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MACCORDS-EVAL

Sam ups - To Date

27 July 1968

EVALUATION REPORT

PACIFICATION PROGRESS IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE

I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. (U) PURPOSE: The purpose of this report is to present information and observations derived from a visit to Quang Nam Province, I Corps Tactical Zone, during the period 15-20 July 1968.

2. (C) DISCUSSION:a. RD Program:(1) RD Cadre Groups:

(a) Visits were made to hamlets occupied by six of Quang Nam's thirty-four RD Cadre Groups -- three in Hieu Nhon District and three in Dien Ban District. Of the six groups, five were present in their hamlets and one could not be found. Presumably, the one which could not be found had taken the day off while the area leader attended a meeting in Hoi An.

(b) To the extent that the remaining five groups were present in their hamlets, engaged in self-defense activities and performing some organizational and Tet-damage-repair functions, the RD program in the province could be said to be working. It could not be said, however, that the program is successful.

(c) Very little success had been achieved by any of the teams against the VC infrastructure in the hamlets.

(d) Although the teams were engaged actively in self-defense, there was little indication in any of the hamlets that a coordinated hamlet defense plan had been developed. Three of the five RD groups visited stayed

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with adjacent CAP platoons or elsewhere outside their assigned hamlet at night. The RDC advisor estimated that only about 40% of the RD groups of the province stay in their assigned hamlets at night. Further, three of the five teams had not trained RDEC although the group leaders said the training would start soon. The two groups of RDEC which had been trained had not been issued weapons.

(e) All of the teams claimed to hold periodic meetings of people in their hamlet, but only a couple of the teams had developed the normal people's organizations usually formed by RD groups within a hamlet.

(f) Except for some contribution to the defense of the hamlet, this evaluator feels that neither a new spirit nor a better life has been created by the RD group in any of the hamlets visited. Except for the physical presence of the RD group, it is doubtful if governmental concern for the people had been developed or if the appreciation of the people for the government had been enhanced.

(g) It should be pointed out that the foregoing comments are not unique to Quang Nam Province. The same conditions prevail elsewhere within I Corps and were also found to exist during recent visits by this evaluator to Dinh Tuong and Phong Dinh Provinces in IV Corps and Phuoc Tuy Province in III Corps.

(2) RD Control Group Commander: The RD cadre advisor stated that the Vietnamese RD Control Group Commander, LT Tan That Ban, is ineffective and should be relieved. Advisor complaints included the following: LT Ban shows no interest in his job and, in fact, has asked to be relieved; he has been absent from the province twice for extended periods of time; he has only been known to visit RD groups at night on two occasions and both times a direct order was required; finally, he has taken no aggressive action to

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cause RD groups to remain in their hamlets at night but rather has advised the groups to leave their hamlets when security is inadequate. US advisors at province are trying at their level to bring about Lt Baa's relief.

Assistance should be provided from Saigon, if possible.

b. Phoenix Program:

(1) The Phoenix Program in the province is in a state of limbo. A directive had been received disbanding the PIOC. President Thieu's proclamation had been received establishing the Phung Hoang Program and promising further instructions regarding the establishment of the PIOC. These instructions were being awaited.

(2) Some concern was expressed by the province Phoenix coordinator over the leadership scheduled for the PIOC. The deputy police chief was scheduled to be the PIOC chairman but was in Saigon and it was not known when he would return. An ARVN lieutenant of doubtful effectiveness was being brought in from one of the districts as the deputy.

(3) Of the nine districts in the province, all but Day Xuyen have DIOCC's. All the DIOCC's have representatives from the S-2, Census Grievance, and National Police; and the three DIOCC's in districts with an RD program have RD representation. Hoa Vang and Dien Ban Districts have Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU's) but none of the other districts have troops readily available for the attack of the infrastructure. Orders either have or will soon go out from the province chief directing the reorganization of the DIOCC's. Indications are that the police representative will run the DIOCC for each district chief.

(4) Each of the DIOCC's has either an officer or ECO advisor. Most of the advisors, however, have not had formal intelligence training.

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c. National Police Field Force (NPFF): Quang Nam Province has two NPFF companies, the 104th and 105th. Up to this time, neither of the companies have operated in accordance with NPFF concepts. One has been habitually in garrison providing self-protection while the other has been used normally in static defensive positions to the south of Hoi An. Periodically, the two companies change positions. The police chief has now agreed that at any one time, six of the eight NPFF platoons may be used in operations against the infrastructure. It remains to be seen whether this promise is kept as Chief Minh was recently moved to Quang Nam Province from Quang Ngai where reportedly he was relieved for improper use of the NPFF. A second problem is the lack of good timely intelligence upon which to act. The Police Special Branch has not developed an effective intelligence gathering capability and has shown a reluctance to pass information directly to the NPFF for action. A third problem discussed by the NPFF advisor was the training received by NPFF. His feeling was that the NPFF were inadequately trained, particularly in the use of police equipment and the application of police techniques. No intra-province NPFF training program has been initiated to remedy this training problem. As a result of the aforementioned problems, NPFF effectiveness in Quang Nam Province has not been good. For example, during the first two weeks in July only one NPFF operation was conducted and it resulted in the capture of only one VC suspect in addition to draft dodgers and deserters.

d. 2d ROK Marine Brigade: Since the movement of the 2d ROK Marine Brigade to Quang Nam Province in January of this year, there have been frequent reports by province advisory personnel of a lack of aggressiveness, a lack of cooperation with sector and subsector, the use of tactics harmful to the pacification effort, and even the committing of war atrocities against innocent civilians. There have been some recent improvements. The brigade now provides

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a field grade liaison officer to sector as had long been requested by sector. There is also better cooperation in the exchange of intelligence information although some of the intelligence flowing from ROK units to sector and sub-sectors is still slow. Other aspects of the situation show little, if any, improvement. Brigade units are still reluctant to conduct operations in areas where significant VC contact might be expected. Other actions harmful to pacification include ROK atrocities earlier this year against over 80 women and children (many belonging to families of RV soldiers) in a hamlet in Dien Ban District from which they had taken sniper fire; ROK capture, multiple-raping, beating, and severing of the arm of a woman caught carrying VC letters; the ROK reputation among people working in their fields of shooting first and asking questions later; and, the general attitude of the ROK Marines toward the Vietnamese people. The district chief in Dien Ban District complained of a lack of cooperation on the part of the ROK's and stated, "We don't understand them and they don't understand us." The limited civic action accomplished by the ROK's falls far short of countering their poor public image. The situation is sufficiently serious that the VC are able to use ROK activities as a basis for effective anti-USMAC propaganda. While the political problems might be great, consideration should be given to the deployment of the brigade to an area of lesser pacification importance which requires defensive operations. Such an area might be the DMZ area where the 2d Regiment, 1st ARVN Division, is now deployed. Either the 2d Regiment, 1st ARVN Division, or the newly forming 5th separate Regiment could thus be transferred to Quang Nam to assist in pacification.

e. RF/PF: The Quang Nam RF/PF advisor brought up several problems connected with Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT's) and with one of the RF/PF improvement programs.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~NOFORN~~(1) MAT's:

(a) There is a personnel problem connected with MAT's. Personnel must have 4-6 months of training before they are eligible for the MAT's program. Thus, in the past, they have only about eight months remaining when the ranch (or guard) is distributed; their productive time with RF and PF units is even less. It would appear that advising RF and PF units is no more difficult than advising battalions and districts. Consideration should be given to assigning newly arrived personnel to MAT's teams after appropriate short term in-country schooling.

(b) MAT's personnel currently come from USARV resources, and are partially rotations and partially overrights. As in most cases where units are required to provide personnel, the less effective individuals of the unit are made available. This has been true in cases within the MAT's program and the result has been less than fully motivated personnel, some ineffective MAT's, and a mounting requirement to relieve some individuals. This problem can be eliminated by using newly arrived individuals rather than exceeding quotas of USARV resources.

(c) Most of the MAT's currently have one issued with many of the items missing. The MAT is thus less than 100% effective and becomes a burden on the district advisory team. Further, MAT's frequently have less than adequate transportation and fuel, reducing the minimal transportation assets of the district advisory team.

(2) PF Housing Program: The PF Housing Program stated that in his opinion the PF Housing Program within the district is within. Construction material issued to the PF may be used to repair and improve facilities or to reinforce defensive positions but, for the most part, the material is sold by the PF

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and the money pocketed. This will be the subject of further evaluation on subsequent field trips.

f. Miscellaneous Comments:

(1) A barbed wire security barrier is being constructed completely around the city of Banang. It consists of three fences -- two constructed a few yards apart and a third running parallel to and about 150-200 yards inside the first two. The area between the fences is to be filled with mines. The obstacle is being built at such a distance from the city of Banang as to keep the VC outside of 122 mm rocket range.

(a) There are two economic impacts of the barrier. First, the area between the three fences is lost so far as crop production is concerned. Secondly, the obstacle will divide many farms and will deny free movement between the two segmented portions of land. It will be necessary to go to the nearest major LOC to cross from one side of the barrier to the other.

(b) It is doubtful if the fences will ever be completed and if there will be sufficient troops to guard them when they are completed. (A barrier is only effective when physically guarded and covered by fire. The unpleasant experiences with the Australian fence in Phuoc Tay should be recalled.) Already, VC action has destroyed about 100 meters of one fence which had been completed. The necessity for the barrier along with its anticipated effectiveness and the ability to cover and guard it should be carefully examined. At the same time, the necessity should be weighed against the possible adverse economic impact of the barrier.

(2) Two praiseworthy programs were noted in the two districts visited:

(a) In Hieu Nhon District, an officer and enlisted US advisor along with a member of the district chief's staff had initiated a program of visiting RF/PF units in the late afternoon and spending the night. This way,

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they were able to discover that had the effectiveness of RF/PF operations. In one case the visit disclosed aggressive operations; in the other case, it was found that the RF unit was not sending out night ambushes and patrols. This program appears to have merit as it also involves the district staff more intimately in RF/PF activities.

Saved

(b) In Dien Ban District, a NIT's was observed in operation teaching map reading to a PF platoon. The instruction was well presented in Vietnamese by LT Serrato who had made the effort to learn the language in a very short time. The instruction was well received and by the end of the day the 17 PF platoon members could read map coordinates.

3. (CONF) CONCLUSIONS:

a. The RD program in Quang Nam is making little, if any, meaningful progress.

b. The RD Control Group Commander, LT Tan That Ban, is ineffective and should be relieved.

c. The Phoenix program in Quang Nam Province is in a state of limbo.

d. Because of a lack of proper employment, a lack of accurate, timely intelligence, and lack of proper training, NITF effectiveness in the province has been unsatisfactory. There is some reason to hope for an improvement in the future.

e. The 2d ROK Marine Brigade does not conduct aggressive operations and has been guilty of atrocities and activities counter to pacification.

f. MAT's personnel should be assigned to the program immediately upon their entry into country.

g. There is some evidence that the PF Housing Program may be less than successful as PF soldiers may be selling the construction material rather than building new dwellings.

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The above information was obtained from the files of the United States Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D.C., and is being furnished to you for your information.

5. (S) (U) (F) (P) (C) The following recommendations are those of the
 6. Field and are forwarded for information to the element (signature)
 7. (signature)

1. The 11th Airborne Division, the 10th Central Group, Commander is Giang Son
 Division is under the 11th Airborne Division, 10th Central Group, (11th Airborne, 10th Central Group)

b. That in the previous administrative situations, namely, the 2d NAC, the accused be subjected to a reorganization and receiving a definite evaluation and must the accused be ordered by another unit of a least equal level. (MILS, 3d)

2. That many of the staff assigned to the MIT's program to get lower quality individuals and to have their services for a longer period of time in the field. (pgs. 13)

Clarence W. Hammer
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HEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, CORDS

MACCORDS-EVAL

7 AUG 1968

MEMORANDUM THRU: CHIEF OF STAFF

FOR: DEPUTY TO COMUSMACV FOR CORDS

SUBJECT: Pacification Progress in Quang Nam Province, I CTZ

1. During the period 15-20 July 1968, the Evaluations Branch conducted an evaluation of pacification progress in Quang Nam Province, I CTZ. Specific subjects addressed included RD Cadre, NPFF, Phoenix, RF/PF, and the performance of the 2d ROK Marine Brigade.
2. A copy of the evaluation is attached for your information. Copies are being forwarded to the Senior Advisor and DEPCORDS, I CTZ, for information.
3. Copies have also been forwarded to concerned MACV staff sections and MACCORDS divisions.

1 Incl
as

W. E. Colby
W. E. COLBY
For ACofS, CORDS

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURE

MEMO

From : Secretary, Joint Staff, MACV

To :

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 ...1...Deputy Chief of Staff
 ...2...Chief of Staff HAS seen
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 ...3...DEPCOMUSMACV FOR CORDS
DEPCOMUSMACV
COMUSMACV

...X...Info

.....Recommend approval

.....Recommend signature at

.....For consideration

Remarks:

SUBJECT: Pacification Progress in Quang Nam
 Province, I CTZ

CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS AT BLACK
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[Signature]
 M-5786

[Signature]
 For Secretary, Joint Staff

7 Aug 68

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19 AUG 1968

MACJOIR

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. WARREN PARKER
PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR
QUANG NAM PROVINCE, I CTZ
ADVISORY TEAM 1
APO 96337

THRU: DEPCORDS, I CTZ

SUBJECT: Pacification Progress in Quang Nam

I've been trying to relate the attached evaluation report with your July province report -- with only limited success.

First of all, I'm particularly concerned that PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG appears to be "in limbo". Have you finally got the Province Chief to move out? What additional help do you need from I Corps or Saigon to get it going?

Have you been able to get rid of Lt Ban, the ineffective RD Control Group Commander? Put pressure on the Province Chief -- we won't continue to fund a program which the Vietnamese staff with incompetents. Same applies to the two ineffective NPPF companies.

Can you document the poor performance of the 2nd ROK Marine Brigade? With facts, perhaps the CG, III MAF or COMUSMACV can do something about the situation.

I realize that we can only move as fast as we can motivate our counterparts. But we also need our own action plans to get more attention on essential pacification programs. If you don't have such a plan, you should get one.

I've asked the DEPCORDS to back you up. Let us know when you need help. In the meantime, I expect you to stir things up in Quang Nam.

SIGNED

R. W. Komer

Inclosure
a/s

Copies to:
ACoFS, CORDS
~~Chief of Staff~~

RMMontague:pc

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