 1st Div	GOOD	
Thua Thien	1st Bn, 3d Regt, 1st Div	FAIR	
Thua Thien	3d Bn, 3d Regt, 1st Div	GOOD	
Quang Ngai	1st Bn, 4th Regt, 2d Div	FAIR	
Quang Ngai	3d Bn, 4th Regt, 2d Div	GOOD	FAIR
Quang Tin	3d Bn, 5th Regt, 2d Div	NOT RATED	
Quang Tin	4th Bn, 5th Regt, 2d Div	FAIR	
Quang Nam	1st Bn, 51st Regt, I Corps	GOOD	
Quang Nam	2d Bn, 51st Regt, I Corps	GOOD	
Quang Nam	3d Bn, 51st Regt, I Corps	GOOD	
Quang Nam	4th Bn, 51st Regt, I Corps	GOOD	
<u>II CORPS</u>			
Binh Dinh	2d Bn, 41st Regt, 22d Div	GOOD	
Binh Dinh	3d Bn, 41st Regt, 22d Div	NOT INSPECTED	
Binh Dinh	4th Bn, 41st Regt, 22d Div	GOOD	
Phu Yen	2d Bn, 47th Regt, 22d Div	GOOD	
Phu Bon	3d Bn, 47th Regt, 22d Div	FAIR	
Ninh Thuan	2d Bn, 44th Regt, 23d Div	UNSAT	UNSAT
Binh Thuan	3d Bn, 44th Regt, 23d Div	GOOD	
Binh Thuan	4th Bn, 44th Regt, 23d Div	GOOD	
Darlac	1st Bn, 45th Regt, 23d Div	GOOD	
Kontum	1st Bn, 42d Regt, 24th STZ	NOT INSPECTED	
<u>III CORPS</u>			
Binh Duong	1st Bn, 7th Regt, 5th Div	GOOD	
Binh Duong	2d Bn, 7th Regt, 5th Div	GOOD	
Binh Duong	3d Bn, 8th Regt, 5th Div	GOOD	
Binh Duong	4th Bn, 8th Regt, 5th Div	NOT INSPECTED	
Binh Long	2d Bn, 9th Regt, 5th Div	UNSAT	
Binh Long	4th Bn, 9th Regt, 5th Div	GOOD	FAIR
Phuoc Long	3d Bn, 9th Regt, 5th Div	FAIR	
Bien Hoa	1st Bn, 48th Regt, 18th Div	GOOD	
Bien Hoa	4th Bn, 48th Regt, 18th Div	FAIR	
Phuoc Tuy	3d Bn, 48th Regt, 18th Div	GOOD	
Binh Tuy	1st Bn, 52nd Regt, 18th Div	UNSAT	

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III CORPS Cont'd

Long An	3d Bn, 46th Regt, 25th Div	FAIR	
Long An	4th Bn, 46th Regt, 25th Div	UNSAT	
Long An	1st Bn, 50th Regt, 25th Div	GOOD	GOOD
Hau Nghia	2d Bn, 49th Regt, 25th Div	FAIR	
Hau Nghia	4th Bn, 49th Regt, 25th Div	UNSAT	

IV CORPS

Kien Hoa	2d Bn, 10th Regt, 7th Div	GOOD	
Kien Hoa	3d Bn, 10th Regt, 7th Div	GOOD	
Dinh Tuong	1st Bn, 11th Regt, 7th Div	GOOD	
Kien Tuong	4th Bn, 11th Regt, 7th Div	GOOD	UNSAT
Go Cong	4th Bn, 12th Regt, 7th Div	GOOD	
Vinh Binh	3d Bn, 14th Regt, 9th Div	FAIR	
Vinh Binh	4th Bn, 14th Regt, 9th Div	FAIR	
Kien Giang	1st Bn, 15th Regt, 9th Div	GOOD	
Vinh Long	1st Bn, 16th Regt, 9th Div	GOOD	FAIR
Vinh Long	4th Bn, 14th Regt, 9th Div	FAIR	
Chuong Thien	1st Bn, 31st Regt, 21st Div	GOOD	
An Xuyen	1st Bn, 32d Regt, 21st Div	UNSAT	
Bac Lieu	2d Bn, 32d Regt, 21st Div	GOOD	
Ba Xuyen	2d Bn, 33d Regt, 21st Div	GOOD	
Phong Dinh	4th Bn, 33d Regt, 21st Div	GOOD	

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ANNEX IV-4

RF/PF BY CORPSRF Companies

	<u>Support of Pacification</u>	<u>Security of Urban Areas or Military Installations</u>	<u>Total</u>
I Corps	104	11	115
II Corps	164	46	210
III Corps	174	36	210
IV Corps	<u>239</u>	<u>58</u>	<u>297</u>
TOTAL	681	151	832

PF Platoons

	<u>Support of Pacification</u>	<u>Security of Urban Areas or Military Installations</u>	<u>Total</u>
I Corps	516	129	645
II Corps	835	169	1,004
III Corps	550	146	696
IV Corps	<u>1,311</u>	<u>328</u>	<u>1,639</u>
TOTAL	3,212	772	3,984

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ANNEX IV-5

RD CAMPAIGNS

<u>CAMPAIGN</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>OPCON</u>	<u>EFFECTIVENESS</u>
<u>I CORPS</u>				
<u>11th DTA</u>				
Quang Tri	Quang Tri	Regimental	Regiment	Fair
Huong Tra	Thua Thien	District	District	Good
Huong Thuy	Thua Thien	District	District	Fair
Phu Vang	Thua Thien	District	District	Fair
<u>QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE</u>				
Hung Quang I	Quang Nam	Regimental	Regiment	Good
Hieu Nhon	Quang Nam	District	District	Fair
<u>12th DTA</u>				
Tam Ky	Quang Tin	Provincial	Province	Fair
Binh Son	Quang Ngai	District	District	Fair
Son Tinh	Quang Ngai	District	District	Fair
Nghia Hanh	Quang Ngai	District	District	Fair
Mo Duc	Quang Ngai	Battalion	Province	Poor
Tu Nghia	Quang Ngai	District	District	Not Rated(new)
<u>II CORPS</u>				
<u>22nd DTA</u>				
Binh Khe	Binh Dinh	District	District	Good
Phu Cat	Binh Dinh	District	District	Fair
An Nhon	Binh Dinh	District	District	Good
Tuy Phuoc	Binh Dinh	District	District	Good
Tuy Hoa	Phu Yen	Battalion	Province	Good
Hieu Xuong	Phu Yen	District	District	Fair
<u>23rd DTA</u>				
Binh Nam	Binh Thuan	Regimental	Regiment	Poor
Song Dinh	Ninh Thuan	Battalion	Regiment	Fair
Vi Dan	Darlac	Battalion	Regiment	Good
Le Ba Tong	Khanh Hoa	District	District	Good
Dong Tien	Khanh Hoa	District	District	Good
Thien Chi	Lam Dong	District	District	Poor
Bich Hue	Tuyen Duc	District	District	Fair

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23rd DTA Cont'd

Nguyen Thu	Tuyen Duc	District	District	Fair
Bai Van Thien	Tuyen Duc	District	District	Fair

III CORPS31st DTA

An Dan A	Long An	Regimental	Brigade	Fair
An Dan B	Long An	Regimental	Brigade	Fair
Quyét Tien I	Hau Nghia	District	District	Good
Quyét Tien II	Hau Nghia	Battalion	Battalion	Good

32nd DTA

Tuong An	Binh Duong	Regimental	Regiment	Good
Anh Duong	Phuoc Long	Battalion	Battalion	Good

33rd DTA

Phu Hoi	Bien Hoa	Battalion	Province	Poor
Phuong Hoang	Phuoc Tuy	Battalion	Battalion	Good
Dac Thanh	Binh Tuy	Battalion	Battalion	Fair

IV CORPS41st DTA

Cang Long	Vinh Binh	Regimental	Regiment	Fair
Mang Thit	Vinh Long	Provincial	Province	Good
Binh An I	Kien Giang	Provincial	Province	Good

42nd DTA

Giai Thuan	Phong Dinh	Provincial	Province	Good
An Xuyen I	An Xuyen	Battalion	Province	Poor
An Xuyen II	An Xuyen	Provincial	Province	Fair
Chuong Thien I	Chuong Thien	District	District	Good
Ba Xuyen I	Ba Xuyen	District	District	Good
Ba Xuyen II	Ba Xuyen	District	District	Good

43rd DTA

Ba Tri	Kien Hoa	Regimental	Province	Good
Hoa Binh I	Go Cong	Battalion	Province	Fair
Thanh Phu	Dinh Tuong	District	District	Fair
Tam Hiep	Dinh Tuong	Battalion	Province	Good

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**CONFIDENTIAL****V. ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT SITUATION****A. (C) Enemy Threat.**

1. During the abortive 1964-65 pacification "programs" the enemy reacted only mildly. He neither identified these programs as a key threat to the insurgency, nor did he concentrate any particular efforts directly against them. Of course, his systematic kidnapping and assassination activities hampered the overall pacification effort.

2. While no firm records were maintained on attacks against RD teams throughout most of 1966, 25 major attacks were recorded. The results of all enemy actions are shown below:

	<u>Incidents</u>	<u>Average RDW Strength</u>	<u>KIA/WIA</u>	<u>MIA/Deserted</u>	<u>Monthly Rate of Desertion</u>
1st Qtr	*	14,022	168/ *	7/ *	-
2nd Qtr	*	17,871	166/ *	31/ *	-
3rd Qtr	*	20,292	171/ *	19/208/ **	-
4th Qtr	*	19,806	<u>88/ *</u>	<u>18/395</u>	.7%
			593/ *	75/ -	

\* No records kept of these items in 1966.

\*\* Represents desertions for the month of September only.

3. It was not until 1967 that the enemy began to focus on pacification areas. Captured VC documents and other intelligence sources indicate that the VC have begun to recognize the potential of the RD program and the threat it presents. The following table shows the results of enemy action against RD teams through the first five months of 1967:

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	<u>Incidents</u>	<u>Average RDW Strength</u>	<u>KIA/WIA</u>	<u>MIA/Deserted</u>	<u>Rate of Desertion</u>
January	45	23,374	37/69	9/144	.6%
February	48	22,992	20/36	3/227	1.0%
March	126	22,200	101/111	19/361	1.6%
April	111	21,440	63/87	22/210	1.4%
May	85	21,800*	36/60	10/ **	-

\* Estimated.

\*\* May figure not available at this time.

4. Although the frequency of actions taken against the teams is well above the 1966 level, the number killed is a little lower than for the same period in 1966. This is due primarily to the different purpose and make up of the teams in early 1966. The former teams (Political Action Teams) often purposely sought out the enemy, while the RD teams engage in hostile action as a defense measure only.

5. The increased frequency of enemy attacks against RD teams in 1967 clearly reflects his intent to destroy the pacification program and to discredit the RD worker and GVN in the minds of the people. The higher number of incidents also has made a psychological impact on the RD Worker Program as may be seen in the increased number of desertions and in the program's inability to meet recruitment targets. Although the last two months have shown a downward trend in the number of incidents, there is no indication that the enemy has altered his effort.

6. The VC have the capability to counter pacification

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throughout SVN with few exceptions. The strength of the infrastructure and local VC units has not changed substantially despite successes of US/FWMAF and RVNAF against main force units. The enemy's political capabilities, extending from the hamlet to the international scene, range from influencing the outcome of local elections to creating pressure for acceptance of a coalition government in RVN. They also possess the capability to disrupt the economy by stifling communication and trade, and to create an air of insecurity through acts of sabotage, harrassment and terror, kidnappings, assassinations, and attacks on security forces, outposts and main installations or bases.

7. The enemy is expected to continue his attack on the pacification program with at least as much vigor as in the past few months. Since the RD teams are ideal targets, in terms of their importance to the overall program and the psychological gains accruing from the enemy's successes against them, it is expected they will receive the most attention by the enemy. It is anticipated also that the enemy will make a concerted effort to disrupt and delay the establishment of local self government. Locally elected officials already have become targets for VC assassinations and kidnappings. The absence of local governmental and legal systems enhances the insurgent position by forcing GVN officials to take steps outside the law.

8. The enemy will continue his propaganda efforts, overt military actions, and covert guerrilla activities as an attempt to thwart the program and to create an anti-US atmosphere and a feeling of insecurity among the population.

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B. (CNF) Inherent Limitations on the Pacification Effort. In assessing the status of pacification today, one must take into account several built-in societal problems.

1. Extensive corruption in all its forms -- diversion of funds and commodities, extortion, graft, payroll-padding and nepotism -- continues to increase and has surpassed levels of tolerance. All elements from GVN Ministers and province chiefs to petty officials and policemen are involved. Corruption is so pervasive and so visible that it has become a major factor in the continuing dissociation of the people from a government which most of them regard with contempt, fear or simply apathy.

a. Diversion of US assistance commodities and funds is an insignificant part of the total picture. Far worse is in-group favoritism and nepotism, which entrenches an administrative system based on personal influence and prevents promotion of competent new leadership. Extortion and mistreatment of the population is prevalent, condoned, and rarely punished. The following excerpt from a recent special joint report is illustrative: "In addition it (the static census grievance cadre) also reports regularly on the widespread corruption in the province. Due to reports of the latter, CG workers are coming under much persecution and harrassment from local officials who have much to lose due to exposure of their malpractice. In one case this month, a CG worker was tied to a hamlet flagpole for fifteen hours when he inquired about the destination of 25 ox carts of lumber. His inquiry revealed the people were cutting

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and hauling the lumber, without payment, for the Deputy Province Chief for Security."

b. The average Vietnamese believes the US condones these practices. They do not understand how US power which is so visible could not be exercised, and how a regime and system of which we did not approve could endure. This contributes to a growing cynicism concerning reasons for the American presence in Vietnam, and makes it increasingly difficult to persuade anyone that the US is here to help the people, as opposed to helping ourselves and perpetuating the wealthy and the military.

c. Reform will be very difficult. The present salary structure is such that an officer can barely live on his legal income. A Lieutenant Colonel/Province Chief receives about 17,000 piasters a month, depending on the size of his family. Those officials not allotted official quarters are forced to spend almost all of their income for rudimentary housing, due to the inflationary pressure on a limited supply caused by US demand. For a Vietnamese field grade officer to live as well as an American clerk requires corruption. If he wants to educate his children and care for his family (of paramount importance in this society) on an acceptable level, additional income is required. Subordinate officers throughout the civilian and military hierarchies are under pressure from their superiors to engage in corrupt practices and provide "kickbacks". During General Quang's tenure as IV Corps Commander, he is rumored to have sold the positions of province chief in large, rich provinces for as much as

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three million piasters. Subordinate officials in such circumstances are required to recoup their investment and frequently to provide a continual flow of contributions. Meaningful reform as a result only can be carried out by cleansing the top.

d. It is difficult to prove even the most flagrant abuses, but it is useful to list some of the practices, particularly in the provinces, which have been mentioned more frequently. Among these are the sale of export and import licenses for the movement of provincial produce, collection of salaries for ghost RF/PF allocations, sale of draft deferments, "kickbacks" on public works contracts, and sale of civil status documents. Each of these areas touch directly the populations welfare, livelihood, or security and engenders the destructive alienation which traditionally has handicapped the government's efforts in the rural areas.

e. Courses of Action. We do not have an aggressive action program against corruption. As a starter, we should implement the recommendations of Inter-Agency Committee on Corruption. (Memorandum to the Ambassador dated 12 March, 1967). These are good basic steps which require increased pressure on appropriate GVN officials from the highest US Mission level:

- (1) Immediate efforts to publicize the GVN's anti-corruption program.
- (2) Immediate efforts by the US agencies working with the GVN agencies involved in investigating and prosecuting corruption to strengthen and improve the technical capabilities of

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the GVN agencies.

(3) Immediate guidance to the US civilian agencies on reporting and processing corruption data, as well as, guidance for counterpart dealings.

(4) Immediate processing of significant corruption data received by US agencies for review by the Inter-Agency Committee on Corruption -- and possible referral to the GVN for action.

(5) Immediate studies on the anatomy of corruption, the relationship of low GVN salaries to the corruption issue, and the structure and administrative competence of the Commissioner General for Inspection.

(6) In order that it receive priority attention and support, overall coordinating responsibility for the US Mission attack on corruption must be placed at a high level within the community.

2. Weak government administrative-financial procedures, and almost the entire bureaucratic structure of the GVN, is inept, inefficient, and antiquated. A major exception is the financial procedures used by the RD Ministry, which have evolved from rural construction budgetary procedures created in 1963 to support the Strategic Hamlet Program and to supplement activities of the line Ministries which were incapable of operating effectively in rural areas. It was hoped that the RD Ministry would stimulate the older bureaucracy to move into newly pacified areas with normal government services. This has not occurred and few administrative reforms have been made.

a. A large part of the bureaucracy is incompetent and

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poorly trained, and leadership is lacking at almost all levels. Some personnel improvements have been made through training abroad and in SVN. However, this leadership is numerically inadequate and often feels itself hopelessly curtailed by diffuse authority and incompetent superiors. The GVN civil service is modeled on an outmoded form of the French fonction publique. It is small, restrictive and entirely inadequate to provide professionalism to government operations. The civil service requires urgent overhauling and expansion to include more categories of government employees.

b. As noted before, the inadequate salary structure demoralizes the bureaucracy and does not make it an attractive profession to qualified youth.

c. The multiplicity of programs, centers of authority, construction projects, the draft, and the US/FW force buildup, have placed increasing demands on a fragile leadership and administrative base, thus adding to the problem. Management ability is of particular importance to successful pacification, which is largely a matter of administering a large number of disparate assets. Although individual US personnel often see evidence of improvement in the quality of their counterparts, the overall governmental structure seems more and more inadequate to support the demands placed upon it. And since this war, as we keep telling ourselves, is a war which can only be won by the Vietnamese themselves, the conclusions to be drawn are serious.

d. Courses of Action. Essential steps must be taken to improve the present situation as a matter of the highest priority.

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(1) Because the budgetary and administrative structure of the RD Ministry is considered more efficient than that of the other GVN ministries, MACV believes that many of the MRD procedures should be adopted by the other ministries. While the specifics of this proposal have not been worked out, a study should be undertaken as a first step towards effecting these changes.

(2) Because of its critical importance and its state of deterioration and exceptionally poor organization, the Ministry for Agriculture should be the subject of particular attention. A study should be undertaken immediately with a view toward completely overhauling it.

(3) To overcome the overlap and the complete lack of coordination in national training programs, develop a coordinated US/GVN training program to improve the effectiveness of GVN administration from hamlet to national levels. Conduct a review to: identify existing training programs and the US or GVN agency responsible for each (a review of USAID programs is now in progress); identify training requirements at each level of the GVN in terms of skills, degree of training and numbers to be trained; measure available resources -- both human and material -- and their potential for expansion. Following this review, appoint a National Training Coordinator who will establish a combined US/GVN training coordination committee which will develop US/GVN machinery and the in and out-of-country programs required to achieve established goals. This committee should be composed of: the US National Training Coordinator; the Chairman of the Central Committee for

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Administrative Improvement and head of the National Institute of Administration; and representatives from MACCORDS, the MACV Training Directorate, USAID/PAD, the Special Commissioner for Administration, the Ministry for Education, and the Commissioner General for Planning and Development. This committee will examine all programs which train personnel for government positions to determine their adequacy as to substance, selection of candidates, and the goals toward which training is oriented. The committee should revive the In-Service Training Branch of the National Institute of Administration. The US National Training Coordinator and his GVN counterpart, the Chairman of the Central Committee for Administrative Improvement, should coordinate with US/GVN agencies having major training programs to harmonize these programs within established national training priorities and goals. Training programs which will ensure effective and motivated government administration at the local and province levels must receive the highest priority.

(4) Recruiting and training of technical service personnel should be given priority attention; provision should be made for either draft deferment or mobilization-in-place of key technical service personnel.

(5) The US advisory effort must change emphasis so that a greater number of highly qualified and experienced financial, legal and administratively sophisticated personnel can be focused on the basic procedural problems now stifling performance. This, rather than technical service advice, should have the highest priority.

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(6) An urgent need exists to overhaul the GVN's mobilization laws and system. The present situation is counterproductive and does not permit rational use of personnel leaving schools, universities, and training centers. Special priorities need urgently to be set for technical service personnel. The revision of the GVN's draft statutes should be given on the US side to MACV and USAID under the direction of the Mission manpower office.

(7) There is no adequate policy for use of veterans. They should be earmarked, slated for training and future government service. Work in this field should be the responsibility of MACV and USAID.

(8) In the design and approval of new programs or the expansion of existing ones, the limitations of the GVN administrative structure must be considered carefully. No new programs can improve the quality of old ones if the failure of existing programs is, as is so often the case, a result of an inefficient administrative organization and/or a scarcity of trained personnel. Any new program must deal with these problems as well as drawing on the sharply limited pool of available manpower. Any effective expansion of GVN efforts must be preceded by a sharp increase in training programs and improved incentives for GVN administrative personnel. At this point in time, it is imperative that maximum effort be given to improving the quality of ongoing programs.

C. (C) Role of US Advisory Effort. The total military/civil field advisory effort consists of 7,141 personnel. The diverse nature of the desired qualifications for advisory personnel constitutes

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a serious problem for the US agencies. Training requirements to achieve the optimum qualifications for advisory personnel constitutes a major deterrent to the field advisory effort.

1. Growth in size.

a. Military. The military field advisory group, including all personnel from corps through subsector level, consists of 2,337 officers and 3,551 EM for a total authorization of 5,888. A revised JTD has been submitted to the JCS for approval. If this authorization is approved, the military field advisory group would have an authorization of 2,500 officers and 4,072 EM -- total of 6,572 personnel. Against the current authorization, there are 5,508 military personnel assigned, or 93.54 percent of authorized strength.

b. Civilian. The CORDS Staffing Summary reflects an authorization for 1,253 personnel for the civilian advisory positions in the 4 Regions. Against this authorization, there are 985 personnel currently assigned, or 66.16 percent of authorized strength.

2. Effectiveness of the Advisory Effort.

a. The pattern of US advisory relationships has been one of unusually close and sometimes intimate contact and empathy at the lowest working levels, but distant, formal, professional contact at the higher levels where more far-reaching decisions are made. Throughout the US advisory effort there has been an over-emphasis upon rapport -- upon getting along with one's Vietnamese counterpart rather than persuading one's counterpart to act. Yet side by side with this goes a widespread tendency of seeing one's counterpart to discuss business

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only, relying on logic and rationale rather than on broader understanding and mutual respect.

b. Far too few US advisors, military or civilian, have sufficient knowledge of Vietnamese culture and language. Persuasion is difficult to achieve through an interpreter and across an abyss of cultural differences. Operations are staffed with personnel lacking in understanding of our commitment in Vietnam. Rosters are crowded with technically competent officers, ill prepared by experience or training to serve in advisory roles. There are no meaningful ground rules to guide advisors. Guidance, particularly on the civilian side, has been inadequate. Recent efforts to improve training programs have begun to have an impact, but in-country training is largely non-existent.

c. A common failing of US advisors is to react to inaction, lethargy and immobility by impatiently trying to get the job done themselves. There is a general failure to recognize that we will never be able to achieve do-it-yourself pacification. It is the Vietnamese who must do the job with US/FW assistance and advice.

d. The advisory effort at the national level continues to be inadequate. Even in the case of the MRD, where relations are close and cordial, the day-to-day advisory effort is insufficient. Many key personnel in civil operations have only the most occasional and tenuous contact with MRD. Liaison with the Ministry for Information and Chieu Hoi is good on the Chieu Hoi side, but is inadequate on the Information side. USAID's ministerial level advisory relationships with RD-related ministries vary from adequate, in one or two cases, to

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poor in the others. Too often US personnel do not even know enough about what the ministries are doing. This can be attributed partly to a lack of meaningful, constant communication with Vietnamese counterparts, and partly to reluctance on the part of the GVN ministries to reveal information.

e. The US military advisory effort suffers from short tours. Frequent in-country rotation adversely affects the individual efforts of advisors. This is a heavy factor considering the fact that the largest proportion of US advisors are military. In the military, perhaps more than among civilians, cordiality and friendship with counterparts are interpreted as success.

f. The advisory effort still emphasizes technical and professional specialities, while the major problems facing program execution are managerial and administrative in nature.

3. Courses of Action.

a. Revise US personnel placement and recruiting policies so that people of ability and sensitivity are placed in critical positions such as advisors to ministries, province chiefs, district chiefs and battalion commanders. Give priority attention to recruitment, emphasizing quality rather than quantity. Probationary clauses in contracts and systems to remove ineffective personnel should be simplified.

b. Jointly prepare procedures with the GVN to permit greater advisory control of resources programmed for the advisory effort.

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c. Provide realistic guidance to advisors on how to advise and how to work with confidence and ability. Increased social contact will produce gains. Prescribe Vietnamese and French training for advisors as determined by language qualifications of their counterparts. Require additional training through substantial overlaps with departing personnel. Place particular emphasis on political orientation.

d. Consult with the GVN on the number and type of advisors which it regards as desirable.

e. Reconsider length of tours. The integration of civilian and military advisory efforts seems to demand longer tours for personnel in sensitive and other critical positions. Require subsector advisors to remain in place for the duration of their tours. Entice good sector advisors to stay on or return.

f. Effect truly joint planning with the Vietnamese, bringing them in at the beginning instead of the end of our planning process. One of the major problems in past efforts to gain GVN involvement and commitment has been the practice of presenting them with neatly wrapped, finished plans for them to execute.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**VI. (C) STATUS OF 1967 PROGRAM

A. General. The 1967 RD program got off to a slow start and did not receive any real impetus until after the TET holidays ended in mid-February. However, in a number of respects, it is improved considerably over the 1966 program:

1. Command relationships have been established and resources concentrated in 48 RD campaign areas. Military forces have been assigned, RD workers have been committed in hamlets, and RD budget supported construction is being executed successfully in the province.

2. Much greater emphasis on support of RD now activates the GVN chain of command helped primarily by AB 142, which required direct ARVN participation in RD, and an inter-ministerial directive which defined the RD campaign command structure involving regimental and battalion commanders. The 53 ARVN battalions now supporting RD are an indication of this involvement.

3. A GVN organizational structure has been established to support the RD program, and national leadership has been given by RD Minister Thang.

4. Increased pressure has been placed on the technical ministries to cooperate, though with disappointing results. The 75% of budget most ministries allocate for administration and salaries combined with residual personnel conservatism and grossly ineffective administrative procedures prevent any expansion of services.

5. The National Police are making their first halting steps towards participation in RD.

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B. Effect on the Enemy. Although the majority of the provinces report that their RD programs are not on schedule, considerable pressure is being placed upon the enemy through the 1967 pacification program. This pressure is not always measurable in quantitative terms. There is a close correlation, however, between pacification, the rise in Hoi Chanh, enemy concern which has been reflected in numerous intelligence reports and the intensity of enemy attacks on RD teams.

. Limiting Factors. Some factors which limit greater progress are: the general lack of adequate leadership at all levels, but especially at the district and RD team level; the failure to coordinate adequately ARVN defense reaction with RD team warnings system, and these in turn with the population; cynicism among GVN officials and the rural population who have seen these programs come and go far too many times in the past. Most provinces have complained of an over concentration of resources in the Ap Doi Moi, and in RD target campaign areas. In I Corps, for instance, 60% of the 1967 RD budget is concentrated on 6.5% of the population living in Ap Doi Moi, 21% is scheduled for 6% of the population living in Ap Cung Co, and only 19% is scheduled for the remaining 87.5% of the population. Bien Hoa Province in III Corps complains that 68 of its schedule 95 funded self-help projects are programmed for only 12 hamlets and, altogether, only 33 hamlets will benefit from the program as opposed to 70 in 1966. Also, in Bien Hoa, 39 classrooms are being constructed in 13 hamlets in 4 districts, as opposed to 53 classrooms affecting 32 hamlets in all 6 districts in 1966. Gia Dinh Province, because most of its hamlets are considered

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"pacified", is receiving less RD emphasis in 1967 -- a total budget of 80 million piasters, as opposed to 104 million in 1966. There is apathy among the general population towards the RD program, which may result partly from so much talk about RD, when the majority of South Vietnam's population is dependent upon the ministerial system which consistently has been incapable of providing essential services to the people.

1. The concentration of military forces, as necessary as it may be, tends to distort our overall perspective of the problem, especially as reported in Go Cong Province, where GVN armed personnel in the campaign area numerically approaches the population being pacified.

2. There is a general lack of enthusiasm among officials at almost all levels of GVN participation. For most of these people, RD is a job and salary and a situation. It is not yet a commitment.

3. Some flexibility in the MRD approach is now apparent. In May, Brigadier General Dzu and senior officers of the JGS and MRD visited 11 of SVN's provinces with authorization from Minister Thang to change projects, including shifting of some funds out of RD target campaign areas for school construction and medical installations. Although few funds were shifted because of incompleteness of presently planned projects and a psychological fix by GVN province chiefs on the very visible and frequently visited target areas, indications are that greater use will be made of this authority when the teams return to the provinces in late June.

D. Resources.

1. Initial 1967 RD budget funds were released in January.

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Generally, support commodities have been delivered to the provinces as scheduled, except where air transportation has been required. Road transportation, however, is becoming more difficult in many areas even where security is adequate, because of the general destruction and deterioration of French built roadbeds through lack of maintenance and repair. Especially Route 4, which connects Saigon with the Delta, is in critical condition.

2. Despite some improvements reported from various parts of the country, the technical services still are regarded as marginally effective at best. The basic weakness lies in the lack of qualified personnel (in some cases the technical workers reportedly know less than the people they are advising) and lack of motivation. Provincial service chiefs still tend to be office-bound. However, relationships between service chiefs and RD workers have started to improve.

3. During the last few months the National Police have been criticised less severely than they were earlier this year. It would appear their operations are improving. A disproportionate number of police still remain in provincial centers, but efforts are being made to correct this situation. The PFF, although generally incorrectly assigned to static defensive roles, have shown competence when, as in Binh Dinh, they have been used in combined operations against the VC infrastructure.

E. Status of RD Execution. The following analysis of progress is based on the May SJR's: The majority of provinces reported that the execution of their RD plans is behind schedule, although only

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nine provinces actually reported their programs as on schedule. In those provinces reporting unfavorably on RD execution, the previous reasons offered (plan inadequacy, confusion over basic concepts, and TET holidays) no longer apply. The lack of progress now can be pinpointed by individual provinces and attributed to more fundamental problems. The inadequacy of province officials tasked with RD execution is the most frequently stated reason for lagging province programs. Still, in Region I the lack of security poses the overriding obstacle to RD progress. Provinces in other regions reported RD execution problems associated with the lack of interest on the part of the GVN officials include:

Region II: Quang Duc - Tuyen Duc

Region III: Gia Dinh - Hau Nghia

Region IV: Go Cong - Vinh Long

It must be emphasized that the foregoing list may reflect more accurate or straightforward reporting. Absence of other provinces from the list does not necessarily equate to success.

F. Summary of RD Team and Census Grievance Activities.

1. Region I.

a. RD Teams. Very little was reported as reasons for either good or poor team performance. Quang Ngai reported a significant improvement but stated that more progress could be achieved if they had more advisors. Danang cited the need for improved internal administration. Quang Tri reported little progress during the month because the teams are preoccupied with security.

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b. Static Census Grievance. Three reports (Quang Tin, Quang Ngai and Danang) stated that the program is improved and is continuing to expand, but gave no reasons for this. Quang Tri reported its program getting back to normal after the replacement of the Census Grievance Chief in March.

2. Region II.

a. RD Teams. All provinces, with the exception of Phu Bon, reported that the RD Worker program is improved over previous months. Phu Bon remarks that the quality of the teams is poor and that considerable push by top province officials will be required to accomplish the 1967 plan. Only four of the provinces attempted to give causes for the improvement. In each of the four cases, strengthened and improved leadership was given as the main reasons.

(1) Binh Thuan cited the establishment of the RD campaign and the assignment of a command group as the reason for improved performance. Lam Dong reported that the greater part of the impetus was due to the interest and enthusiasm of the province chief. Ninh Thuan said that improvement of its program was due to strong influence and excellent leadership of the control chief. Tuyen Duc reported some improvement in anticipation of getting a new cadre leader.

(2) In a negative sense, Khanh Hoa cited their understrength as the cause of low team spirit and morale.

(3) All provinces report being understrength and, while teams appear to be moderately effective, progress generally is

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behind schedule in terms of accomplishing the 11 points.

(4) Fleiku reports some difficulty with Montagnard hamlets accepting RD teams because RD interrupts the Montagnard's normal way of life.

b. Static Census Grievance. All programs reported being effective. Only two reasons were given: Lam Dong -- improved training; Tuyen Duc -- a good CG Chief.

3. Region III.

a. RD Teams. Most provinces report RD teams as being understrength and several note that recruiting is a problem. Bien Hoa is unable to recruit from the countryside and, consequently, has had to draw on towns and cities for RD workers. In spite of the understrength, all but three provinces report satisfactory progress, and in some cases improved progress, even if somewhat behind schedule. Where performance is noted as good or improved, it appears to be the result of stronger and more active leadership on the part of province and district officials.

(1) Binh Duong, for example, attributes improved performance to clarification of the chain of command with the province chief assuming greater control, RD teams' ability to withstand VC attacks, and greater interest and assistance on the part of province and US officials.

(2) Long Khanh attributes its improvement to greater interest on the part of the province chief, and his delegation of authority to district chiefs. Hau Nghia reports mixed

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successes and disappointments. Successes seem generally to be attributed to strong district leadership. Phuoc Tuy province has begun a system of unannounced inspections by the province chief, which already has resulted in better performance. Phuoc Tuy's province chief previously received false reports from his subordinates on team performance.

(3) It appears also that where leadership is good and where GVN officials evidence a great deal of interest in the program, team morale remains high in spite of VC harassment and threats (e.g., Binh Duong).

b. Static Census Grievance. Most provinces reported that the program is doing well and took an active part in local elections. Reporting (on SJR) generally was sparse.

4. Region IV.

a. RD Teams. Progress by the RD teams at the end of May is described generally as satisfactory, although in several cases the teams are somewhat behind schedule. Three provinces (Ba Xuyen, An Xuyen and Bac Lieu) reported improvements in team performance over previous months. Vinh Binh province reported an excellent job by the RD workers in assisting in the relocation of over 2,000 people from a VC controlled area into a more secure area. In this case, workers assisted in persuading people to move and helped move houses, other structures, food stuffs and livestock.

(1) Discipline in several provinces was reported to be improving. In at least two instances absenteeism has been

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curtailed, even though teams are reported generally to be understrength. Continuing efforts are being made to improve motivation and efficiency. Chau Doc, for example, reports having instituted an in-province training program to stimulate motivation and improve performance.

(2) Several provinces report increased interest and active participation on the part of the province chiefs and district chiefs in RD. Leadership at the team level, however, reportedly can stand improvement.

(3) Security remains a problem in several provinces, (e.g., An Xuyen, Chuong Thien, Kien Phong, and Kien Tuong). Some efforts are being made, however, to improve security, such as a request for an increase in military forces in Kien Phong (which has not been honored), better control of weapons in Dinh Tuong, and repositioning of teams in Sadec.

(4) An Giang province is reorganizing and reorienting its RD Worker program in line with the improved security situation of that province. Vinh Long province has suggested replacing the teams' armed elements with PF platoons as a means of coping with the problem of understrength teams. Go Cong has suggested that its teams are too concentrated and should be more spread out with the hope that this would allow the teams to work harder and more effectively.

b. Static Census Grievance. Most provinces reported a satisfactory, and in several instances, improved, Census Grievance program. Kien Tuong province reported in April that two CIDG operations were mounted on the basis of Census Grievance reports.

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Production of reports also was reported improved in Chuong Thien, Phong Dinh, and Ba Xuyen. Chau Doc reported that the CG personnel were most helpful during the local elections in April. An Giang reported that the Census Grievance program had been terminated by the province chief because it was, in his opinion, too large and poorly managed. A moratorium has been declared during which officials will try to determine the causes of the program's failure. At a later date a Census Grievance program will be attempted on a smaller scale which will meet the needs of the province more adequately.

G. Conclusions. Where province and district officials are taking an active interest in RD operations, the program appears to be moving forward. Where support of local officials is lacking, or there is evidence of corruption which has definite impact on the local population, then the program is faltering. Reported ineffective RD councils are symptomatic of this basic lack of interest. Evidence of corruption is difficult to establish, but is a major factor impeding progress and probably undermining progress. Command visits such as those to Go Cong either produced results or led to pressure to remove inert officials presently retarding RD execution. This technique could be expanded by combined GVN/US visits by senior officials, on a scheduled basis, visiting those provinces reporting a general disinterest in RD by responsible officials. The corruption problem must be considered in the larger context of greater US influence over Vietnamese performance (See Section 'XI).

H. Concentration Versus Dispersion.

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1. A major aspect of the RD plan is the concentration of resources in more limited areas over a longer period of time to foster greater economy of resources, civilian and military. The theory in its broadest terms is sound. The interpretation and execution, however, often has been faulty. The program assumed greater security in some areas than has been the case, leaving RD teams and hamlets overexposed, and subject to psychologically damaging VC attacks. Another problem has been the relative excess of attention given to Ap Doi Moi, which are receiving more resources than they meaningfully can absorb, and the inattention to hamlets which underwent pacification programs in earlier years.

2. NPA. While the 1967 program reflects improvements in concentrating resources, the supposed concentration of resources in the NPA, the 26 priority provinces and the concentration of resources in the Ap Doi Moi still do not employ this principle in a way that is likely to pay off. The concentration of effort in the NPA is largely mythical; the 26 priority provinces are virtually meaningless; and the Ap Doi Moi are too small in area.

I. Recommended Areas for Possible Program Expansion. There are areas in SVN where concentration of resources can pay off with demonstrable progress, but they must be chosen carefully based on the local situation. The areas selected should be chosen because they are showing progress now and can show even greater progress with the application of additional resources. Any MACV plans to take action on the special province considerations shown below should be staffed

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first through the appropriate corps senior advisor. The following areas, by corps area, are recommended for increased concentration of resources:

2. II Corps.

a. Binh Dinh Province.

- (1) The 1967 program is on schedule and gaining momentum.
- (2) The province has an energetic and effective leadership team.
- (3) Routes of communication throughout the RD area are secure and in usable condition.
- (4) The recruiting base is sufficient to support an expansion.
- (5) There is generally a favorable attitude on the part of the people toward the GVN.
- (6) Little or no increase in present military forces would be required to move into the Phu My Valley area for program expansion if RD teams were made available to replace civil/military teams presently performing the RD team mission.

b. Phu Yen Province. This province should be considered for the same reason as stated above for Binh Dinh Province with the exception that some increase in RF/PF will be required.

3. III Corps.

a. Tay Ninh Province.

- (1) Good progress in the first half of 1967 has been made.

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(2) The recruiting base is sufficient to support an expansion.

(3) The province is 85% Cao Dai and is well organized under an extremely effective provincial team.

(4) RD teams are good and are at full strength.

(5) The attitude of the people and the administration is favorable to increased RD activity.

b. Binh Duong Province.

(1) The province has requested limited expansion.

(2) The province has supervisory capability to expand the program.

(3) Capability exists for recruiting additional RD teams and PF in the expansion area (Ben Cat District).

(4) It would be a partial solution to the large refugee problem within the province.

(5) The program is gaining momentum and the year-end goals might be reached on schedule.

4. IV Corps.

a. Go Cong Province.

(1) The program is on schedule.

(2) Adequate security forces are present in province to support the expansion.

(3) Adequate and secure lines of communication exist.

(4) Provincial officials with the exception of the province chief are becoming more RD oriented.

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(1) The present program is gaining momentum and made more progress in May than in any month so far this year.

(2) The presence of the 2d Brigade, 9th US Division has improved radically the security condition around the RD area.

(3) The province team is strong and effective.

(4) A recruiting base to support expansion is present.

c. Ba Xuyen Province.

(1) The present program is on schedule.

(2) The security situation is improving.

(3) The people are behind the program.

(4) RD teams are effective.

d. Bac Lieu Province.

(1) The program is generally on schedule.

(2) Because of aggressive offensive operations by units of the 21st ARVN Division, new areas have been brought under GVN control and the province already has received permission to work in two additional ADM.

(3) Some additional RF/PF units will be required but they are needed regardless of whether the program is expanded.

J. Areas for Consideration of Possible Program Curtailment.

Any MACV plans to take action on the special province considerations shown below should be staffed first through the appropriate corps senior advisor.

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1. I Corps. In spite of the general deterioration of the security environment, only Quang Tri Province warrants attention at this time.

a. Generally there are inadequate security forces in the RD area to meet the increased enemy threat.

b. The provincial administration's support of the RD program is mediocre.

c. The attitude of the people toward RD is poor.

d. Low morale and high absenteeism in the RD teams are unsolved problems.

2. II Corps. None.

3. III Corps. Bien Hoa Province because:

a. The program is behind schedule and becoming increasingly so.

b. There is generally inadequate supervision of the RD effort by the province chief and the technical service representatives.

c. The security resources are allocated improperly with respect to the programmed RD areas.

d. The province has experienced difficulty in recruiting RD workers.

4. IV Corps.

a. An Xuyen Province.

(1) The program is far behind schedule.

(2) Province has requested a reduction in the program.

(3) Security conditions are poor throughout the

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province as well as in the RD areas.

(4) First semester hamlets will not be finished for several more months.

(5) The strength of the RD teams and RF/PF units is low.

(6) There is a general lack of secure routes of communications particularly to and from the RD areas.

b. Chuong Thien Province.

(1) The program is behind schedule in all the hamlets outside of the RD campaign area.

(2) The security condition is marginal in all but the RD campaign area.

(3) The strength of the RF/PF units and the RD teams is low.

(4) There is a lack of secure routes of communications to the RD areas.

J. Courses of Action.

1. Apply continuous US pressure on the GVN to eradicate corrupt officials in top-level positions and increase US influence over Vietnamese performance, in particular, in executing the RD program.

2. Bring former VC into the RD program, to utilize their special abilities and zeal to stimulate the revolutionary aspects of RD.

3. Press for the organization of developmental activities under village/hamlet administration, with resources introduced directly at that level, in order to stimulate ultimately self-sustaining

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local development.

4. Clarify and ensure proper implementation of "military support of RD", making it an aggressive area-security generating operation rather than a protective, "digging in" exercise, particularly where ARVN is assigned.

5. Concentrate more RD resources in carefully selected areas already making progress and capable of a faster pace. In the process, formally drop the NPA concept and persuade MRD to sharpen its focus on the present priority province system.

6. Undertake to get the technical ministries committed to province plans by releasing their resources directly to the provinces.

7. Apply systematic pressure on province and district officials to become involved in the RD campaigns and to demonstrate through personal involvement interest in the performance and welfare of the RD teams. One method of applying such pressure is to give evidence of Saigon and corps interest by frequent field trips and high-level officials, both US and GVN.

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**CONFIDENTIAL****VII. STATUS OF THE DIFFERENT ELEMENTS AND PROGRAMS OF PACIFICATION.****A. (C) RD Worker Teams and Census Grievance.**

1. Objectives. The objectives of the RD Worker and Census Grievance programs are to deny the VC control or domination of the rural population and to involve the people in voluntary action in support of local authority. These programs seek to build the people's confidence in the GVN, deny VC access to contested areas, counter VC propaganda, provide an element of security to the population, create local authority hostile to the VC and receptive to the GVN, and collect and disseminate information on the VC infrastructure.

2. Assessment.

a. Progress has been made in the administration and operation of the RD Worker program during the first half of 1967. Training programs for both workers and leaders are improving. In many hamlets where teams are working, the hamlet population is increasing. Liaison with the MRD and the Cadre Directorate has improved, although much remains to be done to remove corrupt officials, inept leaders, and poor instructors, and to strengthen program administration. The Static Census Grievance (CG) program has set a good record. The GVN is giving more attention and responding to the needs and aspirations of the people as reported through the CG system. Progress is on schedule in getting the MRD designated as the national authority for the CG program.


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INCIDENTS AGAINST RD WORKERS 1967




b. Three major problems confront the RD Worker program in mid-1967: (a) inadequate security for the people and RD teams (see chart above); (b) shortage of mature leadership within the teams; and (c) shortage of manpower in the right places. In general, there is not sufficiently high quality leadership evolving from among the young people recruited for RD teams. This does not mean that the recruits necessarily lack leadership talent among them, although the quality and motivation of the recruits is a problem. It does mean that the average Vung Tau graduate does not have the experience or maturity needed to gain the respect of the team members and hamlet elders he has to deal with. Team leaders should be over 30 and have prior leadership experience.

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ATTRITION RATE (%) RD WORKERS 1967



c. The shortage of manpower in some places and, in others, our inability to recruit available manpower from rural areas as well as the high attrition rate (approaching 40% annual rate -- see chart above) have brought the program short of its goals in terms of numbers of workers in the field and in training. The program presently has only 25,200 workers in the field and in training against the planned 31 May level of 32,000. At this rate, a level of only 33,000 instead of the end-of-year force goals of 41,000 RD workers will be obtained. While it is possible theoretically for each RD team to work two hamlets each year, the problems of security and the national shortage of qualified manpower and leadership present formidable problems which must be addressed in the latter half of 1967.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**3. Courses of Action.

a. Require for each RD team a separate defense plan, approved by the province chief and province senior advisor. Each defense plan would ensure coordination with air and artillery reaction forces, and provide standard operating procedures to be followed in the event of a communications breakdown during attack.

b. Strengthen leadership and motivational training to improve performance and discipline.

c. Lower the education requirement to recruit more peasants; recruit more Hoi Chanh; institute an adult literacy course at the Vung Tau Training Center.

d. Implement retraining in the provinces on a wider scale and make fuller use of the Vung Tau training facility for retraining as well as leadership training.

e. Give greater attention to the work of the teams in organizing the people into meaningful cooperative efforts. In particular, the efforts of the teams in this regard should be closely coordinated with the USAID program in support of local farmer's associations and credit cooperatives.

B. (C) RD Budget.1. Assessment.


a. A 3 billion piaster RD budget is available to the MRD for the procurement of materials, labor and technical skills at the province level. Two billion of this has been released to the

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GVN RD BUDGET EXPENDITURES -- 1965-67

(Millions of Piasters)



provinces, .6 billion has been released to other ministries for RD-related activities, and the remainder is held in reserve. However, the actual rate of expenditure of provincial budgets is behind the 1966 rate. As of 31 May, only 22.8% had been expended. Although this is only one index of RD implementation, it does point up the fact that in 1967, NLD activities started more slowly than in 1966 when provincial budgets were 30% expended at the end of May. The principal reason for the relative slowness was the preoccupation with completing many 1966 projects during the first quarter of 1967. (See chart above for comparative budget expenditures by month for 1965, 1966 and 1967.)

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b. Although MRD fiscal procedures have been simplified at the Saigon level, this simplification has not taken place in the provinces. Few US advisors understand local budgetary procedures. Funds are controlled by the province chief and their release to projects is subject to his inclination.

2. Courses of Action.

a. Simplify RD budgetary procedures at province level. Increase the quality and quantity of guidance to the field.

b. Revise and tighten the RD management system; institute ways to ensure timely release of RD budget funds at the province and district level.

C. (C) New Life Development.

1. Assessment.

a. New Life Development activities related to RD include: self-help, warehouse and transportation, development of provincial roads and bridges, rural electrification, rural government administration, construction of maternity dispensaries, building of hamlet schools, and development of agriculture. In general, there had not been much measurable progress at the end of May in any of these programs, with the important exceptions of unfunded self-help and the hamlet school program -- both of which were ahead of schedule. Some reasons are: delay because of the TET holidays, preoccupation with elections, inactivity and lack of involvement on the part of province officials, and the over-concentration on Ap Doi Moi. Salient points of some of

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the more important programs necessary for future progress are:

(1) Warehouse and transportation programs need a greater effort. Only 2 of the 96 warehouses planned for 1967 have been completed. Unless corrective measures are taken soon, that activity will not achieve its targets for 1967. The principal problems begin with inaction at the province level.

(2) The provincial roads and bridges program is designed to maintain existing secondary roads and build new roads in isolated rural areas. The program is vital to RD in order to maintain and improve communications between Ap Doi Moi and provincial and district capitals, to provide adequate security and stimulate economic activity.

b. The record of accomplishments is limited. Repairs are made only on an emergency basis, and new construction is minimal, even in Ap Doi Moi. A major contract program with US or third country construction firms may be the answer to shortages of manpower and engineering capabilities.

c. Information concerning the number of hamlet schools planned, constructed and in use for 1965-1967 is shown in Table 1 (page VII-8). The number of teachers trained and allocated for 1963-1967 is shown in Table 2 (page VII-9).

d. Information on the number of funded and unfunded self-help projects completed is depicted in Table 3 (page VII-10).

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
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Table 1

Status of Hamlet Schools -- 1965-67 \*




\* Excludes self-help hamlet schools



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
Table 2  
Hamlet School Teachers Trained & Allocated -- 1963-67



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Table 3  
Self-Help Projects Completed -- 1966-67



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**CONFIDENTIAL**2. Courses of Action.

- a. Give the warehouse and transportation programs immediate and close attention to move them off dead center.
- b. Implement the training program for the 55,500 newly elected local officials.
- c. Accelerate development of a massive program for the construction of feeder roads. Consider the possible use of US construction firms.
- d. Consider contracting with US or third country construction firms to rebuild major roads and bridges vital to pacification.

D. (C) Attack on VC Infrastructure.

1. Objectives. To identify, locate, and eliminate the VC infrastructure by improving collection and collation of information thereon and by improving and intensifying exploitation operations against the infrastructure.

2. Assessment.

a. The National Police Special Branch (PSB) is the principal collector of information on the VC political infrastructure. It has made some progress in developing its capability to identify and locate this target. Various other Vietnamese civilian and military organizations also have the responsibility, authority, and means to collect such information and gradually are improving their capabilities. Despite a large total effort, achievements fall short of the goal because collection operations remain insufficiently coordinated,

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systematized, and directed at all levels of command. Likewise, the intelligence product still is insufficiently reliable, in part, and insufficiently well written, complete, collated, and evaluated. Exploitation operations are not well targeted, systematized, coordinated, and evaluated. Despite computerized processing of infrastructure information at CICV and increased training of Vietnamese military intelligence personnel and collection of infrastructure data by police and special branch, translation of this information into an effective program to eliminate the infrastructure has not taken place.

b. The District Operational Intelligence Coordination Center is a significant step toward improvement of both intelligence and exploitation operations. However, it still remains to be tested and proven. Problems to be overcome are: inadequate numbers of well trained personnel, insufficient and inconsistent GVN motivation to take effective action, finding ways to improve overall collection and collation of information, and finding ways to improve exploitation operations.

3. Courses of Action.

a. Indoctrinate all participants in the special nature of the infrastructure attack as against the strictly military attack. Accomplish further training of all participants, particularly the PSB, in the techniques of collection operations, reporting, processing, evaluating, collating, dissemination, filing, and retrieval of information. Indoctrinate US and Vietnamese commanders and US advisors at

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all levels in selection of means of exploitation, coordination of assets, proper use of assets, and post-action evaluation.

b. Develop a central repository for information on VC infrastructure in each district, province, and in Saigon. The PSB organization at district and province levels should be used for this purpose. On the US side, J2 and CICV should be used for the same purpose at the Saigon level.

c. Establish pilot DOICC in all Corps areas and re-vitalize the PICC and target them at the VC infrastructure.

d. On the US side, vest management responsibility for exploitation of intelligence on the infrastructure in the senior advisor at each level.

e. Re-examine roles and missions of US and GVN organizational units concerned with attacks on the infrastructure. Fix responsibility for coordination of exploitation of intelligence on the infrastructure.

f. Make greater use of POW, civil detainees, and, especially, of Hoi Chanh for identification of key VC infrastructure personnel. Intelligence coordination centers at national, province, and district level should organize programs to categorize information on all Hoi Chanh, detainees and POW.

E. (C) Regression.

1. Perhaps the greatest hidden danger facing our efforts in SVN is that of regression. A consistent pattern in past years has

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been that of areas considered pacified gradually slipping away in the face of the re-emergence of a submerged infrastructure (that supposedly had been eliminated or neutralized) or re-infiltration. Significant current examples of areas now in danger of regression include Binh Dinh's An Nhon and Tuy Phuoc Districts, Bien Hoa's long-pacified Duc Tu District, and Phong Dinh's Long Tuyen Village adjacent to the Binh Thuy airfield. When the RD program does not leave local government capable of self-sustaining local development, or when it does not leave at least a strong GVN security presence, the VC are free to return and they are doing so.

2. Course of Action. Give highest priority to the study of the problem of regression and resurgence of VC influence, leading to a recommended action program including the identification of warning signals indicating the re-emergence of the infrastructure or re-infiltration. Perhaps a technique of deliberately allowing the infrastructure to re-surface should be developed.

F. (C) Chieu Hoi.

1. Objectives.

a. To bring in, process, and rehabilitate 45,000 returnees and prepare for an additional 50,000 in case of a definite shift in the war.

b. To maximize use of returnees against enemy.

2. Assessment. There were 16,175 returnees as of 31 May. This is a high rate compared to 1966, and already represents 80% of

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the 1966 total. The following table reflects the trend by quarter since 1965:

	<u>CHIEU HOI RETURNEES</u> 1965-1967		
	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
1st Quarter	1,362	5,521	10,746
2nd Quarter	2,636	4,318	5,429 (incomplete)*
3rd Quarter	3,327	3,318	
4th Quarter	<u>3,799</u>	<u>7,083</u>	
TOTAL	11,124	20,240	

\* April 1967 - 2,805

May 1967 - 2,624

5,429

Although the recent trend has been downward in comparison with February-March, it still is approximately double the 1966 rate for the same period. It is planned to meet the 45,000 goal. Facilities are limited, but Chieu Hoi center capacity is in the process of being doubled from 20,000 to 45,000 per year. Although marked improvement has been made in gaining GVN acceptance of the program since its inception, GVN support for the Chieu Hoi program still is not strong at all levels and petty corruption is fairly common at province level. The use of returnees for reconnaissance and intelligence work with tactical military units has had excellent results to date; e.g., the small "Kit Carson" scout program in I Corps which has 50 Hoi Chanh on its payroll. Armed Propaganda

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Teams (APT) are the most valuable Chieu Hoi PSYOP resources. About half of the 3,330 planned APT strength is employed now, but only one quarter are armed adequately. A few returnees are being hired by GVN ministries, 200 have been trained in RD, and 32 have been hired by the Refugee Directorate. However, the National Reconciliation program is only beginning to get off the ground. Rehabilitation of returnees is hindered by GVN distrust and unconcern; 20% have no place to go when released from centers other than Chieu Hoi Hamlets, but reportedly only 1% return to the VC.

3. Courses of Action.

a. Establish an emergency fund of at least 10 million piasters under CORDS/Chieu Hoi control for purchases of miscellaneous equipment and services at national, regional and provincial levels (Note: This fund is in addition to a prior 12 million piaster special fund request to use for emergency construction only).

b. Establish an American Chieu Hoi PSYOP Representative as an assistant to the Assistant Provincial Representative for Information and PSYOP in 34 key provinces.

c. Develop an extensive and more comprehensive follow-up program including a systematic approach to job placement (examine possibility of organizing a National Reconstruction Corps to provide employment for returnees).

d. Encourage and support RD Minister Thang in the use of Chieu Hoi in RD program.

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e. Encourage all elements of MACV to adopt the Kit Carson program or its equivalent.

f. Explore with the GVN the formation of Hoi Chanh combat units within GVN ground forces.

g. A determination needs to be made establishing a source of weapons for APT, i.e., available surplus MAP weapons in country or dollar purchase. In any event, the APT should be supported fully.

h. Consider maintaining a Chieu Hoi PSYOP campaign at TET levels all year long.

G. (C) National Police.

1. Objectives.

a. To increase the NP from 66,000 to 74,000 which will increase NPFF element from 10,000 to 15,000.

b. To expand the marine police capabilities for resources control.

c. To implement a new National Identity Card and Records system.

d. To increase facilities and thereby support larger police forces.

2. Assessment. The NP recruitment program is approximately on schedule. A special campaign has been instituted to recruit ex-military personnel. Present training facilities can produce 16,000 men per year (an additional 3,000 when Thu Duc Academy is completed which is adequate to achieve 1967 goals). Cards will be issued under

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the New ID Card program beginning in August; construction on the National ID Center is 30% complete. (For information on the number of ID cards issued in relation to population, see Table 4, page VII-19.) The Marine Police lack personnel and shore-based facilities due to GVN inactivity, particularly concerning land acquisition. 24 PFF provincial companies are in operation and 16 are in training. In addition, there are 12 companies of urban-located Order Police. Twenty out of 24 provincial PFF companies currently are employed properly. The PFF program is gaining momentum slowly, and the 1967 force goal of 80 companies (15,000 men) should be met unless the current recruitment rate drops.

3. Problems.

a. NP salaries are too low, increasing a tendency toward venality.

b. Present NP administration is concentrating on military problems rather than on combatting low-level insurgency, the VC infrastructure, and civil law and order.


c. Continuity of administration is hampered by the transfer of military officers in and out of the NP.

d. Proper utilization of NP, particularly PFF in support of RD, is hampered by province chiefs who disregard DGNP directives concerning deployment. Although 20 out of 24 PFF companies currently are employed properly, this is a changing factor subject to the whim of the province chiefs. This is one reason NP are not deployed.

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Table 4  
ID Cards Issued Nationwide in Relation to Population



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sufficiently at village and hamlet levels. An additional factor in the deployment of NP at the local level is security. Large scale VC operations in many rural areas prevent the deployment of small unit NP forces.

e. CORDS has undertaken a major study of the civilian detainee problem. It recommends a major program to attack the problem of inadequate detention facilities.

4. Courses of Action.

a. Raise police salaries and strengthen the DGNP Internal Security Bureau to combat corruption.

b. Withdraw US support from PFF companies and NP not properly deployed in rural areas.

c. Make a concerted effort to reverse the trend toward militarization of the NP officer corps. Specifically, ARVN officers serving in key police positions should resign their commissions and become career police officials. Police officers should be given orderly promotion opportunities.

d. Highest priority should be a revision of the present judicial system. Urgent attention must be given to the construction of adequate detention facilities and preparation of new classification standards for civil detainees and suspects to relieve congestion and permit orderly processing.

H. (C) Psychological Operations (PSYOP).

1. Objectives. The broad objective of PSYOP is to assist in

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the achievement of the political goal of linking the rural population to the GVN through information and propaganda themes about GVN programs. The three major objectives for 1967 are: to provide maximum support for Chieu Hoi; to support RD programs; and, through technical, advisory and commodity support, to build the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) into an institution capable of supporting national programs effectively.

2. Assessment of Progress to Date.

a. The PSYOP program this year has met with varied success. JUSPAO and MACV have provided the Chieu Hoi program with massive support through the preparation of millions of leaflets and posters. This effort has been successful. On a national level, JUSPAO had supported police recruiting efforts and the resources control program with posters and leaflets.

b. Programs in support of RD generally have not been adequate in view of the urgency of the RD program. Currently two motion pictures are in production for use in the RD program, and JUSPAO has done a series of excellent pamphlets as well as sponsored effective cultural-drama teams. In addition, there is a regular weekly radio program on RD.

c. Information and psychological exploitation of primary GVN programs has not been fully coordinated and planned at the national level. As a result Ministry of Information and Chieu Hoi (MICH) directives to the field are too general in nature and lack definite

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guidance. MICH guidance has failed to designate support of RD programs as a year-round priority effort.

d. A long up-hill battle is ahead to induce a sense of motivation and urgency into the VIS. It is in need of major surgery and priority attention in terms of training and support if it is to become effective.

3. Courses of Action.

a. Both GVN and US program development and direction from Saigon should be strengthened.

b. The VIS should be revitalized, reorganized, retrained and upgraded. The concept of a VIS institute endorsed by JUSPAO in 1966 should be implemented.

c. Information and propaganda should be focused on supporting nation-building programs.

d. Sufficient budgetary support should be given to implement PSYOP campaigns for RD, Chieu Hoi, and other priorities at appropriate levels comparable to the Chieu Hoi TET campaign, and on a year-round basis.

I. (C) Refugees.

1. Objectives.

a. To assist 500,000 new refugees in addition to the 810,000 existing at the end of 1966. (941,670 have been resettled or returned to their hamlets since 1 January 1964.)

b. To provide vocational training for 3,200 refugees

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at Ministry for Education facilities and for an additional 6,000 refugees at local provincial schools.

c. To construct 120 new temporary centers with all facilities; to construct 120 new classrooms and train required teachers.

d. To resettle 41,400 families in 200 resettlement hamlets.

2. Assessment. The arrival of 213,081 new refugees during the first five months of 1967 is in line with the overall projection for the year (40,000 per month). The 1967 program developed by SCR assumed that 250,000 would be resettled or returned to their hamlets during the year. However, only 74,000 have been re-established (31,000 resettled and 43,000 returned to their homes) compared with a projection of 100,000 for the period. Vocational training is exceeding projected levels with capacity not established at the 600 annual rate. Ten classrooms were complete as of 30 April; 51 are under construction. The refugee program shares universal GVN problems: poor logistic support, unavailability of secure sites for resettlement, operational ineffectiveness at province and district, poor coordination between field and central offices, and insufficient GVN concern and motivation to do something at the province level. In some areas, the lack of advance information on US/FW military operations has resulted in unplanned arrival of refugees. No clear policy has been developed on either the US or GVN side on the

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ultimate objectives of this program, i.e., resettlement in secure areas versus return to native hamlets, policy on conscious making of refugees, etc.

3. Courses of Action.

- a. Increase US influence over Vietnamese performance (see Section XI).
- b. Improve civil-military coordination to assure adequate preparation for refugees generated by US/FW military operations.
- c. Improve GVN and US program management.
- d. Increase the professional and motivational training program for Special Commissariat field employees.

J. (C) Highlander Affairs.

1. Objective. To support programs of the GVN Special Commissariat for Highlander Affairs, to include: 26 construction projects, agricultural training programs, establishment and operational support of 3 Highlander Chambers of the National Court and 21 District Courts, and the distribution of school textbooks in tribal dialects.

2. Assessment. Twenty-five hundred Highlanders have received agricultural training under the RD program. Two agricultural training centers financed from the RD budget are under construction. Two National Courts and 12 District Courts are operating. GVN corruption and indifferences to Highlanders is hurting the program, particularly in II CTZ where the corps commander has alienated Special Commissioner for Highlander Affairs and undermined his influence. On the other

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hand, the Highlander Commissariat is weak, and its staff generally inept. A continued thorn in the GVN side is the existence of FULRO forces in frontier sanctuaries.

3. Courses of Action.

a. Support Highlander requests for fuller representation in the GVN.

b. Make a concerted effort to improve the leadership in the Highlander Commissariat.

K. (U) Youth Affairs.

1. Objective. To support youth programs of the Ministries for Youth and Education that are designed to develop responsible working relationships between youth leadership and the GVN.

2. Assessment. 25,000 students have participated in Youth Civic Action programs; 300 self-help construction projects have been completed in Saigon District 6, 7 and 8. Adult education literacy and vocational training, cooperatives and sanitation and health programs have been initiated in these same districts. A National Soccer Program has been instituted. The principal problems are distrust between GVN leaders and youth groups and poor performances by Ministry for Youth workers at provincial and district levels. Excessive US presence in Districts 6, 7, and 8 undermines the work of young Vietnamese leaders there.

3. Courses of Action.

a. US commodity and advisory support to youth projects

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should continue with a minimum of obvious US presence and direction.

b. Educate GVN, through advisory effort, in the value of active non-political forms of independent youth activity.

L. (U) An Giang Priority Project.

1. Objective. To establish accelerated area development program by concentrating 20 specific activities in land reform, agriculture, education, health, welfare, public administration and police protection in the An Giang priority area.

2. Assessment. The program is not progressing satisfactorily due to bureaucratic red tape, ineffective coordination between GVN and US, the lack of response to project needs, and the lack of authority at province/district levels.

3. Courses of Action. Administration on the US side should be handled at the Saigon level and a full scale review conducted in the context of the CY 68/69 program development exercise just beginning.

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**SECRET**VIII. MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES.A. (S) Estimating the Resources Committed to Pacification.

1. Summary. Exclusive of US/FW military support, \$552 million is being expended on pacification in 1967. This represents only 2.6% of the total \$24 billion reportedly being put into SVN this year. \$164 million of the \$552 million are US generated piasters in the amount of \$19.4 billion or 30.3% of the total 64 billion piasters generated in 1967.

2. Comments. Direct expenditure in support of CORDS activities of 6.4 billion piasters in CY 1967 represents only a portion of the total investment in pacification, because also to consider are the large costs entailed in creation of infrastructure and services which support pacification but appear in other budgets. For example, the salary costs for GVN employees come from the ministry budgets and are not paid from US generated piaster accounts. In 1967, salaries for GVN civilian personnel working in pacification are estimated to be about 14 billion piasters. The direct expenditure, however, makes up 40% of the total US civilian agency piaster expenditure for CY 1967.

3. Comments on the Tables.

a. Table 1 (page VIII-4) is an overall summary of dollar and US generated piaster costs in support of pacification based on available information.

b. Table 2 (page VIII-5) is a summary of all identifiable pacification costs for 1965-1968. Exact dollar costs in

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support of the GVN military (weapons, ammunition, vehicles, etc.) are not available for 1965 and 1966. Thus, these figures are rough estimates. Dollar costs for US military expenditures in support of pacification are not available for 1965 and 1966. The 1967 and 1968 figures are rough estimates. On the piaster side, the Vietnamese military costs for prior years and 1968 are not available. Thus, these figures are rough estimates also.

c. Table 3 (page VIII-6) shows the contributions by each of the participating agencies and Table 4 (page VIII-7) summarizes the US civil resources committed directly to pacification activities. In terms of total US civil agency dollars, the 1967 program represents an increase of just over 250% over the 1965 program and an expansion of nearly 50% over the 1966 program. The 1966 program increased about 65% over that of 1965. The planned amount for 1968 represents about 300% increase over 1965 and 20% over 1967.

d. Table 5 (page VIII-9) shows the GVN and US inputs into GVN Ministry programs in support of pacification from 1965 to 1968.

e. Table 6 (page VIII-11) shows the 1967 GVN military commitment by category expressed in many-years and cost. The man-year cost factors for GVN military are:

<u>TYPE PERSONNEL</u>	<u>MAN-YEAR COST</u>
ARVN	99,000 piasters
RF	66,000 piasters
PF	38,000 piasters

Total man-years are based on a straight lines projection of the actual experience during the first four months of 1967. Estimated annual

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dollar cost of MAP support per RVN soldier is \$950 for ARVN, \$890 for RF and \$460 for PF.

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Table 1

Annual Pacification costs - Summary totals of all components to the extent the information is available.\*

	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	Total (1965-1968)
Dollars in thousands	122,544	224,452	388,204	483,237	1,218,437
Piasters in billions	7.0	10.1	19.4	27.8	65.1

\* The totals for 1965, 1966 and 1968 are incomplete because of the lack of prior year and future year information on Vietnamese military components for both dollars and piasters.

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Table 2

Summary Table of All Identifiable Pacification Costs  
1965-1968 Dollar Costs in Thousands of Dollars

	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	Total (1965-1968)
RD Activities*1	20,792	51,344	76,954	101,533	250,623
RD Related Activities*2	20,151	43,079	69,426	84,170	216,826
US Support to VN Ministries	57,901	74,529	110,824	115,934	359,188
Vietnamese Military*3	<u>23,700</u>	<u>55,500</u>	<u>131,000</u>	<u>181,600</u>	<u>391,800</u>
TOTAL	122,544	224,452	388,204	483,237	1,218,437

## Piaster costs in billions of piasters

	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	Total (1965-1968)
RD Activities*1	1.4	1.7	3.0	3.0	9.9
RD Related Activities*2	1.6	1.8	3.4	4.4	11.2
US Support to VN Ministries	2.8	3.1	3.2	5.4	14.5
Vietnamese Military*3	<u>1.2</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>9.8</u>	<u>15.0</u>	<u>29.5</u>
TOTAL	7.0	10.1	19.4	27.8	65.1

\*1 RD Activities: RD Workers and New Life Development.

\*2 RD Related Activities: Chieu Hoi, Refugees, Public Safety, PSYOP, and Other.

\*3 Vietnamese Military: ARVN, RF, PF.

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Table 3

## PACIFICATION CONTRIBUTIONS BY CIVIL AGENCY

AGENCY		<u>US\$ (Thousands)</u>	<u>US Personnel</u>	<u>US Generated VN\$(Piasters)</u>	<u>GVN Manpower CY</u>
RD:					
USAID	1965	29,551	263	1.9	55,700
	1966	51,679	384	3.5	72,480
	1967	87,798	811	6.3	97,583
	1968	104,370	913	8.1	119,158
OSA	1965	9,392	30	(.3)*	3,000
	1966	40,744	90	(1.9)*	24,000
	1967	54,582	258	(2.9)*	45,000
	1968	76,533	258	(4.4)*	65,000
JUSPAO	1965	2,000	28	.05	1,500
	1966	2,000	28	.05	1,500
	1967	4,000	52	.1	6,000
	1968	4,800	72	.1	6,000
<u>Other Pacification:</u>					
USAID support to					
GVN Ministries					
	1965	57,910	1,378	2.8	16,353
	1966	74,529	558	3.1	31,003
	1967	110,824	1,377	3.2	31,643
	1968	115,934	1,374	5.4	42,007
TOTAL	1965	98,853	1,699	4.75	76,553
	1966	168,952	1,060	6.65	128,983
	1967	257,204	2,498	9.6	180,226
	1968	301,637	2,617	13.6	232,165

\* Dollar purchased piasters. Non-additive.

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Table 4

## US RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF PACIFICATION

## RD ACTIVITIES

Division (Agency)	FY US\$ (Thousands)	US Personnel	US Generated \$VN (Billions) (CY)	GVN Manpower*7 (CY)
RD Workers (OSA)	1965 9,392	30	(.3)*2	3,000
	1966 40,744	90	(1.9)*2	24,000
	1967 54,582	258	(2.9)*2	45,000
	1968 76,533	258	(4.4)*2	65,000
New Life Development*3 (USAID)	1965 11,400	110	1.4	10,000
	1966 10,600	130	1.7	10,000
	1967 22,372	375	3.0	13,800
	1968 25,000	410	3.8	26,400
Sub-Total	1965 20,792	140	1.4*8	13,000
	1966 51,344	220	1.7*8	34,000
	1967 76,954	633	3.0*8	62,800
	1968 101,533	668	3.8*3	91,400

## RD RELATED ACTIVITIES

Chieu Hoi (USAID)	1965 60*4	2	.2	3,000*4
	1966 79	9	.3	3,400
	1967 1,400	19	.9	3,795
	1968 1,740	29	1.4	4,000*4
Refugees	1965 --	--	--	--
	1966 8,000	28	.7	480
	1967 16,586	50	1.2	788
	1968 19,530	49	1.4	858

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Table 4 (Continued)

Division (Agency)	FY	US\$ (Thousands)	US Personnel	US Generated \$VN (Billions) (CY)	GVN Manpower*7 (CY)
Public Safety (USAID)	1965	12,091	86	.2	40,700
	1966	23,000	137	.6	55,500
	1967	30,400	227	.8	74,000
	1968	33,100	255	1.0	82,000
PSYOP (JUSPAO)	1965	2,000	28	.05	1,500
	1966	2,000	28	.05	1,500
	1967	4,000	52	.1	6,000
	1968	4,880	72	.1	6,000
Other*5 (USAID)	1965	6,000	65	.1	2,000
	1966	10,000	80	.2	3,100
	1967	17,040	140	.4	5,200
	1968	24,920	170	.5	5,900
Sub-Total	1965	20,151	181	.55	47,200
	1966	43,079	282	1.85	63,930
	1967	69,426	488	3.4	89,783
	1968	84,170	575	4.4	98,758
Grand Total	1965	40,943	321	1.95*8	60,200
US Resources in	1966	94,423	502	3.55*8	97,980
Support of RD	1967	146,380	1,121	6.4*6,8	152,583
	1968	185,703	1,243	8.2*8	190,158

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- \*1 Based on best immediately available figures or estimates.
- \*2 Dollar purchased piasters. Non-additive.
- \*3 Includes all USAID-funded and managed activities in direct support of RD.
- \*4 These are rough estimates based on USAID reports and experience factors.
- \*5 Includes headquarters technical support; miscellaneous USAID-funded and managed activities dealing with Refugee Relief, Chieu Hoi, Highlander, etc.
- \*6 In addition, 1.3 million piasters has been requested and is part of a package to be negotiated with the GVN.
- \*7 GVN manpower figure very rough estimates.
- \*8 Does not include US dollar purchased piasters for the RDW program.

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Table 5

## GVN and US Inputs to Ministry Programs in Support of Pacification

<u>Division</u>	<u>FY</u>	<u>Total US\$000</u>	<u>#US Pers.</u>	<u>Total VN\$ (CY) (000.000)*</u>	<u>Estimated VN Manpower</u>
Agriculture	1965	15,569	37	1,202	4,700
	1966	5,864	48	408	1,320
	1967	16,265	235	359	4,237
	1968	13,080	234	1,376	5,766
Education	1965	2,110	21	90	530
	1966	2,563	27	132	728
	1967	7,378	34	196	2,064
	1968	9,318	30	499	3,291
Labor	1965	80	--	--	--
	1966	325	2	3	70
	1967	1,881	37	9	137
	1968	1,824	37	44	438
Logistics	1965	--	--	--	--
	1966	4,606	--	550	2,420
	1967	8,961	202	507	3,184
	1968	16,759	192	1,974	4,117
Public Admin	1965	1,643	22	--	--
	1966	1,468	19	13	809
	1967	3,897	98	60	3,917
	1968	4,873	91	223	4,941
Public Health	1965	5,312	114	133	578
	1966	14,490	151	260	7,460
	1967	29,986	356	389	9,092
	1968	34,878	360	75	13,861
Public Works	1965	25,015	35	866	10,365
	1966	31,825	91	756	17,666
	1967	16,718	93	623	7,456
	1968	9,738	92	146	8,634
Tech. Support	1965	8,172	149	505	180
	1966	13,388	220	1,000	530
	1967	25,738	322	1,036	556
	1968	25,464	338	1,063	959

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<u>Division</u>	<u>FY</u>	<u>Total US\$000</u>	<u>#US Pers.</u>	<u>Total VN\$ (CY) (000.000)*</u>	<u>Estimated VN Manpower</u>
All	1965	57,901	378	2,796	16,353
Divisions	1966	74,529	558	3,122	31,003
	1967	110,824	1,377	3,179	30,643
	1968	115,934	1,374	5,400	42,007

\* In 1965 piaster support came from Ministry budgets. In 1966 and 1967  
piasters were US-generated.

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Table 6

Summary of US/FW Military Resources Committed to Pacification in 1967

<u>Category</u>	<u>Number of Men</u>	<u>US\$ Cost</u>	<u>VN\$ Cost</u>
ARVN	30,000	28.5	3.0
RF	59,000	52.6	3.9
PF	<u>79,000</u>	<u>50.3</u>	<u>2.9</u>
TOTAL	168,000	131.4	9.8

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**CONFIDENTIAL**B. (C) Progress Measurement.

1. Current Reports, Procedures and Methods for Monitoring the Program. Our present inventory of ways of monitoring pacification progress consists of over 50 narrative and statistical reports. In addition, there are special evaluations by evaluators from CORDS.

a. Special Joint Report (SJR). The SJR began as a joint civil/military report from the province team in March 1966. In January 1967, the Statistical Annex and the Hamlet Evaluation System became parts two and three of the SJR. The annex was added because of the need for essential quantifying data. To date, it has not been successful and is under review. The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) was created at the special request of the Secretary of Defense as an instrument for evaluating progress at the hamlet level. The HES is still in its "shake-down" stage.

b. The Quarterly Combined Review. This is a review of the Combined Campaign Plan and supporting plans prepared by MACV and RVNAF, JGS. COMUSMACV and the Chief of RVNAF, JGS are the reviewing officials. Support of pacification is an input to the review.

c. MACV Monthly Evaluation Report (MONEVAL). This is a narrative report submitted by province senior advisors and contains an assessment of the military situation in the province.

d. Corps Senior Advisors RD Overview. This is prepared each month by corps senior advisors to provide an overall evaluation of the status of RD in each CTZ.

e. Civilian Agency Reports. In addition to the reports

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already mentioned, there is, at the present time, an undetermined number of reports from the field to civilian agencies in Saigon. As there has been no central control over these reports, a vast flow of paper has resulted which has taxed severely the limited personnel available to handle this information. At the same time, civilian agencies in Saigon have pointed out they have yet to get the right kinds of information from the field needed to manage their programs. This problem is now under review.

2. Progress Indicators. These reports measure a number of factors which are significant indicators of progress. The singular nature of the war, however, and the paucity of data in an underdeveloped country disallow any hard and fast indicators. Any list of indicators would, in fact, be a list of the least undesirable factors rather than those which are most wanted. The following indicators comprise the best available list:

a. Status of Hamlets. Data are derived from the HES. HES is an automated US system for determining the status of pacification at the hamlet level throughout SVN. It requires the district senior advisor to evaluate each hamlet in the district except those under VC control and record his assessment in terms of 18 entries on a worksheet from F (worst condition) to A (best condition). Fifteen problem areas having an impact on pacification progress are included in the evaluation and the district senior advisor assesses their degree of seriousness in each hamlet. The status of hamlets for the first five months of 1967 as derived from HES data is depicted in

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Table 8 (page VIII-21).

b. Status of Population. Data are derived from HES and the status of population for the first five months of 1967 using this US system is presented in Table 9 (page VIII-22).

c. GVN Hamlet and Population Classification. HES also integrates GVN control information and displays monthly the status of hamlets and population using GVN criteria: Secured, Undergoing Securing, Contested and VC Control.

(1) GVN Status of Hamlets. The GVN goal in 1967 is to secure or upgrade 1,103 hamlets. Hamlet status for 1966 and the first five months of 1967 is shown in Table 10 (page VIII-23).

(2) GVN Status of Population. The 1967 US goal is to secure 66% of the population. Population status for 1966 and the first five months of 1967 is depicted in Table 11 (page VIII-24).

d. Status of Roads. The goal in 1967 is to secure 50% and open the remaining 50% of those roads declared militarily essential in the 1967 Combined Campaign Plan. The status of roads as of 31 May 67 is: secure -- 38%; open -- 48%; and closed -- 14%.

e. Status of Railroads. The 1967 goal is to secure or open 65% of the national railway system and secure 100% of the railway system within the NPA. The national status of railroads as of 31 May 67 is: secure -- 32%; open -- 8%; and closed -- 60%. Within the NPA the status is: secure -- 48%; open -- 0%; and closed -- 52%.

f. Status of Waterways. The goal in 1967 is to secure 100% of the essential waterways within the NPA of III and IV Corps.

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The status of waterways as of 1 May 67 is: secure -- 12%; open -- 68%; and closed -- 20%.

g. Status of Area. Data are derived from overlays prepared at sector level. This is a manual procedure used for depicting the monthly status of area control in SVN using the criteria "secure" through "VC control". The area status as of 31 May 67 is: secure -- 10.7%; undergoing securing -- 2.4%; contested -- 18%; uninhabitable -- 27.0%; and VC control -- 40%. Area status for 1966 and the first five months of 1967 is depicted in Table 12 (page VIII-25).

h. District RD Evaluation. This evaluation identifies the status of RD progress in all corps areas, by district, using the following criteria: A -- making definite progress, B -- holding position and C -- losing ground. A summary of district evaluations, by corps, is shown in Table 13 (page VIII-26).

i. Number of citizens who volunteer information on enemy movements and planned attacks.

j. Percentage of ARVN initiated small unit operations which result in contact with the enemy (KIA, weapons captured, intelligence obtained).

k. Number of reports by census grievance workers on corruption by local officials.

l. Number of positive actions taken against corrupt officials.

m. Percentage of budget or regular GVN Ministry programs expended (agriculture, health, education, public works,

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irrigation).

n. Number of unfunded self-help projects outside Ap Doi Moi.

o. Number of local officials assassinated or abducted by the VC.

3. Evaluators. In addition to numerous reports and indicators, CORDS possesses a staff of evaluators whose accumulated in-country experience and knowledge of the language provide CORDS with perhaps its most valuable indepth evaluation of problem areas.

4. Quantification Problem. The difficulties in measuring pacification progress are primarily the problem of quantifying representative and valid indicators and the lack of reliable statistics. The HES, the Statistical Annex and the District RD Evaluation Study are recent attempts to cope with this situation. To date, however, the problem of providing Saigon with meaningful information on RD has been best answered by the use of narrative reports -- a situation which is likely to prevail for some time. The object here is to keep narrative judgement honest and objective and not just a recital of "progress highlights".

5. RD Program Goals. It is both essential and feasible to develop a system of RD program goals or objectives and sub-program tasks. Evaluation of RD performance can be accomplished as a function of efforts and results achieved, or a combination of both. The problem is to identify meaningful goals and objectives.

6. GVN Teams. Beyond our own reporting and evaluating system, the GVN has established interministerial inspection teams composed

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of representatives from the MRD, Programs Service, Rural Affairs Service and the Budget and Supply Service. These operational teams, one for each CTZ, accompanied by CORDS representatives, conduct inspections of RD progress in the functional areas of hamlet construction, RD workers, New Life Development and budgets.

7. Courses of Action.

a. Refine RD Evaluation System (RDES). An overall, fully automated system, RDES is planned for development to measure objectively not only the status of hamlets and population, but area and additional parameters to include political, economic, geographical, religious and sociological indicators.

(1) Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). Plans have been developed and actions initiated to improve HES through the use of statistical techniques to include factor analysis and regression analysis to determine indicator/problem weighting values, significance of data and indices of RD progress. Techniques will be developed to conduct analyses to determine significance and sensitivity of RD indicators and problems.

(2) Area Assessment System (AAS). Actions have been initiated to automate the AAS fully incorporating the following features:

(a) Production during June 1967 of automatic data processing (ADP) multi-colored overlays in scales from 1:50,000 to 1:1,000,000 depicting location and status of hamlets in SVN using US categories of A through VC control.

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(b) Production during July 1967 of ADP multi-colored overlays, in varying scales, depicting location and status of hamlets in SVN using GVN classifications of secured through VC control.

b. J2/Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV) Data.

Plans have been developed and initial coordination accomplished directed toward the integration of J2/CICV data having an impact on RD progress to include VC incidents directed against district towns, RD teams and election centers, VC infrastructure, and frequency of VC/NVA activities.

c. USAID Data. The RDES is being automated in modular form to accept the integration of USAID statistical data and measures of progress available in report form. It is planned to expand RDES to accomodate these data resulting in the capability of presenting a total RD progress display.

d. Data Management Agency. Activation of the MACV Data Management Agency 1 April 1967, the anticipated arrival of an IBM 360-50 digital computer in the fall of 1967, and plans to acquire a high speed compatible plotter will permit RDES to be completely automated and provide an extensive in-country RD data base highly responsive to data queries.

e. HES Data Validation Study. To ensure accuracy of the evaluation system while simultaneously expanding its capability, MACV has requested USARV to initiate a four month study, using the resources of the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV), to determine through field investigation, the validity and relevance of information and

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data reported as part of HES.

f. Quantification Problem. To improve progress measurement and quantification techniques, six additional contract systems analysts scheduled to arrive during June 1967 will begin research to develop more adequate indicators of RD progress, identify and collect supporting statistical data, and design new and improved quantitative measures of RD progress.

g. RD Goals. The research team due to arrive during June 1967 will seek methods to establish and derive RD goals and, based upon data derived from formal and empirical analyses, develop procedures to measure progress toward these goals.

h. Procedures and Methods for Monitoring Effort.

(1) US.

(a) To improve RD monitoring effectiveness, it is planned to improve existing procedures by establishing a RD Support Management Center (RDSMC). The purpose of the RDSMC will be to assist in RD problem identification, improve RD planning, enhance RD coordination, and facilitate decision making.

(b) To facilitate reporting procedures and reduce duplication of effort, it is planned to combine the SJR and the MACV Monthly Report into a single submission that also integrates information acquired through the USAID Statistical Annex.

(2) GVN. It is planned to develop, at the request of the GVN Deputy Minister for Revolutionary Development, an automated MRD Program Evaluation System (PES). The PES will list each

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hamlet in the GVN RD program to include: province, district, village and hamlet names; population; status as of 31 Dec 66; month when each of the 96 GVN RD tasks are started, 50% complete and 100% complete.

It is planned to improve and increase the interface, through projects such as PES, of GVN RD monitoring efforts with those of the US.


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Table 8

Hamlet Status -- 1967 (Derived From HES)




Total Hamlets: 11,920 12,085 12,167 12,294

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Table 9

Hamlet Population Status -- 1967 (Derived From HES)

Non (SIA)

Hamlets

Non Hamlet

13.1	12.9	13.1	13.2	13.2
3.1	3.7	3.7	3.6	3.6
16.2	16.6	16.8	16.8	16.8

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


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Table 10


Hamlet Status -- 1966-67 (Derived From GVN System)



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Table 11  
Population Status -- 1966-67 (Derived From GVN System)




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Table 12

Area Control Status -- 1966-67 (Derived From GVN System)

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Table 13

\*

District RD Evaluation

(No. of Districts/Percent)

	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>	<u>Total</u>
Districts Making Definite Progress (A)	11/27%	27/56%	31/61%	46/52%	115/51%
Districts Holding Position (B)	23/57%	21/44%	19/37%	38/43%	98/44%
Districts Losing Ground (C)	6/16%	0/0	1/2%	4/5%	11/5%

\* As of 31 May 1967

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A. (U) Preliminary planning for pacification in 1968 is being conducted by the Plans and Programs Division, MACCORDS and through the Joint Planning Group (JPG) -- an ad hoc organization organized on 11 April of representatives of MACCORDS, USAID, and JUSPAO. The JPG is addressing the following areas:

1. Development of a list of plans and directives which will be required from all agencies directly or indirectly involved in pacification together with a schedule for preparation and review of each.
2. A review of definitions used in pacification and a statement of concepts and goals of pacification.
3. Development of RD guidelines for 1968.
4. A review of the RD Campaign and Sector Security Plan directives.

B. (U) The first area listed above is important particularly from the point of view of timing. The integrated P&P Division should be able to bring more influence to bear on the Combined Campaign Plan for 1968 so that the military tasks and goals related therein will be more closely timed to pacification plans and goals. At the same time, plans must be developed in time to furnish conceptual guidance for all the various programs which make up the support of pacification. Essentially the subcommittee working on this particular problem will develop a pacification support outline to parallel the development of the Combined Campaign Plan.

C. (U) The second area involving concepts and goals is

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most important. The absence of any generally agreed concept prior to General Thang's announcement of his concepts for RD in 1967 was a missing ingredient in the development of the 1967 plans. It is hoped that the subcommittee not only will define RD, pacification and nation building more clearly, but will produce an overall concept which ties RD and RD related areas together. This problem area is probably the most significant in terms of integration of civil and military planning.

D. (U) The third area, the development of RD guidelines for 1968, already shows great progress. Last year the guidelines were developed as an essentially budgetary exercise. Ex post facto there was an attempt to make them serve more than budgetary purposes. The subcommittee already has produced a general format for the 1968 guidelines which includes management data not available in the 1967 guidelines. If accepted by the GVN, the guidelines for 1968 will provide a much more useful management tool which goes far beyond budgetary implications.

E. (U) The fourth area is being addressed to ensure that RD campaign and sector security plans are developed systematically along with provincial RD planning.

F. (U) The last area, the review of the RD Worker program, is being addressed in response to the questions asked by MRD.

G. (U) The basic approach being taken is that part of the 1968 RD program should be a continuation of the 1967 RD program and should

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represent more effective coordination and/or integration of all programs with emphasis on the major thrusts identified elsewhere in this paper. A smooth transition from 1967 to 1968 is being sought to increase and maintain the momentum of 1967. At the same time, we hope to increase the speed and coverage of the program by adopting, utilizing and benefiting from other mechanisms and concepts for spreading pacification in areas not covered by the formalized 59-man team trained in Vung Tau. There is much room for exploiting Vietnamese initiative in this regard and for seeing that resources are applied to those programs which show signs of success.

H. (C) The three principal problems confronting MACCORDS and the JPG are (a) influencing the Vietnamese and gaining their acceptance of US recommendations (a newly elected government and the changing of the guard may make this very difficult); (b) developing and gaining acceptance for a general concept and strategy in 1968; and (c) putting into effect on a timely basis a recognized need for fully coordinated/integrated planning this year. CORDS' position within the MACV staff should make easier the inter-relationship between the military plans and those plans concerned with pacification and its support. Special emphasis is being placed upon informal and intensive liaison during policy formulation and upon a coordinated development and review of all programs involved in pacification. Most important is the development of conceptual guidance which will assure that the many good individual programs and plans will have

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overall continuity.

I. (C) The following specific actions to improve 1968 pacification planning will be emphasized:

1. Integrate and improve 1968 civil-military pacification planning at all levels more effectively than in 1966-67.
2. Press for greater concentration of effort.
3. Set specific time-phased goals. Develop an improved system for monitoring progress and discovering potential bottlenecks early.
4. Plan for extensive use of local civil-military pacification teams to supplement RD teams, thus permitting increased momentum.
5. Insist on joint project agreements to increase leverage and ensure GVN involvement.
6. Include in 1968 plans security and other measures to prevent regression in 1967 RD areas.
7. Prepare plans for a post-RD phase incorporating local development under the aegis of village committees.
8. Take steps to give district and province officials a greater sense of personal commitment to the pacification process.
9. Convince the GVN to streamline budget procedures for release of funds.

J. (U) 1968 planning still is in the formative stage. There are no specifics developed yet on what the pacification goals should be for 1968. CORDS will be in a better position to determine these once the

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current reviews of provincial programs and the second set of combined military quarterly reviews are complete.

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**UNCLASSIFIED****X. IMPACT ON RD OF DEVELOPMENTS OUTSIDE THE RD PROGRAM.****A. (U) Village and Hamlet Elections.**

1. Village and hamlet elections have been conducted efficiently in some 800 villages and 5,000 hamlets during the past three months with a high percentage of registered voters casting ballots (over 80%). Candidates were screened and often persuaded to run by district and provincial officials. The actual balloting seemed to be free and secret, although definite pressure was applied to achieve a high percentage of voter participation. Nevertheless, many former hamlet and village chiefs were defeated in the elections, and although the elections were greeted generally without a great deal of voter enthusiasm, there were exceptions. This event has been an essential first step toward achieving greater local government responsibility.

2. The increased responsibility given to village councils is potentially significant if coupled with increased local tax receipts, and a modified assistance program involving village administrations more directly.

3. Significantly, machinery now exists for elections later this year in Ap Doi Moi now undergoing RD. This is an essential ingredient in the current application of the 11 point criteria. How enthusiastically people participate in these elections, and to what extent provincial officials allow and encourage natural leaders to emerge will be one indication whether elections are significant, or just one more exercise in organized self deception.

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B. (C) National Elections. RD teams already are being used to promote national elections, and RD progress in the second half of 1967 will be limited as a result. Province/district officials and RD teams will be diverted from RD work to concentrate on campaigning for selected candidates. Furthermore, overall direction of the RD program is only part-time now and can be expected to become much weaker as top-level RD officials give more and more of their attention to organizing and supervising the elections. However, successful national elections, i.e., accepted by the Vietnamese as honest and responsive, can make an extremely important contribution to pacification.

C. (C) Major Military Offensive by NVA/VC Forces. Intelligence estimates indicate a continuing threat of a major military offensive by NVA/VC forces. The present situation in Quang Tri and other areas of I Corps indicate the difficulties involved in attempting to conduct a meaningful RD program where there is an unstable security situation. A major enemy offensive, or increase in forces, would only aggravate this situation making RD virtually irrelevant in menaced provinces which would have to concentrate on holding operations until enemy offensives were defeated. Rural populations which had committed themselves previously to the GVN would have to be evacuated, and the inherent problems associated with relocating large numbers of people would have to be handled.

D. (S) Increase in US Force Levels. COMUSMACV has requested an increased in US military force structure in FY 68 in order to maintain the required balance of forces vis-a-vis the VC/NVA force

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build-up. He has proposed, with the Mission Council's approval, to increase total authorized RF/PF strength from 300,000 to 350,000 to provide continuing local security. These proposals are under consideration by CINCPAC and the JCS. An increase in RVNAF and US/FWMAF will permit more ARVN battalions to support RD only if the increase is at a greater rate than the enemy force build-up and resultant main force threat.

E. (U) Reorganization of the US RD Structure. The recent reorganization of the US structure supporting the GVN RD program promises to help boost the lagging GVN/US RD effort in this area. However, this reorganization will not affect RD progress significantly in the countryside except as it may influence Vietnamese performance. It is recognized that OCO and RDSO differed in their views concerning the RD concept and as to how US support was to be provided to RD. Now a mutual understanding should be achieved. Single managership facilitates detailed analysis of the RD program and permits consistency in planning and programming and in the US advisory effort. The pooling of US resources will allow greater effort in critical areas. The reorganization will permit more flexible use of existing US civil/military leadership capabilities.

F. (C) Possible Resurgence of Inflation.

1. A resurgence of inflation similar to that which SVN's economy underwent a year ago also is a serious threat to RD. Another series of price increases would have a detrimental effect on the economy and RD as well. By necessitating a cut-back in plaster

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expenditures, inflation could limit the pace of the RD program.

2. GVN officials and workers, already hit hard by past inflation, would undergo another serious lowering of morale. Their performance would deteriorate further, and corruption would be further encouraged. While serious inflation would affect the rural population also, it would not be as serious an impact as in urban areas.

3. Construction projects would be curtailed for lack of funds. Contractors generally would not bid for government work for fear of long delays in receiving payment. Funds budgeted for classroom, dispensary, or road construction would prove insufficient and, as in the past, the GVN probably would prove incapable of adjusting to a rapidly changing situation.

4. Above all, a resurgence of inflation could destroy the confidence of the people in their government and further drive the general population into "attentisme".

5. In order to offset as much as possible the impact inflation would have, it would be wise to develop contingency plans for curtailment of certain programs, shifts of priority on expenditures, measures to increase revenues, and other means of controlling liquidity.

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**CONFIDENTIAL****XI. (CNF) US INFLUENCE -- THE NECESSITY, FEASIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF ASSERTING GREATER LEVERAGE.****A. Necessity of Leverage.**

1. The most crucial problem in achieving the goals and objectives of the RD program is that the programs must be carried out by the Vietnamese. Present US influence on Vietnamese performance is dependent upon our ability to persuade, cajole, suggest, or plead. Political and practical considerations usually have argued against developing any systematic use of the various levers of power at our disposal. The potential reaction of the Vietnamese may become even greater now that they appear to be reasserting themselves and when the question of sovereignty is an increasingly sensitive one.

2. However, the factors of corruption, antique administrative financial procedures and regulations, and widespread lack of leadership probably can be overcome in the short run only if the US increases its influence on Vietnamese performance. The increasing magnitude of corruption and its damage to any program make the need for developing and applying a system of leverage which forces the Vietnamese to take US views into account greater now than ever before. Even the best conceived and executed RD program will result in failure in terms of gaining the allegiance of the people so long as such extensive corruption prevails.

**B. Feasibility of Leverage.**

1. Two questions arise as to the feasibility of applying leverage: (a) Can an effective system of leverage be developed

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and managed given the quality of the US advisory effort? (b) Is the application of leverage politically feasible?

2. An effective system of leverage extending from the national level, where it would involve insistence on certain high standards of performance, down to district level, where it would involve specific control over resources, can be developed. The difficulty of managing such a system is real, and in the past has prevailed in many minds over the desirability of attempting to institute such a system. The concern is that inexperienced or unsophisticated advisors at the local level would misuse the not inconsiderable power involved. Given the new organization and the possibility of upgrading the level of many of the province senior advisors to colonel or equivalent, if it materializes, would mitigate against this danger. Special training sessions clearly would be required, but it should be possible to find 50 qualified province advisors and some 240 qualified district advisors capable of sensitive application of power. However, turn-over problem would be great and, if not overcome, could become serious enough to endanger the whole system.

3. Control over resources is one approach to the exercise of power. We should, however, consider another alternative -- that of exerting pressure only in the corridors of power themselves, i.e., at the very top. This would be the more subtle but infinitely more far-reaching technique of dealing face to face with the highest level of government on those issues of greatest potential impact, e.g., key personnel appointments. The approach here is really oriental

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in the sense of being personal and hidden from public view while the former alternative is western, systematic and very visible. The exercise of this kind of power, which might be limited to conversations a deux between Ambassador and President or Ambassador and Prime Minister is one which most Vietnamese believe we already exercise. It is an approach that, in Vietnam, would be far more effective than any other.

4. The question of the political feasibility of applying leverage is more difficult to assess. Involved are the questions of sovereignty and the sensitivities of individual GVN officials. Particularly difficult to assess is the unknown outlook of a new government involving an elected legislature. Negotiations of agreements containing conditions of aid will be extremely difficult and any such negotiations should be undertaken with full recognition of the likely reaction of GVN officials. (The Vietnamese outside government assume we are using our power now.) However, the new organization for RD and the presence of a new team could offset these considerations, at least in a tactical sense.

C. Desirability of Asserting Greater Leverage. The question of the desirability of the application of leverage revolves principally around its impact -- both short and long run, on Vietnamese society and embryonic institutions -- and the possibility of reinforcing current trends toward an unintended depth of involvement in Vietnamese affairs. The answers to both of these aspects depends largely on one's view of the state of Vietnamese institutions

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and the extent of the US commitment in Vietnam. Viewed in the context of the latter point, the risks involved in greater use of US power pale in comparison to the need for greater control over the outcome. These points argue, however, for the "oriental" approach described above.

D. Courses of Action. US influence over key decisions must be attained as quickly as possible. We recommend the "oriental" approach. However, should the other alternative of more open exercise of power be selected, the system would have to include US control of resources. As a tactical measure, such control could be associated initially with the introduction of additional resources. The introduction of greater US control and the procedures that would be necessary to ensure an adequate US voice in the decision making process should be tied to the "New Team" and the new US organization for RD. For that reason, too long a delay would be unfortunate.

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**SECRET****XII. (S) RECAPITULATION OF MAJOR CONCLUSIONS**

A. GVN/US efforts during the latter part of 1966 and the first half of 1967 established a broader understanding and appreciation of RD. During 1966, the foundations of the first cohesive pacification program since the days of Strategic Hamlets was established. The military situation is in our favor, and more resources are being applied to RD than ever before. The program is gaining momentum, and if continuity is provided into 1968, a strong start toward real progress in the future will have been made.

B. On the negative side, however, the RD program has had, with some exceptions, little effect on the loyalties of the Vietnamese or on the VC's hold on the countryside. Given its relatively slow start, the 1967 program probably will not fully achieve its goals. The problems of corruption, including social injustice and ineffective administration, are fundamental to the GVN's continued inability to gain the allegiance of major portions of the rural population and to implement meaningful programs effectively. To attack corruption successfully, the US Mission will have to give the effort considerably higher priority than in the past.

C. Throughout SVN, the VC infrastructure remains a tightly-knit, effective organization. GVN and US programs and activities have not proved effective counters to that infrastructure. Provincial and district level intelligence coordination centers must be developed and expanded. Reaction to intelligence must be more rapid and forceful.

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Responsibility must be fixed at the National level for coordination of exploitation of intelligence on the infrastructure.

D. We must cope with the problem of regression. The proven ability of the VC to submerge his infrastructure until the RD wave has passed, and to re-infiltrate is not being countered effectively, nor even systematically watched. An action program must be developed as quickly as possible to provide the capability to monitor areas not receiving RD attention, or which are otherwise considered secure.

E. The failure of Vietnamese leadership at all levels to cope with the enormous demands placed on it by the war has intensely aggravated the traditional problems of governmental ineffectiveness and inertia. The professional quality of GVN leadership must be improved. To accomplish this, a coordinated and goal-oriented Vietnamese training program for potential and actual leadership at all levels should be implemented as a matter of highest priority, both for the civil administration and for the military forces. Equally important, the means to remove the incompetent and corrupt from the system, rather than simple transfer within it, must be found.

F. In the short run, the only likely course of action capable of overcoming the worst effects of corruption and a fragile governmental structure is great US influence on Vietnamese performance. Overriding the very real and great dangers inherent in a deliberate exercise of our power is the depth of our commitment and responsibility for the outcome.

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G. We must strengthen the organization of hamlet/village governing institutions, particularly enhancing their will and capability of undertaking and sustaining local developmental activities and programs. In this context, an alternative to the present concept of National Ministry programs following up RD must be found. It is neither a feasible nor necessarily desirable concept, involving too much national government at the local level. The current efforts of USAID to initiate a program of local development should be supported to the maximum. In this regard, the possibility of establishing a "Local Development Fund" following the financial procedures of the MRD budget, designed to stimulate self-sustaining local development, should be explored.

H. We must clarify and ensure proper "military support for RD," making it an aggressive, area-security generating operation rather than a protective, "digging in" exercise, in particular where ARVN is concerned.

I. We must increase both the quantity and quality of US advisory assistance -- civil and military. US personnel placement and recruiting policies must ensure that highly qualified advisors are appointed to critical positions. Persons sophisticated in politics, finance, and administration should be appointed to focus on and deal with the management problems now stifling performance.

J. Concentration of resources in RD target areas should continue. The present application of the NPA, 26 priority provinces and Ap Doi Moi will not produce demonstrable progress in areas of significant size.

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Therefore, a new effort to concentrate resources in carefully chosen areas meeting the criteria of current progress plus capacity to achieve greater results with more resources should be made starting now. In this regard, priority provinces should be selected because of their relative importance to the overall pacification effort rather than on how good a province plan is. Where the initial plan of a priority province is weak, attention should be given to improving the plan rather than denying resources to the province. Further, specific priority areas for each province should be selected as the area for focusing resources in any given time span. In the process, the NPA concept should be formally dropped.

K. While the RD teams have weaknesses primarily flowing from the leadership problem, they are generally an effective vehicle for the introduction or re-introduction of the GVN presence in rural areas, and for initiating the development of local government. The record to date indicates improved performance can be achieved by stressing recruitment of more mature workers, leadership and motivational training, and the personal involvement of local officials. Supplementary techniques for increasing the number of RD-type teams without undue dilution of quality must be stressed.

L. A significant military effort is being devoted to support of RD, and performance of ARVN battalions on this mission is improving as a result of the MTT training. However, current projections of RD progress and security requirements will result in a declining degree of security in late 1967 unless the enemy threat abates or additional friendly forces become available.

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M. A great unknown is the coming impact on the total situation and RD of an elected government. Not only will the election process divert resources and slow the program, but dealing with an elected government will present new complications and easily could disrupt planning for 1968 and check momentum. Careful consideration should be given to the US approach to the new government, particularly with regard to corruption, increasing US influence, and the 1968 RD program.

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## MAC JOIR BRIEFING

SUBJECT: Briefing on Project TAKEOFF

I. PURPOSE: Based on a comprehensive assessment of pacification, an action program to give pacification a new thrust during the last half of 1967 has been developed by the reorganized MACV staff. COMUSMACV and the Ambassador have approved Project TAKEOFF in concept. Detailed action programs are being developed. This briefing covers the concept and content of Project TAKEOFF. It describes what the US Mission intends to do in conjunction with the GVN to step up the pace of pacification.

II. SCRIPT:

Based on the pacification assessment just described, which Ambassador Komer laid on after the reorganization in Saigon took place, we are developing an action program to give pacification a new thrust during the last half of 1967. The program is designed to sustain momentum through the elections and on into 1968 (A).

We have patterned the program after the task organization which General Westmoreland set up for the RVNAF improvement exercise. An exercise which ties in perfectly since security is a prerequisite to and necessary component throughout the pacification process.

TAKEOFF furnishes positive management direction of the important programs that combine to make up pacification. It reaches from Saigon down to our 200 district teams.

Project TAKEOFF provides a project manager to oversee the key action programs which will move pacification forward. Each of the 8 to 12 key action programs also has a program manager (B).

Objectives are to use available resources more effectively, tap first more and then all of the potential resources, and move pacification ahead at an accelerated pace.

The Saigon management setup is duplicated at each corps. Corps or region is an important management echelon on the US side, particularly.

LTC MONTAGUE

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Thus, we will have program managers at corps to control US civil/military resources and supervise field operators at province and district.

In province, the newly-integrated civil/military advisory team will feel the impact of Project TAKEOFF in the form of increased support for priority projects, improved direction and responsiveness to requests for help or guidance, and greater focus on key elements of pacification. Because programs are executed at province and district, each province and district team will develop its own action plan and execute it. A district plan will be quite simple -- a listing of projects by priority with action responsibility assigned to an advisor and a GVN official.

As soon as possible, we want the GVN to adopt the principles of Project TAKEOFF and subscribe to a set of action programs. Without constant prodding, GVN may let pacification slide during the election period. Just the opposite should occur. Elections and movement toward responsible, representative government is a fundamental part of pacification. Elections should support and foster other pacification efforts and vice versa.

We have reviewed the question of leverage and intend that it be applied more extensively by CORDS advisors to get action of GVN officials. Advisors will be judged on results obtained, not how well they get along.

The eight programs in Category I now make up Project TAKEOFF (C). The other four in Category II may be added later. Too many at the outset would dilute our efforts and overtax the GVN. Therefore, to get moving fast we are first selecting the important, most pressing, or simplest programs.

The Chieu Hoi action program (D) is a sample of an important but relatively simple program. These actions have already been worked out with the Chieu Hoi Ministry.

The attack on VC infrastructure (E) is another action program that is important, pressing and more difficult. These principles fall out of a study just completed by Ambassador Komer and the MACV and CIA staffs.

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The approved US side plan for attack on the VC infrastructure is shown on this chart (F). An Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation Group has already been set up. The Director, Mr. Parker, has been named and is assembling the permanent staff.

The police action program (G), under Mr. Manopoli, is almost complete. It places emphasis on improving and retargetting the police field forces on the VC infrastructure.

Because local security is essential for pacification progress, we have a special action program (H) aimed at expanding and improving RVNAF support to pacification.

Finally, pacification planning (I) has high priority because we are entering the 1968 planning cycle. An action program is being worked out by a Joint Planning Group to improve 1968 pacification planning. This has already become a combined GVN-US venture.

A phased approach has been adopted for Project TAKEOFF. We expect to complete detailed action programs by end June (J).

Obtaining agreement on action program content and getting rapid response will be easy on the US side. The tough part will be motivating the GVN and having it accept the necessity for stepping up pacification across the board -- not just within the Ministry of Revolutionary Development.

The necessity for forward planning -- the US planning and programming cycle is about to begin for FY 1968 and the GVN planning and budget cycle is about to begin for CY 1968 -- makes it impossible to carry out all proposed actions immediately. Some will have to be postponed until 1968. However, given the flexibility in US programs and the slack in certain GVN programs, critical actions can be undertaken now without significant additional support. Some reprogramming will, however, be required.

We will build into Project TAKEOFF a system for periodic review and evaluation. Program managers will be required to submit monthly reports covering rate of accomplishment, problem areas and recommendations for further actions by the 10th of each month. A consolidated monthly progress report will be submitted to COMUSMACV. We envisage including evaluation of Project TAKEOFF problem areas

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in the quarterly review of progress of A3 142 -- the Combined Campaign Plan -- as a device for needing the GVN at corps level.

GVN performance remains the crucial factor. Nonetheless, we believe by this programming technique, with direct program management on the US side, and with systematic evaluation of progress and problems we cannot help but achieve some increase in effectiveness of the pacification effort.

SLIDE J OFF

Ambassador Komer would now like to cover briefly the pacification outlook.

III. LIST OF SLIDES

- A. Outline of briefing
- B. US organization for Project TAKEOFF
- C. Action programs -- existing and prospective
- D. Chieu Hoi action program
- E. Action program for attack on infrastructure
- F. Management for attack on infrastructure
- G. Police action program
- H. Expansion and improvement of RVNAF support to pacification
- I. Action program to improve 1968 pacification planning
- J. Measures to assure program is carried out

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# PROJECT TAKEOFF


GIVING PACIFICATION A NEW THRUST

• CONCEPT

• CONTENT

• TIMING

## PROJECT TAKEOFF CONCEPT



## 8-12 ACTION PROGRAMS

### I . PRESENTLY UNDER REVIEW :

1. IMPROVE 1968 PACIFICATION PLANNING.
2. ACCELERATE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM.
3. MOUNT ATTACK ON VC INFRASTRUCTURE.
4. EXPAND AND IMPROVE RVNAF SUPPORT.
5. EXPAND AND SUPPLEMENT RD TEAM EFFORT; EMPLOY SUBSTITUTE TECHNIQUES.
6. INCREASE CAPABILITY TO HANDLE REFUGEES.
7. REVAMP POLICE AND PFF.
8. PRESS LAND REFORM ( IN CONJUNCTION WITH USAID ) .

### II . POSSIBLE ADD - ONS :

- PUSH ANTI - CORRUPTION PROGRAM .
- REVAMP PSYOPS .
- IMPROVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT .
- DEVELOP FOLLOW ON PHASE TO PACIFICATION .
- STRESS TRAINING AND MOTIVATION OF OFFICIALS AT BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL LEVELS .

# CHIEU HOI ACTION PROGRAM

*PROG MGR - OGDEN WILLIAMS*


- ARM & TRAIN ALL ARMED PROPAGANDA TEAMS.
- GIVE PROGRAM MANAGER \$VN 10 MILLION SLUSH FUND.
- CONSTRUCT 51 ADEQUATE CHIEU HOI CENTERS.
- MAKE SHODDY NAT'L CHIEU HOI CENTER INTO A MODEL.
- DOUBLE US CHIEU HOI PROVINCE ADVISORS (TO 10).
- INCREASE USE OF HOI CHANH IN PACIFICATION.
- ASSIGN CHIEU HOI PSYOPS ADVISORS IN 20 PROV.
- DEVELOP GREATER QUICK-REACTION PSYOPS CAPABILITY TO EXPLOIT CHIEU HOI.
- INCREASE & IMPROVE VOCATIONAL TRAINING.
- QUADRUPLE KIT CARSON SCOUTS TO 1800.
- INITIATE TET-LIKE PSYOPS CAMPAIGN KEYED TO ELECTIONS.
- CONVINCE GVN TO FORM CH COMBAT UNITS.

1200

## PRINCIPLES - ATTACK ON INFRASTRUCTURE

- ATTACK BASICALLY POLICE RESPONSIBILITY ARMED FORCES ASSIST.
- REAL TARGET IS KEY INDIVIDUALS IN VC.
- USE CLEARLY DEFINED "RIFLESHOT" APPROACH, NOT JUST "SHOTGUN" DRAGNET OPERATIONS.
- ON US-SIDE MOUNT JOINT CIA-MACV INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS.
- DEVELOP US-SIDE FIRST TO CATALYZE SIMILAR GVN DEVELOPMENT.
- ASSIGN CLEAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR COORDINATION AT SAIGON, CORPS, PROVINCE AND DISTRICT.
- USE EXISTING RESOURCES FULLY THRU BETTER COORD.
- FOCUS ON EXPLOITATION AS WELL AS INTELLIGENCE
- USE PRU AND RETARGETED POLICE FIELD FORCE AS ACTION ARM

# ORGANIZATION FOR MANAGING ATTACK ON INFRASTRUCTURE





## POLICE ACTION PROGRAM

PROG MGR JOHN MANOPOLI

- INTENSIFY EFFORT TO MEET END-YEAR GOAL OF 74,000.
- IMPROVE POLICE FIELD FORCE AND EXPAND TO 15,000.
- EXTEND RESOURCES CONTROL TO ALL POLICE ELEMENTS.
- BEGIN FOOLPROOF ID CARD SYSTEM ON 1 AUG -- ISSUE NEW CARDS TO 3,475,000 BY END-YEAR.
- EXPAND TRAINING FACILITIES BY 1/3.
- COMBAT CORRUPTION IN NATIONAL POLICE.
- INCREASE CAREER PROSPECTS OF POLICE -- REVERSE TREND TOWARD MILITARIZATION.
- INCREASE POLICE BUDGET -- FUNDS ALLOCATED FOR 69,000 ONLY.
- TRAIN 3,600 MORE POLICE LEADERS.
- INCREASE ADVISORS BY 75% -- TO 224.

100

## EXPANSION & IMPROVEMENT OF RVNAF SUPPORT TO PACIFICATION

PROGRAM MANAGER: J3/CORDS

(MUST BE TIED TO RVNAF IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM)

- EXPAND RF/PF ALLOCATION TO PACIFICATION SUPPORT (GREAT BULK OF 119,000 ADDED RF/PF REQUESTED FOR 1968 - 69 WILL BE ASSIGNED).
- THICKEN ADVISORY STRUCTURE ESPECIALLY AT SECTOR 3 SUB-SECTOR LEVEL, e.g., 2 ADVISORS TO EACH DOIGC, 50 ADVISORS FOR RD TEAMS, 1648 MORE FOR RF/PF, 2 MORE ADVISORS TO EACH RD BATTALION.
- INCREASE NUMBER OF ARVN BATTALIONS IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF RD FROM 53 TO 60 OR MORE.
- PUT GREATER STRESS ON NIGHT PATROLLING, ACTIVE DEFENSE INSTEAD OF DIGGING IN, RAPID EMPLOYMENT OF MOBILE REACTION FORCES, etc.
- RE-EXAMINE POSSIBILITIES OF PART-TIME, UNPAID HAMLET MILITIA.

# ACTION PROGRAM TO IMPROVE 1968 PACIFICATION PLANNING

PROGRAM MANAGER: BG KNOWLTON

- INTEGRATE 1968 CIVIL/MILITARY PLANNING CYCLE AT ALL LEVELS MORE EFFECTIVELY THAN IN 1966-67.
- ACCELERATE 1968 PLANNING GUIDELINES TO AVOID HIATUS AT YEAR END. INVOLVE GVN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
- PRESS FOR GREATER CONCENTRATION OF EFFORT.
- SET SPECIFIC TIME-PHASED GOALS. DEVELOP IMPROVED SYSTEM FOR MONITORING PROGRESS AND DISCOVERING POTENTIAL BOTTLENECKS EARLY.
- PLAN FOR EXTENSIVE USE OF LOCAL "CIVIL/MILITARY TEAMS" TO SUPPLEMENT RD TEAMS, THUS PERMITTING INCREASED MOMENTUM.
- BRING OTHER PACIFICATION ELEMENTS, E.G., POLICE AND OTHER GVN MINISTRIES INTO PLANNING PROCESS FOR FIRST TIME.
- INSIST ON JOINT PROJECT AGREEMENTS TO INCREASE LEVERAGE AND INSURE GVN INVOLVEMENT.
- INCLUDE IN 1968 PLANS SECURITY AND OTHER MEASURES TO PREVENT REGRESSION IN 1967 PACIFICATION AREAS.
- PREPARE PLANS FOR POST-PACIFICATION PHASE INCORPORATING LOCAL DEVELOPMENT UNDER AEGIS OF VILLAGE COMMITTEES (IN CONJUNCTION WITH USAID).
- TAKE STEPS TO GIVE DISTRICT AND PROVINCE OFFICIALS GREATER SENSE OF PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO PACIFICATION PROCESS.
- CONVINCE GVN TO STREAMLINE BUDGET PROCEDURES FOR RELEASE OF FUNDS.

## MEASURES TO ASSURE PROGRAM IS CARRIED OUT

- ① COMPLETE DETAILED ACTION PROGRAMS (80% COMPLETE NOW) BY END JUNE.
- ② SEEK HIGHEST LEVEL GVN ACCEPTANCE IN PRINCIPLE. THEN NEGOTIATE PROGRAM SPECIFICS WITH MINISTRIES CONCERNED. GETTING GVN COMMITMENT WILL HELP MINIMIZE HIATUS IN RD DURING ELECTION CAMPAIGN.
- ③ USE PHASED APPROACH, WITH DEADLINES FOR EACH PHASE, AS INCENTIVE FOR GVN ACTION AS WELL AS FOR SYSTEMATIC PROGRAMMING.
- ④ INSTITUTE PERIODIC REVIEW & EVALUATION (ON US SIDE, MONTHLY REPORTS BY PROGRAM MANAGERS & CONSOLIDATED REPORT TO COMUSMACV).
- ⑤ INSERT PROJECT TAKEOFF PROGRAM REVIEWS INTO QUARTERLY REVIEWS OF AB 142 - COMBINED CAMPAIGN PLAN.
- ⑥ DEVELOP REVISED 1968 VERSIONS OF PROJECT TAKEOFF ACTION PROGRAMS BY 1 DECEMBER. EVEN IF INTERIM RESULTS IN SECOND HALF 1967 ARE LIMITED, SIX MONTHS OF PROJECT TAKEOFF EXPERIENCE WILL SERVE MAJOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSE IN GEARING UP GVN FOR ACTION DURING 1968.

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BRIEFING FOR THE JOINT STAFF  
ON THE  
STATUS OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT IN VIETNAM

Gentlemen, this briefing will examine the status of the Revolutionary Development Program in Vietnam as of the end of August and the progress which it has made to date.

CHART A ON

As you recall, the Revolutionary Development Program for 1967 was targeted on National Priority Areas, as indicated in orange on this chart. (PAUSE) Additionally, 26 provinces, as indicated in dark green, were assigned priority for the allocation of Revolutionary Development resources. (PAUSE) The red dots indicate the location of specific campaign areas which were selected because of important human and economic resources.

PAUSE - 5 SECONDS

CHART A OFF

CHART B ON

It was estimated at the beginning of 1967 that 4400 of the 12,000 hamlets in the country were already secure. 1100 additional hamlets were selected for pacification

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during this year. This figure has been raised to 1200 since the first of the year. The breakout of the selected hamlets by corps tactical zone is shown on this slide.

PAUSE - 5 Seconds

CHART B OFF

The assets required to carry out the 1967 Revolutionary Development program include tactical units to secure the area and Revolutionary Development teams to work in the hamlets with the people. As you recall, ARVN was assigned the mission of Revolutionary Development support as its primary mission during 1967. This mission involves providing security within campaign areas to the RD teams working there. Currently, the following ARVN forces are providing direct support to the RD program.

CHART C ON

(PAUSE) In addition there are 27 infantry battalions and a large number of RF and PF units which are committed to security type missions which provide indirect support to RD.

CHART C OFF

The dispositions and tactical areas of responsibility of the ARVN battalions which are providing direct support to RD within each corps tactical zone are indicated on the following four slides.

2  
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CHART D ON

PAUSE - 10 SECONDS

CHART D OFF

CHART E ON

One obvious problem is the small size of the area secured by a battalion. These areas, however, are where major elements of the population are located.

PAUSE - 5 SECONDS

CHART E OFF

CHART F ON

PAUSE - 10 SECONDS

CHART F OFF

CHART G ON

PAUSE - 10 SECONDS

CHART G OFF

Support is provided to the RD Program not only by the ARVN units which have this as a primary mission but also by many of the operations conducted by US and Free World forces.

CHART H ON

In this chart the 7265 battalion days of operations during August by all friendly forces, US, Free World and ARVN, are broken down by type of operation. Note that 73% of the entire ground combat effort during this month

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was in the conduct of operations which support the Revolutionary Development Program either directly or indirectly.

PAUSE - 5 SECONDS

CHART H OFF

The second major asset in the Revolutionary Development program is the Revolutionary Development Teams. These, as you know, are trained at Vung Tau and are deployed into the programmed hamlets to carry out the pacification of the hamlets. There are two main types of teams -- the standard 59 man Revolutionary Development Cadre Groups, and the montagnard teams. The following chart indicates the number of such teams which were operational each month during 1967.

CHART I ON

The top part of each bar represents the montagnard teams. Note that a change in the types of montagnard teams occurred in May. The former Montagnard Political Action Teams (MPAT) and Montagnard Civic Action Teams (MCAT) were combined into Truong Son Teams with a strength of 70 each. (The term Truong Son is the proper name of a range of mountains in the highlands and serves to identify the teams with the montagnard people. It is not translatable into English.)

Note that the number of RD Cadre Groups, which are indicated in the blue portion of each bar, fluctuated between 411 and 421 for the first five months of the year

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but has begun to increase since May. It is expected that the total number of RD Cadre Groups will reach 600 by the end of the year, and the Truong Son teams will reach 120.

Not shown on the chart are 32 special teams being employed in II Corps as an expedient to increase the number of hamlets which could be pacified during the year. These teams, which are known as Civil-Military Teams, are developed around a RF or PF platoon by the attachment of locally available technical and administrative cadre. They are employed in hamlets which have already attained a relatively high level of security, and they are expected to achieve only the initial steps of pacification. It is too early to make an overall evaluation of the effectiveness of these teams.

CHART I OFF

CHART J ON

This next chart will give a visual impression of the deployment of RD teams by type by province throughout the country.

PAUSE - 15 SECONDS

CHART J OFF

You will recall that the VC have been attacking the RD teams in an effort to disrupt the Revolutionary Development program.

CHART K ON

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The chart at the upper left shows the number of VC initiated incidents directed against RD personnel each month this year. Note the marked increase in these incidents since February and the peak in August during the pre-election period. The upper right chart shows the RD workers killed by the VC. Again note the peak in August. The bottom chart depicts the desertion rate. This increased markedly to a peak of 236 per thousand per year in May but has dropped every month since. This drop is encouraging, particularly so in August when the incident and death rates peaked.

## CHART K OFF

(PAUSE) You will recall that at the beginning of this year a new system, known as the Hamlet Evaluation System, or HES, was instituted as a management tool for the Revolutionary Development Program.

## CHART L ON

This chart depicts the number of hamlets rated in each category of the HES at the end of August. You will recall that the categories A, B, C, D & E portray a pacification spectrum, with A representing the most favorable situation from the point of view of the GNV, and E representing a bare minimum of government presence and influence within a hamlet. A VC hamlet is completely controlled by the VC.

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The "other" category on the chart includes primarily unevaluated hamlets.

Since all A, B & C hamlets were considered secure enough for the conduct of elections during the past year, most of the remaining charts of this briefing will lump A, B & C hamlets into the general category of "GVN Controlled" and will combine the D & E hamlets into the category of "Contested."

CHART L OFF

CHART M ON

This chart shows the control of hamlets within the country as a whole and within each Corps Tactical Zone as of the end of August.

PAUSE - 15 SECONDS  
CHART M OFF - CHART N ON

This chart is an actual machine printout of the locations of the hamlets in the various categories of the HES. This is taken from the HES tapes which are received each month from Saigon. The data here is for August. Note that there are a lot of red dots and very few blue in the Camau Peninsula in the south. The blue tends to predominate along the Bassac River and between the Bassac and the Mekong, and then a very heavy concentration of VC hamlets north of the Mekong up to Saigon. North of Saigon again there is a predominance of blue. Travelling farther north,

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the greater security and sparser population of II Corps are noticeable. It is possible to pick out the major roads by the dots along them. In I Corps again the red dots begin to predominate, with several district towns standing out as blue islands surrounded by a red sea.

FLIP 1 ON

This flip adds the D & E or contested hamlets, shown here in orange. This display is interesting in that it depicts the trend line or direction in which GVN security will go when adequate resources are available to upgrade the D & E hamlets to C. As you will remember, there are 2723 contested hamlets.

CHART N OFF

(PAUSE) Up to this point the charts have only presented data concerning the number of hamlets in each category of the HES. This does not present a complete picture of the situation, because it fails to account for people living in the urban areas and refugee camps and for the members of the Armed Forces. These non-hamlet people are under government control. Consequently, on this next chart, which is based on population rather than hamlets, these people are included in the blue.

CHART O ON

PAUSE - 15 SECONDS

CHART O OFF

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## CHART P ON

Here we see a comparison of population control and hamlet control. The more optimistic picture presented by the population chart is brought about by the large number of people residing in the cities and those who have abandoned VC areas for government controlled areas or refugee camps.

## CHART P OFF

## CHART Q ON

This chart indicates the five best provinces in the country and the five worst, based on percentage of population control. The more favorable security situation of II & III Corps as opposed to I & IV Corps is evident. An Giang, in Western IV Corps, is the best province in the country, rated 100% GVN controlled. An Xuyen, at the southern tip of the country is the worst, with 66% of its population and 75% of its hamlets under VC control.

## CHART Q OFF

Turning now to trends, the next two charts portray the results of the HES for each month from January 1967, when the system was first put into practice, until August. First the hamlets.

## CHART R ON

Note here that the "other" category was not initiated until June. (PAUSE - 5 SECONDS) The change here has been extremely gradual.

## CHART R OFF

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## CHART S ON

Here we see the population control trend through the year. In this case, the increase in GVN control is a little more noticeable, but the overall impression is again one of very gradual change.

## CHART S OFF

As I mentioned, the HES has only been in effect since last January. To get a picture of the trend of the war over a longer period, it is necessary to utilize the GVN's evaluation system. Though we consider it less valid than the HES, it is the only one that can depict the progress of pacification since the United States entered the war in force.

## CHART T ON

This chart was recently shown to the President and Mr. McNamara. It utilizes GVN data to show population control since the low point of December 1964. The bar to the immediate right of the large graph shows that by comparison, the August Hamlet Evaluation System data provides very similar results to those of the GVN for June. The three additional bars spaced across the chart represent an attempt to validate the GVN control data by examining voter registration and participation for various elections. The height of the total bar indicates the percent of the

<sup>10</sup>  
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total adult population which registered for that particular election, and the dark blue portion of the bar indicates the percent of the adult population which actually voted. Note the very close correlation between the registration for the recently completed presidential elections and the HES data for government control. The percent of the adults registered was almost identical with the percent of the total population in A, B & C hamlets. The two earlier elections do not correspond so closely, but they do tend to validate the general trend of increasing government control.

CHART T OFF

(PAUSE) You will recall that the HES score of a hamlet is a composite made from ratings on some eighteen separate indicators. By examining the changes in scores on specific indicators, we may gain additional information on the progress of the war.

CHART U ON

This chart indicates in green the number of hamlets by corps that were reported as having been freed from the military control of the local village guerrilla platoon during July and August. The red indicates the number of hamlets in which the guerrilla platoon succeeded in reestablishing control during the same period. Overall, the number of hamlets changing one way or the other on this item was only 1.8% of all hamlets in the country,

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again indicating that change is not occurring very rapidly at the bottom level. Note that the preponderance of the retrogressions occurred in I & II Corps. The decrease in overall security in I Corps because of the DMZ situation and the resulting troop redistributions could account for the increase in guerrilla control in the I Corps provinces during this period.

## CHART U OFF

As you are aware, General Giap recently published a series of articles openly advocating greater reliance on guerrilla warfare by VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam. These articles may reflect decisions previously arrived at by the Politburo. If this is so, the trend of guerrilla platoon control reported in the HES may provide the first real clue that the new strategy is being implemented.

(PAUSE) We have examined the status and trends of pacification within South Vietnam as a whole. How is the Revolutionary Development Program for 1967 working out? Is it going according to plan?

## CHART V ON

By and large, the Revolutionary Development Program is behind schedule. As indicated on this chart, only ten provinces in the country are considered to be on schedule. The major reasons cited for the lag are a slow start because of the Tet holidays and disruption of the program because of the election.

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CHART V OFF

CHART W ON

Here we see the HES status, as of August, of the 1200 programmed hamlets for 1967. During the year, each of the RD teams was scheduled to develop two hamlets. As of the end of August only 98 teams -- 20% -- had moved into their second semester hamlets. The remainder were scheduled to move by the end of September. Hopefully this will result in a shifting of most hamlets to the left of this scale, into the A , B & C categories.

CHART W OFF

(PAUSE) Two programs related to Revolutionary Development bear comment. First is the Chieu Hoi Program.

CHART X ON

With around 22,000 Hoi Chanhs already turned in by the end of August, this program was almost 100% ahead of 1966. However, it was dropping behind schedule for 1967. By the end of September, as shown on this slide, the third quarter figures showed a continuing decline from the first quarter high. The program will probably not achieve the 1967 goal of 45,000 but is still expected to greatly exceed the 1966 program.

PAUSE - 10 SECONDS

CHART X OFF

Finally, the refugee situation.

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CHART Y ON

PAUSE - 5 SECONDS.

Since 1964 close to two million refugees have come under government control. This year they have been coming in at a rate of almost 40,000 a month. This represents a tremendous loss to the VC of potential recruits, labor, food producers and intelligence assets. Unfortunately, the government is experiencing considerable difficulty in handling this vast influx of refugees, particularly in I Corps where there was an almost total breakdown in administration of the refugee program during the summer. As indicated in yellow on the chart; some 767,000 refugees throughout the country have never been resettled, and almost half of these are in I Corps.

As a result of the difficulties experienced in the refugee program during the summer, the CORDS organization was energized to take corrective action. Considerable improvements have been achieved during the past few months, but the program is still weak. You are aware that Senator Edward Kennedy is currently conducting hearings which have been probing the refugee situation.

CHART Y OFF

(PAUSE) In his summary of the RD situation at the end of August, Ambassador Komer specifically cited two major

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problems. The first was the refugee situation just discussed. The second was the slow progress being made in identifying and eliminating the infrastructure. Although the management structure designed to accelerate results in this field has been developing, results so far have been limited.

## CHART Z ON



In summary, at the end of August 53 ARVN battalions and 598 Revolutionary Development Teams were committed to the RD program. The government controlled 41% of the hamlets and 68% of the population. 22,000 Hoi Chanh's had turned themselves in this year, and 330,000 refugees. However, 767,000 refugees were still waiting for a home.

There continues to be steady progress in the Revolutionary Development Program, but no startling breakthroughs.

## CHART Z OFF

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CAMPAIGN AREAS



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## PROGRAMMED HAMLETS

1 JAN      31 AUG

I — 244      263

II — 393      439

III — 213      232

IV — 243      266

1100      1200

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ARVN UNITS IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT  
31 AUGUST 1967

ARVN BATTALIONS

53 (OUT OF 154)

RF COMPANIES

213 (OUT OF 832)


PF PLATOONS


755 (OUT OF 4028)

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






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DISPOSITION AND TAOR'S OF ARVN BATTALIONS  
IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT  
III CTZ




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DISPOSITION AND TAOR'S OF ARVN BATTALIONS  
IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

IV CTZ



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## LETTERHEAD POLICY OPERATIONS S. 2/PE

AUGUST 1987

TOTAL - 7233 BATTALION DAYS

SEARCH AND DESTROY

(REGIONAL)

1676 BN DAYS

23%

SEARCH AND DESTROY

(PROVINCIAL)

1385 BN DAYS

19%

SEARCH AND DESTROY

(LOCAL)

1234 BN DAYS

17%

73%

SECURITY OPNS

2662 BN DAYS

37%



RESERVE - 308 BN DAYS

4%

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# REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT TEAMS


1967



RD CADRE  
GROUPS



MPAT MCAT



TRUONG SON  
RD TEAMS

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
# DISTRIBUTION OF REVOLUTIONARY

DEVELOPMENT LEADS BY PROVINCE

261 1510718

• RD CADRE GROUP


• TRUONG SON TEAM





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## VC EFFECTS ON RD TEAMS

VC INCIDENTS AGAINST RD PERSONNEL




RD PERSONNEL KILLED BY VC

RD PERSONNEL DESERTION RATES  
(PER THOUSAND PER YEAR)

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## STATUS OF HAMLET'S COUNTRY WIDE

(AUGUST HES DATA)




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
## HAMLET CONTROL - AUGUST 1967

(HES DATA)


## COUNTRY WIDE




I CTZ




II CTZ



III CTZ



IV CTZ



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VE

HAMLET EVALUATION STATUS  
AUGUST 1967

AB AND C  
D AND E  
VC




SOUTH VIETNAM

VC


# POPULATION CONTROL - AUGUST 1967

(HES DATA)


## COUNTRY WIDE




I CTZ



II CTZ



III CTZ




IV CTZ

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
# HAMLET VS POPULATION CONTROL - AUGUST 1967

(HES DATA)


HAMLETS




POPULATION




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
# HAMLET STATUS TREND - 1967 (HES. DATA)



# POPULATION STATUS TREND - 1967 (HES DATA)



# SOUTH VIETNAM POPULATION CONTROL AND ELECTIONS



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## HAMLETS CHANGING STATUS IN SPECIFIC HES ITEMS

JUNE TO AUGUST 1967

## VILLAGE GUERRILLA PLATOON CONTROL OF HAMLET

GUERRILLA CONTROL REESTABLISHEDGUERRILLA CONTROL BROKEN

I CTZ

<u>60</u>	<u>24</u>
-----------	-----------

HAMLETS

II CTZ

<u>49</u>	<u>15</u>
-----------	-----------

HAMLETS

III CTZ

<u>14</u>	<u>18</u>
-----------	-----------

HAMLETS

IV CTZ

<u>17</u>	<u>39</u>
-----------	-----------

HAMLETS

SVN - TOTAL

<u>140 HAMLETS</u>	<u>96 HAMLETS</u>
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# PROGRESS TOWARD 1967 RD GOALS


31 AUGUST 1967

	PROVINCES ON SCHEDULE	PROVINCES BEHIND SCHEDULE
I CTZ	0	5
II CTZ	5	7
III CTZ	1	10
IV CTZ	4	12
TOTAL	10	34

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
## STATUS OF PROGRAMMED HAMLETS - AUGUST 1967

( HES DATA )



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## HOI CHANH



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# REFUGEE STATUS (CUMMULATIVE IN MILLIONS)

