


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UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222



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MACJOIR

5 February 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Presidential Review of Pacification, I CTZ
Danang, 3 February 1969

1. Following the normal briefings with a multiplicity of charts, the CG, I CTZ asked each province chief to state his recommendations for improvements in the machinery of pacification.
2. This led to an interesting set of recommendations:

a. Quang Tri

(1) The PC recommended that the provinces be given an advance of 10 million piasters so that refugees could be paid immediately, rather than having to wait two or three months for the Ministry to provide the necessary funds.

(2) RD Cadre need better radios.

b. Thua Thien

(1) The present standard of assistance to refugees involves roofing, cement, and rice. The PC recommended that the rice supply be reduced from six to three months and that no cement be given. He estimated that this would save some 10 million piasters, and recommended that this be used to give the refugees mechanical plows and water pumps, in order to help them become self sufficient quicker.

(2) He questioned whether the commercial channels were prepared to furnish necessary cement in 1969, and requested that CORDS and MORD continue to supply this instead of supplying development funds to be used to purchase cement.

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(3) Due to the heavy damage suffered by the city of Hue, the PC recommended that the city be established as an "RD unit" so that public reconstruction could be carried out, e.g. the theater, the electric power system, etc. He estimated that this would require 30 million piasters and would have a very substantial psychological value (Comment: The '69 Guidelines do not provide the kind of RD support within municipalities as in rural villages)

c. Danang

(1) The Mayor requested that exemptions from the mobilization law be arranged for the members of the phuong committees, similar to the exemptions available in rural villages. He stated that otherwise he would lose most of his village level cadre.

(2) He asked for a better information effort aimed at the schools and the students.

d. Quang Nam

(1) The RD Cadre teams when split in half will need additional weapons.

(2) The Province requested exemption from the requirement to repair the road from Nam Phuoc to Dai Loc and from Dien Ban to Dai Loc, since security on these roads prohibits the province from working on them.

e. Quang Ngai

(1) People's Self Defense Force need a basic statute, especially to cover care for the wounded.

(2) The refugee agencies are woefully short of personnel to handle their many responsibilities and need more.

(3) Most information leaflets are printed in Saigon, thanks to JUSPAO, but this involves a time lag. He would like a system by which they could be printed locally. He also spoke of the need for improvement of village and hamlet information cadre.

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f. Quang Tin

(1) He also wished that MORD would continue to furnish cement in 1969.

(2) With respect to People's Self Defense, he commented that he could not meet his quotas if he remained within the legal ages established for People's Self Defense. He thus requested more flexibility with respect to these ages so that he could enlist additional personnel.

(3) He commented on the need for a special cadre for information at the hamlet level, which does not exist in the present structure.

3. The President then took the floor and complimented I CTZ on the good results of its APC. He said that this was, of course, due to a favorable military situation but it was well exploited and I CTZ had compensated for the difficulties of early 1968. For 1969, he commented on the need to continue the spirit, determination and enthusiasm of the APC. He stated there would be two phases: one from now to June and the second for the remainder of the year. He then set quotas of hamlets for the first phase as follows: Quang Tri - 62; Thua Thien - 65; Quang Nam - 68; Quang Tin - 65; Quang Ngai - 83. He stated that 276,000 people should be upgraded to secure to make a total of 2,360,000. Thus, 77% of I CTZ would be in the relatively secure category by June, looking toward 90 % by December. Depending upon the military situation and the Paris negotiations, he stated that he might launch another APC in July.

4. The President then stated that the results of the '68 RD program and the APC together amounted to about two-thirds of the progress made between 1961 and 1967. He stated that this came from strong leadership, organization, and management. He stated that during 1968 the various levels of the GVN had learned the concept of the war and how to defeat the VC and that it was important to maintain this for the decisive year of 1969. This was true whether a political solution is found or not. The single principle and the 8 objectives of the 1969 plan thus are a vital campaign on which all cadres must concentrate in order to reach all the goals set.

5. The President expanded on the principle of community spirit. He broke it into its three component elements of cooperation among the people, cooperation between the people and the government, and cooperation among the government organizations. He emphasized that it is through this

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principle that the VC must be defeated in the political struggle. He stressed the need to give the people real responsibility and to engage them in the effort so that they play a full part in countering the VC attack. He said the people must participate in political decisions so that they will help defend them. They must also participate in the actual work through elections and through self help projects. The government's role is to assist, but to let the people decide and provide the labor. In this fashion the people will truly participate in the overall national effort and the government will assist and help defend the people who are making the basic decisions. Also, the government agencies must mutually cooperate, under strong leadership, with good communications from center to local levels, and with close control to see that work is carried out effectively. He stated that the government must avoid the mistakes of the past, especially actions taken for form's sake, and commented that the government should not rely merely upon reports.

6. The President then stressed the importance of exploiting the advantages the government now has, especially assistance from its allies. The province chiefs were instructed to request assistance from US commanders for military operations, transportation, etc. They were encouraged to turn to the allies this year as they may not be so available in the future.

7. The President reiterated the decisive nature of 1969 and urged all to push hard and use all available effort to achieve both military and political victory. He named four main activities beyond the military effort:

- a. The Pacification and Development Program.
- b. Improvement of village and hamlet committees by increasing personnel thereon, training them and providing good administration at the lowest level.
- c. Election of hamlet and village committees, to counter VC claims of territory and population. These elected committees must then be trained to make them more effective.
- d. Assistance to the people, through helping the poor and especially through a land reform program. He stated that goals would be set with respect to land reform to define how much should be distributed and how much regularized. He said that the GVN must show what it does for the

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people so that they will vote for the national side ("not for me personally.") Again, he said that the most important action of 1969 is to gain the people to the side of the government.

8. With respect to the Pacification and Development Program, he said the Central Council will set goals through June. Among other things these will include measures to improve village and hamlet administration by providing an information member for each hamlet and nine members on the village committee, including one technician to work on technical matters. Also of importance will be a schedule of elections to be held by end-March, by end-June and by end-December so that 90% of the population will be organized and have elected committees. He stated that more officers would have to be sent to the provinces and that good service chiefs would have to be provided for provinces and districts, especially in the fields of education, information, land reform and social welfare. He promised that mobilization policies would be reviewed to insure that these people are made available.

9. The President then raised the importance of carrying out "New Life Development" as a follow-on to pacification and development, but not to be postponed. He said that it is in this way that people will see that the Government is interested in helping them by raising their standard of living, as well as in establishing political control over them. This would also show the contrast with the VC so that the people in a free choice would choose the GVN.

10. With respect to administration, the President directed the province chiefs to review hamlets which are no longer populated and eliminate them or integrate small remnants with other hamlets, so that the percentage of people and hamlets come out the same. He stressed that this should be based on the real situation in the country.

11. The President concluded by saying that during the first phase of 1969 the spirit of enthusiasm and "assault" which marked the APC must be continued. He stated that the GVN could not relax as the VC would again try to attack, either against the cities or the rural hamlets, in order to support their negotiating position in Paris. The VC still can attack and is infiltrating to do so; therefore, the Government cannot rest on the achievements of the past. Thus, although the first phase of 1969 will not be a "special" campaign, the President urged that his listeners consider it a special effort.

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12. The President then addressed the senior Vietnamese officials and Province Chiefs privately.

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