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USAID-FUNDED PROJECTS DIRECTLY SUPPORTING PACIFICATION WERE IDENTIFIED AND RESTRUCTURED TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM SUPPORT TO PACIFICATION EFFORT. IN FALL 1967, NEW FOCUS ON PACIFICATION WAS CLEARLY EVIDENT DURING GVN BUDGET REVIEWS, WHEN IT WAS AGREED THAT OVER 75 PERCENT OF THE AMERICAN AID CHAPTER OF THE GVN BUDGET WOULD BE DEVOTED TO SUPPORT OF PACIFICATION-RELATED PROGRAMS.

C. IT WAS CLEAR DURING THIS PHASE THAT STRONGER CENTRAL PACIFICATION AUTHORITY WAS REQUIRED TO DIRECT ACTIVITIES OF MINISTRIES AS THEY RELATED TO PACIFICATION. THE CENTRAL RD COUNCIL WAS THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL FOR THIS FUNCTION; HOWEVER, EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP OF THIS COUNCIL WAS VESTED IN THE MINISTER OF RD WHO DID NOT HAVE COMPLETE AUTHORITY IN THE PACIFICATION FIELD. CONSEQUENTLY, SEPARATE RD GUIDELINES WERE PREPARED IN 1967 BY MORD, AND PROVINCES WERE REQUIRED TO PREPARE BOTH AN RD PLAN AND A BROADER PACIFICATION PLAN (REQUIRED BY AB 143) TO INCLUDE OTHER PACIFICATION PROGRAMS RELATED TO THE TRADITIONAL AND NARROWER RD PROCESS.

4. (C) PLANNING IN 1969.

A, THE ENEMY'S TET OFFENSIVE IN 1968 PROVIDED BOTH AN OPPORTUNITY AND A REQUIREMENT TO REVIEW PAST PACIFICATION POLICIES AND CONCEPTS. AFTER THE TET ATTACK, THE GVN REALIZED THAT ONE CENTRAL AUTHORITY WAS REQUIRED TO COORDINATE AND DIRECT THE VAST RECOVERY OPERATION. AT FIRST, UNDER CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, AND SUBSEQUENTLY THE PRIME MINISTER, THE CENTRAL RECOVERY COMMITTEE PROVIDED THE DIRECTION REQUIRED AT A CRITICAL TIME AND ALSO ESTABLISHED THE VALUABLE PRECEDENT OF VESTING PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING AUTHORITY IN A COORDINATING BODY AT A TOP GOVERNMENT ECHELON.

B, A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF PACIFICATION POLICIES AND MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES BEGAN IN JULY 1968, AFTER THE CRC HAD LARGELY COMPLETED ITS TASK AND THE CRISES OF THE FIRST HALF-YEAR HAD BEEN BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL. DISCUSSIONS BEGAN BETWEEN MORD AND US REPRESENTATIVES ON WAYS TO STRENGTHEN PACIFICATION MANAGEMENT, THE NEED TO FOCUS ON PRIORITIES, AND THE PROPER MIX REQUIRED IN 1969 BETWEEN DEVELOPMENTAL AND SECURITY-ORIENTED PROGRAMS. IT WAS CLEAR, FROM A MANAGEMENT POINT OF VIEW, THAT MORD WAS SERIOUSLY OVEREXTENDED AND THAT IT HAD TAKEN ON RESPONSIBILITIES OVER THE YEARS OF OTHER MINISTRIES WHICH WERE AS A RESULT NO LONGER INTERESTED IN OR PULLING THEIR WEIGHT IN PACIFICATION.

C. AT THE SAME TIME, MACCORDS WAS INDEPENDENTLY REVIEWING STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF PREVIOUS STRATEGY AND MAKING SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE. THIS REVIEW

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CULMINATED IN ~~THOUGHTS~~ ON PACIFICATION~~®~~ PAPER WHICH WAS GIVEN TO KEY GVN OFFICIALS IN JULY AND SERVED AS BASIC MACV STATEMENT OF PACIFICATION POLICY. BRIEFLY, ~~THOUGHTS~~ ON PACIFICATION~~®~~ PAPER ADVOCATED FOLLOWING CONCEPTS:

- (1) INCREASED EMPHASIS ON TERRITORIAL SECURITY AS THE FIRST ESSENTIAL STAGE OF PACIFICATION.
- (2) NEED FOR CENTRALIZED DIRECTION AND IMPROVED MANAGEMENT OF PACIFICATION.
- (3) GREATER CONCENTRATION OF PACIFICATION RESOURCES ON MOST IMPORTANT GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS AND PROGRAMS.
- (4) ESTABLISHMENT OF STRONG GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY IN VILLAGES ON A PERMANENT BASIS, AND FOCUSING PACIFICATION EFFORT AT VILLAGE RATHER THAN HAMLET.
- (5) INCREASED INVOLVEMENT OF THE PERMANENT TECHNICAL MINISTRIES IN PACIFICATION.

D. IN LINE WITH THESE CONCEPTS, THE FOLLOWING PACIFICATION PRIORITIES, WHICH BECAME THE BASIS FOR 1969 PACIFICATION GUIDELINES WERE ESTABLISHED:

- (1) UPGRADE TERRITORIAL SECURITY.
- (2) STEP UP ATTACK ON VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE.
- (3) DEVELOP STRONGER LOCAL GOVERNMENT.
- (4) EXPAND SELF-DEFENSE.
- (5) DEVELOP SELF-HELP PROCESS AS POLITICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL TOOL WITH MAJOR EMPHASIS ON HOW PROJECTS ARE EXECUTED INSTEAD OF MEASURING SUCCESS BY NUMBERS.
- (6) UPGRADE REFUGEE CARE AND EXPEDITE RESETTLEMENT.
- (7) GIVE GREATER SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE TO CHIEU HOI PROGRAM.
- (8) STIMULATE RURAL ECONOMY.

E. INITIAL REACTIONS FROM MOST HIGH-LEVEL VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS, INCLUDING PRESIDENT THIEU, TO THE CONCEPTS AND PRIORITIES PRESENTED IN THE ~~THOUGHTS~~ PAPER WERE, IN GENERAL, FAVORABLE. ENCOURAGED BY INITIAL REACTIONS OF HIGH-LEVEL VN OFFICIALS, MACCORDS DEVELOPED A COMPLETE PACKAGE OF RECOMMENDED PACIFICATION GUIDELINES TO BE USED AS BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH GVN OFFICIALS AT WORKING LEVEL.

F. AFTER THE FAILURE OF AUGUST 1968 ENEMY OFFENSIVE, A DECISIVE STEP WAS TAKEN WHICH, IN RETROSPECT, SERVED TO COALESCE THINKING ON 1969 PACIFICATION STRATEGY. IT WAS DECIDED THAT A

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 SPECIAL CAMPAIGN SHOULD BE LAUNCHED IMMEDIATELY TO SEIZE INITIATIVE FROM THE ENEMY AND EXPAND GVN CONTROL AND AUTHORITY IN RURAL AREAS. OVER 1000 D, E AND V HAMLETS WERE TARGETED FOR SECURITY UPGRADING AND REINSTITUTION OF SIMPLE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DESIGNED TO MOBILIZE GROUP ACTIVITY AND POPULAR SUPPORT.

G, THE ACC
 LERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN (APC) WAS LAUNCHED AT ABOUT THE TIME WHEN PREPARATIONS WERE UNDER WAY FOR PLANNING THE 1969 PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN. IN ORDER NOT TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THE SPECIAL CAMPAIGN, GVN DEFERRED 1969 PLANNING UNTIL DECEMBER 1968, THEREBY PERMITTING THE APC TO RECEIVE FULL ATTENTION.

H, IN LATE OCTOBER-EARLY NOVEMBER, THE ISSUE OF CENTRAL PACIFICATION MANAGEMENT TOOK ON NEW IMPORTANCE. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE LOOSELY ORGANIZED CENTRAL RD COUNCIL WAS ILL-EQUIPPED TO MANAGE A PROGRAM OF SUCH URGENCY AS APC. THE NEED FOR CENTRAL MANAGERIAL CONTROL OF THE APC AND THE PRECEDENT ESTABLISHED BY THE CRC, LED ULTIMATELY TO A GVN DECISION TO ESTABLISH, UNDER THE PRIME MINISTER, A PERMANENT CENTRAL PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL (CPDC).

I, CPDC, AS ESTABLISHED BY PRIME MINISTERIAL DECREE SL/BDXD 155, WAS CHAIRED BY PRIME MINISTER, WITH THE FIRST MINISTER SERVING AS SECRETARY GENERAL, AND ALL MINISTERS PARTICIPATING IN PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT AS EQUAL MEMBERS. THERE WAS A SMALLER COORDINATING COMMITTEE CHAIRED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM MINISTRIES MOST DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN PACIFICATION. THERE WAS ALSO A CURRENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE PERMANENTLY CHARGED WITH CONDUCTING THE COUNCIL'S DAILY BUSINESS AND EQUIPPED TO HANDLE PLANNING.

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REPORTING, INSPECTING, AND ANALYSIS, WITH THE APPOINTMENT OF A DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER FOR PACIFICATION, CPDC INTERNAL ORGANIZATION IS BEING REARRANGED AND STRENGTHENED. GENERAL KHIEM WILL BE SECRETARY GENERAL, VICE THE FIRST MINISTER, DECREES DISBANDING THE COORDINATING COMMITTEE AND ESTABLISHING A STAFF IN LIEU OF THE CURRENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ARE BEING PROCESSED.

J. AS AN INDICATION OF GVN'S GROWING CONCERN AND SUPPORT FOR THE PACIFICATION EFFORT, THE PRIME MINISTER DEVELOPED AND RELEASED A PACIFICATION CONCEPT CONTAINING MOST OF THE CONCEPTS PRESENTED IN THE MACCORDS @THOUGHTS ON PACIFICATION@ PAPER, AND THE PRESIDENT ATTENDED A PLENARY SESSION BRIEFING BY THE CPDC STAFF ON PACIFICATION STRATEGY FOR 1969.

K. SHORTLY AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S BRIEFING, THE CPDC ISSUED BASIC DIRECTIVE ON 1969 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN, INCORPORATING CONCEPTS OUTLINED IN THE @THOUGHTS@ PAPER AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S PAPER ON PACIFICATION, AND TAKING APPROPRIATE MINISTRIES WITH PREPARATION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE ANNEXES TO THE GUIDELINES, THE BASIC DIRECTIVE, WHICH APPEARS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 1969 GUIDELINES, OUTLINES THE ACCEPTED GENERAL STRATEGY FOR PACIFICATION AND BEARS CLOSE RELATIONSHIP TO THE GENERAL STRATEGY STATEMENT CONTAINED IN THE MACCORDS PROPOSED DRAFT OF THE GUIDELINES, WHICH WAS SUBMITTED TO CPDC FOR REVIEW AND CONSIDERATION, THE FOLLOWING MAJOR THEMES FOR 1969 WERE INCLUDED: EXPANSION OF SECURITY INTO CONTESTED AND VC AREAS; POLITICAL/POPULAR MOBILIZATION AND REORIENTATION AND REORGANIZATION OF RD CADRE TOWARD THIS END; AND MAJOR EFFORT TO SHARE POWER WITH LOCALLY ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE.

L. AFTER COMPLETING INITIAL DRAFTS OF THE ANNEXES, EACH MINISTRY WAS INVITED TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO CPDC FOR FURTHER REVIEWS, DURING WHICH ANNEXES WERE PUT INTO FINAL DRAFT. THESE REVIEWS WERE TRULY A COORDINATED PLANNING EFFORT, EACH MINISTRY HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND ITS OWN POLICY ARTICULATED IN DRAFT ANNEXES, AND CPDC STAFF MEMBERS ATTENDING THESE MEETINGS INSURED THAT MINISTERIAL POLICY WAS CONSISTENT WITH NATIONAL PACIFICATION POLICY. MACCORDS WAS ALSO REPRESENTED BY A MEMBER ON THE FULL-TIME CPDC LIAISON STAFF, WHO WAS PRESENT TO INSURE THAT GUIDELINES WERE CONSISTENT WITH US POLICY AND OBJECTIVES. IN MANY CASES MACCORDS DRAFTS OF ANNEXES WERE ACCEPTED BY BOTH MINISTRIES AND THE CPDC AS THE FINAL VERSION. IN OTHER INSTANCES, CPDC STAFF MEMBERS AND MINISTERIAL REPRESENTATIVES DID NOT AGREE WITH THE US VERSION AND THE VN VERSION PREVAILED.

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M. IN THE FIRST WEEK OF JANUARY, SEPARATE GVN AND US TEAMS WENT TO THE FIELD FOR REVIEW OF PRELIMINARY PLANS. DEPCOMUS-MACV FOR CORDS LED THE US DELEGATION WHICH WENT TO EACH FIELD FORCE HEADQUARTERS AND MET WITH US ADVISORS FROM ALL PROVINCES. THE GVN DELEGATION, LED BY MR. BUU VIEN (ASSISTANT TO HUYNH VAN DAO, FIRST MINISTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF CPDC) AND COLONEL NGUYEN VAN TU (CHIEF OF CURRENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, CPDC), FOLLOWED THE SAME PROCEDURE WITH GVN PROVINCIAL PERSONNEL. DELEGATIONS SPENT LONG HOURS EXPLAINING THE SPECIFICS OF THE GUIDELINES AND REVIEWING PROVINCIAL PLANS IN RELATION TO THEM. SOME MISUNDERSTANDINGS WERE ENCOUNTERED, largely THE RESULT OF GRAPPLING WITH NEW CONCEPTS AND POLICY DEPARTURES. THESE MISUNDERSTANDINGS WERE CLEARED UP AND, AS A RESULT, PROVINCE PLANS WHEN SUBMITTED TO SAIGON WERE BETTER THAN EXPECTED.

N. IN SPITE OF VERY SHORT DEADLINES, PROVINCIAL PLANS WERE SUBMITTED TO THE CPDC BY 15 JANUARY AS SCHEDULED OR SHORTLY THEREAFTER. COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWS BY MACCORDS AND CPDC SHOWED PLANS VARIED FROM VERY GOOD TO VERY POOR. PRINCIPAL PROBLEM WAS LACK OF SPECIFICS, WHICH TENDED TO MAKE PROVINCE GUIDELINES OUT OF WHAT WERE SUPPOSED TO BE PROVINCE PLANS. EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT PROVINCIAL PLANS MUST BE REPLETE WITH SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS OR EVEN MOST CONSERVATIVE DOCTRINES AND CONCEPTS ARE NOT CARRIED OUT. MACCORDS REPRESENTATIVES AND REPRESENTATIVES FROM MINISTRIES, WHICH HAD PREPARED ANNEXES TO THE GUIDELINES, REVIEWED EACH PROVINCE PLAN THOROUGHLY. THIS REVIEW, UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE CPDC, RESULTED IN IMPROVED PLANS. THEY STILL, HOWEVER, WERE NOT AS STRONGLY AND CONSISELY WORDED AS DESIRED.

O. THE GVN DECIDED THAT MINISTER DAT WOULD LEAD A DELEGATION TO THE FIELD FOR FINAL REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF PLANS. DURING THIS REVIEW, IN WHICH US REPRESENTATIVES PARTICIPATED, PROVINCES FORMALLY PRESENTED THEIR PLANS TO MINISTER DAO FOR APPROVAL. MINISTER DAO MADE IT CLEAR IN APPROVING PLANS THAT THEY WERE FAR FROM PERFECT AND THAT A GREAT DEAL OF FOLLOW-UP WOULD BE FORTHCOMING FROM CPDC. WITH THE PLANS OFFICIALLY APPROVED, THE 1969 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WAS LAUNCHED ON TIME.

P. THE PROGRAM FOR 1969 BEGINS WHERE THE APC ENDED. IN EARLY FEBRUARY, PRESIDENT THIEU BEGAN A SERIES OF TRIPS TO THE FIELD TO REVIEW RESULTS OF APC. AT THE FIRST REVIEW, IN II CTZ,

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THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS WERE NOT, HOWEVER, FULLY IN LINE WITH THE STRATEGY AND CONCEPTS FOR 1969 AND IN SEVERAL INSTANCES LEFT CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION. THIS MEETING TOOK PLACE ON A SATURDAY, WITH THE CTZ MEETING SCHEDULED FOR THE FOLLOWING MONDAY. ON SUNDAY, MCAC ADVISORS MADE SEVERAL URGENT CALLS AND WROTE URGENT MESSAGES TO THE PRESIDENT IN AN EFFORT TO BRIDGE THE APPARENT COMMUNICATION GAP ON THE GVN SIDE. THE PRESIDENT REVISED HIS INSTRUCTIONS AND IN THE OTHER THREE CTZS, HIS GUIDANCE REINFORCED THE GUIDELINES PERFECTLY.

Q, DURING THESE REVIEWS, THE PRESIDENT WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO EXPRESS SATISFACTION WITH THE OUTCOME OF THE APC AND TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE 1969 PROGRAM. IN SO DOING, HE LENT NEW SUPPORT TO THE WORK OF THE CPDC.

R, LATE IN FEBRUARY, THE CPDC ISSUED A SUMMARY OF PRESIDENT'S REMARKS MADE DURING HIS CROSS-COUNTRY REVIEW OF APC, THE DECISIONS TAKEN AND GUIDANCE ISSUED BY MINISTER DAO DURING THE CPDC REVIEWS, AND THE GOALS TO BE ATTAINED BY END-JUNE 1969. MAIN POINTS WERE:

(1) THERE MUST BE A CONTINUATION OF THE SPIRIT, DETERMINATION AND ENTHUSIASM OF THE APC.

(2) THE 1969 PROGRAM WILL BE IN TWO PHASES: ONE FROM FEBRUARY TO JUNE, AND A SECOND FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE YEAR.

(3) THE SINGLE PRINCIPLE AND EIGHT OBJECTIVES OF 1969 PLAN ARE ABSOLUTELY VITAL.

(4) 1969 IS A DECISIVE YEAR. THERE ARE FOUR MAIN GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES VITAL TO CAMPAIGN: (A) IMPROVEMENT OF RVNAF, PLUS ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL MEASURES REQUIRED ON NATIONAL LEVEL TOWARD THAT END; (B) PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT TO CONTROL 90 PERCENT OF POPULATION; (C) ELECTION OF VILLAGE AND HAMLET COMMITTEES;

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(D) LAND REFORM,

S, WHILE THE PRESIDENT WAS ENGAGED IN REVIEWING THE APC, THE CPUC HAMMERED OUT END-JUNE GOALS FOR 1969. THESE GOALS CALLED FOR COMPLETION OF WELL OVER ONE-HALF OF THE PROGRAM BY MID-YEAR. CPDC THEN INVOLVED GVN REGULAR MINISTRIES IN AN INTENSIVE REVIEW OF THESE GOALS TO DETERMINE THEIR FEASIBILITY AND TO ASSURE THAT ALL ELEMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT WERE ACTIVELY ENGAGED.

T, THE 1969 PACIFICATION EFFORT OFFICIALLY BEGAN ON 1 FEBRUARY, BUT IN REALITY NOT MUCH WAS EXPECTED UNTIL AFTER THE TET HOLIDAY IN LATE FEBRUARY. IN ADDITION, NEW 1969 CONCEPTS -- FOCUS ON THE VILLAGE, REORGANIZATION OF RD CADRE TEAMS, ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING OF PEOPLE'S SELF-DEFENSE, REJUVENATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND MOBILIZATION OF POPULAR GROUPS -- WILL REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE TRAINING EFFORT AND A LONGER THAN USUAL GESTATION PERIOD.

U, BUT FOR FIRST TIME, GVN HAS SET MID-YEAR TARGETS FOR PACIFICATION. THESE WERE PUBLISHED ON 3 MARCH AND ARE TO BE ACHIEVED BY 30 JUNE 1969.

- (1) D, E AND V HAMLETS TO BE SECURED - 1,835.
- (2) ADDITIONAL POPULATION TO BE BROUGHT UNDER GVN CONTROL 1,458,690.
- (3) ELECTION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: HAMLETS - 3,117; VILLAGES - 569.
- (4) HOI CHANH TO BE RALLIED - 15,600.
- (5) ADDITIONAL PSDF - 625,000 MORE MEMBERS TO BE ORGANIZED AND 125,000 MORE WEAPONS ISSUED.
- (6) REFUGEES TO BE RESETTLED - 594,657; REFUGEES TO RETURN TO HOME VILLAGES - 489,034.

V, THE 1969 PROGRAM IS FOCUSED ON INSPIRING POPULAR ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMUNITY GROUPS TO TACKLE THEIR OWN PROBLEMS OF DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT. IT IS ALSO FOCUSED ON REJUVENATING THE TRADITIONAL LEVEL OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT -- THE VILLAGE -- TO SERVE AS A CATALYST AND ORGANIZER OF THE LOCAL DEVELOPMENT PROCESS. THEREFORE, IN CONTRAST TO PREVIOUS YEARS, THERE IS NO EMPHASIS ON SPENDING FUNDS OR IMPLEMENTING A CERTAIN NUMBER OF PROJECTS.

W, ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT MEASURES OF SUCCESS OF THE 1969 PACIFICATION PLAN, THEREFORE, WILL BE THE DEGREE TO WHICH AUTHORITY CAN BE DECENTRALIZED TO VILLAGE AND POPULAR INVOLVEMENT IN COMMUNITY DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT CAN BE STIMULATED

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