

CONFIDENTIAL

135

SPECIAL JOINT NARRATIVE REPORTS  
on REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT:  
1967 - QUANG NAM PROVINCE (u)

## PERIOD ENDING:

30 APR 67  
31 MAY 67  
31 JULY 67  
31 AUG 67  
31 OCT 67  
30 NOV 67

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 703 and 704. The furnishing or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

From: MACV

1C4

73 135 603

CONFIDENTIAL

NOV 1967  
MACV

CONFIDENTIAL

## OFFICE OF THE SENIOR ADVISOR

QUANG NAM SECTOR - *PA 1744 - T-3*

ADVISORY TEAM #1, MACV

APO 96337

MACTN-QNS

4 May 1967

SUBJECT: Special Joint Narrative Report on Revolutionary Development.

Province: Quang Nam. Report for the Period Ending: 30 April 1967.

TO: Office of the Deputy Ambassador  
American Embassy  
Saigon, Vietnam

1. Status of the Revolutionary Development Plan. For reasons outlined in the February report the 1967 RD program in Quang Nam was seriously stalled when LTC Le Tri Tin took office as Province Chief on February 14. Subsequently, however, the program initiated by the new Province Chief has significantly improved overall RD performance in the province and has ~~been~~ far to ~~well~~ putting the work of the teams back on schedule.

All elements of LTC Tin's original program continue to function. The joint US-GVN Coordinating Committee has met regularly and has proven to be effective in identifying problem areas associated with RD, organizing GVN and free world assets to deal with these problems, and in following up to assure their ultimate solution. The joint US-GVN Intelligence Coordination Center continues to operate and has succeeded in directing increased attention to the improvement of RD intelligence efforts. The RD field inspection program has identified numerous specific points which required improvement.

As a direct result of the inspection program a series of specialized training sessions have been initiated to improve the technical competence of individual RD workers. Another result of recommendations stemming from field inspections was the development of improved and simplified RD supply procedures. Also during April new procedures designed to expedite approval of RD self help materials were implemented. Finally an exhaustive survey of the security situation of every RD team in province was completed during the month and forms the basis for detailed discussions with US and Vietnamese security forces in an effort to further improve the security of the teams.

The ARVN directed Hung Quang I (Phase II) Campaign in support of revolutionary development is slightly behind schedule due in a large part to the redeployment of ARVN engineer units to other high priority projects. ARVN's general level of performance in this operation remains very high, however, and ways in which the program can be expedited are currently being studied.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MACTN-QNS

4 May 1967

SUBJECT: Special Joint Narrative Report on Revolutionary Development

2. Political/Psychological.

a. General: Both factions of the VNQDD Party in Quang Nam are strongly opposed to ARVN participation in local government in as much as both are extremely eager to control all key positions within the province. The party is therefore naturally interested in the current village elections and both factions have significantly increased their political activity during April. In this regard, however, it is important to note the factions have concentrated on improving their political positions at district and provincial level and have devoted relatively less effort toward the village elections. Party infighting frequently makes it appear that the two factions are more interested in their internal power struggle than in the larger effort against the Viet Cong. Party machinations during April continued to include instances of VNQDD leaders attempting to misuse government programs including RD to increase their own personal power positions. As the Province or District Chief attempt to correct such abuses he is immediately brought under considerable fire by the involved faction of the party. In as much as most civil leadership candidates in Quang Nam are connected in one way or another with VNQDD there is sometimes a tendency for the Province chief to bring in outsiders to staff key positions. LTC Tin is finding that this solution frequently serves to unite the two factions in their attack on both himself and any new official brought in.

At the present time principal VNQDD leaders are making the charge that Quang Da Special Zone Commander, Colonel Nguyen Duy Hinh, is a secret Dai Viet and is working in cooperation with I Corps Commander General Hoang Xuan Lam to fill all key provincial positions with Dai Viet leaders in an effort to increase Dai Viet power position during the forth coming presidential elections. Colonel Hinh flatly denies this and states that he is completely uninterested in politics.

b. VIS: It is hoped that the assignment of Nguyen The Sung to the previously vacant post of VIS Chief will stimulate VIS performance. A joint US-GVN Psywar Council composed of representatives of all interested agencies in the province is being formed in an effort to better coordinate all aspects of psychological operations within the province. The council met twice during April on an ad hoc basis to consider specific subjects. It is hoped that in the future council meetings can be put on a more regular basis and a wider range of subjects can be considered.

c. Election Activities: During April, 83.5% of the total listed voter populations in 30 Quang Nam villages actively participated in as many village elections, filling 66,857 ballot envelopes to elect 284 village council members from among a total of 365 candidates. During the first set of elections, on April 2nd, 89.6% of the total listed voters of seven villages

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MACTN-QNS

4 May 1967

SUBJECT: Special Joint Narrative Report on Revolutionary Development

filled 9,545 ballot envelopes to elect 60 council members from a total of 88 candidates. On a rainy 16 April, following violent, pre-dawn enemy activity in three election areas, 76.3% of the listed voters of nine villages filled 28,254 ballot envelopes to elect 92 councilmen from a total of 112 candidates. During the last scheduled election, on 30 April, 89.4% of the listed voters of 14 villages filled 29,058 ballot envelopes to elect 132 council members from a total of 165 candidates. Province expects to hold elections during June in the six villages where elections were, for various reasons, postponed during the month. While it is, of course, still too early to determine the ultimate effect these elections will have on the RD program, the Province Chief is quite optimistic and has high hopes that they will make significant contribution toward convincing the people that the GVN is sincere in its efforts to work for their best interests.

d. Minorities, Political, and Religious Groups: Both factions of the VNQDD are actively working to organize government employees in the province. Many minor officials and clerks working at Province Headquarters are said to have complained to the Province Chief that they are being "pressured" into joining the party organization against their wishes. LTC Tin stated that a number of these people have actually requested to be transferred out of I Corps. He also said that he is simultaneously being pressed by the two party factions to facilitate their respective organization drives. This situation developed late in April and as of the end of the month the Province Chief was still considering what action, if any, he should take on this matter.

Although not presently as involved in politics as they were a year ago, the Buddhists are currently reestablishing their organization in Quang Nam Through the reactivation of Pure Buddhist Family Associations. The senior bonze in province is Thich Chon Phat. He is a known moderate and has not in the past involved himself overly in local politics. He is, however, presently being assisted by several radical younger bonzes, who have in the very recent past made public statements indicating their disapproval of present GVN leadership.

### 3. Security.

a. General: The overall security situation as regards RD in the province, during the month of April, remained about the same. There were four significant incidents initiated by the VC against RD Teams. Three of these incidents occurred during the predawn hours of 16 April and were specifically directed at disrupting the village elections. RD casualties were 1 KIA and 3 WIA. On 19 April a VC mine killed 1 RD worker and 1 US Marine, and wounded 1 US Marine and 1 RD worker. The incident occurred on highway 5 in Dai Loc District.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MACTN-QNS

4 May 1967

SUBJECT: Special Joint Narrative Report on Revolutionary Development

b. Enemy Situation: VC activities reflected a moderate decrease for the month as compared to the March reporting period. The total VC initiated incidents for the month is still higher than the monthly average for the past six months. Approximately 33% of the 137 VC initiated incidents for the month occurred in the National Priority Area. Major VC activities were directed at disrupting lines of communication, undermining the RD effort, and small scale terrorist activities. All indications are that these type activities will continue for the month of May.

c. Infrastructure: There was little if any change in the basic structure of the VC infrastructure in the province during the month but the mission of VC cadre in secure and contested areas was clearly directed toward adversely influencing the village elections. Guerrilla elements have continued to support the local and main force units with terrorist activities. The majority of these incidents have occurred in southern Hieu Nhon District in the NPA and along highway 1 in Que Son District between Huong An Bridge (BT 146457) and Ba Ren Bridge (BT 101511).

d. Friendly Situation: Three battalions of the 51st Regiment and the 59th RF Battalion continue to provide support to Phase I of the National Priority Area. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions have relocated approximately 130 families into the resettlement hamlets of Yen Ne and Le Son in Hoa Vang District. Plans are now being made to begin the second period of the resettlement operation in eastern Hoa Vang during the month of July. The 59th RF Battalion and the 1st Battalion, 51st Regiment continue to provide civic action support and security to the new life hamlets in central Hoa Vang District.

Five multiple battalion search and destroy operations were conducted south and west of Hoi An city in the districts of Duy Xuyen and Que Son. Two of these were combined USMC/ARVN operations. Results of the operations were: Friendly - 6 KIA and 27 WIA; Enemy - 103 KIA and 47 WIA.

During the reporting period senior Vietnamese commanders continued to stress security. Emphasis was placed on the defense of outposts, bridges, and district headquarters. Additionally, substantial improvements were made in the defensive positions around Hoi An City.

4. Economics. No Change.

5. Provincial Resources in Support of RD.

a. RD Cadre Teams: Two very successful 3 day training courses were given to RD workers selected from all 23 teams presently in province

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MACTN-QNS

4 May 1967

SUBJECT: Special Joint Narrative Report on Revolutionary Development

in the fields of Census Grievance and Psychological Warfare.

b. Self-Defense Forces: 140 Hamlet Self-Defense cadre were given 16 days of training in weaponry, ambush, counter-ambush, hamlet defense and patrolling by Team 6 in Thanh Nam Hamlet. Team 7 held a retraining and re-organization course for 80 self-defense cadre on Cam Nam island.

c. Technical Cadre: During the month ARVN engineer units supported by USMC, NSI, OCO and GVN Public Works made significant progress in the reconstruction of the Hieu Nhon District Headquarters building which was blown by the Viet Cong in March. It is hoped that construction will be completed in May. Construction of the more remote Thuong Duc District Headquarters building also blown by the Viet Cong in March is behind that at Hieu Nhon due to construction difficulties and a reduction in the number of engineer troops available in province. Efforts are underway to speed up construction of Thuong Duc.

d. Police: During April advisory effort was directed at increasing the use of PFF in the field. At the present time one company (minus) is deployed in province but lacks a number of items of authorized equipment. The Police Chief submitted a request for this equipment through his channels at the end of the month. Follow up action is being taken through normal Public Safety Advisory channels.

e. Provincial Administrative Personnel and Organization:

(1) In general, village and hamlet officials are cooperating with RD teams satisfactorily. At district level, however, political considerations frequently detract from the satisfactory performance of government officials dealing with the RD program. The Province Chief is of course, fully aware of these problems and seems to be sincerely attempting to resolve them wherever possible. The basic problem as outlined in 2a above is exceedingly difficult, however, particularly as it effects worker discipline and it will clearly require considerable additional attention before it is satisfactorily resolved.

(2) A formal briefing program by the OCO Province Staff was initiated during the month through which the Regimental Staff and Battalion Commanders of the 7th USMC Regiment, newly arrived in province, were briefed on all OCO programs. Special emphasis was placed on the RD Program and specific procedures for military-civilian coordination were developed.

6. Required Actions. Additional RF companies will be required for the Hung Quang I Campaign once the operation is completed. These companies will be needed to provide permanent security to the resettlement hamlets in the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MACTN-QNS


4 May 1967

SUBJECT: Special Joint Narrative Report on Revolutionary Development

area and conduct denial type operations in the cleared areas. Recruiting has begun for one RD company and three PF platoons for Hoa Vang District. This is considered inadequate, however, since once the resettlement and clearing phases are complete, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 51st Regiment are to be released for similar type operations in other portions of the National Priority Area.



ALBERT A. FRANCIS  
PROVINCE REPRESENTATIVE, OCO  
Quang Nam Province



FRANCIS B. KANE Jr.  
LTC INF  
Senior Advisor

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORM

OFFICE OF THE SENIOR PROVINCE ADVISOR  
CIVIL OPERATIONS & REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT  
QUANG-NAM PROVINCE

2

2 August 1967

To: Headquarters, COMUSMACV, APO 96222  
Via: Commanding General, III MAF/Senior Advisor, ICTZ  
Subj: Special Joint Narrative Report on Revolutionary Development, Quang-Nam Province, report for period ending 31 July 1967  
Ref: (a) Joint OCO/MACV Directive Number 2-67  
(b) COMUSMACV Msg 031039Z May 1967  
(c) COMUSMACV Msg 220226Z Jul 1967

1. STATUS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PLAN.

The month of July produced two dramatic Viet Cong incidents that may be wrongly interpreted as a degradation of the overall security atmosphere of Quang-Nam Province, i.e., the rocket attack on the DANANG Air Base and the HOI-AN prison attack, both on 14 July. It is important to note that these two incidents, devastating though they were, have not altered the security situation in Province.

RD progress is considered to be on schedule with a significant increase in the number of projects completed during the month by a majority of RD Teams. Administrative processing of project approvals, materials, availability and transportation of materials to sites experienced a signal improvement. The Province Chief, Lieutenant Colonel LE-TRI-TIN, has devoted a great deal of personal effort to boosting the RD endeavor through numerous, unscheduled visits to team locations; constant emphasis to District, Village and Hamlet Chiefs concerning the importance of the RD program; and, maintaining a thorough knowledge of the problems, status and conduct of the overall program.

The second phase of HUNG QUANG I Campaign commenced on 1 July in the Eastern HOA-VANG District area. Search and destroy operations were conducted by the Third Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment, followed by site selections and census operations to locate the resettlement hamlets. Construction of housing, public facilities and hamlet support activities are continuing on the first phase of this campaign in western HOA-VANG and eastern HIEU-DUC Districts. A reallocation of military forces now has the First Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment in the HIEU-DUC area attempting to continue the resettlement in DUONG-LAM and DUYEN-SON Hamlets; the 2d Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment is providing security in the central portion of the HUNG-QUANG operating area around YEN-HE and LE-SUH resettlement hamlets; the 3d Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment is conducting the second phase of the campaign in eastern HOA-VANG district.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

HUNG-QUANG II Campaign in southern HIEU-NHION District commenced in Mid-July. This operation is primarily a security support operation around the RD Teams located in the areas adjacent to HOI-AN.

2. POLITICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL.

a. General. Quang-Nam Province is by tradition a politically active area. With the announcement in July of the official slates for the Presidential and Senatorial races, the simmering political pot has come to a full boil. Both VNQDD factions have changed support of candidates several times each according to where each faction could obtain the best deal. The Radical Buddhists (Trich Tri Quen) have indicated that they will attempt to obstruct the elections unless THIEU and KY resign. The DAI-TET's and Catholics have been fairly quiet thus far. While Quang-Nam has none on the Presidential slates, there are 23 Quang-Nam Candidates running for the Senate.

The most significant incident of a political nature during July took place in DUC-DUC District. On 6 July, the VNQDD lured the District Chief, Major NGUYEN-LAM, into attending a VNQDD holiday celebration, then turned the celebration into a demonstration against him, all pre-arranged ahead of time. The District Chief was confronted with a list of his alleged crimes and forcibly held at the demonstration site for approximately five hours during which time both he and his official position were abused. To secure the District Chief's release and prevent his RF troops from using force to rescue him, the Province Chief sent his Deputy for Security, the Province Police Chief and a VNQDD Central Committee member to talk with the demonstrators. The end result so far has been the transfer of Major LAM to the 1st ARVN Division in THUA-TIEN Province. Rumor persisted during the month that the VNQDD planned similar incidents in other districts; however, to date no further incidents have taken place.

Four District Chief's were changed during July. Captain DANG-VAN-TIEN replaced Major HU in DUC-DUC; Captain NGUYEN-DINH-SUONG, District Chief of QUY-SON exchanged assignment with Lieutenant LE-VAN-DAP, District Chief of DUY-NUYEN; and, Captain DANG-VAN-YAN, District Chief of DAI-LOC was relieved by Lieutenant General LAM, I Corps Commander for alleged illegal transactions and will be replaced about 1 August by Captain TRAN-QUOC-DONG.

b. VIS. The joint US-GVN PSYWAR Council continued to emphasize participation in planning, support and training operations. The major theme during the month's activities was preparation for the coming national elections; leaflets, posters and taped radio messages are being prepared to provide wide dissemination throughout the Province.

Plans to implement the use of television broadcasts within the PSYWAR arsenal have been set-back due to the technical inability to relay the signal from the HUE station to Quang-Nam Province. This plan is still considered to be potentially outstanding PSYWAR program and therefore merits further investigation.

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORM

Plans to implement the use of television broadcasts within the PSYWAR arsenal have been set-back due to the technical inability to relay the signal from the IUE station to Quang-Nam Province. This plan is still considered to be a potentially outstanding PSYWAR program and therefore merits further investigation.

The use of the VAN-TAC-VU Teams during July was curtailed due to the loss of several members of both teams. The remaining members were grouped into one team to continue scheduled performances. This program is still one of the single most valuable assets to the PSYWAR program.

An improved interrogation program for Chieu-Hoi processing was implemented during the month in cooperation with the National Police Special Branch.

c. Election Activities. The postponed elections of village official's of SON-KUAN Village, QUE-SON District were held on 9 July. Of 995 registered voters, 941 or 94.5% participated in the elections re-scheduled from May. They cast 6,202 individual ballots or 82% utilization to elect 8 village councilmen of 9 candidates. Re-scheduled elections were also held in SON-THAM Village, QUE-SON District on the same day, however, the results have been contested and the province has forwarded the entire files to GVN for a decision.

The high percentage of utilization reported for the SON-KUAN Village elections is not explained by any firm information at this level; however, the postponement may have generated interest plus the very political nature of QUE-SON District, with an active VNQDD Party, may have influenced the turnout.

d. Minority Political and Religious Groups. Minority groups have been quiet during the month. The incidents involving the more recalcitrant, larger political factions overshadowed any activities involving minority elements if indeed there were any at all.

### 3. SECURITY.

a. General. The provincial security situation as regards RI operations remains virtually the same as previous months, despite the psychological effects of the 14 July Rocket Attack on DA-MG Air Base and the HOI-AN Prison attack. Viet Cong initiated incidents have actually decreased slightly during this reporting period in comparison to previous months. There were 34 incidents reported in July as compared to 107 last month. There was an increase of incidents within the National Priority Area. RI Teams were involved in four Viet Cong contacts resulting in one (1) RI Worker KIA and one (1) RI Worker WIA. On 3 July, Team 15 in TUY-LOAN Hamlet, NIEU-DUC District, successfully repelled an attack by a Viet Cong Platoon with no casualties suffered. On 7 July, Team 16 in LONG-XUYEN Hamlet, DUY-QUYEN District was attacked by an estimated two (2) companies of VC.

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORM

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FURN

The RD Team and local PF were able to prevent the Viet Cong from penetrating further than the outer edges of the hamlet. Local inhabitants reported that the VC suffered five (5) KIA and five (5) WIA. Eight (8) civilian houses were destroyed during the engagement; the RD Team rebuilt them the following day. On 8 July, Team 19 in CONG-DONG Hamlet, QUE-SON District was informed by local inhabitants that a VC team had entered the hamlet. The RD Team and local PF drove off the VC in a running fire fight. The VC kidnapped three civilians who were released the following morning unharmed; they reported that they had been interrogated about military strength within the area. Also on 8 July, Team 10 in BONG-KHUC Hamlet, DIEN-BAN District was attacked by two companies of the VC's V-25 Battalion. This action accounted for the VC casualties noted above. The VC kidnapped 28 young people, killed one civilian, destroyed the Village Office and burned one civilian house.

b. Enemy Situation. Main Force and Local Force units are believed to be concentrating on preparations for operations during late August and early September to harass and disrupt the National Elections. Indications are that local force strength has been reduced considerably due to recent friendly operations. Guerrilla activities have been directed primarily toward assassination's, kidnaping, arson and similar terrorist activities. VC distribution of forces indicate a continuation of small unit activities with the capability of massing for large scale attacks on limited objectives. A new, battalion sized unit has been reported in the eastern DUY-NUYEN District area; it has been tentatively identified as the 539th NVA Battalion.

c. Infrastructure. The 14 July prison attack in HU-LAI resulted in the release of more than 800 political prisoners. Intelligence reports indicated that many of these escapees are undergoing re-training and will be returned to their localities in the near future. The return of these cadre to VC ranks will increase their capacity to oppose the coming elections as well as create a better operating atmosphere for VC military units.

It is estimated that there are 2,027 VC Political Cadre in Quang-Nam Province, subdivided as follows:

Provincial Cadre:	607
District Cadre:	850
Village Cadre:	500
HU-LAI Cadre:	80

It is estimated that the basic biographical data has been collected on more than 75% of the VC Cadre in Province; emphasis is now being placed on obtaining more detailed information to facilitate their location and apprehension. Special Branch Intelligence operations and the Province Interrogation Center (PIC) are expanding their efforts to identify, locate and capture or eliminate the infrastructure. The five District Intelligence Operations Coordination Centers (DIOCC) in Province are progressing in their efforts to create sufficient files on leading VC Cadre in each District to enable reaction forces to locate them. Coordinate operations of PULLAF, IP, Census, Grievance, River Rats and the Province Renaissance Unit are being conducted more frequently against VC Cadre. Collection of information and establishment of active files continues to show progress.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

d. Friendly Situation. ARVN and FVN AF's continued to provide enthusiastic support to the Revolutionary Development Program throughout the Province. The distribution of military forces in direct support of RD efforts in the NIA was covered in paragraph 1, above.

(1) Six (6) major operations were conducted by sector during the month of July. The purpose of these operations was to improve security conditions along Highway 1 in DUY-XUYEN and QUÉ-SON District's, and to provide protection to the southern portion of the NIA. Results of these operations were: Friendly - 3 KIA; Enemy - 11 KIA (confirmed) and 36 detainees.

(2) QUANG-DA Special Zone conducted one major search and destroy operation during 12-17 July. This joint US-ARVN operation included the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment; 1st Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment; 37th and 39th Ranger Battalions; and, the 3rd Troop, 4th Armored Cavalry Squadron. The operation took place in southwestern DAI-LOC District. ARVN results of the operation were: Friendly - 11 KIA, 45 WIA, 1 MIA; Enemy - 43 KIA (confirmed), 162 KIA (probable), 18 captured, 13 individual weapons captured. Subsequent interrogation reports and captured documents indicate that contact had been made with the N-20 Local Force Battalion and that at least two companies had been destroyed. It is believed that the operation significantly improved the security of RD operations in DAI-LOC and DUC-DUC District's.

(3) Both HUNG-QUANG Campaigns were highlighted in paragraph 1, above.

(4) The 4th Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment and the 59th RF Battalion continue to provide security and conduct civic action programs in southern HOA-VANG District in support of the ten RD Teams in that portion of the NIA.

(5) The 5th Marine Regiment (-) moved into southern QUÉ-SON District during the month and it is believed that planned operations in that area will further enhance RD progress in the southern portion of the Province.

#### 4. ECONOMICS.

a. General. The rumor reported last month concerning the AN-HOA Industrial Complex in DUC-DUC District was confirmed in mid-month by a classified dispatch from COMUSMACV stating that Governor HANH, Minister of Economy, intended to "freeze" the project for security reasons. It was indicated that HANH desired a 100% guarantee of security before he would expose equipment valued at 25 million dollars. Governor HANH and party visited AN-HOA on 18 July and evidently received a favorable impression as a result of briefings conducted by Mr. LE-THUC-CAN, Chief Engineer of the complex and various others involved in security including the Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment based at AN-HOA.

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORM

It is understood that operations will be allowed to continue, but that the completion schedule will be extended. The importance of this decision to continue operations cannot be over-emphasized. The very fact that the project ~~itself~~ exemplifies the nation building goals necessary to the Republic of Vietnam is paramount to progress. In addition, this decision relieves tension within this semi-isolated, highly political and refugee populated district. The refugee support provided by the complex under the leadership of Mr. CAN is a vital program, one that would be virtually impossible to replace if the complex were closed. Refugee's are trained in technical skills, employed by the complex and even provide material support within their various hamlet-camps. It is interesting to note that the security question developed complimentary statistics pertaining to the 13 months tenure of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment. Prior to Marines being assigned to the area, the complex sustained 30 KIA at a result of VC attacks during the year. There has been no KIA since the battalion's arrival, nor any losses to equipment, while some 6,582 tons of material have been moved overland from DA MNG to AN-10A on a road that had not been open for 2½ years.

b. Material Resources and Transportation. Vehicle availability for the movement of ID materials inter-province continues to be inadequate. Of the six provincial ID trucks on hand, only three are capable during the average month. The National Maintenance Program Team, operating within ICTZ is attempting to solve the spare parts availability problem while continuing the survey to implement the maintenance shop system.

#### 5. NEW LIFE DEVELOPMENT.

The agriculture program continues to be one of the most successful programs in province. The pilot model Taiwan plow reported last month was field tested in several districts and observed by farmers, Farmers Association and Cooperative members, and Provincial Officials. Considerable interest was exhibited with the result that the Farmer's Cooperative placed an order for 30 plows to be distributed for further field testing. The Farmer's Association also demonstrated the recently purchased Japanese-made Tractor-Tillers in several districts. They intend to rent the tractor-tillers to farmers to help increase crop yield; the rent will, in turn, pay for the tractors. The HA-THAM lan project is progressing slowly due to mechanical failures and minor technical difficulties, but the Marines anticipate completing the project prior to the rainy season as planned. During the month, the HIEU KHOU District Farmer's Association distributed 40 water pumps to farmers for small irrigation projects. The first meeting of the Provincial Agriculture Committee was held on 15 July; chaired by Mr. NGUYEN NHAN, Deputy Province Chief for Administration, and including representatives of each provincial agriculture service, the Finance Service Chief, the Economics Service Chief and the NLD Agriculture Advisor. This committee is a milestone for provincial agricultural development efforts.

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORM

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORM

CONFIDENTIAL

Self Help projects during the month manifestly increased in both numbers and quality. This significant upswing is due in large part to the fact that the long vacant billet for the Self Help Advisor was filled in June, providing a much needed, full time technical advisor to the field.

MILPHAP Team, I-2 continued to provide technical guidance to the Provincial public health program. The MILPHAP Commander has been highly successful in promoting improvements in hospital operations, increased visits to hamlets and districts by public health teams and technical assistance to GVN hospital equipment maintenance.

The District Representative concept introduced the first of the year has proven to be the key to extending the advisory effort to the mass-roots level of government. We now have District Representatives in all three National Priority Area District's, and one District Representative at-large to cover the other six districts within Province. The effectiveness of this program can be measured in the fact that provincial officials, military commanders and district officials all highly praise the harmony of operations prevalent in these districts now manned. In districts without a full-time representative, it is encouraging to hear strongly worded requests for assignment as soon as possible. The District representative in effect operates as a one-man CORPS unit, involved with the full scope of HLI programs in support of PD.

#### 6. CHIEU-HOI.

During the month of July 57 Hoi-Chanks were received in the Chieu-Hoi Center (24 military and 33 political). The total number of Hoi-Chanks undergoing training in the center is 132; dependents include 21 wives and 46 children. Twenty-four Hoi-Chanks were released from the center and relocated to controlled hamlets within Province.

Political reorientation courses continue to be conducted by Provincial Chieu-Hoi staff mentors; course materials include "Vietnam and the World Situation"; "The Reconciliation Policy"; "The Vietnam Constitution and Elections"; "The Communist Betrayal and Plot to Control South Vietnam"; and the "Role of the People in the Struggle for Independence". Classes are scheduled for a minimum of two hours per day, the remaining time is devoted to vocational training, interrogation, recruitment interviews by Kit Carson advisors, and self help projects to improve the center.

Twelve Hoi-Chanks were graduated from the DANANG Polytechnical School Vocational Training Program as mason's during the month. The provincial vocational training program suffers from a lack of instructors for formalized classes, however informal training is conducted in tailoring, barbering and cement block construction. CARE provided three sewing machines and NAE provided cloth to support the tailor classes.

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORM

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

A two-week training seminar was conducted in HOI-AN for the 55 man Armed Propaganda Team utilizing VIS, Chieu-Hoi and PsyOps Advisors as instructors. The seminar emphasized political reorientation and the art of psychological operations with public speaking, organization of meetings, use of generators and movie projectors and self-defense techniques as practical application phases for each team member. Upon completion of this training, the class was organized into 15 man teams and conducted psychological operations in NCA-VANG and DAI-LOC District's in conjunction with ARVN, VIS and district campaigns.

#### 7. REFUGEE.

The refugee program within Province continues to suffer lack of organization, administrative detainment of funds, inexperienced refugee cadre and reluctance on the part of the Refugee Service Chief, Mr. DUONG. Coupled with an extremely high percentage of refugees generated throughout Province, the program is reduced to coping with emergencies rather than fulfilling approved program goals. Despite this fact, the program is continuing through support from FMMF, certain ARVN units, district officials and others close to the problem. Emphasis continued to be placed upon improvement of camps within the NPA.

During the month, a Refugee Relief Mobile Team was assigned to Province and is currently working in DAI-LOC District, the scene of the recent ARVN BINH QUANG VI operation. It is too soon yet to evaluate the results of their efforts.

Social Welfare programs were reorganized as a result of a joint US/GVN conference held on 11 July. All aspects of the program were reviewed and evaluated and plans formulated to provide monthly issues of food commodities to each category.

#### 8. PROVINCIAL RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF RD.

a. RD Teams. Two very successful training programs were conducted during July for selected members of each RD Team in Province. Militia Leaders were provided formal instruction and practical application in cooperative security planning and coordination; intelligence collection organization; hamlet defensive preparations; ambush techniques; warning systems; map reading; and, small unit tactics. Construction workers were provided classroom and practical application instructions in construction techniques; cement mixing; concrete block fabrication; simple planning tips; construction layout and actual erection of a latrine in the recently acquired site for RD Team training and processing in HOI-AN.

Teams 26 and 27 recently completed in-province training emphasizing the importance of initial impressions of the team in the hamlet; local problems in the hamlets to which they will be assigned; and, the importance and philosophy of the RD program. The teams were assigned to AN-NY and CAN-HO Hamlets, NIEU-DUC District.

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORU

CONFIDENTIAL

b. Self Defense Forces. Training of hamlet self defense forces continues to show progress. Team 2 completed an extensive program of training a force of 69 men and women in LO-GIANG Hamlet, HOA-VANG District. A significant feature of this program was the support provided by the 59th RF Battalion; they provided arms, ammunition and technical assistance. The group completed the course with a day's familiarization firing at the HOA-CAM Training Range. Considerable effort is still required to insure that each hamlet self defense unit can in fact carry out their duties after the RD Team departs the hamlet.

## c. Biannual Report of Self Defense Strength.

Hamlet	RD Team	Male	Female	Uniforms	Weapons
<u>HOA-VANG DISTRICT</u>					
LIEN LAC	1	40	29	69	0
LO GIANG	2	38	31	49	0
NUU DONG	3	31	16	0	0
NUU THO	4	0	0	0	0
QUA GIANG	11	20	20	50	0
GOM DAU	12	60	0	0	30
PHONG NAM	13	42	18	0	0
AN NGAI TAY	14	0	0	0	0
	23	(RD Team recently assigned)			
QUANG CHAU	24	(RD Team recently assigned)			
<u>DIEN LAM DISTRICT</u>					
BONG LAI	9	11	12	0	0
DAIG KHIONG	10	23	27	0	0
THAM CHIEM	20	(RD Team recently assigned)			
<u>HIEU NHU DISTRICT</u>					
XUYEN TRUNG	5	8	11	0	0
THAM NAM (CH)	6	78	62	0	0
THAM NAM (CN)	7	14	0	0	0
THAM NAM (CN)	8	33	35	0	0
AN MY	26	(R Team recently assigned)			
CAM PHO	27	(RD Team recently assigned)			
<u>HIEU DUC DISTRICT</u>					
TUY LOAN	15	30	0	0	0
<u>DUY XUYEN DISTRICT</u>					
LONG XUYEN	16	59	0	0	0
TEA XUYEN	17	31	16	0	25
<u>QUE SON DISTRICT</u>					
XUAN THUONG	18	20	16	0	10
CONG DONG	19	20	0	0	7
<u>DUC DUC DISTRICT</u>					
PHU DA	21	21	0	0	0

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORM

CONFIDENTIAL

## DAI LUG DISTRICT

PHUOC AY	22	16	0	0	0
----------	----	----	---	---	---

## THUONG DUC DISTRICT

BA SAN	25	19	0	0	0
--------	----	----	---	---	---

(Weapons are sorely needed for this program. I Corps has been requested to provide them to the Province Chief for assignment).

d. Technical Cadre. In general, the quality and effectiveness of GVN technical cadre is satisfactory, with a few that are classified as outstanding. The enthusiasm and effectiveness demonstrated by Mr. NGUYEN HUU NHUNG, the Provincial Works Chief, places him in the latter category though he has been on the job a relatively short period of time. On the other hand, the Refugee Chief, Mr. DUONG constantly exhibits reluctance, lack of responsiveness and a careless attitude about his job.

e. Police. The National Police programs continue to be hampered by lack of equipment, internal organization problems, and obvious reluctance to incorporate the full range of capabilities available to promoting a unified police effort. Mr. NGUYEN DAI TOAN, The Province Police Chief, appears to be reluctant to support the Province Interrogation Center (PIC), the Special Branch Intelligence operations and the Hamlet Information Programs. He has demonstrated that he will support only those programs that will produce personal rewards for himself; as a result, the on-going programs are less effective.

The Police Field Forces (PFF) continue to await the release and issue of their TO&E and as a result are not committed to the field.

f. Provincial Administrative Personnel and Organization. The Village-Hamlet Officials Training Program completed the first phase of training during the month. This GVN program was considered to be highly successful; a CORPS provincial officer monitored and contributed as a guest seminar speaker during the entire course.

A noticeable increase in the effective responsiveness by provincial administrative echelons to districts, villages and hamlet problems were observed during the month. Slow reactions during the past have changed to an acute awareness of timely response particularly to RD project submittals and decision processing.

The CORPS RD Briefing program started several months ago continued to present the philosophy of RD, coordination required between FAP and GVN activities and emphasizing the importance of utilizing GVN channels, to improve units operation in Province. This program has proven to be a very effective effort that has produced tangible results in the overall RD program in Province.


CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORM

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORM

CONFIDENTIAL

O  
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS.

Additional RV/PF units are still required to increase local security within the operation areas. The redistribution of RVN forces within the NPA mentioned in paragraph 1, above, will influence that areas security. However, as RD Teams near completion of their missions and self defense forces remain under strength and ill-equipped, the continued security of Ap Boi Noi remains in jeopardy without an increase in RV/PF units. RVN units within Quang-Nam Province are spread over an extremely large, traditionally contested area; the addition of troops, though obviously a military decision, would clearly increase the security potential.

  
L. D. PUCKETT  
Senior Province Advisor  
Quang-Nam Province

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORM

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE SENIOR ADVISOR  
QUANG NAM SECTOR  
ADVISORY TEAM #1, MACV  
APO 96337

QN May 67

MACTN-QNS

4 June 1967

SUBJECT: Special Joint Narrative Report on Revolutionary Development.  
Province: QUANG NAM. Report for Period Ending : 31 May 1967.

TO: Office of the Deputy Ambassador  
American Embassy  
Saigon, Vietnam

1. STATUS OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PLAN.

During May, Province Chief LTC LE-TRI-TIN continued to address himself to basic problem areas in the RD program. As a result of his leadership during the three months that he has been Province Chief the overall RD program has made considerably more than satisfactory progress. Of particular note during May was his firm action in disciplinary matters. For the first time in this province, infractions of regulations by RD workers were actually punished. Deserters were expelled from the program and, if eligible, were drafted into ARVN. A blacklist has been compiled of all RD workers who have been dishonorably discharged and will be used to assure that none are inadvertently given positions in other programs.

The new RD leadership is also continuing its efforts to improve the efficiency of RD headquarters. A number of excess headquarters personnel have been transferred to the field and some ineffectives have been dropped from the program entirely.

As a result of recommendations made in the provincial RD security survey (April SJR) PRC-10 radios have been issued to all teams to strengthen their communications capabilities. Both MACV and RD advisors are devoting increased attention to finding additional ways to assist the teams in further improving their overall security posture. In this regard the Province Chief has been encouraged to personally visit each of the teams and to interest himself in all of their problems including security. During May, LTC Tin visited about half of the teams. Additional ARVN engineer troops were assigned during the month to the Hung Quang I (Phase II) campaign, replacing those which were earlier reassigned to other high priority projects. Work is once again proceeding at a satisfactory pace.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MACTN-QNS

4 June 1967

SUBJECT: Special Joint Narrative Report on Revolutionary Development.

2. POLITICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL.

a. General: Recent action in disciplining RD workers and replacing inefficient RD headquarters personnel continues to stimulate concern within the VNQDD political party in Quang Nam. Inevitably party members are among those being relieved of duty and some vague threats were made during May that "political trouble" might develop if these policies were continued.

Local VNQDD leaders are unanimous in their opinion that Quang Da Special Zone Commander Colonel Nguyen Duy Hinh is a secret Dai Viet leader and is systematically replacing key RD personnel with secret Dai Viet's so that he can control the politically important RD program during the September presidential elections. Interestingly, VNQDD opinion is divided as to the political orientation of the Province Chief, LTC Tin. Some VNQDD argue that he is not a Dai Viet while others concede only that he is "clever than most" in hiding his secret affiliation with the Dai Viet party. It is commonly believed among VNQDD leaders that LTC Tin's Chief of Staff was recruited into the Dai Viet party during May and that most ARVN officers in province whether actually members of the Dai Viet party or not are supporting Colonel Hinh's plans to put his followers into positions wherein they can influence the forthcoming elections.

b. VIS: The new VIS Chief, Nguyen The Sung, is developing well. He is attempting to rejuvenate an aging VIS equipment inventory and to get available psyops equipment into the field. The joint US-GVN Psywar Council met several times during May. Efforts continue to be made to regularize its meetings and to expand the scope of its responsibilities.

c. Election Activities: On 28 May the first set of Quang Nam Hamlet Elections were held. 18,098 out of 24,378 voters, or 74.1%, in 42 hamlets of nine districts voted to elect 42 hamlet chiefs and three deputy hamlet chiefs from among a total of 105 candidates. No overt, violent enemy activity was reported associated with any of these elections. Per district, turnout varied from a high of 97.4% in two hamlets of Que Son District, to a low of 65.8% in 13 hamlets of Hieu Nhon District. No other elections activities were scheduled for May.

d. Minorities, Political and Religious Groups: During May the two rival factions of the provincial VNQDD political party reached an agreement to halt their interparty struggle at least until after the September presidential elections. This agreement is reported to have been imposed by the provincial leaders by party leaders at the regional and national levels as part of a general attempt to obtain increased party discipline during the forthcoming national elections. The present relationship between the two factions is at best tenuous and the local VNQDD leaders are slow to take any positive steps toward real cooperation with one another.

Page 2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MACTN-QNS

4 June 1967

SUBJECT: Special Joint Narrative Report on Revolutionary Development.

Buddha's birthday was celebrated during the month without major incident. Ceremonies lasted for about three days throughout most of the province and were well attended. Little of political content was noticed in any of the open Buddhist meetings, however at least one secret meeting was held by radical bonzes in the provincial capital during which considerable anti-government sentiment is reported to have been expressed.

An unidentified Dai Viet leader from Da Nang called on the Province Chief early in the month. According to LTC Tin the purpose of the call was to urge him not to give support to the VNQDD party candidates during the forthcoming presidential and national assembly elections. The Province Chief said that he had absolutely no intention of backing the VNQDD, Dai Viet, or any other political party and that he had not yet received any official guidance reference the presidential elections ~~and that~~ he was worried lest both President Thieu and Premier Ky decide to run and ~~both~~ put informal political pressure on the Province Chiefs for support.

3. SECURITY.

*IN THIS REGARD HE SAID THAT*

a. General: The overall security situation as regards RD in the province during the month of May remained about the same as during the previous month. There were four significant VC/ED contacts during the month. Team 5 received three rounds of 82mm mortar fire on 30 May killing one villager and wounding two others. No RD workers were injured. Team 19 was attacked on 4 May by an estimated VC Company. Contact lasted two hours and resulted in five villagers KIA, and two RD workers WIA. VC casualties were five probable KIA. The RD team lost one PRC-10, four carbines, one grenade, and one pistol. Team 16 ambushed 2 VC units trying to infiltrate their hamlet on 6 May. The RD team captured three Chinese Communist type grenades and a belt of machinegun ammunition. VC casualties unknown. No friendly casualties. On 25 May Team 25 set out an ambush that accounted for one VC KIA.

b. Enemy Situation: VC initiated incidents for the month of May have remained steady when compared to the last reporting period. The breakdown of incidents for the reporting period shows a slight increase in mortar attacks, kidnappings and attacks on small units. Approximately 2% of the 130 VC initiated incidents for the month occurred within the National Priority Area. An increase in incidents was also noted within the western Hoa Vang portion of the National Priority Area. Several small unit attacks highlighted the VC activity for the month of May. The VC are expected to continue with their harassing and terrorist activities intermixed with attacks on small units. However, if the opportunity should arise the VC can attack with up to a regimental size force.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MACTN-QNS

4 June 1967

SUBJECT: Special Joint Narrative Report on Revolutionary Development.

c. Infrastructure: The status of the infrastructure in Quang Da Special Zone remains the same. The guerrillas will continue to support the local force and main force units in the National Priority Area and the rest of the Special Zone. On 31 May Captain Do Xuan Thiet defected to GVN control at Que Son District. This man supplied good immediate tactical intelligence, and it would be advantageous to Quang Da Special Zone for Captain Thiet to be retained at province level.

d. Friendly Situation: During the month of May, both ARVN and FWMF continued their whole hearted support of the Revolutionary Development Program. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions of the 51st Infantry Regiment, and the 59th Regional Force Battalion, conducted search and destroy and pacification operations within the National Priority Area. The 4th Bn, 51st Inf Regt participated in a 12 day training exercise at the Hoa Cam Training Center in order to improve their effectiveness in support of Revolutionary Development. The Vietnamese Air Force continued to provide transportation for supplies and foodstuffs destined for remote areas. Both ARVN and USMC units participated in major security operations during the conduct of hamlet elections on 28 May. Joint USMC/ARVN County Fairs and Medcaps were also conducted throughout Quang Da Special Zone.

#### 4. ECONOMICS.

a. General: The general economic situation in the province remains basically unchanged from the previous month. Price fluctuations were minimal in basic commodities. During the month, however, construction commenced on a number of wells, classrooms, latrines, etc., in the various New Life Hamlets. Villagers living in these hamlets are obviously pleased with the projects and feel that their general standard of living has been improved by them.

b. Material Resources and Transport: The new Public Works Chief, Nguyen Huu Phuong, appears to be more energetic than his predecessor and, for the first time in over 2 years, road crews are working on the Province's main highways. It is hoped that the minimal repairs they are able to make will hold these roads together through the next monsoon season.

5. New Life Development: During May, OCO advisors coordinated with USMC engineers and work started on the repair of the Ha Thanh irrigation dam. This dam, which provides irrigation water for about 1500 hectares of land in the National Priority Area, was damaged during the past monsoon season. Construction of the Chuong Pho Dam also started during the month. This is a new salt water intrusion dam being constructed under the 1967 budget which will provide protection for 150 hectares of rice land. The Provincial Irrigation Section is supervising its construction. An important element in both of these projects has been the willingness of the farmers

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MACTN-QNS

4 June 1967

to willingly participate in construction activities.

6. CHIEU HOI:

The Chieu Hoi Service began using the new Chieu Hoi Center during May. The physical plant at the new center is a considerable improvement over the old location. The new center is, however, located in a somewhat more exposed position on the edge of Hoi An town. Two new bunkers have therefore been built for additional Regional Force personnel to bolster defense of the area. A new latrine is being constructed at the center and plans are being made for the construction of a permanent kitchen/dining facility and additional living quarters for Hoi Chanh.

At the present time the Armed Propaganda Team does not possess any weapons. The possibility of arming these men is being looked into. In this regard, however, it is important to note that the former Chieu Hoi Chief was an ardent VNQDD organizer and it is commonly believed that the APT's in this province are responsive to the political direction of the Ho Van Anh faction of the VNQDD. This has stimulated considerable local concern lest the APT's use their weapons for local political purposes. The Province Chief is, however, currently reviewing his predecessor's decision not to arm the APT's.

7. REFUGEE.

Increased attention is being given refugee problems in this province and specific recommendations are being formulated for presentation to provincial authorities. During May the Province Chief was shown a number of the basic problem areas in the field and has agreed that concerted action must be taken to improve the program in Quang Nam. Hopefully at least some improvements will become evident during the next report month.

8. PROVINCIAL RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF RD.

a. RD Cadre Teams: Three very successful two day training courses were given to RD workers selected from all 23 teams presently in province in fields of Communications, Administration, and Poultry Care.

b. Self-Defense Forces: Teams 1, 2, and 5, held training courses for combat youth during the month.

c. Technical Cadre: ARVN engineers completed the Hiếu Nhơn District Headquarters building during May and will complete improvements in its defensive positions during June. Construction of the Thượng Đức District Headquarters building was expedited somewhat during May, but is still lagging due to supply problems. These problems should be resolved during June.

d. Police: Even though the TO&E equipment requested for the PFF (April SJR) has not yet been received, PFF did accompany USMC units in field

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MACTN-QNS

4 June 1967

operations during May. Early receipt of this equipment would be extremely useful in encouraging the PFF to increase their field operations. Follow-up action on this request continues to be taken through normal Public Safety Advisory Channels.

e. Provincial Administrative Personnel and Organization:

(1) The RD S2 was relieved of duty during May creating an important vacancy in the RD Headquarters staff. The position will be filled in June.

(2) The RD briefing program initiated in April for regimental staff of 7th Marines was expanded during the month to provide formal briefings to company level officers and senior NCO's of the 3rd and 2nd Battalions, 7th Marines.

9. REQUIRED ACTIONS: None.

for *H. F. Cook*  
ALBERT A. FRANCIS  
PROVINCE REPRESENTATIVE, OCO  
Quang Nam Province

*J. F. Kane Jr. M.A.T.*  
for *J. F. Kane Jr. M.A.T.*  
FRANCIS B. KANE Jr.  
LTC INF  
Senior Advisor

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

OFFICE OF THE PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR  
MACCORDS, QUANG-NAM PROVINCE  
APO 96337

GES:AJP:rcg  
1 December 1967

To: Office of the Deputy Ambassador, American Embassy, Saigon  
Via: Commanding General, III MAF/Senior Advisor, ICTZ  
(Attn: CORDS Joint Staff)

Ref: Joint MACV/JUSPAO/USAID/OSA Directive Number 4-67

PROVINCE REPORT  
(RCS-MACCARDS-01-67)

QUANG-NAM PROVINCE (03)

Period Ending 30 November 1967

1. STATUS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PLAN:

(C) The 1967 Province RD Plan is behind schedule, primarily because territorial security is unstable, at least as it affects revolutionary development activities. Increased enemy incidents (see paragraph 4, below) during November negated the slight gains experienced during October when the security situation showed some improvement.

(C) Material support to the RD program suffered during the month because of transportation problems resulting from the destruction of several key bridges and other traffic delays caused by an increase in VC mining incidents. Also, transportation resources were required almost exclusively for support to the massive increase in refugees in Dai-Loc, Duc-Duc and Que-Son Districts.

(C) Twenty-five New Life Hamlets programmed for the first phase of the plan and three in the second phase have been completed. In a strong effort to complete ten New Life Hamlets in the second phase, the Province has assigned two RD Teams each to four hamlets and plans to assign two RD Teams each to six other hamlets, for a total of twenty RD Teams to the ten remaining incomplete New Life Hamlets. This should facilitate completion of the program by the end of January 1968.

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

2. (U) Project TAKEOFF. As specified in Paragraph 2 of Annex R to Joint MACV/JUSPAO/USAID/OSA Directive Number 4-67, reporting on the general status of Project TAKEOFF progress, lack thereof, problems and their related solutions, is integrated into the appropriate sections of the Province Report and CORDS Field Program Reports.

3. POLITICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL.

a. (C) General. Among both local citizens and government officials there is an attitude of relief at the end of election activity and its accompanying disruptions. In at least one district, popular interest in the operation of local government has been sustained, and led to non-violent action against a corrupt official.

A large cross-section of religious, political and minority groups in DUY-XUYEN District joined in demanding the dismissal of the District Chief, Cpt NGUYEN-DINH-SUONG, whom they accused of selling altered identification papers, trade contracts and commodities intended for use by the people. The Province Chief reacted swiftly to the citizens' petition and removed Cpt SUONG from office.

A committee headed by the province Deputy for Security is investigating the charges against Cpt SUONG. There is some indication that the militant Buddhists and VHK (Quang) faction of the VNQDD are attempting to influence the committee's work to reflect adversely upon the Catholic group in DUY-XUYEN. The Province Chief has taken a firm stand against attempts to sabotage an objective report from the investigating committee.

Early in November Cpt JAMES J. DORSEY, USMC completed his tour as CORDS/POD representative in QUANG-NAM, and was succeeded by Cpt MATTHEW J. MARSHALL, USMC.

b. (U) VIS. Despite the continued absence of the VIS Chief, Mr. NGUYEN-THE-SUNG, VIS operations have continued without interruption. Mr. TRAN-QUANG-VINH, who assumed responsibility during Mr. SUNG's illness, has directed VIS propaganda efforts toward the enormous refugee population recently arrived in DUC-DUC and DAL-LOC Districts, making use of the VIS Van Tac Vu Team.

c. (U) Election Activities. There have been no election activities in QUANG-NAM Province during the month of November.

d. (U) Minorities, Political and Religious Groups. Protest activities among militant Buddhists have not materialized in the past month; such activity had been anticipated in the aftermath of lower house elections.

2.

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

4. SECURITY.

a. General. The general security situation in province during November continued to deteriorate. There were 124 enemy initiated incidents reported during the month as opposed to 99 last month. Major attacks were launched against refugee camps throughout the province by main force VC units resulting in heavy civilian casualties, destruction of over 600 dwellings, wide spread terror and an obvious psychological impact. The enemy continued to interrupt traffic along routes of communication, destroying bridges and culverts, utilizing command detonated mines, small ambushes and harrassing sniper fire. There were five enemy incidents directed against RD Teams during the month as opposed to one last month.

b. Enemy Situation. Significant enemy actions during the month were:

(1) LOC-MI, LOC-AN, LOC PHONG, PHIEM-AI and AN-MY hamlets were attacked by VC units of varying strengths utilizing mortars, automatic weapons and small arms against defending RD Teams. Casualties were:

<u>FRIENDLY</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>
KIA 5	KIA 0
WIA 7	WIA 5 (informants information)
MIA 1	CIA 2

(2) During the early morning of 2 November, VC units conducted coordinated attacks against several locations in DAI-LOC District. Focal points were the AI-NGHIA Hamlet and bridge, CAP C-4 (near TAM-HOA Hamlet), the Refugee Camp at TAM-HOA Hamlet, and a USMC Platoon Base (M/3/7). The VC destroyed 150 houses (majority within the Refugee Camp); 10 USMC KIA; 1 RD Cadre KIA (Team 22); 1 RD Cadre WIA; and 6 civilian KIA and unknown civilians WIA.

(3) During the early morning hours of 5 November, the VC destroyed one span of the TU-CAU bridge (Anderson Trail) and the GIAP-BA bridge on Highway 1 in DIEN-BAN District. Diverisionary attacks preceded these two incidents.

(4) During early hours of 6 November, VC units conducted coordinated attacks on HOI-AN (Hieu-Nhon District), VINH-PHUOC (Dien-Ban District) and a number of ARVN, RF and FF unit locations in DUY-YEN District. Hoi-An was mortared and an estimated platoon overran a bunker utilizing B-40 rockets. Several mortars hit the city resulting in 7 civilians KIA.

3.

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

In VINH-PHUOC, the VC kidnapped 48 civilians, killed 3 civilians and burned 3 houses in a terrorist raid. The DUY-XUYEN attacks resulted in 3 RF KIA, 10 PF KIA and 2 Civilians KIA.

(5) On 8 November, the VC conducted several large scale attacks in DAI-LOC, HIEU-DUC, DIEN-BAN and DUY-XUYEN Districts, all obviously well coordinated. CAP C-1 and Refugee Camps in LOC-AN and LOC-PHONG Hamlets, DAI-LOC District were primary targets, casualties were: 3 USMC KIA; 4 RF KIA; 9 PF KIA and 24 civilians KIA. There were 278 houses destroyed. Enemy casualties were: 29 KIA confirmed and 50 KIA probable. A reaction force from the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines averted a complete disaster. DUONG-LAM and DUYEN-SON "Peace" Hamlets in HIEU-DUC District were attacked by a sapper team while an estimated platoon of VC engaged the defending ARVN forces and CAP B-3 and B-4. Casualties were 1 USMC KIA, 7 ARVN KIA and 1 PF KIA. There were 17 houses destroyed in DUONG-LAM and 1 house destroyed in DUYEN-SON. The VC kidnapped 26 civilians and destroyed 106 of the 110 houses in the PHU-CU Refugee Camp, VINH-PHUOC Village, Dien-Ban District.

(6) On 12 November, 6 members of A Company, 37th Signal Battalion attached to MACV Advisory Team #1 (Hoi-An) were killed by a command detonated explosive, believed to have been a 750 pound bomb, while traveling on Highway 538 east of Hieu-Nhon District Headquarters.

(7) On 14 November, 11 PF of the XUYEN-CHAN Platoon, DUY-XUYEN District were KIA in an ambush by the VC as they were clearing the road from highway 1 into DUY-XUYEN District Headquarters. A large number of weapons were also lost.

(8) The VC entered VINH-PHUOC Village, Dien-Ban District again and kidnapped 15 civilians during the night of 23 November.

(9) Automatic weapons fire inflicted heavy damage to a U. S. Army helicopter flying in support of MACV Advisory Team #1 at noon on 25 November as the helicopter was leaving Hoi-An airstrip. Casualties were: 2 U. S. Army WIA.

(10) At about 2000 hours on 26 November, the VC attacked CAP S-1, east of Hieu-Nhon District Headquarters and at the same time hit the District Headquarters with 2 rounds of mortar fire resulting in 12 USMC WIA. VC swimmers dropped the center span of the THANH-QUIT bridge on highway 1 in Dien-Ban District.

In addition to the enemy units reported previously, USMC and USA units reported making contact with elements of the 2d NVA Division (Quang-Tin Province based) in Duc-Duc and Que-Son Districts. POW's indicate that two additional NVA Rocket Battalions have entered this Province if confirmed, this would bring the total to five NVA Rocket Battalions operating in Province.

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

The enemy continued to possess the capability of mounting up to regimental sized ground attacks supported by mortars and heavy rockets against friendly forces and installations. It is estimated that priority targets of the enemy will continue to be RD and pacification efforts, including refugee camps. A definite increase in mine incidents (24 reported on major LOC's) is anticipated in addition to the continuation of classic terrorist activities, kidnapping and harassment.

c. Infrastructure. In continuation of the significant infrastructure detection of 18 October, Sector S-2, Police Special Branch and National Police have succeeded in uncovering and arresting a total of 62 political and security members of the local VC infrastructure. One of the most important arrests involved Mr. TRAN-NGOC-HUY, an employee of the Province Land Service who was discovered to be the Hoi-An Chairman of the National Liberation Front. This particularly fortunate break in what is considered to be a well structured and apparently successful operation throughout Province has provided stimulus to the ICEX effort.

Construction and administrative organization of the new (Province) Intelligence Coordination Center neared completion and operating procedures were put into effect to establish the collection and dissemination of intelligence.

d. Friendly Situation. QUANG-DA Special Zone (QDSZ) provided units to Sector (Province) for military operations but did not conduct any major operations on its own during November. QUANG-NAM Sector conducted eight military operations of which three proved of interest.

(1) ARVN. Operation PHI-PHUNG-48 was conducted on 1 November by the 1stBn, 51stARVNRegt and accounted for three VC KIA and assorted arms captured with no friendly casualties. Operation PHI-PHUNG-52 was conducted during the period 11-13 November by the 1st Ranger Group and 2/4 Cavalry Troop accounting for two VC KIA and 1 VCS; friendly casualties were one KIA and one WIA. Operation PHI-PHUNG-55 was conducted 23-24 November by the 1stBn, 51st ARVNRegt, 2/4 Cavalry Troop and 2 RF Companies accounting for six VC KIA, 3 tons of rice and 120 liters of gasoline destroyed; friendly casualties were 3 WIA. The 3dBn, 51stARVNRegt is undergoing refresher training in the Hoi-An area. The 51stARVNRegt continues in direct support of RD.

(2) Regional Forces. Besides the two RF Companies involved in ARVN conducted operations noted above, several RF Companies participated in other QUANG-NAM Sector operations. The 59thRFBn continues in direct support of RD with the 57thARVNRegt; a total of 13 RF companies support RD.

(3) Popular Forces. In addition to supporting the USMC CAP Program, 15 PF Platoons are in direct support of RD efforts. PF units throughout Province continued to participate in static defense roles,

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORM

District operations and routine patrolling in their adjacent areas. Support of PF units (food, weapons, utilization) were the subject of increased interest at Sector and Sub-Sector levels as a result of discovering misuse of personnel and poor support procedures.

(4. US/FWMAF. USMC units conducted two major operations during November. Operation LEEZEE was conducted in Duc-Duc District during the period 6-17 November and resulted in 65 NVA KIA (confirmed), 125 NVA KIA (Probable), 7 VC KIA (Confirmed), 40 VC KIA (Probable), 2 NV POW, 16 detainees and 3500 pounds of rice evacuated; friendly casualties were 37 KIA and 122 WIA. Operation FOSTER was conducted in Duc-Duc and Dai-Loc District with results reported to date of 10 NVA KIA (confirmed), 3 NVA KIA (Probable), 92 VC KIA (confirmed), 305 VC KIA (probable), 8 POW, 65 detainees, 8 individual weapons captured and 87 tons of rice evacuated; friendly casualties were 21 KIA and 123 WIA. The operation ended at 301200L Nov 1967. Current statistics are not available for operations conducted by the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cav Div operating in southern Que-Sou District.

Operation TATTOO, the Province water ways denial program is continuing with minor successes reported this month. The relatively few night missions flown by "Lighting Bug" during November reported a decrease in river traffic, however, "Lighting Bug" missions have not been available to Quang-Nam Sector in sufficient numbers to control the water ways nor to provide an accurate evaluation of river traffic.

#### 5. ECONOMICS.

a. (C) General. Success in improving the standard of living in rural areas has varied with local security conditions and the availability of transportation for materials. Even in Ap Doi Moi, attempts to raise the living standard have little pacification value if popular participation is lacking. For this reason US and TCVN advisors are advocating more hamlet-village discussion meetings on 1968 self-help projects before they are approved.

Eleven funded self-help projects were completed this month in Ap Doi Moi, and another eleven in Ap Tan Sinh; seven were finished in other hamlets. Of the unfunded projects proposed for 1967, 90% have been completed, almost all with the assistance of FWMAF units.

The success of the resources control program is far from complete. Purchases of food and building materials on the black market are heavy and, judging from their availability through the Province, continue to flow through checkpoints.

6.

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORM

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORM

No specific enemy efforts at dislocating production have been reported. Because mining incidents have increased during November, the regular flow of materials along National Route 1 has been interrupted for periods of one or two days. Movement along Highway 536 between VINH-DIMH, HOI-AN and PHUOC-TRACH Villages has been similarly delayed, generating temporary price hikes on a few items.

Anti-inflationary measures adopted by USMC units in QUANG-NAM have been extended to prohibit use of Lambretta shuttle taxis by US personnel. As reported many times in the past, prices in markets near FWMAF installations are inflated. Frequent repairs made necessary by military road traffic have improved the quality of main highways in the Province.

While retail market prices have not changed substantially during the month, the price of labor has risen. Local contractors have been obliged to match the high salaries offered to semi-skilled laborers in Danang. If wage competition continues, worker shortages may eventually effect rural construction in QUANG-NAM.

A shortage of labor is also felt in the agricultural sector; wages for farm laborers have risen from a reported VN\$60-70 in early 1966 to VN 150-180 per day late in 1967. Judging from his interest in buying labor saving devices, however, the farmer has more money to spend than in 1966. This is probably explained by an increase of around 25% (GVN estimate) in vegetable production during 1967. Vegetable production is expected to increase by the same amount in 1968, due primarily to the encouragement of US advisors, increased availability of vegetable seed and fertilizer, and a greater number of refugees growing vegetables on small plots. Rice production is expected to maintain the 1967 level of 72,000 tons unless the area of secure land is reduced.

b. (U) Material Resources and Transport. As previously reported, truck freight rates have risen sharply. The higher cost of transportation has all but halted commercial shipment of gravel from HIEU-DUC District to HOI-AN.

#### 6. PROVINCIAL RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF PACIFICATION.

a. (C) RD Cadre Teams, Truong Son Cadre and Other RD Teams. Increased enemy activity during the month of November has limited the ability of some RD Cadre Teams to operate effectively. Progress has

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORM

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

nevertheless been made in attacking infrastructure and in augmenting popular self-defense groups. RD Cadre Team 29, installed at HOA-THAI village, HOA-VANG District only this month, has already captured six VC infrastructure members; the team's motivation has improved considerably since returning from Vung-Tau training in October.

At present 30 RD Cadre Teams are deployed in 26 hamlets in all districts of the Province; four hamlets have two teams each, and six additional hamlets will shortly receive combined teams. The decision to combine teams was reached by the Province Chief, who wishes to insure that planned construction in 1967 Ap Doi Moi will be completed on schedule.

A representative from Saigon arrived in the province to investigate claims by 47 RD Cadre that wounds they received in the past are still incapacitating. These cadre, who continue to draw pay without performing their regular duties, will be sent to Danang for a hospital examination and returned to their teams if found fit.

Until recently few RD Cadre Teams had regular contact with headquarters personnel outside of monthly paymaster visits. In an effort to keep teams adequately informed, visiting groups have been expanded to include both a US advisor from headquarters and a CORDS rural development officer. Visiting groups hold a meeting with village officials and the local National Police Chief; a US military advisor and his Vietnamese counterpart are also present.

In line with Project TAKEOFF goals of expanding and supplementing RD Teams, GVN officials and US advisors have implemented Ministry recommendations for 1968 recruitment. The Province Chief has instituted a system of more stringent background investigations on prospective cadre. Candidates are given the opportunity to live and work with a cadre team for a short period during which the team leader may judge the individual's potential and performance.

Assistant team leaders will attend a leadership training course at the National Training Center during December. A twenty day course given by the PsyWar and Planning Section was completed late in the month at various team locations.

b. (C) Statistical Census-Grievance. As a means of increasing the effectiveness of the overall SCG effort under Project TAKEOFF a careful redeployment of cadre assets was begun in November. Cadre strength was reduced from 300 to 287 through termination of ineffective cadre,

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORM

voluntary retirement and elimination of cadre receiving dual salaries. The Province Chief has acted enthusiastically in investigating cadre suspected of drawing from two payrolls; of four cadre whose activities were scrutinized, three were found guilty and terminated.

The effects of redeploying cadre have been beneficial in many cases. Total cadre reporting is up almost 15%; dissemination of intelligence reports has increased; grievance reporting has doubled; Hoi Chanh brought in by SCG cadre numbered five this month against none in October.

Because of the reduction in cadre forces, there has been a substantial drop in the number of hamlet and village residents interviewed. Reports on popular aspirations are also down by approximately 6%. Reduced reporting is explained equally by the general deterioration of security in QUANG-NAM; VC activity in rural areas makes it increasingly difficult for cadre to remain overnight in hamlets and villages.

Intelligence collection remains the principal mission of the SCG Center, and in the present month 20 SCG cadre have been assigned to work in DOIC or PIC Centers. This necessary emphasis on the basic mission of SCG has weakened the Center's overall grievance-aspiration reporting effort. In order to increase responsiveness in this field, the US advisor has planned with the CORDS New Life Development representative for a rapid response program to meet needs articulated through SCG cadre. Hopefully such response will increase popular good faith in the SCG program and encourage the people to supply information on enemy intentions and activities.

Other proposals for expanding SCG effectiveness include a system of token rewards and citations for cadre who are personally instrumental in bringing Hoi Chanh to the Government side.

Changes in SCG pay procedures were continued in November as cadre pay scales were modified to conform with Saigon directives. Though the salaries of many cadre were reduced, there have been only two instances of resignation. The MORD payment system has been adopted because of its built-in controls against improper procedure and payroll "ghosts."

A six-day workweek has been declared for SCG personnel; actually the longer week had been instituted at the QUANG-NAM Center two weeks before it became official GVN policy. The SCG Cadre Chief, Mr. NGUYEN MINH HUY, will in future require all personnel working in the

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORM

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

Center to acquire a basic knowledge of English. The US advisor has offered financial support for the project if a qualified local instructor can be recruited.

c. (C) Self-Defense Forces. On 25 November, RD Cadre Team 28 completed training of a new RD People's Group composed of 25 men and 24 women. Team 28 is located in CAM NAM village of HIEU NHON District.

The new team raises the province total of RD People's Groups to 25. Lack of sufficient weapons has delayed plans made under Project TAKEOFF for arming all groups.

d. (C) Technical Cadre. Though all technical cadre working in support of the province RD plan lack extensive training, they are capable of meeting the basic requirements of Ministry programs. Were technical knowledge improved through continuing training, cadre effectiveness in transmitting skills to others would increase. Most cadre have acquired a degree of familiarity with their programs but lack practical experience. There are agricultural cadre, for instance, who do not come from farm families and who are not able to resolve practical problems. Unless future training includes a period of relevant work experience, technical cadre will continue to offer the people little more than textbook advice.

Much of the delay in implementing Ministry programs is administrative; streamlined regulations would allow cadre to make available the materials and demonstrations needed for high impact field operations in QUANG-NAM.

e. (C) Police. Activities in developing law and order during the month have focused on expanding National Police control in secure areas. While police complacency and poor security have discouraged program implementation in other parts of the province, the secure areas have been systematically searched for illegal residents, draft evaders and deserters.

In the area of Chieu Hoi registration, the US advisor suggested that Chieu Hoi authorities coordinate registration with the National Police; as a result registrations have been carried for groups of returnees rather than on an individual basis. The identification card program has continued; 350 cards were issued in November, bringing the total to 445,444.

A decree from the Directorate General of National Police has placed resources control activities under the Administrative Block (Uniform Force). Previously responsibility fell to a Special Block. Ten checkpoints and two mobile checkpoints function in the province.

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

Of the total National Police force in QUANG-NAM, approximately 50% work outside the province capital. In rural areas these police enjoy more prestige among the people than their urban counterparts, though there is still widespread reluctance to report crimes and enemy activity for fear of retribution.

The National Police Field Forces have participated in operations with the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry on three occasions. In direct support of the RD Program, PFF conducted two platoon size operations, both night ambushes which brought no contact. Additionally, PFF furnished 15 squad size patrols in the area of Hoi-An.

The 109th NPFF returned from training in DA LAT, and a full-time US advisor, Mr. ROBERT UTTER, assumed duties on the last day of the month.

#### 7. PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL AND ORGANIZATION.

a. (C/NF) GVN Personnel and Responsiveness. The quality of administrative personnel and their responsiveness to the needs and aspirations of the people varies among government divisions. The administrative Service Chief, Mr. NGUYEN TAO, is a respected career civil servant who has held office since the DIEM period. Considering the number of extraordinary projects requiring Mr. TAO's attention (elections, FWMAF requests for land use, among others), his office has a fair record of efficiency. Understaffing is a legitimate problem in all provincial offices, but is not infrequently used as an excuse for incompetence and intransigence among officials.

The Province Chief, LTC LE TRI TIN, has worked to influence administrative operations in favor of popular needs though he must deal continually with the political pressures peculiar to QUANG NAM Province and the corruption common to all areas.

b. (C/NF) Effectiveness of Officials in Pacification. Two factors undermine the effectiveness of province-level officials in implementing pacification programs. The first is a lack of cooperation among military officers and civilian Service chiefs; a second difficulty is the political rivalry which discourages mutual trust among officials.

During the recent influx of refugees in DAI LOC and DUC DUC Districts, neither province nor district-level officials made creditable efforts to meet emergency relief needs. Neither the Refugee Service Chief nor his assistant were present in the province during the first week of the emergency.

11.

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

Only through the actions of US advisors and USMC units were commodities released and distributed. The Refugee Chief has yet to dispatch registration personnel to the affected areas and has ignored SCR authorization to hire as many such workers as necessary.

Political parties exert an especially strong influence over the tenure and performance of officials at district level. With the departure of Mr. TRAN TRONG SIN from his post in HIEU NHON District and the appointment of Opt VO VAN SANG as District Chief, all district governments in QUANG-NAM are headed by military officers. Their interest in pacification varies as greatly as their individual competence as officers and administrators. Three District Chief's have been removed during 1967 on charges of corruption and incompetence, reflecting no credit on remaining district officials or on the pacification program as a whole.

Few village and hamlet officials have the talent of arousing community interest in pacification projects. The training program for these officials is weakened by lack of material on group leadership, the planning of agendas and assessment of community needs and resources. GVN assistance programs for villages and hamlets are nowhere adequately described for the benefit of officials or their constituents.

c. (C) RD Councils. During November the Provincial RD Council has been concerned almost entirely with the preparation and submission of the 1968 RD Plan. Consequently, some minor delays have occurred in the processing of requisitions from district councils for NLD materials and commodities.

d. (U) Special Coordination Arrangements. The coordination of US advisory efforts and GVN activities is maintained by frequent advisor-counterpart meetings at all levels, which obviate the need for special arrangements.

e. (C/NF) GVN Effectiveness in Pacified Areas. The administrative shortcomings already discussed apply equally to pacified areas. Even in the nominally pacified district of HOA VANG, local officials are reluctant to visit areas where Government response is immediately required. In the present month a major plague epidemic was averted at NUI KIM SON only through the efforts of US advisors; HOA VANG District officials took no initiative in reporting or controlling outbreak of the disease. Refugee relief problems have received only irregular attention by officials in the same district.

12.

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

8. (U) USAID/JUSPAO. No questions requiring response have been received during November.

9. REQUIRED ACTIONS.


a. (C) Project TAKEOFF. No actions specifically identified with Project TAKEOFF are required at this time. It is suggested, after several months experience with this management tool, that its identity as a priority program be abandoned. Such action would further simplify monthly reporting requirements without really affecting the emphasis placed on these important pacification objectives.

b. Other Actions.

(1) (U) Monthly Province Report. It is recommended that the requirement for the Deputy Province Senior Advisor to submit comments on the Province Report be rescinded. Such a procedure seems to be incompatible with normal command relationships and places an unnecessary burden on the DPSA. It also tends to create the erroneous impression that there is only limited confidence in the ability of the PSA and his staff to do complete and objective reporting.

(2) (C) Interpreters. Interpreters and translators are indispensable in CORDS provincial operations. The recruitment and training of acceptable Vietnamese interpreters is a constant problem, though one which has been successfully met in QUANG NAM Province to date. The current GVN emphasis on mobilizing manpower for military service will certainly result in the induction of most CORDS interpreters in the province. It is suggested that this will become a national as well as provincial problem, and that immediate attention should be given it.

(3) (C) Refugee Supplies. Refugees are a continuing problem in QUANG NAM Province. Operation FOSTER generated more than 16,000 refugees in a recent two week period. While generally excellent, US military and civilian reaction was largely neutralized by delayed response to the need for temporary shelter (tents). After local military supplies were exhausted, two weeks were required to arrange the airlift of canvas from II CTZ to Danang. Because GVN reaction to refugee needs is usually far less efficient than it should be, it is especially important that US forces react promptly and professionally. Otherwise, the adverse publicity created among refugees and their relatives damages the total pacification effort and encourages many refugees to return to their homes in VC held territory. It is suggested that a highly responsive priority system be devised which will require immediate reaction by US military and civilian forces to the demands of emergency refugee situations:



L. DUANE PUCKETT

Province Senior Advisor  
Quang Nam Province

2 Incl

- (1) Comments of Province  
Deputy Senior Advisor
- (2) District Senior Advisors' Reports

13.

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

APPENDIX 1. COMMENTS OF DEPUTY PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR.

a. (U) The Province Deputy Senior Advisor, LTC THOMAS F. JENKINS, departed on leave late in the month and was unable to supply comments on the Province Report.

b. (U) Prior to departure, LTC JENKINS indicated his complete agreement with recommendation b.1. (Monthly Province Report) in the required actions section of this report.

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

MACCORDS PROVINCE REPORT  
(RCS-MACCARDS-01-67)

## APPENDIX 2. REPORTS OF DISTRICT SENIOR ADVISORS.

I. Hoa Vang District (National Priority Area)


a. (U) Status of Pacification. The pacification effort in Hoa Vang District has progressed without major interruptions since the beginning of 1967. The GVN's principal pacification program in Quang Nam Province, the Hung Quang Campaign, was begun in Hoa Vang early in the year; with material and advisory assistance from US agencies, the 51st Infantry Regiment (ARVN) has constructed four major resettlement sites within the District and participated in joint operations with friendly military forces. US military units have supplemented the overall RD effort by completing more civic action projects in Hoa Vang than in any other District of the province.

b. (U) Factors Influencing Pacification. Largely because sufficient friendly military units have been present in Hoa Vang during 1967, there are no major security problems. At the same time, the enemy has demonstrated his continuing ability to strike in areas where military units are temporarily absent. On 23 November, a security platoon of the 3/51 ARVN Battalion was withdrawn from the refugee hamlet of Nui Kim Son to attend an RD orientation course. No replacement troops were provided; on 25 November, a VC unit entered the hamlet, destroyed 9 houses and wounded two civilians.

(C) Directly related to the pacification effort in Hoa Vang is the problem of refugees; already more than 15,000, the refugee population increases rapidly as military operations are carried on in neighboring districts. Outside the Hung Quang Campaign, the GVN has made almost no effort to expedite refugee resettlement, to develop cottage industry, vocational training or agriculture. Education, sanitation and public health facilities fall far short of SCR criteria; an outbreak of plague in the Nui Kim Son refugee area resulted in civilian deaths, and a major epidemic was averted only through the efforts of US advisory personnel. The most dangerous consequence of neglect has already begun to appear: strong cynicism toward the GVN and its advertised programs has developed among refugees in Hoa Vang.

c. (C) Special Problems and Recommendations. The Commander of the 59th RF Battalion has consistently failed to exercise leadership and command initiative in employing his unit within its TAOR. The Battalion, whose primary mission is the support of RD in Hoa Vang District, has been rendered ineffective by its Commander's frequent absence; he will not delegate authority and has rejected most of the suggestions of three successive US advisors. It is recommended by the 59th RF Battalion Advisor, the 51st Infantry Regiment (ARVN) Advisor and myself that the Commander be replaced.

d. (U) District Chief: Major Mai-Xuan-Hau.

  
JAMES A. SWENSON  
Major, Infantry  
District Senior Advisor

2. Dien Ban District (National Priority Area)


a. (U) Status of Pacification. No advances have been made in the pacification of Dien Ban District during the month of November due to the continuing inadequacy of available troops. When measured in terms of geographic control, the District is approximately 40% under GVN influence, 25% Viet Cong and 35% contested. The majority of the population, however, lives in the secure area along National Routes 1 and 14; elsewhere hamlets are deserted, contested or in free fire zones. One village, Phu Ky, is completely under enemy control. Friendly troop strength is not sufficient either to extend Government influence beyond the secure area or to prevent VC raids, ambushes, mining and terrorist incidents within that area.

b. (U) Factors Influencing Pacification. Military units operating in Dien Ban District, including RF/PF, are assigned the mission of protecting vital installations such as bridge complexes, power plants and routes of communication; this mission strongly limits their ability to conduct operations.

GVN officials in Dien Ban are enthusiastic about pacification plans, and give full cooperation to the USMC in implementing them. All local USMC units have conducted successful MEDCAP programs, and have supported self-help projects in an effort to improve relations between the military and civilian populations. In all such programs there has been close and fruitful cooperation among USMC units, the District Chief and the MACVORDS District Advisory Team.

c. (U) Special Problems and Recommendations. Largely because of limited security, RD Cadre Teams operating in Dien Ban District have had less than a dynamic impact in the overall pacification program. Certainly an increase in friendly troop strength will be necessary before these teams can perform their mission successfully.

d. (U) District Chief: Major Hoang-Trung



WILLIAM A. JORDAN  
Major, Infantry  
District Senior Advisor

3. Hieu Nhon District (National Priority Area)

a. (U) Status of Pacification. The pacification effort in Hieu Nhon District has deteriorated slightly in the past month, due principally to a worsened security situation. At present the GVN exercises effective control by day and night along a narrow band following Highway 538 between the Dien Ban District line and Hieu Nhon District Headquarters. The road east from District Headquarters to Phuoc Trach is closed to vehicular traffic, and the VC warned civilians against traveling this route. Most of Can Nam Island, Phuoc Trach Hamlet and the area adjacent to Junk Fleet 14 are also under GVN control; in all other areas, only armed units may enter.


b. (U) Factors Influencing Pacification. A recent change in District Chiefs has contributed to the slowdown in Hieu Nhon's pacification effort, though the lull is probably temporary.

One RD Cadre Team, unable to accomplish its mission in An My village, has been moved to reinforce another Team at Cam Pho. All other cadre teams are making good progress in construction projects, though requests for materials by Team 28 have yet to be received by the RD Council. The new District Chief has taken an active interest in the work of the RD Cadre Teams.

MEDCAP programs are regularly run by GVN and German Malteser Health Service Teams.

c. (U) Special Problems and Recommendations. The most pressing problem in the pacification of Hieu Nhon continues to be the relative ease with which the enemy moves into and through the District from the south. Until this traffic is eliminated, no pacification agents will be able to operate with lasting effectiveness.

d. (U) District Chief: Captain Vo-Van-Sang

  
JOHN A. BERRY  
Major, Infantry  
District Senior Advisor

4. Dai Loc District


a. (C) Status of Pacification. Enemy initiated attacks early in November have been responsible for a serious setback in the pacification effort of Dai Loc District. The attacks of 2 November and 8 November were aimed partly at refugee resettlement hamlets, and at Ai Nghia, the hamlet immediately adjacent to District Headquarters. The enemy's mission was apparently to intimidate the civilian populace by demonstrating the inability of friendly forces to provide security. Considerable unrest has continued through the month, obliging RF/PF units to concentrate their defensive efforts around the District capital; Government control in outlying areas has been substantially reduced as a result. GVN still retains control of approximately 60% of the geographical area of Dai Loc during the day, and roughly 45% at night.

b. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification. Stagnation in the pacification effort can be attributed to the intensity of the two attacks and to the large number of civilians who were witnesses or victims. District officials failed to make personal contact with the populace during this critical period; instead, Armed Propaganda Teams were employed to provide reassurance and encouragement, and had little success. Residents in the District capital still leave their dwellings at night, moving to the area of the USMC installation at Hill 37 and returning home only at first light. GVN officials have taken no initiative in remedying the situation.

In an attempt to regain the offensive, the Marines have initiated Operation FOSTER, a search-and-destroy operation in the "Arizona" area of southern Dai Loc and northern Duc Duc District. The operation has generated over 6500 refugees in Dai Loc; in caring for them, a mobile refugee team from the Community Development Foundation has been joined by GVN MEDCAP teams, an Armed Propaganda Team, a Cultural Drama Team, a PsyWar Team and a Police Field Force platoon.

c. (C) Special Problems and Recommendations. As the refugee population continues to swell, the number of RF/PF units committed to their security reduces the mobility of local defense forces, and marks them as lucrative targets for future attacks. Until the refugee population is reduced or the security forces are increased, renewed enemy attacks are a real possibility.

d. (U) District Chief: Captain Tran-Quoc-Do



JAMES P. WHITAKER  
Captain, Infantry  
District Senior Advisor

5. Duc Dau District

a. (C) Status of Pacification. Thirty-seven of the forty-five hamlets in Duc Dau District are under VC control. GVN/FWT exercise complete control in Xuyen Thu and Xuyen Phu villages and heavily populated areas of Son Khuong village along the river bank. Control is diminished considerably in fringe areas during the hours of darkness.


b. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification. A deterrent to the pacification program in remote or sparsely populated areas is attributed to the lack of fixed defensive positions in key areas. Pacification will be enhanced, especially along water routes, once the following approved CAP positions are constructed and become operational: Ninh Hoa, AT804369; Khuong Trung, AT805399; Khuong Que AT843422; and Ben Dau, AT842468.

There has been one (1) Bn size operation (Antenna Valley) in the district this month and one (1) Bn size operation (Foster) now in progress. The effect on pacification cannot be measured at this time; however, as of this date, 3,681 VN civilians have been relocated into Xuyen Thu village - a safe area. It is expected that some of these refugees, women and children, will return to their homes once Operation Foster is terminated. Cpt Triem, District Chief, has stated that when Operation Foster is completed, he will permit refugees to return to their villages on a voluntary basis. His reason for making this decision is land - too many people are crowded into too little area. A wider base of operation is urgently needed and should, I feel, start with Loc Que village. To undertake expansion, troops must be on the ground - fixed.

While no major RD projects have been initiated or completed during this reporting period, the RD team is committed to building a new hamlet to house refugees once land agreements are made. This will be followed by or run concurrently with the construction of a well and latrine. The 5th Platoon, 29th CA Company, attached to the 2d Bn, 5th Marines, has been most effective in assisting with the movement of refugees and with the storage and distribution of commodities.

c. (C) Special Problems and Recommendations. There are no major problems that cannot be resolved through the coordinated efforts of District and Province. In this respect it is requested that Provincial staff members continue to keep this office advised of any action taken that will affect District operations.

d. (S) District Chief: Captain Dang-van-Triem.

  
JOHN GREEN  
Major, Infantry  
District Senior Advisor

DECLASSIFIED

6. Duy Xuyen District

(U) At present there is no District Advisory Team in Duy Xuyen District.

DECLASSIFIED

7. Hieu Duc District.

a. (U) Status of Pacification. Viet Cong actions against refugee camps and Peaceful Hamlets (Ap Hoa Binh) have undermined the pacification effort in Hieu Duc during November. These attacks have occurred at night, when GVN control extends to no more than 40% of the populated area of the District. At the same time, RF/PF units, in cooperation with 1/7 Marines, have improved the defensive posture of the District Headquarters area.

b. (U) Factors Influencing Pacification. GVN officials and friendly military units have given support to the pacification effort within the limits of their capabilities, though poor security has recently undone some of their successes. RF/PF and ARVN units provided much of the labor in building Duong Lam and Duyen Son Peaceful Hamlets, though enemy attacks have regularly destroyed up to 50% of the houses in each location. The building initiative has been assumed largely by the five local CAP units, which also run regular MEDCAP programs.

RD Cadre Team 15 at Tuy Loan cooperated fully with CAP personnel in improving the defenses of the New Life Hamlet area, and in initiating both funded and unfunded self-help projects. Popular support for such projects has been extremely limited to date; the people's first concern is for personal security, and military units or cadre have been obliged to do most of the work in civic action projects.

c. (C) Special Problems and Recommendations. III<sup>rd</sup> considered actions involving FWMAF personnel in the area of Hoa Loc village have worked to the detriment of pacification in the entire District. Incidents which have brought harm or offense to local civilians have been brought to the attention of FWMAF authorities in the hope that further damage to friendly efforts can be averted.

d. (U) District Chief: Captain Nguyen-Van-Thuan



JAMES A. LOLLISS  
Major, Infantry  
District Senior Advisor

### 3. Que Son District

a. (U) Status of Pacification. Que Son District is divided into three political and geographic zones: Zone 1 includes the eastern third of the District and the Moc Bai Vital Area along National Route 1; Zone 2 is the central area surrounding District Headquarters; the western villages of the District are included in Zone 3.

With the exception of the Huong An and Ba Ben Bridge, Zone 1 is firmly under enemy control; VC activity has to date prohibited pacification efforts. Government control in Zone 2 has made it the center of pacification activity in Que Son District. In Zone 3, GVN exerts no control whatsoever over the population.

b. (C) Factors Influencing Pacification. Though the majority of the population in Zone 2 is sympathetic to the Government side, pacification in the area has been set back by an influx of 930 civilian refugees and 247 displaced people rendered homeless by the burning of Lan Thuong hamlet. At the same time, US forces have operated aggressively to the west of District Headquarters to maintain the pacification initiative.

Unfortunately these efforts have not been matched by the GVN side. Two RD Cadre Teams working near District Headquarters have made slow progress in completing their programs; the Government is unresponsive to their requests for construction materials.

Medical programs are more successful: The Battalion Surgeon of the 2nd Brigade, 12th Cavalry conducts daily MEDCAPS in Lan Thuong; local village nurses and public health assistants hold sick call daily at District Headquarters for 30 to 50 patients; the MACV Advisory Team and 2/12 Cavalry have been able to Medevac an increasing number of seriously ill or wounded patients during this month.

c. (U) Special Problems and Recommendations. The most pressing need in the pacification program of Que Son is for improved transportation. With more than half the land area and population under enemy control, increased mobility for personnel and materials is essential for progress in pacification activity.

d. (U) District Chief: 1st Lieutenant Le-Van-Dap.

*Charles D. Mears, Jr.*  
CHARLES D. MEARS, JR.  
Major, Infantry  
District Senior Advisor

9. Thuong Duc District.

a. (U) Status of Pacification. Despite an increase in enemy activity, pacification efforts have advanced in Thuong Duc during the month of November. GVN is able to exercise control over approximately 85% of the District's populated areas in daylight hours, and over roughly 50% at night. Within the areas of Government control, the population is responsive to pacification efforts and generally aware of the benefits to be gained from participation.

b. (U) Factors Influencing Pacification. US personnel in Thuong Duc base their efforts on the District's master RD program, and emphasize the welfare benefits of popular participation in pacification activities. While local GVN officials agree with this approach, it is difficult to gain their active support for most projects. The RD Cadre Team in Ha Tan, potentially a valuable force, is not working at full capacity.

One highly successful program has been organized by FWMAF with the cooperation of the German Malteser Health Service; corrective surgery (harelip, removal of growths, etc.) is made available to local civilians in the District itself, and has lent enormous impact to the overall pacification effort.

Construction has begun on Route 14 leading west to Dai Loc District, using laborers recruited locally.

c. (U) Special Problems and Recommendations. Overcrowding in refugee centers has become critical; GVN and FWMAF officials feel that construction of a new center is the highest priority need in Thuong Duc.

d. (U) District Chief: Captain Nguyen-Dinh-Kham.

  
FRANK COLANTUNO  
Captain, Infantry  
District Senior Advisor

CONFIDENTIAL - NOFORN

19

OFFICE OF THE SENIOR PROVINCE ADVISOR  
 CIVIL OPERATIONS & REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT  
 QUANG NAM PROVINCE

GES:iges  
 1 September 1967

From: Senior Province Advisor  
 To : Office of the Deputy Ambassador, American Embassy, Saigon  
 Via : Commanding General, III MAF/Senior Advisor, IOTZ  
 (Attn: COMCDS Joint Staff)

Subj: Special Joint Narrative Report on Revolutionary Developments,  
 Quang Nam Province Report for Period Ending 31 August 1967.

Ref : (a) Joint COO/MACV Directive Number 2-67  
 (b) COMUSMACV Uncle msg 031039Z May 1967  
 (c) HQ I Corps Advisory Group ltr of 8 May 1967  
 (d) CG III MAF Uncle msg 220224Z Jul 1967  
 (e) DepCOMCDS III MAF Conf msg 250352Z Aug 1967

1. STATUS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PLAN.

Increased VC activities within QUANG NAM Province during the month of August were highlighted by three dramatic attacks on built-up areas, i.e., land attacks supported by mortars and rockets on the provincial capital (HOI AN) and the neighboring DIEN BAU District city of VIEN DIEN and a rocket attack on the MARBLE HOLLOW/AMU Air Facility. During the night of 26-27 August, a VI Battalion reinforced with one local force company attacked HOI AN and temporarily succeeded in overrunning the eastern portion of the city. An attempt to penetrate the northern portion of the city was stopped by existing defense units and effective artillery fire. The eastern attack, obviously intended for the provincial headquarters, was finally stopped at the hospital by members of the IOTZ Team. The enemy sustained 26 confirmed KIA and 2 captured LA. Friendly casualties were the subject of a separate report. During the same night, a reinforced battalion attacked VIEN DIEN City in DIEN BAU District. These two attacks were obviously coordinated to reduce the effects of on-call artillery and air support.

The combination of this significant increase in VC pressure and the anticipated slow-down prompted by pre-election preparations, definitely produced an adverse effect on overall RD efforts. Although progress was normal during the first half of the month, the sharp reduction experienced at mid-month results in a basic evaluation that the RD effort is once more behind schedule.

The second phase of IRUNG QUANG I Campaign in eastern HOA YANG District is progressing slowly. The 3rd Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment is continuing security operations within the area and elements of the 101st ARVN Engineer Battalion is supporting the Peace Hamlet construction phase.

CONFIDENTIAL - NOFORN

CONFIDENTIAL - NOFORN

## 2. POLITICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL

a. General. Pro-Selection activities have dominated nearly all provincial business. RD Forces have been urged by one party Pro-Selection or another to solicit for their candidates. Individual RD Members will obviously support the candidate that represents their own political views; however, indications are that the majority of the RD Teams are loyal to the QUANG Section of the VUQDD and will therefore support their candidate, VU NHANH KHUAT. All teams have been assigned election security responsibilities within their areas and also the mission of informing the people of the importance of their ballots and how to participate at the polls.

The transfer of the DAI LOC District Chief, Captain DANG VAN HANH, reported last month, did not take place. It has been reported that the ANH faction of the VUQDD persuaded General LAM (1 Corps Commander) to retain Captain HANH as District Chief even though it was General LAM that had decided to relieve him. LtCol TIN, the Province Chief, is very unhappy about this decision since he has done a great deal to get HANH removed. There were rumors and reports that the ANH faction had paid someone a considerable sum of money to influence the reversal of the initial decision. It has also been rumored that the QUANG faction of the VUQDD would stage a demonstration similar to that held against the DOG DUC District Chief last month. According to LtCol TIN, Captain HANH is a Dai Viet Party member and has made some progress in organizing his district. The ANH faction support of HANH is interpreted as being their choice of the better of two evils; rather than risk having a QUANG Section supporter enter DAI LOC. The ANH faction, now operating rather freely, chose to support HANH. This situation jeopardizes the RD effort considerably; it is a well known fact that HANH "manipulates" RD materials to his personal advantage. The entire situation has been presented to both GVN and American higher echelons in the form of a documented fact report.

The psychological effect of the attacks on HOT AN and VIEN DIEN have been most pronounced within the civilian community. Families of public officials and active political participants have temporarily relocated their residences. The VC have effectively reminded the population of their presence. This may adversely influence participation on election day.

b. VIS. Mr. NGUYEN THE SUNG, Province Information Chief, has effectively demonstrated that leadership and impartial GVN support results in successful programs. VIS personnel have distributed posters, banners, slogans, and locally produced displays throughout the province. Virtually every truck, bus, cyclo and cart has been provided a "bumper sticker". The "get out the vote" campaign conducted by this section is considered to be highly commendable.

c. Election Activities. Provincial preparations for the 3 September elections appear to be progressing smoothly. Public interest has steadily increased since the Village-Hamlet elections and it is estimated that a very high percentage of voters will partici-

CONFIDENTIAL - NOFORN

On 20 August, many southerners have received positive assurances that the US will be able to participate in the otherwise unpopulated portions of the national elections. The people have been told since May that the Da Nang 1st Province's part political party, the People's Committee, is listed to be an indication that a nonaligned opposition to the US will be encouraged.

During the afternoon of 20-21 August, prominent public figures were selected targets. Colonel LUONG-DUONG NHAN, GIAI LA Special Zone Com. Cm. was ordered to evacuate his family from their residence at the height of the attack after receiving direct hits on his house and home. Lt Col. LUONG QUANG NHAN, a early candidate for the June House elections, or DTI QUANG NHAN, was also evidently targeted; he was not at his home, however, five members of his family were murdered during the two day attack.

Current estimates indicate that the DA NANG 1st District is favored in QUANG NHAN Province, though VU and KIEN supporters are also numerous.

d. Legislative, Political, and Religious Groups. After initial indications pointing to a lack of elections from SAIGON, the local Buddhists have apparently decided to actively participate in the elections instead of boycotting them in protest against THINH-LI as occurred in the beginning of the North. This does not preclude the possibility of a strong movement after the elections as threatened earlier.

### 3. SECURITY.

a. General. The security situation with respect to RD Teams deteriorated as expected in August. There were 16 attacks directed against RD Teams resulting in the following casualties:

	Friendly			Enemy		
	KIA	WIA	MIA	KIA	WIA	MIA
RD Teams	7	5	0	13	3	3
RF	4	2	0			
PP	2	6	0	(Commanded by body counts)		
Civilian	3	3	10			

There were also 51 VC incidents within RD Markets pertaining to propaganda broadcasts, leaflet drops, mining, and related terrorist activities.

RD Team 22, located in PHUOC AN Market, DA NANG District, was attacked 3 times within a 7 day period in the beginning of the month. The VC attacked from the same direction each time with company sized units. In each case, the local IP unit failed to react; they were either buttoned-up or not physically present. Support from the District Chief (Captain RAM) has been consistently poor if at all. Combat support for the team has been provided primarily through the MACV Sua Sector Advisor to the USMC unit located in the area. Artillery support is credited for pre-

CONFIDENTIAL - IN FORM

## CONFIDENTIAL - DMZ

ventus; the VC were gaining a victory over the RD Team since nothing was being done. When the District Chief was asked to provide more support to the RD Team, he stated that he wanted to make contact. The VC were totally enraged before he would permit a reaction force, so that he could "trap" them. On one occasion when the 1st Sector Advisor had called in artillery from the USAF unit, the District Chief violently objected, arguing that he could call artillery when and if he thought it necessary. The situation in DMZ IGC continues to support the need to replace the District Chief (see paragraph 2, see above):

b. Enemy Situations: The majority of the reported VC incidents were small-scale ~~at least~~ terrorist acts, increased firing of Jikes of communications, harassing patrols and a definite increase in kidnappings. As reported above, an increased number of attacks on RD Teams were recorded. During the two attacks on the night of 26-27 August against HOT AN and VIEN DUY, six RD Teams were also assaulted. Obviously, the step-up is designed to remind the people of the VC capability to "have it's own battlefield" and to influence election participation.

c. Infrastructure: The basic guidelines for the operationalisation of the NPA Program has been received and local organisation is progressing smoothly. QUANG NAM Province has 5 District Operational Intelligence Coordinating Centers (DOXCO) and a Province Intelligence Center upon which to build an effective ICIE system. The NPA is potentially an asset to ICIE, however, the present organization requires leadership and major re-activation. It is highly recommended that a U. S. Advisor be assigned to this province to coordinate training and operational usage of the ICIE.

VC Political Cadre neutralized or eliminated during the month of August, as reported by the HP Service is as follows:

Killed	:	3
Captured	:	20
Rallied	:	3

Due to preparations for the National Elections to be held on 3 September, the various agencies were unable to provide an estimate of how VC political personalities identified during this month.

An interesting highlight reported by RD Team 7 of BINH LAM Village, HOA VANG District on 24 August. Mr. TRUONG VAN HOA, militiaman, observed a letter fall from a vegetable basket while he was riding a bus from HIEU DONG to CAY LIE. Upon reading the letter, he discovered that it was from a VC to him formally requesting money and food. His efforts to locate the owner of the basket during the ride were fruitless, however, at CAY LIE he stopped the bus, located a policeman, who in turn investigated the matter. A passenger identified the owner of the basket as a young girl who was later identified as a VC liaison Cadre. Mr. HOA was commended for his close observation and quick-witted reactions.

d. Friendly Situations: Only 3 major military operations were

CONFIDENTIAL - DMZ

CONFIDENTIAL - NOFORN

conducted due to a lack of troop units available. Sector executed these operations in furtherance of securing Highway 1 in DUY NHAM, QUE SON and DIEN BAN Districts. In conjunction with pre-election security, Sub Sectors conducted an increased number of company and platoon operations. The river interdiction program was supported by "Firefly" missions, particularly in the DUY NHAM and HOI AN river complexes. These missions, in conjunction with "Spectre" aircraft and ARVH-USMC M101 artillery fires proved to be especially effective during the month. On 27 August, I Corps released the 21st and 39th Ranger Battalions to strengthen the security in the DIEN BAN and DUY XUYEN District areas and to conduct search and destroy operations in support of the election security plan.

#### 4. ECONOMICS

a. General. The economic atmosphere of QUANG NAM Province appears to be closely related to the effectiveness of the RD Program. Where RD Teams have been successful in the construction or expansion of hamlet market places and local security has been noticeably increased, commercial traffic has also increased. This increase of commercial traffic does not necessarily mean that great economic strides are being made, it does mean that a free flow of produce is allowed to reach the people. Per capita income is substantially the same.

b. Material Resources and Transport. Resources control efforts have received a side effect from the RD effort by way of the increased security provided by RD Teams and attendant RD campaign forces. A noticeable reduction in the flow of produce to the enemy has been detected in successful AP DCON HQs; however, an increased enemy effort has also been noticed outside of RD areas to counter the effect of that reduction. (Resources control efforts are not so effective that much needed emphasis by the NP can be relaxed). An interesting observation has been discovered in the market price of bulgar; bulgar has risen from 400VN\$ per bag to over 600VN\$ per bag in recent weeks. This is attributed to the increased purchases by the VC as a result of recent search and destroy operations and their liberation of large amounts of rice and other foodstuffs.

The U. S. presence obviously influences the local economy to some degree, however, a strict III MAF control measure has reduced this affect as it pertains to troops. The continuing rise in the demand for construction materials by both Vietnamese and U. S. builders has experienced several price rises in such items as sand and gravel. Source areas located in contested territory have experienced some difficulty in transportation to sales areas, therefore prices have had a tendency to rise accordingly. Labor costs influenced by raises in DANANG have begun to be felt in the province also. Masons and carpenter wages have risen from 350VN\$ per day in the city to 400VN\$ per day and 200VN\$ per day in the rural areas to 250VN\$ per day.

CONFIDENTIAL - NOFORN

CONFIDENTIAL - NOFORN

## 5. NEW LIFE DEVELOPMENT.

a. Agriculture. A welcome addition to the agriculture program was the assignment of Miss HONG, Bone Improvement Agent for QUANG NAM Province. She will add a new dimension to a fast growing rural interest in sanitation, health, child care, sewing, cooking, etc. It is hoped that she will receive approval to hire several district workers to help her cover the nine districts in this province.

Rice threshing machines were distributed to active cooperatives and Farmer's Associations during the month. Pontoon machines, obtained through the C-5 section, 1st Marine Division, will be tested in the province; reports of farmer's reactions will be used to determine future orders.

Cooperative training sessions were held at HOA PHUOC Village in HOA VANG District and XUYEN MY Village in DUY XUYEN District during August. The subject of the training was "activities and services of cooperatives; organization, duties and responsibilities of directors and members. Demonstrations of water pumps for irrigation and rice threshing machines were held in conjunction with the training sessions.

b. Public Health. MILPHAP Team N-2, under the command of LCDR M. A. FUNK, continues to function as the prime medical support activity in QUANG NAM Province. Besides physically staffing a large percent of the local hospital, the team conducts field training courses for district medical personnel. Early in the month reports were received from PHUOC VILL District that typhoid cases had been received. Investigation by LCDR FUNK revealed that this was not the case, but that an immediate training program was instituted for district medical technicians to properly identify syphilis. An immunization and preventive medicine program was initiated in PHUOC VILL Village, HOA VANG District as a result of reports of a plague epidemic. The month's activities were highlighted by the attack on HOI AN wherein the MILPHAP Team is credited with stepping a drive by the VC company on province headquarters after the VC had overrun the ARVN Engineer Compound and the ARVN A&L Company Compound. The team sustained 1 USMC KIA, 1 USMC WIA and 4 USN WIA. Enemy casualties within the compound were 8 KIA and 2 WIA POW's. The team defended their position in a commendable fashion.

c. RD Support. As a result of the efforts of the COMUS Logistics Officer and the RD Support Officer, RD materials delivery to RD Teams moved smoother this month than ever before. Administrative controls and physical movement controls were effectively tightened. Priorities were instituted as a result of the nationwide shortage of roofing tin.

d. Self Help. Mr. J. DAPROZA, Self Help Advisor, continued his very effective field inspection and assistance trips. A system of combining RD team inspections with Mr. DAPROZA's visits seem to be enhancing the Self Help concept within RVN areas.

CONFIDENTIAL - NOFORN

CONFIDENTIAL - NOFORN

Welfare Service desperately needs additional personnel. The recent workload pertaining to emergency relief definitely taxes the abilities of this small section. Vehicles are required to react to the mounting number of rural incidents also.

The recent emphasis placed on refugee and social welfare problems have brought many visitors to this province. A group from YMCA International, sponsored by USAID visited the province to investigate the possibility of establishing a leadership training program that would provide personnel for community centers. The Christian Children's Fund Organization also made representation during August to process financial assistance to children that have lost one or both parents. To date 104 children have been processed by the Social Welfare Service, but so far only 15 have been accepted.

#### 8. PROVINCIAL RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF RD.

a. RD Teams. Two training programs were conducted for RD Workers during August. RD Workers were brought into HOI AN for both sessions. Education and Propaganda/Motivation were the two subjects taught.

Three District RD Coordinating Conference Committees have been established in the National Priority Area (MOA VANG, DIEU BAN and HIEU NHON Districts). The committees meet regularly, once per week at each District. Members include the District Chief and his staff, RD Team Leaders, Sub Sector Advisors, GORDS District Representatives, COPDS RD Operations staff members, RF/PP units and others directly involved in the local RD efforts. Thus far, the committee has proved to be highly successful in identifying problem areas, determining solutions through the actual participants, emphasizing RD potential not only to the District Chief and his staff, but to all of the various supporting units as well. Plans are underway to extend this system in each district.

b. Campus Grievance. The program has continued to function as normal with a slight decrease in output as a result of pre-election activities. An active information program pertaining to the importance of the elections and the peoples responsibilities was coupled with some instances of candidate support.

c. Self Defense Forces. The training program previously reported as being conducted by the RD Teams is seriously jeopardized by the lack of armament available. Homeguards were recruited and convinced of the importance of their voluntary efforts; were trained by the RD Team and in some cases assisted by RF/PP units, and then were not issued firearms. As a result, they were capable of erecting obstacles and acting as listening outposts only. In at least one instance, their identification with the program was very nearly disastrous; i.e., CAU NAM Island was overrun by the VC on 26-27 August and the RD Team, lacking sufficient forces to cope with the attack, withdrew from the hamlet. All of the Self Defense Forces were gathered together by the VC after a house to house search. The

CONFIDENTIAL - NOFORN

CONFIDENTIAL - NOFORN

## 6. CHIEU HOI.

a. General. Eighteen new HOI CHANH were received by the HOI AN Chieu Hoi Center during August. Twelve were classified as military and six were classified as political cadre. Five rifles of assorted types were turned-in during the month.

b. Training. A twelve day political retraining program was conducted during the period 15-26 August. The course consisted of 96 hours of instruction plus movies, musical programs and group activities. A total of 120 HOI CHANH, divided into small groups, received the retraining. The vocational training program held at the DANANG Polytechnical School continued to offer excellent educational opportunities for HOI CHANH. The five-man quota offered to this center was not filled this month; the GVN Chieu Hoi Chief, Mr. BUI TAN VINH, apparently decided not to send any students until after the elections.

c. Kit Carson Scout Program. Recruiting of HOI CHANH has been fairly good, however, the selections sent to user-units must be evaluated by them to determine if the local criteria is justified. Feedback from user-units has been very sparse.

d. Armed Propaganda Team. Members of the APT were committed throughout the province during the month; however, their effectiveness is evaluated as poor due to lack of armament (reported last month).

## 7. REFUGEE.

The refugee problem in QUANG NAM Province is a matter of record. Active participation on the part of the GVN Refugee Relief Service from province level through I Corps and above is sorely needed. It appears that each level has a valid "excuse" for its inadequacies, however, the refugee system is extremely simple and should not be as difficult to implement as current experience indicates.

There is some confusion still concerning the detainment of the funds for the 1967 budget by I Corps. According to Mr. VINH DUC KHU, Province Refugee Chief, the funds have not been released yet; but, according to I Corps, the funds were released on about 16 August. Mr. DUONG claims that I Corps is trying to discredit him in order to replace him with a military officer. Regardless of the reasons or inadequacies involved, the funds are direly needed to continue the program.

The daily reporting system instituted by the office of DepCCRS in DANANG serves to keep higher echelons currently apprised of refugee developments within the province.

The refugee population within province justifies the immediate assignment of at least one more Refugee Relief Mobile Team. The addition of a RRM will greatly improve implementation of relief work as set forth in the Refugee Handbook.

The Social Welfare Service Chief, Mr. TRAN THANH TAM, has resigned. (The death of his children and critical injury of his wife in a mine incident was reported previously). The Social

CONFIDENTIAL - NOFORN

CONFIDENTIAL - NOFORN

VC would surely have either murdered or kidnapped the entire group if it were not for the RD Team Leaders plan that was very effectively executed. RD Team 7 had withdrawn from the hamlet and let the VC think that they had run when while the VC were milling about, they counterattacked and killed 8 and captured the guard that was placed on the Self Defense Force. This action cost the team 4 KIA. It is conceivable that if the Self Defense Force had possessed armament, that the VC landing could have been repelled.

d. Technical Cadres No significant changes to last months report.

e. Police There has been a noticeable increase in NP activity during the month of August. There were 245 apprehensions this month as compared to 196 reported last month. Patrols along Highway 1 were also increased with a significant result; 5 VC cadre were captured, 16 VC suspects detained, 19 draft dodgers arrested, 8 illegal residents apprehended and 1 military deserter arrested. Materials confiscated as a result of these patrols included 60 bags of cement, assorted medicines, batteries and 200 bags of rice without proper documentation.

National Police Field Forces (NPFF) conducted operations in the HUNG QUANG Campaign area in conjunction with ARVN forces. Fifteen ambushes were established that resulted in two direct encounters with VC units. An additional company of NPFF was assigned to the province during the latter part of the month bringing the total forces available to 239 as opposed to 179 last month. It is very strongly requested that an additional U. S. Advisor be assigned to this province to coordinate the utilization and training of the NPFF.

f. Provincial Administrative Personnel and Organization. A Flood Relief Committee was formed at province level in anticipation of the monsoon period. Planning is underway to pre-stock certain districts with emergency materials.

At the request of provinces, districts have submitted their selections of potential New Life Hamlets for the 1968 Plan. The provincial RD Council is now reviewing these recommendations and will conduct a conference that will include CORPS representation during mid-September.

9. REQUIRED ACTIONS

The availability and distribution of sufficient security forces continues to be a problem within the province. RF/PF unit authorizations mentioned last month remain high on the agenda as a means of providing security for completed AF DOI HQT after RD Teams move to new locations. Self Defense Force armament also continues to be a distinct problem in this light.

The allocation of barrier materials in accordance with the CORPS directive and I Corps restrictions is clearly inadequate. RD Teams should receive these materials as soon as they are placed in the hamlet. The amounts cannot be an arbitrary figure as is

CONFIDENTIAL - NOFORN

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL - NOFORN

now the case. Each hamlet presents distinctly different terrain and tactical considerations that justify increases (or decreases) to the current allowances. Control measures can insure proper usage and prevent waste.

While the importance and desirability of official visitors is clearly understood and in most cases highly desired by the provincial team, unannounced visitors sorely detract from the effectiveness of the daily workload. Local facilities to provide for overnight visitors are currently unavailable; some members of the CORDS staff are doubled-up while awaiting construction of additional housing.

  
L. D. PUCKETT

CONFIDENTIAL - NOFORN

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

OFFICE OF THE PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR  
MACCORDS, QUANG NAM PROVINCE  
APO 96337

AJP:rcg  
1 November 1967

From: Province Senior Advisor  
To: Office of the Deputy Ambassador, American Embassy, Saigon  
Via: Commanding General, III MAF/Senior Advisor, ICTZ  
(Attn: CORDS Joint Staff)  
  
Subj: Special Joint Narrative Report on Revolutionary Development  
Quang Nam Province Report for Period Ending 31 October 1967  
  
Ref: (a) Joint OCO/MACV Directive Number 2-67  
(b) COMUSMACV Unclassified msg 031039Z May67  
(c) Hq I Corps Advisory Group ltr of 8May67  
(d) CG III MAF Unclassified msg 220226Z Jul67  
(e) DFC III MAF Conf msg 250352Z Aug67  
(f) ACofS CORDS Saigon Conf ltr of 19Sep67

1. STATUS OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PLAN.

An improved security situation in QUANG NAM Province has allowed Revolutionary Development activity to regain momentum during the month of October. While reported Viet Cong incidents have increased in number, attacks have been launched with less magnitude and success than in the past two months. Three factors are believed responsible for this change in enemy operations: VC attention to securing a share of the rice harvest and to stocking new caves; floods resulting from the first major rainfall; and increased operational activity among redeployed friendly forces within the Province.

Early in the month, mortar attacks were directed against the headquarters of DIEN BAN and HIEU DUC Districts; the Province capital of HOI AN also received four rounds of 60mm mortar fire, accounting for 10 WIA. Three significant ground attacks were launched against friendly positions, first in DIEN BAN District and subsequently in the area of the HUNG QUANG I Campaign, HOA VANG District.

Political developments and RD Cadre activity during the month have begun to dissipate the psychological impact of past VC operations. Lower house elections passed without major incident, and interference by militant Buddhists did not materialize. In the pre-election period, GVN military and police forces twice assisted RD Teams in repelling enemy attacks and in capturing VC agents operating near RD hamlets.

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

In line with the phased action plans of Project TAKEOFF, an effort has been made to align present RD activity more closely with Ministry directives. This has stimulated interest on the part of GVN officials, particularly in relation to planning for the 1968 Program. Planning meetings have continued on schedule in DANANG and HOI AN, and next year's New Life Hamlets have been tentatively selected.

The HUNG QUANG I Campaign, Phase 2, has been extended southward into DIEN BAN District. A site has been chosen near GIANG NAM village for the construction of a new Peace Hamlet by the 51st Infantry Regiment (ARVN).

## 2. POLITICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL.

a. General. The focus of political activity and psychological operations in the Province was the lower house election of 22 October. Pre-election activity among both voters and candidates was less intense than during the Presidential campaign. Buddhist leaders were unable to foment demonstrations against the elections, symptomatic of weariness among the voting populace and of the waning power of the VHK (Quang) faction of the VNQDD party.

Of the 153,363 registered voters in QUANG NAM Province, 81.6% cast ballots. The total of ballots cast represented a 78% utilization of the possible three votes per registered voter. Some 4,955 votes were ruled illegal, in most instances because too many ballots had been inserted in the voter envelope. Province officials estimate that as many as 20% of the disqualified votes represent attempts to influence election results illegally. The remainder are explained by voter ignorance of correct balloting procedure.

All three winners from the field of eighteen candidates were members of the VNQDD party:

Mr. PHAN THIEP	36,788 votes
Mr. PHAN MAT	26,249 votes
Mr. BUI QUANG SAN	25,452 votes

Messrs. THIEP and MAT are of the Ky Bo (Anh) faction; Mr. SAN belongs to the VHK (Quang) faction.

These election results reflect the decline of Quang faction power within the VNQDD and within the Province. Nothing approaching a Buddhist-Quang faction coalition emerged from the voting, and it is anticipated that Mr. SAN, once installed in Saigon with his family, will be an infrequent visitor to QUANG NAM and a less vocal agent of factional demands.

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

2.

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

As prelude to administrative reorganization within the QUANG DA Special Zone, a number of personnel changes were announced this month. Most notably, Col. NGUYEN DUY HINH will be relieved as QDSZ Commander to become Deputy to General LAM for RD and RF/FF activities in I Corps Tactical Zone. The QDSZ staff will merge with the QUANG NAM Sector Staff under the command of LtCol LE TRI TIM, the present Province Chief. The former QDSZ Chief of Staff, Maj MINH, will assume a position in Saigon. A further change involves the Deputy for Security, Maj NGUYEN DINH THUY, who will move to the ICTZ Staff; Maj CAU, who has previously been Deputy for Security in Thua Thien Province, was appointed as Maj THUY's replacement, but has not yet assumed his duties.

The Province Chief has not yet issued an order establishing a new Provincial Reconnaissance Unit for QUANG NAM, and is not expected to do so until a commander has been selected for the new unit.

In response to recent III MAF and I Corps Directives on the formation of a Joint PsyOps Committee, proposals on the composition of such a committee have been submitted to the Province Chief. The following GVN and US officials have been suggested as members:

GVN

VIS Chief  
Chieu-Hoi PsyOps Chief  
RD PsyOps Chief  
National Police PsyOps Chief  
Sector S-5  
10th Polar Battalion C.O.  
51st Infantry Regiment S-5

US

CORDS Province Representative for PsyOps  
G-5 Advisor, MACV  
1st Marine Division PsyOps Officer  
(as required)  
5th Marine Regiment PsyOps Officer  
7th Marine Regiment PsyOps Officer  
Airmobile Brigade PsyOps Officer

The Province Chief is expected to issue an order establishing this Committee early in November.

b. VIS. VIS mounted a distinctly low-key campaign in support of this month's election, and was clearly successful in its tactic. Despite the hospitalization of the VIS Chief, Mr. NGUYEN THE SUNG, the campaign program was completed. Mr. SUNG is expected to make only partial recovery from a serious brain disease, and his absence will be counted a serious loss to the VIS effort in QUANG NAM.

c. Minorities, Political and Religious Groups. Recent information indicates that the militant Buddhist organization in QUANG NAM has elected to enter the Second Phase of its Struggle Movement. Protest activity in this Phase involves self-immolation, and the National Police have been alerted that a diseased or aged Buddhist may be called upon to commit suicide in HOI AN.

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

3.

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

3. SECURITY.

a. General. Instances of VC operations against RD Teams have decreased dramatically in October. Only two incidents have occurred in RD Team locations: detonation of a mine in DIEN BAN District, in which all casualties were US Marines, and a land attack against RD Team 4 in GIANG NAM Hamlet, HOA VANG District. The latter incident took place the night of 26 October and was immediately reported to the nearby CP of the 51st Infantry Battalion (ARVN). Elements of the 4/51 Battalion arrived as a reaction force and, acting on information that a second attack was imminent, remained in the hamlet. The VC were successfully ambushed as they returned to strike the Team.

b. Enemy Situation. Terrorist activity in the pre-election period centered in the extreme eastern portion of the Province, where 26 civilians were killed and 23 injured in sniper and grenade incidents. There were 18 kidnappings and two hamlet headquarters were destroyed. One civilian was murdered in HOA VANG District.

The overall total of incidents was 90, an increase of 5 over the September figure. The most significant among these was a ground attack on 8 October directed against RF elements at MOC BAI and PHU PHUONG outposts and the BA REN Bridge in DIEN BAN District. The attack was repelled, leaving 50 confirmed enemy KIA and, on the friendly side, 13 KIA and 12 WIA.

Further ground contact took place in the area of the HUNG QUANG I Campaign, HOA VANG District, where VC attacks were launched on two successive nights against LE SON Peace Hamlet. The hamlet was defended by a platoon of the 2nd Battalion, 51st Infantry Regiment (ARVN); the enemy destroyed 27 houses and four were killed.

Major enemy units operating within QUANG NAM Province continue to be:

- 1) Elements of the 2nd NVA Division, particularly the 3rd NVA Regiment in QUE SON District.
- 2) The 368B NVA Artillery Regiment (with 122mm and 140mm rocket launching capability) in THUONG DUC and HIEU DUC Districts.
- 3) The 402d (T89) Sapper Battalion, also in THUONG DUC and HIEU DUC Districts.

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

- 4) The R20, V25 and 105th Local Force Battalions, and
- 5) The 70th Local Force Battalion of QUANG TIN Province.

c. Infrastructure. A major advance in the effort to destroy enemy infrastructure began on 18 October in HIEU NHON District. Two intelligence cadre of RD Team 27 received information from an informer on the location of a VC tunnel complex. Together with an ARVN Ranger platoon, RD Team cadre approached the tunnel and ambushed 14 VC attempting escape. Six VC were killed and eight captured; eight RD cadre were wounded by a grenade explosion during the ambush.

Interrogation of the captives by the ARVN S-2 and National Police has so far led to the arrest of 35 VC agents operating within the Province and in DANANG. To assure thorough interrogation of these and any future suspects, the PSB Chief has organized a special Section for their questioning. If the present snowball effort continues, it is expected that enemy infrastructure within the Province will be decisively weakened.

A meeting was called on 24 October by the Senior ICEX Coordinator to discuss the establishment of the new Provincial Intelligence Coordination Center. The possibility of merging existing facilities for the collection and dissemination of intelligence into a PICC was weighed against that of creating a new body to provide needed sophistication to present efforts. Relevant GVN and US officials are continuing the discussion and will soon propose solutions.

New Project TAKEOFF plans for attacking the infrastructure have been outlined as follows:

- 1) Target operations by the National Police against known infrastructure personalities in areas adjacent to RD hamlets. These operations will rely in large measure on information collected by the RD Cadre Teams.
- 2) More frequent use of the National Police by FWAF in operations of short duration, especially the searching of hamlets and arrest of VC suspects.
- 3) Distribution of a list naming the ten most wanted VC in each District. Initially only one District will receive such a list, both to test its impact and to minimize advance warning to VC in other Districts. Appropriate rewards will be given for information which leads to the capture of these VC.

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

d. Friendly Situation. During the first week of October there was a major change in FWIF units operating in QUANG NAM Province. The 1st US Marine Regiment was transferred to QUANG TRI Province, and the 5th US Marine Regiment was moved into the former 1st Marine TAOR. In QUE SON District, the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Air Cavalry replaced the 5th Marine Regiment. There were no major changes in the disposition of ARVN forces.

On 25 October a six-man MACV Advisory Team was established in QUE SON District. Pending completion of living facilities at District Headquarters, the District Senior Advisor, Maj CHARLES MEARS, has located the Team in the 2/12 compound southwest of QUE SON City.

Operations to provide election security were conducted during the period 21-22 October, though no significant contact was made. Two large scale operations were cancelled during October because of heavy rains and flooding.

QUANG DA Special Zone has conducted two major operations involving the 1st Ranger Group (21st Ranger Battalion and 37th Ranger Battalion). Operation BINH QUANG 9 was conducted in DUY XUYEN District between 6-12 October; BINH QUANG 10 was carried out in neighboring QUE SON District between 17-20 October. The two operations generated the following casualties:

<u>Friendly</u>	<u>Enemy</u>
KIA.....1	KIA.....6
WIA.....8	VCC.....1
	VCS.....6

Nine tons of VC rice were captured during the operations, along with a quantity of medical supplies, batteries and tobacco. An AT mine was destroyed, and one individual weapon captured.

Of the three operations conducted by QUANG NAM Sector during October, only Operation PHI PHUONG 44 yielded significant results. Capitalizing on high water created by the mid-month rains, the 1/51 ARVN Battalion and 2/4 Cavalry Troop accounted for 5 enemy KIA and 7 VCS. There were no friendly casualties.

Operation TATTOO, a waterways denial effort, had until recently been slowed by the non-availability of Firefly gunships. QUANG NAM Sector was given a high priority call on the aircraft in October, however, and by the 24th of the month some 12 enemy rivercraft were sunk, 18 damaged, and 60 VC personnel reported killed in Firefly sweeps.

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORM

4. ECONOMICS.

a. General. No substantial changes were noted in the average retail prices of common items in most areas of the Province. Understandably, the exceptions are those markets adjacent to US military installations, where inflated prices do not reflect the levels of other rural markets.

The number and quality of semi-skilled and skilled construction laborers available for work in rural areas continues to decrease. Masons and carpenters are especially attracted to the higher paying jobs available in DANANG and at US military installations.

b. Material Resources and Transport. Materials continued to flow freely into the Province along National Route 1 from DANANG to the main consumer Districts of HOA VANG, DIEN BAN and HIEU NHON. Access to other Districts is limited; surface traffic to HIEU DUC and DAI LOC Districts, while heavy, is frequently interrupted by mining incidents (31 civilian deaths this month). Transportation to DUC DUC District is restricted to convoys and light commercial trucks. Movement to THUONG DUC District and eastern QUE SON District is possible only by air. Route 1 is open for convoy traffic into QUANG BINH Province, though USMC construction activities at the new CAU LAU Bridge between DIEN BAN and DUY XUYEN Districts still prohibit passage to heavy commercial trucks. The mid-month floods left Route 1 impassable for two days while washed out culverts were replaced.

Essential building materials are available from sources within the Province. Gravel is produced and sold in HIEU DUC District at \$VN 650 per cubic meter. The same gravel transported to HOI AN may sell for as much as \$VN 1300 to \$VN 1500 per cubic meter. Similar transport markups affect sand prices; purchased near the source, one cubic meter costs \$VN 80, while the HOI AN price is \$VN 200. There is no indication that contractors are short of desired materials or substitutes. Public and military road repair efforts, however, are beginning to be slowed by shortages of coarse aggregate.

5. NEW LIFE DEVELOPMENT

a. Agriculture. The Agriculture Advisor has been away from the Province for most of the month, and is expected to return from a lecture assignment in the United States by 1 November.

b. Public Health. An interpreter shortage developed early in the month and threatened to curtail the MILPHAP Team's advisory and teaching efforts in the Province Hospital. Three interpreters have since been released from

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORM

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

CORDS/NLD Division in HOI AN to work with the MILPHAP Team on a full time basis.

On 23 October the Medecine Chief reported to the MILPHAP Medical Officer in Charge that supplies of morphine and penicillin were stolen from a warehouse in the hospital compound. At the time of the theft the MILPHAP compound was under guard by members of the PF and FFF. The incident was reported to the Province Chief and National Police Advisor on 24 October; the same night a second theft of similar supplies occurred. The Province Chief has not yet taken steps to secure medical supplies more completely.

A new American M.D. joined the hospital staff on 26 October; Dr. ROWE is a general practitioner with training in anesthesia, working under the VPVN Program. A US Nursing Advisor has been contacted to assist the MILPHAP Team in establishing a Nurses Training Course in HOI AN.

The Medecine Chief departed 27 October on a trip to Taiwan, and is expected to be away for at least two weeks.

c. Education. In addition to his regular duties as CORDS Representative in HIEU NHON District, Mr. L. P. WILLIAMS has been appointed to act as Education Advisor in the Province. Through the cooperation of the Education Chief, Dr. HOANG HUU HA, the US Leadership Training Program for Vietnamese students has been publicized in QUANG NAM, and all applications have been forwarded for consideration.

d. Administration and Logistics. The new GVN-MORD logistics system has been implemented in QUANG NAM Province. Initial reaction on the part of CORDS officials is that the new system is a viable one. No delays have been incurred in warehouse releases under the new procedure, though the flow of materials in support of RD District-level operations has been slowed by a lack of air transportation.

#### 6. CHIEU HOI.

a. General. Despite increased efforts by Chieu Hoi PsyOps Cadre and the Armed Propaganda Team, the number of incoming Hoi Chanh remains very low. Leaflet drops, leaflet distribution, broadcasts and indoctrination meetings continued; in addition, 27 VC-connected families were contacted by the APT and prevailed upon to encourage their relatives to rally. APT mobility remains a problem, as no reliable means of transportation is available.

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORM

b. Input. Only eight Hoi Chanh were received during October, five of whom are military personnel; the remaining three are political cadre. There are seventeen Hoi Chanh presently in the Province Chieu Hoi Center, a reflection of last month's successful VC operations and the increased surveillance of personnel which enemy cell organization permits.

c. Training. There is little enthusiasm for vocational training among the few Hoi Chanh now in the Center. Instruction is limited to tailoring, sewing and net-weaving, which can be taught locally. Employment of Hoi Chanh has been limited to the Kit Carson Scout Program (4), Chieu Hoi Hamlet cadre training program (4) and enlistment in Popular Forces (1).

d. Kit Carson Scout Program. Plans are being made to establish a Kit Carson Scout training center in QUANG NAM Province. The USMC Kit Carson Program Advisor, SSgt JOHN JOHNSON, made a two-day visit to the training center in QUANG TRI Province, and will submit recommendations for a new center shortly.

e. Budget. Total expenditures for October were \$VN 1,495,957; the balance of Chieu Hoi funds is \$VN 4,307,305.

## 7. REFUGEES.

a. On 18 October, Mr. VINH DUONG was replaced as Refugee Chief by Mr. DOAN CU. Mr. CU was formerly Refugee Chief in PHU YEN Province and has to date given the overwhelming problems of QUANG NAM's refugees his energetic attention.

The 1967 Refugee Resettlement Budget of \$VN 41,329,000 was approved and released both by the I Corps Commander and QUANG NAM Refugee Chief. Additional allotments from the SCR were \$VN 1 million for emergency assistance to refugee flood victims, and \$VN 320,000 for reconstruction of 64 houses destroyed by VC action at CON CHAI Temporary Camp. The Refugee Chief has also received a second Jeep for his fleet.

On 6 October, CORDS Refugee officials and members of the 29th Civil Affairs Company attended a meeting in DANANG for first discussions of input to the 1968 Sector Plan for refugees.

b. Refugee Activities. No new refugees were generated in the month of October.

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORM

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORM

Progress has been made in the area of temporary allowances and resettlement payments under the current year's program. The ICTZ Refugee Inspector assigned three staff members to assist the QUANG NAM Refugee Chief in coordinating payment procedures with District Refugee Chiefs in DUY XUYEN, QUE SON and DUC DUC. Temporary payments have been made to 4,704 people, while 818 have received the permanent allowance.

A second Refugee Registration Mobile Team has been assigned to the Province, and will work in HIEU NHON District.

On 10 October, 22,500 pounds of rolled oats and bulgur were airlifted by USMC helicopters to THUONG DUC District flood victims. Refugees in DAI LOC District received 59,400 pounds of emergency relief foodstuffs.

c. Social Welfare. Mr. PHILIPPE ACHENER joined the CORDS staff on 25 October, and will work with the Refugee Advisor in Social Welfare Service programs.

A program for the expansion of living quarters at the HOI AN poorhouse compound has been undertaken by the 29th CA Team and the German Malteser Health Service Team.

#### 8. PROVINCIAL RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF R.D.

a. RD Teams. In accordance with Project TAKEOFF action plans to expand and supplement RD Team efforts, work has continued in planning the 1968 RD Program with Province officials. It has been tentatively agreed that next year's Program will be limited to 30 Teams. Those hamlets which have been designated Ap Doi Moi for 1968 are being visited and surveyed by the Teams which will work in them. As the study of each hamlet is completed, a US advisor and his counterpart will visit the responsible Team to discuss the forthcoming effort. Teams are being educated to view the overall RD Program as a Provincial-National effort, rather than a localized hamlet program.

Implementation of the 1967 RD Program continues to run behind schedule, principally because of poor leadership and excessive absenteeism. MORD disciplinary regulations have been re-examined during October, and will be applied immediately in cases of desertion.

A complete survey of RD Teams made this month revealed that 274 Cadre have not attended training at VUNG TAU. A request has been made that all these Cadre be admitted to the November class; this will result in 30 fully trained Teams at the beginning of the 1968 Program.

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORM

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

Cpt ROBERT N. CONNOR completed his tour as RD Advisor, and has been replaced by Mr. STEVE VALENT. Two other new Advisors, Messrs. JAMES BURTON and BILL POLCHOW bring the US staff to full strength.

b. Census Grievance. The CG Center Chief and his US Advisor have undertaken a systematic evaluation of SCG Cadre performance. A freeze on new hiring was declared and the termination of several Cadre has been recommended on grounds of improper conduct.

Beginning with the October payroll, the recommended Saigon pay scale of 1 July 1967 was used in computing salaries. This has resulted in Cadre pay cuts of from \$VN 40 to \$VN 60 at the hamlet-village level, and up to several thousand piastres for headquarters personnel. Neither resignations nor apathy have increased among Cadre as a result of this change, and the US Advisor does not anticipate major problems.

Five area studies with background information, blacklists and hand-drawn maps have been supplied to military units by the SCG Center. In addition, the Center has provided CG Cadre for use as guides on military operations. In a move to improve communication between individual CG Cadre and military units in the field, the CG Center Chief and US Advisor have devised a letter of introduction for Cadre to carry. Written in English and Vietnamese, the letter briefly explains the Cadre's function and outlines the ways in which he can assist military units. Each Cadre is instructed in drawing maps of his area using a series of symbols for which printed explanations in English and Vietnamese are provided. Enhanced by simple hand gestures, the letter, map and symbol code should enable Cadre to pass on much information which has until now been blocked by the language barrier.

The Province Chief has decided to begin a thorough study of CG operations in the Province with an eye to eliminating Cadre malpractice, such as the drawing of salaries from more than one source the Province Senior Advisor has pledged cooperation in examining CG and related programs.

e. Police. National Police activities in support of the election included assignment of 170 personnel to polling places throughout the Province.

Of the two National Police Field Force Companies assigned to QUANG NAM Province, one has begun a three month training course in DA LAT. Platoons of the remaining Company are stationed in DANANG at the Chieu Hoi Center in HOI AN, and near Resources Control check-points. There is one Administrative Platoon. The 104th FFF Company has participated in two operations with the USMC.

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

11.


CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

The Resources Control Program has to date accounted for the confiscation of 12,946 kilograms of rice, 12,830 kilograms of paddy, 10,305 litres of fish sauce, and smaller quantities of other foods and medicines.

9. REQUIPED ACTIONS.

During the past month the US Advisory Staff has noted an increase in the number of business visitors to the Province. For the most part these individuals arrive with little advance notice, expecting that the time of one or more officers will be devoted to their briefing and orientation. While the Staff anticipates a reasonable amount of such activity each month, the recent flood of visitors has required an effort almost above and beyond the call of duty.

It would greatly benefit all concerned if maximum advance notice and alternative dates for planned visits could be given. This would unquestionably result in better organized and more timely handling of persons with valid reasons for visiting QUANG NAM Province.



L. D. PUCKETT

Province Senior Advisor

CONFIDENTIAL - NO FORN

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

NOFORN

Property of

MARINE CORPS HISTORICAL ARCHIVES

Please Return to Room 3127

CONFIDENTIAL

NOFORN

DECLASSIFIED