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
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# PACIFICATION PRIORITY AREA SUMMARY



PREPARED BY

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF

// FOR CIVIL OPERATIONS

AND

REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND,  
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INTRODUCTION

1. The purpose of this booklet is to present the pacification priority areas with related statistical summaries and the National Pacification Policy for 1969.

2. Pacification priority areas were developed utilizing past experience and the new data systems which are now available at this headquarters. Priority areas were established based on four criteria:

- Population Density
- Vital Lines of Communication
- Strategic Government Centers
- Areas of Economic Importance

Priority areas were developed to focus management attention at the province, CTZ, and national levels; to determine pacification resource requirements; and to prepare a balanced resource allocation plan for 1969 in light of resource availability. Enclosed are maps of each CTZ which display the pacification priority areas in two degrees of importance. The clear green areas are of utmost importance to pacification. The dotted green areas are considered more important than the uncolored area but less important than the clear green areas. The objective of selecting priority areas is to utilize and allocate pacification resources in areas for maximum benefit. It is not intended that previously allocated resources should be subject to a major redistribution or that only those

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clear green areas would receive new resources.

It should be noted that since all provinces have pacification resources, they also have a priority pacification effort. Once this priority area is "pacified," necessary resources should remain in the priority area, and the pacification effort should be expanded as remaining resources permit.

The pacification priority areas indicated on the enclosed CTZ maps have been reviewed and approved by US and GVN Province, CTZ and National Officials.

Adjacent to each CTZ map is a summary of significant statistics. The security status was obtained from the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). "Relatively Secure" includes that population in a HES security category A, B or C hamlet. "Contested or VC Controlled" includes that population in a HES security category D, E or V hamlet.

3. Also enclosed in this booklet is a paper called "THOUGHTS ON PACIFICATION" which is a Pacification Policy Summary. In brief, this paper explains the eight priority pacification programs and outlines policy for shifting the emphasis of these pacification programs. Four changes in pacification emphasis are outlined:

a. Greater geographical and functional concentration of the pacification effort. (Priority areas and eight priority programs.)

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b. Redirect pacification efforts from the hamlet to the village level. \*

c. Establish permanent central government presence in the village. \*

d. Require participation of all technical ministries. \*

4. The enclosed maps, statistics, and narratives were prepared with the hope that they would be self-explanatory, however, any additional information required or desired will be provided upon request.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. The pacification priority areas in I CTZ include the heavily populated coastal lowlands, major lines of communication (Route 1 and the National Railroad) and the areas of economic importance in each Province. The priority areas also encompass the autonomous city of DaNang, the religious city of Hue and all the Province capitals.

2. Population Summary:

Total Population in I CTZ	3,236,000
Population in the Pacification Priority Areas (74% of CTZ total population)	2,404,000

3. Population Security Status:

a. Relatively Secure Population


CTZ Total	1,733,000
Population Priority Areas (76% of CTZ relatively secure Population)	1,323,000

b. Contested or VC Controlled Population

CTZ Total	1,503,000
Pacification Priority Areas (72% of CTZ Contested or VC Population)	1,081,000

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II CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. The pacification priority areas of II CTZ include the large cities along the coast and the significant population centers and agricultural areas near the coast. These areas include most of Route 1 and the national railroad. In the Highlands, priority areas, although not following a discernable pattern, include the major population centers of each Province as well as the areas of economic importance.

2. Population Summary

Total Population in II CTZ	2,895,000
Population in the Pacification Priority Areas (84% of CTZ total population)	2,432,000

3. Population Security Status

a. Relatively Secure Population


CTZ Total	2,082,000
Pacification Priority Areas (79% of CTZ relatively secure population)	

b. Contested or VC Controlled Population

CTZ Total	813,000
Pacification Priority Areas (96% of CTZ contested or VC population)	778,000

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**CONFIDENTIAL**III CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

1. The pacification priority areas in III CTZ include: the Capitol City of Saigon which is not only densely populated but is the economic hub for South Vietnam; the highly populated areas contiguous to Saigon and along the major LOCs emanating from Saigon; and the Province Capitals and areas of economic importance.

2. Population Summary:

Total Population in III CTZ	5,411,000
Population in the Pacification Priority Areas (89% of CTZ total population)	4,837,000

3. Population Security Status:

a. Relatively Secure Population


CTZ Total	4,424,000
Pacification Priority Areas (89% of CTZ relatively secure population)	3,956,000

b. Contested or VC Controlled Population

CTZ Total	986,000
Pacification Priority Area (89% of CTZ contested or VC population)	881,000

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- Ap Doi Moi - Real New Life Hamlet. One designated to meet the 11 pt. criteria.
- Ap Tan Sinh - New Life Hamlet. One secured on the 6 pt. criteria as of 31 Dec 66 & on which no further work is planned unless it regresses to Ap Cung Co status.
- Ap Cung Co - Consolidation Hamlet.
- (1) A former Ap Tan Sinh hamlet which has regressed in one or more of the 6 pt. criteria
- or
- (2) One designated in the provincial plan to be raised to the status of an Ap Tan Sinh (6 pt. criteria).
- Ap Binh Dinh - Pacification hamlet. One designated for work to meet the first two of the eleven points of the Ap Doi Moi.

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1. In IV CTZ the pacification priority areas include the rich agricultural areas of the Delta with its densely populated areas along the vital LOCs (Routes 4, 5A, 6A, 7A and 24; Mang Thit and Cho Gao Canals). The priority areas also include the Province and major District capitals, airfields and key economic facilities of IV CTZ.

## 2. Population Summary

Total Population in IV CTZ	5,879,000
Population in Pacification Priority Areas (63% of CTZ total population)	3,675,000

## 3. Population Security Status

## a. Relatively Secure Population


CTZ Total	2,989,000
Pacification Priority Areas (70% of CTZ relatively secure population)	2,106,000

## b. Contested or VC Controlled population

CTZ Total	2,889,000
Pacification Priority Area (54% of CTZ contested or VC population)	1,569,000

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NATIONAL SUMMARY

Of the 44 provinces of South Vietnam, each has a designated pacification priority area for focusing pacification resources and management attention; however, there are certain areas of greater pacification importance which have been designated as "first priority."

Approximately 77 percent of the total population of South Vietnam is within the pacification priority areas. In addition 13 percent of the population outside the priority areas are now under GVN control according to the HES. Therefore, achieving security for the population in the priority areas coupled with retaining the relatively secure population outside the priority areas will result in GVN control of 90 percent of the total population of South Vietnam.

Not only do the priority areas include the vast majority of the population but it also includes the major lines of communication and the rich agricultural areas necessary to produce a viable economy. Included in the priority areas are 76 percent of all or portions of the 249 districts in South Vietnam and 63 percent of the 2,321 villages of South Vietnam and 62 percent of the 12,755 hamlets.

Inadequate pacification resources (in particular territorial security forces and management talent) and the urgency of securing and organizing the major portion of the population dictates the need for focusing available assets in priority areas to achieve greater pacification momentum and establish a lasting GVN presence.

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## THOUGHTS ON PACIFICATION

### I. GENERAL

1. Summary. We must achieve greater pacification momentum.

Achieving greater momentum will depend largely on increased concentration of still inadequate resources on priority activities and in priority areas. However, successful concentration of widely varied resources and the many forces available will require improved pacification management. Pacification must also be recognized as much more than just Revolutionary Development (RD). Unless the other essential elements of pacification -- PHUNG HOANG, territorial security, Chieu Hoi, police refugees, etc. -- are fully coordinated, real pacification success cannot be achieved.

2. Need for centralized direction of pacification. Though the President and Prime Minister have stated repeatedly that pacification is a national policy, pacification is still not nationally managed. In fact, the GVN does not have a National Pacification Program; it has many separate pacification-related programs. Most of these programs are under different national level managers and are largely uncoordinated, much less unified in the sense of being aimed at the same specific objectives. This lack of coordination hampers the ability of national and lower-level managers to direct pacification efficiently. Therefore, pacification

*Weaknesses*

must be given centralized national level management. It is recommended that a Deputy Prime Minister for Pacification be assigned. He should serve concurrently as Secretary General of a revitalized Central Revolutionary Development Council (CRDC), which meets at least twice monthly with the President or Prime Minister as chairman.

3. Inadequate resources. Although resources committed to pacification have increased over the past several years, they are still limited and constrained by lack of manpower. We must therefore concentrate pacification resources on the most important geographic areas and programs. We must, in addition, utilize existing resources more effectively and efficiently. A sensible list of priorities is essential.

The eight priority pacification programs which must be emphasized are:

a. Territorial security -- the first essential stage of pacification. Territorial security forces must be improved and deployed for maximum benefit.

b. The attack against the VC infrastructure. This effort must be rapidly expanded as the enemy effort intensifies. PHUNG HOANG shows promise and has great potential. It should be better coordinated with other elements of pacification and given close attention by the CRDC.

c. Stronger local government -- is an essential. Hamlet and village administrations do not function effectively, if at all. There must be greater involvement of the people. Self-defense and self-help are programs



which should increase this involvement.

d. Self-defense -- must be stepped up. An aggressive, comprehensive program is needed to cover both urban and rural areas. In the cities self-defense can be best handled by the Interior Ministry; in the countryside the RD Ministry should be responsible under the policy direction of the Interior Ministry.

e. RD and self-help are closely related methods of getting people involved. Both programs should be integrated closely. Self-help should be greatly expanded. PF platoons, cross-trained as RD teams, should be widely used to extend into more areas.

f. Economic revival, particularly in the Delta. This was one of the most promising programs during 1967. Although regressed by TET, the rural economy is recovering. Further revival of the economy in the countryside and growth of prosperity are important to pacification. They are mainly functions of improved territorial and LOC security, intelligent economic policy such as removal of restrictions, and successful execution of the TN-8 rice and fertilizer programs.

g. Resettlement and care of refugees needs greater attention. The percentage of SVN population in refugee status has continued to climb to almost 10 percent. This problem is of national importance. A more promising place in society must be provided for refugees. Resettlement must be stressed.

h. National Reconciliation and Chieu Hoi programs need improve-

ment. The opportunities presented by the current situation require an aggressive rejuvenation of these important, possibly vital, programs.

## II. PACIFICATION GUIDELINES

1. Strengthen pacification management. The CRDC has a structure extending through province level and including all the important elements of pacification. It should be strengthened through more active use. Though the President or Prime Minister chairs the CRDC, the Secretary General should be a Deputy Prime Minister who will handle operational problems and coordinate execution of CRDC policy decisions. He should be assisted by a small but high-level coordinating staff. Because MORD is seriously over-extended now, the CRDC Secretary General should not be from MORD. The members of the staff should be the second-ranking official of each of the CRDC member Ministries. Beginning immediately, the CRDC itself should meet bi-weekly with the PM as chairman. The CRDC should report to the President after each meeting. The Coordinating Staff should meet twice a week. The Coordinating Staff should be provided adequate personnel and facilities.

If thought necessary to insure that the CRDC does not become unwieldy, the Prime Minister, the MOI, Chief, JGS and MORD could form an Executive Committee to take up policy questions inappropriate for the full CRDC or which the full body referred it for solution.

This National CRDC concept should be repeated at corps and province level. For example, the Province Chief should chair the Province RDC

made up of the chiefs of appropriate technical services, the Deputy Sector Commander and the Deputy for Administration. It should have a small coordinating staff headed by a representative of the Province Chief's office of higher rank than the number two's of the members of the RDC.

Drawing again on the Recovery experience wherein US involvement in day-to-day deliberations enabled US support to be more effective than ever before, there should be high-level US representation on the CRDC, coordinating staff, and at corps and province level. The US already has a single manager for its support to pacification and the tie-in would insure close coordination of US support.

The strengthened CRDC should issue systematic directives to provide operational guidance, notifications of policy changes and tasking orders to its member ministries (and other elements of the government if necessary) as well as to corps and province. They should be signed by the PM or the President. These directives would integrate the policy and operational guidance for all the different elements of pacification to include RF and PF, PHUNG HOANG, Local Government, Self-Defense, Chieu Hoi, Refugees, Psywar, and RD.

A systematic planning process and reporting schedule is essential. The CRDC should require that province and corps pacification plans be prepared on a fixed schedule and reviewed at the next higher echelon.

The province plan is basic. It should incorporate all elements involved, especially RF and PF. Annual plans are not sufficient. Province plans must be kept up to date as changes occur or are required. A standard format must be followed such as the overlay scheme described in the Combined Campaign Plan, AB-143. Slightly modified to incorporate recent changes in hamlet nomenclature and the shift to the village concept, the AB-143 format would provide a basic plan with overlays as annexes. A single monthly overlay showing changes would keep Corps and Saigon informed and serve as the key report of progress in each province. While province is the responsible agency for the annual plan and monthly reporting, districts would be required to maintain an up-to-date status of the pacification plan within the district and provide feeder data to province. Follow-up inspections should be carried out frequently to insure that provinces are either on schedule or problems have been reported with recommended solutions.

2. Concentrate pacification efforts. Inadequate resources (in particular territorial security forces and management talent) and the urgency of securing and organizing the great bulk of the rural population, dictate concentrating pacification efforts in geographic priority areas and toward the achievement of a few top priority objectives. Geographic priority areas have been identified following President Thieu's four criteria: high population density, traversed by important LOCs, contain vital government centers, and have significant economic importance. These

priority areas should receive close management attention and first cut at new territorial security and other resources.

3. Shift focus to village. Primary pacification emphasis in the past was on hamlets -- an emphasis which tended to ignore and actually weaken the village organization. Today the low level of GVN activity in hamlets which have undergone pacification in previous years is partly the result of lack of interest and capability of villages to continue pacification efforts. Recent GVN policies have increased authority and resources of village governments. More than 1,120 villages have elected administrations. To further strengthen village government and to give pacification lasting qualities, villages should become the focal point for local pacification activities.

4. Develop permanent GVN presence. As indicated before, pacification used to be a transitory phenomenon. While GVN resources were being devoted to a hamlet, pacification tended to flourish. Territorial security usually improved as RF and PF, and sometimes ARVN, were stationed in the hamlet. But when the RD team departed and the security forces were thinned out, many hamlets regressed to their original condition. Hence, to improve and strengthen pacification, it is necessary to retain a strong GVN presence semi-permanently, if possible. Thus the concept of permanent deployment of RF and PF at hamlet and village in accordance with needs dictated by the security situation, and the permanent deployment

of RD teams to villages begun in 1968 should continue in 1969. The attached general planning criteria for RF and PF and RD teams should be adopted as guidelines.

The PF and the RD teams should be under the operational control of the village chief.

An additional refinement to the village deployment of the RD teams should be made. Prior to beginning the 1969 program, each RD cadre should be surveyed to determine his home, location where he desires to settle permanently, experience (both prior experience and experience as an RD cadre), and occupational preference.

Prior to beginning the 1969 program, an RD cadre seminar should be held in each province to insure complete understanding of the pacification program, reorganize the teams based on information received in the survey, and assign teams to specific villages permanently.

5. Reduce responsibilities of MORD. As a matter of necessity, MORD has taken on many responsibilities of other ministries over the years. It is now seriously over-extended, and the other ministries are not interested in or pulling their weight in pacification. With a greatly strengthened CRDC, it should be possible to reverse the process and transfer back to the regular ministries many of their normal activities now performed by MORD. If MORD restricted its efforts to RD teams, self-help and self-defense -- all essential priority programs, it could

make these programs much more effective than they are now. This would

mean that MORD would have one functional area since RD teams, self-defense and self-help should be an integrated effort in any village.

Many, perhaps most, of the activities now carried out under the RD program would continue. They would not be programmed as activities at the national level but would be done, as desired by the people, through self-help.



### III. EIGHT PRIORITY PACIFICATION PROGRAMS

1. Upgrade territorial security. Current territorial security forces are inadequate in number and quality. However, manpower constraints and lead time considerations make substantial expansion beyond end-FY 69 force levels less attractive, more difficult and less timely than improving quality of existing forces. Better deployment and employment of RF companies and PF platoons is the quickest way to get results. Leadership is the key to better employment. Because end-FY 69 RF and PF force levels are still inadequate, some ARVN battalions probably must be retained on territorial security missions and utilized more effectively than in the past.

JGS/MACV already have a 15-point RF and PF improvement program. This program must continue to receive top priority and must be updated periodically. The CRDC should get periodic reports or briefings on the status of the RF and PF improvement program. Follow-up inspections and actions are essential. By becoming involved, the CRDC can insure that other programs -- PHUNG HOANG, RD Cadre, self-defense, etc. -- contribute actively to improving territorial security.

2. Step up the attack on the VC infrastructure (VCI). The PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX framework exists. Almost 200 DIOCC's are operational. More than 1,000 VCI have been neutralized each month for the past four months. However, the number of VCI is 80-90,000; it is still strong;

and the enemy appears to be shifting to an increased political effort.

Hence, PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX must be made more effective.

The President's 1 July decree provides the necessary direction to the effort of increasing the attack on the VCI. The new PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) provides the necessary details. With modest increases, sufficient assets would be available -- if used aggressively and in a coordinated manner -- to double or treble the results now being obtained. Neutralization of VCI at three times the present rate could thwart the enemy's shift to a more political phase and significantly weaken his ability to continue the fight. Thus, under general direction of the CRDC and specific policies of the National PHUNG HOANG Committee, it is essential that the attack against the VCI be greatly accelerated.

3. Develop stronger local government. Many uncoordinated and largely ineffective programs now exist for strengthening local government. Moreover, since TET the number of functioning hamlet administrations has declined 20-30 percent. Village administrations have generally failed to improve, and in many cases have regressed. Continued enemy pressure through his terror campaign is hampering the ability and willingness of local GVN officials to carry out their duties, which are the essential link between the people and their government.

The CRDC must assume responsibility for integrating, coordinating and providing policy guidance to the various efforts aimed at strengthening

local government. One way to accomplish this is through a simple action program (modeled on the 15-point RF/PF improvement program) to bring about early improvements in training, protecting and supporting local officials. The most important action should be the issue of directives and policies that increase the resources available to local administrations and the authority of local officials to use them in accordance with desires of the local populace. Special programs which emphasize on-the-job training for local officials through use of mobile training teams are also important.

4. Expand self-defense. Self-defense has been a program without adequate national backing and direction. RD cadre teams have trained countless Revolutionary Development People's Groups in the rural areas. Few have received arms. For the most part, support and interest ceased when the RD team moved to a new hamlet. After TET, self-defense flourished in the cities, especially among civil servants. Again support and interest quickly waned.

A National Committee has recently been formed. The Interior Minister has been assigned definite responsibilities to organize self-defense in both rural and urban areas. A decree has been issued. August was designated "Self-Defense Month." A realistic program has started. Its momentum needs to be built and sustained. Most important, provisions of the decree emphasizing arming the people must be vigorously satisfied.

5. Emphasize RD and self-help. The self-help program was originally designed as a tool for organizing the people. This purpose has been obscured by anxiety of province chiefs and RD leaders to build things for the record. Desires of the people are not always considered. Much of the work, even if within the capabilities of the local populace, has been done through contracts. Results, in the sense of involvement of the people, have been inadequate.

A good way to improve self-help and RD is to tie the two together under the control of the village chief, who is the representative of the people. Not only will the people become more involved but the local administration will be strengthened. Therefore, an RD team should work for the village chief and stay semi-permanently in the village. Working together, the village administration and the RD team can develop an interest in the people to help themselves. Using funds and materials furnished by the GVN to supplement locally available materials and voluntary labor, some of the needs of the people can be quickly satisfied. Implemented in this manner, self-help will fulfill its purpose of developing a more organized local population which will defend itself against outside attempts to interfere with security and growing prosperity.

To carry out a greatly expanded self-help program, more security and more trained organizers are needed than are provided by 800 RD cadre teams. The only readily available source is the 4,500 PF platoons primarily deployed in hamlets and villages. Thus the present government

program to cross-train 1,000 PF platoons as RD teams by end-1968 must be implemented. Expansion in 1969 of the number of RD-trained PF platoons to 2,000 or more is essential in order to push pacification out to more of the rural population.

6. Revive the rural economy. Growth of prosperity along with improved security are the most powerful attractions of pacification. Although substantial improvement of the rural economy -- higher paddy price to the farmer, increased vegetable production, etc. -- occurred in 1967, it was set back by the TET offensive. New programs to expand use of TN-8 rice, increase hog and poultry production, and speed up introduction of water pumps and small land tillers were delayed. However, the rural economy is now slowly recovering.

Further revival of the economy is essential to pacification progress. Rice and protein production must be increased and farmer income should be improved. Farm-to-market roads must be made secure and kept in good repair. Low-interest rural credit should be expanded. Labor-saving devices (water pumps, land tillers, and motors) must be made readily and widely available. Economic restrictions -- licenses, permits, taxes, checkpoints, etc. -- must be lifted to foster a free flow of goods and produce. To coordinate the extensive efforts required, the CRDC should have a sub-committee on Economic Revival that would meet regularly and report to the CRDC. The sub-committee should concern itself with

such matters as LOC security and repair, overall economic policies affecting rural areas, and the cessation of economic restrictions.

7. Upgrade refugee care and step up resettlement. More than one million refugees are living in temporary camps or with friends and relatives. More refugees are being created as intense military actions continue. At this time, few refugees, except those people made homeless during the TET and mini-TET offensives, are being resettled. Hence there is no reduction in the burden on the government to care for refugees. Moreover, this care is barely sufficient because of inadequately staffed province refugee services and too few mobile refugee teams. Mobilization is cutting into the existing, overtaxed organization.

It is imperative that a large-scale resettlement program begin during the next six months. The new, forward-thinking programs initiated by the Ministry of Health, Social Welfare and Refugees to manufacture and distribute 100,000 prefabricated houses by end-1969 should be started immediately. Greater emphasis should be given to returning refugees to their own villages as soon as security permits. Meanwhile, every effort should be made to provide adequate care to all temporary refugees and see that they get all assistance promised by the GVN. To do these major tasks requires the full support of many ministries and the RVNAF; the MHWR cannot do it alone. Hence, refugee matters should be coordinated

by a strengthened CRDC.

8. Revive national reconciliation and Chieu Hoi. For the first six months of 1968, the returnee rate was only one-third of the rate during the same period in 1967. Although there was a marked increase in July, the Chieu Hoi program is running far behind its potential. This is partly the result of lack of interest except by the Chieu Hoi Ministry and less than adequate handling of returnees. However, the basic concept and program are sound. There are signs that the Chieu Hoi program is reviving -- July returnee rate was 75 percent higher than June, quality of returnees is two to three times greater than in 1967. Three high-level VC have defected in recent months, and the utilization of Hoi Chanh has greatly improved.

More must be done to exploit the opportunities which exist. Enemy morale is flagging. Military pressure on the enemy is increasing. Enemy commanders are being forced to accept heavy casualties for scant political gains. Use of Hoi Chanh as Armed Propaganda Teams and as Kit Carson Scouts has proved to be highly productive in encouraging additional defections. Good treatment and adequate facilities are known to attract more Hoi Chanh. Hence, through better execution of existing programs, greater interest and attention by GVN leaders, and more support and better cooperation from other ministries, it should be possible in the last half of 1968 to more than double the number of returnees.

who rallied in the first half of the year. This should be the minimum goal. To achieve it, a special campaign of the same intensity as the annual TET campaign should be launched now and continue throughout 1969.



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A basic political objective in SVN, sustained and supported by allied military operations in Vietnam, is the pacification program.

Pacification progress in 1967 was slow, with most advances being made during the first half of the year. According to the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), GVN population control increased from about 62 percent to approximately 66 percent between January and June, but after June it remained almost static. Some of the increase was caused by refinement in the HES and other increases were attributed to population expansion and migration of people to GVN controlled areas from areas controlled by the VC.

The successful conduct of elections in the face of determined VC/NVA disruptive efforts was one of the major accomplishment of the GVN. The introduction of representative, constitutional government perhaps was the major significant result of US support in SVN. The elections should have produced a larger psychological advantage for the GVN, but little occurred from that important, but undramatic development. The new GVN was a cautious, fragile, and uncertain entity which did not quickly generate strong enthusiasm in the populace, nor did it initiate any serious effort to build a party to develop political support and assist in the passage of its early legislative program. By the end of 1967 the GVN had taken little apparent action to reduce graft and corruption which remained serious problems.

Although the number of Hoi Chanh, VC/NVA returnees, dropped sharply in the last part of 1967, the overall total of approximately 27,000 was about 45 percent higher than for 1966 and represents a significant achievement.

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To improve territorial security, approximately 55 ARVN battalions were committed to Revolutionary Development\* (RD) support. Additionally, about 200 Regional Forces (RF) companies and 570 Popular Forces (PF) Platoons were assigned RD support missions.

RD Cadre were able to succeed in programmed hamlets primarily because of the protection which they received from ARVN battalions in support of the RD program. Nonprogrammed hamlets failed to show any real improvement, however, because of inadequate improvements in territorial security.

The strongest single political force in SVN continued to be the VC infrastructure, guerrillas, and local forces. In spite of problems in taxation, manpower, food, and morale, this force was still effective. The National Liberation Front (NLF) appeared to end the year with greater strength than at the beginning.

To improve the exposure and attack of the VC infrastructure, a new management structure for all US advisory levels was established in July, called ICEX (Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation). Reaction by the GVN was slow, for not until 20 December, did the GVN set up a comparable coordinating framework, PHOENIX. By 31 December, approximately 2,000 VC infrastructure personnel were eliminated. A major problem in the GVN program against the VC infrastructure was inadequate detention facilities, and infrastructure personnel were released or escaped with considerable frequency.

Great stresses continued to threaten the fragile economy but the threat of runaway inflation was checked throughout 1967. Although rice production increased, it was still 15 percent below the 1964 crop, and the increase barely exceeded the expected two and one-half percent population growth for the year. Although industrial production rose, the SVN economy was not sound, and continued to be largely dependent on US aid.

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\* Revolutionary Development is the integrated military and civil process by the GVN to restore, consolidate, and expand government control so that nation building can progress throughout the Republic of Vietnam.

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From January through December of 1967, about 435,000 refugees came under GVN control. This number, although smaller than in 1966, still greatly strained the GVN.

By 31 December, all roads considered essential to friendly operations were open and about 60 percent of the mileage was secure. Additionally, approximately 35 percent of the rail-road mileage was open and 30 percent was secure. Of the waterways in the national priority areas of III and IV Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ), about 90 percent were open and 45 percent were secure.

US agencies involved in advising and assisting the pacification program were reorganized in May into a new integrated civil-military agency, the Office of Civil Operations, Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), under the direction of COMUSMACV. As a result, the pacification program received added resources, increased military support, enhanced civil-military staffing, and benefited from better coordinated support by the US government.

Pacification in 1968

The Tet offensive, 29 January to mid-February, due both to its destructiveness and psychological effect, had a major impact on the pacification program. Prior to the Tet offensive approximately 67 percent of the population were living in relatively secure areas. This percentage dropped just below 60 percent as of 29 February.

Since 31 March, there has been a gradual upward trend in the percentage of people living in relatively secure areas from approximately 62 percent in April to about 67 percent in ~~September~~ <sup>NOVEMBER</sup>. Relatively secure rural population has progressed at approximately the same rate from a post-Tet low of 44 percent in March to ~~51 percent~~ <sup>60 percent</sup> in ~~September~~ <sup>NOVEMBER</sup>.

Although pacification suffered an unquestionable setback as a result of the Tet offensive, there were several bright spots. GVN units for the most part fought well, and in some cases exceptionally. Of primary significance, there was no massive popular demonstration of support for the enemy cause.

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In spite of allied military successes, pacification suffered a further setback as a result of the May attacks. However, toward the end of June, the spirit of public determination and involvement had shown a perceptible increase. As a result of the Tet and May attacks it became necessary to divert funds, commodities, and leadership attention from the RD program to civil recovery and refugee relief.

The Chieu Hoi returnee rate declined following Tet until July because of the enemy's intensified anti-Chieu Hoi program, VC countermeasures, coalition government propaganda, and closer surveillance over their personnel. Since July, the returnee rates have improved appreciably and in October there were 2,500 returnees, the highest figure for any month since May 1967.

By July, commercial activity in I, II, and III Corps had approached pre-Tet levels. Curfews were eased, major LOC reopened, and prices declined from the February high to only slightly above pre-Tet levels. IV Corps, where the VC made a determined effort to discourage movement of commodities to and from the Delta, remained a problem. Civilians enrolled in self-defense programs of all types exceeded 750,000 by 31 October, of which about 240,000 had received training and approximately 70,000 had been issued weapons. As of 30 September, approximately 9,500 infrastructure personnel had been killed or captured or had rallied to the GVN.

Recent communist political activity in the countryside includes attempts to replace the old communist "Village Autonomous Committees" with a new facade called "Revolutionary Administration of Liberation Committees." There is no confirmation of progress of this reorganization, which represents a substantial effort toward establishment of a new administrative system that could be used in the post-hostility struggle with the GVN to win control of the population.

Assessment

A comprehensive assessment of pacification should be conducted in an historical perspective and include all relevant factors. Practically every pacification indicator points to a better rate of progress by mid-1968 than in 1967 and more in 1967 than in any previous year since the height of the Diem regime. A brief

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evaluation of all pacification indicators, when reviewed in aggregate, substantiates the conclusion that pacification in Vietnam today is making reasonable and promising progress.

Although the HES provides the most convenient single index of pacification at the hamlet-village level, pacification cannot be satisfactorily analyzed solely in terms of the Hamlet Evaluation System. This system is not an adequate measure by itself for several reasons. The current HES is an imperfect measuring device and is not suitable for precise analysis at any level of aggregation, from hamlet through national. At best, the HES may be used as a rough indicator of major trends. For much of its first year, 1967, HES data were incomplete, inaccurate, and inconsistent since the system was new, in a formative state, and subject to varying interpretation. The HES always will reflect subjective evaluation by officials at all levels.

Some improvements have been made in the system, both structurally and methodologically and much remains to be done. As could be expected, MACV has been developing revisions to improve the system for more than a year and will implement the revised HES in February 1969. This comprehensive revision attempts to increase objective measurements in the report, will facilitate use by US field personnel, expand economic and political data appreciably, and will improve standardization of reported data and measurement. Even in its improved form, it will still be only an indicator of pacification progress in SVN.

A balanced, thorough analysis of pacification must include other important military, economic, and political factors, whether or not quantifiable data are available. Many of these factors have a multiple relationship to pacification. When they are positive, they accelerate pacification and, in turn, are enhanced by the resulting progress. Conversely, when these conditions are negative, or regress, so does pacification.

The failure of VC/NVA main forces to achieve major military victories since the US and FVMAF began their large buildup in SVN has profoundly affected pacification. Only after main force communist pressure was removed could pacification progress appreciably. Psychologically, politically, and economically,

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allied military success has had a significant impact on pacification and nation building programs in Vietnam, even though not all such impact can be quantified satisfactorily.

Other VC major defeats have affected pacification programs and progress. Notably, the VC stated their intent first to prevent and then destroy the series of elections held by the GVN, beginning with the Constituent Assembly election in September 1966 and continuing through the national executive and legislative elections of 1967. Further, the GVN conducted elections in thousands of hamlets and villages and most recently concluded election of supreme court justices.

The GVN is stronger and more stable than in years. It is a freely elected, constitutional government becoming more responsive to the aspirations of the Vietnamese. The President and Prime Minister are exerting personal leadership, appearing before the populace, publicly establishing standards for, and examining performance of, provincial and district officials, and instituting dialogs with administrators and political groups.

Significant progress also is being made toward improving the caliber and performance of Corps, Province, and District officials. Corrupt and incompetent officials are being removed and better performance by national, regional, and provincial officials is developing. The resulting improvement in the political and administrative functioning appreciably enhances the prospects of the pacification program.

The struggle in Vietnam is first and foremost a political conflict, and such political actions by the GVN have significance on pacification extending far beyond their many imperfections. Few, if any, of these political factors can be quantified.

Two other highly important indicators of overall pacification progress that are not adequately covered or are not included in the HBS are the Chieu Hoi and the anti-VC infrastructure (PHOENIX) programs. Both of these critical GVN programs are contributing to discovering and elimination of the VC infrastructure.

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Additionally, progress is being made in training and arming peoples self-defense organizations. This effort is an integral part of pacification, and the results should be included in evaluation of the pacification program.

The quantitative and qualitative improvement in the RD Cadre Program is not accurately measured by the present HES. Nor can the intensive and sweeping effects of the current programs to modernize and increase the number of the RP and PF units, which are enhancing territorial security, be determined adequately through the current HES.

The ability of the GVN to cope with its severe refugee problems is a fundamental part of the overall pacification effort. As with every other pacification program, much work with the refugee problem remains to be done, yet progress has been made and continues as the GVN improves its program and increasingly larger numbers of refugees are cared for. As one by-product of resecured control over the countryside, the size of the refugee problem is partly an indicator of the program's success; the GVN's attitude and effectiveness in handling refugees can and does strongly influence the attitudes of people toward the GVN.

A thorough analysis of pacification would include pertinent economic factors not contained in the present HES. For example: rice production has improved significantly, inflation has been controlled, and increasingly, critical LOC have been opened and secured. The GVN has initiated significant measures to revive the rural economy, improve farm incomes, and redistribute land. Additionally, a massive effort, largely by ARVN and US military engineers, continues to rebuild and upgrade the roads and bridges in Vietnam.

Viet Cong strength has declined and their ability to recruit and tax has diminished despite stepped-up terror. However, the VC still control a significant portion of the countryside and continue to possess a political apparatus and guerrilla strength to back up their harried main forces.

Although the overall trend in pacification is encouraging, a great deal remains to be done. The GVN itself acknowledges that there is too much corruption and inefficiency, as is evidenced by its ongoing campaign to cope with these problems.

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A viable political dialog must be fostered by the GVN to link the village to the national government and provide an effective alternative to existing communist organizations. Many hamlets and villages still lack adequate protection; systematic VC terror and assassination have not yet been prevented; numerous refugees still lack adequate care; many roads, bridges, schools, and marketplaces remain to be built to assist in reaching a sustaining rate of social and economic activity.

In conclusion, comprehensive and responsible appraisal of pacification must consider the numerous factors and programs affecting it, many of which are not susceptible to measurement or quantitative analysis at this time. The growing energy and spirit with which the GVN is accelerating pacification efforts is encouraging. There have been many pacification efforts in the past, but none on the scale with the resources and with the leadership being demonstrated today. Despite many continuing and serious problems, pacification has regained the lost momentum following the Tet and May offensives, and the outlook is more favorable than in months, if not years. *Hopefully, in 1969 the GVN will continue to achieve the same progress in pacification as was evidenced during the last three months of 1968.*

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SECRETREPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCESBackground

At the end of 1960 the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) numbered 247,700. By December 1964 this force had more than doubled to a strength of 514,300, yet RVNAF almost was defeated by the enemy during late 1964 and early 1965. Only the large scale intervention of US forces prevented a South Vietnamese collapse and thereby provided the opportunity to rebuild an effective fighting force. By late 1967, RVNAF had expanded to 643,100 men and had improved its performance noticeably; however, it was still armed with WW II vintage weapons and equipment.

In order to prepare for the day when the US could begin turning over a larger part of the war to RVNAF, General Westmoreland recommended in November 1967 that a program be instituted to upgrade the quality of RVNAF weapons and equipment. Specifically, General Westmoreland recommended issuing M-16 rifles, M-79 grenade launchers, and M-60 machine guns, as well as increasing the number of mortars and howitzers and modernizing the trucks and radios within RVNAF. This program was approved by the Secretary of Defense in January 1968.

In January 1968, the GVN instituted a partial mobilization to build up RVNAF. This program was progressing satisfactorily when the Tet offensive struck. Although RVNAF bore the major impact of this offensive, it performed well in meeting the onslaught. This response provided convincing evidence that it had improved considerably since the dark days of 1965. The offensive also provided added incentive to expand RVNAF to its full potential through general mobilization. To this end, US support of an overall RVNAF force ceiling of 801,215 men was approved by the Secretary of Defense in May, and the GVN National Assembly passed a general mobilization bill in June. Additionally, action was begun to speed up the modernization of weapons and equipments in the hands of RVNAF.

The response of the South Vietnamese to the Tet offensive and general mobilization has been highly encouraging. Between 1 January and 30 August, a total of 181,527 volunteers entered  
*September 1967*

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RVNAF--240 percent as many as in the same period during 1967. As a consequence, the total strength of RVNAF at the end of August was 844,519, well beyond the 801,215 ceiling. The Joint General Staff (JGS) has approved MACV plans to capitalize on the momentum of mobilization by moving into contested areas and continuing to recruit toward an overall ceiling of 850,000 from among the contested population. A favorable decision by the Secretary of Defense has been made to permit US support of the higher RVNAF force objective.

#### Expansion, Modernization, and Improvement

Plans have been prepared for the expansion of the RVNAF force structure in two phases. The Phase I plan, which is based on an assumption of continued US participation in the war at current levels, aims at maximizing RVNAF ground combat power. Major Phase I additions are: 7 infantry battalions; 6 armored cavalry squadrons; 19 artillery battalions; 4 helicopter squadrons; 143 RF companies and 300 PF platoons.

The Phase II plan aims at providing a self-sufficient RVNAF capable of maintaining internal security after US, FWMA, and NVA forces have withdrawn. Primary additions under this plan involve logistic, Air Force and Navy units.

In addition to RVNAF expansion and modernization programs, there are currently some 67 programs underway to improve the overall performance of RVNAF. These include personnel, logistic, and training programs and should result in a steadily increasing level of morale, discipline, and combat proficiency within RVNAF.

The key factor in improving RVNAF performance lies in the upgrading of the leadership throughout the structure, and the major leadership problem is a lack of qualified personnel. This situation, due in large measure to combat losses, VC terrorism, and VC recruitment, has been aggravated by the current expansion.

By 31 August, the leader shortage within the Regular Forces had been largely corrected. As indicated in the chart below, these forces were only short 274 officers, while an overage existed within NCO grade of E-5 and above. The RF, however, was still short both officers and NCOs.

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SECRETRVNAF Leader Status, 30 Aug 68

	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Difference</u>
Regular Forces			
Officers	32,318	<del>31,011</del> 32,024 (99%)	- 297
NCOs E-5 & above	86,601	<del>92,327</del> 88,752 (102%)	+2,151
Regional Forces			
Officers	14,999	<del>12,393</del> 11,828 (78%)	-3,171
NCOs E-5 & above	40,228	<del>34,174</del> 32,496 (81%)	-7,732

In addition to shortages in overall leader strength, there is a maldistribution of grades which results in serious shortages at higher levels. In the grades of captain and above, the regular forces have only 58 percent of their authorized strength, while the RF has only 28 percent. Within the NCO grades of E-6 and above, only 82 percent are assigned in the regular forces and 65 percent in the RF.

Programs are underway to provide the bulk of the needed numbers of leaders by the end of 1968 and to correct the higher grade shortages through enhanced promotions over the next three years.

One of the most serious problems facing RVNAF is desertions. During 1967, the desertion rate was reduced considerably from the high rates existing in 1965 and 1966. At Tet many personnel could not rejoin their units due to the widespread fighting in progress and were carried as deserters. Since Tet, the desertion rate has jumped back up to that existing in 1966, approximately 16 per thousand per month. As a consequence, ~~86,170~~ RVNAF personnel deserted between 1 January and 30 August 1968.

Much of the increased desertion is due to a clemency policy promulgated during the Tet offensive. Subsequently, this lenient policy was discontinued, and efforts are underway to tighten the legal and punitive machinery for deserters while simultaneously taking action to improve the living standards and morale of the ARVN soldier and his dependents.

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Studies indicate that about 30 percent of all deserters are men with less than six months service. As mobilization slacks off and the new recruits are integrated into their units, there should be a drop in the desertion rates.

The bulk of the manpower involved in the expansion of RVNAF has been assigned to RF and PF units. These units traditionally have had the lowest priority in every respect within RVNAF, and their prestige, recognition, and performance generally have been poorer than those of the Regular Forces.

A variety of programs are underway to correct deficiencies in leadership, firepower, and performance of RF and PF units. Included are programs to improve advisory support for the RF and PF, to increase the number of RF and PF units, to provide more and better leaders, to increase the training of RF and PF units, to exchange officers with ARVN units; to substitute modern small arms for the current weapons in their hands, to improve the maintenance of radios, and to correct deficiencies in the employment and deployment of RF and PF units. Additionally, the Territorial Forces Evaluation System has been established to provide valid information on the status and performance of PF/RF units and to evaluate the progress of the programs for their improvement.

All programs for PF/RF improvement, except for the final stage of weapon modernization, will be completed during FY 69 and should result in significantly better performance by the end of that fiscal year. An overall improvement in performance will permit RF and PF units to relieve ARVN units from territorial security missions. Such action will make available some 40 maneuver battalions for other combat operations.

In addition to RVNAF, there are approximately 190,000 personnel serving with paramilitary forces. Thus, there are over a million people under arms in South Vietnam, from among an overall population of 17.5 million and a government controlled population of 11.5 million. Because of the priority expansion of RVNAF, paramilitary forces expanded by only 30,000 personnel in 1968, with this expansion occurring almost exclusively with the Revolutionary Development Cadre and the National Police. It is planned that by the end of FY 69, however, paramilitary forces will have expanded to 250,000 personnel.

240,000

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In conclusion, for the reasons stated above, the effectiveness of RVNAF in general and PF/RF in particular can be expected to improve significantly in both the near future and over the longer term. Further gains in combat performance of RVNAF should be realized as time passes. In fact, MACV's Territorial Forces Evaluation System already provides substantial evidence that considerable improvement has begun in the Regional and Popular Forces.

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SECRETCONCLUSIONS

The conflict in Southeast Asia is essentially political. Political leaders of both sides closely control military operations, and operations are undertaken with at least as much consideration given to likely political reaction throughout the world as toward influencing the military situation in SEA.

There are no quick cure-alls for the problems of South Vietnam or of Southeast Asia.

Within the current restraints on military operations, primary military effort is placed not on elimination of the major source of the problem (aggression by NVN) but against the aggression in SVN and on solution of problems which NVN's aggression has caused within SVN.

The primary objective in SVN is establishment of a stable constitutional government which is responsive to its people and which controls and coordinates development of its people and resources. This is an objective which only the South Vietnamese can accomplish. US and combined actions and support currently underway (military operations, RVNAF modernization, pacification) are undertaken to provide conditions under which the primary objective may be attained.

The programs and actions undertaken in SVN are soundly conceived and interdependent. The successes of one program assist the others. In an undertaking that is essentially defensive, however, success of any program depends to some degree upon conditions outside the program itself--enemy reaction, for example. Every friendly action is likely to generate an enemy reaction.

The United States has undertaken a relatively long-term commitment in SVN. The South Vietnamese are making major strides, with US assistance, in developing a capability to defend and develop their country. Their government is more stable than it has been in years, and is growing in its capability and desire to accomplish its objective. The end of US

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aid commitment in SVN is not yet in sight. The growing South Vietnamese military capability, however, indicates that unless the enemy undertakes new and unforeseen initiatives, a reduction of the US combat force commitment without sacrifice of military security and political objectives is a goal toward which progress is being made.

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